Copyright Office NPRM indicaties desire to strip sites of 512(c) protection

Eric Goldman explains here.  We already could tell that the Office was interested in shrinking the safe harbors; apparently the Office wants to do that in part by purging the list of registered DMCA agents every three years.  As someone who had the OTW’s initial registration bounced for not having a fax number (we … don’t have a fax machine?) (I used mine in the end), I have a bit of whiplash on the technical requirements side.  Per the NPRM, written comments are due June 24.

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Law firm advises: protect your brand via (c)

The advice from Drinker Biddle includes using the DMCA to get uses of your TM taken down, which is pretty much exactly the definition of one significant category of DMCA abuses.

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EFF/Copyright professors’ comment on FCC’s proposed set-top box rule

Content companies have opposed the FCC’s proposed set-top box rule on the grounds that it would allow copyright infringement because people who’d paid for cable would be watching it without additional payments from the set-top box providers.  As you can tell, I think this is incorrect.  I and several other professors have signed on to the EFF’s letter responding to these concerns.  You can read the letter here.

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Starting a wooden puzzle blog

This is an experiment for me to share my adventures in wooden jigsaw puzzles.  Today’s review is an Artifact puzzle, Matte Stephens, Manhattan (380 pieces).2016-05-24 09.30.39

This is an atypical Artifact–many pieces joined very tightly, rather than loosely, and some even had to be forced.  It made me wonder whether this was produced early on in Artifact’s existence, because while the looser fit of other Artifact puzzles can be frustrating when one is trying to move chunks around, overall it’s a more pleasant experience once you’re used to it than this tighter fitting type was.  Many of the pieces were also relatively large.  Fine, but not fantastic.  3/5.

NB: I’m a tough grader, and I cut my teeth on Staves, so 3/5 is still time well spent.

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Dilution question of the day, handbag edition

Betsey Pop Betsey Johnson Kitsch “soda” handbag

So, what’s the dilution verdict?

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Another trademark claim asserted for political purposes

Paul Alan Levy responds
to a C&D against a candidate for local government who is being threatened
with claims of trademark infringement for using the city’s logo on his campaign
materials.  As always, it’s a
refreshing read
. Of particular note, Levy points out that §2(b) bars
registering the insignia of any state or municipality; the claimant’s
registration is in the name of “City of Mesa Municipal Development
Corporation,” for specialized services such as construction planning.  The registration did not claim that it was
for a  city logo, and yet the C&D
letter asserts that it is.  The PTO has
apparently been construing §2(b) narrowly to allow some government agencies to
register logos for narrow purposes, and Public Citizen questions whether this
is a permissible interpretation of the statute. 
To the extent that the registrant represents that the mark is in fact the city’s logo, Levy notes that
§2(b) invalidates any registration, whether the registrant is the city or some
other entity.  Given the claims made to
the candidate, he contends, the claimant will be estopped from arguing that it
isn’t the city’s logo.

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Who’s responsible for Amazon product detail pages for TM and (c) purposes?

Oriental Trading Company, Inc. v. Yagoozon, Inc., 2016 WL
2859603, No. 13CV351 (D. Neb. May 16, 2016)
 
This is a pretty interesting dispute because it suggests
that Amazon’s business practices may be exposing certain entities who sell
through Amazon to substantial business risks, and even discovery may leave outstanding issues unknown.
 
Yagoozon sells various novelty products through Amazon; OTC
sued it for copyright and trademark infringement, as well as deceptive trade
practices under Nebraska’s Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act and violations
of the Nebraska’s Consumer Protection Act. The claims are apparently based on
the fact that, for various products OTC sells, consumers can also buy from
Yagoozon on pages using OTC’s photos (and perhaps other elements).
 
The court denied OTC’s motion for summary judgment.  As to direct copyright infringement, the
parties disputed whether Yagoozon, Amazon, or another third-party seller was
responsible for displaying the copyrighted photographs. Although OTC argued
that Yagoozon was the one to select the relevant Amazon product detail pages on
which to sell its products and also used the product detail pages whenever it
sold inventory, there were genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Yagoozon
“created the product detail pages at issue, edited the pages, and/or is
ultimately responsible for the displaying of plaintiffs’ copyrighted
photographs.”
 
