OTW copyright consultation comments

The Organization for Transformative Works submits comments to the EC in response to its copyright consultation.

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no Lanham Act standing for misrepresentation by seller to buyer

Nature’s Products, Inc. v. Natrol, Inc., 2013 WL 7738172, No. 11–62409 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 7, 2013)

The parties had business dealings from the late 1990s through 2011. In 2001, they executed an open-ended indemnity agreement applying to any products Natrol bought from NPI. In 2009, NPI took over manufacturing for certain Natrol ProLab products. Natrol provided labels for the products representing that they were wheat and gluten free. In 2010, NPI returned Product Allergen Questionnaires, as completed by NPI’s Regulatory and Compliance Manager, which represented that the ProLab Products created by NPI were free of wheat and gluten allergens.

In September 2011, after an FDA investigation, NPI determined that the ProLab products did contain wheat and gluten, through the ingredient glutamine peptide. NPI informed Natrol of its discovery, and Natrol recalled the ProLab products. Natrol cancelled its contracts with NPI and destroyed the products. NPI sued Natrol for breach of contract and unjust enrichment for Natrol’s failure to pay NPI’s invoices. Natrol counterclaimed for breach of contract, breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty of merchantability, breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, breach of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, and civil remedies for violations of Lanham Act.

The court found genuine disputes of material fact on the breach of contract claim. There was some contractual relationship, but they didn’t have a thorough written contract, so summary judgment couldn’t be entered. This also precluded summary judgment on the breach of express warranty claim. However, the court found that NPI breached its indemnity agreement, which broadly required NPI to indemnify Natrol “from and against any and all damages, losses, expenses, costs, claims, judgments and liabilities … in any manner related to … the breach of any representation … of NPI … pertaining to the [covered] Products.” “This language is broad and unambiguous. It applies to the instant situation where NPI incorrectly represented to Natrol that the ProLab Products were wheat and gluten free, Natrol sold those Products with a label containing that representation, and Natrol subsequently recalled those Products because of the inaccurate representation.” This was so even though NPI made its inaccurate representations after the order was in and after it had begun manufacturing. If NPI had properly completed the questionnaires, Natrol would have had many more options.

Nonetheless, genuine disputes of fact remained as to the calculation of Natrol’s losses. Likewise, while Natrol established breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, material issues of fact remained on damages. As for breach of warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, though NPI knew of the purpose here, there were factual issues about whether Natrol relied on NPI’s skill and judgment when buying the products, because the contractual terms were unclear.

Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act: A FDUTPA claim isn’t defined by a contract’s express terms, but covers unfair and deceptive practices arising out of business relationships. Again, there were disputed issues of fact: whether the inaccurate representation on the questionnaires that the products would be wheat/gluten free was unfair or deceptive was for the jury, as was the question of the extent to which that conduct caused Natrol’s actual, not consequential, damages.

Lanham Act claims: Natrol lacked prudential standing under Phoenix of Broward (though this is under review by the Supreme Court, it’s unlikely that any standard the Court adopts would change this result, given the fact that Natrol is NPI’s customer rather than direct or indirect competitor). Natrol didn’t lose customers because of NPI’s conduct; rather it put a product on the market with misleading claims. “Had Natrol failed to recall that Product, Natrol’s competitors or consumers may have had valid Lanham Act claims against Natrol. Natrol, as the seller of the product, cannot bring those claims against its own manufacturer.” This wasn’t the kind of injury Congress sought to address.

Posted in consumer protection, contracts, http://schemas.google.com/blogger/2008/kind#post, standing | Leave a comment

Lance Armstrong has a rare good day: consumer protection claims dismissed

Martin v. FRS Company, No. CV-13-01456 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2014)

FRS makes energy and sports drinks and related goods. Lance Armstrong was an equity owner and brand ambassador for FRS who participated in FRS’s marketing and ad strategy. Martin and other plaintiffs brought the usual California claims, including warranty claims, based on ads starring Armstrong (who at the time had yet to admit his use of performance enhancing drugs and had yet to be stripped of his titles).

An allegedly representative ad asked “What is Lance Armstrong’s Secret What is Lance Armstrong’s Secret . . .” over images of him training. Armstrong finished the question by looking into the camera and stating “Weapon?” The ad continued: “FRS with Quercetin,” “Keep it Real” while showing images of FRS energy drinks. The three key deceptions identified by plaintiffs were: (1) Armstrong was the only 7-time Tour de France champ; (2) FRS products were closely associated with his abilities and achievements; and (3) FRS products – and not illegal performance-enhancing substances – were the “secret weapon” that enabled those achievements and abilities.

Breach of warranty: plaintiffs didn’t comply with California’s pre-suit notification requirement. Regardless, the claims at issue were mere puffery (of which more below) and thus couldn’t form the basis of a warranty claim.

Consumer protection claims: puffery can often be resolved at the motion to dismiss stage. Williams v. Gerber Products Co., 552 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2008), is not to the contrary. In Williams, the plaintiffs got the benefit of the doubt because they alleged that the products weren’t “nutritious” and didn’t contain juice from the fruits displayed on the packaging, thus the products didn’t provide the advertised results. But plaintiffs didn’t allege that the products here didn’t provide the advertised benefits of fighting fatigue and supporting the immune system.

The phrase “secret weapon” was unquantifiable. Plaintiffs argued that in this circumstance it was quantifiable: Armstrong was actually using drugs as his secret weapon. The court was unconvinced; “secret weapon” was more like “high-quality,” “more innovative,” “of superb quality” and “packed with power,” all found to be non-actionable puffery. The phrase said nothing about the specific characteristics or components of FRS products. (Query: if the ads weren’t about linking Armstrong’s performance with his use of FRS products, what were they about? The opinion references an NAD decision finding that Armstrong’s appearance was as an endorser, and thus found an implied claim that his endorsement is that he drinks the product because it enhances his performance capability as an elite athlete, but the court here said that wasn’t enough to make it not puffery.)

Plus, the allegations required an unreasonable inference: that defendants’ products were the source of his success, rather than illegal performance enhancing drug use. But Armstrong didn’t make specific representations about the products. And plaintiffs didn’t allege that the products didn’t work or that Armstrong didn’t actually use the products. (Note: I can’t see why that matters, if the claim is that Armstrong’s “secret weapon” claim and not the other claims triggered a purchase.)

Plaintiffs argued that defendants were capitalizing on the controversy surrounding his wins and the rumors of illegal drug use—and they apparently did so with enough of a wink and a nudge to escape liability. “[T]he reasonable consumer would not make the inference that a healthy energy drink could be the proprietary reason a decorated cyclist achieves success. Such an inference requires the reasonable consumer to discount extensive training, natural ability or even illegal PEDs use.” Plus, Armstrong didn’t endorse the products until two years after his last Tour de France win. This was like the statement in TYR Sport, Inc. v. Warnaco Swimwear, Inc., 709 F. Supp. 2d 821, 830 (C.D. Cal 2010), that “athletes [should] wear Speedo equipment if they wanted to compete at the highest level”: classic puffery. 

Also, taking the ads this literally, the ads would reveal the “secret,” showing that a “secret weapon” advertisement is a self-defeating concept. (Okay, I understand this decision, but that’s going way too far. The plaintiffs’ arguments don’t entail that kind of interpretation.)

Plaintiffs also tried actionable omission, which requires some kind of duty to disclose. A duty occurs (1) when the defendant is the plaintiff’s fiduciary; (2) when the defendant has exclusive knowledge of material facts not known or reasonably accessible to the plaintiff; (3) when the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff; or (4) when the defendant makes partial representations that are misleading because some other material fact has not been disclosed. They argued that the “7 Time Tour de France Winner” was deceptive, but though Armstrong knew he won them illegally, he still won them, and there was no allegation that he knew he’d be stripped of his title; the allegations didn’t say that the ads ran after he was stripped of his titles. Fraud by hindsight isn’t fraud. Nor was “secret weapon.”

Plaintiffs argued that Armstrong knew about his own doping activities, but, even imputing that knowledge to FRS, that wasn’t enough, because the cases discuss omissions about products, not about their endorsers. Because “secret weapon” was puffery, Armstrong’s use of performance enhancing drugs wasn’t material.

Separately, plaintiffs failed to meet Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard. They alleged exposure to the ads only in conclusory fashion (e.g., a plaintiff was “generally aware” of the Armstrong-FRS association). They didn’t identify the specific products they purchased, or specify the time and place of the alleged misrepresentations (note that other courts hold that identifying the relevant ads does that without specifying when they were broadcast/where they were seen). They also didn’t specifically allege reliance.

Finally, the court understandably disapproved of quotes of the ads with inserted bracketed language that changed the essence of the ad. One ad said: “if it’s good enough for Lance, it is good enough for me!” The complaint alleged: “if it’s good enough for Lance [to win 7 Tour de France world titles], it is good enough for me!” (You know, I would think that’s enough to allege that Armstrong was representing that the product helped his performance, even without the alterations.) Nor did plaintiffs sufficiently plead enough to satisfy even the vague unfairness prong of the UCL, since they didn’t specify why the FTC’s guidelines for unfairness (assuming they applied) had been violated.

