Good Meat Project v.
GOOD Meat, Inc., — F.Supp.3d —- , 2024 WL 1083462, No. 23-cv-04145-RFL (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2024)
GMP is a nonprofit
focused on sustainable butchery and meat production practices. It provides
farmers, ranchers, and butchers with marketing education and technical
assistance; incubates “Meat Collectives” across the country; and educates
consumers about responsible meat production and consumption practices. GMP owns
two federally registered trademarks: the “GOOD MEAT” standard character mark
and the “GOOD MEAT BREAKDOWN” design mark.
GMI is a food
company which produces and sells cultivated, lab-grown meat from extracted
animal cells. GMI removes embryonic
fertilized chicken eggs, minces the tissue and places the cells in culture,
grows cells in culture, and then 3D prints the cells into shapes resembling
cuts of chicken. Eat Just, GMI’s parent company, filed an ITU for a stylized
GOOD Meat mark in 2020; in 2021, defendants entered into agreements granting
their security interests in the intent-to-use application to a third party, and
also Eat Just assigned the entirety of its business having an interest in the GMI
mark to GMI. A notice of allowance issued in 2022.
The court denies a
preliminary injunction on the trademark claims based on lack of likely success
on the merits, but declines to dismiss either infringement or false advertising
claims. The false advertising claims are based on the allegation that the
defendants falsely advertise and promote their cultivated meat products as
“real meat, made without … taking a life” by “painlessly extract[ing] cells
from an egg or living animal.”
Likely success on
the merits: Strength was the sticking point. GMP was entitled to a strong but
rebuttable presumption that the GOOD MEAT mark is inherently distinctive
because the PTO registered the mark without requiring GMP to show secondary
meaning. GMI successfully rebutted this presumption by showing, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that the mark was merely descriptive, putting the burden back
on GMP to show secondary meaning.
Under both tests
used by the Ninth Circuit—the imagination test and the competitive need test—“good
meat” was descriptive of GMP’s services:
Customers do not need to exercise their imaginations to understand that
the term “GOOD MEAT,” as applied to educational services, refers to education
concerning “responsible” consumption of animal meat: that is, meat that
consumers can feel good about eating. There is little-to-no mental leap
required to understand that GOOD MEAT describes GMP’s services. Indeed, the
evidence shows that, in ordinary parlance, the term “good meat” is used
routinely to refer to the concept of sustainably sourced meat.
The court noted that
the fourth Google result for “good meat” is a book titled Good Meat: The
Complete Guide to Sourcing and Cooking Sustainable Meat. This title was
probative of how the term “good meat” is used in ordinary speech and
demonstrated the descriptive nature of the term. So too with the competitors’
needs test. GMI identified, two LinkedIn pages run by international companies
selling food products, GoodMeat and Good Meat Co.; the aforementioned book; and
USPTO records showing over 570 live registered trademarks using the term “good”
to describe meats and processed foods. Though registrations and foreign uses
aren’t use in the US, “these examples are not being used to show a crowded
trademark field or the extent of use in the term in the domestic market; they
are used to show how difficult it is to market goods and services that support
sustainably or responsibly sourced meat without using the term ‘good meat.’”
With the burden back
on GMP to show secondary meaning, it didn’t do so. There was no evidence that
consumers viewed the term “good meat” as referring a single source: that is,
GMP. This actually should have ended the inquiry: no mark, no trademark
infringement. But the court treated it as weighing against likely confusion.
GMP argued that it
had organized Meat Collectives in numerous states and has promoted its services
in various states, but didn’t offer evidence of how its efforts have been
received in the actual marketplace. Its evidence was insufficient to gauge the
mark’s commercial strength.
GMP then argued a
reverse confusion theory, but there the important question is “whether the
junior mark is so commercially strong as to overtake the senior mark.” [Again,
reverse confusion shouldn’t be available where there’s no mark, and probably
not even for a descriptive mark, given the risk that the adopter took on of
choosing a descriptive term.] But there wasn’t evidence that the “mark” had
been completely overtaken. For example, GMP was the sixth result in a Google
search for “good meat,” behind two results unrelated to either GMP or GMI. [Query
how personalization of search results affects this metric.]
Proximity of the
goods: They were similar at a high level of abstraction. But GMP offers
services, while GMI sells goods. “GMP focuses on butchering, slaughter, and the
development of Meat Collectives. It provides educational services to butchers,
ranchers, farmers, and consumers interested in sustainable meat production.
