House DMCA hearing part 1

House Judiciary DMCA Hearing. (Links on names go to testimony.)
Rep. Goodlatte: Unanticipated: volume of notices plus reappearance of content. Adequacy of notice is an issue. Fraudulent notices with little risk of penalty are also a problem, though a low percent. §512 was balanced among interests. Keep consensus model in mind.

Rep. Conyers: In 1998, there were few blogs; social media like Facebook and Twitter didn’t exist.  (RT: why I call the DMCA the Digital Fifteen Minutes Copyright Act.)  Some courts interpreting §512 have done so in ways more restrictive than we intended, imposing significant burdens on copyright owners to monitor the internet and specifically identify millions of infringing files.  Narrowly interpreted circumstances under which providers will be deemed to have red flag knowledge of infringement to take material down. Has also generated lots of litigation with new technologies like cyberlockers and P2P filesharing, which have facilitated infringement in a manner we in Congress didn’t fully envision when we enacted §512. Statute is therefore largely ineffective in combating massive amounts of infringement that occur using these technologies. We must decrease infringement.  Sites providing access to infringing copies continue to increase.  We must improve the process for identifying/handling repeat infringers.  Copies of the same works are reuploaded.  Result: whack-a-mole.  Should consider whether search engines can somehow prioritize results that don’t contain infringing material.  They’ve demoted search results in other contexts.  Resistance to doing that for copyright owners. The voluntary agreement among ISPs and large copyright owners is a good model, targeting P2P infringement of those big copyright owners’ works.

Sean O’Connor, University of Washington School of Law

§ 512 is at the intersection of artists, copyright owners, and internet providers.  Represents rhizome.org and a site that allows people to make multimedia collages to express themselves.  They were started by artists who respect copyright, but who also want to make content widely available.  One point: we’re often trying to divide the tech world from the content world, and with smaller artists and startups there’s often much overlap.  §512 was a solution in the 1990s.  But over time it’s had unintended consequences, accidentally fostering a culture of copyright contempt. 

Why? Because of the kind of advice given to clients—they should not be monitoring content for potential infringement. There’s no upside.  §512 allows it, but they get the safe harbor regardless. But there are downsides to monitoring—they might find red flags/actual knowledge of infringement, or awareness. Then they have to proactively takedown the content. Why should they look?  Not the intention, but unintended consequence. Lack of monitoring has led to the current situation; millions of takedowns is clearly unsustainable. 

Taking care of relentless repostings of clearly infringing works, not remixes/transformative uses.  That’s a large chunk that we could try to reduce.  Since people are told not to look, that’s emboldened bad actors to just repost.  Getting the volume down—won’t eradicate it, but if we could take care of whack-a-mole for nontransformative works we could help startups/artists.

Common carrier doctrine: we wanted access to the internet in the 1990s.  Those companies rightly were concerned that they’d be liable for things sent through their system.  Proposals: (1) there should be notice and staydown.  Voluntary among stakeholders to stop repostings and make tools available to smaller OSPs.  Google has good tools, Google Analytics (RT: I didn’t realize that analyzed infringement.)  Make Google give its tools to them?  If no agreement reached in reasonable times, amend DMCA to create duty to remove repostings, just as there’s a duty to terminate repeat infringements.  (2) Set congressional policy around willful blindness. 
 
(RT: From the perspective of a small ISP, this is a proposal designed to put us out of operation.  We can’t staff this, since we’re all volunteer and keeping busier than a one-armed paperhanger just keeping the site up most of the time; we can’t scan the site with humans, and we can’t buy the tech.  Of course suppressing new/small sites is not a sad thing for some large copyright owners, but I think that’s a bad idea for the rest of us. I’m quite confused by why O’Connor believes that increasing duties for ISPs will help out small ISPs that, he correctly says, don’t have the resources/staff to invest in significant proactive compliance efforts.  He wants it to be easier to find “red flag” knowledge based on what ISP employees encounter as they go about their days–but who is to train them about how to recognize an infringement?  And without a takedown from a copyright owner, there’s no counternotification, so the user who thinks she’s got a valid fair use claim can’t even counternotify, as many people who’ve run afoul of Content ID have discovered.)

