Grand Theft Auto online delay not actionable

McMahon v. Take–Two Interactive Software, Inc., No. EDCV 13–02032, 2014 WL 324008 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2014)

Plaintiffs brought the usual California claims based on plaintiff’s advertisements for Grand Theft Auto Vvideogame as including an online multiplayer component, even though they began selling GTAV on September 17, 2013, without making GTA Online available until October 1, 2013.

The court rejected T2’s standing argument—plaintiffs adequately alleged that they lost money or property because they wouldn’t have bought the game when they did if they’d known the truth—but dismissed the complaint anyway. This wasn’t a loss of use claim, but rather an economic injury: they got less than they paid for (and lost the time value of the money). Likewise, though injunctive relief was unavailable, their restitution claims weren’t fatally flawed.  While loss of use can’t support restitution because it doesn’t represent a benefit to the defendant, plaintiffs’ request for refund for the money they paid for the online feature would count as restitution.

The complaint failed, however, to allege fraudulent, unlawful, or unfair conduct.  T2 argued that before release, it made widely reported public announcements of the true launch date and that the packaging explicitly stated that “access to special features … may not be available to all users.”  The court rejected the first argument—media reporting can’t fix misleading statements on packaging—but accepted the second. The package doesn’t indicate that online play would be immediately available.  Though it prominently stated “Featuring Grand Theft Auto Online,” it also stated that “[a]ccess to special features [defined to include online play] may require internet connection, may not be available to all users, and may, upon 30 days notice, be terminated, modified, or offered under different terms.” “These disclaimers clearly indicate that the online component of GTAV is a ‘special feature,’ which ‘may not be available to all users.’”  This broad language provided clear notice that online play, “despite its prominent highlighting on the packaging, may not be immediately available, regardless of the reason for the unavailability, even from the time of the initial release of the game.”  Thus, the packaging wasn’t plausibly deceptive.

As a result, plaintiffs couldn’t plead actual reliance.  The “immediate cause” of the loss wasn’t a misrepresentation, but their own incorrect conclusions. Given that they claimed to be dedicated video game players, “their reliance upon Defendants’ alleged misrepresentation on the packaging and their conduct in purchasing GTAV were ‘in the light of [their] own intelligence and information … manifestly unreasonable.’”

There was also no unlawfulness.  There could be no CLRA violation because software and online services aren’t “goods” or “services” covered by that law.  Nor was there unfairness. Though the caselaw is unsettled about the meaning of “unfairness” in consumer cases, plaintiffs couldn’t satisfy any of the tests.  Though T2 could have done more to notify purchasers of the October 2013 launch of online play, the disclaimers were adequate, not “oppressive,” and T2 didn’t cause substantial injury to consumers.  Because online play was a special feature that could always be unavailable, its initial unavailability “could not have represented a substantial injury to customers, as subjectively significant the feature may have been for Plaintiffs.”

Amendment would be futile, so complaint dismissed with prejudice.
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Insurer’s Lanham Act claim against broker proceeds through necessary implication theory

New Jersey Physicians United Reciprocal Exchange v. Boynton & Boynton, Inc., No. 12–05610, 2014 WL 317179 (D.N.J. Jan. 28, 2014)

Plaintiff NJ PURE sued defendants for false advertising under the Lanham Act, libel, slander, and violations of the NJ Insurance Trade Practices Act; the court dismissed only the last.  Plaintiff is a nonprofit that sells malpractice insurance to physicians and other potential policyholders. Defendant is an insurance broker in the business of soliciting, advertising, and obtaining clients for plaintiff’s for-profit competitors.

Defendants allegedly libeled and slandered NJ PURE in oral and email exchanges with its prospective clients, and falsely advertised by issuing “Marketplace Updates” to prospective clients which offer misleading or false comparisons of NJ PURE’s financials with those of for-profit competitors served by defendants. Essentially, the Marketplace Updates allegedly highlighted as significant certain of NJ PURE’s financial indicators and statistics which are not relevant to the financial health of a nonprofit reciprocal exchange, but are relevant to its for-profit competitors (defendants’ clients).  This allegedly gave a false or misleading impression of NJ PURE’s relative inferiority and undesirability as a malpractice insurer to potential clients.

