Self-promotion: ABA Blawg 100

So it’s come to this: the ABA Blawg 100 is coming around again, and if you like 43(b)log, I’d love your help staying on it!  You can nominate by following this link.  Thanks!

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When all you have is a Captain Hammer …

The costumed performers who importune passersby in Times Square are not universally beloved.  Via the WSJ comes this suggestion for getting rid of them:

State Sen. Brad Hoylman, whose district includes Times Square, said the companies that created the characters needed to “step up to the plate” and use copyright laws to assist in thwarting the undesirable presence of copyrighted characters. “They can do something to enforce their copyright and I’m convinced that that should be another route we should be taking,” he said.

Unsurprisingly, the article mushes together copyright and trademark.  But this wouldn’t make a bad exam question.  Assume the character costumes such as Spiderman were purchased from a licensed source.  First sale kicks in, but the performers seek payment for posing in photos with people.  Is there then a reproduction that they’ve induced?  What about the unfixed public performance of being the character (or being out of character)? 

As for trademark, I’m hard pressed to see likely confusion, but given how expansive the doctrine has become, you might not even need dilution, unless a court sees this as a Rogers v. Grimaldi-type situation where the “product” being sold is a performance.  As for dilution, is performing for money commercial speech?  First Amendment doctrine says no, but trademark cases routinely ignore First Amendment doctrine.

However, this is all a (literal?) sideshow: the problem that the article discusses is that there are too many people asking for money in Times Square (in the view of other people whose livelihood is earned in other ways, some of them competing).  The costumes are neither necessary nor sufficient to cause this problem, as the article notes when discussing “other peddlers” and referring to the problematic people as “panhandlers.” The real trick would be to explain why that has anything to do with the policies justifying copyright and trademark law.  I’m not in favor of using intellectual property laws to solve non-IP problems, however much fun it is to discuss the theoretical underpinnings of such claims.

H/T ST.

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Purpose-transformativeness versus content-transformativeness

In 2008, Tony Reese presciently told us that the case law on fair use “transformativeness” showed a trend towards favoring transformative purpose over transforming content, so that exact reproduction could have a very good shot at fair use.  Today’s example, via Eric Goldman, involves Westlaw and Lexis’s creation of databases containing the full text (minus some privacy redactions) of legal filings.  In a quick opinion, the court deems this conduct clearly transformative–it results in the creation of a completely new thing, a legal research database–and not harmful despite being commercial and involving full copies (or as near as makes no difference).  At this point, I think it’s safe to say that it’s easier to win a fair use case by engaging in large-scale, wholesale copying to create a database than it is to win a fair use case by altering the content of a single work–there are plenty of cases in the latter category, of course, but there are also cases finding infringement, and so far there aren’t any in the former category.  I would be surprised if the Authors’ Guild v. Google case became the first.

Critics of so-called “expansive” fair use holdings sometimes argue that (1) favoring databases is an unjustified extrapolation from Campbell, which after all was a content-transformativeness case, and (2) that conceptually, “transformativeness” overlaps with the derivative works right, which also speaks of how a work may be “transformed” or adapted.  (1) and (2) are, it seems to me, really in conflict–any need to constrain content-transformativeness for fair use purposes in order to protect the derivative works right doesn’t apply to purpose-transformativeness, which generally needs to work with reproductions to achieve its aims.  Anyway, Reese’s careful framework seems to me to explain the subsequent six years of cases too.

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Deceptive whiskey?

The Whiskey Reviewer announces a series evaluating the marketing claims of various whiskeys. What I found quite striking was that the claims of interest were very much centered around “authenticity,” both in production and in narrative:

  • Potemkinism: Does the company run what Chuck Cowedery labeled a “Potemkin Distillery,” where they claim to be a distillery but are in fact a bottler?
  • Back Story: Are there bogus elements in the company’s historical claims, and if so how bogus are they?
  • Marketing Flim Flam: Other elements of the company’s image and marketing practices that some find objectionable.
  • As with so many things, stories matter.

