consumer false advertising plaintiffs can’t use surveys the way competitors can

Sinatro v. Barilla America, Inc., No. 22-cv-03460-ASK (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 30, 2026)

Deception of a substantial number of reasonable consumers,
even well less than a majority, can be the basis of Lanham Act liability. But consumer
protection cases have difficulty handling this, and so they make up
all-or-nothing tests. Here, that means nothing.

closeup on challenged claim

Sinatro sued Barilla for the usual California claims, alleging that the claim “Italy’s #1 Brand of Pasta” on its boxes deceived consumers into thinking it was made in Italy from Italian ingredients when, in fact, that pasta was made in the United States from non-Italian ingredients. (This claim has now been removed.) On each of the relevant boxes, the side label with nutrition facts also included the representation “Made in the U.S.A. with U.S.A. and imported ingredients” in white text directly beneath Barilla’s name and location, which are statements required by FDA regulation.

side disclosure

nutrition panel

In Sinatro’s survey, 57 percent indicated that the statement “does communicate” that “[t]he product’s ingredients are sourced from Italy,” 32.3 percent indicated that the statement “does not communicate this,” and 10.7 percent selected the “Don’t know / not sure” option. A separate conjoint survey found a 9.9% price premium associated with the claim.

plaintiffs’ survey prompt

Barilla’s survey replicated Sinatro’s but included five—instead of just one—possible interpretations. In response, 84.0 percent of respondents answered affirmatively for “[t]he brand is the most popular pasta brand in Italy,” while 42.3 percent did so for “[t]he product’s ingredients are sourced from Italy.” Perhaps unsurprisingly, Barilla’s surveyor decided to remove certain “inattentive” or “confused” respondents from the sample, reducing the 42.3 percent “from Italy” figure to either 34.2 or 27.5 percent, depending on how you counted, whereas the 84.0 percent “most popular” figure remained nearly unchanged (dropping only to 83.5%).

Barilla survey prompt

I would note that these reduced figures are more than enough to win a Lanham Act false advertising claim. Also, the reduction came from counting misunderstandings of other claims, which is one way of declaring a bunch of actual consumers to be unreasonable. (The 34.2 percent figure comes from eliminating respondents who indicated that a “[n]on-GMO” label means that the product is gluten free, while 27.5 percent comes from eliminating these same respondents and also those who indicated that the Challenged Representation means that “[t]he brand is the oldest producer of pasta in Italy.”)

Did the survey even matter? Front-of-product deception is actionable under consumer protection law despite qualifiers on the side panel, but only if the front is “unambiguously” deceptive. This isn’t the Lanham Act concept: a front label is not “ambiguous” “simply because it is susceptible to two possible meanings” but rather “when reasonable consumers would necessarily require more information before reasonably concluding that the label is making a particular representation.” That is, reasonability is interposed as a separate, normative screen, regardless of what a substantial number of consumers actually think.

The court excluded plaintiff’s survey under Daubert. (Again, there’s plenty of Lanham Act precedent, but courts tend not to cite across regimes, which given the different meanings of “ambiguous” is probably overall a good thing, though a comprehensive harmonization would also be welcome.) The court found the consumer perception survey biased (and also criticized the conjoint analysis because it “impermissibly measures the undifferentiated impact of all interpretations of the Challenged Representation without isolating the impact attributable to only misleading interpretations”).

The survey asked only whether the package conveys that “[t]he product’s ingredients are sourced from Italy,” and provided only three possible responses: an affirmative answer, a negative answer, and “[d]on’t know / not sure.” This was biased because by only asking that one question, the survey steered respondents “to that very meaning and gives them no opportunity to indicate other meanings.” This seems inconsistent with most Lanham Act survey cases, which generally (1) allow questions about specific messages, at least after an initial “did the ad say anything about?” question, and (2) treat offering yes/no/not sure options as enough to avoid impermissible leading.

