organic protein is generic, but trade dress comes to the rescue

Orgain,
Inc. v. Northern Innovations Holding Corp., 2021 WL 1321653, No. 8:18-cv-01253-JLS-ADS
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2021)

The parties compete in the market for nutritional supplements. Orgain
alleged that defendants infringed its trade dress in selling a competing
plant-based nutritional supplement adorned with the “organic protein” phrase in
black font against a white background, framed by green bands that circumscribe
the top and bottom of the packaging, as well as a green leaf motif and colored
boxes highlighting the dietary profile of the product. Defendants allegedly
altered the packaging of their nutritional supplement on multiple occasions to
more closely resemble Orgain’s packaging.

Orgain’s claimed trade dress

accused product

First,
defendants showed that “organic protein” is generic. Under the Ninth Circuit
“who-are-you/what-are-you” test, “organic protein” is a what.  Each word was
generic, and the combination didn’t add meaning (citing Booking.com).  And Orgain itself used the phrase
generically, e.g., “organic protein is the engine of all Orgain products.”
Orgain’s owner stated that “[he] made it [his] mission to formulate a drink
that would actually make a difference in [his] health. It had to be … high in
organic protein ….” Orgain’s website says: “Orgain™ provides 255
nutrient-dense calories with a perfect 2:1 ratio of organic carbohydrates to
organic protein,” and the FAQ answer to “what’s in Orgain?” is “16 grams of the
highest quality Organic Protein to help build lean muscle.”  Orgain
argued that these were merely descriptive uses, but didn’t explain why, and
Orgain had the burden of proof to show protectability.

Likewise,
there was evidence that other companies in the nutritional supplement market use
“organic protein” generically in connection with their products. Again, Orgain
couldn’t win by arguing that those uses were also descriptive. Indeed, in many
of the documented uses, “organic protein” was used as the title of the product,
just as Orgain used it; Orgain failed to explain why those uses were
descriptive and defendants’ use was allegedly infringing.  

Survey
evidence is the “ultimate test” for genericness, Booking.com (ugh), so
Orgain offered a “modified Teflon survey” from Hal Poret that concluded
that 74% of respondents believed the term “organic protein” was descriptive.
Defendants’ Teflon survey found that 88% of consumers understand
“organic protein” to be a category of products rather than a brand name. You
will not be surprised to hear that the dueling surveys did not manage to create
a genuine issue of material fact.

Poret
reasoned that the Teflon format, dealing with a term that started life
fanciful, had to be modified when the plaintiff was claiming rights in a
descriptive term. Thus, respondents were instructed that “[g]eneric terms
identify a type or category of product,” while “[d]escriptive terms describe an
ingredient, characteristic, quality, feature, or function of a product.”

The
survey listed “automobile,” “ice cream” and “allergy medicine” as examples of
generic terms and “hatchback,” “Rocky Road,” and “non-drowsy” as examples of
descriptive terms. To advance to the main questionnaire, respondents had to
identify “yogurt” and “bottled water” as generic and “lemon lime” and “natural”
as descriptive. Respondents who made it through were presented with a list of
words or terms to identify as “generic” or “descriptive”: organic protein,
creamy chocolate, lactose free, protein drink, and nutritional supplement.

But
the survey “side-stepped the key inquiry—namely, whether respondents understood
‘organic protein’ to refer to Orgain’s goods or whether they understood the
term to refer to a category of products.”

True,
“generic” and “descriptive” are separate legal definitions along the
distinctiveness spectrum. But the genericness inquiry is not about where
consumers categorize the mark along the distinctiveness spectrum. Rather, the
genericness inquiry asks whether consumers perceive the term as identifying a
common name for a certain type or class of products.

[I
think what this gets at is that surveys can detect secondary meaning, but
they’re not going to be great at distinguishing among conceptual categories,
and why would they be? But this means that Booking.com punts to surveys
in order to eliminate genericness whenever there is enough secondary meaning.
Some people like that result; I do not.] The Poret survey didn’t ask consumers
“is this a name of a type of product or is this a source-identifier?” It could
have done so. But instead, it provided “no evidence” of whether the consuming
public viewed “organic protein” as a mark that identifies Orgain’s products.

Even
if this evidence were relevant, the definitions of “generic” and “descriptive”
were overlapping and confusing. The supposedly descriptive examples “Hatchback”
for vehicle, “Rocky Road” for frozen dessert, and “Non Drowsy” for allergy
medication were

likely
to confuse survey participants when viewed in light of the definitions
provided. For example, “non-drowsy” is a type or category of cold medicine, and
“Hatchback” is a type or category of car. By the Poret Survey’s own definition,
those terms are therefore generic.

The
questions compounded the problem by asking respondents to categorize five terms
as descriptive or generic, but didn’t bother to tell them for what.

