ABA teleconference on irreparable harm in Lanham Act false advertising cases

I’ll be participating in this teleconference, 12 pm EST on December 12. 

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A case peppered with TM and advertising issues

United Tactical Systems v. Real Action Paintball, Inc., 2014 WL 6788310, No. 14-cv-04050 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2014)
UTS sued RAP4 mostly over the trademark PepperBall; the court granted a preliminary injunction based on some of its claims.  Nonparty PepperBall Technologies (PBT), a dominant player in the relevant market, sold irritant projectiles called PepperBalls: “Irritant projectiles are generally small plastic spheres that contain an irritant powder that functions similar to pepper spray [but can be shot from a distance], and are primarily sold to law enforcement and military.”  PepperBall Technologies sold live rounds in a red shell, as well as other projectiles in different colors, such as green marking rounds and clear training rounds.
PBT’s PepperBall mark became incontestable.  It developed the irritant powder, and outside manufacturers assembled it into plastic shells; one manufacturer was Perfect Circle, which made most of BPT’s projectiles for nearly 14 years. More recently, PBT used a company called APON, though it wasn’t clear whether PBT ever sold APON-made projectiles.
PBT ran into money troubles.  Perfect Circle and another company, Tiberius Arms, bought PBT’s loans and formed a new company, Advanced Tactical Ordnance Systems (ATO).  Doing business as Phoenix International, ATO bought “all the tangible and nontangible assets” of PepperBall Technologies at a Uniform Commercial Code foreclosure sale, allegedly acquiring the incontestable PepperBall trademarks, goodwill, business name, and trade secrets.  UTS alleged that ATO ensured a seamless transition, retaining most employees, trainers, and suppliers. ATO thus became the supplier of PepperBall irritant projectiles, with parent company Perfect Circle continuing to manufacture PepperBall projectiles. ATO sold standard live rounds, which were all red, and maximum strength rounds, which were half-red and half-black.
RAP4 is a competitor using marks incorporating LESS LETHAL.  Its projectiles have come from various suppliers over the years, and it generally used orange shells to indicate live rounds.  (Frankly, I would think the industry would want to settle on one universal color for live rounds, to avoid dangerous misunderstandings!)  At one time, RAP4 bought irritant projectiles from SWAT, which RAP4 alleged merged with PBT, after which RAP4 sold those projectiles as PepperBall branded products—the only time it used such branding, according to RAP4.
After the foreclosure sale, RAP4 negotiated with PBT’s former COO for an exclusive dealing agreement for RAP4 to get irritant projectiles from APON, effective April 2012.  In August, RAP4 used its website and email to announce “RAP4 Resumes PepperBall Technologies Inc. Production.”  The announcement said:
RAP4 is proud to announce the acquisition of machinery, recipes, and materials once used by PepperBall Technologies Inc., the manufacturer of Less Lethal Live Rounds that are trusted by law enforcement and military units far and wide. Now we manufacture our Less Lethal Live Rounds directly, on that original machinery, and conforming with the original specifications, to provide our customers with improved quality control uninterrupted supplies. With the inspiring success and service-proven track record of our Less Lethal Launchers, comes the need for high-quality, highly effective less lethal ammunition like that originally manufactured by PepperBall Technologies Inc.
Earlier this year, PepperBall Technologies Inc was liquidated and foreclosed by their creditors. RAP4 acted immediately through acquisition and resume [sic] the machinery, recipes, and materials required to continue production of our Less Lethal Live Rounds. That means we have direct oversight of quality control, and the ability to keep producing those less lethal rounds that have proven themselves as invaluable tools time and again. [….]
With PepperBall Technologies Inc.’s equipment, recipes, and standards integrated into our manufacturing, we will be able to offer even more innovations … and an uninterrupted supply of the less lethal rounds that our police and military customers need!
The post had pictures of RAP4’s new projectiles, which used red and red-black to indicate standard and maximum strength live rounds. A day later, RAP4 issued “clarifications” stating that “The Original Recipe and machinery to produce pepperballs was acquisitioned by RAP4 and RAP4 is now able to manufacture the original pepperball under the name of RAP4 Less Lethal.” The clarification also acknowledges that “Pepperball Technology is Forclosed [sic]” and “[a]ll rights to the name Pepperball belong to the new owners, which is Phoenix International.”  A few days later, after a C&D from ATO, RAP4 sent out another email and added another statement to its website:
RAP4 Less Lethal Live Rounds are produced by the original OEM manufacturer that once produced for PepperBall Technologies Inc. In 2012 PepperBall Technologies Inc. was liquidated and foreclosed and now PepperBall Technologies Inc. and brands belong to Phoenix International LLC. Because of this reason, RAP4 and original OEM manufacturer have been able to team up and have improved the formula and process for making Less Lethal Live Rounds. Now RAP4 is able to guarantee the highest-quality product and provide continuous availability!
Disclaimer:
— RAP4 is not associated nor affiliated with PepperBall Technologies Inc. and brands. All rights to the PepperBall Technologies Inc. and brands belong to its new owner.
— RAP4 live rounds are NOT made by the current PepperBall Technologies Inc.
Both ATO and RAP4 received communications from customers and others indicating that they believed that (1) RAP4 had purchased PepperBall Technologies, and (2) RAP4 made and sold PepperBalls. RAP4 allegedly told customers over the phone that it was PepperBall Technologies and that it sold official PepperBalls, and didn’t correct customers’ misunderstandings when they contacted RAP4.
Further developments: A preliminary injunction against RAP4 in Indiana was dissolved on appeal for lack of personal jurisdiction.  ATO stopped selling all-red PepperBall projectiles in late 2012.  UTS allegedly acquired ATO’s assets, including PBT’s assets.  UTS, operating as PBT, now sells half-red, half-white PepperBalls as well as half-red, half-black ones.  RAP4 continued to sell its PAVA Less Lethal projectiles, and added Peppershot Less Lethal projectiles.
