Amicus seeking rehearing in In re GNC

Brian Wolfman and I just filed this amicus on behalf of law professors seeking rehearing in the In re GNC case, which badly misunderstood literal falsity.

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Amicus seeking rehearing in In re GNC

Brian Wolfman and I just filed this amicus on behalf of law professors seeking rehearing in the In re GNC case, which badly misunderstood literal falsity.

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And his fate is still unlearn’d: Subway overcharge claim fails

Hollander v. Metropolitan Transp. Authority, 2015 N.Y. Slip
Op. 50991(U), 2015 WL 4077193, No. 160972/13 (Sup. Ct. June 25, 2015)
 
Hollander sued the MTA on behalf of purchasers of 7–Day and
30–Day MetroCards, alleging they were falsely advertised because they aren’t
valid for a full 7 or 30 days.  Instead,
no matter when you first activate them, they end at midnight 7/30 calendar days
later, meaning that you might lose up to nearly a day depending on when you
activate them.  Even activation at 11 pm
will be counted as your “Day 1.”  The MTA
website says that the 7–Day MetroCard is “[g]ood for unlimited subway and local
bus rides until midnight, 7 days from day of first use,” and a similar
statement for the 30-day version.
 
Hollander alleged that this violated General Business Law §§
349-350, constituted breach of contract, and resulted in unjust enrichment.  The MTA disagreed, noting that Hollander had
been using such unlimited ride cards since as early as 2000, and that he’d been
put on repeated notice as to the actual duration. “There is no disputing that
straphangers get better deals with these cards when they ride the subways and
buses more frequently, and consequently, the MTA earns less per ride.”  According to an affidavit from the MTA, “the
total average cost per passenger on the subways and buses is $3.15, only about
50% of which is accounted for by revenue collected from unlimited ride
MetroCards.”  Weekly and monthly passes
are estimated to reduce fare revenue by 5% to 8%.  The MTA further argued that users are
overwhelmingly satisfied and prefer the security of knowing the card won’t run
out of value.  “[O]f the tens of
thousands of complaints processed since the inception of the program, there has
not been a single claim concerning the short dating practice alleged by
plaintiff in this action.”
 
The MTA contended that, given the age of the program,
lengthy and detailed explanations were no longer required, though a 1998
brochure directed at tourists did say: “Your seven days start when you use your
card the first time, so if you use it for the first time on a Monday morning,
it’ll run out on the following Sunday at midnight.” The MTA’s website says that
the use of unlimited ride MetroCards is subject to the MTA New York City
Transit tariff, and similar language appears on the back of every MetroCard.
The current tariff says the 7-day card is: “Valid for unlimited rides on NYCTA
subway or … local bus …, taken within 7 days of initial swipe or dip of pass.
Pass valid until 11:59 pm on 7th day.”
 
The court noted that the standard in New York is whether
allegedly deceptive conduct would “mislead a reasonable consumer acting
reasonably under the circumstances”; the Court of Appeals hasn’t explicitly
overruled the older “ignorant, unthinking and credulous” standard, but it also
has applied the reasonability standard in recent cases.  The court ruled that, given the
“clearly-stated midnight deadline,” it was evident that the first day of use,
no matter how short, must be counted; if days were counted with Day 1 as the
day after first use, a consumer could get nearly 8 days from a 7-day pass. “[D]ue
to the midnight expiration, the average consumer of reasonable intelligence
should realize that cards first swiped later on the first day of use will cut
down on the amount of overall hours in which the card can be used.”  The MTA never promises 7 or 30 “full” days of
use, and the expiration date appears every time users swipe an unlimited ride
card. The lack of any complaints about this reinforced Hollander’s strained
interpretation.
 
In any event, the public is “conclusively presumed to know”
the terms and conditions of legal tariffs. 
The filed rate doctrine therefore barred any challenge that would enmesh
the court in the rate-making process, as here. 
Hollander argued that he wasn’t challenging the reasonableness of the
tariff, but only the marketing; but the materials clearly stated they were
subject to the tariff, and he was actually challenging the cards’ conditions of
use.  The filed rate doctrine applies not
only to charges, but to the “classifications, practices, and regulations
affecting such charges,” since rates and charges “do not exist in isolation.”
 