Defendants’
survey, on the other hand, was perfectly persuasive.

Even
if the evidence had created a fact issue on descriptiveness, Orgain failed to
show secondary meaning. Orgain had a survey that arguably showed secondary
meaning of its trade dress (though 36% net recognition is in *gulp* territory,
I would think), but it didn’t test “organic protein” separately.

Nonetheless,
there were triable issues of material fact on the overall trade dress claim.

Nonfunctionality:
Though individual elements like having a term in black font against a white
background might be functional, and green and a green leaf might commonly be
used to identify “organic” or healthy products, “[the] focus [is] not on the
individual elements [of the trade dress], but rather on the overall visual
impression that the combination and arrangement of those elements create.” And
since Orgain only claimed exclusive rights in the specific combination of
elements it listed, it could show nonfunctionality.

The
court found that Orgain didn’t show that its trade dress was inherently
distinctive; it was not enough to contend that “the specific combination of
elements in the [claimed trade dress] has not been adopted by anyone other than
[Defendants].” Defendants proffered evidence that Orgain’s competitors use
packaging with similar aesthetic elements, including jar-shaped containers;
labels using color block; the term “organic protein” on the label; a green leaf
to denote “organic” food; and color bands. This showed that the claimed trade
dress was “a mere refinement of a commonly-adopted and well-known form of
ornamentation for a particular class of goods” and not “unique or unusual in
[this] particular field.” Even without that, the claimed trade dress featured a
“common, basic” package shape and label design.

However,
Orgain created a fact issue on secondary meaning. “While some courts have,
indeed, found a 36% showing did not raise a factual issue precluding summary
judgment and instead weighed against a finding of secondary meaning,
other courts have found a 35% showing to be persuasive evidence of secondary
meaning.” There was also circumstantial evidence of secondary meaning,
including evidence of actual confusion. The evidence: 16 Amazon reviews, 23
social media posts, and 13 direct communications from consumers, some of which
tended to show actual confusion, e.g., an Amazon review stating, “DON’T BUY!!!
Bought this thinking it was Orgain on accident (which I use daily and absolutely
love)”  and others that involved
communications with Orgain itself: “Any chance you can look into the
similarities of ‘Purely Inspired’ packaging? I bought it on Amazon thinking it
was your company’s product and upon getting it realized it wasn’t Orgain!”
Also, marketing representatives mistakenly placed Orgain’s shelf talkers—the
advertisements that stick out from shelves in stores—on defendants’ products in
Walmart stores, or vice versa. This evidence was “substantial, but not
overwhelming given the size of the relevant market and the fact that the
parties’ products have co-existed on the market since 2015.”

There
was also a genuine dispute about copying. Orgain argued that “because Orgain’s
name came up in surveys that Defendants conducted in support of rebranding
their label, and because the rebranded labels look more like Orgain’s than
Defendants’ previous label, it must be inferred that Defendants copied Orgain’s
label to trade on its success.” Defendants’ survey indicated that 77% of those
surveyed preferred (what became) their new label, and that the new green theme
and the colorful display of nutrition facts, which are parts of Orgain’s
claimed trade dress, contributed to the new label’s popularity. In another of
defendants’ surveys, consumers were asked to write the names of all the
plant-based protein brands they knew of, and Orgain was a frequent response. And
a revised label used a more prominent “organic protein” mark on this the new
label, which Orgain pointed to as proof of intent to copy. Defendants pointed
to other evidence that tended to disprove copying and treat Orgain as one of
many competitors, including studies that didn’t even include Orgain in their
comparisons.

Even
without other circumstantial evidence, there was some direct and circumstantial
evidence meriting trial.

So too
with likely confusion; you can tell how the various factors went. On actual
confusion, there were dueling surveys: Defendants’ Eveready survey found 4% net
confusion, while Orgain’s Squirt survey found 17% net confusion. A trial should
determine which survey was better, the “more suggestive” Squirt survey or the
Eveready survey, which arguably didn’t do as much to measure what would happen
if the products were encountered together in the marketplace. Query: what happens
if the jury concludes that the confusion stemmed primarily or entirely from
generic use of “organic protein”?

one entrant in P’s Squirt lineup

Another in the Squirt lineup

test image for Squirt lineup

Control image for Squirt lineup

Query: is this a good control image if “organic protein” is generic? Isn’t it testing in part for the effect of “organic protein” in the big font at the center?

