Alisher Juzgenbayev,
The Vanishing Enforcer: Consumer Protection in an Era of Dual Retrenchment,
120
Nw. U. L. Rev.
1449
(2026).

Abstract

Recent developments, including reductions in the federal workforce,
effective suspension of certain enforcement activities, and attempted
centralization of independent agency rulemaking in the White House, have
significantly weakened administrative agencies. This administrative
retrenchment is concerning as private enforcement of a number of
consumer protection statutes has been simultaneously curtailed through
the Supreme Court’s decisions in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins and TransUnion
LLC v. Ramirez, which dramatically narrowed plaintiffs’ standing. These
decisions rely in part on a vision of strong executive authority,
positing that broad private standing conflicts with an Article II
framework where a politically accountable President faithfully
implements laws and exercises coordinated enforcement discretion. When
the Executive interprets this discretion so expansively as to
effectively nullify enforcement of federal statutory schemes, Congress
retains few tools to engage in meaningful lawmaking to advance policies
across different domains. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA)
and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) offer a telling
case study: as courts have systematically restricted private
enforcement, particularly class actions, they have channeled enforcement
toward the CFPB—theoretically positioning the agency to address
systemic violations through enforcement, monitoring, and information
gathering. While individual consumers may still access state courts or
raise FDCPA violations defensively, addressing systemic violations
requires robust administrative enforcement if the Article II
justification for restricting private standing is to remain coherent.
The possibility for such enforcement now faces mounting challenges from
increased politicization of enforcement, executive disempowerment of
agencies, and growing judicial skepticism about the propriety of
independent agencies and their investigative and interpretative
authority. The risk is that some consumer protection statutes will
become effectively unenforceable as neither private litigation nor state
alternatives can adequately fill the resulting enforcement gap.

from Blogger https://tushnet.blogspot.com/2026/04/reading-list-vanishing-enforcer.html