On the Section 32 and counterfeiting claims, RAP4 contested whether ATO validly acquired the mark from PBT or UTS validly acquired the mark from ATO.  UTS didn’t submit a written assignment from PBT or from ATO.  Though assignments recorded in the PTO are prima facie evidence of execution, they aren’t conclusive; the Assignment Branch of the PTO doesn’t examine substance.  Without a written assignment of goodwill, could UTS be the “registrant” of the incontestable mark?  Some courts presume that marks presumptively pass to a buyer, absent contrary evidence. Others look for a writing, to ensure against accidental assignment, clarity of rights, and predictability/certainty of ownership.  Given this uncertainty, there were too many unresolved issues to find that UTS was likely to show that it was the “registrant” for purposes of Section 32/counterfeiting claims.
Section 43(a) claims don’t require a registration, only commercial injury.  Commercial injury is generally presumed “when defendant and plaintiff are direct competitors and defendant’s misrepresentation has a tendency to mislead consumers” (citing the 9th Circuit’s TrafficSchool.comdecision, with a see also for Lexmark).  Given the competition between the parties, UTS could sue under §43(a).
Turning first to false association: RAP4 argued that “pepperball” is generic, submitting “dozens of pages of online printouts from newspaper articles, online forums, etc., where people have used the terms ‘pepperball,’ ‘pepper ball,’ and ‘pepper-ball’ amongst other things to refer to irritant filled projectiles.”  Incontestability is no bar to a genericity finding, but registered marks are entitled to a strong presumption of validity.  (Query how this works where the court has just found that UTS can’t proceed under §32 at this point.)  The court found this issue “perplexing,” given evidence that other manufacturers used “Pepper Balls” to identify irritant projectiles.  RAP4’s evidence was “compelling” but “limited,” and some of it could be construed as referring to PepperBall branded projectiles in particular.  There wasn’t enough evidence to find genericity yet.
This wasn’t a “traditional” confusion case.  UTS alleged that RAP4 used the PepperBall mark in announcements, metatags, and “hidden text” on RAP4’s website.  RAP4 argued that its use was nominative, while UTS argued that RAP4 was using the mark to speak about its own products, not UTS’s.  The court correctly noted that New Kids also applies where “the defendant’s ultimate goal is to describe his own product.”
Starting with the last announcement, RAP didn’t falsely suggest it was sponsored or endorsed by the trademark holder.  However, it “implicated the source-identification function by essentially implying it was the new source of PepperBalls.”  The evidence showed confusion (note that the nominative fair use test does not have actual confusion as an element; New Kidsspecifically declined to consider evidence of actual confusion).  UTS cited a number of consumers writing things like: “I have received an e-mail from RAP 4 stating they are taking over your business. Is there any information you can give me regarding this email and the training and equipment we have been purchasing from you over the years?” and “What do you know about Pepperball going out of business and being purchased by another company called RAP4? Is this true and, if so, how would it affect us?”  And here we get to the incoherence of “misleadingness”: Tabariand New Kids involved truthful uses that allegedly implied sposnorship, but “[u]nlike Toyota Motor Sales and New Kids, UTS alleges that RAP4’s use of the PepperBall mark was misleading.”  Note: the only way this makes any sense is to read “misleading” to mean “false,” in that the information conveyed that these were the “real” PepperBalls was not true; it’s ordinarily unproblematic to say that facially true claims can be misleading, but New Kids takes that implied falsity off the table for a certain class of uses.
It was possible for RAP4 to refer to its own projectiles without using the PepperBall mark; even if it was using the mark to refer to its arrangements with APON and their purported connection to PepperBall products, “there is considerable dispute as to whether RAP4’s statements were true, even without considering the underlying implications of those statements.”  The court concluded that this was more false association than traditional trademark infringement, but found confusion to be likely.
The issue with respect to metatags and “hidden text” was more complicated.  After the Indiana TRO and after RAP4 removed the announcement, it still used the metatags “Pepperball Projectiles,” “pepper ball,” “pepperball,” “pepperballs,” and “Pepperball” on its website, as well as white text on a white background including “pepperball.”  (This is a terrible idea. Search engines ignore it, but courts don’t. There is no upside.)  UTS didn’t provide evidence about how these functioned, and RAP4 didn’t make any arguments either.  Brookfieldblessed the initial interest confusion, but recently the Ninth Circuit warned against finding confusion “when a consumer is never confused as to source or affiliation, but instead knows, or should know, from the outset that a product or web link is not related to that of the trademark holder because the list produced by the search engine so informs him.” Network Automation.  Using Sleekcraft, the court found serious questions going to the merits as to infringement from these uses.  Notably, the court found that intent favored UTS because RAP4 used the mark with knowledge that it was another’s trademark.  (Also of note: the court still used “serious questions going to the merits” as an alternative standard for granting preliminary relief, even after Winter.)
False advertising: RAP4’s announcements connected it with PBT and the PepperBall projectiles.  The literally true statement “PepperBall Technologies Inc was liquidated and foreclosed by their creditors,” combined with other statements, including remarks about RAP4’s “acquisition” of PepperBall’s equipment and technology, was likely to mislead consumers into thinking that RAP4’s new projectiles had the same qualities and key characteristics as PBT’s because they came from the same source.  RAP4 argued that its subsequent announcements and disclaimers showed no intent to palm off.  But even the disclaimers had a context; they said that RAP4’s Live Rounds “are produced by the original OEM manufacturer that once produced for PepperBall Technologies Inc.” The implication was that RAP4’s projectiles were, “for all intents and purposes, PepperBalls,” and RAP4 implied it had “improved” the PepperBall formula and quality control, but there was no evidence of this.
The other clarifications were no better. “It has come to our Attention that there has been some misinformation and confusion in relation to our acquisition of PepperBall Technology” insinuates that it had acquired PBT, as did the post title, “Clarification About RAP4’s Acquisition of PepperBall Technology[.]”  RAP4 said it had acquired “[t]he Original Recipe and machinery to produce pepperballs” even as it disclaimed rights in the name.