State
law claims: Aside from arguments above, Orgain argued that, “trademark and
trade dress rights notwithstanding, Defendants engaged in unfair competition
because they copied Orgain’s design.” The court found that “triable issues of
fact preclude summary judgment on the issue of actual copying.” [Disturbing
insofar as it doesn’t address the core problem with the claim, if not
coextensive with the trade dress claim: strong federal policies preclude state
laws that purport to bar copying itself, as Sears/Compco/Bonito Boats
all teach.]

from Blogger https://ift.tt/3BR4ejN

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , , | Leave a comment

Uber’s expansion into ads hits a TM hurdle

Uber Inc. v. Uber Technol., Inc., No. 20-cv-2320 (PKC)
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2021)

Uber Inc. has offered design and marketing services under
the name “Uber” since 1999. Uber Technologies, the one you know about, was
incorporated in 2010. As it grew and expanded into new services, Uber Inc. “found
itself on the receiving end of customer complaints, misdirected product
shipments, legal and regulatory correspondence, and other communications
intended for Uber Technologies.” And Defendants began saying that they planned
to expand into the display-advertising business: putting ads on a vehicle’s
digital signage, a rider’s mobile app, and on digital screens like electronic
billboards. Uber Inc. also alleged that its 2019 application to register a
trademark was stalled based on a description of services that overlapped with a
pending, competing ITU application filed by Uber Technologies in connection
with advertising, marketing and promotional services, including “promoting
third party goods and services.”

The court declined to dismiss the Lanham Act/NY law
complaint, with the exception of the duplicative unjust enrichment claim.

Uber Inc. describes its business as including graphic design
like logos, stationery and brochures; promotional events and mailings; and
consumer-oriented campaigns, like magazine advertisements. It’s allegedly been
retained by well-known brands, including BMW and Macy’s, and by companies
headquartered throughout the United States, and promotes itself mainly through
the websites http://www.uber-inc.com and http://www.uber.nyc. 

Meanwhile, Uber OOH [Out of Home], whose corporate
relationship to Uber Technologies was a bit unclear, describes itself as “The
Official Uber Advertising Network.”

Starting in 2012, Uber Inc. received an increasing number of
calls and communications intended for Uber Technologies. Confusion allegedly
grew more frequent with time, becoming “constant” in the last three years.

[O]ne of plaintiff’s customers sent
plaintiff a large payment that was intended for Uber Technologies, while
separately sending a payment to Uber Technologies that was intended for
plaintiff. A vendor mistakenly granted Uber Technologies access to plaintiff’s
account, resulting in plaintiff’s temporary inability to access its own account
and giving Uber Technologies access to plaintiff’s business information.
Plaintiff alleges that it has stopped attending trade shows and sometimes does
not answer calls due to overwhelming call volume intended for Uber
Technologies. 

This really does seem like a good candidate for “junior
should pay senior to change its name,” and in 2015 Uber Technologies offered
Uber Inc. $80,000 to do so. Uber Inc. counteroffered with $800,000, and
rejected Uber Technologies’ $120,000 response, believing that they were still
in different fields. But in 2019, Uber Technology allegedly began preparatory
steps to enter the advertising business.

In 2020, a site published under the “Uber OOH” name allegedly
stated that the company would assist clients in creating advertising.

Unsurprisingly, the complaint plausibly alleged reverse
confusion. Even with differences between the parties’ core services, the
complaint plausibly alleged Uber Technology’s advertising-related expansion
plans put it in competitive proximity to Uber Inc’s graphic design and
marketing services. Though the complaint failed to identify instances of actual
confusion among “prospective customers who were seeking out plaintiff’s
advertising and design services,” that wasn’t required, and confusion among
others offered “some factual support for the plausibility of plaintiff’s
claims.”

Forward confusion was also plausible; on a motion to
dismiss, the court did not agree that no consumer could plausibly confuse
plaintiff’s graphic design-intensive business with the mobile, digitally oriented,
“out of home” advertisements offered by defendants. The complaint quoted Uber
Technologies statements expressing “broad ambitions for their advertising
services, and not just advertisements displayed on vehicles.”

Nor did the complaint plead itself out of court on laches.
The period in NY is six years, and the complaint didn’t establish that Uber
Inc. knew it had an actionable claim more than six years before suit was filed.
“[K]nowledge of Uber Technologies’s use of an ‘Uber; mark and the receipt of
misdirected calls does not equate to knowledge that plaintiff had an actionable
claim under the Lanham Act.” Plus, Uber Technology’s offer in 2015 might
constitute its awareness that it was “entering contested ground,” weighing
against laches.  

State-law dilution claims, which don’t require fame, also
survived.

from Blogger https://ift.tt/3n6s3QB

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged | Leave a comment

lawyer doesn’t make use in commerce by negotiating for client

Big
Ligas, LLC v. Yu, 2021 WL 1518993, No. 20-23719-Civ-Scola (S.D. Fla. Apr. 16,
2021)

Big
Ligas is owned by three members equally: Daniel Echavarria, also known as Ovy;
Christian Andres Salazar; and Paulo Londra. Ovy and Salazar are the managing
members, and defendant Yu is an entertainment attorney who represents Londra,
an Argentinian “rapper and reggaeton/trap singer.” The parties signed a deal
memorandum “to help Londra launch his career as a singer and songwriter.”