Annemarie Bridy, University of Idaho College of Law: §512 has proven resilient in the face of internet evolution. No one doubts that there’s a lot of infringement, and that dedicated infringers can evade enforcement. But perfect enforcement is a chimera.  Fair and workable enforcement should be the goal, and §512 is doing that. Copyright owners and ISPs have automated systems; many ISPs hosting UGC provide simple to fill out forms for smaller copyright owners, which should be expanded.  P2P is more of a challenge, but that’s declining with legal alternatives growing.

§512 puts costs on both parties; enforcement must be collaborative if it is to be effective.  Music industry stumbled in the transition, but is now returning to secure footing.

Paul Doda, Global Litigation Counsel, Elsevier Inc.: Elsevier has large portfolio; can’t possibly search for all our content all over the internet, so focus on sites with the most Elsevier content. We face growing volume, need to repeat notices for same infringing works, and reuploads at fast speeds.  We had zero counternotifications because we take our DMCA obligations seriously: human verifies that full copy is uploaded. This makes it difficult to keep pace.  Sites that comply with takedowns continue to have hundreds of thousands of infringements per month.  4shared: 570 reuploads of one book. Uploaded: also hundreds of reuploads.  7-9 days until takedown takes effect; millions of users are able to download.  Elsevier also publishes confidential exams for nursing students. Sometimes stolen from schools and uploaded; have issued takedowns to little effect because some sites don’t honor takedowns or punish repeat infringers. This undermines the academic process/quality of nursing care. The system is breaking down.

What to do without stifling creativity?  Filtering.  Collaboration with UGC sites = success. Scribd is a good example of targeted filtering in good faith: fingerprinting containing unique characteristics of books; uploads are checked.  Only captures matches, and users are notified so they can dispute rejection. We need more collaboration in the publishing industry.  Urge Congress to bring together stakeholders; without oversight, not enough incentives for collaboration. Notwithstanding voluntary measures, some sites will drag their feet. If they refuse to consider measures adopted by peer companies, remedies from Congress may be necessary. 

Katherine Oyama, Senior Copyright Policy Counsel, Google Inc.: Never a better time for creativity online.  (1) Tech sector has been the engine of US economic growth and job creation—new markets and billions for the content industry, and this has only been possible because of the DMCA foundation.  (2) DMCA strikes the right balance in promoting innovation and protecting rights owners.  Internet providers not being held liable for every post by users is an essential feature on which the entire internet relies.  More than 1 million YouTube creators earn revenue; Google has sent $1 billion to the music industry in the past few years. This is just the beginning for the market for digital entertainment.  DMCA helped enable this economic success by creating legal certainty, allowing investment in new services. Only copyright owners know what they own and where they want their works to appear.  Cooperation allows for innovation and encourages investment.  FB, Twitter, Pinterest are enabled by this.  Google has made takedown easier and faster than any other online platform, and despite increase in volume of notices our average turnaround time is less than 6 hours for search results. Even now, notices are far less than 1% of what we index.

There are abuses. Attempts to censor criticism, attack competitor, gain political advantage are rare but problematic.  DMCA allows new systems to generate revenue: Content ID allows rightsholders to choose in advance what to do with UGC, and all the major record labels/studios use it; most choose to monetize instead of take down. We are also working on highlighting more legal content—prominent links to buying a show/movie instantly or buy movie tickets when you google it.

Most effective way to combat rogue sites is to attack their sources of revenue. We’ve expelled 76,000 sites, mostly through our own detection, over the past few years.

We should encourage other countries to adopt DMCA systems via our trade agreements.  (Heh.)

