Lexmark allows false advertising claim against law firm for soliciting timeshare clients

Diamond Resorts Int’l, Inc. v. Aaronson, 2018 WL 735627, No.
17-cv-1394 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 2018)
Diamond is a timeshare developer managing more than 420
membership resorts worldwide. The Aaronson defendants are an Orlando-based
attorney and his law firm focusing on soliciting Diamond’s timeshare members to
become clients of Aaronson’s services to free them from financial obligations
under their purchase and financing contracts. Diamond alleged false
advertising, resulting in members ceasing to pay under their timeshare
contracts, and subjecting Diamond to baseless arbitration proceedings.  Diamond sued for (1) violations of the Lanham
Act; (2) tortious interference with a contractual relationship; (3) trade libel;
(4) violations of Florida’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act; (5)
malicious prosecution; and (6) RICO violations (of which no more will be said,
because they’re RICO claims).
The court rejected Aaronson’s argument that its speech
wasn’t “commercial advertising or promotion” under the Gordon & Breach test, because it wasn’t in competition with
Diamond.  The court unsurprisingly
rejected that argument in light of Lexmark
(which functionally amended the Gordon
& Breach
test).  Where, as here,
“a party claims reputational injury from disparagement, competition is not
required for proximate cause; and that is true even if the defendant’s aim was
to harm its immediate competitors, and the plaintiff merely suffered collateral
Nor could the court resolve whether the advertising was
merely opinion or puffery at the pleading stage.  (Indeed, it wasn’t clear from the court’s
analysis whether Diamond alleged specific statements, or merely “ ‘material
false and misleading statements,’ which have deceived Plaintiffs’ timeshare
members into believing that Plaintiffs have engaged in unlawful activity and
caused them to stop making payments on their Timeshare Contracts.”  The court also cited precedent holding that an
opinion may be actionable under the Lanham Act “if it fairly implies a factual
The state-law claims weren’t precluded by Florida’s
litigation privilege, which provides absolute immunity for acts or statements:
(1) made or committed in the course of judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings;
and (2) “connected with, or relevant or material to, the cause in hand or
subject of inquiry.” This includes “conduct that is ‘necessarily preliminary’
to a judicial proceeding,” which is confined to pre-suit communications that
are a statutory or contractual condition precedent to suit.  Diamond’s claims arose out of the challenged
advertising, which wasn’t required by, permitted by, or even related to the
subsequent arbitration proceedings.
For similar reasons, the court rejected Aaronson’s argument
that, when they rendered legal services to Diamond’s timeshare members, they
were agents of those members and couldn’t be a third party for purposes of
tortious interference claims, which require a third party to interfere.
The trade libel claims sufficiently alleged special damages:
(1) the costs of arbitrations; (2) the costs of defending arbitrations; and (3)
members’ unpaid promissory notes.  FDUTPA
claims also survived.
The malicious prosecution claim failed, however, because malicious
prosecution claims are generally disfavored under Florida law, and other
jurisdictions have rejected malicious prosecution claims based on arbitration
proceedings. Thus, the court would not predict that the Florida Supreme Court
would expand this claim to arbitration proceedings.

from Blogger http://ift.tt/2EnKlYA

This entry was posted in Uncategorized and tagged , . Bookmark the permalink.

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out /  Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out /  Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out /  Change )

Connecting to %s