Posted in california, consumer protection, http://schemas.google.com/blogger/2008/kind#post, warranties | Leave a comment

FTC successfully imposes individual liability on high-level employee

Federal Trade Commission v. Ross, 2014 WL 703739, No. 12-2340 (4th Cir. Feb. 25, 2014)

The hits (by which I mean FTC victories) just keep on coming. Here, the FTC sued Innovative Marketing and several of its high-level executives and founders, including Ross, for deceptive internet advertising. The district court enjoined Ross from participating in those deceptive practices and found her jointly and severally liable for over $163 million in consumer redress.

The court of appeals affirmed. The FTC contended that the defendants operated “a massive, Internet-based scheme that trick[ed] consumers into purchasing computer security software,” referred to as “scareware.” The ads told consumers that a scan of their computers detected a variety of dangerous files, like viruses, spyware, and “illegal” pornography, but no scans were ever conducted. Ross, a VP at IMI, defended, while the remaining defendants settled or defaulted.

The district court found that Ross was personally responsible for the deceptive advertising, based on her broad responsibilities, personal financing of corporate expenses, oversight of many employees, and involvement in the creation and dissemination of the ads. It also concluded that Ross had actual knowledge of the deceptive marketing scheme, or was “at the very least recklessly indifferent or intentionally avoided the truth” about the scheme.

Ross argued that the district court lacked the authority to award consumer redress, which is to say a money judgment, under the provision of the statute authorizing a court to issue a permanent injunction, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b). Consumer redress isn’t expressly authorized, but “the Supreme Court has long held that Congress’ invocation of the federal district court’s equitable jurisdiction brings with it the full ‘power to decide all relevant matters in dispute and to award complete relief even though the decree includes that which might be conferred by a court of law.’” Those equitable powers can’t be “denied or limited in the absence of a clear and valid legislative command.” Thus, by authorizing the issuance of a permanent injunction, Congress presumptively authorized the district court to exercise the full measure of its equitable jurisdiction. This included the power to order “complete relief,” including monetary consumer redress, which is a form of equitable relief.

Ross argued that the FTCA wasn’t like the statutes at issue in the relevant Supreme Court cases, and thus that the presumption of full power didn’t apply. But there’s no “magic words” rule here; the Supreme Court has applied the same rule where the statute only authorized the district court to “restrain violations” of the law. Ross’s arguments about the structure, history, and purpose of the FTCA (not described, but if they’re like others I’ve seen, involve comparison to the ALJ route provided for in the statute, and the relief available thereby) were “not entirely unpersuasive,” but every federal appellate court to consider them (a total of five before this decision) has rejected them: “We adopt the reasoning of those courts and reject Ross’ attempt to obliterate a significant part of the Commission’s remedial arsenal. A ruling in favor of Ross would forsake almost thirty years of federal appellate decisions and create a circuit split, a result that we will not countenance in the face of powerful Supreme Court authority pointing in the other direction.”

Turning to individual liability for corporate misdeeds, Ross argued that a securities fraud standard should apply, requiring (1) “authority to control the specific practices alleged to be deceptive,” coupled with a (2) “failure to act within such control authority while aware of apparent fraud.” Nope! Ross’ proposed standard would permit the Commission to pursue individuals only when they had actual awareness of specific deceptive practices and failed to act to stop the deception, i.e., a specific intent/subjective knowledge requirement; her proposal would effectively leave the Commission with the “futile gesture” of obtaining “an order directed to the lifeless entity of a corporation while exempting from its operation the living individuals who were responsible for the illegal practices” in the first place.

Instead, an individual may be liable if she (1) participated directly in the deceptive practices or had authority to control those practices, and (2) had or should have had knowledge of the deceptive practices. (2) can be shown by showing actual knowledge of the deceptive conduct, reckless indifference to its deceptiveness, or an awareness of a high probability of deceptiveness and intentional avoidance of learning the truth. This too preserves circuit uniformity with six other appellate courts.

Then Ross had some evidentiary challenges. Her expert was precluded from testifying about how the ads linkable to her were nondeceptive, but that issue had previously been resolved at summary judgment; the only issue at trial was Ross’s own liability. “Because the individual liability standard does not require a specific link from Ross to particular deceptive advertisements and instead looks at whether she had authority to control the corporate entity’s practices, [the expert’s] testimony was immaterial, and thus irrelevant, to the issue reserved for trial.” The district court also didn’t err in calculating redress.

Finally, the district court didn’t clearly err in finding that she had control of the company, participated in the deceptive acts, and had knowledge of the deceptive ads. In an affidavit in Canadian litigation, “she swore that she was a high-level business official with duties involving, among other things, ‘product optimization,’ which the district court could reasonably have inferred afforded her authority and control over the nature and quality of the advertisements. Other employees requested her authority to approve certain advertisements, and she would check the design of the advertisements before approving them. Chat logs showed that she served in a managerial role, directing the design of particular ads (e.g., requiring the word “advertisement” to be removed across ads and directing other people to “add aggression” to the ads). She was a contact person for IMI’s purchases of ad space, and she had the authority to discipline employees and contractors when work didn’t meet her standards.

“Given these facts, the district court could have reasonably inferred that Ross was actively and directly participating in multiple stages of the deceptive advertising scheme.” Though there was some indication that she personally didn’t perceive or believe that the ads were deceptive, she knew about multiple complaints about IMI’s advertisements, including that they would cause consumers to automatically download unwanted IMI products. There was no way the district court’s conclusion was clear error.

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The dangers of monetizing a Twitter feed

I’ve seen commentary about how this article on the successful monetization of photostream Twitter accounts by a company called Kulfoto ignores that the copyright situation of the photos it shares seems to be … unclear at best  However, I was struck by something different: the apparent noncompliance with the FTC’s guides for presenting sponsored advertising  The ad for Chegg that appeared on @CollegeStudent contained no disclosure that it was an ad  Even if copyright owners don’t come knocking, the FTC might—and the FTC will have questions both for Kulfoto and for the advertisers who paid for these spots.

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Violence and African-American patenting

Lisa D. Cook, Violence and Economic Activity: Evidence from African American Patents,

1870 to 1940.  How do inventors respond to evidence that the government isn’t interested in helping them?  Abstract:

Recent studies have examined the effect of political conflict and domestic terrorism on economic and political outcomes. This paper uses the rise in mass violence between 1870 and 1940 as an historical experiment for determining the impact of ethnic and political violence on economic activity, namely patenting. I find that violent acts account for more than 1100 missing patents compared to 726 actual patents among African American inventors over this period. Valuable patents decline in response to major riots and segregation laws. Absence of the rule of law covaries with declines in patent productivity for white and black inventors, but this decline is significant only for African American inventors. Patenting responds positively to declines in violence. These findings imply that ethnic and political conflict may affect the level, direction, and quality of invention and economic growth over time.

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false comparative ads lead to profit disgorgement

General Steel Domestic Sales, LLC v. Chumley, No. 10–cv–01398, 2014 WL 788015 (D. Colo. Feb. 27, 2014)

The Rule 59(e) motion to amend judgment in this false advertising case was denied for want of clear error. The parties, General Steel and Armstrong, compete in the market for steel buildings.

Previous ruling.  Eric Goldman on the TM aspects, where General Steel lost its claims based on defendants’ keyword advertising triggered by “General Steel” (which as of this morning seems to continue, and clicking on defendants’ sponsored link leads to a page that labeled “industry related legal matters,” which seems to mean cases brought against or lost by General Steel; defendants’ own loss is as yet unrepresented). 
 
Defendants argued that the court erred in finding literal falsity from ads that listed “Pre Galvanized Secondary Framing” and “Stainless Steel Fasteners” beneath Armstrong’s logo and didn’t list these features beneath General Steel’s logo.  Armstrong argued that this was literally true because Armstrong includes those features unless customers decline them, but General Steel doesn’t include them unless customers ask.

The advertisements at issue do not draw the fine distinction upon which Armstrong relies. …The clear import of the advertisement is that these features are available in Armstrong buildings, but not available in General Steel buildings. The evidence at trial established that this implication is false because both companies provide these features at additional cost. That these features may be accounted for in Armstrong’s–but not in General Steel’s–initial price quotation does not render the advertisement true, nor does it undermine the Court’s conclusion that both companies provide these features if customers are willing to pay more for them. The advertisement does not use the term “standard” or explain that General Steel customers may also obtain these features.

Another reminder: in comparative advertising, it is important to compare apples to apples. 