Maria Schneider, Composer and Member of the Recording Academy’s New York Chapter Board: Personal experiences with notice and takedown—an independent musician.  Grateful for fanbase and critical acclaim, but livelihood threatened by illegal distribution. DMCA is upside down because uploads happen in matter of seconds, but takedowns take hours, mostly unsuccessful. Burden isn’t on those breaking the law; no consequences for big data businesses that profit from unauthorized content, but big losses for artists.  Loves internet distribution/fan funding, but struggles against internet sites offering music illegally: album available on numerous filesharing sites.  $200,000 of savings/years of work needed for releasing album. Takedowns are frustrating/depressing.  Her responsibility to police the internet on a daily basis. Whack-a-mole.  Need fix. (1) Creators should be able to prevent unauthorized uploading before infringement. It’s technically possible, as YouTube already does it. Every artist should be entitled to register their music, just like the Do Not Call list. Filtering can be used to monetize or protect content. (2) Takedown should be more balanced. Most fans probably don’t intend harm, but just need to click box. She needs to prepare a notice, spending hours learning unique rules. Should be more streamlined process. ISPs should be required to educate users to help them understand what can be uploaded. If they had to be instructed, system would be more efficient.  (Yes, I’m sure it would be tons more efficient for Google to walk me through the law before each blog post I make goes live.  Or maybe she only wants that to happen with AV works.  Also, let’s (not) hope that we can get our allies to adopt the same rules …)  (3) Takedown should mean staydown. Most of her time is now spent fighting infringement, not making music. Disincentive to create. Simple changes would make great strides in fixing broken system.

Paul Sieminski, General Counsel, Automattic Inc.: Small company, big impact. WordPress: anyone can create and publish in minutes. Powers large media properties, small sites, law firm homepages, family blogs—more than 48 million sites, 13 billion pageviews/month.  230 employees, one lawyer.

DMCA provides important protections to us, and works reasonably well. Troubling rise in misuse of process. Egregious: fraudulently misrepresent content ownership to get rid of disagreements.  Articles trying to remove content critical of a business’s products.  Etc.  We do our best to review notices, which takes resources away from other important pieces of our business. Suppresses legitimate free expression and erodes trust in our copyright system. Piracy is a real issue, but we see abuses by those who submit as well. Powerful and easy to use weapon: notice that must be honored at risk of liability; safest thing to do is comply with no questions asked. Puts full burden on users, who are often small independent musicians and amateur publishers. Often lack sophistication/resources to fight back. And there are no real deterrents to misuse, unlike statutory damages. Thus most abuses result in successful takedowns with no repercussions.  Only §512(f) is a remedy; we’ve joined with users to bring suits that are expensive, time-consuming, and unlikely to result in significant monetary redress.

Internet has many fabulous affordances.  Innovative tools allow anyone to publish, or even organize a democratic grassroots overthrow of an oppressive regime.  For the most part, the law has worked, but we should be mindful of how it can be used to suppress the freedom of expression it’s supposed to foster.  Keep us and our communities of creators in mind as you think about reform.
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Transformative work of the day: SVU edition

Carmen Maria Machado, Especially Heinous: 272 Views of Law & Order SVU: A sf/meta novella based on SVU. Though it’s not in the style of the average piece of fan fiction, I will note that certain popular pairings do appear.

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Transformative work of the day, Frozen edition

What happens when you run the lyrics of “Let It Go” through several Google Translate languages, then back to English?  (My favorite part is the singer visibly preventing herself from singing the signature line correctly.)

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NYT on finessing FDA label requirements

Oreo’s “Cookie Dough” Oreo has neither chocolate chips nor cookie dough.  “Compliance” with FDA labeling requirements is achieved (says Oreo) by the use of “flavor creme” in smaller type on the packaging, plus “chocolatey” chips since the chips don’t meet the definition of chocolate.  (Yum!)  As for marketing, Oreo is relying on “permission”: if consumers receive some visual/olfactory signals that a food is what they expect, they’ll apparently spot the manufacturer the rest.

H/T Zahr Said.

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unjust enrichment claim preempted once patent claim fails

Medisim Ltd. v. BestMed LLC, 959 F. Supp. 2d 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)

Previous opinions in this case between thermometer competitors, mostly addressing trademark issues now out of the case (I skipped the patent parts).  After a jury trial, the jury awarded Medisim $1.2 million for willful patent infringement, $2.29 million for unjust enrichment, and found that BestMed infringed the copyright in Medisim’s instructions for use. The court invalidated the patent for anticipation, and also reversed the unjust enrichment award, but granted equitable relief on the copyright claim.