In addition, Hollander couldn’t show any injury. He didn’t
argue that he wouldn’t have bought the cards had he known the truth, or that he
was forced to pay more in transportation costs as a result of being misled. “Any
subscriber who pays the filed rate has suffered no legally cognizable injury.”  Plus, it was undisputed that the unlimited
cards were better for regular riders like plaintiff, who even testified that he
continued to buy 30-day cards, because of the better per-ride price.  (Hmm, under other circumstances I would think
it was still possible to suffer injury even if there were no alternative, but ok.)
 
Breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims failed
too.  I was amused to note that there’s a
1983 case dismissing a subway user’s claim that the MTA was in breach of an
implied contract to transport passengers arising from the sale and purchase of
a token, because the MTA “provided persistently late train service and
permitted unsanitary, unsafe, and overcrowded conditions on its trains.”

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And his fate is still unlearn’d: Subway overcharge claim fails

Hollander v. Metropolitan Transp. Authority, 2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 50991(U), 2015 WL 4077193, No. 160972/13 (Sup. Ct. June 25, 2015)
 
Hollander sued the MTA on behalf of purchasers of 7–Day and 30–Day MetroCards, alleging they were falsely advertised because they aren’t valid for a full 7 or 30 days.  Instead, no matter when you first activate them, they end at midnight 7/30 calendar days later, meaning that you might lose up to nearly a day depending on when you activate them.  Even activation at 11 pm will be counted as your “Day 1.”  The MTA website says that the 7–Day MetroCard is “[g]ood for unlimited subway and local bus rides until midnight, 7 days from day of first use,” and a similar statement for the 30-day version.
 
Hollander alleged that this violated General Business Law §§ 349-350, constituted breach of contract, and resulted in unjust enrichment.  The MTA disagreed, noting that Hollander had been using such unlimited ride cards since as early as 2000, and that he’d been put on repeated notice as to the actual duration. “There is no disputing that straphangers get better deals with these cards when they ride the subways and buses more frequently, and consequently, the MTA earns less per ride.”  According to an affidavit from the MTA, “the total average cost per passenger on the subways and buses is $3.15, only about 50% of which is accounted for by revenue collected from unlimited ride MetroCards.”  Weekly and monthly passes are estimated to reduce fare revenue by 5% to 8%.  The MTA further argued that users are overwhelmingly satisfied and prefer the security of knowing the card won’t run out of value.  “[O]f the tens of thousands of complaints processed since the inception of the program, there has not been a single claim concerning the short dating practice alleged by plaintiff in this action.”
 
The MTA contended that, given the age of the program, lengthy and detailed explanations were no longer required, though a 1998 brochure directed at tourists did say: “Your seven days start when you use your card the first time, so if you use it for the first time on a Monday morning, it’ll run out on the following Sunday at midnight.” The MTA’s website says that the use of unlimited ride MetroCards is subject to the MTA New York City Transit tariff, and similar language appears on the back of every MetroCard. The current tariff says the 7-day card is: “Valid for unlimited rides on NYCTA subway or … local bus …, taken within 7 days of initial swipe or dip of pass. Pass valid until 11:59 pm on 7th day.”
 
The court noted that the standard in New York is whether allegedly deceptive conduct would “mislead a reasonable consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances”; the Court of Appeals hasn’t explicitly overruled the older “ignorant, unthinking and credulous” standard, but it also has applied the reasonability standard in recent cases.  The court ruled that, given the “clearly-stated midnight deadline,” it was evident that the first day of use, no matter how short, must be counted; if days were counted with Day 1 as the day after first use, a consumer could get nearly 8 days from a 7-day pass. “[D]ue to the midnight expiration, the average consumer of reasonable intelligence should realize that cards first swiped later on the first day of use will cut down on the amount of overall hours in which the card can be used.”  The MTA never promises 7 or 30 “full” days of use, and the expiration date appears every time users swipe an unlimited ride card. The lack of any complaints about this reinforced Hollander’s strained interpretation.
 
In any event, the public is “conclusively presumed to know” the terms and conditions of legal tariffs.  The filed rate doctrine therefore barred any challenge that would enmesh the court in the rate-making process, as here.  Hollander argued that he wasn’t challenging the reasonableness of the tariff, but only the marketing; but the materials clearly stated they were subject to the tariff, and he was actually challenging the cards’ conditions of use.  The filed rate doctrine applies not only to charges, but to the “classifications, practices, and regulations affecting such charges,” since rates and charges “do not exist in isolation.”
 