Things
went well, and then as Londra’s success increased, the parties’ relations
deteriorated. Amidst negotiations with other parties about Londra’s second
album, Londra hired Yu.

Big
Ligas alleged that, among other things, Yu “falsely claimed that she and/or
Paulo owned the copyrights that are in fact owned by Big Ligas.”  She allegedly falsely represented that she was
authorized to deliver Londra’s “recording artist and songwriting services …
when in fact, any compositions or recordings created under publishing or record
deals not authorized by Big Ligas, including those negotiated by Yu, are not
commercially exploitable without Big Ligas’[s] authorization, under Paulo’s
name or otherwise.”

Big
Ligas sued for tortious interference and for false advertising and trademark
infringement under the Lanham Act. The tortious interference claims failed for
contractual reasons and because Londra’s lawyer was his agent, not a stranger
to the contract.

Lanham
Act claims: Along with the alleged misrepresentations about authority, Big
Ligas alleged that Yu used Londra’s “name and likeness … to promote his
recording services to Warner (and others) and his songwriting services to
Kobalt (and others), without Big Ligas’[s] approval or authorization,” confusing
third parties.

Yu
rejoined that she was, in fact, Londra’s counsel, and using his name was “classical
fair use” (that is, descriptive fair use) because “she is not using the name
Paulo Londra in the trademark sense, but only to identify her client and
describe his relationship to her.” Of course, descriptive fair use requires
good faith which sure sounds like it’s hard to decide on a motion to dismiss,
but that’s no barrier here. Londra’s stage name and given name are the same
[should the result be different if they weren’t?], “and the Plaintiff’s
allegations do not prove that Ms. Yu used the Plaintiff’s mark in commerce by
referring to and describing her relationship with her client by using his given
name.” [Of course this was a use in commerce; in a different situation, this
argument would be laughable. Trademark law has ruthlessly been stripped of the
tools it needs to say “this is not a trademark claim,” and that’s why the
Seventh Circuit approach of just reaching the equitable result can appeal.]

Even
if we needed to do a descriptive fair use analysis, Yu would win:

The
Court finds that, as Londra’s attorney, Ms. Yu’s use of his name to
identify him as her client was other than as a mark, used in the primary
descriptive sense, and was undertaken in good faith, that is without the intent
to trade on the good will of Big Ligas. To the extent the use of the name Paulo
Londra creates some risk of confusion, Big Ligas assumed that risk by
establishing Paulo Londra, Londra’s given name by birth, as his stage name.
(emphasis added)

This
isn’t motion to dismiss language, although it is clearly the right result.

False
advertising: “That Ms. Yu contacted third parties and stated she is Londra’s
attorney with authority to negotiate on his behalf is not a false or misleading
statement insofar as Ms. Yu was acting on behalf of her client, Londra.” This
was a contract dispute, not a Yu problem.

from Blogger https://ift.tt/2X1nE6g

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , , | Leave a comment

Coach narrowly alleges grounds for cancellation of similar marks

Tapestry,
Inc. v. Chunma USA, Inc., 2021 WL 1534988, No. 20-CV-0271 (JMF) (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
19, 2021)

Tapestry
(Coach) sued Chunma for trademark infringement, false designation of origin,
false advertising, and cancellation of Chunma’s registered trademarks under the
Lanham Act, unfair competition and trademark infringement under New York state
common law; and injury to business reputation under New York’s GBL, based on
Chunma’s products bearing logos that allegedly infringe upon Coach’s
trademarks, including Coach’s well-known “Signature C” mark. Chunma’s motion to
dismiss the cancellation claims was denied.  

The claim
for cancellation of the ‘675 Mark was based on fraud in obtaining the trademark
registration and misrepresentation of source, whereas their claim for
cancellation of the ’549 and ’077 Marks was based on misrepresentation of
source alone.

077

549

675

For
fraud, Coach alleged that Chunma made a material misrepresentation in its
trademark registration application, in particular that the mark was in use as
of the application date, when in fact there was no bona fide use until years
later. Chunma also allegedly misrepresented the specimen that it submitted
alongside its application as a “SCANNED ACTUAL TAG” when, in fact, it was
merely a “computer illustration, digital image, or similar mockup” that the PTO
would not have accepted.

As for
false suggestion of a connection, Coach explicitly alleged that Chunma’s marks
“falsely suggest a connection with Plaintiffs.”