Unjust enrichment: this claim survived originally because the Lanham Act didn’t preempt state law claims of unjust enrichment, but the claim was “vaguely pleaded, and fell in the interstices of its claims for patent infringement, copyright infringement, unfair competition (state and federal), false advertising (state and federal), and Deceptive Acts and Practices.”  Most of these other claims were dismissed on summary judgment, and the claim for copyright damages was dismissed before the case was submitted to the jury.  The jury was charged with deciding whether “BestMed has been unjustly enriched by obtaining profits from the sale of its thermometers”; it found against Medisim on the state unfair competition claim, which overlapped significantly with the unjust enrichment claim.

Given all this, there wasn’t record evidence to support the award of damages, especially since some of BestMed’s sales occurred during an agreement between the parties, waiving a claim for unjust enrichment.  In light of the patent’s invalidity and the verdict of no unfair competition, an unjust enrichment claim couldn’t arise out of sales of the accused products after the parties’ agreement expired. “Now that Medisim’s attempt to gain a monopoly through the patent law has proved unavailing, it cannot argue that it should nevertheless receive the same protection through the state law of unjust enrichment. A quasi-contract granting Medisim patent-like protection over its invalidated patent would usurp the federal patent law, and for this reason, the jury’s verdict on unjust enrichment must be overturned.”

Plus, even if the patent were valid, the damages would have to go, “because there was no evidence to support a finding that BestMed received an incremental benefit over that compensable by the patent laws.”  Medisim didn’t present evidence of a difference, but argued that BestMed obtained an incremental benefit by misappropriating goodwill and confidential knowhow, but it didn’t have any evidence of that post-agreement.

However, Medisim was entitled to an injunction for disposal of BestMed’s copyright-infringing indstructions.  Under 17 USC § 503(b), a court may order destruction or disposition of infringing copies. Since Medisim lacked a legal remedy for its copyright claim, equitable relief was its sole remedy; BestMed didn’t contest Medisim’s right to equitable relief. 
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Getty Images test

//embed.gettyimages.com/embed/160639386?et=GXqXs6gz-Uu7Yf7jO2VckA&sig=10emSGT2-mLNVs0uBXKn_5dCIMrPTpuXYw6vbX_v98c=
This is a test of the Getty embed code.  I expect to check periodically to see whether ads have been run across it, as provided for/threatened in the Terms of Service.  This BusinessWeek article raises some significant questions about the scope of the “noncommercial” limitation; Creative Commons has the same issue (and a lot of disagreement about what “noncommercial” means).  It remains to be seen whether having a single enforcer will make any difference in the definition of noncommercial.

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state can regulate health referral provider’s speech about potential benefits

1-800-411-Pain Referral Service, LLC v. Otto, 2014 WL 904190, No. 13-1167, — F.3d —- (8th Cir. Mar. 10, 2014)

My discussion of the opinion below.  411-Pain advertises extensively and connects callers to health care providers or attorneys in their areas.  It contends that its “extensive—and very costly—advertising” benefits providers in its referral network who might not otherwise choose to advertise on their own. Defendants are the members of the Minnesota Board of Chiropractors whose enforcement of Minnesota’s No-Fault Act Amendments allegedly unconstitutionally chilled 411-Pain’s speech.  The Act requires insurers to provide basic economic loss benefits to their insureds, regardless of fault, and also regulates ads to curtail potentially unethical practices by “licensed health care provider[s].” The 2012 amendments to this law require solicitations or ads for medical treatment or referral for medical treatment of an injury eligible under the No-Fault Act must:

1. be undertaken only by or at the direction of a health care provider;

2. prominently display or reference the legal name of the health care provider;

3. display or reference the license type of the health care provider … ;

4. not contain any false, deceptive, or misleading information, or misrepresent the services to be provided;

5. not include any reference to the dollar amounts of the potential benefits under [the No-Fault Act]; and

6. not imply endorsement by any law enforcement personnel or agency.

 411-Pain argued that several elements of this suppressed its speech protected by the First Amendment.  Its radio ads, for example, tell car accident victims to call the company immediately after an accident and inform accident victims that they “may be entitled to up to forty thousand dollars in injury and lost wage benefits,” without disclosing the legal names or license types of the health care providers in 411-Pain’s referral network.  Sample ad excerpt:

… Car accidents happen … What you plan to do next can make all the difference … Car accident … Remember after 911 … Call 411 … 1-800-411-pain … 1-800-411-pain knows about car accidents … It’s what they do … Call 1-800-411-pain 24 hours a day 7 days a week from home, hospital or accident scene … Call 1-800-411-pain and let them explain the up to $40,000 in injury and lost wage benefits you may be entitled to … Plan now … Program 1-800-411-pain into your phone number under “accident” … Car accident, remember, after 911 call 411. 1-800-411-pain.