Defendants also argued that the court erred in finding that Armstrong was advertising comparatively when it claimed to provide “general steel buildings” and “general steel construction.” This matters, the court noted, because “courts may presume that a plaintiff has been harmed by false comparative advertising that specifically targets its company or brand, but may not presume injury with respect to non-comparative advertising.”  But all the statements on which the court relied for its disgorgement award were on the “May the Best Building Win” webpage, available at a domain name “maythebestbuildingwin.” The first full paragraph of text explained that “[t]here’s really only 2 companies to consider–Armstrong & General Steel…. How do the two finest buildings on the market stack up against one another? Take a look and decide for yourself.”  The court declined to consider statements appearing later on the webpage to be different ads.  In those portions, Armstrong referred to “general steel” buildings and construction.  This merely emphasized its targeting of General Steel.  “Given that the term ‘general steel’ refers to plaintiff General Steel, Armstrong’s claims to provide ‘general steel’ buildings can be understood as a false comparative advertisement in which Armstrong is offering itself as an alternative source of its competitor’s products.”

Finally, defendants argued that the court erred in ordering disgorgement of Armstrong’s profits.  “[A] plaintiff need only establish the defendant’s gross sales of an infringing product, or a product that was falsely advertised, in order to shift the burden onto the defendant to show appropriate deductions from those profits.” Defendants cited Lindy Pen Co., Inc. v. Bic Pen Corp., 982 F.2d 1400 (9th Cir.1993), which stated that the “plaintiff has only the burden of establishing the defendant’s gross profits from the infringing activity with reasonable certainty,” and argued that General Steel was required to show “with reasonable certainty” that defendants’ profits flowed directly from its false comparative advertising. But Lindy Pen continues: “Once the plaintiff demonstrates gross profits, they are presumed to be the result of the infringing activity. The defendant thereafter bears the burden of showing which, if any, of its total sales are not attributable to the infringing activity, and, additionally, any permissible deductions for overhead.”

Here, there was evidence that Armstrong’s internet ads were highly effective, generating tens of thousands of leads; that 90% of Armstrong’s ad budget went to internet ads; that “general steel” was the third most common search term in the industry, “supporting an inference that the May the Best Building Win webpage would frequently appear in the list of organic search results of consumers searching for information regarding General Steel” (note: Eric Goldman may disagree about this!); that Armstrong’s profits rose while it disseminated its false advertising; and that Armstrong persisted in making false statements even after litigation had begun. This was enough to link the false advertising to Armstrong’s profits.

Defendants’ expert supposedly opined that Armstrong’s comparative advertising generated only 7.5% of its leads.  But in fact, he concluded that 7.5% of Armstrong Steel’s traffic was “a result of paid search advertising directed towards searchers using queries related to the General Steel brand.” Since the comparative ads at issue here weren’t part of paid ads, but instead displayed on Armstrong’s own website, that didn’t matter.
 
Note: one lesson reinforced by this case is that comparative advertising can’t be the basis of a successful trademark claim, whether in Smith v. Chanel or online.  False advertising law is the only Lanham Act remedy for unwanted use of a mark by a competitor when that competitor is making comparisons.  But “only remedy” and “weak remedy” are not the same thing.

General Steel Domestic Sales, LLC v. Chumley, No. 10–cv–01398, 2014 WL 788040 (D. Colo. Feb. 27, 2014)

Same case: the district court declined to award General Steel prejudgment interest.  This is discretionary; its purpose is to compensate the wronged party for the lost time value of its money, and should be awarded when it would serve as compensation and when the equities favor the award.  Courts have declined to award prejudgment interest on disgorged profits when a plaintiff failed to show that it would’ve enjoyed those profits absent the unlawful conduct. Here, General Steel failed to establish actual damages, and the award was based on a presumption that Armstrong’s false comparative advertising harmed General Steel plus a finding of willfulness.  Thus, there was no basis for finding that prejudgment interest would be compensatory.
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Trademark Scholars’ Roundtable part 3

Session 3: Comparing The Two Dimensions

Discussant:  Mark McKenna

Why is it difficult to stick to product/geographic markets as a topic? Both dimensions have consumer-facing concerns (how will consumers actually understand the uses in different markets) and other considerations (practical admin. of the system, interaction w/registration system, concerns about commercial interests and when/how they ought to be allowed to expand).  If we want both dimensions have similar rules, we would want to think there’s relatively the same balance between those consumer and other interests. He’s not sure they do. Geog. scope interacts w/registration, treaty obligations, sovereignty in ways that make it distinct/not motivated so much by consumer understanding. This is also somewhat true in product markets, but we’ve converged on confusion to manage all this.

Insofar as we’re trying to regulate the relations between parties/not primarily focused on consumer behavior, might treat them differently.  Accession: if granting a party an adjacent market, is it because we expect the party to have superior ability to enter/manage? Might expect that skills would be transferable to new geographic areas, but less so in other product markets.

Brand as persona: Lots of these goods were staples not individually branded; retailers had a lot of power. Marketing changed in significant part in order to change relationship between producers and retailers, so producer could connect more directly w/consumers.  This whole system has implications for how we structure relations between different levels.  A TM system that rewards advertising will give more power to brands than to retailers.  Also, then they had to focus on non-product characteristics—convince people that they should buy one kind of salt instead of another.  Our TM system supports delivering these ads where the advertised characteristics are disconnected from physical aspects of the goods.

Bill McGeveran: to the extent that branding allows producers leverage against retailers, degree of capacity to extend branding to other product might make you on the margin less interested in that. But you’re creating consumer demand for the refreshment of Coke to get better slotting fees from retailers—most significant incentive for branding is to make consumers want you and that might not change at all based on Coke’s ability or inability to extend to other product lines.

McKenna: might change the nature of the ad message.  Coke would still say “you want Coke, not some other soda.” But if you can brand other things w/Coke, you can port the brand meaning to other goods/services, so you have less incentive to focus on characteristics specific to your category and more to focus on brand personality that is portable.

Litman/Burrell suggest that an intentional/causal account of this phenomenon as driving force of change in TM law doesn’t work (esp. in terms of British law).

Bone: addition of psychological concepts to advertising does change how ads are made: become less informational.  This does push TM law to change too.

McKenna: agrees that this was a change in marketing that courts were noticing.

Litman: just doesn’t agree with the idea that TM law was “designed” to cut retailers out; maybe a wording issue.

McGeveran: consumer v. producer orientation is really important.  In product space, the product-mark association may have special meaning in TM because you can only think about distinctiveness w/r/t a particular product; exporting to different product can take away context that can be legally important, and that’s not true of geographic space. 

Does think that internet makes exposure to other, distant marks more likely—Google gives me the nearest coffee shop first, but others in other states will also show up in the search results. 

Bently is unconvinced about this increased exposure—need more evidence.

McGeveran: thinks it’s so but that it won’t necessarily increase likely confusion. If internet has shrunk geographic and product spaces, doesn’t necessarily mean consumer perception of the meaning of distance stays unchanged.

Mike Grynberg: there are a lot of doctrines that have similar effects in geog. and product markets—one could look at the Rogers test as a kind of “honest concurrent use” for geography. Lawmakers share a common baseline: tendency of TM law generally to posit inattentive consumers.  Need reason to deviate from that baseline.

Expertise in the age of the internet: not as much of a gatekeeper function; gatekeeper mattered when space in which knowledge was stored was somewhat scarce (e.g., library shelves). And now people need filters more than gatekeepers; build communities online in which people participate in the construction of truth, for good or ill. Information cosmopolitan: capable of interacting w/marks and other sources of information—possibility for multiple ways of constructing meaning. That view would provide a different foundation for Dawn Donut, saying that consumers can resist confusion while producers are operating in different markets, even w/the rise of the internet. But the same notion of consumer ability to self-protect/make meaning can also be used in product markets, as w/Sheff’s data and the many Tiffanys in the world.  Cascading amount of nonactionable uses that potentially “dilute” marks—could posit competent consumers who are able to manage this info.

But is this an elitist argument? Info resources are not evenly distributed. 

Harm stories retain their intuitive appeal.

Dinwoodie: agrees that there is change in “distance” w/out necessarily changing confusion—may lead to more sophistication.  You can see the 9th circuit, over the course of 15 years, figure this out. But processing info takes time, and it’s still unclear how much we base our decisions on immediacy and how much we use the new information.

National marketing impulse may explain both market limits erosion and territorial limits. Coexistence agreements in registration and settlements routinely divide both geographic and product markets.  Attempts to give certainty—but sometimes what you think is a clear definition becomes more complex, as in Apple v. Apple. Many countries had a concept of defensive registration—reserved a product market removed from the goods on which you actually used the mark; another way of providing certainty over who has the right to expand into a market. Problem for use-based regimes.  But now US has ITU. Though ITU has much shorter fuse than the common 5-year period for use.

Heymann: interesting that concurrent use can be divorced from consumer understanding.

Dinwoodie: finesse that by giving deference to parties’ agreement on the idea that they know better than a court how a market would naturally flow. But there definitely be a problem of overriding consumer confusion.

McKenna: parties do this all the time—sale and leaseback; create a blanket entity that leases back to both, but both are really in control of their own activities; etc.

Dinwoodie: is there marketing literature about territorial extension as there is about product market extension? Could that be brought in to help us understand confusion?

