Chat rooms in history

The Boston Globe’s 1960s Confidential Chat has it all, from pseudonyms to flame wars about women who worked outside the home v. women who didn’t.  The more things change …

Full-Time Homemaker No Longer Justified?: Confidential Chat, Boston Globe, Feb 11, 1964.

Posted in Uncategorized | Leave a comment

Can’t use your phone on your Delta flight? Blame trademark licensing!

Slate reports on the fact that many Delta-branded planes aren’t really Delta planes, but operated by lower-paid carriers, and thus not yet allowed to let passengers keep their electronic devices on during takeoff and landing.  This pattern is likely to be repeated with other carriers.  As the article points out, passengers are likely to blame the flight attendants, not the practice of outsourcing, and that’s a shame.

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HAMP-ed up UCL claim resurrected on appeal

Lueras v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 2013 WL 5848859, No. G046799, — Cal.Rptr.3d —- (Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2013)

The new frontier: mortgage-related claims brought under consumer protection laws.  A divided court of appeals reversed the dismissal of Lueras’ negligence, breach of contract, fraud, and unfair practice claims against Bank of America and ReconTrust.  The key fact alleged was that,

a mere 13 days before Bank of America foreclosed on Lueras’s home, Bank of America falsely represented in writing to Lueras that no foreclosure sale would occur while Lueras was being considered for “other foreclosure avoidance programs.” In so doing, Bank of America expressly and in writing informed Lueras he “will not lose [his] home during this review period.” A Bank of America representative also informed Lueras the pending foreclosure sale would be postponed. Nevertheless, days later, Bank of America foreclosed on Lueras’s home.

The story is familiar and frustrating: Lueras refinanced a $385,000 loan in 2007, then suffered financial hardship and requested a HAMP modification in 2009, but Bank of America offered him instead Fannie Mae’s HomeSaver Forbearance program.  Bank of America’s letter said: “Under the HomeSaver Forbearance program, we are working with Fannie Mae, a government-sponsored enterprise, to reduce your mortgage payment by up to 50% for up to 6 months while we work with you to find a long-term solution.”  Thus, Lueras entered into a forbearance agreement and made the monthly payment for 10 months, but—contrary to the promises it made—Bank of America didn’t work with him to identify feasible foreclosure prevention alternatives. 

Meanwhile, Lueras submitted all required information to determine whether he qualified for a HAMP modification. While he was waiting, the trustee ReconTrust served him with a notice of default.  Only once this notice was recorded did Bank of America begin to explore alternatives to foreclosure.  Lueras enlisted the California AG, which agreed to monitor and assist with the modification process.  He was served with a notice of trustee’s sale with a scheduled sale date of Feb. 22, 2011; it was rescheduled four times, to May 18, 2011.

Bank of America allegedly eventually determined Lueras was HAMP-eligible and made an oral modification offer, which Lueras accepted.  But a May 5 letter told Lueras he wasn’t eligible.  The letter said that Bank of America was reviewing Lueras’s financial information “to determine if there are other options available to you” and that Bank of America “will contact you within 10 days to let you know what other options are available to you and the next steps you need to take.” The May 5 letter also stated: “If a foreclosure sale of your home is currently pending and on hold, that hold will continue and remain in effect while you are considered for other foreclosure avoidance programs.” While advising Lueras not to ignore any foreclosure notices, the letter stated, “you will not lose your home during this review period.”

Lueras immediately contacted Bank of America, which told him that the letter was sent by a third party in error, and that he’d been approved for a reduced interest rate subject to Fannie Mae’s approval.  A May 6 letter said that Bank of America was reviewing his financial documents, with one of three possible responses: (1) notification he had been approved for a trial period plan under HAMP, (2) notification he was not eligible for a HAMP loan modification, or (3) more information was needed to make a decision. Again, he immediately contacted Bank of America, but was told that the letter was erroneous because his application had already “been approved” by Bank of America. Bank of America told Lueras that the trustee’s sale rescheduled for May 18, 2011 would be reset, pending approval by Fannie Mae.   