GMI, by contrast, sells a food product that explicitly avoids butchering,
ranching, and farming.” Disfavored confusion.
Mark similarity: “Visually,
the marks are similar. Aurally and semantically, they are identical.” Favored
confusion.
Actual confusion: A
GMP board member claimed to have received a LinkedIn message from students at
an Italian university who mistakenly believed they were contacting GMI. “The
Ninth Circuit has found mistakes made by a single retailer and single customer
insufficient to support a showing of actual confusion. Other courts in this
District have also found even stronger evidence of this type to be similarly
unpersuasive.” This was even weaker evidence, given that the alleged confusion
wasn’t among “industry journalists or the vendors that are GMP’s target
customers.” Moreover, the evidence was even less compelling in light of the
passage of time: if GMI had, as GMP alleged, flooded the online market with
advertising, only one example of actual confusion disfavors a finding of likely
confusion.
Marketing channels: “Merely
showing that both businesses advertise on the internet is insufficient to show
marketing channel convergence.” The marketing was otherwise quite distinct: GMP
markets principally to ranchers and farmers, while GMI markets cultivated meat
products made without ranching or farming. Disfavors confusion.
Degree of customer
care: The record was mixed.
Ranchers and farmers are likely to exercise high levels of care in
seeking out training programs and networking opportunities, but members of the
public interested in sustainable meat practices may be less discerning.
Likewise, GMI’s products are relatively cheap — its cultivated meat product is
served as part of a tasting menu that costs only $70 despite being offered by a
famous chef — but also cater to a relatively niche group of consumers who may
exercise greater care in their meat consumption.
Neutral.
GMI’s intent: There
was no evidence that GMI intentionally selected its mark to capitalize on GMP’s
goodwill or to “palm off” its goods as that of GMP, or intended to flood the
market (or that GMI should have known of the mark and disregarded the risk of
reverse confusion).
Likely expansion of
product lines: “Given their antithetical
targets, it seems unlikely that the GMP and GMI would expand into each other’s
marketing channels.…There is little risk that GMP will begin creating any
lab-based meat product, and it is equally unlikely that GMI will begin
providing educational services related to farmed and butchered meat.”
In essence, the same
analysis applied to the GOOD MEAT BREAKDOWN mark, except that that mark was
more dissimilar to GMI’s mark, which outweighed the greater conceptual strength
of “good meat breakdown” and design.
Also, the length of
time that GMP waited before seeking relief undercut any finding of imminent
harm. GMI sent a C&D to GMP in April 2022 (whoops!) but did GMP didn’t
sue until sixteen months later, then waited two more months before filing for
preliminary relief. Also, GMI recently withdrew its application to sell its
cultivated meat products in the domestic marketplace, further undercutting the
idea that harm is imminent. The court also considered GMI’s investment of millions
in its branding and advertising as weighing against relief.
Nonetheless, the
complaint sufficiently alleged infringement. For purposes of a motion to
dismiss, GMP alleged that its mark was valid and infringed.
False advertising: GMP
plausibly alleged that consumers could understand “GOOD Meat” and “real meat”
to mean meat from a once-living animal, or that consumers could believe that
GMI’s cultivated meat products are developed entirely from chemical or
plant-based sources, not from the use of an embryonic, fertilized egg. GMP also
sufficiently alleged competitive injury “as its consumers may mistakenly
believe that GMP endorses GMI’s statements and approach to food production, and
resultingly decide to stop using GMP’s services.” [Notably, while false
advertising doesn’t require competition, this particular theory of competitive
harm seems parasitic on the infringement claim, and would have to fail if there
was no likely confusion even if there was falsity.]
GMP also stated a
plausible claim for declaratory judgment that GMI’s mark was deceptively
misdescriptive. However, it didn’t plausibly allege that the mark violated the
Lanham Act’s anti-ITU-trafficking rule. Even if the ITU was used as collateral
for a loan, “[a] security interest in a mark, as collateral for a loan, does
not fall within the plain language of section 1060(a). It also does not raise
the policy concerns that underlie the Lanham Act’s anti-trafficking provision.”
With no allegation of actual default or transfer to a lender, the claim was
dismissed with leave to amend.
from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2024/04/good-meat-is-descriptive-for.html
Rebecca Tushnet 