    H/T James Milles.

    Posted in advertising, http://schemas.google.com/blogger/2008/kind#post | Leave a comment

    intent to use successful term in ads isn’t intent to confuse


    Overstock.com, Inc. v. Nomorerack.com, Inc., No. 2:13-CV-1095 (D. Utah June 30, 2014)
    Overstock sells a lot of stuff online: over one million products, with over six million customers last year. Nomorerack directly competes with Overstock, and has sold more than $420 million worth of products to nearly 5.2 million customers since it was founded. Overstock owns a number of registrations for OVERSTOCK.COM, and sued Nomorerack for using “overstock” in ads, like so:
    The court denied a preliminary injunction.
    First, the court found the similarity between the marks to favor defendants. (This might be an example of stampeding the factors.) Marks aren’t to be dissected, so the court rejected the argument that “overstock” was nearly the same as “overstock.com.” The marks have to be considered as they’re encountered in the marketplace, including Overstock’s stylization of its mark. By contrast, Nomorerack didn’t use a stylized “O” design and it didn’t use .com. It used “overstock” in combination with other words, such as “overstock clearance,” generally in all caps, and always with a reference to “nomorerack” or “nomorerack.com.” Though Nomorerack used text-based ads that didn’t have distinct stylization, the domain name was always clearly displayed in those. Thus, there was little visual or aural similarity between the marks. There was similarity in meaning: the sale of discounted products. But Overstock used the term to identify its company, while Nomorerack used it to identify a type of product or sale. 
    Next, the court found Nomorerack’s intent unproblematic. The court refused to infer intent to confuse based on Nomorerack’s knowledge of Overstock. Intent to copy a mark can justify an inference of likely confusion, but intent to copy a product can’t justify that inference; so therefore with awareness of the plaintiff. Instead, the evidence was that Nomorerack used a number of different terms in ads—“Cyber Monday, Black Friday, Free Shipping, Blowout Sale”—and settled on “overstock” because that word had the best performance. The intent was not to copy, but to sell more effectively. “Whether the success of this term is based on Plaintiff’s reputation and good will or some other reason is not clear.” Continued use after receipt of a C&D also didn’t justify an inference of bad intent, since intent at the time of adoption is key.
    Overstock argued that Nomorerack moved away from its own green and white color scheme to adopt Overstock’s red and white colors. But the evidence didn’t justify that finding; instead Nomorerack used a variety of color schemes in its ads. Intent weighed in Nomorerack’s favor.
    Actual confusion: All Overstock had were isolated, anecdotal instances of confusion, which could be disregarded, given the large volume of transactions at issue. Overstock received ten consumer complaints about Nomorerack, and Nomorerack produced over 200 complaints. Some consumers who bought from Nomorerack thought they were buying from Overstock; others thought that Nomorerack somehow “hijacked” their order; others believed that Nomorerack’s ad was an ad for Overstock; others believed that the parties were somehow affiliated. (Other than the ad-based ones, how do we know these incidents derived from ads using “overstock” in the text?) However, even in the evidence provided by Overstock, some consumers clearly recognized the difference. E.g., one consumer said “[s]ome items listed on Nomorerack.com are cheaper than the same items that Overstock.com has” and that they found “better pricing on nomorerack.com.” Plus, in the context of millions of customers and millions of sales per year, “relative to the total volume of sales, the limited evidence of actual confusion provides little weight.”