The court also held that the survey “fails to capture the possibility that respondents understand the Challenged Representation to have multiple meanings,” and thus couldn’t assist the trier of fact.  The don’t know/not sure option wasn’t enough because the survey design “bias[es] the survey by suggesting to respondents, at least implicitly, that they should believe there is at least some sort of relationship between the different items when the possibility might not even have occurred to the vast majority of consumers who see the items.”

Survey respondents who answered [the] question affirmatively might have never made an association with Italian ingredient sourcing had the survey not fed it to them. And respondents who normally would think the statement means something else entirely may have abandoned that opinion upon intuiting from the survey itself what they should take the Challenged Representation to mean. A “[d]on’t know /  not sure” option does not negate such effects, because the question by its design elicits them before respondents even go to choose an answer.

Query: Under this analysis, is any closed-ended question allowable?

Without the survey, “no reasonable juror could conclude on the remaining record evidence that ‘members of the public are likely to be deceived.’” Named plaintiffs’ testimony wasn’t enough because, “[a]lthough surveys and expert testimony regarding consumer expectations are not required, a few isolated examples of actual deception are insufficient.”

To the extent that the words “Italy’s #1 Brand of Pasta” make a claim about brand—namely, that Barilla is the foremost brand of pasta in Italy—undisputed record evidence showed that Barilla had leading market share, and the court also found this the most plausible meaning.

So, would consumers necessarily require more information before concluding that the pasta was Italian in origin? The court rejected the most “plaintiff-friendly” reading of 9th Circuit precedent, which would find ambiguous only those labels that “ma[k]e no representation at all” or, like “Nature Fusion,” “[are] so devoid of any concrete meaning that there [is] nothing from which any inference could be drawn or on which any reasonable belief could be based.” That would make ambiguity essentially a puffery defense. The court wasn’t willing to do that; to do so would mean finding the front label ambiguous “because it is at least amenable to the (undisputedly false) meaning that the Plaintiffs here advance—i.e., that the pasta is made in Italy with Italian-sourced ingredients.”

But using this standard “would effectively mean that any label susceptible to at least one concrete false meaning would be actionable.” [Note that this is in fact the rule in Lanham Act cases, where a substantial number of reasonable consumers would receive this message as shown by acceptable evidence of actual consumer reception. This is because Lanham Act plaintiffs are allowed to aggregate consumer behavior even if we accept substantial variation among consumers; probabilistic liability is ok for them, whereas consumer plaintiffs must rely on a presumption that all consumers are likely to be deceived, so courts set the standard higher (even though that’s not strictly logically entailed).] Anyway, to do so would be inconsistent with Trader Joe’s, which found that “100% New Zealand Manuka Honey” could support multiple meanings, including such false meanings as “that its contents were 100% derived from the Manuka flower.”

Thus, Barilla’s front label was ambiguous, and the survey, even if admissible, didn’t address ambiguity and even reinforced the conclusion that the brand popularity meaning was the predominant one.  “[A] reasonable consumer would necessarily require more information before concluding that the statement should instead be understood to mean something else entirely. Accordingly, Barilla has made no ‘unambiguously deceptive’ claim.” And the side label clarified US origin, making it not misleading as a matter of law.

The court further justified its holding as providing an easily administrable rule to lower courts and clear guidance to retailers. “[S]ellers may have confidence that so long as they do not make ‘unambiguously deceptive’ statements on their front labels, they may rely on their back and side labels to clear up misunderstandings.” And if consumers unreasonably persist in being fooled, so much the worse for them!

from Blogger https://tushnet.blogspot.com/2026/10/consumer-false-advertising-plaintiffs.html

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Schedule A false advertising TRO dissolved for the defendants who showed up

Kiel James Patrick, LLC v. Partnerships & Unincorporated
Associations Identified on Schedule A, 2026 WL 3015613, C.A. No.
25-cv-633-MRD-AEM (D.R.I. Oct. 7, 2026)

KJP filed a Schedule A claim against a bunch of defendants
for false designation of origin/false advertising; many defaulted, while two
answered and got the TRO against them dissolved.  

KJP sells seasonal and festive sweaters; defendants sell
competing sweaters. The defendants argued that particularized review of the claims
against them was appropriate; KJP disagreed, arguing that the defendants
delayed unduly and pointing to the allegations the court had previously
accepted in granting and extending the TRO, which thereby became a preliminary
injunction. The court was not impressed by KJP’s argument.