UTS showed that these statements were likely to deceive by presenting evidence from actually confused customers.  RAP4 argued that a survey was required, but intent to mislead can justify a presumption of likely deception.  (Given the clarity of the confusion evidence here, it might have been stronger to rely on the evidence of actually confused consumers to extrapolate to a significant number.)  The court found UTS’s evidence of intent compelling, given testimony that a key player knew that the use of “acquisition” was confusing.
Deception about RAP4’s ability to produce PepperBall quality projectiles, or better, would be material, given PBT’s strong reputation for quality and reliability.
As for likely injury, the Ninth Circuit has held that the risk of future harm to a competitor, plus the interest in consumer protection, means that competitors need not prove injury for a §43(a) violation.  But anyway, UTS showed likely injury: it sold PepperBall projectiles, and if consumers were misled, sales were likely to be diverted.
Results on the California UCL and FAL claims tracked the federal claims.
UTS also alleged willful infringement of its red and red/black trade dress.  RAP4 rejoined, sensibly, that “because irritant projectiles are used in high-stress crowd-control or military situations, a user needs to be able to quickly distinguish the ‘live’ projectiles from other types, and live projectiles are generally made ‘red’ in color so the users can distinguish them from the other kinds.”  While UTS had the burden of showing nonfunctionality, RAP4 provided evidence that red had utilitarian advantages; PBT’s training materials showed that color was used to signal product features.  RAP4’s witness testified that in “[r]ecent history, our clients do require that the colors be in red for live-fire for reason that they have already successfully train[ed] their personnel to identify by the colors used,” and that other manufacturers also used the color red and/or reddish-orange to identify live pepper-filled rounds.  UTS argued that one specific agency only asked for red so it could buy from US manufacturers, but it didn’t provide evidence for that claim, and even if true, other customers also required red. The Department of Justice even says “distinctive markings and colorings on the different shells would help to more reliably distinguish lethal from less lethal [munitions].”
What about alternative colors used by RAP4 and other manufacturers, like orange/white?  UTS submitted an email indicating that RAP4 selected the red and red/black color scheme “to compete with Pepperball[.]”  However, UTS didn’t show that other color schemes were salable to law enforcement or other customers who’ve come to rely on red. UTS argued that “the only advantage red and red/black projectiles offer Defendants is that it makes it easier for them to sell to departments already trained to use UTS’s system,” but that isfunctionality.  RAP4 would be at a commercial disadvantage if it couldn’t use red to identify live rounds, and red/black to identify extra strength rounds. 
PBT’s training materials, now UTS’s also constituted evidence of advertising utilitarian features, which was strong evidence of functionality.  The expense of manufacture was neutral, but in total UTS failed to meet its heavy burden of showing that red served no purpose other than identification.
UTS also alleged trademark dilution.  (Seriously?)  UTS failed, of course, to show federal fame.While UTS alleged that it and the prior owners of the PepperBall mark “have spent millions of dollars and fifteen years publicizing the mark and selling the projectiles at issue in this litigation with the PepperBall trademark,” it didn’t provide specific evidence of how that money was spent or when the mark became famous.  It didn’t explain why selling 23 million projectiles at at least $1 each would make the mark recognized by the “general consuming public.”
Trade secret misappropriation: UTS argued that RAP4 contracted with Conrad Sun knowing that he was a former PBT officer and picked his brain, but Sun wasn’t party to the litigation.  UTS argued that RAP4 misappropriated the formula/recipe for the projectiles; UTS’s customer list; and “market leads and market research.”  UTS didn’t show that the last category was proprietary, or that RAP4 possessed or used this information, or even that it was defined with sufficient particularity.  A client list can be a trade secret, but UTS didn’t provide information about how its lists were developed or how RAP4 misappropriated them.
As for the formula/recipes for the projectiles, PBT did develop a formula it considered secret and proprietary. Even its manufacturer Perfect Circle wasn’t allowed to know the formula other than what was on the material safety data sheets. UTS’s evidence indicated that secrecy was maintained throughout the foreclosure sale, and that the proprietary nature of the formula was critical in the foreclosure decision.  RAP4 argued that UTS failed to take reasonable efforts to protect secrecy: the contents of the powder were listed on the material safety data sheets posted on PBT’s website, and the recipies were in PBT’s patents.  Given that UTS didn’t dispute the existence of the patents, the court found no likely success on the merits.
Irreparable harm for the §43 claims: UTS relied heavily on presumptions of harm rejected by Winter, eBay, and Herb Reed.  However, lost control over reputation and damage to goodwill could be irreparable harm, even though speculative injury isn’t sufficient.  UTS established likely irreparable harm “because without such relief continued loss of control over its business reputation is likely.”  Several of the announcements were still online and uncorrected, and UTS was still receiving calls indicating confusion.  Ongoing confusion “is likely to contribute to loss of control over UTS’s reputation and goodwill.”  (If lost control is irreparable without more, then likely confusion is irreparable harm because likely confusion means lost control.  But the Ninth Circuit told us not to collapse the inquiries!)
UTS argued that it was being harmed because RAP4’s projectiles were inferior. This was hotly disputed, but UTS submitted a picture of leaking projectiles allegedly from RAP4.  If accurate, this evidence supported UTS’s lost control theory. 
So, UTS showed irreparable harm due to lost control over its reputation and goodwill.
Though RAP4 showed evidence that the prior injunction harmed it, that was its own fault, and it didn’t show that a new injunction would cause similar harm. The public interest was also served by enjoining confusing uses and misleading advertising.
The court therefore preliminarily enjoined the defendants from using “PepperBall” or “PepperBall Technologies” on or to refer to RAP4 or RAP4’s irritant projectiles; shipping, selling or filling orders for PepperBall projectiles; making any false statements, “directly or indirectly,” about UTS, ATO, PBT, or Phoenix International; and making any false statements about the availability of “authentic” PepperBall projectiles from UTS or PBT.