TV ads “feature a vehicle crash and then an actor appearing as a police officer or EMT with an ambulance conveying to viewers that if they call the phone number associated with 800-411-PAIN or go to411Pain.com, then they can get help after being injured in an accident.”  411-Pain claimed that the ads had conspicuous and prominent disclaimers stating that the person appearing in the ad was a “PAID ACTOR.”

The district court denied preliminary injunctive relief, finding that the challenged aspects were inherently misleading commercial speech and thus unprotected.  The ads failed to inform victims that 411-Pain was a referral service, and the reference to up to $40,000 in benefits was inherently misleading because accident victims may receive nothing, or may receive benefits far in excess of $40,000 from many different sources.  The use of law enforcement personnel “extend[ed] a misleading aura of authorized approval” to the company, despite the disclaimer. The ban on advertising not done “by or at the direction of a health care provider,” was a “valid prohibition on speech concerning unlawful activity,” since if the advertising was not done at the direction of licensed health care providers, then 411-Pain’s business relationships with chiropractors may implicate anti-kickback statutes. In the alternative, a referral business inherently advertises “at the direction of” its providers, and contracts could further clarify this.  The disclosure requirements were also okay under Zauderer.

In order to make it hard to get a preliminary injunction (the standard comes from an abortion case), when a “validly enacted statute” is at issue, there’s an elevated standard for success, designed “to ensure that preliminary injunctions that thwart a state’s presumptively reasonable democratic processes are pronounced only after an appropriately deferential analysis.”  (I don’t know why the court doesn’t just talk about eBay—it seems to suggest that a challenge to a non-legislative action isn’t governed by the likely success on the merits standard but by something lower.)

The court then tried to understand what Sorrell meant, determining that the Court had “devised a new two-part test for assessing restrictions on commercial speech.”  First, ask whether a restriction is content- or speaker-based, or both.  If it’s either, it’s subject to “heightened scrutiny,” though we don’t know what that means, since after determining that the regulation in Sorrell was indeed subject to heightened scrutiny, the court proceeded to use Central Hudson, saying that the state lost even under that standard.  So, when commercial speech restrictions are content- or speaker-based, their constitutionality depends on Central Hudson.  (Why is this new?  Why aren’t all commercial speech regulations “content-based” in the sense that they only cover commercial speech, and not noncommercial speech?  Your guess is as good as mine.)

So, the court of appeals turned to the first challenged provision, the ban on “any reference to the dollar amounts of the potential benefits under [the No-Fault Act].” This was a content- and speaker-based restriction, because it only applied to “licensed health care providers” and related people.  Whether it governed inherently misleading speech was a question of law, which could be determined by examining the “particular content or method of the advertising” as well as from “experience [that] has proved that in fact such advertising is subject to abuse.”  (Why isn’t that a fact question, not a question of law?  Your guess is as good as mine.)  Inherently misleading speech may be banned outright.

The court of appeals agreed that the reference in 411-Pain’s radio ads to a possible entitlement of “up to $40,000 in injury and lost wage benefits” was inherently misleading, because it implied that consumers would receive a floor of benefits “up to” $40,000, while many would receive nothing; it also implied that there was a ceiling that didn’t exist.  “While an attorney or insurance agent qualified to advise clients about coverage could convey this information, 411-Pain’s advertisements of ‘up to’ $40,000 in economic loss benefits misleadingly limit the universe of information.”  The ads could prompt some consumers to unnecessarily seek benefits and keep other consumers from obtaining more benefits. 

