DOJ 230 workshop part 2

Panel 2: Addressing Illicit Activity Online
Whether Section 230 encourages or discourages platforms to
address online harms, such as child exploitation, revenge porn, and terrorism,
and its impact on law enforcement.
Moderator: The Honorable Beth A. Williams, Assistant
Attorney General Office of Legal Policy
Yiota Souras, Senior Vice President and General Counsel,
National Center for Missing and Exploited Children: One main program is Cyber
Tipline, reporting mechanisms for public/ISPs to report suspected child sexual
exploitation. We analyze and make available to law enforcement. Receive reports
including CSE, trafficking, enticement, molestation. Largest category: CSAM.
Tremendous growth in reports: 2019, just under 17 million, w/over 69 million
files including video and images. Continues to grow. Many preverbal children as
well as younger teens.
Professor Mary Anne Franks, University of Miami: Cyber Civil
Rights Initiative: aimed at protecting vulnerable populations, online
exploitation, harm to women/sexual minorities/racial minorities. Civil rights
relate to tech. On nonconsensual pornography, active in (1) legislation where
needed, (2) working with tech cos on policies, (3) general social awareness.
For all tech’s good, have to be attentive to social media amplifying abuse and
civil rights violations. Bad actors, bystanders, accomplices, those who profit
from bads and hide under shield. Model statute issue: faced pushback from tech
& civil liberties groups. Many states take this issue seriously, thanks to brave
victims; rapid development in state law. Now up to 46 states & DC with
restrictions. Not solving problem: in many states the law is too narrow. Many
states require personal intent to harm victim, which is not how the internet
works. Average revenge porn site owner doesn’t intend to harm any given person,
just doesn’t care/interested in profits/voyeurism. 79% cases aren’t personal
intent to harm.
230 is the other big problem: trumps state criminal law.
Only way to maneuver around is federal criminal law on nonconsensual porn. We’ve
introduced a bill, not voted on yet.
Q. re reposting as harm to victims.
Franks: That’s one of the most severe aspects of attack: infinite
replicability. Much is initially obtained nonconsensually, via assault or secret
recording, or distribution without consent. It’s a harm each time. What happens
when a search on one’s name reveals all porn. 230 isn’t fulfilling its goals
for good samaritans. 230 doesn’t distinguish between helpers, bystanders, and
thieves. Intermediaries solicit, encourage, amplify violations. Also domestic
terrorism, misogyny, disinformation: harm to democracy/erosion of shared
responsibility for terrible actions.
Q: FOSTA/SESTA tried to address this for CSE. Impact?
Franks: we don’t see impact b/c we deal with adult victims,
not trafficking but privacy. Piecemeal tinkering on one bad form isn’t best way
to reform, makes unwieldy and sets up hierarchy of harms. Sex trafficking isn’t
the only bad.
Souras: we’ve seen Backpage go down, overlapped w/enactment
of FOSTA/SESTA. Immense disruption in market for child sex trafficking, which
continues. Feds did move against Backpage, no single co has risen up to fill
that lucrative gap. We’d love to see more federal action but there is
deterrence.
The Honorable Doug Peterson, Attorney General of Nebraska:
Trafficking online: federal prosecutors were very active in Nebraska; developed
a state law. No revenge porn prosecutions yet but can see issues with drug
sales and fraud, limited by 230. Nat’l Ass’n of AGs proposal: allow states and
territories to prosecute, just like feds: simple solution. Acceleration of
online crimes is significant, especially for young people targeted by apps.
Feds require a certain threshold; need to get aiders/abettors.
Q: challenges to law enforcement?
Peterson: some platforms: good cooperation. Murder case on
Tinder, which was v. helpful. Google & others have informed us and allowed
prosecution, esp. child porn. Enabled more thorough investigation.
Matt Schruers, President, Computer & Communications
Industry Association: What platforms are doing: over 100,000 people focused on
trust and safety. Large services have elaborate & sophisticated tech tools,
frequently made available to others. Participates with NCMEC and other private sector
initiatives. 10s of millions of reports to law enforcement. More investement
can and should be done—not industry alone. Many cases industry refers to law
enforcement don’t result in action: fewer than 1500 cases.
Q: why do companies report?