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Religion isn’t (yet) a defense to false advertising

State v. Valerie Saxion, Inc., 2014 WL 6839970, No. 02–13–00227 (Tex. Ct. App. Dec. 4, 2014)
Valerie Saxion argued that her free speech (and RFRA) rights were being violated by the state’s pursuit of claims against her and her company for the false and misleading sale of dietary supplements.  Texas sued Saxion for violations of the Texas Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (TFDCA) and the Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA), based on her claims about the ability of her dietary supplements to diagnose, mitigate, treat, cure, and prevent disease.  The state further alleged that Saxion’s promotion of herself as a “naturopathic” doctor, which Texas does not recognize, was deceptive, and stated that any use of terms like “Doctor” or “Dr.” her name on labels or advertising was false advertising.
Texas sought to enjoin Saxion from, among other things, misbranding, misrepresentation, and mislabeling by failing to disclose that claims to diagnose, mitigate, treat, cure, or prevent disease cannot legally be made for dietary supplements; representing that she had a sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation, or connection that she does not have by using the title “Doctor,” or the abbreviation “Dr.”; and making misleading claims, either explicitly or implicitly, to diagnose, mitigate, treat, cure, or prevent disease for dietary supplements through any means.  Examples of Saxion’s claims included: “CLA has been shown to have strong anti-cancer properties. Especially in inhibiting breast and prostate tumors as well as colorectal, stomach and skin cancer, including melanoma…. CLA even lowered cancer cell growth. CLA is an excellent inhibitor of tumor growth.”  The complaint also listed numerous other substances for which Saxion made numerous other equally aggressive claims.
Saxion contended that her statements were based on her sincerely held religious beliefs, though she admitted that these religious statements were “not contained on the labels of her products.”  She pointed to a book she wrote which stated:
1. Realize there is a problem! The first step to utilizing your spiritual authority over food or whatever has a hold on you is admitting you have a problem.
2. Ask for the Holy Spirit’s help! Ask the Holy Spirit to reveal anything that is not pleasing to Him. If you really want to be free, listen when he answers. You may be surprised what he reveals to you.
3. Repent! Ask the Lord to forgive you for allowing food to have such a strong hold on your life, and thank Him for [s]howing you this area of your life that needs work. Don’t beat yourself up over it. Just repent and receive God’s forgiveness and love.
…
God has placed herbs, minerals and vitamins for us to understand and utilize to maintain health and regain health[.] He [h]as instructed man through His Word on how to utilize these for our personal wellness.
Saxion sought a declaratory judgment that her rights would be violated if penalties were imposed against her, because her statements rested on religious doctrine or belief and her speech was therefore not just commercial speech.  She averred that she promoted dietary supplements to be used in conjunction with faith in God, that she was a regular on TBN’s Praise the Lord and hosted TBN’s Alternative Health, and that the attorney general’s office intended to silence her ministry and destroy her business.  Though her book told people to seek medical advice, none of the excerpts specifically mentioned the products at issue in this case, and she didn’t promote her products specifically on her shows, speaking instead of “vitamin C” and the like.  TBN apparently cancelled her alternative health programs “due to legal matters that are taking place within your ministry.” Saxion contended:
It strains credulity to imagine a person would dedicate her life to a theology contained in the book, The Gospel of Health, the A–Z Guide to Vibrant Health God’s Way, yet market her vitamins independent of any religious motivation. She does attempt to keep health claims off the labels. But maybe some do technically cross a line. She nevertheless cannot be stopped or punished. She avoids health claims on the labels to be respectful, not because she must.
Even in Texas, this did not fly.  For various reasons the procedural issues in this interlocutory appeal were tied up with the substance; Texas allows a member of the electronic or print media, or a person whose communication at issue appears in same, to appeal from an interlocutory order when the claim against it involves the free speech/free press clause of the First Amendment.  However, Saxion was not being sued by the State in the capacity of an author “or with regard to the statements made in her books and other media-related presentations but rather in the capacity of the owner of a business that manufactures and sells products that the State regulates.”  The communications at issue were labels, not libel.  “Saxion has not shown that her products’ allegedly improper and misleading labels appeared in or were published by the electronic or print media, and her own evidence shows that she kept her supplements business separate from her media activities.”  In addition, the law’s plain language didn’t include free exercise/freedom of religion claims.
Saxion claimed that the AG’s enforcement actions infringed on her free exercise rights.  If there was a burden on the free exercise of religion by interfering with an individual’s observance or practice of a central religious belief, the question was whether the burden was a substantial one, and if so, whether it was justified by a compelling governmental interest.  However, the practices challenged by the State didn’t seek to restrain Saxion from practicing any religious beliefs or expressing any religious opinions.  (This is a completely understandable conclusion, but query how it comports with Hobby Lobby: if she really has a sincere religious belief that she’s supposed to sell this stuff to cure cancer—and we’re not supposed to question her sincerity—why isn’t the state’s action suppressing a religious activity?  Of course I’d also find that there’s a compelling governmental interest—though note how, because she’s promoting these supplements to treat illness, the state doesn’t have to show that she’s wrong to show a violation of the state and federal food and drug laws.  Why shouldn’t the state have to bear that burden?)   
Tilton v. Marshall, 925 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. 1996), disallowed claims against a televangelist for conspiracy and intentional infliction of emotional distress but allowed claims with respect to fraud claims that did not involve allegedly fraudulent and deceitful presentations of religious doctrine or belief). In a plurality opinion, Tiltoncautioned that the trial court had to carefully consider each alleged misrepresentation and determine which fraud claims, if any, involved religious doctrines or beliefs, to ensure that the trier of fact did not hear evidence on them or pass on their veracity. In Saxion’s case, one of the labeling or other product-related issues involved any statements of religious belief.  Instead, the state was regulating the advertising and sale of dietary supplements “as a proper restraint on commercial speech necessary to protect the public.”  Saxion “failed to show how her religious calling to educate others on the health benefits of vitamins was substantially burdened when the part of her evidence that was undisputed by the State showed that she was able to separate her general message about vitamins and minerals from any promotion of a specific brand from her dietary-supplement business.”
Saxion had no federal RFRA claim because federal RFRA doesn’t apply to the states, and she failed to properly raise a state RFRA claim.