Lueras made many attempts to contact Fannie Mae, Bank of America, and the AG during May 2011, but never received any further response. HAMP’s guidelines require servicers to wait 30 days after denying a HAMP modification before foreclosing, allowing an appeal.  On May 18, the AG’s office told Lueras that the foreclosure sale would happen on that day; minutes later, his home was sold.  The sale was ultimately rescinded.

The court first held that Bank of America and ReconTrust didn’t have a duty of care to offer a loan modification or offer alternatives to foreclosure.  However, “a lender does owe a duty to a borrower to not make material misrepresentations about the status of an application for a loan modification or about the date, time, or status of a foreclosure sale.”  Thus, Lueras could potentially amend his complaint to state a claim for negligent misrepresentation of fact. 

The court reached similar results on breach of contract.  Though Bank of America never signed the forbearance agreement, it was still bound because it accepted payments during the deferral period and was entitled to receive a $200 incentive fee “upon successful reporting to Fannie Mae of the initiation of a HomeSaver Forbearance plan and the collection of one payment under the forbearance plan.” (Though an agreement modifying a note and deed of trust is subject to the statute of frauds, the agreement here stated: “No Modification. I understand that the Agreement is not a forgiveness of payments on my Loan or a modification of the Loan Documents.”)  The agreement did require Bank of America to work with Lueras in good faith to identify foreclosure prevention alternatives within six months.  Thus, Lueras could also amend his complaint to allege that Bank of America’s failure to act breached its duty.

Bank of America argued that Lueras failed to allege damages.  Payments he made during the deferral period weren’t contractual damages because they would have been owed under the mortgage in the absence of the forbearance agreement. But he might be able to allege some other damages from the failure to work with him in good faith.

California’s mortgage-specific law was no help because it only provided the remedy of a one-time postponement of foreclosure where the lender didn’t look for foreclosure alternatives in time.

Fraud: As with the contract damages, Lueras’ continued payments on the loan didn’t constitute detrimental reliance.  Nor did the money, time and effort he wasted on compiling over a hundred pages of documents while attempting to modify the loan, which was de minimis.  But he might be able to amend the complaint to allege detrimental reliance, even if the trustee’s sale was ultimately rescinded.

UCL violations: Bank of America argued that Lueras hadn’t lost money or property as a result of its actions, because he’d been in default for years before suing and his monthly payment under the forbearance agreement was less than his monthly payment under the mortgage.  But the allegation that his home was sold at foreclosure was sufficient economic injury: “Sale of a home through a foreclosure sale is certainly a deprivation of property to which a plaintiff has a cognizable claim.”  He might also be able to amend the complaint to allege that his injury was “caused by” BoA’s allegedly unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent conduct.  After all, BoA told him that any pending foreclosure sale would be “on hold,” that the May letters were sent in error, and that he’d been approved for a modification.  Also, Lueras might be able to allege that BoA didn’t work with him in good faith to evaluate and try to identify and implement a permanent solution, as a consequence of which he lost his home through foreclosure.  Although it was his default that triggered the foreclosure proceedings, BoA’s subsequent misrepresentations/failure to work with him in good faith might also have caused the foreclosure sale.

Unfair/unlawful/fraudulent practices: The court held that some of the alleged conduct could not violate the UCL, to the extent that Lueras alleged that BoA promised him a solution: “Nothing in the Forbearance Agreement would mislead a borrower into believing Bank of America would always determine or identify a permanent solution to ‘save’ the borrower’s home.”  However, “[i]t is fraudulent or unfair for a lender to proceed with foreclosure after informing a borrower he or she has been approved for a loan modification, or telling the borrower he or she will be contacted about other options and the borrower’s home will not be foreclosed on in the meantime, as represented in the May 5 letter. It is fraudulent or unfair for a lender to misrepresent the status or date of a foreclosure sale.” Lueras could also allege that BoA violated its duty to act in good faith.