The Lanham Act claims: Defendants, somewhat surprisingly, didn’t argue standing.  Instead they challenged whether their emails/statements constituted “commercial advertising or promotion,” because they were individual instances of communication instead of disseminated to a widespread market segment.  But NJ PURE alleged a much larger scheme carried out by email and other media; “information and belief” was appropriate at this stage, before discovery.  (Also surprising: that defendants didn’t focus on the part of the Gordon & Breach test that requires competition between the parties—though there is obviously a solid case for competition here, in that defendants seem to make more money when plaintiff makes less and vice versa.)

Next, defendants argued that NJ PURE didn’t allege literal falsity, and also didn’t allege that consumers were actually misled, and thus the complaint failed.  NJ PURE pled both falsity and misleadingness; whether the statements in the Marketplace Updates were literally true was a factual question.  Also, NJ PURE’s main theory was falsity by necessary implication: by comparing data side by side when that data was only relevant for for-profit firms, “coupled with explanatory paragraphs which explained the significance of the financial indicators in such a way that was true for Plaintiff’s for-profit competitors, but not true for a non-profit entity such as Plaintiff,” the statements as a whole were literally false.  This sufficiently pled literal falsity by necessary implication: the Updates allegedly conveyed the message that NJ PURE wasn’t financially sound “as clearly as if it had been stated directly.”  There was no need to evaluate misleadingness.

The libel and slander claims were also sufficiently pled.  NJ PURE alleged pecuniary harm in the form of loss of former policyholders, delays in obtaining new policyholders and the loss of prospective contracts with potential policyholders.  New Jersey’s Supreme Court has made clear that presumed damages are available in private defamation cases, so NJ PURE didn’t have to plead special damages; nominal harm sufficed.

The Insurance Trade Practices Act claim was dismissed because there’s no private cause of action under that law.  There’s precedent that a violation of ITPA can found an unfair competition claim, but that’s not what NJ PURE’s complaint pled.
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Matthew Rimmer on fair use

Matthew Rimmer takes a closer look at fair use, with reference to Naomi Novik’s testimony at the recent congressional hearing.  One reaction I’ve seen to the hearing, which is something I noticed at the time, is that there weren’t any tech industry representatives–Google etc. got plenty of criticism, and a bit of defense from Peter Jaszi, but tech isn’t Peter’s central focus.  So in that respect, the hearing did not hear from everyone with a vital interest in fair use.  Individual artists need fair use, and they need intermediaries to have fair use too; their interests aren’t opposed, but they aren’t exactly the same either.

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Sony data breach case stripped down but not gone

In re Sony Gaming Networks And Customer Data Security Breach Litigation, No. 11md2258, 2014 WL 223677 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2014)

Venkat Balasubramani’s take.  These consolidated cases arose from a criminal intrusion into Sony’s online gaming system. Plaintiffs alleged that Sony failed to provide reasonable network security, including utilizing industry-standard encryption, to safeguard the personal and financial information stored on Sony’s network.

Sony’s online services allow people to play games, and for a fee to access additional content, including games and movies; they can also access other services such as Netflix on their Sony PlayStations consoles.  Acessing the services required agreeing to Sony’s Terms of Service and providing Sony with personal identifying information, including names and credit card information.  Hackers accessed millions of customers’ data in April 2011, which Sony allegedly didn’t disclose for a while, though it took the network offline a few days later and kept it down for almost a month while it audited the system.  During that time, plaintiffs couldn’t use Sony’s online services, and many couldn’t access the third party services either.  Sony allegedly continued to misrepresent the circumstances of the breach and didn’t inform the public about the breach in one variant of its serices for roughly ten days.  Then it made a public statement that user personal information had been compromised, and encouraged those affected to “remain vigilant, to review [their] account statements[,] and to monitor [their] credit reports.”  Sony allegedly admitted that its failures “may have had a financial impact on our loyal customers. We are currently reviewing options and will update you when the service is restored.” Further, Sony conceded that some games couldn’t be played offline.  A week later, Sony took a different service offline and announced that it too might have been compromised.  Sony ultimately announced that it would provide US users with free identity theft protection services and certain free downloads and online services.

