a handful of Google v. Oracle thoughts: categories, microworks, and market circularity

A couple of small Google v. Oracle thoughts: The majority
clearly says that, as with other categories of protected works, distinctions
can be made within the categories, drawing lines “among” computer programs,
books, and films. Not all literary works are the same; Infinite Jest gets a different kind of copyright protection than my emails do. Likewise, while the recent Warhol case at times seems
to imply that the derivative works right overrides fair use, the same GvO passage
says that copyright provides both reproduction and derivative works right, but
also subjects all works to fair use. 

One of my minor obsessions is “courts that reproduce the
entire works in suit in the opinion”—whether they find for the plaintiff or the
defendant, and whether they rule on substantial similarity or fair use, they never
even consider whether it’s ok to do so. It’s obviously a good idea for purposes
of understanding what the law is—a description of a song or picture will never allow
a subsequent reader to understand what the protectable expression in the song
or picture was—and I think obviously fair, but it’s amusing to me that it
happens without anyone pointing out that this must be in reliance on fair use. 

Anyway, in GvO, Justice Breyer instead reproduces an entire
short story, which was just minding its own business and had nothing to do with
the case, in two different languages no less. And he does so in the course of
suggesting that the scope of fair use would be more limited with respect to that short story than to a sentence of the same length in a longer novel. I think
that’s a troubling conclusion—Justin Hughes has written very well about the
problem of “microworks” and the right result would probably be to say that the book
of stories from which that story comes should be the proper unit of analysis
for factor three. But now I have questions: Can casebook authors use this
portion of the case without fear? Could the copyright owner bring a CASE Act
claim against the US as a result? I don’t actually know whether claims against
the US can go to the Copyright Office or have to go to the Court of Claims. 

On factor four, it was nice to see acknowledgement that (1)
the licensing package Oracle offered was very different from what Google
ultimately copied, and thus didn’t show market harm from what Google
actually copied
and (2) this was a circularity problem, which should be
avoided. Also, relevant to the “mixed question of law and fact” issue, the
majority says: “the jury’s fair use determination means that neither Sun’s
effort to obtain a license nor Oracle’s conflicting evidence can overcome
evidence indicating that, at a minimum, it would have been difficult for Sun to
enter the smartphone market, even had Google not used portions of the Sun Java
API.” I think that means that the jury verdict must be interpreted to have
favored Google on factor four, resolving the factual part of factor four in its
favor. I am not sure what that means for summary judgment in future cases,
especially if factor one remains more of a legal question.

from Blogger https://ift.tt/3s2RW2u

This entry was posted in Uncategorized and tagged , , . Bookmark the permalink.

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out /  Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out /  Change )

Connecting to %s