    Overstock argued that Nomorerack’s denominators were meaningless because we don’t know how many consumers saw the infringing ads. But that weighed against Overstock, which bore the burden of proof. It only provided a handful of complaints, which could be disregarded.
    Similarity in products/manner of marketing: this favored Overstock.
    Degree of care: The expense of the parties’ products varied widely, but price isn’t determinative. What matters is the consumer’s degree of care exercised at the time of purchase. Overstock argues that consumers trying to get a good deal wouldn’t be careful about the source of the offer, but Overstock’s VP of marketing said that a high percentage of its customers engage in comparison shopping, and Overstock prices products on the assumption that people are comparing prices. “Because both parties purport to offer items at discounted prices, the Court believes that consumers will exercise care to find the best price for the product they seek to purchase, rather than purchasing the item on impulse.” This favored Nomorerack.
    Strength of the mark: OVERSTOCK.COM was incontestable, but that didn’t make it strong. The court found the conceptual classification “close,” but ultimately “overstock” was descriptive: it conveyed the characteristics of the products, that they were excess or surplus inventory. Overstock originally began as an Internet-based liquidator of excess or surplus inventory. Overstock argued that it now carried more goods and services than that, but descriptiveness doesn’t require that a term convey all of a product’s characteristics, uses, or functions. (And relatedly, a term can be descriptive of some of a business’s products/services and be descriptive for the business as a whole—e.g., In re Quik-Print Copy Shops, Inc., 616 F.2d 523 (C.C.P.A. 1980), where the business provided services other than quick printing.)
    Commercial strength: Overstock provided evidence to support a finding of commercial strength. It submitted a study indicating that approximately 73% of United States consumers and 89% of online shoppers had heard of Overstock.com or “the Big ‘O.’” The commercial strength of the mark made up for its conceptual weakness, making the overall factor favor Overstock.
    The particular factors favoring Nomorerack indicated that confusion was unlikely. Thus, the court didn’t need to evaluate Nomorerack’s descriptive fair use defense, though it noted that Nomorerack’s evidence on this was compelling: it submitted evidence that it wasn’t using the term as a mark (query what would count as “evidence” of this), that the term was descriptive, and that its use was fair and in good faith.
    Belt and suspenders: Overstock also didn’t show irreparable harm, given the minimal actual confusion, and given that its evidence of lost sales suggested that cost and product selection could explain consumers’ choices to buy from Nomorerack instead of confusion. By contrast, an injunction would require Nomorerack to stop using one of its most effective ad campaigns, harming it.
    Posted in trademark | Leave a comment