The named plaintiffs suffered service interruptions and some alleged that they bought credit monitoring services to protect themselves or suffered unauthorized credit card charges.

There are 51 counts in this multidistrict complaint; they can be grouped as: (1) negligence; (2) negligent misrepresentation; (3) breach of express warranty; (4) breach of implied warranty; (5) unjust enrichment; (6) violation of state consumer protection statutes; (7) violation of the California Database Breach Act; (8) violation of the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act; and (9) partial performance/breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

The court reaffirmed its holding that the plaintiffs had Article III standing: the dissemination of their sensitive personal information increased the risk of future harm. Clapper v. Amnesty International, 133 S.Ct. 1138 (2013), didn’t change that, although that case found that the plaintiffs there hadn’t alleged sufficient injury to challenge FISA surveillance because they hadn’t shown that targeting of their communications was “certainly impending” (subsequent revelations might affect one’s evaluation of this argument), and because the costly and burdensome measures they’d taken to protect confidentiality couldn’t themselves establish standing.  The court here found that Clapper didn’t impose a new requirement, just rejected “a speculative chain of possibilities based on potential future surveillance.”  Here, there was an alleged wrongful disclosure, which was enough for standing—plaintiffs alleged a “credible threat” of impending harm.

The negligence claims lost for various reasons.  For example, though plaintiffs alleged a brief delaby between the intrusion and Sony’s consumer notification, they failed to allege that their injuries—credit monitoring services, loss of use and value of the services, and/or diminished value of their game consoles—were proximately caused by the allegedly untimely delay.

The court found that commercial entities had a legal duty to safeguard a consumer’s confidential information entrusted to them using reasonable security measures, including industry-standard encryption, under California and Massachusetts law.  However, the economic loss doctrine precluded recovery; plaintiffs didn’t allege a “special relationship” with Sony beyond those envisioned in everyday consumer transactions, so they couldn’t avoid the economic loss doctrine.

As for negligent misrepresentation/innocent misrepresentation/negligent omission claims, they went down for various reasons (e.g., negligent misrepresentation is not available in Ohio for non-business-based claims), primarily because the misrepresentation claims were based on statements in user agreements/the privacy policy, which were presented to plaintiffs after they bought their consoles.  Thus, they couldn’t plausibly allege pecuniary loss as a result.

The user agreements required California law for the breach of warranty claims, which kicked out more causes of action based on the laws of various states; implied warranty claims also failed because of the existence of an express agreement disclaiming implied warranties, and because network services aren’t “goods” under the UCC.  The existence of a valid contract also doomed various unjust enrichment claims.

As for the consumer protection claims: Begin with California, and of course with standing, which requires injury in fact/economic injury caused by the unfair business practice or false advertising that is the gravamen of the claim.  The court found that plaintiffs adequately alleged harm stemming from Sony’s omissions at the point of purchase.  Though the network was free/plaintiffs registered after acquiring their consoles, plaintiffs alleged that access to the network, and internet access via their consoles, was a key feature of the consoles.  They further alleged that if Sony had disclosed that the network wasn’t reasonably secure, or that it didn’t use industry-standard encryption to secure their personal information, they wouldn’t have bought, or would have paid less for, the consoles.  Although plaintiffs couldn’t have reasonably relied on the post-purchase-disclosed user agreement/privacy policy, they could have relied on the alleged fraudulent omissions.

But did plaintiffs plead with particularity? While no reasonable consumer would believe that Sony promised to provide continued and uninterrupted access, plaintiffs suffficiently pled that Sony misrepresented that it would take “reasonable steps” to secure their personal information, and that Sony used industry-standard encryption “to prevent unauthorized access to sensitive financial information.”   Though Sony disclaimed perfect security, deceptiveness was a question of fact given Sony’s representations about industry-standard encryption.  The fraud-based omission claims were also sufficiently pled (relating to Sony’s failure to tell consumers it didn’t have adequate safeguards in place, failure to immediately notify consumers of the intrustion, and failure to disclose material facts about the security of its network).  Plaintiffs also sufficiently alleged a basis for restitution—Sony benefited financially from the sale of consoles based on fraudulent omissions.  However, UCL/FAL claims for injunctive relief failed for want of specificity.  Sony argued that the CLRA didn’t apply to registration for free network services, but omissions at the point of console purchase were a different matter.