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B&N almost entirely off the hook for copying backpack design

Rubio v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., 2014 WL 6769150, No. 14–CV–6561 (S.D.N.Y Nov. 11, 2014)
Rubio sued her alma mater, the Fashion Institute of Technology (FIT) and Barnes & Noble, Inc. for copying her original drawing of a backpack, producing actual backpacks based on her design, and selling those backpacks using her name. Only her copyright claims survived.
Rubio studied accessory design at FIT; in 2010, she took a course in accessory drawing, one of the assignments for which was to create an original drawing for 30% of the course grade.  It was announced that each drawing would be automatically entered in a contest sponsored by defendant Barnes & Noble as part of its “Back–To–Campus” collaboration with FIT. FIT didn’t explain the terms or what would happen to the winning entry. Rubio’s drawing won.
Rubio’s drawing
B&N sent Rubio a letter in May 2011 congratulating her and announcing that backpacks based on her drawing would be sold in Barnes & Noble stores and on its website.  FIT, months later, asked Rubio to sign a consent form assigning her rights, but she didn’t.  Rubio became aware that B&N was selling backpacks based on her design with a hangtag that reads: “Backpack, FIT Fashion Institute of Technology, State University of New York, Diana Rubio, AAS Accessories Design 2011.” The description on the Barnes & Noble website states: “This canvas backpack is designed by F.I.T. student, Diana Rubio, exclusively for Barnes & Noble!”  Rubio sent a C&D in 2013, registered her copyright, and sued in August 2014.
hangtag using Rubio’s name

Backpack as sold on B&N website
The court found it plausible that defendants copied the drawing in the course of making the actual backpacks, and thus the copyright infringement claim survived to the extent that it was based on copying the drawing itself.  But there was no claim based on production of the actual backpacks, which were useful articles.  Rubio didn’t identify conceptually separable elements, and the court couldn’t either.  (Nor can I.)
Rubio’s claim for violation of her right of privacy under Section 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law was barred by the one-year statute of limitations. New York uses the single publication rule, so a claim accrues on the first day the offending material is published, not upon each subsequent publication, and she sued too late.
Her state law claim for unjust enrichment was preempted.  Rubio argued that if the backpacks were uncopyrightable, then there was no preemption, but her claim was based on her rights in her drawing.  Congress’s choice not to accord copyright protection to useful articles derived from copyrighted images meant that preemption was exactly the right result.
Rubio’s Lanham Act false association claim failed because she has not alleged that she has any commercial interest in her name. While the Lanham Act’s protections are not limited to widely known celebrities, a plaintiff has standing under the statute only if his or her identity carries some “level of consumer recognition.” Rubio alleged that she was “a young, aspiring entrepreneur and fashion designer who, while holding a day job as a skincare professional, has been in the process of designing and launching her own fashion accessories since at least 2011.” But that failed to allege that her name carried any commercial value analogous to a trademark, or that it is recognized by consumers in the relevant market. So she lacked standing to assert a Lanham Act claim for false association.  (Query whether Lexmark analysis ought to have changed this in any way.)
Nor could her Lanham Act false advertising claim survive. She didn’t plausibly allege a false or misleading statement. The only statement at issue was the description of her backpack on the Barnes & Noble websites: “This canvas backpack is designed by F.I.T. student Diana Rubio, exclusively for Barnes & Noble!”  The court found this to be true: Rubio’s own allegations established that she designed the backpack while a FIT student, for submission to B&N.  “[T]he Drawing’s multiple references to ‘B & N’ and ‘Barnes & Noble’ belie any claim that it was not made specifically for Barnes & Noble.” Thus there was nothing false or misleading about the statement.  Note: Dastar might be needed to sew up the reasoning here.  The implication—perhaps even the necessary implication—of B&N’s statement is that Rubio willingly participated/authorized B&N to use her design; that part isn’t true, but it’s (1) unlikely to be material, and (2) the kind of implication Dastar may put off limits.
There’s no question that Rubio appears to have been badly treated.  FIT should have conducted itself much better, and B&N too.  The complaint indicates that Rubio found an initial settlement offer unpleasantly low; it’s hard to know from the outside what that means, but the inability to claim statutory damages or fees based on the infringement occurring pre-registration probably affected the amount she was offered.

Posted in copyright, dastar, http://schemas.google.com/blogger/2008/kind#post, right of publicity, standing, trademark, unfairness | Leave a comment

No free lift: ad-as-contract claim survives

Kearney v. Equilon Enterprises, LLC, No. 3:14–cv–00254, 2014 WL 6769697 (D. Or. Dec. 1, 2014)
Plaintiffs sued on behalf of a proposed nationwide class for breach of contract and violations of various state consumer protection statutes.  The court denied the motion to dismiss the breach of contract claims, but found that the consumer protection claims had to be pled with particularity and weren’t.
Shell service stations displayed this ad as part of Equilon’s Ski Free promotion:  