    Your daily unauthorized use

    Geisinger Medical Center is expanding.  Here’s one of the images of what the new version will look like:

    Okay, but who are those handsome devils (also in Slide 17 of the Geisinger slide show)?

    Could it be Sam and Dean Winchester, as portrayed by Jared Padalecki and Jensen Ackles?  (Screenshot from Supernatural 5×08, Changing Channels.)

    I must say, I admire the dedication of whoever put them into this presentation.  Incidental use?

    I’ve covered “unexpected Jensen Ackles in advertising” before; I wonder how many other non-A-list actors this happens to. 

    Posted in right of publicity, trademark | Leave a comment

    NY statutory law covers B2B false advertising, but common law unfair competition doesn’t


    Leason Ellis LLP v. Patent & Trademark Agency LLC, No. 13 CV 2880 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2014)
    Leason Ellis (of Trademark Blog fame) sued PTA for false advertising, unfair competition, deceptive business practices, and tortious interference with prospective economic relations. Here the court grants in part and denies in part a motion to dismiss.
    The complaint alleges that PTA “seeks to confuse trademark owners into purchasing services under false color of authority,” holding itself out as a government entity (or as affiliated with the USPTO) “by using a misleading name and website, and by employing a website URL located in the “.org” top-level domain instead of the ‘.com’ top-level domain (i.e., ‘www.patenttrademarkagency.org’).”  PTA allegedly mails confusing “reminder” notices to trademark owners that appear to be government-issued and falsely state the owners’ trademarks are about to expire. Instead, the notices are solicitations, which don’t disclose that the fee charged by the USPTO to renew a trademark is $100 per class, whereas PTA charges $985 to renew the registration of one “class” of goods or services and $385 for each additional class.  PTA’s website says “[w]e are not lawyers and do not provide legal advice,” but Leason Ellis alleged that defendants nevertheless advertised legal services/engaged in the “unauthorized practice of law” by appearing before the USPTO without a law license in violation of certain USPTO regulations. 
    PTA allegedly solicited Leason Ellis’s clients and potential clients, leading clients to complain to Leason Ellis and causing confusion.  Leason Ellis alleged that these efforts “create a false and deceptive representation of equivalence with the legitimate trademark-related services provided by those such as [p]laintiff,” thereby unfairly “diverting business” from plaintiff and allowing defendants “to unjustly profit from providing inferior services to unsuspecting trademark owners.”
    The court concluded that there are only two bases of liability under §43(a)(1), and if you choose (B) it must be false advertising, as opposed to (A)’s false association.  Leason Ellis alleged only the former, using various theories.  PTA argued that Leason Ellis lacked standing; the court disagreed, given the allegations of damages.
    However, the common law unfair competition claims had to fail.  New York courts have now clarified that there are “two theories of common-law unfair competition: palming off and misappropriation.”  That’s it, despite earlier broad statements.  Leason Ellis alleged neither.  Alleging that the public confused the PTA with the PTO didn’t matter in the absence of a plausible allegation of confusion of PTA with Leason Ellis, or even with law firms generally. 
    By contrast, GBL §349 and 350 claims survived.  The challenged practice must be “consumer-oriented,” but businesses can be consumers in appropriate circumstances, which were present here.  A claim under these statutes must allege consumer injury or harm to the public interest; the allegations, if proven, would involve public harm.
    Posted in http://schemas.google.com/blogger/2008/kind#post, trademark | Leave a comment

    AU Gender/IP call for papers

    The Women and the Law Program
    and the Program on Information Justice & Intellectual Property
     American University Washington College of Law 

    Call for Papers: Eleventh Annual IP/Gender Symposium
    Save the Date: Friday February 27, 2015

    This year, we will engage in a broad discussion of “Reimagining IP/Gender: The Next Ten Years of Feminist Engagement with Intellectual Property Law.” The symposium will take place in Washington, DC on Friday, February 27, 2015.

    Rather than focus discussion on particular cultural practice, such as the creation and dissemination of fan fiction or the stewardship of traditional knowledge, this year, we seek papers and projects that address the full spectrum of feminist/queer theory and all aspects of intellectual property and information law. We encourage submissions from scholars, creators and activists who have not yet engaged with intellectual property law to explore how this legal space might open up new insights regarding the production of knowledge, commodification, definition and valuation of women’s work, and other areas of feminist and queer inquiry. We also hope to spur intellectual property scholars to explore how the tools of deliberately intersectional feminist and queer theory can shed new light on the challenge of creating intellectual property law that fosters social justice. 

    Accepted papers will be considered for publication in the American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy, and the Law in a special symposium volume. 

    Additional information, including some possible topics, can be found at: pijip.org/2015-ipgender-call/ 

    We are interested in projects that relate to specific case studies, as well as more synthetic studies of these topics. We also welcome projects that include performance and demonstrations in connection with specific projects or overall themes. Please visit pijip.org/ip-gender/ for a complete list of past presentations. Proposals from all disciplines, including law, women’s studies, queer studies, education, communication, cultural anthropology, development, medicine, sociology, and the arts are not only welcome, but encouraged. 

    If you are interested in taking part, please submit a 250-500 word précis of your project, with some indication of where your work on it stands, as well as a current C.V., by Sunday, July 27, 2014, using this submission form. We will notify you of whether we will include your proposal in the program no later than Friday, August 8, 2014.

    Posted in cfps, http://schemas.google.com/blogger/2008/kind#post, patent, trademark | Leave a comment

    PTO/NTIA upcoming copyright roundtables

    If you want to speak up for remix culture and are around Berkeley or LA, you can still register for the Los Angeles and Berkeley Green Paper Roundtables.  Registration is open for the Los Angeles roundtable until COB July 8, 2014 and will remain open until COB July 9, 2014 for the Berkeley roundtable.