Florida (FDUTPA): Dismissed for want of actual damages, which means a difference in market value of service delivered versus market value in the condition in which it should have been delivered.  The Florida plaintiffs didn’t allege that they wouldn’t have bought their consoles but for Sony’s deceptive conduct, and they failed to allege that a reasonable person would’ve behaved differently at the point of purchase absent the challenged conduct; plaintiffs’ allegations were about the post-purchase user agreement and privacy policy. Consequential damages are unavailable in Florida, so what plaintiffs paid for third party services disrupted by the security problems was unrecoverable.  And disclosure of personal information wasn’t actual damage, since personal data doesn’t have an apparent monetary value that can be priced. However, the Florida claims for declaratory/injunctive relief survived, despite the privacy policy’s disclaimer of perfect security. Again, Sony allegedly warranted that it would take “reasonable” security measures and use industry-standard encryption, but didn’t; this created a factual issue.

Michican’s Consumer Protection Act: essentially the same result.  (This opinion is a bear, but the judge did not take any shortcuts; each state’s law is specifically considered, even though the results are pretty much in tandem.)

Missouri Merchandising Practices Act: Claim survived, for reasons similar to those offered for California.

New Hampshire Consumer Protection Act: Claim for statutory damages survived, as the NHCPA “does not require a showing of actual damages for the claimant to be awarded the statutory minimum and attorneys’ fees.” Literally true but misleading claims are actionable, and the necessary “rascality” was sufficiently alleged here; the New Hampshire Supreme Court has upheld a NHCPA claim when a defendant “made representations [ ] knowing that he lacked sufficient knowledge to substantiate them.”  However, statutory damages were disallowed in the absence of actual damages in the class action context. Plaintiffs failed to allege actual damages resulting from Sony’s alleged material misrepresentations, so the class action allegations were dismissed, but not claims for injunctive relief.

New York Deceptive Practices Act: Dismissed for lack of actual injury caused by Sony’s alleged material misrepresentations.  Lost privacy/value of personal information stemming from a data breach wasn’t enough, at least where the loss was unintentional rather than intended by the defendant.  See the Florida analysis for the court’s treatment of the rest of the claimed harms, which also led to dismissal of the Texas claims. Comment: despite differences in courts’ wording of the test, these states and many others have basically the same rules. This suggests that courts should be more willing to entertain multistate class actions, with some grouping when necessary.

Ohio consumer protection statutes: Because the “vast majority of federal courts and all lower state courts to address the issue have concluded that relief under the [Ohio Deceptive Trade Practices Act] is not available to consumers,” the court found that plaintiffs lacked standing.  As for the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act, consumer class actions require that the defendant’s alleged violation be “substantially similar to an act or practice previously declared to be deceptive” by the Ohio Attorney General or an Ohio state court, and plaintiffs couldn’t meet that standard.

The damage claims under the California Database Breach Act were dismissed (no damages caused by delay in notice) but not the injuctive relief claims.  Sony wasn’t a consumer reporting agency and therefore couldn’t violate the Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act.  Finally, the court allowed a claim for partial performance/breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing to go forward, based on allegations that Sony didn’t perform under a settlement agreement between the parties.
Posted in california, consumer protection, contracts, http://schemas.google.com/blogger/2008/kind#post, standing | Leave a comment

Digital Copyright book: discount offer from publisher

Description from the publisher:

NEW 4TH EDITION
Digital Copyright
Law and Practice
By Simon Stokes
 
The first edition of this book in 2002 was the first UK text to examine digital copyright together with related areas such as performers’ rights, moral rights, database rights and competition law as a subject in its own right. Updated editions have included the UK implementation of the 2001 Information Society Directive and commentary on user-generated content and the development of Web 2.0 and beyond. Now in its fourth edition, the book has been updated and revised to take account of legal and policy developments in copyright law and related areas, in particular the increasing role of the Court of Justice of the European Union in shaping EU copyright law. 
 