Schruers: no one wants service to be used for illegal
activity, regardless of law. There are bad actors, but a number of cases
illustrate that services that solicit/participate in unlawful content lack 230 protection.
Q: what about bad samaritans who don’t report their
knowledge: should industry set standards?
Schruers: There’s a role for best practices, much of which
is going on now. Don’t generalize a few bad actors.
Q: does 230 mean companies aren’t obligated to remove
harmful content?
Soares: most companies have separate reporting obligation
for CSAM. But co can choose to moderate or not; protected if they moderate or
they can moderate sporadically. Incentive promise has become aspirational.
There are cos that are partners, do tremendous work, but others turn the other
way recklessly.
Q: when did industry recognize existing problem and what did
it do?
Professor Kate Klonick, St. John’s University: doesn’t represent
any co. Her work doesn’t focus predominantly on illegal content but on harmful/violation
of community standards. There’s a huge difference in top 3 cos and many sites
discussed today. Different incentives to keep up/take down. FB etc. seek to
make platforms what people want to see over breakfast. Many incentives to
remove bad content—economic harms from bad media, users, advertisers who don’t
want ads to run against CSAM or revenge porn. Techlash in which it’s easy to
gang up on platforms. Since 2008 FB has been very robust on systems &
processes to avoid these. Not all tech/platforms are the same.
Peterson: AG of Pa had Tree of Life mass shooting; D was
using Gab before he struck. Looked at Gab’s engagement, but Paypal and GoDaddy
reacted quickly and industry response was so quick there was nothing to go
after.
Schruers: 230 protects those decisions by service providers.
Undermine that=no incentive to cut off.
Franks: distinguish b/t (c)(1) and (c)(2) [of course if you
only had (2) then any failure is held against you if you were correct once
before]. No incentive to act like good samaritans. They only grew a conscience
after public pressure in response to victims. Could have been avoided in first
place if design had been less negligent. Why should any of us be at the mercy
of corporations to see whether firearms are sold to a mass shooter? (c)(1)
doesn’t do anything to encourage cos to do better. Google is not a clean, well
lit place, nor is Twitter, if you’ve been attacked. Some people have always had
privacy, free speech, and ability to make money. But civil rights is about who’s
been left out. Descriptively not true that internet is by and large a good
place.
Q: Klonick says economic incentives align with moderation
for some. What to do about other companies where there’s a market for revenge porn
and CSAM?
Klonick: agree w/Shield Act: there are things to be done
with regulation and companies. This is a norm setting period: what to make of
what’s happening. Tech moves forward and our expectations change again. Concern
over acting quickly; hard to know ramifications.
Q: does 230 address safety?
Schruers: these trust and safety programs are not new. More
can & should be done. Prepared to engage w/ law enforcement; predate recent
bad press, part of doing business. There are a few bad actors, not entitled to
230, which creates exactly the right incentives by allowing policing w/o fear of
liability. (c)(1) does create issues when content is not taken down, but if it
were gone, there’d be nothing but takedowns, suppressing marginal voices and
unpopular views. We see this in other jurisdictions; no protection for lawful
but unpopular viewpoints. Requires balancing; there will be missed calls.
Q: what does more can & should be done mean?
Schruers: Asymmetry between reports & prosecutions; new
tools to be shared. Engaging w/IGOs around the world, OECD cooperation to
measure and respond to problems.
Q: CSAM reports grew a lot last year. How is there still so
much?
Souras: there is tremendous work being done by largest
companies, typically the best screeners & reporters. Once we drop off top
4-6 companies, there are 1000s of platforms around the world—chat, filesharing.
One problem: there is no level set. Moderation is helpful but completely
voluntary. Many choose not to screen. Larger companies also inconsistent over
time/across platforms/lack transparency.  
When we talk about 100,000 duck bites, there’s a harmed person behind
every one of those cases even if also a business cost.
Q: Is automation/AI the answer? Small business burdens?
Souras: We have supported tests of AI/ML. We are far away
from that eliminating the proliferation.
Q: why so far away? Zuckerberg says 5-10 years.
Franks: there will always be promises around the corner.
Human judgment is required. Have to stop illusion of control from tech tools.
