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Meta
False establishment claims not actionable under consumer protection law
Aloudi v. Intramedic Research Group, LLC, 2015 WL 4148381, No. 15-cv-00882 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 9, 2015)
Aloudi brought the usual California/warranty claims against IRG for its claims about its JavaSLIM product, a “green coffee bean extract weight loss formula.” The label says that JavaSLIM is “Clinically Proven” to cause “significant reduction in actual body mass index (BMI).” Aloudi alleged that the only “active” ingredients in the Product “are chlorogenic acids and caffeine, neither of which are effective treatments for weight loss,” but that IRG advertised that the product “helps consumers achieve ‘safe, effective, RAPID weight loss,” and “also cited and continues to cite a ‘clinical trial’ purportedly proving that [the Product’s] ingredients provide a ‘significant reduction in both body weight and all important Body Mass Index (BMI) in just a few short weeks.’”
Aloudi alleged that “there are no clinical trials or scientific studies showing that the Product or its ingredients are safe and effective for weight loss or that the Product or its ingredients cause a significant reduction in body weight and BMI.” IRG’s failure to provide “adequate ‘substantiation’ that these statements are truthful and not misleading” allegedly violated the Dietary Supplement Health Education Act of 1994 (“DSHEA”) and therefore was unlawful under the UCL. Plus, Aloudi alleged falsity under the UCL because “chlorogenic acids have never been shown to be an effective treatment for weight control.” Further, he alleged, the FDA determined that “there is ‘inadequate data to establish the general recognition of the safety and effectiveness’ of caffeine for the specified use of ‘weight control,’” and “there is a scientific consensus that ‘magic pills’ containing caffeine and green coffee extract, such as [the Product], do not and cannot provide significant reductions in weight loss alone.”
The court kicked out the lack of substantiation allegations because “[i]t is well settled that private litigants may not bring claims on the basis of a lack of substantiation.” Aloudi argued that IRG’s claims were establishment claims, which could thus be falsified by showing that the evidence didn’t support them.
First, the court ruled, that didn’t support the UCL “unlawful” claim, based entirely on IRG’s lack of substantiation as required by DSHEA. RT: But that seems mistaken. True, the UCL in general doesn’t allow consumers to bring lack of substantiation claims as falsity claims—but if the underlying law does require substantiation, the UCL is designed to create private plaintiff authority to act under the “unlawful” prong. There might be preemption issues, but there’s a lot of law on how to manage that.
Second, Aloudi’s argument relied on Lanham Act precedent, and California law didn’t make that “establishment claim” distinction. (It’s notable that courts usually analyze the Lanham Act and state law in pari materia when competitors are suing; why they should do that when consumers are suing, especially after Lexmark, is less clear. Compare also the 4th Circuit’s In re GNC case, which imports explicit/implicit falsity with absolutely no analysis or argument. This is the court’s best reason, it seems to me, but weakened by its reliance on the idea that there’s just no precedent out there supporting Aloudi’s argument. It would be better to think about the purposes of state consumer protection laws and whether they’re well served by some kind of establishment claim doctrine.)
The court concluded that “[t]he California legislature delegated the authority to demand substantiation for advertising claims to prosecuting authorities alone.” Thus, “as a matter of law, Plaintiffs cannot bring consumer protection claims solely on the basis of a lack of substantiation.” The court therefore disagreed with McCrary v. Elations Co., No. 13–cv–00242, 2013 WL 6403073 (C.D.Cal. July 12, 2013) (“Since Defendant’s advertising expressly states that it has clinical proof to support [its product’s] effectiveness, Plaintiff plausibly alleges falsity when he contends that there is an absence of such proof.”).
RT: McCrary was right. “Substantiation” is when the regulator says, “you say your product causes weight loss. Please prove it.” But the advertiser here didn’t make that claim. It made a different, stronger claim: that it’s clinically proven to cause weight loss. If you show that the product is not clinically proven to cause weight loss, you’ve falsified—proved false—the claim the advertiser actually made, even if you’ve also incidentally shown that a different claim (this product causes weight loss) is unsubstantiated. The instant ruling is a license to deceive, especially in the supplement space where there’s too much going on for regulators to go after everyone and too many competitors for a Lanham Act suit to be worthwhile for any given competitor. This result is particularly bad because claims to have empirical proof are more powerful than straight-up claims. Nor would a ruling the other way eviscerate the no-substantiation rule: it would still bar a consumer plaintiff from prevailing when the advertising claim does not invoke empirical proof and the plaintiff only attacks the reliability of the studies allegedly behind the claim. (Note the separate issue: there are two ways to attack the studies. Either they’re just not reliable to prove the claim made, which is a substantiation argument, or they actually show the opposite (that the product doesn’t work), which is a falsity argument. Aloudi’s first set of allegations goes to the first line of attack, but there might be the second lurking in them.)