The book helps put digital copyright law and policy into perspective and provides practical guidance for those creating or exploiting digital content or technology, whether in academia, the software, information, publishing and creative industries, and other areas of the economy. The focus is on the specifics of the law in this area together with practical aspects, including precedents and precedent checklists dealing with common digital copyright transactions. The latest edition has been expanded to include a discussion of Open Access, eBooks and app development and licensing. Both academics and practitioners will find the book an invaluable guide to this rapidly developing field of law.
 
The Author
Simon Stokes is a solicitor and a partner with Blake Lapthorn and a Visiting Research Fellow at Bournemouth Law School.
 
Published January 2014
310pp    Hbk   9781849464024
RSP: £45 / €58 / US$90 / CDN$90
Discount Price: £36 / €46.40 / US$72 / CDN$72
 
UK, EU, ROW: If you would like to place an order you can do so through the Hart Publishing website (link below). To receive the discount please quote the reference ‘STOKES4’ in the voucher code field and click ‘apply’.
 
US: If you would like to place an order you can do so through the Hart Publishing website (link below). To receive the discount please quote the reference ‘STOKES4’ in the special instructions field on the credit card screen.
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Harvard Law Review Symposium on Freedom of the Press

Copied from Balkinization.

Harvard Law Review Symposium 2014: Freedom of the Press

A conference in celebration of the 50th anniversary of
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).

February 15, 2014
Harvard Law School
Austin North

8:45 Breakfast

9:20 Introduction:

Mark Tushnet
Harvard Law School
“Reflections on the First Amendment and the Information Economy”

9:45 Panel 1:

Susan Crawford
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law
“First Amendment Common Sense”

Comments by Stuart Benjamin (Duke)

10:55 Panel 2:

Sonja R. West
University of Georgia School of Law
“Press Exceptionalism”

Comments by RonNell Andersen Jones (BYU) and by David Anderson (University of Texas)

12:10 Lunch

1:10 Panel 3:

Marvin Ammori
Fellow, New America Foundation
“Free Speech Lawyering in the Age of Google and Twitter”

Comments by Marjorie Heins (Free Expression Policy Project) and by Jonathan Zittrain (Harvard)

2:35 Panel 4:

Rebecca Tushnet
Georgetown University Law Center
“More than a Feeling: Emotion and the First Amendment”  (As it turns out, my paper is in the “one of these things is not like the others” category, but I hope it builds on Sullivan as well.)

Comments by Caroline Corbin (University of Miami)

3:45 Panel 5:

Jack Balkin
Yale Law School
Old School/New School Speech Regulation

Comments by Yochai Benkler (Harvard) and by Dawn Nunziato (George Washington University Law School)

5:00 Break

5:10 Open Panel

Posted in first amendment, http://schemas.google.com/blogger/2008/kind#post, my writings | Leave a comment

News for storage jars: the real scandal in Virginia is the supplement

So Slate says, citing the FDA’s warning that the supplement the McDonnells helped tout is being unlawfully marketed.

Posted in fda, http://schemas.google.com/blogger/2008/kind#post | Leave a comment

9th Circuit makes trademark fair use even more confusing

Aaargh. A great case for Bill McGeveran’s claim that trademark defenses have grown so rococo that they can be detrimental to legitimate uses.