“[A]ccording to Amazon’s own documents, in order to create a
product detail page, the seller/creator must be advertising a product that is
not already available on Amazon.” Once a detail page has been added, the
product becomes part of Amazon’s catalog, and other sellers can create listings
for the same product.  Amazon also allows
product detail pages to be edited after their creation.  Which sellers have control over the product
detail page when multiple sellers request edits is determined by Amazon’s
algorithm.  OTC didn’t submit evidence allowing the
court to conclude as a matter of law that Yagoozon created or was otherwise
responsible for the product detail pages at issue. Likewise, there were
disputed issues about whether Yagoozon intentionally induced or encouraged either
Amazon or any other third-party seller to directly infringe OTC’s copyrighted
photographs.
 
These same issues precluded summary judgment on direct and
contributory trademark infringement claims. 
OTC argued that Yagoozon chose to use the product detail pages at issue,
making it responsible for infringing sales of competitor products under OTC’s
marks. But there were genuine issues about whether Yagoozon intentionally
induced Amazon or any other third-party seller to infringe, or whether it continued
to supply products knowing that the recipient was using the product to engage
in trademark infringement.
 
The same reasoning applied to the state law claims.

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Second Circuit muddies nominative fair use more than 9th Circuit ever has

International Information Systems Security Certification
Consortium, Inc. v. Security University, LLC, No. 14-3456-cv (2d Cir. May 18,
2016)
 
The Second Circuit manages to make its multifactor confusion
test worse (and you thought it had already hit rock bottom by considering
quality of the goods, which hurts the defendant if there’s a quality difference
and hurts the defendant if there’s equal quality).  ISC2 sued Security University and Sondra
Schneider, alleging that SU’s use of ISC2’s certification mark constituted
trademark infringement and dilution. 
The district court’s finding of lack of fame and thus no dilution isn’t
challenged on appeal.  The court of
appeals reversed the district court’s finding of nominative fair use and
remanded both for consideration of the multifactor test, now with three new
factors added, and also for consideration of endorsement confusion as well as
source confusion.
 
ISC2 registered a certification mark, CISSP, to denote a “Certified
Information Systems Security Professional” who has met certain requirements and
standards of competency in the information security field, including passing
the CISSP certification examination that ISC2 administers.  Schneider is CISSP-certified, and offers
information security training through SU, which used the CISSP mark in
connection with certification-specific training courses.  ISC2 doesn’t object to SU using the mark to
indicate that its services attempt to prepare students for the CISSP certification
examination. SU instructors also may accurately identify themselves as being
CISSP-certified, so long as they follow ISC2’s regulations governing the use of
the mark.
 
But ISC2 objected to ads run between 2010 and 2012, which,
ISC2 argued, misleadingly suggested that SU’s instructor, Clement Dupuis, had
attained some higher level of certification as a “Master CISSP” or “CISSP
Master.” E.g., “MASTER THE CISSP DOMAINS with the Master CISSP Clement Dupuis”;
“You are
taught by CISSP Master Clement Dupuis, the father of http://www.ccure.org website.”  When ISC2 objected, Schneider responded that “SU
will continue to use the word Master. Master Clement Dupuis is a Male Teacher
[and] thus he is a Master according to the dictionary.” (I share Eric
Goldman’s distaste for this response
.)
 
The district court found that, applying nominative fair use,
there was no source confusion.  Adding “Master”
didn’t implicate source confusion or mislead anyone about who was offering the
services in question.  It reasoned that, “[b]ecause
a certification mark is intended to signal a quality-related characteristic of
the good, rather than source or origin, . . . it is hard to imagine a case in
which use of a certification mark by a person who has met the requirements for
certification would likely lead to confusion as to source or origin, or would
not be a nominative fair use.”  Though the
district court “asserted” that no reasonable juror could find sponsorship or
endorsement, “its conclusion was based entirely on the fact that the
advertisements did not ‘suggest[] that (ISC)2 itself is offering the classes.’”  The district court also pointed to
disclaimers at the bottom of some of the ads disclaiming
endorsement/sponsorship by ISC2.
 
The court of appeals began by chiding the district court for
not applying the standard multifactor test. 
“[T]he Polaroid factors are not, of course, ‘exclusive’ and should not
be applied ‘mechanically.’ No single factor is dispositive, and cases may
certainly arise where a factor is irrelevant to the facts at hand. But it is
incumbent upon the district judge to engage in a deliberate review of each
factor, and, if a factor is inapplicable to a case, to explain why.” 
 