False designation of origin: KJP failed to show that the
answering defendants used its photos. KJP alleged that, even if they didn’t copy
the photos exactly, they re-generated them using AI. (Why this would violate
the Lanham Act, especially given Dastar, is left as an exercise for the
reader.) The basic problem was that there was no evidence “that the challenged
images were copied from [KJP’s] website, altered from [its] photographs, or
generated by AI to impersonate [it].” Instead, the answering defendants offered
product-image evidence from an “independent sourcing agent, 1688.com,” as their
source. “A review of Plaintiff’s website further reveals that the images
submitted by the Answering Defendants look dissimilar to Plaintiff’s
advertising materials, even if there is some similarity between the sweaters.” That
similarity wasn’t confusion about origin.

False advertising: This was the same theory that defendants
used KJP’s advertising materials, particularly its website images, without
permission. KJP argued that defendants sold “imitation” products. But that’s
not a false representation, nor does it show consumer deception. “Furthermore,
there is no evidence on the current record that the Answering Defendants copied
Plaintiff’s trademarks or made a particular claim about their products that is
verifiably false or misleading.”

As Eric Goldman has often noted about Schedule A cases,
these allegations, at least as to these defendants, should have been thin
enough to deny the TRO; the plaintiff apparently didn’t supply convincing
pictures even when challenged to do so.

from Blogger https://tushnet.blogspot.com/2026/10/schedule-false-advertising-tro.html

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dismissal of NYC’s consumer protection claims against fossil fuel companies affirmed

City of New York v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 2026 WL 3023932, Appeal
No. 6583, — N.Y.S.3d —- (App. Div. Oct. 8, 2026)

False advertising claims against fossil fuel companies for
contributing to climate change are hard to win. The City alleged that
defendants engaged in “deceptive … trade practice[s]” proscribed by the
City’s Consumer Protection Law (CPL) “by misrepresenting the purported
environmental benefits of using their fossil fuel products” (“product
greenwashing”) and “by creating a misleading impression of the role of
renewables [i.e., renewable energy] in their businesses” (“corporate
greenwashing”). The appellate court affirmed the dismissal
of the claims
.

Product greenwashing: The alleged deceptiveness came from
failure to disclose that fossil fuels contribute to climate change, but the
connection was already public information. If, as alleged, consumers care about
fossil fuels’ contribution to climate change, they couldn’t be duped by failure
to disclose. This was true even if the court didn’t apply the reasonable
consumer standard but rather the older standard: the effect the statement would
have upon a consumer falling within the ranks of “the ignorant, the unthinking
and the credulous who, in making purchases, do not stop to analyze but are
governed by appearances and general impressions.” “Because the statements at
issue disclose that the improved products are gasoline, even unsophisticated
consumers – given the City’s foundational assumption of near-universal
understanding of the link between gasoline use and climate change – would
necessarily understand that use of the improved products contributes to climate
change.” Comparative statements that improved products would produce fewer emissions
than other gasoline products could not “lead even an incautious consumer to
understand defendants to be representing that the environmental impact of use
of the new products to power private vehicles would be comparable to the impact
of taking public transportation, bicycling, walking, or using electric or
hybrid cars.” Nor were defendants required to quantify the reduction in
emissions in their ads. “Nor has the City come forward with evidence that the
reduction in emissions made possible by the gasoline products at issue is so
minute, as compared to other gasolines, as to be legally insignificant.”

As to the corporate greenwashing claim, the court concluded
that the complaint did not sufficiently allege that the statements were “made
in connection with the sale” or “offering for sale” of “consumer goods or
services” “because none of the clean alternative energy products referenced in
the statements were sold to consumers, either in New York or anywhere else.”