However,
with respect to the ’549 and ’077 Marks, the misrepresentation of source claim
was “a close question.”  “[I]t is well
established that “allegations … of the type that typically support a claim of
likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d)” do not suffice to state a claim for
cancellation of an incontestable mark based on misrepresentation of source
under Section 14(3).” (I note that, looking at TSDR, Coach requested an
extension of time to oppose at least one of these marks, but does not seem to
have actually opposed them.) “Significantly, even intentional copying of a
plaintiff’s trademark does not, standing alone, state a misrepresentation
claim.” Instead, a plaintiff must plead “specific facts reflecting [the
defendant’s] activity that, if proved, would amount to an attempt to create the
impression that [the plaintiff] is the source of [the defendant’s] services” or
goods, such as conduct outside use of the registered mark itself.

The
complaint did “narrowly” state a claim. Coach pled that Chunma sells “products
bearing logos and source-identifying indicia and design elements that are
studied imitations of [Plaintiffs’ well-known] Signature C Mark,” with
“reckless disregard or willful blindness to Plaintiffs’ rights, and/or with bad
faith, for the purpose of trading on the goodwill and reputation of the
Signature C Mark” and to “deceive consumers, the public, and the trade into
believing that there is a connection or association between [Chunma] … and
[the] Coach” brand. The complaint also showed images showing close similarities
between Coach’s trademarks and some of Chunma’s products. Viewed in the light
most favorable to plaintiffs, that sufficed for now, though Coach would “ultimately
bear a heavy burden to prove this claim by clear and convincing evidence.”

accused product

another

another

The
subsequent stipulation to a permanent injunction did not cover the
registrations, but there is apparently a confidential settlement agreement that
may have covered them.

from Blogger https://ift.tt/3BU4Zc5

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged | Leave a comment

There’s no such thing as “leasing real estate in violation of the Lanham Act”

Wakefern Food Corp. v. Marchese, 2021 WL 3783259, No. 2:20-cv-15949-WJM-MF (D.N.J. Aug. 26,
2021)

Always
something new in trademark! Wakefern, the largest retailer-owned supermarket
coop in the US, sued Marchese for attempting “to lease commercial real estate
in violation of the Lanham Act … and New Jersey common law.” 

Wakefern
operates approximately 353 supermarkets under various brands such as ShopRite and
Fairway Market across several states, and has a registration for ShopRite.

Marchese
formed defendant Family Markets for the stated purpose of carrying out a retail
supermarket business. I
n mid-2020, Marchese allegedly contacted Wakefern about the possibility of
joining the Wakefern cooperative. He allegedly told Wakefern’s representative
that he owned both Family Markets and a number of “Foodtown” supermarket
locations across New Jersey, including a specific Foodtown location in
Plainsboro. Wakefield told Marchese to submit a summary of his qualifications
in writing, but he didn’t follow up. The supposed Plainsboro location was allegedly vacant.

“Marchese
also contacted a real estate broker to inquire about a listing of a vacant
50,000 square foot supermarket in Middlesex, New Jersey.” He allegedly informed
the broker “that he was interested in leasing the vacant space, that he was the
owner/operator of an active supermarket business in Family Markets, that he had
an ownership interest in several members of the Wakefern cooperative, including
four ShopRite® supermarkets in New Jersey, and that he had started the process
of becoming a Wakefern member himself.” Afterwards, the broker contacted
Wakefern and was told that Marchese wasn’t a member and had no
Wakefern/ShopRite affiliation.

Perhaps
overreacting, Wakefern sued for trademark infringement and false advertising in
violation of the Lanham Act and violation of state unfair competition law,
which is coextensive and thus disappears from our story.

Trademark
infringement: This just wasn’t use in commerce. Whether confined to the §1114
definition of “use in commerce” or using some other broader standard for §1127,
Marchese’s statement didn’t qualify:

Plaintiff is correct that Marchese’s conduct in invoking
Wakefern and the ShopRite® brand may have been an affirmative act ultimately
designed to achieve some sort of commercial benefit (i.e. the acquisition of
commercial space from which to operate a supermarket). However, there are no
allegations that Defendant has ever offered, distributed, possessed, sold, or
advertised any goods or services of any kind bearing or imitating Plaintiff’s
marks, or even had the capacity to do so. Nor are there any allegations that,
had Marchese been successful in securing the vacant commercial property, he
would have engaged in any infringing conduct in the actual operation of a
supermarket. Indeed, Plaintiff’s allegations suggest that Marchese made false
representations to the broker in order to take advantage of the broker’s
services rather than to sell or promote his own. Moreover, Plaintiff has not
cited any case, and the Court is aware of none, in which a single, private
business conversation, without any corresponding dissemination or marketing to
the broader purchasing public, has been found to constitute a “use in commerce”
for purposes of trademark infringement.