Then the court made short work of the falsity allegations. The allegation that there was a “scientific consensus that ‘magic pills’ containing caffeine and green coffee extract, such as [the Product], do not and cannot provide significant reductions in weight loss alone” was purely conclusory, and the remaining facts alleged were insufficient to show falsity, based on general statements by politicians and the FDA that weren’t tied to this particular product or these specific representations. Nor was Aloudi’s anecdotal experience that JavaSLIM didn’t work sufficient.
Finally, Aloudi failed to identify specific actionable omissions.
The warranty claims failed for the same reasons.
Dastar-barred claims can’t be repled as false advertising claims
Friedman v. Zimmer, No. 15-502 (C.D. Cal. Jul. 10, 2015)
Richard Friedman sued Hans Zimmer and others, alleging that the score to 12 Years a Slaveinfringed his copyright to a composition, To Our Fallen. Friedman also alleged violation of the Lanham Act through misrepresentation of the score’s authorship in advertising and promotion. He further asserted claims for violation of his moral rights under the German Copyright Statute of 1965, which provides that an “author shall have the right of recognition of his authorship of the work,” and under the French Code of Intellectual Property of 1992, which provides “the right of respect for the name of the author.”
The court first rejected defendants’ argument that the complaint wasn’t specific enough about who did what in terms of copyright infringement, alleging that they all “produced and distributed” the Film “in the United States and throughout the world,” even though the Copyright Act does not apply extraterritorially and even though some of the defendants might not have made reproductions of or distributed the score. “Before discovery, Plaintiff has no reasonable means of determining the roles that the Moving Defendants played in producing and distributing the Film.” If some of the defendants lacked a role in reproducing/distributing the score, they could put that in their answers and the issue could be resolved on summary judgment.
The Lanham Act claim, however, failed. Friedman alleged that defendants falsely advertised the film as featuring “Music by Hans Zimmer.” This claim would plainly be Dastar-barred had it been brought under §43(a)(1)(A), and you can’t get around that bar, which is based on concern for avoiding a perpetual copyright/patent, by pleading a violation of §43(a)(1)(B) instead but based on the same operative facts.
Yes, the Supreme Court mentioned §43(a)(1)(B) in dicta, hypothesizing that a producer who gave consumers “the impression that the video was quite different from [the other] series” might be guilty of false advertising. But that just means that a misrepresentation that led consumers “to believe they were buying one product when they were really buying another” could be actionable. “[G]iven the Court’s concerns about creating overlap between the Lanham Act and other intellectual property regimes, it would have made little sense for the Supreme Court to reject the Dastar plaintiff’s claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) but permit the same sort of claim to be asserted under a different prong of the same statute.”
The Ninth Circuit already reasoned this way in Sybersound Records, Inc. v. UAV Corp., 517 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2008), which held that alleged misrepresentations about the licensing status of karaoke songs didn’t implicate the “nature, characteristics, or qualities” of the products, which would have to be “characteristics of the good itself, such as the original song and artist of the karaoke recording, and the quality of its audio and visual effects.” Friedman argued that Sybersound’s reference to the “artist” made his claim viable, but that wouldn’t avoid the Lanham/Copyright Act overlap. The court elaborated: Sybersound’s discussion
means only that a seller cannot falsely advertise a recording as being performed by one artist when it is really performed by another. For instance, a seller cannot advertise a CD as containing “All Along the Watchtower” sung by Jimi Hendrix when it actually contains a recording of Bob Dylan singing the same song. That would give consumers the impression that the CD they were buying was “quite different” from what it actually was, which would be a misrepresentation of the nature, characteristics, or qualities of the good. Those are not the facts alleged here.