After buying ten gallons of fuel, a customer got a voucher with the receipt.  But the voucher couldn’t be exchanged for a free lift ticket. Instead it was a two for one coupon; you could only get a free ticket by buying another at full price, and there were various other restrictions.  (Note that, regardless of the fate of this lawsuit, this promotion would appear to violate FTC and similar state rules about “free” offers; consumer plaintiffs aren’t the only worries I’d have about this promotion.)
Equilon argued that its ad lacked sufficient specificity to be an offer, and therefore there could be no acceptance or meeting of the minds. The general rule is that an ad isn’t an offer, Leonard v. Pepsico, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 2d 116 (S.D.N.Y.1999), aff’d, 210 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000), but rather requests to negotiate with incomplete terms.  But if an advertisement is “clear, definite, and explicit, and leaves nothing open for negotiation,” then the advertisement “constitutes an offer, acceptance of which will complete the contract.” Lefkowitz v. Great Minneapolis Surplus Store, 86 N.W.2d 689, 691 (1957).
Sateriale v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 697 F.3d 777 (9th Cir. 2012), considered a tobacco rewards program that offered “C-Notes” along with cigarettes; these could be redeemed for merchandise after customers enrolled in the rewards program.  After years, RJR announced that it would end the program, giving customers 6 months to redeem their C-Notes.  Then, RJR didn’t allow redemption before the program’s termination, and customers sued.  On appeal, the court found that, while the plaintiffs had not adequately alleged the existence of an offer to enter into a bilateral contract, they had adequately alleged the existence of an offer to enter into a unilateral contract. “A bilateral contract consists of mutual promises made in exchange for each other by each of the two contracting parties,” while “a unilateral contract involves the exchange of a promise for a performance.”
In light of the totality of the circumstances, the court ruled, plaintiffs accepted RJR’s unilateral offer by saving their C–Notes and attempting to redeem them in accordance with the C–Notes catalogue’s terms. The totality of the circumstances included “the repeated use of the word ‘offer’ in the C–Notes; the absence of any language disclaiming the intent to be bound; the inclusion of specific restrictions in the C–Notes; the formal enrolment process …; and the substantial reliance expected from consumers.” Consumers’ substantial reliance was important because “a member of the public is unlikely to undertake substantial reliance in the absence of a binding commitment from the offeror—i.e., on the mere chance that the offeror will perform.”
There’s an exception to the general rule that an ad isn’t an offer for rewards, including offers of a reward for the redemption of coupons. That’s because the rule arose to address the problem of over-acceptance.  The issues were whether the advertiser clearly promised to perform in exchange for something requested by the advertiser, and whether the recipient “reasonably might have concluded that by acting in accordance with the request a contract would be formed.”
Construed favorably to plaintiffs, the ad here was the sign “buy 10 gallons of fuel, get a voucher for a free lift ticket!”  Equilon “in clear and positive terms, promised to render performance in exchange for the purchase of ten gallons of fuel.”  And a recipient reasonably might have concluded that by acting in accordance with the request a contract would be formed.
Nor did the contract fail for lack of consideration.  Equilon argued that the initial purchase of fuel was a separate contract from the purchase of ten or more gallons in return for a voucher, and past consideration can’t support a contract, nor did the price of the transaction overall vary whether or not the customer got a voucher.  But that assumed a bilateral contract, not a unilateral one.  A unilateral contract can be created by performing the act requested as acceptance and consideration.  Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged consideration when they stated that they purchased ten gallons of fuel at a participating Shell station with the intention of participating in the “Ski Free” promotion.
Then the court turned to the state law consumer protection claims: were they fraud-like? Fraud can be averred by specifically alleging fraud, or by alleging facts that necessarily constitute fraud even if the word “fraud’ is not used.”  Rule 9(b) is intended to protect reputation, and to provide adequate notice.  The relevant allegations were essentially that Equilon controlled the Ski Free promotion and that it didn’t provide the promised “free” ticket.  You might wonder why the absence of any intent allegation isn’t important, especially since one of the main reasons that consumer protection laws were enacted was to avoid the stringent scienter requirements of common-law fraud.  Anyway, I do.
But not this court!  “Although Plaintiffs do not allege that Defendant had knowledge of the advertisement’s falsity or ignorance of its truth directly, Plaintiffs do allege that Defendant conducted the advertisement program and approved all the marketing activities and plans.” And we can infer that Equilon intended the ad to be relied on, as the purpose of advertising is to induce reliance.  Thus, the claims sounded in fraud and had to be pled with particularity.
Note: this goes way further than most cases applying 9(b) to state consumer protection claims. In every other case of which I am aware, the plaintiff pled deliberate falsehood, not just falsehood, at least triggering the 9th Circuit’s standard.  Liability doesn’t depend on any scienter on the defendant’s part, and screwing this offer up could be negligence, at least.  I don’t get this result at all.
Because plaintiffs alleged a unified course of fraudulent conduct and relied entirely on that course of conduct as the basis for their claim, they had to satisfy Rule 9(b), and didn’t.  The “who” was “a Shell station located within the [relevant state].” The “what” was the Ski Free ad. The “when” was “within the class period.” The “where” was also “a Shell station located within the [relevant state].” The “how” is that the class representative purchased fuel at the Shell station with the intent of receiving a free lift ticket, but was instead provided a “buy one, get one free offer” with other various restrictions.
The court found the “who” and “where” insufficient, since there might be over a hundred Shell stations within each relevant state.  Even if Equilon reviewed its advertising, it might not know with specificity which station displayed the ad.  “Overall, simply alleging a generic Shell station within the relevant state does not state with particularity who engaged in fraudulent behavior.”
In addition, the “what” was disputed.  There was the alleged ad, and if that were all that “likely” would be enough to put Equilon on notice.  But plaintiffs also alleged that there were “various other signs or indications on or about the store property indicating in large bolded lettering that free products or services were being offered by the station under the Ski Free promotion,” and that “signage was consistent with signage contained on the http://www.skifreedeals.com website for various seasons during the class period.”  That might be enough under Rule 8, but it was shaky for 9(b); the court let it skate by.  The “how” was also sufficiently alleged.
The “when” was also insufficiently specified; plaintiffs never alleged the specific dates for the class period, which might be the 2012 ski season or might not, and anyway the ski season varies in length.  The one-year statute of limitations under Oregon law might kick in, depending on the facts.
Plaintiffs did, however, adequately plead reliance and causation.

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How do you keep them in the library after they’ve seen Google?

Oral argument in the latest and possibly last round of the longstanding Authors Guild v. Google case apparently went reasonably well for Google.  I was struck by Judge Chin’s statement that his clerks use Google Books to do cite checks.  (So do I.)  If the general rule, illustrated by Sony v. Universal, that technology that judges themselves have become familiar with and find useful will not be found infringing holds here, that bodes well for fair use.

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ABA Blawg 100: submitted for your consideration

I’ve already mentioned my pleasure to be on the nominated list along with my coauthor Eric Goldman’s blog (under Tech for some reason).  Others well worth checking out in/around the advertising field include All About Advertising Law (Venable) and the FDA Law Blog (Hyman Phelps), both under Consumer Law.  Vote early and use your 13 votes wisely!

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Falsity of political ad irrelevant to constitutionality of public entity’s rejection