Although the CPL bans conduct that “has the capacity,
tendency or effect of directly or indirectly deceiving or misleading consumers,”
“[e]ven an allegation that a statement has the tendency to indirectly deceive a
consumer must still be ‘made in connection with the sale’ of a consumer good or
services” to fall within the scope of the prohibition.

from Blogger https://tushnet.blogspot.com/2026/10/dismissal-of-nycs-consumer-protection.html

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would-be competitor lacks Lanham Act standing

Onego Bio Inc. v. Clara Foods Co., 2026 WL 3033777, No.
1:25-cv-01131-JDW (D. Del. Oct. 9, 2026)

Onega Bio sought a declaratory judgment that defendant EVERY’s
patent covering recombinant ovalbumin protein was invalid and unenforceable and
that Onego didn’t not infringe the patent, but there was no imminent,
substantial controversy between the parties. I’ll focus on the also-failed
Lanham Act false advertising claim.  

Onego, according to the complaint, “specializ[es] in the
production of animal-free egg proteins through precision fermentation” and
“aims to revolutionize the food industry by offering sustainable and ethical
alternatives to traditional egg products.”

“In 2024, Onego secured funding to scale-up production and
expand its market presence in North America.” It plans to build a
130,000-square-foot facility in Wisconsin to produce its protein product. “As
part of Onego’s expansion efforts in the United States, Onego has shipped its
protein products here.”

EVERY competes in the market for animal-free egg proteins (using
yeast instead of Onego’s fungi). EVERY allegedly made false representations
about its own product by claiming in press releases and presentations that the
egg protein it makes is “equivalent,” “bio-identical,” and “nature-equivalent”
to what is found in natural eggs, while allegedly EVERY’s egg protein in fact contains
up to 13 amino acids not found in natural egg protein, including amino acids
from yeast proteins.

The court held that Onego lacked statutory standing; it didn’t
plead injury to commercial sales in more than conclusory fashion. The complaint
didn’t allege that Onego makes or sells its products in the United States.
Shipping protein products into the US wasn’t enough, given that Onego hadn’t
even broken ground on its planned production facility.  “At most, Onego’s allegations suggest that it
hopes to enter the U.S. market and become EVERY’s competitor. Thus, there is no
basis for me to presume that Onego suffered a commercial injury.”

Nor did reputational harm claims fare better. Onego didn’t
plead facts supporting its assertion that EVERY’s claims about its own product harmed
Onego’s reputation. Nor did alleged risk to the egg protein replacement market
as a whole state a cognizable injury, even if that market is nascent.

from Blogger https://tushnet.blogspot.com/2026/10/would-be-competitor-lacks-lanham-act.html

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candy buyers fail to allege difference between pumpkin & Jack-o’-lantern shape

Vidal v. Hershey Co., No. 24-60831-CIV-DAMIAN, 2026 WL
2730302 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 16, 2026)

Reese’s Peanut Butter Pumpkins with carved face on package
actual candy

There’s a Reese’s Peanut Butter pumpkin. It was advertised with a Jack-o’-lantern package, but the actual pumpkin-shaped chocolate had no such face. The package that says, in all capital letters: “DECORATING SUGGESTION.” (So you’re supposed to carve off little strips of chocolatey coating? With what tools? Hope your house is really cool, given the pliability of the coating at room temperature!) It is possible to make chocolates with molds that would give them Jack-o’-lantern faces.

Jack-o’-lantern molds for candy

 Plaintiffs sued for false advertising under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA).

The court found lack of standing due to lack of injury in fact. “A plaintiff may establish a concrete injury-in-fact under a benefit-of-the-bargain theory by showing that they paid for a product but received something of lesser value or that was completely worthless.” FDUTPA “does not provide for the recovery of nominal damages, speculative losses, or compensation for subjective feelings of disappointment.”

Plaintiffs didn’t that the Reese’s Peanut Butter Pumpkins they purchased were not edible or that they suffered any side effect, health issue, or harm from consuming the product. Nor have did they allege that the sale of the Peanut Butter Pumpkins was illegal. So there was no benefit-of-the-bargain injury.