Query: Suppose Friedman really did write the full score and the CD says Zimmer did. Nonetheless, the score itself is the same—it’s just the attribution that’s wrong. But if the performer is different, the court seems to be saying, the performance is different too, and therefore the proper subject of a false advertising claim. But what if this had been a Milli Vanilli type lawsuit, where some performer alleged that he was the stunt double voice for the performer whose name is on the record? I think this court would have wanted to kick that claim out too. Is it because the performance would be no different, it’s just got the wrong name on it? Is it because of materiality?
Friedman argued that the Ninth Circuit approved a similar claim in Photomedex, Inc. v. Irwin, 601 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2010), in which the plaintiff alleged that the defendants violated the Lanham Act and California unfair competition laws by representing that one of the defendants invented a medical device when he had not. The Ninth Circuit found that the defendant was not the sole inventor, and thus held that the claim might have been misleading. However, the Dastar issue wasn’t raised either at the district court or on appeal, which explains why the court didn’t cite or discuss Dastar or Sybersound—the court was only asked about misleadingness and didn’t assess “whether [the] statement, misleading or not, related to a nature, characteristic, or quality of a good.” To the extent that Photomedexallowed a Dastar claim under §43(a)(1)(B), it was inconsistent with Dastarand Sybersound and not controlling.
The court also dismissed claims relating to moral rights under German and French law. Friedman might be able to assert those rights with respect to infringing conduct that occurred in France or Germany, but US courts aren’t compelled to entertain such claims. The court here wasn’t going to do so given the fact that moral rights had “no clear parallel” in US law. There is also authority for declining jurisdiction. “American courts should be reluctant to enter the bramble bush of ascertaining and applying foreign law without an urgent reason to do so”:
Enforcing foreign laws that are materially different from U.S. laws raises public policy and separation of powers concerns. These concerns are particularly salient in the context of moral rights. When Congress enacted the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, it had the opportunity to broadly grant authors the same moral rights that they would enjoy in any other nation in accordance with the terms of the treaty. But faced with “an avalanche of opposition to moral rights” from even “the bill’s most vociferous advocates,” Congress expressly declined to enact that aspect of the treaty. We think it prudent to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction where Plaintiff seeks to enforce rights that Congress has clearly and deliberately decided not to provide under U.S. law.
Also, judicial economy favored declining supplemental jurisdiction, since a US court would have to consume far more resources figuring out moral rights law than French or German courts, familiar with those rights, would. Also, “the significant risk of jury confusion in a trial involving both domestic and foreign law copyright claims may require us to conduct a separate trial for Plaintiff’s moral rights claims.” So the court kicked them out instead.
Is it awful of me to want a Downfall remix featuring historians reacting?
Historians react with anger to Goebbels copyright ruling.
H/T Zach Schrag.
Quote of the day: on trademark harm
Ralph Sharp Brown knew his stuff with respect to trademark theories of harm that go beyond lost sales: “Judge Frank has already pointed out that the defendant ought to have an opportunity to prove that he will not harm the plaintiff’s fair name. Good repute may be beyond price; but it is not beyond cross-examination.”
Ralph S. Brown Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 Yale L.J. 1165, 1194 (1948)
(footnotes omitted). Brought to you by summer research projects!
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Quote of the day: on trademark harm
Ralph Sharp Brown knew his stuff with respect to trademark theories of harm that go beyond lost sales: “Judge Frank has already pointed out that the defendant ought to have an opportunity to prove that he will not harm the plaintiff’s fair name. Good repute may be beyond price; but it is not beyond cross-examination.” Ralph S. Brown Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 Yale L.J. 1165, 1194 (1948) (footnotes omitted). Brought to you by summer research projects!
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Amicus seeking rehearing in In re GNC
Brian Wolfman and I just filed this amicus on behalf of law professors seeking rehearing in the In re GNC case, which badly misunderstood literal falsity.
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Amicus seeking rehearing in In re GNC
Brian Wolfman and I just filed this amicus on behalf of law professors seeking rehearing in the In re GNC case, which badly misunderstood literal falsity.