The dissent would have found, among other things, that Lueras lacked standing for a UCL claim, since he couldn’t have lost money or property when he was in default.  “Rather, he has experienced an incredible windfall. Lueras has avoided foreclosure on the Property even though he has not made any payment on the Loan since July 2010.”  Also, the dissent would have held, Lueras couldn’t show reliance on any of the May statements since all his actions/inactions took place before then.
Posted in california, consumer protection, unfairness | Leave a comment

Misleading health insurance letters?

Report on letters discouraging consumers from investigating cheaper alternatives and subsidies here at Talking Points Memo.  Exercise for the reader: what’s the potential for Lanham Act and state consumer protection law claims (in states that don’t exclude insurance from the coverage of their unfair practices/consumer protection statutes)?

Posted in advertising, consumer protection, http://schemas.google.com/blogger/2008/kind#post | Leave a comment

No class action against payment processor for multiple sites

Yordy v. Plimus, Inc., No. C12-0229, 2013 WL 5832225 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2013)

Yordy went to  TheNovelNetwork.com, which allegedly promised her unlimited downloads of bestselling eBooks for a one-time $49.99 fee, which she paid, only to discover that the website didn’t offer the promised books for download, but rather only had links to eBooks that were already available elsewhere on the internet for free (some in violation of copyright law).  That site was allegedly one of 19 such “Unlimited Download Websites” that utilized the same fraudulent advertising scheme. She alleged that Plimus controlled this scheme and profited by taking a percentage of each one-time fee as a payment processing fee. She brought the usual California claims.  Plimus denied that it was involved in the design or implementation of the marketing and advetising, but was just a processor.

The court denied Yordy’s motion for class certification.  It first rejected Plimus’s argument that the class was unascertainable because the court would have to determine if each individual had been exposed to the allegedly false advertising.  But the alleged misrepresentations here were not “communicated only to select individuals, but to the public at large on the face of the UDWs.”  Screenshots showed these and similar statements: “Members have unlimited access, no restrictions,” and “MILLIONS of titles available!”  The websites included images of popular (and in fact unavailable) titles such as Lord of the Rings and The Da Vinci Code. All putative class members were exposed to this allegedly false advertising, so no individualized inquiry would be required to determine class membership.  Numerosity was also satisfied.

The problem was commonality.  Yordy argued that the common questions were: (1) whether Plimus is liable for facilitating and promoting the UDWs, and (2) whether Plimus had knowledge of the fraudulent nature of the UDWs.  But questions weren’t enough; Yordy needed to show “the capacity of a classwide proceeding to generate common answers.”  She didn’t.  After the court requested Yordy to identify evidence linking Plimus to the UDWs’ advertising, she identified communications between Plimus and only one UDW.  Consumer complaints received by Plimus didn’t demonstrate that it was involved in advertising or promotion.  (Why not contributory liability?  That would seem possible on a classwide basis.)  “While Yordy need not prove Plimus’s involvement with all the UDWs’ misrepresentations at this stage, she must present sufficient evidence to satisfy the Court that the putative class has common claims.”  She didn’t.

Typicality was also absent, for similar reasons.  Yordy failed to show that Plimus’s involvement in the UDW she visited was similar to its involvement with the 18 UDWs she didn’t visit.  Though the misrepresentations may have been similar, there was no evidence that Plimus’s conduct in bringing about those misrepresentations was similar.  “The Court is cognizant of not reaching too far into the merits in requiring Yordy to prove Plimus’s involvement in advertising, but, as with commonality, Yordy must at least establish that Plimus’s involvement in each UDW was substantially similar such that Yordy’s claims against Plimus relating to TheNovelNetwork.com are representative.”  Also, without commonality and typicality, there couldn’t be adequacy.
Posted in california, class actions, http://schemas.google.com/blogger/2008/kind#post | Leave a comment

Peter Jaszi Lecture: Bernt Hugenholtz on Flexing Authors’ Rights

American University Washington College of Law
Program on Information Justice and Intellectual Property 
Presents
The 2nd Annual Peter Jaszi Distinguished Lecture:
Professor Bernt Hugenholtz – Flexing Authors’ Rights
 