American Freedom Defense Initiative v. Southeastern Pennysylvania Transportation Authority, No. 2:14-5335 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 2014)
Plaintiffs sued SEPTA, arguing that it violated their First Amendment rights by refusing to post an ad on buses on the grounds that the ad was “patently false” and “offend the minimal civility standards.” The ad says: “Islamic Jew-Hatred: It’s in the Quran. Two Thirds of All US Aid Goes to Islamic Countries. Stop the Hate. End All Aid to Islamic Countries.” It also features a picture of Adolf Hitler meeting with Haj Amin al-Husseini, with the caption, “Adolf Hitler and his staunch ally, the leader of the Muslim world, Haj Amin al-Husseini.”
Scurrilous ad at issue
SEPTA’s ad standards bar “[a]dvertising that tends to disparage or ridicule any person or group of persons on the basis of race, religious belief, age, sex, alienage, national origin, sickness or disability.”  Plaintiffs successfully moved to exclude evidence of the ad’s falsity from the upcoming preliminary injunction hearing.  SEPTA wanted to submit expert testimony from Dr. Jamal J. Elias, Professor of Humanities at the University of Pennsylvania, “an eminent scholar of Islam and Muslim society.” Professor Elias concluded that referring to Haj Amin al-Husseini as the “leader of the Muslim word” was “manifestly false,” and that the statement “the Quar’an teaches Jew-Hatred” is “unfair and erroneous.”
SEPTA argued that, while laws banning false statements can violate the First Amendment (Alvarez), the issue here wasn’t a ban but a refusal to accept an ad.  It also invoked Illinois v. Telemarketing Associates, Inc., 538 U.S. 600 (2003), which held that the First Amendment does not bar fraud claims against charities for making false statements in an effort to solicit donations. Further, it argued that falsity went to defendants’ unclean hands, of relevance to injunctive relief.
This didn’t go well for SEPTA, as you can tell from the intro to the legal analysis:
Speech concerning public issues “has always rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values.” N. A. A. C. P. v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 102 S. Ct. 3409, 3425 (1982). As such, “[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion.” W. Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
Alvarez makes clear that falsity alone doesn’t make speech unprotected.  Even Alito’s dissent said that  laws restricting false statements about issues of public concern, including religion and history, would present “a grave and unacceptable danger of suppressing truthful speech.” There might be true and false statements about those things, but “it is perilous to permit the state to be the arbiter of truth.”
Here, the speech at issue is “exactly the sort of political expression that lies at the heart of the First Amendment.”  Thus, the First Amendment applied to exactly the same extent whether the speech was true or false, and Professor Elias’ conclusions were irrelevant.
Nor was this a fraudulent charitable solicitation, even though the ad listed a website that redirected to another website that actively sought donations. “The advertisement is not fairly characterized as a solicitation simply because it contains a link which redirects traffic to a second webpage which in turn allows visitors to make donations.”
Nor would falsity mean unclean hands; the ad was protected regardless of its falsity, so the desire to have the ad run as submitted wasn’t bad faith.

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B&B v. Hargis: just one reaction

When I read the SG’s brief advocating for preclusion as an ordinary result, I was concerned that there was limited understanding of what a registration/opposition proceeding actually is compared to an infringement case.  For example, the SG assumed that in every case, the right at issue in an infringement case could only be bigger than the registration, because the right might also be based on uses on goods for which there wasn’t a registration.  This is of course completely wrong: the registration covers all the goods listed, traveling in all the channels in which such goods ordinarily travel unless there’s an explicit restriction, at any price, and also covers the mark as registered and does not include matter that’s not part of the registration.  Thus, it is both possible and indeed commonplace for a registration cited as a 2(d) bar to have a bigger footprint than it would in an infringement case, where differences in actual sales channels, price, house marks, and other marketplace features that in fact distinguish the two uses in question can prevent a finding of likely confusion.  See, e.g., J.T. Colby & Co. v. Apple Inc., No. 13-2227 (2d Cir. Sept. 29, 2014) (finding no likely confusion between Apple’s iBooks mark for electronic books and plaintiff’s ibooks mark for electronic books, because plaintiff’s mark was “frequently surrounded by contextual information that associates it with a publishing company, including the publishing company’s name and location, the title of a book and its author, and other copyright information, while Apple’s mark “appear[ed] exclusively on Apple-branded hardware.”).

But it got worse at oral argument, when the Assistant SG, who I’m sure was just doing his job but seems not to be a subject matter expert, talked about the role of consumer surveys and completely misstated the law:

The only other, I think, difference or purported difference identified in one of the amicus briefs was consumer surveys and the idea that they will only accept a consumer survey where it has the word on a blank card.  That’s true ­­ you know, just the word “Sealtite” on a blank placard.  That’s true when what is sought to be registered is a word mark, not a design mark with a particular color.  The idea being that you can’t skew the survey by adding colors and things when  actually what you’re seeking registration for is just the word.
But the same thing could happen in an infringement court.  If the defendant was sued based on their registered word mark, I think a factfinder in an infringement court would say a survey that has design elements ­­ color, font, and so forth ­­ when you’re asserting the right to use this word in any context, that sort of survey is not going to be as probative as a survey that just uses the word, since you’re seeking the right to just use the word.
Unfortunately for anyone depending on the SG for guidance, that’s just wrong.  Without presenting the mark as it’s actually used in context, your survey is not worth very much and might even face exclusion, since it doesn’t test the question at issue: will this use, with all its attendant circumstances, cause confusion? See, e.g., THOIP v. Walt Disney Co., 690 F. Supp. 2d 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[T]he closer the survey methods mirror the situation in which the ordinary person would encounter the trademark, the greater the evidentiary weight of the survey results.”) (quoting 6 J. Thomas McCarthy, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 32:163 (4th ed. 2014)).

One could say that he’s talking about a defendant who has a registration (“their” word mark), but even if that’s true, he’s still wrong: the defendant’s registration, even if it can’t be cancelled, doesn’t give it the “right” to use the mark “in any context.”  Imagine, for example, Motorola using its registration of its word mark to argue that it could use McDonald’s golden arch for its M.  The defendant in an infringement case isn’t seeking the “right” to use its word mark in the abstract; it’s defending against a claim that it’s infringing somebody else’s mark, and that is a question about actual use.

Disclosure: I mooted respondent’s counsel, for which I was compensated.  My views, however, are entirely my own.

Side note: I’d be remiss not to note the classic Breyer hypo here.  

Suppose I want to [register a particular shade of green for dry cleaning pads, Qualitex] and I own the trademark, a junior person comes in and he has a different shade of green. Okay? Seems different. Can I introduce evidence that the people who use these particular kinds of dry cleaners are colorblind? And so they won’t recognize the difference. It has nothing to do with the use. It has only to do with the customers or the conditions in which they are used. Can I introduce that at the board or not?

Well, it makes more sense than the hairbrush shaped like a grape from Wal-Mart.