Also, confusion over source isn’t the only actionable
confusion; confusion over affiliation or sponsorship is also actionable. Weight
Watchers International, Inc. v. Luigino’s, Inc., 423 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 2005)
(confusion over endorsement of or other involvement in defendant’s product was
actionable); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Electronics, Inc.,
816 F.2d 68, (2d Cir. 1987) (unauthorized importation and sale of Cabbage Patch
dolls manufactured in Spain with the foreign language adoption papers and birth
certificate infringed because plaintiff’s “domestic good will is being damaged
by consumer confusion caused by the importation of the [Spanish] dolls,” which
were materially different from American dolls).
 
Further, a certification mark can be infringed in numerous
ways. A professional who uses the mark without being certified can infringe, as
can a competing certification organization, but it’s also possible to infringe
in other ways, even if the party has met all the requirements for certification.
The court of appeals pointed to a TTAB ruling that “even where a defendant’s
product contains ingredients which have been certified by the owner of a
certification mark, the defendant’s incorporation of that certification mark
into its own composite trademark might be likely to cause confusion as to
sponsorship, affiliation or connection.” Tea Bd. of India v. Republic of Tea,
Inc.,  U.S.P.Q.2d 1881 (T.T.A.B. 2006).  Thus, SU  may have infringed on ISC2’s certification
mark by identifying its certified instructor as “Master CISSP” and “CISSP
Master.”  Just to hammer the point home,
the court of appeals noted that it wasn’t necessary that the defendant’s use be
use “as a [certification] mark.” Even though neither ISC2 nor SU offers a “Master
CISSP” or “CISSP Master” certification, “customers [may] be led to believe
[ISC2] has introduced a new line” of certifications. The court could also take
into account the lack of such a certification in the proximity of the
products/bridging the gap factors.
 
So what is the
proper analysis?  “This Court has
repeatedly urged district courts to apply the Polaroid factors even ‘where a factor is irrelevant to the facts at
hand.’”  Nominative fair use is a test
that replaces the ordinary multifactor test in the Ninth Circuit and thus is
used to determine whether confusion is likely. 
It’s an affirmative defense in the Third Circuit, which “affords
defendants broader protection” because it applies even if confusion is likely. [Note
that this is a really weird reading of the defense; in practice the Ninth
Circuit version is a ton broader.]  The
court of appeals rejected both approaches; nominative fair use isn’t an
affirmative defense because it’s not in the statute, unlike descriptive fair
use.
 
And the Ninth Circuit approach is wrong because “we see no
reason to replace the Polaroid test
in this context,” even though “we also recognize that many of the Polaroid factors are a bad fit here and
that we have repeatedly emphasized that the Polaroid
factors are non-exclusive.” [This is really, really dumb lumping.  “Bad fit” and “irrelevant” aren’t reasons?  The Second Circuit has doubled down on its
initial decision, decades ago, to treat infringement of competing and
noncompeting goods with the same test.] 
 
In Tiffany v. eBay,
the Second Circuit already “recognized that a defendant may lawfully use a
plaintiff’s trademark where doing so is necessary to describe the plaintiff’s
product and does not imply a false affiliation or endorsement by the plaintiff
of the defendant.”  [Apparently the court
is not overruling its prior decision in Tiffany,
even though that decision didn’t apply the Polaroid
factors or fulfill its alleged duty to explain why the Polaroid factors didn’t apply, because reasons.  If I were a defendant, I would point to this
court’s endorsement of Tiffany to
justify sticking with the initial analysis.]
 
As a result, “district courts are to consider the Ninth
Circuit and Third Circuit’s nominative fair use factors, in addition to the Polaroid factors.”  Specifically, courts are to consider:
 
(1) whether the use of the
plaintiff’s mark is necessary to describe both the plaintiff’s product or
service and the defendant’s product or service, that is, whether the product or
service is not readily identifiable without use of the mark; (2) whether the
defendant uses only so much of the plaintiff’s mark as is necessary to identify
the product or service; and (3) whether the defendant did anything that would,
in conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the
plaintiff holder, that is, whether the defendant’s conduct or language reflects
the true or accurate relationship between plaintiff’s and defendant’s products
or services.
 