Experience Hendrix L.L.C. v. Hendrixlicensing.com Ltd, Nos. 11-35858 (9th Cir. Jan. 29, 2014)

Defendant Pitsicalis, who licensed copyrights in some images of Hendrix, was found liable for trademark infringement for some Hendrix-related conduct.  (The court also upheld Washington’s right of publicity law that grants rights of publicity to everyone, domiciliaries or not, within Washington’s borders—another reason the Supreme Court should fix this metastasizing right, and quickly.)  On appeal, Pitsicalis challenged only the determination that the domain names hendrixlicensing.com  and  hendrixartwork.com infringed  Experience  Hendrix’s  trademark  “Hendrix.”   He argued that his use was nominative.  The district court found  that  Pitsicalis used “Hendrix”  in his  domain  names  to  refer,  not  to  Experience  Hendrix’s products  (as  the court of appeals said was  required  for  a  nominative  fair  use  defense),  but only  to  Pitsicalis’s  own  product  or  service,  licensing  and marketing  Hendrix-related  goods  (which  is  not  protected under  the  nominative  fair  use  defense).  “On appeal,  Pitsicalis does  not  argue  that  his  domain  names  refer  to  Experience Hendrix’s products.  Nor does he contend that Jimi Hendrix is  Experience  Hendrix’s  product.”    (Citing  Cairns  v.  Franklin Mint  Co.,  292  F.3d  1139  (9th  Cir.  2002).)  Pitsicalis didn’t raise a descriptive fair use defense (probably because it’s so messed up in the 9thCircuit after the KP Permanent remand), which would deal with a use of a mark to describe only the defendant’s own goods.  Affirmed.

But this is nonsense: raising the nominative fair use defense inherently makes the point that Jimi Hendrix is both a fact-in-the-world and a trademark, just like the New Kids, just like Princess Diana.  In neither of those cases did defendants refer to the goods or services the plaintiff was selling under the mark; they used the names at issue to refer to the entities named, just as here.  Defendant’s service might have been licensing Hendrix-related goods, but the reference to Hendrix contained in his domain names was nominative: a reference to Jimi Hendrix the person, to whom the trademark also pointed.  This seems to be some weird “use as a mark” concept, not fully spelled out and therefore left around like a loaded gun to damage some other fair use.
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Strict liability for misleading advertising in Europe

Interesting post from Lewis Silkin about the UK’s ASA versus the EU Court of Justice: the former allowed an advertiser to rely on a third party’s representations (I think that’s a bit of a simplification–the third party was the complainant who objected to a characterization taken from its own website! I don’t know that the ASA would allow reliance on a totally unconnected third party) while the latter didn’t allow an advertiser to rely on claims that it was the exclusive provider of certain booking services despite having contracts that purported to make it the exclusive provider, when it turned out that some of its partners had ignored the exclusivity provision.  Due diligence, Lewis Silkin concludes, is likely to be insufficient if you’re wrong.

This is the US result under the Lanham Act and most consumer protection statutes, too, though I would expect that concepts of standing would also play a big role here; it is extremely unlikely that a hotel would be able to challenge a hotel information site under the Lanham Act, though trade libel would be a possibility depending on the particular facts.  (The post points out that materiality would be an issue in Europe, as it would be here too–the ASA evaluated whether the claim that a hotel provided complimentary toiletries was misleading, which is maybe not the most significant of claims.)

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Nontransformative, commercial use of earnings call was fair

Swatch Group Management Services Ltd. v. Bloomberg L.P., No. 12-2412 (2d Cir. Jan. 27, 2014)

Swatch sued over Bloomberg’s 2011 posting of the recording of a conference call at which Swatch executives discussed the company’s recently released earnings report with invited investment analysts.  “Swiss law permits public companies to hold this kind of earnings call with a limited group of analysts, provided that the company does not disclose non-public, significantly price-sensitive facts during the call.”  About 132 of 333 invited financial analysts joined the call, and a vendor recorded the entire call, while an operator affiliated with the vendor welcomed the analysts to the call and told them, “This call must not be recorded for publication or broadcast.”  The Swatch executives “provided commentary about the company’s financial performance and answered questions posed by fifteen of the analysts.”  The call lasted 132 minutes, and the executives spoke for 106 of them.

Bloomberg, though not invited, obtained a sound recording and written transcript of the call and made them available online, without alteration or editorial commentary, to subscribers to its online financial research service, Bloomberg Professional. Bloomberg touts Bloomberg Professional as “[a] massive data stream” with “rich content” that is “unparalleled in scope and depth” and is “delivered to your desktop in real time,” as well as “access to all the news, analytics, communications, charts, liquidity, functionalities and execution services that you need to put knowledge into action.”  