DHL case in Europe: now have the possibility, notwithstanding unitary rights, of having a TM in less than EU and someone else able to use the same mark for the same goods elsewhere in the EU.  That prospect scared the dickens out of the TM bar. Phrased objection as creating a problem with the single market. His response: the US is a much more integrated single market with free flow throughout, but is much more comfortable with geographic restrictions and concurrent use agreements!  Somehow the US survives, even though goods and people do flow.  EU is practically fractured markets, but complete skepticism about geographic limits in TM.  Is it just nationbuilding?

RT: McKenna says: Might expect that skills would be transferable to new geographic areas, but less so in other product markets.  My reaction: Really depends on cultural factors, doesn’t it?  McDonald’s, from yesterday, doesn’t just bring the Big Mac and has had trouble when it tries a fullscale import.  McGeveran says: exporting to different product can take away context that can be legally important, and that’s not true of geographic space.  Disagree.  Depending on the mark (also true of product space, e.g. Delta) a geographic distance can make a huge difference.  Recall yesterday’s multiple Tiffany restaurants and strip clubs.  Do we think there’s a chain of each?  Not likely. And that coffee shop example, where Google gives you the nearest first, fits w/my objection to the idea that geography doesn’t provide a context of its own: the search results will be presented in ways making it unlikely that you’ll think that the different similarly named coffee shops are linked.

McGeveran: didn’t mean to contrast geography/product.  Additional information can be confusion reducing as much as it can be confusion creating in either case.

Burrell: Assumptions about consumer: consumer has a smartphone (and thus is not too poor to travel, thus has fewer income constraints). People who have to buy food where they can get it are not the “consumers” of the classic cases.  The courts are talking about people who could go to Paris and would have heard about Maxim’s.  Amazing how easily a notion of the consumer inserts itself into our thinking so that we know the “consumer” has more access to information.  Gender, class are part of the differences.

Defensive registration: had to explain to the Office why a hypothetical reasonable consumer would see the mark on X there would be some kind of harm/association that would damage the TM owner. Fell out of favor because brand owners found it really hard to explain, in the absence of use and in the absence of bad faith, what harm they would be suffering.  (I really want a citation for this!)

Dinwoodie: shows again that dilution is really unfair competition because it’s always what the defendant is doing.

McKenna: agrees that transferability is not necessarily different, but it’s a question worth asking whether one set of skills is more transferable than another (new product v. new geographic market). Thinking about transferability domestically—less significant difference in expanding from NY to Texas than NY to Mexico.

Interesting how easily we all agree, in Mark Lemley’s absence, that TM is doing much more (and different) than consumer protection. That contributes to difficulty in defining the relevant consumers—in service of what?  If it’s about protecting them from disruption in their behavior, you might define them one way. If it’s about defining them in order to allocate markets/business relations, you might define them differently. In many settings, consumers are constructed largely as a stalking horse for how we want to divide up the rights and therefore need do less to figure out what they really think.

Dinwoodie: surveys, for all their flaws, may be a light on real consumers if you think there’s a big gap between your judges and your actual consumers. 

On transferability: to the extent that the owner is licensing, then all they’re selling is their ability to market, not any other skills which become beside the point.

Bone: what sort of effects should we count? We should consider TM’s effects on market structure, but we shouldn’t necessarily use TM to engineer various markets. Dangerous to use TM as engineering device.

Dinwoodie: TM does a lot of things, but that doesn’t mean it should be used to do everything.

McKenna: his claim is not normative but descriptive.

Sheff: defining the consumer is not just normative but distributive: helping richer consumers with more brand awareness may hurt others.  Judge may be mistaken about the consumer in his/her head versus the consumers actually having experience with the mark; but separately, it may be the case that consumers are heterogenous and have different experiences.  We may subsidize one by allowing (or suppressing) use that has different effects on others.

Grynberg: be also clear on what it is we’re allocating/distributing.  Information? Value?

Dinwoodie: speculates that geographic expansion creates more heterogeneity in consumers. 

RT: I think now of McDonald’s and its beef extract used on fries, and its resulting difficulties with Hindus, vegetarians, and others who cared when McDonald’s thought they wouldn’t.  There’s an example of expansion resulting in consumer heterogeneity.  More speculatively: hasn’t branding itself attempted to create more heterogeneous consumers?  Individualizing them, hailing them as unique and different?

Dinwoodie: maybe there’s convergence between geog. and product market rules, but more formal on the geog. side because it’s easier to draw arbitrary lines when political borders are at issue. Then the arbitrary lines get softened because courts think that they’re arbitrary.  (Back to crystals and mud!)

McKenna: thicker set of rules in geog. because of registration overlay, especially in the US.  In the US, registration is mostly about nationwide rights.  Geog. market cases tend to identify areas in which the parties have rights. And those rights are sticky. They stay in place.  That is less likely to happen in product spaces, which feel more ad hoc.  It’s not a coincidence that casebooks teach priority and geog. scope of rights together, and not product market space.  There’s something more systematic and crystalline about geog. scope.  Pragmatism: sovereignty, registration, etc. which is less fluid than the product market space.

Dinwoodie: the normative qs however may be more acute with geog.  Int’l markets: well-known mark doctrine has distributive consequences between developed and developing countries. Maintenance of local culture in a global context is another question.

McKenna: US lens: registration system is more likely to give you rights with a geographic scope unrelated to any consumer understanding—in areas where the mark doesn’t mean anything to consumers (subject to Dawn Donut)—than in distant product areas.

Heymann: what is it that tells you that it’s McDonald’s even if the menu/presentation is different to respond to local conditions? What lets you recognize it as different and yet the same?  Product space offers the same questions—what difference is tolerated until there’s a crossover and the consumer thinks, ok, that’s a different source.

McGeveran: told a great story about his daughter asking if the airline company made their faucet. Navigating meaning is a skill that we teach people—even at 6 she thought it was unlikely.  Learning to parse difference and similarity is a skill.

We don’t intervene to minimize cognitive load on people in many circumstances—commercial, political, etc.  We should justify intervening in TM’s name.

Dinwoodie: other jurisdictions suppress false political speech.

McGeveran: but you don’t have in any democracy rules that ensure not just that people aren’t deceived by political falsehoods but also that they don’t draw mistaken inferences.

McKenna: we don’t regulate the incredibly confusing statements from your insurance company, for example.  (Another thing that might be unique to Americans.)
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Trademark Scholars Roundtable, part 2

Session 2: The Product Market Dimension

Robert Burrell: why do we treat territorial and product markets so differently? In the UK there was never any Q that nationwide protection was going to be the result of registration.  Always understood to be an advantage of registration, and an incentive to register. But you were initially confined very strictly to the goods named in the registration. It took a long time to chip away at that and have, for example, a defensive registration process for similar goods.

Part of this may have to do with the technology of registration, it was always understood you’d have to carve out some way of distinguishing what goods a registrant would get protection for and what goods they wouldn’t: never thought sensible to protect across all classes.

When this technology gets transported through the rest of the empire, it seems to have been accepted that you’d have the same nationwide scope, even though it’s far less obvious that Australia should have nationwide registration—there wasn’t really a single market between Sydney and Perth.  A nation-building exercise: the federal gov’t building a single market.  That’s one of the things the federal gov’t was empowered to do, bound up w/sense of nationhood beyond a simple free trade area.

Even in the UK, we quite soon had not quite a Dawn Donut rule but something similar, with a honest concurrent use defense, which provided both a defense and a way of getting onto the register. First person to register got nationwide protection; concurrent user was frozen into place.  We still see the effects of that today. A-mart, eventually sued by K-mart, which now only exists in Queensland.  Frozen there. We don’t rethink those in relation to confusion; just isolated doctrines. Nationwide protection was always illusory to a degree: courts push back on the idea of one registration being for the entire territory. But we’ve started from the opposite end with products, and think about defenses differently—broad confusion standards, but not much thought about the circumstances justifying exceptions. Why do we have honest concurrent use for remote user but not honest concurrent use for user on distinct enough product?

Bob Bone: Change in way of thinking about goodwill, no longer just product-specific. From brand to firm, and then goodwill becomes redefinable based on circumstances, not just protecting consumers.

Consumer protection orientation can be subtly changed.  How do we decide how closely related two products are?  It’s not intrinsic to the products—we ask about consumer perception. But in that case the factor is circular: the factor depends on likely confusion, but likely confusion is the question; we must be using some other principle to decide what risk level we’re tolerating. Consider a field of likely confusion—it gets higher in the center and weaker as we move out, where “out” is about different dimensions of difference such as similarity of marks, etc. Where do we draw the line?  There’s nothing intrinsically different about product and geographic boundaries, except normatively. So we may draw tighter limits on one than the other, but that’s because of reasons related to the type of dimension it is. Geography = sovereignty plays a role.

Move from the consumer perspective where we’re talking about likely confusion, to producer perspective. Different set of arguments about broader product markets. If brand is identity, then it’s odd to ask producer to change its name in order to move to a new market. Lots of problems with that position, but it introduces a new element.  So how do we want to structure product markets? How will these choices influence firm structures? Consumer perspective is all about confusion and whether it’s geographic or product differences is secondary, but not from producer perspective.