The ads were also inherently misleading by omission: they didn’t explain that an accident victim wouldn’t receive $40,000, or any amount of money, as a simple cash transfer.  The reference to “benefits” was insufficient, because “the effect of the invocation of money without reference to the Act or a description of the way the benefits are obtained misleadingly implies that 411-Pain will acquire cash and pass along a portion of it to the car accident victim.”  In fact, 411-Pain would just refer consumers to providers, and the potential benefits would be paid to providers in the form of reimbursements for services.  “By selectively omitting important pieces of information from its radio ads, 411-Pain’s speech is thus “inherently misleading” due to its failure to provide meaningful context as to the origin and source of potential benefits available under the No-Fault Act.” (Compare the misleading use of “fees” when ordinary laypeople wouldn’t know the difference between “costs” and “fees” in Zauderer.)

Next, on to the ban on implying endorsement “by any law enforcement personnel or agency.” This is content-based, but not unconstitutional, since implied endorsement by law enforcement is inherently misleading.  Plaintiffs didn’t submit their video ads for review, relying instead on an affidavit.  On this record, the ads were inherently misleading.  An affiant’s statement that a disclaimer is “conspicuous and prominent,” standing alone, is “hopelessly subjective: a disclaimer’s ‘conspicuousness’ and ‘prominence’ are, inevitably, in the eyes of its beholder.”  But regardless, the disclaimer, no matter how large, didn’t fix the problem: it didn’t “disclaim implied endorsement by the type of official the actor portrays.”  (Compare the result in Allen v. National Video: “Moreover, the disclaimer says only that a celebrity double is being used, which does not in and of itself necessarily dispel the impression that plaintiff is somehow involved with National’s products or services.”)  The net effect was misleading. 

This ban was distinguishable from invalid categorical bans on mere depiction of judges in attorney advertising, since portrayals of judges aren’t inherently misleading.  The statute here didn’t ban all depiction of law enforcement, but rather endorsement.  The court noted that 411-Pain’s ad didn’t show law enforcement performing normal functions, but rather “an officer or EMT who speaks directly to the audience and tells viewers to call 411-Pain immediately after a car accident. The actor-officer’s support for 411-Pain imbues the company with a faux-sense of official legitimacy that ‘inherently mislead[s]’ viewers.”

Next, the ban on ads that aren’t undertaken by or at the direction of a health care provider: This is a speaker-based restriction.  But it too shouldn’t be preliminarily enjoined, since it targeted potentially unlawful activity, specificially violation of anti-kickback statutes.  The authorization to advertise under providers’ direction, instead of burdening speech, allowed arrangements that otherwise might be illegal under governing state law.  It’s simple for a provider to direct a third party, by paying it for advertising services.  If 411-Pain is still nervous, it can draft contractual language warranting that it’s advertising at providers’ direction for purposes of the law.

Next, the requirement that ads “prominently display or reference the legal name of the health care provider” and the associated license type.  411-Pain argued that this amounted to a complete ban because it was so unduly burdensome. Given the number of providers in 411-Pain’s network, 411-Pain argued that it couldn’t possibly identify all of them and their license information on each ad.  Also, it contended, without actual proof of deception, the appropriate standard was Sorrelland not Zauderer.

First, the court rejected a facial challenge: the provisions aren’t so unduly burdensome and unjustified that in no conceivable instance would such provisions ever be constitutional. Applied to a single provider, there’s no undue burden.

On the as-applied challenge, the court of appeals didn’t find an unconstitutional burden.  The Supreme Court has said that when laws “impose a disclosure requirement rather than an affirmative limitation on speech, … the less exacting scrutiny described in Zauderer governs” a court’s review of the disclosure rules, something the DC Circuit has called “akin to rational-basis review.”  The state has a substantial interest in protecting the public from misleading and false advertising aimed at persons injured in automobile accidents.

But 411-Pain argued that the government hadn’t shown that the ads are actually misleading, and that Ibaneztherefore controlled instead since the ads were only “potentially” misleading.  However, Zaudererand Milavetz didn’t require proof of actual deception.  The court of appeals followed Zauderer and Milavetz, inferring the inherently misleading character of the speech at issue from its content.  “The ads fail to inform consumers of the nature of 411-Pain’s business as a referral service, and they omit the fact that the No-Fault Act is only one of many sources of recovery an accident victim may pursue. Indeed, the ads never mention the No-Fault Act at all.” No survey was required to determine that the ads had a tendency to mislead.