Swatch sued for infringement, then applied for registration for the sound recording of the earnings call; after discussion with the Copyright Office, registration was granted only for statements made by Swatch executives, not statements by the operator or questions from the analyst.  Swatch’s infringement claim went only to the sound recording, not the transcript, pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 114(b), under which only actual sounds fixed in the recording are protected by the sound recording copyright; Swatch apparently conceded that the transcript was outside its right to prepare derivative works (or to control reproductions).

The court of appeals upheld summary judgment for Bloomberg on fair use grounds.  Factor one favored fair use because Bloomberg’s news reporting served an important public interest.  Swatch argued that Bloomberg wasn’t engaged in news reporting, just conveying “data,” and that discovery was needed on the issue (as well as others about Bloomberg’s state of mind and whether Bloomberg’s subscribers actually listen to recordings or just read transcripts). 

“[W]hether one describes Bloomberg’s activities as ‘news reporting,’ ‘data delivery,’ or any other turn of phrase, there can be no doubt that Bloomberg’s purpose in obtaining and disseminating the recording at issue was to make important financial information about Swatch Group available to American investors and analysts.”  This information “is of critical importance to American securities markets.”  The SEC mandates that, when American companies disclose this kind of material nonpublic information, they have to make it available to the public immediately. Though Swatch is exempt from the SEC’s rule, that doesn’t change the public interest in this information, which remains highly relevant to American markets.  “At a minimum, a use of copyrighted material that serves this public purpose is very closely analogous to ‘news reporting,’ which is indicative of fair use.”  This important public purpose overwhelmed the weight otherwise given to “Bloomberg’s clandestine methods and the commercial, nontransformative nature of its use.”  (When a work fits the §107 preamble, there’s a strong presumption that factor one favors the defendant, but given the factual disputes, the court assumed that Bloomberg’s use wasn’t within the “core notion” of “news reporting,” so it didn’t apply the presumption.) 

True, Bloomberg was a commercial enterprise, but so are many fair users, and the link between the copying and commercial gain was attenuated—Bloomberg Professional “is a multifaceted research service, of which disseminating sound recordings of earnings calls is but one small part. Moreover, it would strain credulity to suggest that providing access to Swatch Group’s earnings call more than trivially affected the value of that service.”  So commerciality had reduced weight here.

So did Bloomberg’s lack of good faith, which in general contributes little to fair use analysis.  Assuming, for summary judgment purposes, that Bloomberg was fully aware of Swatch’s directive, its overriding purpose was not to “scoop[]” Swatch or “supplant the copyright holder’s commercially valuable right of first publication,” “but rather simply to deliver newsworthy financial information to American investors and analysts. That kind of activity, whose protection lies at the core of the First Amendment, would be crippled if the news media and similar organizations were limited to authorized sources of information.”  (Citing the Pentagon Papers case!)

Transformativeness is important, but not necessary; some core examples of fair use, like multiple copies for classroom use, “involve no transformation whatsoever.”  (Yay!  It’s nice to see “multiple copies for classroom use,” which is in the statute, be recognized as core fair use, rather than edited out, as has happened in other cases.)  In the context of news reporting and similar activities, “the need to convey information to the public accurately may in some instances make it desirable and consonant with copyright law for a defendant to faithfully reproduce an original work rather than transform it.”  In those kinds of cases, courts often find transformation in the altered purposeor context of the work, as shown by surrounding commentary or criticism.  But additional commentary or analysis was absent here.  Still, by disseminating the call, “Bloomberg was able to convey with precision not only what Swatch Group’s executives said, but also how they said it. This latter type of information may be just as valuable to investors and analysts as the former, since a speaker’s demeanor, tone, and cadence can often elucidate his or her true beliefs far beyond what a stale transcript or summary can show.”  Courts have often noted that a “cold transcript” isn’t as good as a more physical presentation.  Also, it doesn’t matter how many Bloomberg subscribers took advantage of this extra information; it remains independently valuable.