And his fate is still unlearn’d: Subway overcharge claim fails
Hollander v. Metropolitan Transp. Authority, 2015 N.Y. Slip
Op. 50991(U), 2015 WL 4077193, No. 160972/13 (Sup. Ct. June 25, 2015)
Op. 50991(U), 2015 WL 4077193, No. 160972/13 (Sup. Ct. June 25, 2015)
Hollander sued the MTA on behalf of purchasers of 7–Day and
30–Day MetroCards, alleging they were falsely advertised because they aren’t
valid for a full 7 or 30 days. Instead,
no matter when you first activate them, they end at midnight 7/30 calendar days
later, meaning that you might lose up to nearly a day depending on when you
activate them. Even activation at 11 pm
will be counted as your “Day 1.” The MTA
website says that the 7–Day MetroCard is “[g]ood for unlimited subway and local
bus rides until midnight, 7 days from day of first use,” and a similar
statement for the 30-day version.
30–Day MetroCards, alleging they were falsely advertised because they aren’t
valid for a full 7 or 30 days. Instead,
no matter when you first activate them, they end at midnight 7/30 calendar days
later, meaning that you might lose up to nearly a day depending on when you
activate them. Even activation at 11 pm
will be counted as your “Day 1.” The MTA
website says that the 7–Day MetroCard is “[g]ood for unlimited subway and local
bus rides until midnight, 7 days from day of first use,” and a similar
statement for the 30-day version.
Hollander alleged that this violated General Business Law §§
349-350, constituted breach of contract, and resulted in unjust enrichment. The MTA disagreed, noting that Hollander had
been using such unlimited ride cards since as early as 2000, and that he’d been
put on repeated notice as to the actual duration. “There is no disputing that
straphangers get better deals with these cards when they ride the subways and
buses more frequently, and consequently, the MTA earns less per ride.” According to an affidavit from the MTA, “the
total average cost per passenger on the subways and buses is $3.15, only about
50% of which is accounted for by revenue collected from unlimited ride
MetroCards.” Weekly and monthly passes
are estimated to reduce fare revenue by 5% to 8%. The MTA further argued that users are
overwhelmingly satisfied and prefer the security of knowing the card won’t run
out of value. “[O]f the tens of
thousands of complaints processed since the inception of the program, there has
not been a single claim concerning the short dating practice alleged by
plaintiff in this action.”
349-350, constituted breach of contract, and resulted in unjust enrichment. The MTA disagreed, noting that Hollander had
been using such unlimited ride cards since as early as 2000, and that he’d been
put on repeated notice as to the actual duration. “There is no disputing that
straphangers get better deals with these cards when they ride the subways and
buses more frequently, and consequently, the MTA earns less per ride.” According to an affidavit from the MTA, “the
total average cost per passenger on the subways and buses is $3.15, only about
50% of which is accounted for by revenue collected from unlimited ride
MetroCards.” Weekly and monthly passes
are estimated to reduce fare revenue by 5% to 8%. The MTA further argued that users are
overwhelmingly satisfied and prefer the security of knowing the card won’t run
out of value. “[O]f the tens of
thousands of complaints processed since the inception of the program, there has
not been a single claim concerning the short dating practice alleged by
plaintiff in this action.”
The MTA contended that, given the age of the program,
lengthy and detailed explanations were no longer required, though a 1998
brochure directed at tourists did say: “Your seven days start when you use your
card the first time, so if you use it for the first time on a Monday morning,
it’ll run out on the following Sunday at midnight.” The MTA’s website says that
the use of unlimited ride MetroCards is subject to the MTA New York City
Transit tariff, and similar language appears on the back of every MetroCard.
The current tariff says the 7-day card is: “Valid for unlimited rides on NYCTA
subway or … local bus …, taken within 7 days of initial swipe or dip of pass.
Pass valid until 11:59 pm on 7th day.”
lengthy and detailed explanations were no longer required, though a 1998
brochure directed at tourists did say: “Your seven days start when you use your
card the first time, so if you use it for the first time on a Monday morning,
it’ll run out on the following Sunday at midnight.” The MTA’s website says that
the use of unlimited ride MetroCards is subject to the MTA New York City
Transit tariff, and similar language appears on the back of every MetroCard.
The current tariff says the 7-day card is: “Valid for unlimited rides on NYCTA
subway or … local bus …, taken within 7 days of initial swipe or dip of pass.
Pass valid until 11:59 pm on 7th day.”