    The Los Angeles roundtable will be held on July 29, 2014 at Loyola Law School, Walter J. Lack Reading Room, 919 Albany Street, Los Angeles, CA. The Berkeley roundtable will take place the following day, July 30th, at UC Berkeley School of Law, Booth Auditorium, 215 Bancroft Way, Berkeley, CA.

    These Green Paper roundtables will focus on the following topics: 1) the legal framework for the creation of remixes; (2) the relevance and scope of the first sale doctrine in the digital environment; and (3) the appropriate calibration of statutory damages in the contexts of (i) individual file sharers and (ii) secondary liability for large-scale infringement. Register to participate or observe.

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    court enjoins company’s claim to be another company’s founder


    Galvotec Alloys, Inc. v. Gaus Anodes Intern., LLC, 2014 WL 2918581, No. 7:13–CV–664 (S.D. Tex. June 26, 2014)
    Galvotec was founded in 1984 by Rogelio Garza and brothers Luis Miguel and Ramon Galvan. Gaus was founded in 2005 by a third Galvan brother, Juan Antonio. They compete to produce sacrificial anodes for corrosion protection of structures used in the oil and gas industries; there are 3-4 US-based competitors. Galvotec has about 70% of the market, and Gaus now has about 15%. Galvotec owns registrations for GALVOTEC and GA.
    Galvotec challenged Gaus’s use of the Galvotec mark “only insofar as Gaus has claimed corporate affiliation with and prior ownership of Galvotec in its advertisements and personal dealings with customers.”  A Gaus witness testified that the three Galvan brothers, plus a fourth, formed a Mexican parent company that used the name Galvotec and was involved with producing sacrificial anodes.  Galvotec disputed that the name was used to refer to that parent company.  But regardless, Galvotec provided uncontested evidence that it was separately formed as a US company in 1984, that the two Galvans who helped found it sold their shares, and that those shares were transferred to Garza in 1987.  Gaus, however, claimed on its website that it founded and sold “Galvotec,” and evidence was offered that it continued to claim that Gaus or Juan Antonio Galvan previously owned Galvotec.
    The court found that this claim, in the US market, was likely to be interpreted by customers to mean plaintiff Galvotec rather than the Mexican parent formed by the Galvan brothers.  Allowing the claim to continue “would perpetuate Gaus’s ability to divert to itself the reputation and good will created by Galvotec.”  A preliminary injunction against this misleading representation wouldn’t hurt Gaus.  (Is this a trademark claim or a false advertising claim?  What’s the role of Dastar?  If this is a false advertising claim—which it might have to be under Dastar—is this explicit or implicit falsity?  I’d be willing to go for falsity by necessary implication, given the ordinary meaning of Galvotec to the US marketplace.)
    However, the court denied an injunction as to the GA trademark.  Garza testified that Galvotec used the GA logo since 1996 as an abbreviation of Galvotec Alloys, Inc., and that customers have come to refer to Galvotec-produced anodes as “GA” anodes.  Gaus’s witness testified that the Gaus logo, using “Ga” or “GA,” signified the element gallium, the fact that sacrificial anodes are also known as galvanic anodes, and the Galvan family name. “GA” is followed in the logo by “US,” to signifiy Gaus’s US base.  Gaus has marketed itself as GaUS and GAUS.
    Galvotec failed to show irreparable harm.  Its substantial delay in seeking a preliminary injunction demonstrated that there was no urgency.  Gaus has been one of only 3-4 US-based competitors since 2006, so Galvotec couldn’t claim only recent knowledge of its existence or use of GA.  Garza admitted that he learned about Gaus in 2008, and then registered GA as a mark, advising Gaus of its alleged infringement in 2010.  Galvotec then waited until December 2013 to seek an injunction.
    Relatedly, “given that Gaus has been operating under its name and logo since 2006, an order essentially requiring that it change its name to continue operating would result in damages, especially if liability issues are resolved in Gaus’s favor.”  Given the harm to the defendant from a preliminary injunction plus the delay, the preliminary injunction would be denied.
    Posted in dastar, http://schemas.google.com/blogger/2008/kind#post, trademark | Leave a comment