In assessing (2), courts are to consider whether the alleged
infringer “step[ped] over the line into a likelihood of confusion by using the
senior user’s mark too prominently or too often, in terms of size, emphasis, or
repetition.”  In assessing (3), “courts
must not, as the district court did here, consider only source confusion, but
rather must consider confusion regarding affiliation, sponsorship, or
endorsement by the mark holder.”  [How
would you tell whether the defendant did “anything” other than using the mark that
would suggest sponsorship or endorsement? 
I will let the classic X-Files episode Jose Chung’s From Outer Space
answer for me:]
 
“How the hell should I know?”
[So, does comparative advertising qualify for the defense in
the Second Circuit?  It does in the Ninth
Circuit version because using the P’s mark is necessary to identify the P,
which is all that the Ninth Circuit requires. 
It does not in the Third Circuit version because using the P’s mark is
not necessary to identify the D, even if it is necessary to convey the
comparative message.  If district courts
are to consider both circuits’ factors, as suggested by the Second Circuit’s
initial language, then comparative advertising at least has a case for
nominative fair use protection, but if courts are to consider only the
restatement offered by the Second Circuit here, which tracks the Third
Circuit’s version, then comparative advertising should be excluded.]  
 
Remand “for reconsideration of the Polaroid factors in addition to the nominative fair use factors,
keeping in mind the numerous types of confusion that are relevant to an
infringement analysis other than mere source confusion and the numerous ways in
which a certification mark may be infringed.” 
That ought to be fun.

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Consultant’s speech to potential customers wasn’t pure scientific speech protected by First Amendment

Underground Solutions, Inc. v. Palermo, 2016 WL 2866099, No.
13 C 8407 (N.D. Ill. May 17, 2016)
 
Related decisions discussed from 2012,
2014,
and 2015.  Plaintiff UGSI sued Palermo for trade libel
and false advertising under California and federal law (having previously
dismissed a tortious interference claim). 
UGSI alleged that Palermo, as a paid spokesperson for one of UGSI’s
competitors, made false or misleading statements about UGSI’s products,
subterranean pipes used for water transmission. 
Here, the court granted partial summary judgment in favor of UGSI on the
Lanham Act claim and dismissed the trade libel claim.
 
This is what I love about Lanham Act cases: you learn about
details of how the world works.  Underground
water pipes include ductile iron pipe, high-density polyethylene (HDPE) pipe,
and polyvinyl chloride (PVC) pipe.  Rapid crack
propagation (RCP) is pretty much what it sounds and can occur up to several
hundred feet per second; it can happen in any type of pipe when the right
(wrong) event occurs, such as someone bending or pressurizing a pipe too far or
an external object hitting the pipe.  Whether
RCP happens after a break depends on many factors, including the pipe’s
diameter and wall thickness, the internal operating pressure, and the pipe’s
chemical makeup. Although RCP can’t occur in 100% water pressurized pipe,
a small amount of air in a pipe could enable RCP.
 
Municipalities typically use more than one pipe to create a
network.  HDPE pipe sections are often
‘butt fused,’ connected end-to-end by thermal fusion techniques. Ductile iron
or PVC pipe traditionally uses ‘bell-and-spigot’ joints to latch each pipe to
the next. UGSI is the only producer of Fusible PVC pipe, where thermal fusion eliminates
the need for bell-and-spigot junctures. “Some Fusible PVC pipes stretch
seamlessly for miles, which simplifies and speeds up installation, avoids the
potential for corrosion and seepage intrinsic to bell-and-spigot joints, and
eliminates associated maintenance requirements and costs.”
 
Palermo operates a consulting firm that provides litigation
consulting and failure analysis services. During the relevant period, Palermo
had a consulting agreement with Performance Pipe, which makes HDPE pipe. “Along
with two HDPE pipe interest groups (the Plastics Pipe Institute and the
Alliance for PE Pipe), Performance Pipe paid Palermo to attend trade shows and
give presentations about Fusible PVC pipe.” 
Palermo designed a PowerPoint slideshow for these presentations, and put
it on his website.  The slideshow
‘Plastic Pipe for Water Distribution – What You Need to Know About RCP and Butt
Fusion Integrity,’ was primarily focused on illustrating the high RCP risk
associated with butt-fused PVC pipe, rather than butt-fused pipe of all types.  The presentation stated that PVC pipe is more
vulnerable to RCP than HDPE and that butt-fused PVC pipe’s RCP risk is even
higher, because “without bell-and-spigot joints to relieve pressure, cracks can
spread farther and faster without meeting resistance.” 
 