November 7, 2013 | Room 603
5:30 Reception | 6:15 Lecture | 7:30 Dinner Reception
American University Washington College of Law
For registration, CLE and live/on-demand webcast:
http://www.pijip.org/events/2013jaszilecture/

 
Prof. Hugenholtz: Flexing Authors’ Rights
 
The global future of cultural institutions, information industries, and individual creative work hinges, in part, on present decisions about the scope and character of copyright exceptions and limitations. Almost everyone agrees that modern copyright law needs to be flexible in order to accommodate rapid technological change and evolving media uses. In the United States fair use is the flexible instrument of choice. Author’s rights systems in Europe are generally deemed to be less flexible and less tolerant to open-ended limitations and exceptions. But are they really? 
 
This lecture makes the case that (1) author’s rights systems can be made as flexible as common law copyright systems, and (2) that the existing EU legal framework does not preclude the development of flexible norms at the national level.

Professor Bernt Hugenholtz
 
Bernt Hugenholtz is Professor of law and Director of the Institute for Information Law (IViR) at the University of Amsterdam. He is also a professor at the University of Bergen (Norway), and regularly teaches at the Munich Intellectual Property Law Center (Munich), Monash University (Melbourne) and Charles University (Prague).
He is the co-author, with Prof. Paul Goldstein (Stanford University), of International Copyright. Principles, Law, and Practice (Oxford University Press, 3nd ed. 2012), and has written extensively on a range of copyright-related issues. He has acted as an advisor to the World Intellectual Property Organization, the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Netherlands Ministry of Justice.
Prof. Hugenholtz is widely regarded as the foremost expert on copyright in the EU. He was a member of the Drafting Committee of the Wittem Project, a collaboration between copyright scholars across Europe that produced the ground-breaking model “EuropeanCopyright Code” in 2010. With Ian Hargreaves, he authored the 2013 Lisbon Council policy brief on “Copyright Reform for Growth and Jobs: Modernising the European CopyrightFramework.”
Recent publications are available at http://www.ivir.nl/staff/hugenholtz.html.

 
The Peter Jaszi Distinguished Lecture in Intellectual Property
 
The Program on Information Justice and Intellectual Property’s Distinguished Lecture on Intellectual Property Law is named in recognition of the extraordinary ongoing contributions of Professor Peter Jaszi to the study of intellectual property at American University Washington College of Law and in the world at large, and in particular for his lasting contributions to the elevation of the public interest in intellectual property discourse.
 
Support the Lecture: Supporters may make a pledge at wcl.american.edu/go/give, and designate their gift to the lecture by using the “Other” field. Checks mailed to the Development Office should include “Peter Jaszi Lecture” in the memo line.
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Soul man is sad man

Moore v. Weinstein Co., LLC, No.12-5715 (6th Cir. Oct. 31, 2013)

Sam Moore, half of the music duo Sam & Dave sued a number of defendants related to the 2008 fim Soul Man and its accompanying soundtrack.  The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s rejection of all his trademark, right of publicity, and related claims.

Sam & Dave’s 1967 album, Sam & Dave Soul Men included the hit single “Soul Man,” for which Moore won a Grammy.  They broke up and reunited in the early 1980s; Prater passed away.  Moore continued performing using variations on “Sam Moore ‘The Legendary Soul Man,’” and his promoters now call him the “Legendary Soul Man.”  Sam & Dave were inducted into the Rock & Roll Hall of Fame in 1992.

In the movie Soul Man, the two main characters are 2/3 of a 1960s soul trio, Marcus Hooks and the Real Deal.  The third member leaves the group and has a solo career, while the two continue as a duo, then spit up, then reunite for a memorial for the third.  On a cross-country trip, they perform Sam & Dave’s song “Hold On, I’m Comin’.”  Moore argued that they portrayed Sam & Dave.  The soundtrack, “Soul Men The Original Motion Picture Soundtrack,” included no Sam & Dave songs.

Moore sued for infringement of his trademarks in “Soul Men,” “Soul Man,” “The Legendary Soul Man,” “The Original Soul Man,” and “The Original Soul Men,” the 1967 album “Sam & Dave Soul Men,” and  a 2008 documentary DVD, titled “The Original Soul Men Sam & Dave.”