This was true even though plaintiffs alleged that they purchased the products at issue “for the novelty/party-display value of the depicted faces, not merely for generic chocolate-and-peanut-butter candy.” Still, “their only injury is their subjective disappointment.” And the disclaimer “DECORATING SUGGESTION” was next to the image of the carved chocolate pumpkin; while the product may not have the “cool looking carving of a pumpkin’s mouth and eyes,” it does have “a novel pumpkin shape.”

A price premium theory also failed despite allegations that, “[i]n retail commerce, Reese’s Peanut Butter Pumpkins are priced higher per ounce than regular Reese’s Peanut Butter Cups across mainstream retailers and the manufacturer’s website.” But they only alleged a price premium at Target, Walmart, and Hershey’s, not at Publix where they bought. (This seems like a perfectly reasonable inference, though, and plaintiffs did allege that this was representative. Ah, the manipulability of Twiqbal.) But also, that still didn’t show economic injury, because plaintiffs still received candy actually shaped like pumpkins, which could also justify a price premium.

from Blogger https://tushnet.blogspot.com/2026/09/candy-buyers-fail-to-allege-difference.html

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Amicus in section 230 false light case

 The EFF, Eric Goldman, Jess Miers, Mark Lemley, and I filed a brief in Does 1-10 v. Freesites in the Fourth Circuit, arguing that context–the other third-party content surrounding a post–cannot be the basis for a false light claim against a host site. 

from Blogger https://tushnet.blogspot.com/2026/09/amicus-in-section-230-false-light-case.html

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Amicus in Rise & Shine

 I’ve submitted a brief on behalf of trademark scholars in support of neither party.

Summary of argument:

The issue before the Court is whether trademark strength in a likely confusion analysis is a question of fact or a question of law, but this question actually bears on the confusion inquiry as a whole. Sometimes, factual issues predominate in this consideration, but sometimes legal issues do.

This conclusion may sound surprising given the phrase “likelihood of confusion,” which sounds empirical. The full version of the standard—likely confusion among a substantial number of reasonable consumers—clarifies that normative legal judgments (what is substantial, what is reasonable, and what constitutes confusion) are crucial to infringement inquiries. Infringement inquiries therefore are mixed questions of law and fact in which legal analysis can often predominate.

The hallmark of fact finding that deserves appellate deference and clear-error review is individualized adjudication. The multifactor framework to assess likelihood of confusion that courts have regularly used in the 80 years since the enactment of the Lanham Act involves propositions that sound factual, but that have never—not in this case, nor in any other—been tested by factfinding at the district court level.

This includes the question of trademark strength. The theory that “suggestive marks are conceptually stronger than descriptive marks with secondary meaning, thus favoring the plaintiff more in the confusion inquiry,” is not an “adjudicative fact” found by the factfinder based on individualized evidence.

Contrary to some suggestions in Petitioner’s brief, conceptual strength inquiries do not involve direct investigation of consumer understanding of the extent to which a word functions to indicate source when applied to a product. Conceptual strength is partly empirical (involving an assessment of, inter alia, dictionary definitions and other marketplace uses) and partly a matter of prediction about whether people will need to use “imagination and thought” to connect a word with the goods or services at issue. No trademark is “suggestive” or “descriptive” as a state of nature; Judge Friendly accepted that his division was “rough[]” at best. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).

Furthermore, the propositions that suggestive marks are “stronger” than descriptive marks with secondary meaning, and thus that, all else being equal, a mark’s status as suggestive makes confusion more likely than if it were descriptive, are broad claims about reality.

Courts evolved the multifactor confusion test over time, and they are still adding variations for new situations—as they should be. As with many torts, the existence of trademark infringement (given a set of adjudicative facts) is a classic mixed question of law and fact. No resolution of this case should treat either likelihood of confusion or trademark strength as a purely factual question.

from Blogger https://tushnet.blogspot.com/2026/09/amicus-in-rise-shine.html

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it’s hard to get rid of a foreign TM owner’s complaint at the motion to dismiss stage despite territoriality

Honest Greens Barcelona, S.A.U. v. Poky’s LLC, 2026 WL
2593358, No. 4:24-cv-07023-JD (D.S.C. Sept. 2, 2026)