Palermo began with twenty Fusible PVC RCP failures in the
field, from 43 feet to 3,300 feet long.  “He
showed pictures of massive cracks in the butt-fused PVC pipe at some failure
sites, and he provided details of the damage done and replacement requirements
for some of the RCP events described.”  He
then discussed test results from lab experiments on PVC and HDPE pipe, showing
test results that indicated that HDPE’s resistance to RCP was higher than that
of PVC for given water/air mixes.  It’s
possible for pressurized pipes to contain up to 10% air, and he showed graphs
indicating that when a PVC pipe has 10% air volume, it is vulnerable to RCP at
much lower pressures than HDPE pipe with 10% air.  Palermo claimed that modern HDPE pipes had even
higher critical pressures (the point at which the vulnerability emerges) “which
meant that ‘RCP is never an issue.’”  Further,
Palermo reported that HDPE butt-fused joints passed tests that PVC butt-fused
joints didn’t.
 
As a result, some people exposed to the slide show were
reluctant to use or recommend Fusible PVC pipe. 
For example, “Julie Morrison, a consulting engineer in Illinois,
testified that she had been open to the possibility of recommending Fusible PVC
for a project in Illinois but had changed her mind after finding and reading
Palermo’s presentation online.”  UGSI
produced a slide show of its own which it used to reassure a contractor that
expressed grave concerns based on Palermo’s slide show.  UGSI sent Palermo a C&D in March 2012,
and in July 2013, Palermo said that he would “no longer provide negative
information about butt fusion of PVC Pipe” because he felt “UGSI [had]
conducted significant testing to develop the proper butt fusion procedure for
PVC Pipe.” Nonetheless, Palermo continued to deliver his message at trade shows
and on the Internet.
 
Palermo argued that the Lanham Act claim had to fail because
he was engaged in private, noncommercial speech, trying to advance scientific
inquiry on a matter of public concern rather than advertising or promoting
HDPE.  But “an activity is promotional if
it involves dissemination to anonymous members of the purchasing public.”  Members of the polyethelene pipe industry
paid Palermo to deliver presentations to anonymous purchasers and prospective
consumers at trade shows throughout the country, converting his speech into
commercial speech for Lanham Act purposes.  Since he was paid to make his statements in a
commercial setting to potential purchasers, his statements weren’t made purely
to advance scientific discourse.  Cf.
Eastman Chem. Co. v. Plastipure, Inc., 775 F.3d 230 (5th Cir. 2014) (statements
made in a commercial setting and directed at customers “do not become immune
from Lanham Act scrutiny simply because their claims are open to scientific or
public debate. Otherwise, the Lanham Act would hardly ever be enforceable—many,
if not most, products may be tied to public concerns with the environment,
energy, economic policy, or individual health and safety.”) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Moreover, commercial speech need not directly propose a
commercial transaction.  Jordan v. Jewel
Food Stores, Inc., 743 F.3d 509 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 
UGSI argued that there were five false or misleading
statements in Palermo’s slide show: (1) Four of the crack lengths were grossly
inaccurate, overstating crack lengths by hundreds or thousands of feet
(specifically, reporting a crack as 300 feet long when it was only 3 feet long;
2200 versus 1700, 800 versus 430, and 2000 versus 200, plus stating that 13
miles of pipe needed to be replaced after one incident, where there were only 7
miles of pipe to begin with). (2) Palermo described PVC’s critical pressure at
10% air volume, as shown by the key study, as much lower than it was.  (3) Palermo used the study even though
Fusible PVC used far more advanced pipe than that tested in the study.  (4) Palermo described cracks without
disclosing the installation or maintenance errors that caused them to rupture
in the first place. (5) The joint tests Palermo used weren’t designed to test
PVC.
 
The study on which Palermo relied to report PVC’s critical
pressure at 10% air volume unambiguously said it was 2.3 bar, whereas Palermo said
it was 1.6 bar.  He argued that this
simply reflected scientific disagreement, and that he used the study’s
regression line and data generated by another lab (the one that conducted the
joint tests Palermo used):
 
Because scientific truth is
elusive, Palermo says, settling the dispute between methodologies should be
left to the scientific community. But Palermo’s slides do not indicate that he
was approximating, nor do they make reference to any other tests than those
conducted by Greenshield and Leevers. Instead, they unequivocally state that
Greenshield and Leevers found that the critical pressure at 10% air volume was
1.6 bar. In fact, they did not. Assigning a lower critical pressure than the
test actually indicated is a classic example of literal falsity.
 