The appellate court just adopted the district court’s reasoning granting summary judgment on Moore’s Lanham Act and state unfair competition claims, and only engaged in its own analysis of the publicity, state law trademark, and consumer protection claims.

Under the Restatement, the right of publicity doesn’t cover “use of a person’s identity in . . . entertainment, works of fiction or nonfiction, or in advertising that is incidental to such uses,” including “dissemination of an unauthorized print or broadcast biography,” or the “[u]se of another’s identity in a novel, play or motion picture.”  Also (and of course we’re not clear on how this relates to the Restatement), the First Amendment means we use transformative use as per Comedy III.  “[W]e weigh the appropriated likeness against the appropriating work’s expressiveness, evaluating ‘whether a product containing a celebrity’s likeness is so transformed that it has become primarily the defendant’s own expression rather than the celebrity’s likeness,’” which means “‘something other than the likeness of the celebrity.’”   Such “transformed” works (also?) lie beyond the right of publicity’s reach.  A successful publicity claim requires the challenged work to lack creative components of the defendant’s own.  Moore’s claim is weaker than Tiger Woods’ in ETW, given the general protection for movies, and the movie “[w]ithout a doubt” added significant expressive elements to any use of Moore’s identity.

Moore argued that there was no protection for the ad insert featuring his image packaged with the soundtrack’s CD and DVDs.  To promote other CDs and DVDs whose rights were owned by the company that produced the soundtrack, several pages of the insert—called “THE ORIGINAL SOUL MEN ARE AT STAX”—reprinted cover art from various Stax Records albums, including Otis Redding, Isaac Hayes and others.  Another insert page, “Essential Viewing for your Soul,” featured the images of three DVDs’ cover art, including “The Stax/Volt Revue Live in Norway 1967.” That displayed the names and images of the performers in that 1967 show, including “Double Dynamite!! Sam and Dave.”  However, Moore didn’t dispute that the company owned the (copy)rights to promote the video depicting a concert in which he performed.  Given this consent, there was no infringement of the right of publicity.  Plus, the insert title page “clearly refers to the numerous soul albums depicted therein,” of which the concert cover was but one. There was no evidence that the title page caused confusion, and “[r]ead in context” no reasonable juror would mistake this reference for Sam & Dave, or find Sam & Dave “reasonably identifiable” from the reference, even though the soundtrack was marketed to fans of a variety of soul artists.

Moore also sued for state trademark dilution.  Setting choice of law issues aside because the two relevant state laws were identical, both Tennessee and Arizona require famousness, and Moore couldn’t satisfy that element, given that he failed on his federal dilution claim.  Indeed, the only Tennessee factor not present in the Lanham Act was the nature and extent of use of same or similar mark by third parties, which weighed against Moore. The district court found at least 34 other albums currently available that either consist of or incorporate “soul men” or “soul man.”  Moore might be well-known, but the test considers the mark, not the person.

The state consumer protection claims also failed.  Moore alleged that defendants caused a likelihood of confusion about whether he sponsored the movie and soundtrack.  But the Lanham Act analysis covered this.  Under Rogers v. Grimaldi, the First Amendment precluded such a claim, and Moore’s “competing titles” claim also failed to show a likelihood of confusion.  He also alleged that defendants made false/misleading statements about his affiliation or association with the movie.  But he never provided evidence that Tennessee consumers were injured or deceived, as required.
Posted in dilution, first amendment, right of publicity, trademark | Leave a comment

Teaching children to see like a state

My second-grade son came home with the following schoolwork last week:

“Numbers that Name You: There are lots of numbers that label, count, measure, or order information just about you. For example, you have a birthday and an address. Do you have an ID number for a club you belong to? What’s your shoe size? Think about all the numbers that name you. Write these numbers in the person shape…. Find out what a social security number is. Do you have one? Why is this an important number?”

It’s easy to mock theory for having jargon.  But if this is anything other than interpellating the child as subject of the modern surveillance state in the form of data, let me know.