False
advertising: Not commercial advertising or promotion. There was no organized
campaign to penetrate the market alleged; there was also no targeting of a
class of potential purchasers. “Marchese’s allegedly false statements regarding
his relationship with Wakefern were made in the context of a private
conversation with a targeted individual acting in his capacity as a broker
rather than shared more broadly to a class of potential supermarket consumers.
Such isolated, private statements, particularly to non-consumers, do not
constitute the sort of dissemination to the relevant purchasing public
necessary to state a false advertising claim under Section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act.” Wakefield did allege that Marchese engaged in “similar conduct with
respect to multiple Westside Market stores in New York City.” But there were no
other details. “Regardless, even assuming Plaintiff intended to allege that
Marchese has continued to claim a relationship with Wakefern to various real
estate brokers in order to obtain a commercial lease to operate a supermarket,
Plaintiff’s claim would fail: such statements would still be discrete
communications targeted to specific non-consumers rather than promotions or
advertisements disseminated to a segment of the purchasing public.”

from Blogger https://ift.tt/3tlSkLH

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , | Leave a comment

Is disgorgement the new normal in Lanham Act cases?

Grasshopper
House, LLC v. Clean & Sober Media, LLC, 2021 WL 3702243, No. 19-56008, No.
19-56072, — Fed.Appx. —- (9th Cir. Aug. 20, 2021)

The
TMA’s injunctive relief changes are probably going to make it even more clear
that courts aren’t entirely sure whether damage is part of the cause of action
for false advertising; since it isn’t for trademark infringement, trademark
plaintiffs never have to show damage at all to get relief and even
disgorgement, which has now become much more readily available. Is that true
for false advertising plaintiffs?

Here,
the parties compete in the market for addiction treatment. A jury found
defendants liable for false advertising through a purportedly unbiased,
independent site. The district court entered a permanent injunction against defendants
but denied disgorgement of profits, attorneys’ fees and costs. The panel, over
two separate dissents, sends it back for reassessment of disgorgement,
attorneys’ fees and costs (and still doesn’t publish the opinion).

The
district court excluded the plaintiff’s damages expert, finding that he didn’t
apply a reliable methodology in assessing causation of damages because he
discounted competing causal factors without an adequate basis and lacked the
necessary expertise to make those judgments. The district court acted within
its discretion in doing so, and properly cancelled the damages phase of the
jury trial because no other witness had been disclosed on damages. Plaintiff
argued that it should have been able to use the testimony of its principal, but
even during deposition, plaintiff’s counsel stated that he “was not [there] to
talk about causation and damages” and objected to questions directed to him
about damages, declaring that this topic would be exclusively “within the scope
of expert opinion.” He himself acknowledged at his deposition that it was
“beyond his scope of understanding” to explain how plaintiff was damaged.

Disgorgement
had to be sent back because the law on willfulness being required for
disgorgement changed after the court ruled. But watch this language: “On
remand, the district court should consider Defendants’ mental state — whatever
that may be — when determining what award of profits is appropriate.” So
plaintiff is apparently entitled to disgorgement without ever having shown that
it was damaged by the false advertising. So, is damage to the plaintiff part of
the cause of action or no?

The
court said further: “it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to
deny Plaintiff’s request for disgorgement on the ground that Plaintiff had not
established causally, and to a reasonable certainty, the ‘financial benefit’ that
Defendants received from their false advertisement as to Plaintiff.” The trial
court was certain that the defendants had profited to some degree from false
statements about the neutrality of the review and from a review that
represented that it was “based on surveys of former [Plaintiff] clients.” Both
parties’ experts calculated that each of the 192,434 visits to the relevant
webpage had some value, though they disagreed about whether it was $40
or $1.80 per click. Even the lower bound would yield a disgorgement amount at
least five times that of the ‘hypothetical’ alternative amount of $60,000
reached by the district court.” Because even defendants’ expert recognized some
benefit to defendants, it was an abuse of discretion to find that the financial
benefit to them could not be established to a reasonable certainty.

One of
the dissents argued that, because the plaintiff’s theory of falsity was focused
on the falsity of the process by which the review was repaired, the
disgorgement theory needed to account for the possibility that the plaintiff’s
facility deserved its review. That overstates a plaintiff’s burden. “Having
presented sufficient evidence to show that the highly negative review was not
generated by the process that was represented, Plaintiff amply established that
the review was unreliable and therefore false and misleading. At the very
least, Plaintiff demonstrated that the review falsely augmented its own
trustworthiness and persuasiveness.”

The
court vacated the attorneys’ fees award in case its ruling on disgorgement on
remand affected its ruling on the award of attorney fees. And it reversed the
denial of costs because successful plaintiffs are entitled to them; it wasn’t
enough to say that the litigation was “excessively-protracted” or that they
weren’t entitled to attorneys’ fees, which are judged by a different standard.

