Soliciting lawsuits against TM owner isn’t confusing use of TM owner’s mark

AMCOL Sys., Inc. v. Lemberg Law, LLC, No. 3:15-3422, 2015 WL
8493955 (D.S.C. Dec. 10, 2015)
 
AMCOL provides debt collection services and is subject to the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA)’s ban on “harassment” in debt
collection. AMCOL alleged that it had substantial goodwill associated “recognized
by the relevant consumers, including AMCOL’s clients and debtors.”  (Seems unlikely that the debtors have much
goodwill towards AMCOL, though.)  Lemberg
allegedly used the internet to advertise its services using AMCOL’s marks,
interfering with internet users’ ability to reach AMCOL’s own website, and
misleading potential clients into believing that AMCOL’s services violated
applicable laws such as the FDCPA. 
 
Lemberg runs “several websites soliciting potential clients
to file lawsuits against debt collectors, including http://ift.tt/1RO20qI
and http://www.debtbulldog.com.” One of its headings was “Stop AMCOL Systems
Harassment,” which allegedly defamed AMCOL by suggesting a violation of the
FDCPA.  The “heading” for Lemberg’s
YouTube Channel stated “Amcol Systems Calling You? Sue Amcol Systems for
Harass[ment].” Debtors would allegedly choose to retain Lemberg rather than
working with AMCOL. [Debtors are involuntarily involved with AMCOL.  Query whether debt sellers, AMCOL’s actual
customers, would care what happens after sale, as long as AMCOL pays them for
the debt.]
 
The court kicked out the Lanham Act claims and declined to
exercise jurisdiction over pendent state law claims.  First, likely confusion: Lemberg was using
AMCOL’s marks in connection with advertising their own services, but AMCOL
still failed to allege actionable consumer confusion.  Both Radiance Foundation, Inc. v. N.A.A.C.P.,
786 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2015), and Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309 (4th Cir.
2005), hold that criticism of a plaintiff “via use of its marks” does not
equate to consumer confusion.  Although
those cases involved “First Amendment issues” [and this doesn’t?], the broader
holding is that trademark law doesn’t affect the rights of critics and
commentators, because it requires use that is likely to cause confusion as to
source or sponsorship.
 
Allied Interstate LLC v. Kimmel & Silverman P.C., No. 12
Civ. 4204(LTS)(SN), 2013 WL 4245987 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2013), and NCC Business
Services, Inc. v. Lemberg & Associates, LLC, No. 3:13-cv-795-J-39MCR, 2014
WL 5510892 (M.D. Fl. June 6, 2014), adopted by 2014 WL 5514247 (M.D. Fl. July
23, 2014), similarly found no plausible allegations of likely confusion based
on lawyers’ websites targeting particular debt collectors.  The websites made clear that they belonged to
law firms that sued debt collectors like AMCOL, and references to its name were
“merely for the purpose of advertising Defendant’s services and generating
leads for potential lawsuits.”  [This could
be taken care of as nominative fair use, possibly even under the Third Circuit’s
restrictive test which requires that the defendant need to use the plaintiff’s
mark to explain the defendant’s own goods and services.  Interesting that the court doesn’t even need
to do that, and can rely on basic plausibility.  Seriously, why isn’t this fee-worthy?  Rule 11-worthy?]
 
It was implausible that the relevant consumers—businesses seeking
to hire AMCOL to collect debts—would be confused as to the source or
sponsorship of Lemberg’s services based on its use of AMCOL’s marks. Nor could debtors
be said to be part of the relevant consuming public even if they “choose” to
work with Plaintiff to pay off debts. They were subjects, not customers.
 
How about false advertising, such as allegations that AMCOL
harassed debtors in violation of the FDCPA? 
AMCOL didn’t specifically identify false or misleading representations
of fact. The two identified headings – “Stop AMCOL Systems Harassment” and “Sue
AMCOL Systems for Harassment” – wouldn’t be enough to mislead the relevant
consumers, given the context.  Although
AMCOL claimed damages from debtors refusing to work with it, the relevant
damage would have to come from the merchandising context—from AMCOL’s
consumers.  [Here the court repeats its
no-confusion-as-to-source conclusion, though that’s wrong for false
advertising.  The basic Lexmark reasoning, that AMCOL needs to
plausibly allege a competitive injury, still seems obviously correct.]

from Blogger http://ift.tt/1jYMZ7F

Advertisements
This entry was posted in Uncategorized and tagged , . Bookmark the permalink.

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out / Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out / Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out / Change )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out / Change )

Connecting to %s