A note on dilution: used to think tarnishment was understandable and blurring not.  Still doesn’t think blurring makes sense normatively, or that its empirical assumptions are true. But at least it’s in TM language: selling power.

Tarnishment isn’t so simple: consumers don’t make a connection, so it’s not harming the reputation of the firm.  If you think of a strip club, you don’t think less of Tiffany’s the jeweler.  Under this theory (whose empirics, again, he doesn’t believe). Tarnishment is about product diversity.  When I buy Tiffany jewelry, Tiffany is part of what I’m buying.  Advertising: the advertiser can make the mark more/different.  When Tiffany is used on a strip club, the strip club can destroy that control, and so Tiffany will not be selling the same product “Tiffany jewelry.”  Prevents negative information from affecting the meaning of the mark. If we’d like to have regular jewelry and Tiffany jewelry, then barring tarnishment makes sense (if a bunch of Tiffany strip clubs would otherwise come into existence). If this is true, tarnishment isn’t a part of TM law; it’s doing something else.

Bently: on the assumption of nationwide scope—the mechanics of having a TM office would have contributed to that.

Red Bull decision envisions concurrent use in the field of dilution. Red Bull sued a Dutch company that had run a bar called Bulldog since 1975.  Moved from just serving drinks, for which it had a registration, to serving an energy drink.  Was this due cause?  Court seemed to think it could be: natural expansion of products from one market to another—whether it was natural to extend from bar into energy drinks. 

McKenna: Bone’s story makes tarnishment and blurring sound the same: both are about affecting meaning of the mark.

We do have a way of thinking about how owners move through geography, but not a good way of thinking about how they move through product market space. How do you think about superior rights, given that both producers may have started moving?

Bone: doesn’t know what it means for products to move closer together in the product space.  Is pancake flour closer to syrup than sugar? 

McKenna: marketing literature has some answers there.

Bone: still normative.

McKenna: normative to say “too close,” but descriptive to say there are degrees of closeness.

Bone: in a sense blurring and tarnishment are similar. What gives the mark its attraction is making the product more appealing.  But you can also think of it as a particular type of selling device.  Psychological advertising: made a different product from the unbranded version. Can’t make that separation for tarnishment as he can for blurring.

Dinwoodie: in the product area we have a standard which allows us to meander, whereas in territory area we have a blanket rule: you have America.  Once you have a rule, you need exceptions.

McKenna: one other way to think about the difference—TM is build on connecting a mark to particular goods, which is the only way to assess distinctiveness.  We relax that at the infringement stage.  When courts say an inherently distinctive mark is strong, they apply that to other goods/services where it may not have the same meaning.  Geography isn’t as foundational to the TM system; more politically up for grabs.

Dinwoodie: that’s a common law way of thinking: registration lets you get whole classes.  You’re still measuring distinctiveness in theory against the set of goods/services, but practically you get a lot more.

Sheff: Metaphor of confusion manifold is elegant and interesting but probably not descriptively very helpful. If would be nice if each dimension was a vector that could be measured in terms of distance from origin (P’s product), but that’s not what’s going on. It’s not that product proximity is asking whether consumers are likely to be confused due to similarity b/t products, but that confusion is so empty itself—the factors are doing other things. 

See familiar mark in unfamiliar category: something goes on in consumer’s head. If consumer resolves discrepancy, the process of resolving that discrepancy feels good. If they can’t, the cognitive dissonance makes them feel bad. But what does that have to do with confusion? Probably not much. Whatever these dimensions are measuring, we hope they’re measuring effect on consumers, and Q is whether that effect has normative weight.  We might ask whether there’s negative feedback on the prior mark from discrepancy, though the marketing literature suggests there won’t be.

Dilution: who is allowed to participate in creation of mark’s meaning?  It can’t be the case that only the first user is entitled to participate in that.  Who else?  We have no global answer, but sui generis rules.  No sex/no drugs = tarnishment; what about user-generated content/consumer participation?  There we’re moving to allowing that, but what about uses by other firms?  We don’t have clear guidelines.

Burrell: discussing blurring is like atheists arguing the meaning of the Bible: none of us believes in it.  Tarnishment can be conceptualized as an alien invader, or as part of blurring, but you have to know what blurring is and we don’t.

RT: Bone’s description sounds like the province of patent; usually we expect competition in product markets to do the best job of provisioning them.

Borders/distances don’t actually shrink, absent invasion or devolution.  But what bars serve can change, perhaps in a different way—now that energy drinks are popular mixers with alcohol, competing in the market for bars may require selling them.  Compare Apple Computer’s move into music while music was becoming digital, something that wasn’t as salient, so it looked like Apple Computer was moving into music while really they were both moving. Possible tools for measuring closeness of product categories: Lakoff/psychological literature on how people group things categorically.  Legal precedent: rules of accession? Usually used for other purposes, e.g. people have argued with domain names that accession can provide rules of allocation to TM owners, but could it have relevance for product markets too?

McGeveran: some constraints are totally independent of confusion, like sovereignty—a true defense.  (Or at least it used to be.)

Bone: wants us to focus on harm, not on aspects like strength of the mark or similarity.  True that confusion is a grab bag of concepts, but using harm at the center of the infringement manifold has some beneficial effects. 

With dilution: he thinks it’s part of sellers deciding what they’re selling.  With tarnishment, the Q is whether they get to decide the quality or character of the good itself, or whether consumers will be allowed to participate—do we democratize what the goods are?  Or can the producer control? (But will they come when you do call for them?)  Of course the producer can’t control—the public does define this quality.  But it’s sort of like a market for lemons: the acts of particular private individuals can create an externality where people who like Tiffany jewelry may be saddened by the rise of the Tiffany strip club, if the subconscious effects story is true.  You buy this story or you don’t. But if you do, it seems that’s how you have to justify it. (OK, I’ve written a lot about how the empirics are wrong, and Bone does seem to agree, but it’s worth reiterating.)  True, as soon as you say “Tiffany jewelry” is a different product than “jewelry,” we are now fighting over the definition of the relevant market.

Burrell: even if you buy it, you still have to ask when tarnishment might be present.  EU: there might be tarnishment between whiskey and dog food, and he’s not sure that’s different from sex/drugs.

Litman: Does anyone buy this story as something that actually happens?

RT: No! Related point: if you say that making other people feel sad is an externality, you walk into an important issue in utilitarianism, which is whether we should ever count the sadness that some people feel while observing the behavior of others as a harm in a utilitarian calculus.  John Stuart Mill says no, and I’ve said the same. It turns out that if Tiffany stumbles, Cartier is willing to start providing the same benefits, and consumers even seem to enjoy the churn.

Grynberg: we don’t believe in dilution; we don’t think confusion is coherently configured. But we still have a dilution law and a confusion law, committing us to something. So maybe we should turn away from consumers and towards these other policies, like helping businesses.

McKenna: we should stop pretending that dilution is a thing. Attracted to something Tushnet said once: if we must, just say that famous mark owners own the mark, not connected to anything that a defendant’s use does to consumer perceptions, and have all the weight rest on showing fame and on rigorously enforced exceptions.

Dinwoodie: transaction/enforcement costs also have some bearing on that.

McGeveran: might have avoided some monkeying with the confusion rationale, if we no longer had very famous marks exerting a sort of gravitational pull on confusion doctrine.

Litman: Boy Scouts have that; are we happy with that?

McKenna: turns out that, though the new dilution statute has problems, its exceptions are much more robust than for confusion.  For enforcement costs: in order to allow people to protect incremental source meaning, we’ve created a series of rules that are expensive and difficult to apply, and the designs that make it through the hurdles are very few.  Dilution may be the same; there’s now a split about whether you have to show something more than association, and maybe why bother?

Bone: it’s possible that most claimants will give up if you have these hurdles. The Q that would arise: why just famous marks?  Why not give this right to more marks?  The common law asks what principles justify limiting this right to famous marks, and there is nothing but politics.  Courts would try to extend it. 

Heymann: Bently asked what has changed—and maybe it’s not distribution, but the way the consumer interacts with the brand as a personality. Dilution then can be a right of publicity for famous marks, like a right for celebrities.  Brand as persona drives the claims being pressed.

RT: Bone says it’s possible that most claimants will give up if you have these hurdles.  Though that still affects risk calculus in a different way than a small but absolute rule. He fears pressure to extend the right. But this wouldn’t be a common law right—that’s the point. Though I take the point that courts might try to stretch others’ rights to match the statutory right.  Not clear that we’d be worse off, especially if the standard required identical and not merely similar marks. Right of publicity analogy is great.  Notable that the right of publicity too has been under pressure to expand to noncelebrities in various ways.  One piece of evidence on statutory solutions, at least at the state level: NY did a much better job limiting the right than California did!

McKenna: the other issue w/the right of publicity is what counts as use. If you give courts any rein about what counts as use—“persona”—then they’ll run away with it. So any TM solution should require use of the identical mark.  (RT: maybe using the counterfeit standard?)