One
partial dissent thought the district court prejudicially erred in cancelling
the damages phase of the trial for civil procedure reasons.

The
other partial dissent was on disgorgement. In its view, the jury only found
falsity as to the procedure followed by the review and the statement of the
process by which it was developed, not by any particular statement in the
review itself or its ultimate star rating. Thus, damages would have to relate “to
relate to people who were dissuaded from seeking treatment at [plaintiff’s
facility] because of the failure to base the review on former clients’
assessments of the services, as set forth in the Process Statement.” 

from Blogger https://ift.tt/3zRZSbz

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , , | Leave a comment

Pandemic ski resort closures allow both contract and advertising claims

Goodrich v. Alterra Mountain Co., 2021 WL 2633326, No.
20-cv-01057-RM-SKC (D. Colo. Jun. 25, 2021)

Unlike the education cases so far, this pandemic case
sustains both consumer protection and contract claims. “Plaintiffs purchased
Ikon ski passes for the 2019-20 ski season but, due to the COVID-19 pandemic,
Defendants closed their ski resorts on March 15, 2020.” Defendants declined to
refund their money. The passes were allegedly offered as offering “unlimited
access” to “ski or ride as many days as you want” with (in some instances) some
blackout dates at covered resorts during the 2019/20 ski season.

California UCL, CLRA, FAL: First, defendants argued that
under Sonner v. Premier Nutrition Corp., 971 F.3d 834 (9th Cir. 2020) and its
progeny, everything but the CLRA claim for damages should be dismissed because
these equitable claims were only available if legal claims failed. Plaintiffs
argued that they were allowed to plead in the alternative, but the court found
that they had failed to do so. Thus, Sonner “dooms the claim for equitable
relief at any stage.”

Did the CLRA damages claim survive? Defendants first argued
that passes didn’t not qualify as “goods or services” under the CLRA, but were
only temporary licenses, with services provided only ancillary to the license.
The court found that plaintiffs plausibly showed that ski passes were
encompassed within the definition of “services.” Ski pass holders plausibly
purchased more than just a license to be on the slopes, including services such
as providing groomed trails and ski lifts and gondolas to reach the trails,
which were “at heart of what a ski pass holder purchased.”

Deception: Assuming Rule 9(b) applied, plaintiffs satisfied
it. Defendants argued that the alleged promise of “unlimited access” for a
“complete season” (the 2019/20 ski season) was not a “ ‘specific and measurable
claim, capable of being proved false or of being reasonably interpreted as a
statement of objective fact’ ” because they made no representations about the
length of the 2019/20 ski season. But “a reasonable consumer would understand
this was a promise for a definite period: the period of the 2019/20 year
‘during which snow conditions allow for skiing and when people typically go
skiing.’”

Defendants argued that their statement wasn’t deceptive when
made because they couldn’t have known about the pandemic or ensuing governmental
closure orders. The court was persuaded that plaintiffs were plausibly misled
about what would happen if the resorts closed, for whatever reason: defendants
kept all their money. Defendants argued that they disclosed the payments were
“non-refundable,” but that plausibly didn’t apply to these circumstances.

Was there an actionable omission? Previous cases hold that
“to be actionable the omission must be contrary to a representation actually
made by the defendant, or an omission of a fact the defendant was obliged to
disclose,” in particular a safety hazard/physical defect going to central
functionality. With services, though, matters were less clear, and the court
found that omission claims shouldn’t be dismissed. And the relevant knowledge,
for the omission claim, is knowledge that they’d keep the money if they had to
close before the end of the “ski season,” that is, the period “during which
snow conditions allow for skiing and when people typically go skiing.”

Loss causation: Plaintiffs alleged that they wouldn’t have
purchased the ski passes on the terms offered had they known that, if
defendants did not provide the promised resort access during the 2019/20 ski
season, they would nonetheless retain all pass fees. That was sufficient.
Illinois and Wisconsin consumer claims shook out similarly: no equitable
relief, but where damages were available, those claims survived.

from Blogger https://ift.tt/2WKRPia

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , , | Leave a comment

competition in the market of ideas isn’t commercial competition

Children’s
Health Defense v. Facebook Inc., 2021 WL 2662064, No. 20-cv-05787-SI (N.D. Cal.
Jun. 29, 2021)

CHD,
an anti-vaccination group (that also considers pesticides and wireless tech
dangerous), sued Facebook and other defendants for violating the First and
Fifth Amendments, Lanham Act false advertising, and RICO violations. It didn’t
like having some of its content on its FB page labeled “false,” out of date, or
unreliable. Prepandemic, FB also allegedly barred CHD from disputing any
actions taken by FB, and allegedly began to demote its content
(“shadowbanning”). FB deactivated the “donate” button on CHD’s page and barred
it from buying new ads. After repeated violations, FB put a Warning Label at
the top of its page: “This Page posts about vaccines. When it comes to health,
everyone wants reliable, up-to-date information. The Centers for Disease
Control (CDC) has information that can help answer questions you may have about
vaccines. Go to CDC.gov.” Then, after the pandemic hit, CHD shared an article
about the flu vaccine written by a third party website. PolitiFact labeled the
title of the article as “false,” noting that the title is “ambiguous and
misleading,” and the site changed the title to clarify that it was not about
the novel coronavirus.