Problems are structural/design problems. Whether cos recognized the problem 10
years ago or now, this is the world 230 built. Do we think we’re living in best
possible world? Only people who aren’t sent death/rape threats can speak freely
because laws don’t stop threats and abuse from happening. Imagine any other
industry killing people w/toxic products getting away w/it and promising to fix
it later. FB Live was used to livestream murderes and rapes. Zuckerberg didn’t
think it would be misused. That’s unacceptable as an answer. Industry has been
treated like gun industry—immune from all harm caused. How long will we allow
this? Don’t look to tech for how serious the problem is. Industry keeps
promising tools but law is about changing human behavior for good. We’ve seen
that status quo has failed.
Klonick: The internet is everything that makes you mad about
humanity. Zuckerberg didn’t murder or rape anyone. He created transparency so
now we see how terrible we all are and now you want tech cos to clean it up for
you. Tech cos don’t make murder a product, they surface action that has already
taken place.
Schruers: Role of tech: sometimes held out as perfectable,
but not a cureall for humans. Journey, not a destination; ML/AI is being
deployed as we speak. They have false positives and false negatives. This
requires both tech and people.
Peterson: talk is cheap. Deeds are precious. Mississippi AG’s
concerns about prescription drugs, for which he sent Google CIDs, were rejected
and Google went immediately to 230. Message to AGs: you wont’ see behind our
walls. Tired of good intentions; would prefer cooperation.
Q: carveouts for federal prosecution?
Peterson: we work w/DOJ a lot; complement each other. We can
deal with smaller operations where DOJ may not have bandwidth. [Smaller
operations … like Google?]  Request to
add states/territories to exclusion is important b/c a lot of these are small
operators. [There’s a lot of slippage here: is there a website that is just one
guy trafficking that isn’t also a content provider?]
Franks: No one is saying Zuckerberg is responsible for murder,
but there is accomplice/collective liability. [So FB is responsible for
murder?] Intermediaries aren’t directly causing, but promoting, facilitating,
and profiting from it. Collective responsibility: it takes a village to harass,
cause a mass shooting, use revenge porn. No need for complete difference from
real world rules.
Q: Encryption and CSAM: even if services don’t want it, they
can’t see it.
Schruers: Volume of reports shows that’s not the case. These
aren’t the only threats: beyond problematic content, fraud, crime, foreign
adversaries mean that other tech tools are required, one of which is encryption.
Safe communications protects user info: 82d Airborne in Iran is using E2E app
Signal widely used for secure communications because overseas communication
networks could be penetrated and transmissions b/t gov’t devices aren’t secure.
Encryption has a variety of lawful purposes: protestors, jurisdictions
w/problems w/rule of law. Balancing needs to be done but encryption is a
critical tool.
Q: FB Messenger could hide millions of reports.
Souras: E2E is necessary for some things but there has to be
a balance. 17 million reports: if we were in E2E environment for Messenger we’d
lose 12 million reports—children raped, abused, enticed undetected. There has
to be a compromise w/encryption rollout, or we lose 12 million children. [Each
report apparently reflects a different child. It is clearly correct to say that
encryption can be used for bad things as well as good. But the whole day I
never heard anyone explain what the balance would be if we have to balance: do
we only allow people we trust to use encryption? How does that work, especially
given what we know about how trust can be abused? Do we only allow financial
services to use encryption? How does that work? I don’t know whether encryption
does more harm than good or how you’d even weigh the bads against the goods.
But “there must be a balance” is not a plan.]
Klonick: PhotoDNA worked for a while; deplatforming means
that groups move and get smaller and narrower. Encryption does allow that. Autocrats
have learned to use platforms for surveillance and harm, and E2E helps with
that too. We need to think about full ramifications.
Q: should 230 be amended?
Klonick: works as intended. Was not just for startups: was
explicitly for telecoms, libraries, public schools. Nor was encryption not
contemplated: 1996 was mid-Crypto Wars I. Lots of sources exist outside of
encryption. These are critical tools for other equally serious threats. Mistake
to amend.
Peterson: Our proposal is simple: give us ability to support
criminal laws.
Schruers: 230 doesn’t prevent law enforcement action by states.
Prevents action against ISPs. If they’re direct actors, states can go after
them too. Fundamentally interstate commerce protection: services should be
dealt w/at federal level. If answer is resources, provide more federal
resources.
Peterson: let us go after bad actors aiding/abetting criminal
acts to clean up industry instead of waiting for industry to clean up itself.

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