Honest Greens operates restaurants in Spain and Portugal
under the HONEST GREENS name and related marks; it owns registrations for
HONEST GREENS in several foreign jurisdictions, and allegedly developed
substantial goodwill through restaurant operations, advertising, digital
platforms, and social media. It also alleged “substantial contact with United
States consumers” by selling meals to customers from the US. It also alleged
that it marketed its services to United States consumers; received tens of
thousands of visits to honestgreens.com from United States IP addresses; since
2021, has attributed at least seven percent of its sales to customers using
United States-based credit cards; identified more than 36,000 United
States-based users who have downloaded its mobile app; and has approximately
8,000 United States-based users following its HONEST GREENS Instagram account. The
app permits users, including travelers in the United States, to place an order
in advance for collection at one of HG’s European restaurants.

Poky’s allegedly uses the domain name <honestgreens.us>,
a website, a mobile application, and the Instagram username HONESTGREENS.US to
promote a Myrtle Beach restaurant operating under the HONEST GREENS name. The
complaint alleged consumer confusion, including a message asking, “Same menu as
honest greens abroad?” and another reporting, “I’ve placed this order but it
got sent to the wrong location in Myrtle Beach.”

For statutory standing, Poky’s noted that HG didn’t allege
that a consumer chose Poky’s Myrtle Beach restaurant instead of an Honest
Greens restaurant in Spain or Portugal, and that one or two instances of online
confusion are too isolated to establish a plausible causal connection with harm
to HG. This might be true later on, but at the pleading stage HG did enough. It
alleged a US-facing commercial reputation as well as injury to that reputation
from the allegedly confusing restaurants, which sufficed for proximate
causation.

Although Belmora cautioned that “[a] few isolated
consumers” who merely confuse a domestic mark with one seen abroad, without
additional misleading conduct, would rarely state a viable claim,” HG alleged
additional conduct including use of the .us domain when HG’s identical .com
domain was unavailable for the same general category of restaurant services and
an alleged specific intent to deceive consumers as to source or sponsorship. “Whether
Plaintiff can prove intentional copying, meaningful United States goodwill, or
material confusion is a later question.”

Poky’s also argued that, without US restaurants, HG could obtain
neither an injunction (Dawn Donut) nor damages. True, the relevant cases
make geographic market separation “highly relevant, particularly to likelihood
of confusion and territorial injunctive relief, but they do not establish the
categorical rule Defendant proposes.” Again, a motion to dismiss did not
determine whether the evidence could ultimately show “sufficient confusion,
market penetration, or reputational injury.”

However, because false advertising requires more evidence
than trademark infringement, the false advertising claim failed. The complaint
didn’t identify a false or misleading statement of fact or a misrepresentation
of a specific characteristic or quality, nor did it allege materiality. 

An ACPA claim over the domain name also survived because the
complaint plausibly alleged a bad faith intent to profit. At this stage, it was
enough to allege Poky’s knowledge of the mark, intent to infringe, and
confusing similarity, even though Poky’s use of the domain name to operate a
real restaurant “may be relevant to the totality of the circumstances and to
Poky’s contention that it is a legitimate concurrent user.”  “[T]he pleaded consumer diversion facts, not
mere knowledge of the .com domain or similarity of names, are what permit the
ACPA theory to survive at the pleading stage. Whether the proof ultimately
shows only ordinary infringement rather than cybersquatting remains for the
developed record.”

And HG didn’t need to plead a South Carolina registration to
bring common-law claims.

from Blogger https://tushnet.blogspot.com/2026/09/its-hard-to-get-rid-of-foreign-tm.html

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dct strikes down California’s new recyclability law on vagueness/1A grounds

California League of Food Producers v. Bonta, 2026 WL
2055589, No. 3:26-cv-01675-WQH-BLM (S.D. Cal. Jul. 14, 2026)