Under Zauderer, the question was whether the disclosure requirements were reasonably related to the state’s interest in preventing deception, and whether they were “unjustified or unduly burdensome.”  Yes and no, respectively.  The display of network providers’ legal names and license types was reasonably related to the state’s interest because “absent such disclosures, consumers know nothing about the type of care they may receive if they call 411-Pain.”  If they’re calling immediately from the scene of an accident, as the ads encourage them to do, 411-Pain sometimes (if not always) puts them in touch with chiropractors, not physicians.  “The disclosures thus serve an essential purpose by informing victims about the nature of the services offered by the providers with whom 411-Pain does business.” 411-Pain has a minimal interest in not providing any particular factual information in its ads.

Plus, there was no justification for finding an undue burden when the record had no evidence of the number of providers in 411-Pain’s network.  411-Pain’s affiant stated that the company intends to “establish and build” its referral network, and its business would be threatened “if as its network grows, each and every provider’s name and license type must be included in every advertisement.” Maybe, but this wasn’t enough for a preliminary injunction. “To decide whether the disclosure requirements are ‘unduly burdensome’ when applied to 411-Pain, the record must contain more than allegations; it must contain facts demonstrating the undue burden such requirements have on the company’s ability to advertise.”  This is kicking the can down the road, and not very far: the question to be answered is what business models/forms of organization will be disallowed, in practice?  When put that way, though, the post-Lochnersettlement provides a ready answer: any forms the state has a rational basis to prohibit, regardless of whether that’s efficient.
Posted in advertising, commercial speech, disclosures, first amendment, http://schemas.google.com/blogger/2008/kind#post | Leave a comment

IP in the UK

Sir Robin Jacob, Daniel Alexander QC, and Matthew Fisher, Guidebook to Intellectual Property (6th ed.): With dry humor, this book surveys British IP law for nonlawyers/business student types.  I’m not in a position to comment too much on substance.  In any event, the book repeatedly takes the position that when IP rights are at issue it’s often better to settle/go away than to fight even if the claimed right is of dubious validity, which is a position to which I am constitutionally opposed although I understand its practicalities (until you find out that there are no names left available for your business, anyway …).  According to the authors, limits on damages in UK law somewhat mitigate this risk, but this conclusion on patents is typical: “The great majority of patents go through their lives in peace, with nobody really convinced they are valid, but nobody prepared to take the risk of infringing them. Commercially they are just as useful as if they had been valid. Thus, even an invalid patent is often valuable enough to make it worthwhile keeping on bluffing until the bitter end. And there is a lot of truth in the old adage ‘a weak patent in strong hands is worth more than a strong patent in weak hands.’”  Gotta love a good chiasmus.

I appreciated the grace notes of the writing.  “Almost unbelievably, there are now two sorts of unregistered design right …. Unbelievably (again!) there are two sorts of registered design ….”  As for the moral right of paternity, “it may be thought that this is a physiologically and psychologically implausible term, as well as being sexist. Indeed, this is so.”  The following trenchant observations aren’t specific to UK/EU law: “as is coming to be more usual in IP legislation, the draftsman has been careful not to use words that mean anything very definite, either to a lawyer or to anyone else.”  And as for private drafters, “[i]t should in particular be assumed that any agreement drawn up by business people will prove difficult for lawyers (including judges) to sort out; for lawyers and business people have quite different ideas both as to the way they use language and as to the sort of things that agreements ought to provide for.”  Truer words indeed.
Posted in copyright, http://schemas.google.com/blogger/2008/kind#post, patent, reading list, trade secrets, trademark | Leave a comment

Form v. content in DMCA notices

Still working on a long post on Garcia v. Google because ugh, but here I go on a side note: David Post has a post up, Why Google shouldn’t be the copyright court of last resort, which argues that Google shouldn’t screen for bogus copyright notices. While I agree with the title of the post, I’m not persuaded by the content. Post says Google should’ve just honored Cindy Garcia’s takedown request, because it had the proper form of a DMCA request. He argues that the result of Google’s refusal was a case in which the defendant, Google, didn’t have any access to the true facts, making for a bad contest on the question of infringement.