The evidence would permit a jury to determine that Palermo
did not materially misrepresent the length of one crack, where the damage had
to be approximated. However, it was undisputed that Palermo falsely reported
the amount of pipe that needed to be replaced in one incident and the crack
lengths in three.  Palermo argued that he
substantially underestimated another crack length, favoring UGSI.  But for liability purposes it didn’t matter
that one of his literal falsities favored UGSI; the others didn’t.  Thus, the literally false statements about critical
pressure at 10% air volume, the three crack lengths, and the amount of pipe
that needed to be replaced in one city violated the Lanham Act, without further
need to show consumer confusion; UGSI was entitled to summary judgment on
liability for these statements.
 
UGSI asked for an injunction against these statements.  Palermo argued that Winter and eBay prevented
the court from presuming irreparable harm. 
The circuits have an inconsistent treatment: the Fourt Circuit continues
to state that false advertising is typically irreparable “because diminished goodwill
is difficult to quantify,” while the Third Circuit expressly disavowed a
presumption of irreparable harm from false advertising.  Because there were still outstanding falsity
issues on liability, the court decided to wait until after the jury trial,
which would result in further findings about the remaining statements.  This would allow the court to make a better
finding on whether a permanent injunction was appropriate.
 
As for misleadingness, UGSI argued that it showed
substantial differences between the chemical makeup of the pipes tested in the fifteen-year-old
study on which Palermo relied and its own PVC pipe.  UGSI also made other criticisms of whether
the studies on which Palermo relied reflected real conditions. The court found
that genuine factual disputes remained on these and the other remaining
falsity/misleadingness claims.  One of
the older study’s authors, for example, testified that product improvements
likely didn’t change the fundamental qualities of the pipe for the purpose of
his test results, while UGSI’s experts testified that its pipe had a
substantially different molecular weight, which the study’s author conceded was
the most relevant factor in determining fracture resistance.
 
Palermo argued that there couldn’t be any misleadingness
because UGSI didn’t provide a survey showing confusion.  But surveys aren’t always required; Mead
Johnson & Co. v. Abbott Labs., 201 F.3d 883 (7th Cir. 2000), on which
Palermo relied, actually rejected the district court’s improper reliance on a
survey. UGSI showed evidence that one consulting engineer developed concerns
after seeing a slide show, and that another feared that UGSI’s product was
dangerous. This evidence supported a reasonable inference that they were
confused.
 
Palermo then argued that UGSI wasn’t harmed by any misleadingness,
because the confused consumers testified that they didn’t end up making
decisions based on his presentation, after reassurance from UGSI.  “It cannot be the law that where a plaintiff
succeeds in retaining its customers by spending an abundance of time, energy,
and money to combat false advertising, the defendant who produced and
disseminated the false advertisement or commercial promotion escapes liability
for violating the Lanham Act.”  Because
of UGSI’s need to reassure at least one consumer, a reasonable jury could find
that Palermo’s slide show diminished UGSI’s goodwill and reputation.
 
As for the trade libel claims, they required actual trade
diversion, and UGSI didn’t provide evidence that particular purchasers
refrained from dealing with it because of Palermo.  Thus, Palermo won summary judgment.
 
Palermo argued that the same harm problems justified summary
judgment on the California false advertising claim, because of Proposition 64’s
lost money or property requirement.  UGSI’s
“significant resources” spent rebutting Palermo’s statements, however,
qualified.  Nor did the First Amendment
preclude liability, for the reasons given above.

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Court upholds SF’s required warning on sugar-sweetened beverage ads, including pure logos

American Beverage Association v. City & County of San
Francisco, No. 15-cv-03415 (N.D. Cal. May 17, 2016)
 
The court denied plaintiffs’ attempt to enjoin a
sugar-sweetened beverage warning imposed on certain soda ads by San Francisco.  The warning is: “Drinking beverages with
added sugar(s) contributes to obesity, diabetes, and tooth decay. This is a
message from the City and County of San Francisco.” S.F. Health Code § 4203(a).
  The ordinance’s findings included that
consumption of sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs) was associated with numerous
health problems; that obesity is a big problem in the US and SF specifically,
particularly with low-income and nonwhite populations; that SSBs contribute way
too much sugar and too many empty calories to the average American diet; that
even moderate consumption of SSBs is associated with health risks; that children
are particularly at risk (“On average, children consumed 11.96 teaspoons of
added sugars from sodas and fruit drinks per day – 47% of their total intake of
added sugars.”); that the results are costly for California; that food labels
typically don’t show whether sugar has been added; and that young adults are
targeted by SSB marketers.
 