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Delay notifying insurer until after $13.5 million verdict probably harmless

National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Mead Johnson…, — F.3d —-, 2013 WL 5788652 (7th Cir. 2013)

An advertising injury case from Posner, with a bonus picture from the underlying dispute … and it’s not even my birthday.  Mead Johnson bought a CGL policy from National Union, with a $2 million limit for personal/advertising injury, and an excess liability policy from Lexington with a $25 million limit (both are subsidiaries of AIG).

PBM’s third lawsuit against Mead Johnson for false advertising resulted in a jury award of $13.5 million.  PBM Products, LLC v. Mead Johnson & Co., 639 F.3d 111 (4th Cir. 2011).  “Mead wants its insurers to pay that judgment, plus the $15 million settlement that it made to resolve the [resulting follow-on] class action suit.”  PBM’s suit claimed that Mead falsely disparaged PBM’s less expensive store brand by claiming that it lacked key lipids that promote brain and eye development.  Mead Johnson’s insurance policies expressly covered disparagement as advertising injury, but Mead Johnson didn’t notify its insurers until after the damages verdict was handed down.  (Why? Posner doesn’t know.  How about: companies, like Soylent Green, are made of people, and people forget relevant information all the time.)

Both policies required notice of any claim or occurrence “as soon as practicable”; the excess liability policy required notice only if a claim or suit was “reasonably likely” to trigger damages of more than $2 million.  The notice provisions entitle insurers to control the insured’s defense, subject to their fiduciary duty to the insured. 

Mead Johnson said that its Director of Risk Management didn’t learn of the PBM lawsuit until the trial ended, which would be required for its duty of providing notice to kick in for “occurrences,” per an amendment to the agreement. The court found it hard to believe that the Director of Risk Management didn’t know, and anyway a lawsuit was a suit, not an “occurrence.”  Posner understood why insureds wouldn’t want their duty of notice to kick in for any trivial “occurrence,” e.g., “baby cried after swallowing Enfamil; crack appeared in Enfamil container.”  “But it would be absurd to allow a company served with a summons and complaint or other legal claim to obtain an indefinite extension of its duty of notice simply by hiding the claim from its Director of Risk Management,” especially for a claim of this size (PBM asked for $500 million in damages) by a competitor who’d gotten more than $46 million from Mead Johnson in settling two previous similar suits.  Mead Johnson delayed inexcusably in informing both insurers.

However, this failure allowed the insurers to disclaim coverage only if they were prejudiced by the late notice.  Late notice creates a presumption of harm, shifting the burden to the insured to show some evidence, but probably doesn’t shift the burden of persuasion. 

The court found National Union unlikely to have incurred harm from late notice.  “Its policy limit was only $2 million, and we are hard pressed to understand how, had it conducted the defense of PBM’s suit, it could have obtained either a jury verdict or a settlement of less than $2 million.”  Not only were the damages much higher than that, but Mead Johnson used the same firm, and even the same lawyer, that National Union had hired to defend Mead Johnson in PBM’s previous lawsuits.  Had it defended Mead Johnson, National Union would also have had to pay the fees and expenses of the defense, but National Union didn’t argue it would have paid less, and had it skimped on legal expenses the ultimate jury verdict might have been higher, allowing Mead Johnson to claim a breach of fiduciary duty.  The court was tempted to direct entry of judgment for Mead on the National Union/PBM matter, but remanded for factual development on the issue of harm—at oral argument, National Union’s counsel essentially conceded she couldn’t show harm, “[b]ut we hesitate to base a decision on a concession made in the heat of oral argument under a barrage by the judges.”

Lexington’s situation differed: “Conceivably if placed in control of the defense it could have bargained to a settlement of less than $13.5 million or, failing that, have presented evidence or argument that would have convinced the jury to award PBM less.”  But the insurers’ joint defense made no real argument about this, treating Lexington “as the tail to National Union’s kite,” perhaps because of their shared parent.  So the insurers hadn’t shown that it would have made any difference if they, rather than Mead Johnson, had hired the same law firm, but also Mead Johnson had only offered the bare facts that the firm was the same and that $13.5 million was less than $41.5 million, one of the previous settlement amounts.  And the district court erred by holding that when untimely notice is given by an insured after trial in the underlying suit, the presumption of harm became irrebuttable.  The district court should have said that later notice makes it harder to rebut the presumption of harm, but the presumption is never irrebuttable.  So, remand.