McGeveran: NY statute has a list, and has been effectively policed, unlike California’s standard.

Bently: we do have special rights for the Olympics, Red Cross, Red Crescent, and are extremely strong rights with no suitable First Amendment limitations/possible free expression defense under ECHR.  However, other institutions don’t seem to be clamoring for the same set of rights, so maybe they don’t inevitably expand.

Bone: all statutes are rent-seeking, so that won’t necessarily constrain it. Q is whether courts would use analogies to the statutes in other areas.  Heymann is right about branding of identity.  But what justifies protecting this identity? There may be a moral right, but that doesn’t work for a corporation.  If the reason is instrumental, then that instrumental rationale can be extended, and clever lawyers will try to do so. We may not be able to contain it by speaking to the identity of famous marks.

Dinwoodie: European standard uses “identity” but has been interpreted to mean “close to identity.”

Litman: points out that there are dozens of Tiffany’s strip clubs, as well as dozens of Tiffany’s restaurants (Posner’s example).

Mid-point Discussants: Jeremy Sheff

Looked at registrants and whether marks were in same category or not. Atlas has had as many as 127 prior registrations live at the time of applications in the same product class, and 268 live in other classes.  These numbers may be slightly off for technical reasons, but the basic point is there. Champion, Phoenix, Ace, ABC, Titan, Sentinel, Eclipse, Guardian, Star, Guardian, Eagle, Delta, National—similar story.

Takeaway: at least in registration context, TM system hasn’t seen any significant problem with concurrent use of standard character marks by different owners both in the same and different product classes.  This is particularly so with marks that might be arbitrary but connote “strength.”

Consumers are probably pretty good at sorting through different users’ applications of identical marks to different products, and PTO has long recognized this. 

McKenna: this is more evidence that the courts which conclude that registration is evidence of strength are clearly wrong.

Burrell: you’re just using classes, which are broad.

Sheff: yes, and classes have also changed in size and shape over the period studied.

Laura Heymann: when a consumer sees “Virgin” on hammers, what do we assume the consumer thinks?  Maybe we want to ask what’s material to the consumer’s decisionmaking process.  What happens when the consumer experiences the same name in two different product spaces? Examine the assumptions behind our accounts of what consumers think and do.

Bone: we think consumers generalize some experiences.  May feel less positive about the entity to which the bad experience is linked—that’s intuitive. 

McKenna: Marketing research: when it happens, it’s because of sufficiently transferable skills in making and selling products that consumers believe the skills will transfer successfully—there, there might be some feedback. When the products are far enough apart, consumers won’t penalize the producer.  Happens when there’s fit.  Marketers consider extensions “far” when TM cases would consider them closely related—it’s not that it never happens, but it’s a lot more rare than TM doctrine things. 

There is a producer side story to be told: in those settings where what’s perceived to be a brand extension is a failure won’t have a feedback effect, it might nonetheless interfere with other extension plans. If Virgin the airline is perceived to be bad at making hammers, the airline may have trouble with other product extensions.  Normatively we can talk about that, but it’s at least plausible.

Bone: suppose I don’t have a prior positive experience with the senior mark, and I just experience the junior mark.  My first contact will be bad.

McKenna: would have to go back and look.

RT: Bone on the intuitive appeal of harm: Except the memory research and advertising research says that we’re very bad at resisting manipulation: ads make salty orange juice taste good; ads can make us think we saw characters at Disneyland owned by WB; we are very resistant to changing our already formed opinions, from brands to students (what happens when you tell teachers that their kids are particularly smart).  Because we get powerful messages from ads, our first contact with a brand is usually not consuming the product but getting the brand’s message. That’s why I don’t worry too much about the unusual person who has never seen an ad for the senior mark, encounters the junior mark, and then develops a bad opinion of the senior mark when he finally does encounter it.

McKenna: even really sophisticated consumers are really bad at resisting ads.

Much of the literature is about advising companies when it’s smart or not to engage in brand extensions.  It’s about measuring costs and benefits.  Marketing departments aren’t advising to expand into everything—there’s a lot about creating sub-brands and differentiating.

Dinwoodie: still suggests huge gap between legal and marketing assumptions.

McKenna: companies are in part interested in preserving space for future action.  Maybe they are thinking 10 years into the future.  (RT: There are companies thinking 10 years into the future?) Maybe in marketing departments.

McGeveran: execs who don’t want to be the one who lost space X if bosses want to move into it.

McKenna: concerns over free riding/leaking value might change incentives some, but hard to say it’s enough to cut back the incentive to advertise heavily. 

Litman: expects some overenforcement is that counsel believes the harm stories, however improbable.  Would be good for the world if the real empirics could be brought to bear on the problem. 

Bone: hard to falsify the proposition once committed, and people are risk averse so don’t want to change behavior.  Accountants claim they’re measuring something: stockholders think so too. Then we’ve got reinforcement of this thing that needs protecting or will be lost. 

Dinwoodie: there are also countervailing cost pressures; in house counsel might be taking some leads from business/marketing.

Heymann: Google sends letters saying “we see you, but we’re not (yet) asking you to stop.”  Could try to change the paradigm there.

Dinwoodie: if overenforcement is the issue, need something more systemic.

Heymann: but if clients are saying “do something!” lawyers need a legal pressure by which they can push back on that unless something actually should be done.  Much discussion of Jessica Silbey’s work.

McGeveran: Silbey emphasizes that it’s a personhood feeling.  Responsibility for integrity of the brand.

Heymann: sometimes they’d even hear from consumers: do something!

RT: but what is protection?  This is a question of scope: we don’t think that owning a building means you have to prevent people from building a similar building nearby or you’ll lose the value of the building, especially if the people in the new building are making a different thing than you are.  I don’t know if anything but persona/personhood concepts can be at work here.  (Jessica Silbey’s work again.)

Also worth mentioning: pressure from authorized distributors, not just consumers.  Costco v. Omega: Omega’s acts were all about protecting distributors. 

Dinwoodie: similar with keywords: if authorized distributors aren’t allowed to buy keyword ads by contract, there’s an incentive to pressure the TM owner to go after non-authorized distributors of legit goods for buying keywords.

RT: I noticed we didn’t spend as much time as we could have on product markets.  Why are they so hard to talk about?

Dinwoodie: You can get very sophisticated in defining product markets, in antitrust, but that’s not congruent with the rough justice that tends to prevail in TM.

McKenna: so many moving parts in the product market definition: are you interested in consumers? Managing business relations?  Ensuring future room for expansion? Or, with promotional goods, you just have a normative commitment to whose market this should be? We’ve all realized there isn’t one normative principle there on which we can all agree, making it hard to draw the line.
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Trademark Scholars Roundtable

Sixth Trademark Scholars Roundtable: The Territorial and Product Market Dimensions of Trademark Law, UT Austin

Session 1: The Territorial/Geographic Market Dimension

Graeme Dinwoodie: territoriality is becoming more important in reconciling local and global markets.

Lionel Bently: Geographic localism used to be possible; a common story is evolutionary—the most common word is “increasing.”  Increasing connectivity, move across geographic borders.  But what we lack is a deep history. He’s not convinced that the change narrative is right.  19th century cases featured a lot of transnational marketing and movement of goods.  Many of 1830s and 1840s brands were being marketed in America and UK.  Not clear whether this was licensing, but should make us skeptical about claims to novelty that underpin much of this work.

Late 19th/early 20th century English cases on passing off.  One case from 1909 where House of Lords first recognized “goodwill”—involved Spaulding, an American company making sports goods.  First case that recognizes that descriptive words can have secondary meaning was a case involving camelhair belting (for use on machines), used in tropical countries where traditional materials didn’t work—which is to say, sold as part of a system of international production and distribution of goods. UK registration system was response to pressures from traders from elsewhere who feared they wouldn’t get protection under the passing off regime.

We know that there was a lot of international marketing, and the cases are informed by that. We should be skeptical of claims to novelty, and about what it is that we identify as new. Wants to think of the role of TM in British colonialism—systems that allow protection of goodwill generated in Britain in colonial markets, to allow for expansion of British business easily into those markets.

More conceptual Qs: is it desirable to protect spillover reputation that exists from the marketing of goods elsewhere?  Some situations, most of us would probably agree that it is desirable to bar another from using the relevant designation.  Cybersquatting type situation, where someone has just registered a well-known mark in Country B in order to hold up any potential marketing/extort money from them.  No social benefit from permitting that. 

Then there’s the trader who uses the mark in Country B—potential consumer deception.  Well-known mark doctrine undermines the function of the registration system.  Maybe because there’s no need to register; maybe because it defeats nonuse limitations on registered marks.  Undermining registration might not be too bad a thing, though.  Also, you increase the costs for other traders who want to find out what marks are available, which the registration system is supposed to reduce.

What is the standard?  How do you find out whether a mark has a reputation?  Might be easier to show a mark is well known.  Tendency to think that well known is a higher standard than having a reputation. But if the level of known-ness is lower, there are problems, and the notion of known-ness in Europe is much lower than Americans seem to think.