Trade associations challenged a California law about
recyclability claims; the court found it unconstitutionally vague and also
unconstitutional under Central Hudson. Basically, the law provided that
using a recycling symbol would be deemed deceptive or misleading “unless the
product or packaging is considered recyclable pursuant to statewide
recyclability criteria and is of a material type and form that routinely
becomes feedstock used in the production of new products or packaging.” Something
would be deemed recyclable if it was collected by jurisdictions including least
60 percent of the population of the state and processed by facilities that
serve 60 percent of recycling programs statewide. But the standards for “routinely
becoming feedstock” and other key terms were too vague, even for an economic
regulation; there was no scienter requirement to mitigate its harshness. The
state’s own reporting disclaimed comprehensiveness. Defining a consumer good as
“recyclable” if it can be “conveniently recycled” in California counties with
more than 300,000 people offered no guidance as to what recycling programs
satisfy the “conveniently recycled” requirement. Reference to outside guidance
like the Basel Convention also wasn’t specific enough to provide guidance.

Reference to the APR Design Guide for plastic packaging “does
not correspond to other language in the statute because a product or package
design that is ‘detrimental to recycling’ or ‘needs improvement’ may reasonably
be understood as precluding recycling of that material”—or not. “Constitutional
concerns regarding fair notice and standardless enforcement are heightened here
because, under California law, the APR Design Guide provision may be enforced
by private individuals and local governmental actors and may result in criminal
sanctions.” Plus, the Guide described itself as “dynamic” and subject to change
as “packaging technologies evolve.” “Manufacturers are left without statutory
guidance not only as to whether their compliance will be measured at the time
of design, manufacture, or sale of their packaging, but also without reliable
information regarding which version of the APR Design Guide will apply. The
record indicates that the APR Design Guide has been repeatedly revised after
the enactment of [the new law].” Even if the date of design was key, there was
vagueness in determining when a package was “designed.”

Similarly, requirements that “plastic products and
non-plastic products and packaging” must be “designed to ensure recyclability
and [must] not include any components, inks, adhesives, or labels that prevent
the recyclability of the product or packaging” were too vague. Determining what
“prevented” recyclability requires consideration of not only recycling
technologies, but also whether it is “economically feasible” for recycling
facilities to ultimately process those materials into feedstock. The court
severed all the challenged provisions.

Unsurprisingly, then, the Central Hudson challenge
also succeeded. The law directly regulated commercial speech: “environmental
marketing claim[s], whether explicit or implied” related to products and
packaging.

The legislature couldn’t just declare use of recyclability
claims inconsistent with the government’s definition of recyclability to be
inherently misleading. [Now do gas mileage calculations.] In the context of recyclability,
where there were a lot of variables about local practices, the term was only
potentially misleading, not inherently misleading.

California identified two primary government interests:
reducing consumer confusion and improving recycling rates. These were
substantial.

Did the regulation directly advance those interests? “To
satisfy its burden, California must provide evidence establishing that the
harms it recites are real and that its speech restriction will significantly
alleviate those harms.” However, this does not “require that ‘empirical data
come … accompanied by a surfeit of background information … We have
permitted litigants to justify speech restrictions by reference to studies and
anecdotes pertaining to different locales altogether, or even, in a case
applying strict scrutiny, to justify restrictions based solely on history,
consensus, and ‘simple common sense.’ ”

Under Ninth Circuit precedent,

[A] state can invoke ‘common sense’
only if the connection between the law restricting speech and the government
goal is so direct and obvious that offering evidence would seem almost
gratuitous. But as the government’s justifications for a regulation become more
attenuated, bare appeals to common sense quickly veer into impermissible
speculation. In such cases, the state needs to provide evidence to substantiate
that its law will meaningfully further its stated objectives.

Plaintiffs argued that uncertainty would chill recycling
claims, contrary to the state’s objective. California responded that it was
trying to address a different problem: “cross-contamination in recycling
streams, which makes recycling less effective.” This process “weakens the
recyclables market” by increasing the cost to reclaim materials and reducing
the value of contaminated “plastic lots.” But the record didn’t support the
government’s position that enforcement would reduce the total amount of
material that is deposited into landfills.