I think Post’s proposed solution—honor all takedowns that are properly formatted—is a pretty bad idea, despite the terrible opinion in Garcia.  (Also, what’s up with “last resort”?  As the 9th Circuit opinion demonstrates, Google is pretty clearly not the last resort, but rather the first screener.)  Post says that the proper response here was to wait for a counternotification, and the posters themselves could’ve fought about the underlying facts.  Except … I personally know plenty of people with valid fair use arguments who’ve decided not to take the very tiny but intimidating to nonlawyers risk of counternotifying; the research suggests that counternotification is vanishingly unlikely, even when (as is not uncommon) the notices appear to be invalid after minimal scrutiny; and the video here seems to have been reposted by many people who weren’t the copyright owner either in order to make some sort of point about Innocence of Muslims, making it even less likely that we’d get the “right” result through counternotification.

Percentagewise, most notices are valid—but, as Post points out, this is a mostly automated process; if even 1% of 100 million notices are invalid, the absolute number of bad claims is very high, something a free speech-sensitive analysis ought to be concerned with.  Automatic compliance with everything that looks like a DMCA notice would readily enable low-risk censorship and vitiate §230, which protects against such demands when the offensive subject matter isn’t infringing.  This isn’t hypothetical.  People send DMCA notices when they object to use of their trademarks (also here) or have other noncopyright claims, and I heard trademark counsel advising in favor of using copyright to enforce trademark claims at INTA.

Google is mitigating some of the damage by screening some notices that are problematic on their face (as Garcia’s reasonably could be seen to be, since she doesn’t even claim a copyright in the film and since the film was controversial for other reasons, making the “copyright as censorship” problem a real risk).  So, by the way, is Wikipedia, which also has a DMCA policy but does not automatically take down content without independent review.

Google shouldn’t haveto be a copyright court. But until people stop sending bogus DMCA notices, perhaps because they are required to stop doing so by more robust §512(f) enforcement, it’s better than the alternative.

Posted in 230, dmca, google, http://schemas.google.com/blogger/2008/kind#post, trademark | Leave a comment

Does a copyright notice serve as an endorsement?

Basquiat Estate v. Christie’s, via the Trademark Blog. Plaintiffs allege ownership of the mark BASQUIAT and copyrights in Jean-Michel Basquiat’s artwork. The Estate formed an Authentication Committee to opine on the authenticity of works attributed to him. A collector who claimed to have shared an apartment with Basquiat put up 50 works attributed to him. Only 7 had been submitted to the Authentication Committee, 6 of which were authenticated. Christie’s listed the 50 works in a catalog, Jean-Michel Basquiat: Works from the Collection of Alexis Adler. Though the estate denied permission to reproduce some of Basquiat’s works in the catalog, Christie’s put a notice in the catalog: “All artwork by Jean-Michel Basquiat: (c) 2014 the Estate of Jean-Michel Basquiat/ADAGP, Paris/ARS, New York.” The Estate alleged that Christie’s had reason to doubt the authenticity of the remaining items, though it doesn’t affirmatively allege inauthenticity.

I bet you’re expecting a copyright infringement complaint based on the use of authenticated Basquiat images (though not the 44 unauthenticated ones, of course!), but the Estate to its credit (no pun intended) did not bring a copyright infringement claim. However, and with some potential Dastar difficulty given that this is the district of Antidote Films, the Estate alleged false endorsement/false advertising under the Lanham Act, violation of NY GBL § 349, and unfair competition. The theory is that the copyright notice falsely implies that the works are authentic and that the Estate sanctioned the sale.

Were this litigated out, I’d expect, along with the Dastar issues (which would seem to me to preclude outright the false endorsement theory), questions about falsity: the Estate does not allege the inauthenticity of the 43 unevaluated pieces, and “reason to doubt” is not itself inauthenticity, so I can’t see how the complaint pleads falsity. There is that one piece the Estate’s Authentication Committee did not authenticate … but even there is wriggle room that the complaint might be carefully pleading around: if the Committee just said it couldn’t authenticate that piece, that too is not inauthenticity. As I understand it, at least some artists’ authenticating bodies have become hesitant about not authenticating in decisive language, worried about false advertising/slander of title issues of their own. (See this story about the Andy Warhol Art Authentication Board.)

Posted in dastar, http://schemas.google.com/blogger/2008/kind#post, trademark | Leave a comment