In addition, Hollander couldn’t show any injury. He didn’t argue that he wouldn’t have bought the cards had he known the truth, or that he was forced to pay more in transportation costs as a result of being misled. “Any subscriber who pays the filed rate has suffered no legally cognizable injury.”  Plus, it was undisputed that the unlimited cards were better for regular riders like plaintiff, who even testified that he continued to buy 30-day cards, because of the better per-ride price.  (Hmm, under other circumstances I would think it was still possible to suffer injury even if there were no alternative, but ok.)
 
Breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims failed too.  I was amused to note that there’s a 1983 case dismissing a subway user’s claim that the MTA was in breach of an implied contract to transport passengers arising from the sale and purchase of a token, because the MTA “provided persistently late train service and permitted unsanitary, unsafe, and overcrowded conditions on its trains.”
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A rant on the Copyright Office’s Orphan Works proposal

And it’s not even from me!  As a dedicated ranter, however, I must recognize greatness in ranting when it appears.  Kyle Courtney, my hat’s off to you.

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A rant on the Copyright Office’s Orphan Works proposal

And it’s not even from me!  As a dedicated ranter, however, I must recognize greatness in ranting when it appears.  Kyle Courtney, my hat’s off to you.

Posted in copying, http://schemas.google.com/blogger/2008/kind#post | Leave a comment

Reading list: Christine Jolls on visual disclosures

Christine Jolls, Debiasing Through Law and the First Amendment, 67 Stan. L. Rev. 1411
(2015):

Law often compels the disclosure of information in particular—and, increasingly today, in visual—forms. Some judges conclude that such modern disclosure requirements break with the First Amendment interest in ensuring that consumers are “well informed.” This Article brings an empirically dedicated perspective to such judicial analyses and provides a specific delineation—for three existing legally required visual communications—of data and tools that facilitate evidence-based assessment of the degree to which consumer perceptions are factually accurate in the presence versus the absence of such legally required visual communications.

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Reading list: Christine Jolls on visual disclosures

Christine Jolls, Debiasing Through Law and the First Amendment, 67 Stan. L. Rev. 1411 (2015):

Law often compels the disclosure of information in particular—and, increasingly today, in visual—forms. Some judges conclude that such modern disclosure requirements break with the First Amendment interest in ensuring that consumers are “well informed.” This Article brings an empirically dedicated perspective to such judicial analyses and provides a specific delineation—for three existing legally required visual communications—of data and tools that facilitate evidence-based assessment of the degree to which consumer perceptions are factually accurate in the presence versus the absence of such legally required visual communications.

Posted in advertising, disclosures, first amendment, http://schemas.google.com/blogger/2008/kind#post, reading list | Leave a comment

Exaggerated and outdated photos literally false, court rules

Spruce Environmental Technologies, Inc. v. Festa Radon
Technologies, Co., 2015 WL 4038802, No. 15–11521 (D. Mass. July 2, 2015)
 
Spruce and Festa compete in the radon mitigation industry, selling
products for testing and reducing indoor levels of the colorless and odorless
radioactive gas radon.  Festa began using
a catalog with a section titled “*Dare to Compare* U.S. versus THEM.” It
compared a “7 year old AMG Fan v.[a] 5 year old fan from our competitor” and
provided a photograph of a gray Festa fan next to a bright yellow Spruce fan. 
 

Further comparisons, with side by side photos, compared US (referring to Festa) and THEM (referring to Spruce)
 
1)     
“Secure Lock Lever Nuts”
“Inexpensive Wirenuts”
2)     
“Solid lid with four screws to ensure a
watertight fit. Comes with 2 extra in case you drop one”
“Molded Plastic lid secured
with only two screws”
3)     
“Factory Sealed Motor Wire”
“Motor wire caulked to seal”
4) “Solid motor lead wires”
“Stranded motor lead wires”
5) “Factory Stamped, Dated, & Serialized”
“Generic–No Manufacture Info”
6) “Terminal Box With (4) Screw Holes With Brass Inserts
To Prevent Stripping”
“Terminal Box With (2) Screw Holes. Screw Directly Into
Plastic”
7) “Motor Mounted With (4) Mounting Screws. Allows For
Better Stability And Quiet, Vibration Free Operation”
“Motor Mounted With only (2) screws”
8) “Capacitor With Factory Installed Lead Wires For Direct
Connect”
“Capacitor Requires Wires Installed during assembly”
9) “Watertight Pivoting Grommet”
“Plastic Sleeve Requiring Caulking”
 
Festa put the same content on its website. Several of the
images in Festa’s catalog portray products bearing labels indicating that they
are both Home Ventilating Institute (“HVI”) and Energy Star certified.
 