News reporting can’t excuse all copying.  “But here, in light of the independent informational value inherent in a faithful recording of the earnings call, the fact that Bloomberg did not transform Swatch’s work through additional commentary or analysis does not preclude a finding that the ‘purpose and character’ of Bloomberg’s use favors fair use.”  Other news cases finding no fair use were not to the contrary.  Translating from one language to another; reporting the conclusions from research reports; and copying information compiled by a competing financial publisher were all different.  In those cases, the defendants “appropriated works in which the copyright owner had transformed raw financial information by compiling it from multiple sources or by mixing it with their own commentary and analysis.”  Here, though, the sound recording—including the executives’ modes of expression—“were themselves pieces of financial information.”  The other cases were about secondary sources; this case is about a primary source, and that makes a difference.  (This is sounding a lot like Barclays Capital v. Theflyonthewall.com, 650 F.3d 876 (2d Cir.2011).)  Swatch’s desired discovery couldn’t change any of this.

Nature of the work: there’s a thin copyright, because the conference call was “manifestly factual,” even with quirks of expression by the executives.  “[W]hile we assume without deciding in this appeal that the call contained sufficient original expression—in the form of the executives’ tone, cadence, accents, and particular choice of words—to be copyrightable, the purpose of the call was not in any sense to showcase those forms of expression. Rather, the call’s sole purpose was to convey financial information about the company to investors and analysts.”  This placed it “at the very edge” of copyright’s protections.

Also, the work was published before Bloomberg’s use.  Publication, for fair use purposes, is not “publication” as specifically defined by the Copyright Act in §101; statutory publication didn’t occur here.  That technical definition serves many channeling purposes (e.g., triggering the deposit requirement), but it doesn’t serve the purposes of fair use.  The common-law nature of fair use justifies a different, more functional understanding of publication.  The court would not “blind [itself] to the fact that Swatch Group invited over three hundred investment analysts from around the globe to the earnings call, out of which over a hundred actually attended.”  Swatch wasn’t deprived of the ability to control the first public appearance of its expression. Courts “commonly look past the statutory definition when considering this issue,” and even in Harper & Row the Supreme Court suggested that “even substantial quotations might qualify as fair use in a review of a published work or a news account of a speech that had been delivered to the public or disseminated to the press.”

Amount used: this factor can’t favor Bloomberg, but it is neutral.  Given the public interest in the information, copying the whole call was reasonable in light of Bloomberg’s purpose, regardles of how many Bloomberg subscribers took advantage of the value added by the recording over the transcript.

Market effect: None.  The relevant effect is that caused by Bloomberg’s use of the expressive elements of the work, and there was no evidence of any possible market effect.  Swatch didn’t presently seek to profit from publication of earnings calls.  What about a potential market?  “While the loss of a potential yet untapped market can be cognizable under the fourth fair use factor, the potential market here is defined so narrowly that it begins to partake of circular reasoning…. The hypothesized market for audio recordings of earnings calls convened by foreign companies that are exempt from [SEC publication requirements]” was not traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed.

And, even if a financial news or research organization might be willing to pay for access, copyright’s ultimate aim is to stimulate creativity for the general good.  “Here, the possibility of receiving licensing royalties played no role in stimulating the creation of the earnings call.” Swatch actually argued that it didn’t even know whether there was a potential market for this kind of recording.  The call’s purpose was to let Swatch executives disseminate information about the company in a way they believed would be favorable—that’s the incentive for earnings calls, not copyright.  “By making the recording available to analysts who did not or could not participate in the call initially, Bloomberg simply widened the audience of the call, which is consistent with Swatch Group’s initial purpose.”  Swatch’s interest in “know[ing] and control[ling] precisely who heard the call” wasn’t weighty enough compared to the public interest in the dissemination of important financial information. (And here is the Barclayscite.)

Balancing the factors led to a fair use finding.

The court denied Bloomberg’s cross-appeal on the copyrightability of the sound recording as not properly before it; Bloomberg wasn’t aggrieved by the ruling, given its victory on other grounds, and it didn’t jump through the right procedural hoops for a separate appeal.
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