The court noted that the standard in New York is whether
allegedly deceptive conduct would “mislead a reasonable consumer acting
reasonably under the circumstances”; the Court of Appeals hasn’t explicitly
overruled the older “ignorant, unthinking and credulous” standard, but it also
has applied the reasonability standard in recent cases. The court ruled that, given the
“clearly-stated midnight deadline,” it was evident that the first day of use,
no matter how short, must be counted; if days were counted with Day 1 as the
day after first use, a consumer could get nearly 8 days from a 7-day pass. “[D]ue
to the midnight expiration, the average consumer of reasonable intelligence
should realize that cards first swiped later on the first day of use will cut
down on the amount of overall hours in which the card can be used.” The MTA never promises 7 or 30 “full” days of
use, and the expiration date appears every time users swipe an unlimited ride
card. The lack of any complaints about this reinforced Hollander’s strained
interpretation.
allegedly deceptive conduct would “mislead a reasonable consumer acting
reasonably under the circumstances”; the Court of Appeals hasn’t explicitly
overruled the older “ignorant, unthinking and credulous” standard, but it also
has applied the reasonability standard in recent cases. The court ruled that, given the
“clearly-stated midnight deadline,” it was evident that the first day of use,
no matter how short, must be counted; if days were counted with Day 1 as the
day after first use, a consumer could get nearly 8 days from a 7-day pass. “[D]ue
to the midnight expiration, the average consumer of reasonable intelligence
should realize that cards first swiped later on the first day of use will cut
down on the amount of overall hours in which the card can be used.” The MTA never promises 7 or 30 “full” days of
use, and the expiration date appears every time users swipe an unlimited ride
card. The lack of any complaints about this reinforced Hollander’s strained
interpretation.
In any event, the public is “conclusively presumed to know”
the terms and conditions of legal tariffs.
The filed rate doctrine therefore barred any challenge that would enmesh
the court in the rate-making process, as here.
Hollander argued that he wasn’t challenging the reasonableness of the
tariff, but only the marketing; but the materials clearly stated they were
subject to the tariff, and he was actually challenging the cards’ conditions of
use. The filed rate doctrine applies not
only to charges, but to the “classifications, practices, and regulations
affecting such charges,” since rates and charges “do not exist in isolation.”
the terms and conditions of legal tariffs.
The filed rate doctrine therefore barred any challenge that would enmesh
the court in the rate-making process, as here.
Hollander argued that he wasn’t challenging the reasonableness of the
tariff, but only the marketing; but the materials clearly stated they were
subject to the tariff, and he was actually challenging the cards’ conditions of
use. The filed rate doctrine applies not
only to charges, but to the “classifications, practices, and regulations
affecting such charges,” since rates and charges “do not exist in isolation.”
In addition, Hollander couldn’t show any injury. He didn’t
argue that he wouldn’t have bought the cards had he known the truth, or that he
was forced to pay more in transportation costs as a result of being misled. “Any
subscriber who pays the filed rate has suffered no legally cognizable injury.” Plus, it was undisputed that the unlimited
cards were better for regular riders like plaintiff, who even testified that he
continued to buy 30-day cards, because of the better per-ride price. (Hmm, under other circumstances I would think
it was still possible to suffer injury even if there were no alternative, but ok.)
argue that he wouldn’t have bought the cards had he known the truth, or that he
was forced to pay more in transportation costs as a result of being misled. “Any
subscriber who pays the filed rate has suffered no legally cognizable injury.” Plus, it was undisputed that the unlimited
cards were better for regular riders like plaintiff, who even testified that he
continued to buy 30-day cards, because of the better per-ride price. (Hmm, under other circumstances I would think
it was still possible to suffer injury even if there were no alternative, but ok.)
Breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims failed
too. I was amused to note that there’s a
1983 case dismissing a subway user’s claim that the MTA was in breach of an
implied contract to transport passengers arising from the sale and purchase of
a token, because the MTA “provided persistently late train service and
permitted unsanitary, unsafe, and overcrowded conditions on its trains.”
too. I was amused to note that there’s a
1983 case dismissing a subway user’s claim that the MTA was in breach of an
implied contract to transport passengers arising from the sale and purchase of
a token, because the MTA “provided persistently late train service and
permitted unsanitary, unsafe, and overcrowded conditions on its trains.”