Empirical questions: Does protecting a well-known mark facilitate expansion into other markets or not?  Does it allow companies to stay out for longer because they have protection anyway? These seem to be testable Qs.  Skeptic: well-known mark protection is sought by already successful businesses and is a product of rent-seeking more than real economic efficiency.

What are the effects on local investment?  Absent cybersquatting/blocking, if someone innocently adopts McDonald’s in a country like South Africa or Jamaica (real examples) and invests in the mark, and in due course gets sued.  We don’t know!  You can say the local producer didn’t need to adopt the mark, but at least in cases of innocence that’s not fully satisfying. 

RT: Thanks also for the opportunity. I’m afraid I won’t live up to it, because I just have a series of questions.  (Bently’s first, historical question: “What it is that we identify as new?” raises for me the possibility of increased direct consumer access, instead of firms bringing goods across borders. Rise of mass media?  But this may well be overstated.  For his project, compare Christine Haight Farley on the inter-American treaties where American companies were apparently doing the same thing.) 

A forehand/backhand: TM is about consumer protection, until TM is about managing relations among businesses.  Or is it vice versa?  Principles, then exceptions that may be so broad as to actually constitute the background rule (Dawn Donut being one possible example).  Another example: exhaustion, where legitimate goods can be sold across borders … unless there are material differences.  Even if the consumer is getting them from Australia herself by buying them on eBay, apparently, the variation in details, including details in the warranty, still means that there will be confusion as a matter of law.  So we have exhaustion in theory but in practice a retailer can prevent it.

Dorpan v. Hotel Melia, from last year: area of use isn’t exactly reputation, certainly not zone of likely expansion.  It’s confusion.  Confusion might not be everything, as Mark and others have told us, but it’s the only thing.  What this demonstrates to me: Lack of theoretical or even practical basis for an understanding of territoriality as something distinct from the trademark’s strength.  And this is true for registered/unregistered both, I think.

Should registered marks be different?  Nationwide priority means hypothetical confusion inquiry.  We act as if the mark had the full scope of presence everywhere, even if it doesn’t really.  This hypothetical confusion inquiry is usually done in opposition proceedings.  I’ve been thinking a lot about using the registration to act as if the rights were defined by the registration, rather than by use.  I think of this as a European model, though clearly the Europeans can’t entirely resist the appeal of looking to the actual use either.  Implications: not just nationwide priority, but possible effects on strength (this I think is wrong, though you’re starting to see cases where courts say it, as well as courts that say that incontestability means strength), and also on similarity (where the registrant has a standard character mark but usually uses a particular design, and the defendant’s design is different but the words are similar/the same).  If we have nationwide priority, why don’t we have these other features of a registration system?

Well, maybe because of the common law reasoning that resists these hypotheticals. The cybersquatting like behavior Bently talks about wouldn’t work in a use-based system, since there’s no bona fide intent to use. Dawn Donut: Based on the idea that non-nationwide businesses aren’t really that likely to become nationwide—only a few of them really do manage to make it to all 50 states–so it’s on balance better for society to let other businesses continue to use the currently nonconfusing marks even though if the senior user does expand there would then be confusion.  It is a risk assessment.

Final thought: Carol Rose on crystals and mud in propertylaw.  She says courts will always seesaw between them because each has features that operate as necessary correctives to the others.  Should we think about TM, including territoriality, this way?

Dinwoodie: Territoriality issues often collapse to the distinction between use and registration. If you really bought registration, you’d have rights to chunks of goods (at least for 5 years in Europe) as defined by the registration.

Munich economists studied changes in 1860s when TM regime changed—inconclusive, struggling to isolate variables.  Benelux—in 1973, Benelux abolished national rights and went to unitary right.

At some point, a difference in degree justifies difference in kind—it is fair to say that territorial issues are “increasing.”  More interactions of national marks in foreign contexts, particularly online.

Courts do address the cost/benefit issues in the well-known marks cases, such as Grupo Gigante; even the Bancorp case where the dissent has it right.  They’re thinking them through in context of defining the territorial dimension of rights.  Even European courts may limit relief to countries in which a mark is known and in which therefore there is confusion, even though the right is by hypothesis EU-wide.

McKenna: Every year, we fight about whether TMs are about search costs. International level: becomes more clear that the question of what TMs are for is so much more diffuse.  Right to expand in another market is a political choice about structuring commercial relationships, not a consumer issue.  Compromises at the international level have little to do with the normative Qs Americans tend to think TM is about, and the layering makes analysis more difficult.

Dinwoodie: Grupo Gigante is phrased for the “poor immigrants coming over the border,” but the well-known mark doctrine comes from treaties during a period when there weren’t such immigrants and it really was a right to expand.

Bently: the people who really want the well-known mark doctrine are lawyers who fear consequences of not doing their jobs (that is, getting registrations) in a particular country.  (This assumes a registration based system!)

McKenna: registration system is driven by a sense of geographic expansion of trade across the US; this isn’t new but goes to the 1800s in the US, and also true in the international level—but the expansion is all being carried out by means of registration. What differs now: we’re talking about spillovers beyond registration—scope of relief, infringement, etc.  A lot of the features of the registration system are features of int’l agreements driven by old waves of product diffusion; what’s different now?

Searching for use v. searching for repute: McKenna isn’t sure we search for use in any setting. We say we do, but we’re always searching for repute. We don’t have a great idea of what constitutes use, and so we look for things like analogous use. There are some exceptions in priority disputes, but the overwhelming majority of cases really look for recognition, not use.  Maybe the level of repute we’re talking about is higher versus what’s required to find basic “use,” but use isn’t doing the work.

Robert Burrell: points out that Australian courts will routinely reject consumer surveys. 

Dinwoodie: true of British etc. courts while US courts fetishize them; surveys by definition look at distinctiveness to consumers, whereas nonsurvey proxies are more likely to look at what the business is doing.  The evidentiary rule has effects on (or perhaps reflects) the attitude.

Robert Bone: “use” from the 19th century was about what was required to appropriate/control the mark, from a property standpoint. 20th century: move from property to goodwill, pushing us to reputation, but we still have the old use rules.  We’re seeing this old use idea being pushed and crumbling, but TM holds on to the past.

Sheff: how do we determine whether a mark is well known?  Surprisingly difficult to determine fame, which his current empirical project.  Looking at third-party assessments of brand value.  Problem is that best evidence is in the hands of the person claiming big rights; they know what consumers think about their brands better than anyone else.  How do we force that info out of the private user? A registration system is a useful tool for getting one piece of information: I’m staking out a market.  But it’s a very small piece if we’re interested in reputation among consumers in a jurisdiction.  So, we need incentives to disclose.

Dinwoodie: in other countries with pure registration based systems (not much examination as in US) there are a lot of “squatted” marks on the register and there’s cost to getting them back.

Bone: chilling effect on local investment must not be from mark (because there’s always another mark to use), but from fear of big guys coming in.

Burrell: it’s gotten harder to do parallel imports in Australia—in US too?

McKenna: the material difference doctrine has been around for a while, but courts are increasingly willing to treat differences in warranty as material differences—or even removal of product codes.  Why is that material?  Well, Sheff notes that the TM owner claims it interferes with its monitoring of its customers.  RT: but how could that be material to consumers? 

Burrell: maybe in international cases courts require real confusion, not all the proxies we use in national cases—so proving a reputation turns out to be really quite hard. 

Dinwoodie: that works in Australia because it’s not such a mess as the US.

Burrell: if you’re doing a well-known marks case in Australia, the action is technically the same but the foreign company must prove a reputation, not just prove that it’s been selling and advertising for a number of years.

Heymann: Q of whether the marks mean the same thing across jurisdictions.  Does this mark have a meaning is different—do you recognize it v. what does it mean?  Allowing producer to control meanings across jurisdictions—or not. McDonald’s can have different types of McDonald’s depending on local cultures.

Mid-point Discussants:  Marshall Leaffer

There’s good literature on the desire of French firms to promote their goods in French-speaking Africa—could feed into the imperialism discussion.

Interaction of reputation, goodwill, and use: Convinced that de facto we’re looking more at reputation than goodwill.  WIPO says that reputation should be the centerpiece. Leah Chan Grinvald argues that there should have to be a high level of secondary meaning first.  McDonald’s South Africa case seems to comport with WIPO standards—need a substantial number of persons to recognize the mark, which means not a negligible number—a very liberal standard, attenuating the notion of extraterritoriality. Bulova and Vanity Fair are deprecated, after Grupo Gigante; the q of the nationality of the individual in question is less important. Even McBee v. Delica was a close case; if he’d shown real some sales in the US, he should’ve won.

Formalities of registration and renewal: it’s really hard to keep up with them in all countries. Well-known marks = important safety valve for the costly system of today.