Thus, the warning, which must occupy at least 20% of the
area of each SSB ad.  Some beverages are
specifically excluded, such as milk and milk alternatives and 100% natural
fruit or vegetable juice. Covered ads include “any logo, that identifies,
promotes, or markets a [SSB] for sale or use that is any of the following: (a)
on paper, poster, or a billboard; (b) in or on a stadium, arena, transit
shelter, or any other structure; (c) in or on a bus, car, train, pedicab, or
any other vehicle; or (d) on a wall, or any other surface or material.”  Newspaper, internet, TV and similar ads are
excluded, as are containers or packages for SSBs; vehicles used by businesses
that make, distribute, or sell SSBs; standalone logos under 36 square inches; shelf
tags/labels; and certain signs permitted before the law became effective.
 
Plaintiffs argued that the ordinance covered noncommercial
speech, such as Coke ads proclaiming “Love Wins” after the Supreme Court’s
marriage equality ruling, and publicity for the Pride Parade and the Chinese New
Year’s Festival on signs depicting soda products and logos. The court thought
it was debatable whether all of the examples involved inextricably intertwined
commercial and noncommercial speech, citing Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc.,
743 F.3d 509 (7th Cir. 2014).  Even if
those were examples of noncommercial speech, plaintiffs couldn’t succeed on a
facial challenge because they didn’t show that a substantial amount of noncommercial
speech would be affected in relation to the amount of commercial speech
regulated.
 
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court,
471 U.S. 626 (1985), not strict scrutiny, applied.  In Retail Digital Network, LLC v. Appelsmith,
810 F.3d 638 (9th Cir. 2016), the Ninth Circuit held that Sorrell v. IMS
Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011), required the application of strict
scrutiny to content-or speaker-based restrictions on nonmisleading commercial
speech regarding lawful goods or services. 
But Retail Digital involved a
restriction on speech, not a disclosure requirement.  And Zauderer
applies to disclosure requirements whether or not the relevant government
interest is preventing consumer deception.
 
Compelled disclosure doesn’t violate the First Amendment so
long as the disclosure requirement is reasonably related to the state’s
interest. Plaintiffs argued that some greater scrutiny was required because the
warning was imposed only when they decided to speak in the first place, rather
than being triggered by a transaction. 
But Zauderer was the same
situation—the lawyer decided to advertise that there’d be no fees if the case
failed, without disclosing that there’d be costs.  In the court’s view, Zauderer was basically a rational basis standard; it wasn’t even
clear that “factual and uncontroversial” was required, or whether that was just
the Court’s description of the disclosure in Zauderer itself, as long as the disclosure was “reasonably related
to the State’s interest.”
 
Nonetheless, the court continued to apply the “factual and
uncontroversial” requirement, interpreting it to mean that the compelled
disclosure “must convey a fact rather than an opinion and that, generally
speaking, it must be accurate.”  “Uncontroversial”
didn’t require more than accuracy, because the requirement shouldn’t “be so
easily manipulated that it would effectively bar any compelled disclosure by
the government,” particularly “where public health and safety are at issue.” As
the court had previously held, “[a] ‘controversy’ cannot automatically be
deemed created any time there is a disagreement about the science behind a
warning because science is almost always debatable at some level.”  Here, the warning was accurate.
 
Plaintiffs argued that the warning was misleading because it
suggests that “consuming beverages with added sugar is dangerous regardless of
one’s diet or lifestyle” and that “consuming beverages with added sugar
necessarily and inevitably contributes to . . . tooth decay at any level of
consumption.”  But the warning just said
that SSBs “contribute” to tooth decay, which is true, not that they make tooth
decay inevitable.  No reasonable consumer
would interpret the warning as suggested by the plaintiffs; the Zauderer-related case law doesn’t give
an interpretive standard, but the court couldn’t see what other standard could
apply; plus, claims are often evaluated from the perspective of a reasonable
consumer, as in false advertising law.  “Contribute”
isn’t as strong as “causes,” and to hold otherwise would cast doubt on things
like tobacco warnings that say “causes” even though lung cancer isn’t
inevitable for smokers. 
 