The evidence showed that “California faces serious
difficulties in efficiently recycling consumer products and packaging, at least
with respect to those made of plastic.” And there was evidence that “consumers’
attempts to recycle materials, especially plastic bags, are detrimental to the
recycling process because—as a matter of practice—recycling facilities are
unable to process these materials and turn them into feedstock that can become
new products and packaging.” Thus, “elimination of contaminated materials from
recycling streams would benefit the operations of recycling facilities and
result in a greater portion of their collected materials being turned into
feedstock. But the evidence in the record indicates that … this benefit to
recycling facilities would come at the cost of increasing the amount of
materials placed in landfills.” Plaintiffs submitted declarations from members
stating that the law would require them to omit truthful statements regarding
recyclability from their products and packaging, which will result in materials
that would otherwise be recycled going to a landfill. California conceded that
this would be a short-term effect, but argued that manufacturers would respond
by redesigning; this was speculative given manufacturers’ declarations that
instead recycling claims would be omitted entirely. “While these declarations
are self-serving, Defendant offers no evidence to counter them.”

What about consumer confusion? Plaintiffs argued that
consumers would be deprived of “accurate, qualified recycling instructions” for
products and packaging that are capable of being recycled. True, there was
evidence that consumers lack adequate information about which products to
recycle. And the court assumed that “consumers read and consider recyclability
claims on products and packaging during their purchasing decisions and at the
time that they discard the products and packaging.” But the record was conflicting
on whether the law would improve accuracy. Presumably, standardizing the
requirements would “facilitate California consumers’ ability to trust that, if
a product or package is labelled as recyclable, it will be recycled and turned
into feedstock if they place it in the appropriate bin.” And information about
recyclability is presumably difficult for consumers to obtain without relying
on manufacturers’ representations. But there was also evidence that
manufacturers would forgo some recyclability claims, leaving consumers with
less information, including “truthful and genuinely helpful information, such
as a listing of which areas accept the product or package for recycling and
which do not.” [Do such packages with lists actually exist?] And the law “would
still leave consumers in dark about whether a package or product marked as
recyclable is genuinely recyclable in the consumers’ area—i.e., whether the
consumer is in the portion of the state (which can be up to 40%) which does not
accept the material for recycling.” Ultimately, the consumer understanding
claims were too speculative to support the law.

It followed that narrow tailoring was also not present.  The law failed to leave “breathing room for
manufacturers to provide qualified information about their products and
packaging,” such as “[n]ot recyclable in most areas; check locally” or a QR
code on the packaging with “details regarding the product’s recyclability.”
This meant that the provisions of the law that survived vagueness did not
survive Central Hudson.

from Blogger https://tushnet.blogspot.com/2026/09/dct-strikes-down-californias-new.html

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look, there’s a lawsuit: bad claim against comedian leads to anti-SLAPP award

Morake v. Mwanyenyeka, No. 2:26-cv-02795-JLS-AS, 2026 WL
2548629 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2026)

Noted because, well, it’s an unusually bad claim. Morake is
the creator and original performer of “Nants’ingonyama bagithi Baba,” the
opening chant from Disney’s The Lion King. Mwanyenyeka is a “comedian and
content creator” who appeared on a podcast, where he asserted that
“Nants’ingonyama bagithi Baba” means “Look, there’s a lion. Oh my god” in the
Zulu language. This went viral, and he repeated the joke at various comedy
clubs. Morake alleged that this was false and that the true
translation of “Nants’ingonyama bagithi Baba” is “All hail the king, we all bow
in the presence of the king.”

Morake sued for violation of the Lanham Act, defamation,
trade libel, and tortious interference. Mwanyenyeka filed a motion to strike
under California’s anti-SLAPP law, and then Morake dropped all the state claims
in an amended complaint.

The amended complaint now argued false advertising and false
affiliation focused on Mwanyenyeka’s “online
storefront marketing an ‘It’s a Lion’
line of apparel and goods derived
from Plaintiff’s composition.” (Sighs in Dastar.)

Because this sequence showed that Mwanyenyeka was the
prevailing party on the state claims, the court awarded $39,560 in fees.

from Blogger https://tushnet.blogspot.com/2026/08/look-theres-lawsuit-bad-claim-against.html

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