Jessica Litman: Many more companies are international today.  First, consumer understanding.  Second, some degree of territoriality is how the different states/contracting parties acknowledge each other’s sovereignty and power over their own markets and citizens. Increase in multinational corporations affects both: likelihood that consumers think that Marlboro in Japan is the same Marlboro in the US.  Acme Donuts in NY and California: increasingly consumers believe that two companies are related not because consumers or goods are traveling more but because they’re aware that many companies aren’t local.  50 years ago if you were traveling to a different city and saw a descriptive mark you’d assume that this was just a different local company.  Multinationals also change political economy.  Lobbying their various sovereigns to respect their marks cross-border.

Mike Grynberg: How strong/robust do we think these expectations are, versus the costs of weakening territoriality?

Burrell: shouldn’t assume that multinationals desire to trade everywhere; sometimes they have no interest in being in the market. McDonald’s has said outright that it won’t enter Bosnia because it’s too much of a dump.  Well-known marks doctrine still applies.

Dinwoodie: they might come in if Bosnia improves.

McGeveran: they’d say that badly run McDonald’s would harm their reputation among non-Bosnian tourists even if Bosnians aren’t confused.

Dinwoodie: that’s a very producer oriented argument, not really about consumer protection.

RT: (Note on harm stories being quite often wrong.)  Now I’m confused about what goodwill means (ok, I’ve always been confused).  I thought it meant something like the selling power of the mark, which is to say the power to bring sales to the TM owner.  So you can have reputation without selling power? 

Some discussion with Litman over whether consumers would really think Acme was the same in a different state, given other contextual elements. It may be that we shouldn’t treat Proctor & Gamble as a descriptive term and should abandon the old rule about proper names, but just because there are some crossnational brands doesn’t mean they all are, and I think consumers can still tell the difference.

Litman: Gave her students the Cracker Barrel case, and they were largely shocked that the two companies were separate entities.

RT: yes, where a brand presents itself as a national brand and you can find Cracker Barrel cheese in multiple supermarkets, I see that.  But there are also plenty of businesses that are obviously local.

Bone: is there harm from any difference?  The quality of Cracker Barrel cheese and Cracker Barrel restaurants isn’t really related.  If they both look like national brands, you can presume you’ll be ok. 

Dinwoodie: convergence among products is related to convergence in territory (Cracker Barrel being a great example). Change in business organization affects both.

One of the tradeoffs of trade liberalization is that new companies can come in and fight for market share on the established one’s turf. So while you can call the TM rent-seeking, it looks less so in the context of the broader trade deal.

Common-law system in theory starts with reality and has developed hypotheses; the registration system starts with hypothesis and occasionally consults with reality.  The Q is whether they end up in a different place.

Leaffer: Goodwill: what is the mark worth is another definition, but it all depends on other things such as reputation. Reputation is a less loaded term; skeptical of arguments that well-known marks doctrine should be limited to cases in which the mark has goodwill.

Materiality in exhaustion cases, used to destroy exhaustion—does seem to be going in the opposite direction of the copyright cases. 

McKenna: in terms of the harm story, are there points of differentiation between the marks? Relationship between scope of mark and territoriality.  Someone need not open McDonald’s with the same logo/colors in Bosnia. Empirical evidence suggests that consumers are good at differentiation when there’s a reason for them to do that.  “Big Mac Noodles” have successfully opened in some East Asian countries.

We keep talking about reputation/goodwill, but in the context of functionality he’s considered non-reputation-related advantage, and the Q is “reputation for what?”  Courts are pretty slippery and use the concept as a makeweight, as in Au-tomotive Gold. The court thinks that the use of the mark on a keychain necessarily calls the reputation to mind, ignoring the question of whether the reputation is for those goods or services. We have the same problem with confusion, talking about it as all one thing, and we do that with “reputation” too.

Laura Heymann: agrees with the point about logos. Marks don’t exist in tombstone, black and white form; almost always visually presented, even though cases sometimes mention the radio.  Always has a context, which affects how consumers think about the relationship between the two.

Thinking through harm story about Bosnian McDonald’s: if consumers are confused, do they judge McDonald’s business judgments as opposed to the ordinary meaning of the quality of the goods and services?  That’s a different kind of reputation.

Dinwoodie: “what’s the harm?” is a distinctively American question to ask. One could ask a different question (e.g., unfair advantage/unjust enrichment).

RT: (1) a registration system has a ready answer to the “marks don’t exist in tombstone format” point, if the word mark is registered—so then we should dig into the question of why allow that kind of registration, and relatedly why we allow nationwide priority.  (That is, McDonald’s doesn’t use the block letters; it uses its own distinctive font. If we nonetheless agree that McDonald’s is “using” the standard character mark, which I think we must (otherwise it should be cancelled for nonuse!), then someone who opens a McDonald’s in Bosnia with a different font is also using the standard character mark, whether or not that causes confusion).  (2) On Leaffer’s exhaustion comments: There’s a connection also between exhaustion and the point Dinwoodie makes about having to compete against entrants from outside. Exhaustion means that in theory the owner has to compete with its foreign products too.  The larger trade scheme needs to be considered, and the Europeans seem to be ahead of us here.

Jeremy Sheff: Mary LaFrance is working on a paper on the implications of Kirtsaeng for TM—predicts shift to TM methods of exercising control/preventing exhaustion.

Mark Janis: what is the body of law on well-known marks outside the US?

Bone: Persons has this rule about “bad faith” adoption by a remote junior user.  But the theory is that it’s a remote area and there’s no local meaning—what could bad faith possibly mean?  Maybe it’s an evidentiary test—an idea that the D might have reason to believe that there is secondary meaning in the area.  Or maybe it’s a proxy for potential market entry into the area, though that would be weird.  Then you have a Dawn Donuts problem: there’s no entry yet, so what are we accomplishing by stopping the junior use?  Also, as to secondary meaning/goodwill, if that’s the only evidence thereof that’s really slight.

Litman: real consumers encounter TMs in context. A strict application of territoriality treats copying logo, trade dress, business concept exactly the same as copying only the word mark. If we want to treat them differently, and her impulse is to do so, the Q is if there’s a way to do that, say by limiting famous mark doctrine to identity of logo/other visual elements.

Leaffer: there’s a paucity of cases on well-known marks. The South African McDonald’s case is therefore our fallback.

Dinwoodie: you can have passing off in many countries; the countries in which you find these cases tend to have registration-only systems and no passing off backup.

McGeveran: we should be distinguishing between products and services. The nature of what’s moving across territorial boundaries can be goods or it can be information/reputation, and those are distinct.  Increase in both of those movements. Consumer’s ability to go online can defeat decision of goods-maker not to enter a country (unless exhaustion doesn’t apply!), whereas the Bosnian McDonald’s is different.

McKenna: why would we want TM rights to preserve rights to entry?  We might think that owners are more likely to be good at expanding to/exploiting a new geographic market than a new product market.

Registration: maybe we have a rule for registration purposes that block letters encompass everything, but once we get to infringement we ignore that.  We’ve been talking mostly about word marks: but what are we talking about with a registered trade dress?  We don’t really have a long history of interpreting what registration of a product configuration means, mostly because we don’t care what the registration says in an infringement case. But as we start thinking more about stuff outside the registration system, that will force us to think harder about the relationship between the registration system and infringement actions.  We wouldn’t necessarily want the McDonald’s registration for Ba Da Ba Ba Ba, which is registered in standard character form, to cover all alternatives.  You might want to treat it like a patent: you get what you claim, and people who use more than that don’t infringe the patent.

Dinwoodie: Compare Louboutin.  Registered mark valid, but not used. 

When you export US registration for international registration purposes, what do you get? Problems are usually thought to come from the description of goods and services/classes, but also this discussion shows that there can be issues from the description of the mark itself.

Janis: now we’re talking about a regime of claim interpretation, which has its own costs.

Maybe the McDonald’s issue with the different logo should really be a 10bis claim, unfair competition not TM.  There, you focus on what the D has done, not the scope of the P’s right.

Dinwoodie: one reason we’ve moved away from “use” is the rise of the service economy, where advertising is more important, and once you do that for services, why not for goods?

EU is now struggling with need for Dawn Donut type rules since rights are now so geographically broad.  The internet doesn’t make local use irrelevant, it makes it more relevant.

Bently: to what degree is this related to nationbuilding and perceptions of nationbuilding—does Dawn Donut reflect a view of the nation that no longer seems accurate to us?  (Comment: If anything, we’re more divided!)  In Europe, the TM stuff is clearly part of a process of Europe-building, but placed registration in tension with some of the functions of TM, so we’ve started to carve out a series of exceptions from the unitary mark.

RT: w/r/t nationbuilding, contrast the nationalism of our export of copyright—one might suggest that now that the US doesn’t make anything but movies, it hasn’t felt much need to export TM, or even incorporate others’ rules. By contrast we’ve felt great need to export our copyright regimes, minus our limitations.  Exporting culture and law together.

Dinwoodie: European politicians are resistant to any derogation from one EU policy; judges however worry about granting relief that covers 29 countries without reason for that breadth.

Also, © harmonization might be behind TM harmonization for various reasons and TM thus less in need of pressure from the perspective of the harmonizers.
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