The court evaluated five falsity claims, but didn’t go into
detail on two so I won’t either.  The key
claims: 1) depictions of Festa’s products as HVI and Energy Star certified when
they are not, 2) claims that the Spruce fan motors are “Generic–No Manufacture
Info” even though they do have a manufacturer’s label, and 3) implications that
the Spruce fan casing will degrade and change into a yellow color after five
years. Even if these weren’t literally false claims, Spruce argued, Festa’s
intentional deception justified an inference of actual deception.
 
Festa responded that it engaged in comparative advertising only
after Spruce’s sales representatives told customers that Festa’s radon
mitigation fans were “garbage” and “junk.”
 
As for the yellowing issue, Festa submitted photos of Spruce
fans that “have undergone pronounced yellowing after exposure to sunlight.”  However, at the hearing, Festa displayed the
Spruce fan shown in Festa’s catalog.  “Although
the fan certainly was discolored, it was not the bright shade of yellow
portrayed in the photograph.” RT: Note the finding of literal falsity based on
visual exaggeration—not unique, but worth highlighting (so to speak). The lack
of apples-to-oranges comparison, discussed next, probably plays a role: “Defendant
admitted that plaintiff’s fan was photographed with flash while defendant’s fan
was not, which may have resulted in the enhanced brightness of the Spruce fan.”
The court therefore found likely success on the merits as to this comparison.
 
As for the certifications, Festa acknowledged that there was
a lapse in its Energy Star certification due to missing paperwork and that its
fans had not been HVI certified since 2010. Festa submitted the necessary
paperwork and expected to be Energy Star certified again shortly, but also
removed references to Energy Star from its website and no longer places Energy
Star stickers on its fans. The Court found that, even though the fans
photographed in the catalog themselves were Energy Star certified, defendant was
falsely representing that its fans were currently
Energy Star compliant, and likewise with older photos of fans showing an HVI
sticker.
 
How about the description of the Spruce motor as “Generic–No
Manufacturer Info”?  Festa argued that
the motors appeared generic because the Spruce labels lacked a model number,
product name, trademark and manufacturer name, and that one of the motor
manufacturer’s own sales representatives did not recognize the motor because
the product was not branded.  The court
concluded that, though the motor was specifically made for Spruce by another
company, the description wasn’t literally false, and that Spruce didn’t prove
intentional deception.
 
Thus, Spruce was likely to succeed on its false advertising
claim based only on the comparison of the colors of the fans and the Energy
Star and HVI representations. 
 
The First Circuit measures irreparable harm on a sliding
scale, in conjunction with likely success on the merits.  Spruce presented an email from a customer expressing
concern over several aspects of its fans, including the discoloration issue
because it suggests that “it is a cheap product casing.” The court concluded
that money damages would mostly compensate Spruce, but that Spruce showed a “modicum”
of irreparable harm to its goodwill and reputation.  Likewise, the balance of equities tipped
somewhat in Spruce’s favor because the false representations weren’t egregious.  Festa argued that an injunction would be
against the public interest because it would suppress competition, but
consideration of Spruce’s potentially anticompetitive motives for suing would
have to wait for a later stage; it was in the public interest to remove false
advertising from the marketplace.  Thus,
the court granted a limited preliminary injunction.
 

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Venable on notable NAD product name ruling

Amy Mudge and Randall Shaheen explain the NAD’s take on product names: if you put two terms together, as in “Nourishing Coconut Shampoo,” the ingredient has to provide the benefit.  If not, it has to be called “Nourishing Shampoo with Coconut.” Also, if you tout your product as X-free, the ingredient you use to replace X can’t have the same negative qualities that lead people to avoid X.

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