Turning to the second question: was National Union entitled to decline coverage of Mead Johnson’s claims resulting from the consumer class action?  The advertising injury policy covered “oral or written publication, in any manner, of material that … disparages a person’s or organization’s goods, products or services.”  The policy required “pay[ment to the insured of] those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of … advertising injury.”

The class members were consumers who bought Enfamil in preference to cheaper brands of infant formula “on the basis of the same false representations by Mead Johnson that underlay PBM’s suit.” The court saw this as a consumer fraud claim, not a product disparagement claim, since no product sold by the class members was disparaged.  Instead, Mead Johnson’s disparagement induced consumers to buy Enfamil.  But Mead Johnson argued that the policy covered damages for an injury “arising out of” disparaging material.  The court disagreed: the policy said that damages must arise out of the “offense,” here product disparagement; damages merely having their origin in disparagement were insufficient.  A mere indirect causal link was insufficient.  “Such a chain of equations can’t be taken literally, for that would imply that the claims in the class ‘arise out of’ the invention of infant formula.”  (Hunh?  So what?  Is that covered by any policy?  Also, the disparagement sure seems like proximate cause to me, not just but for cause, but the court disagreed.)

Mead Johnson’s argument for “arising out of” went too far:

Suppose that a mother who has been feeding her baby a store-brand infant formula made by PBM reads Mead Johnson’s ad which states that “mothers who buy store brand infant formula to save baby expenses are cutting back on nutrition compared to Enfamil,” or, worse, sees Mead’s visual-acuity ad, reproduced below, that tells mom that if fed Enfamil her baby will see an adorable rubber ducky with butterflies, while if fed a store brand, baby will be able to make out only a blurry yellow monster chased by bats. Mom, fearing that she has done irrevocable harm to her precious child, has a nervous breakdown precipitated by Mead’s false, alarmist advertising. If she sues Mead Johnson for infliction of emotional distress, can Mead require National Union to defend and indemnify it on the ground that the mother’s nervous breakdown arose from product disparagement? An affirmative answer—the answer implied by Mead Johnson’s argument—would, by expanding coverage to remote consequences, make it very difficult for an insurer to estimate liability and thus fix a premium for injuries caused by product disparagement.

RT: Except that the consequences at issue in the actual consumer protection claim are not at all remote. They are, indeed, the very consequences that the disparagement aimed at: consumers would buy more from Mead Johnson and less from house brands like PBM, enriching Mead Johnson and causing damages to PBM.  If the damages to PBM were proximately caused by the disparagement, so too were the damages to consumers.

In conclusion, the court cautioned that the underlying tort claim didn’t need to use the magic word disparagement to trigger coverage, as long as the claim fit the legal definition thereof.
Posted in damages, disparagement, http://schemas.google.com/blogger/2008/kind#post, insurance | Leave a comment

Georgetown Law Journal technology symposium, Nov. 8

The Georgetown Law Journal cordially invites you to its Volume 102 Symposium, “Law in an Age of Disruptive Technology”
Featuring a Keynote Address by Professor Neal Katyal and panels on:

3-D Printing
Chaired by Professors Deven Desai and Gerard Magliocca

Driverless Cars & Tort Liability
Chaired by Professor Bryant Walker Smith

Mass Surveillance Technology
Chaired by Professor Christopher Slobogin

Friday, Nov. 8, 9 am
Gewirz Hall, 12th Floor
Georgetown University Law Center
600 New Jersey Avenue, Northwest
Washington, District of Columbia
Click here to RSVP
Facebook Page and Website
This event is sponsored in part by ACLU, NSLS, and the Federalist Society

Posted in copyright, http://schemas.google.com/blogger/2008/kind#post, patent, privacy | Leave a comment