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Lack of affirmative statement dooms Lanham Act claim

FMC Corp. v. Summit Agro USA, LLC, 2014 WL 6627727,  No. 14–51 (D. Del. Nov. 14, 2014) (magistrate judge)
FMC and Summit Argo compete in the herbicide market.  Herbicides are sold by manufacturers to distributors, thence to retailers, thence to farmers/growers.  According to Summit Argo’s witness, this isn’t like grocery shopping; growers tend to work one-on-one with salespeople employed by retailers, or with independent agricultural consultants.  Thus, growers rarely view product packaging or labeling before buying, though sometimes they may read product labels on shipping boxes or individual jugs when shopping at a retailer.  Growers may also apply the herbicide themselves or contract with a third-party applicator; in the latter case, the grower often won’t ever see the product or its packaging.  Defendants’ expert Fowler testified that “where and how the active ingredient [in a herbicide product] was made is irrelevant to a grower’s purchasing decisions.”  He identified a number of relevant considerations, including price, expected crop value, spectrum and duration of weed control, method and timing of application, ease of use, volatility, product safety and product reliability.  Two herbicides are rarely ever equal; they offer different mixes of benefits.
FMC did provide evidence of “consumer ethnocentrism” from Professor Naveen Donthu. He testified that consumers prefer to purchase domestically-manufactured products, in order to assist the domestic economy, increase domestic jobs and further a sense of patriotism.  The largest market for herbicides in the US is Midwestern farmers. Donthu studied U.S. citizen adult consumers in the American Midwest and found that consumers who exhibited each of three “cultural variables (collectivism, masculinity and uncertainty avoidance)” reacted negatively to the perceived quality of Japanese products, exhibited less intention to purchase such products and owned fewer such products.  He also cited sources supporting claims that rural Midwesterners tend to be collectivist and uncertainty avoidant, and that a high percentage of people running Midwestern farms are men.  Thus, he opined that, all things being equal, American farmers would prefer domestically produced goods versus goods produced in China. Thus, a label falsely indicating or implying domestic manufacture would deceive consumers.
When Summit began shipping its product in mid-2013, the boxes containing the gallon jugs of the product didn’t indicate Chinese origin.  After October 2013, they did, but the actual jugs have never been so labeled.
The judge concluded that FMC didn’t identify any actionable misrepresentation, even if Summit violated the Tariff Act, which requires that “[E]very article of foreign origin (or its container …) imported into the United States shall be marked in a conspicuous place as legibly, indelibly, and permanently as the nature of the article (or container) will permit in such manner as to indicate to an ultimate purchaser in the United States the English name of the country of origin of the article.” 19 U.S.C. § 1304(a).  
First, the court rejected cases holding that violations of the Tariff Act per se violate the Lanham Act (a variant of falsity by necessary implication based on the background rule that foreign goods are labeled as such, creating the conditions under which consumers examine unlabeled goods).  See, e.g., Alto Prods. Corp. v. Ratek Indus. Ltd., No. 95 Civ. 3314 (LMM), 1996 WL 497027 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 1996). Alto held that “[l]ogic dictates” that a consumer viewing such a label will necessarily “assume that [the goods] are American-made, thus creating a likelihood of confusion with goods which are, in fact, American-made,” and that this was material.
But §43(a) imposes no affirmative duty of disclosure; it requires a “false designation of origin” that amounts to a “misrepresent[ation],” which “appears to require that a defendant make an actionable affirmative statement in order to have violated the statute.”  A statement is actionable if it’s misleading or untrue as a result of failure to disclose a material fact, but “in and of itself an omission is insufficient; the plaintiff must also point to an actionable affirmative statement in order to breathe life into such a claim.”
Moreover, the judge didn’t agree with Alto’s reasoning about what a consumer looking at an unlabeled good would necessarily think, given that foreign-made goods are often sold in the US.  (But they are sold labeled, which is the point.  A product on the shelves at Target is presumptively new; a product on the shelves at Goodwill is presumptively used.  Context provides important information.  I find Alto’s reasoning—“this is an X” presumptively communicates “this is an X made in the US” unless otherwise labeled—persuasive.)  At the very least, since this is implied, actual evidence of consumer deception would be required.  Plus, if a violation of the Tariff Act automatically violated the Lanham Act, that would conflict with the idea that there’s no private cause of action for violations of the Tariff Act.
The jug labels at issue didn’t have literally false statements of origin.  True, the label said “Distributed by: Tenkoz, Inc. 1725 Windward Concourse, Suite 1410 Alpharetta, GA 30005[.]” But this was literally true.  Nor did it necessarily imply US origin of the active ingredient.  Instead, consumers would have to make a number of mental leaps to conclude that US-based distributors distribute only US-made goods.
Without a survey or other evidence of actual deception, FMC couldn’t win.  Its expert declaration wasn’t enough.  Professor Donthu didn’t speak to whether any Midwestern farmer was actually confused or would be confused by a similar label.  Instead, Donthu focused on Midwesterners’ desire to buy American.  His declaration assumed a label falsely implying American origin.  Plus, the evidence cut against the idea that farmers even see the labels before buying; Summit’s evidence was more detailed on this point.  The record evidence indicated that, while some farmers read product labels before purchase, mostly they don’t.  Unread labels couldn’t deceive a substantial portion of the intended audience.  (Seems like there’s a theory here for deceiving the consultants and third parties who guide farmers’ purchases.)
Also, FMC didn’t show materiality.  Donthu’s conclusions relied on an earlier article he wrote, but that article examined Midwesterners generally, not farmers or agricultural employees, or even businesspersons.  It looked at their views about cars and consumer electronics, not herbicides or agricultural products, and it related to Japanese origin, not Chinese, around 2005, not 2013.  Donthu conceded that these differences could be significant. Plus, Donthu wasn’t an expert on farmers, and he relied on data “presented at a high level of generality,” such as data for all US farmers instead of those who purchased the relevant products.  This was significant because the evidence indicated that herbicide purchases depend on a number of specific factors; “when Kasper, FMC’s Commercial Director, was asked at his deposition to identify important factors going to farmers’ herbicide purchasing decisions, he did not even mention country of origin as one such factor.”  And Donthu’s ultimate conclusion relied on all other things being equal, which they weren’t when herbicides were at issue.
Thus, FMC didn’t show likely success on the merits.  For much the same reasons, the judge recommended granting Summit’s motion to dismiss—FMC didn’t plead an affirmative misrepresentation.  This also doomed the Delaware Deceptive Trade Practices Act claim, and the common-law unfair competition claim failed to allege a particular valid business relationship with which Summit interfered.

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