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And his fate is still unlearn’d: Subway overcharge claim fails
Hollander v. Metropolitan Transp. Authority, 2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 50991(U), 2015 WL 4077193, No. 160972/13 (Sup. Ct. June 25, 2015)
Hollander sued the MTA on behalf of purchasers of 7–Day and 30–Day MetroCards, alleging they were falsely advertised because they aren’t valid for a full 7 or 30 days. Instead, no matter when you first activate them, they end at midnight 7/30 calendar days later, meaning that you might lose up to nearly a day depending on when you activate them. Even activation at 11 pm will be counted as your “Day 1.” The MTA website says that the 7–Day MetroCard is “[g]ood for unlimited subway and local bus rides until midnight, 7 days from day of first use,” and a similar statement for the 30-day version.
Hollander alleged that this violated General Business Law §§ 349-350, constituted breach of contract, and resulted in unjust enrichment. The MTA disagreed, noting that Hollander had been using such unlimited ride cards since as early as 2000, and that he’d been put on repeated notice as to the actual duration. “There is no disputing that straphangers get better deals with these cards when they ride the subways and buses more frequently, and consequently, the MTA earns less per ride.” According to an affidavit from the MTA, “the total average cost per passenger on the subways and buses is $3.15, only about 50% of which is accounted for by revenue collected from unlimited ride MetroCards.” Weekly and monthly passes are estimated to reduce fare revenue by 5% to 8%. The MTA further argued that users are overwhelmingly satisfied and prefer the security of knowing the card won’t run out of value. “[O]f the tens of thousands of complaints processed since the inception of the program, there has not been a single claim concerning the short dating practice alleged by plaintiff in this action.”
The MTA contended that, given the age of the program, lengthy and detailed explanations were no longer required, though a 1998 brochure directed at tourists did say: “Your seven days start when you use your card the first time, so if you use it for the first time on a Monday morning, it’ll run out on the following Sunday at midnight.” The MTA’s website says that the use of unlimited ride MetroCards is subject to the MTA New York City Transit tariff, and similar language appears on the back of every MetroCard. The current tariff says the 7-day card is: “Valid for unlimited rides on NYCTA subway or … local bus …, taken within 7 days of initial swipe or dip of pass. Pass valid until 11:59 pm on 7th day.”
The court noted that the standard in New York is whether allegedly deceptive conduct would “mislead a reasonable consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances”; the Court of Appeals hasn’t explicitly overruled the older “ignorant, unthinking and credulous” standard, but it also has applied the reasonability standard in recent cases. The court ruled that, given the “clearly-stated midnight deadline,” it was evident that the first day of use, no matter how short, must be counted; if days were counted with Day 1 as the day after first use, a consumer could get nearly 8 days from a 7-day pass. “[D]ue to the midnight expiration, the average consumer of reasonable intelligence should realize that cards first swiped later on the first day of use will cut down on the amount of overall hours in which the card can be used.” The MTA never promises 7 or 30 “full” days of use, and the expiration date appears every time users swipe an unlimited ride card. The lack of any complaints about this reinforced Hollander’s strained interpretation.
In any event, the public is “conclusively presumed to know” the terms and conditions of legal tariffs. The filed rate doctrine therefore barred any challenge that would enmesh the court in the rate-making process, as here. Hollander argued that he wasn’t challenging the reasonableness of the tariff, but only the marketing; but the materials clearly stated they were subject to the tariff, and he was actually challenging the cards’ conditions of use. The filed rate doctrine applies not only to charges, but to the “classifications, practices, and regulations affecting such charges,” since rates and charges “do not exist in isolation.”
In addition, Hollander couldn’t show any injury. He didn’t argue that he wouldn’t have bought the cards had he known the truth, or that he was forced to pay more in transportation costs as a result of being misled. “Any subscriber who pays the filed rate has suffered no legally cognizable injury.” Plus, it was undisputed that the unlimited cards were better for regular riders like plaintiff, who even testified that he continued to buy 30-day cards, because of the better per-ride price. (Hmm, under other circumstances I would think it was still possible to suffer injury even if there were no alternative, but ok.)
Breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims failed too. I was amused to note that there’s a 1983 case dismissing a subway user’s claim that the MTA was in breach of an implied contract to transport passengers arising from the sale and purchase of a token, because the MTA “provided persistently late train service and permitted unsanitary, unsafe, and overcrowded conditions on its trains.”