Nor does it matter that other things cause tooth decay;
underinclusiveness is not a problem under Zauderer,
because “governments are entitled to attack problems piecemeal, save where
their policies implicate rights so fundamental that strict scrutiny must be
applied. The right of a commercial speaker not to divulge accurate information
regarding his services is not such a fundamental right.”  The court concluded that it was ok to target
a significant source of sugar per serving, particularly because it didn’t
provide healthful nutrients as milk and juice do.
 
The same basic reasoning supported the obesity/diabetes
warning.  “[N]o reasonable consumer would
likely construe the warning as specific to him or her and instead would
understand the warning is directed to the general public.”  Even if, as plaintiffs argued, SSBs represented
only 5% of total caloric intake, each serving still offered a substantial
number of calories: one serving size was more than 10% of a 2,000 calorie/day
diet.  Dietary guidelines recommend a
daily limit of 10% of total calories for added sugars, but a single 20-ounce
serving exceeds that limit, and it’s worse for kids.
 
Plaintiffs also challenged the size of the warning, but the
City had a reasonable  basis for making
it be 20% of the advertisement. It had to be “of a sufficient size to be salient
– i.e., noticed and attended to – and research on health warnings for tobacco
products has led the World Health Organization, for instance, to
recommend that tobacco product packaging and labeling bear a health warning of
50% or more, but no less than 30%, of the principal display areas. By
comparison, 20% is relatively modest.” Even if a smaller warning would still be
effective, Zauderer isn’t a least
restrictive means test.
 
Plaintiffs argued that the ordinance still had an
unconstitutional chilling effect because the large size of the warning would
deter them from advertising at all or from engaging in counterspeech, because
counterspeech would transform the ad from promotion into a scientific debate.  However, under Zauderer, as long as the disclosure requirements were “reasonably”
related to the State’s interest, the advertiser’s rights were “adequately
protected,” meaning that the degree of any chilling effect was already
accounted for.
 
Plus, the warning was not unduly large.  Because it was text-only, “the force of the
pictorial advertisement is not likely to be overcome by the text warning,” since
ads with color and pictures are more salient. 
In addition, a paper in JAMA showed that ad messages are still effective
in the presence of health warnings on ads: brand information recall remained
very high.  Though plaintiffs’ expert
noted that recall of an ad’s specific message or heading was lower than in the
presence of a warning message, the court pointed out that, “at least for the
products at issue in this case – SSBs – the advertising message is, in effect,
the brand, and brand recall is not particularly affected by a text warning
message.”
 
Moreover, 20% wasn’t unprecedented, though it was
substantial and raised serious questions. “Not only is 80% of the space
available, Plaintiffs have shown that they have employed pithy advertising on
how to achieve balanced diets and lifestyles.”  Moreover, though plaintiffs submitted
declarations from major beverage companies stating that they’d decline to run
covered ads under the ordinance, the court wasn’t persuaded by these self-serving
claims.  Other industries, including
cigarette and smokeless tobacco products, have successfully incorporated
warnings into ads.  If the medium was as
valuable to sales as plaintiffs claimed, they wouldn’t completely abandon it.  Pharmacos, too, still advertise despite
having to disclose warnings.  “[A]s
anyone who has witnessed a television advertisement for pharmaceutical products
will know, the scope of the information required about potential adverse side
effects often makes the disclosure seemingly as long as the advertising message
itself,” but they still advertise.
 
The court turned to irreparable harm: without showing likely
success on the merits, they didn’t show a First Amendment irreparable
harm.  Plaintiffs also identified harm to
their goodwill and reputation, but the court wasn’t convinced; many consumers
were likely familiar with the high sugar content of SSBs and aware of
calorie-induced weight gain. Plaintiffs could also “engage in counterspeech to
combat the asserted harm, not only in the advertisement containing the warning
itself but also through other means and media.”
 
The court did find that the size of the warning raised
serious questions going to the merits, assuming that test survives eBay and Winter, but the balance of hardships didn’t tip sharply in their
favor given the public health interests at stake.

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