CHD
alleged the usual fringe argument that the United States government — through
Congressman Adam Schiff, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), and the World
Health Organization (“WHO”), as the CDC’s “proxy” — has “privatized” the First
Amendment by “teaming up” with Facebook to censor CHD’s vaccine safety speech.

The
court spent a bunch of time on the state action issues; I will only mention the
theory that “government immunity [under Section 230 of the CDA] plus pressure
(Rep. Schiff) … should turn Facebook and Zuckerberg’s private-party conduct
into state action.” The pressure included an alleged threat to rethink §230 if
FB didn’t take more action. No, because “Section 230 does not require private
entities to do anything, nor does it give the government a right to supervise
or obtain information about private activity.” Nor did the general “threat” to
revisit §230 constitute direction to a specific entity to take a specific
allegedly unconstitutional action against a specific person such as CHD.

Lanham
Act: the warning labels and fact checks allegedly told consumers to abandon CHD
and “instead to follow CDC’s recommendations to get the vaccines produced by
its major advertisers, Merck, GSK, Sanofi, and Pfizer, who buy $1 billion per
annum in advertisements from Facebook.” Thus, CHD alleged, “Facebook and CHD
may reasonably be considered commercial competitors with respect to the
messaging regarding vaccines and 5G that they promulgate to Facebook users.”

But
if this is a political speech case, as CHD alleged, it was hard to see how it
fell in the Lanham Act’s zone of interests. “[T]he warning label and fact-checks
are not disparaging CHD’s ‘goods or services,’ nor are they promoting the ‘goods
or services’ of Facebook, the CDC, or the fact-checking organizations ….” They
didn’t encourage users to donate to anyone, but to look for reliable
information at the CDC. “Thus, all of the alleged misrepresentations – the
warning label and the fact-checks – are simply providing information, albeit
information with which CHD disagrees.” “Information” was not a relevant
service; “[u]nder CHD’s expansive and novel theory of false advertising, any
Facebook warning label identifying an alternative source of information and any
fact-check with an explanation would constitute false advertising under the
Lanham Act because of an injury to ‘messaging.’”

Courts
have held that “[t]he mere fact that the parties may compete in the marketplace
of ideas is not sufficient to invoke the Lanham Act.”  In past suits where nonprofits’ Lanham Act
claims were entertained, “the non-profit alleged an injury to a commercial
interest in sales or reputation.” Thus, CHD was neither within the Lanham Act’s
zone of interests nor did it allege that the warning label and fact-checks constituted
“commercial advertising or promotion,” even assuming that Lexmark
abrogated a commercial competition requirement in the test for the latter.

RICO
claims failed because they were RICO claims.

from Blogger https://ift.tt/3BJoCn5

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged | Leave a comment

Amazon pulls further ahead of possible competitors in TM secondary liability wars

Ohio State Univ. v. Redbubble, Inc., No. 19-3388 (6th Cir.
Feb. 25, 2021)

“Because Amazon’s marketplace operates as a neutral
intermediary between consumers and third-party vendors, courts have typically
not found it liable for trademark-infringing goods sold through its platform.”
But Redbubble wasn’t entitled to the same treatment.  “Because Redbubble’s marketplace involves
creating Redbubble products and garments that would not have existed but for
Redbubble’s enterprise, we find that the district court erred by entering
summary judgment for Redbubble under an overly narrow reading of the Lanham
Act.” The description:

Independent artists, not employed
by Redbubble, upload images onto Redbubble’s interface. Consumers then scroll
through those uploaded images and place an order for a customized item.

Once a consumer places a purchase
on its website, Redbubble automatically contacts the artist and arranges the
manufacturing and shipping of the product with independent third parties. So
Redbubble never takes title to any product shown on its website. And Redbubble
does not design, manufacture, or handle these products. But the shipped
packages bear its logo, and Redbubble handles customer service duties such as
returns.

Aside from managing the website,
Redbubble plays a larger role in overseeing and executing sales made on its
marketplace. For example, Redbubble helps market products listed on its
website. And it markets those goods as Redbubble products to consumers; for
instance, it provides instructions on how to care for “Redbubble garments.”
When customers receive goods from Redbubble’s marketplace, they often arrive in
Redbubble packaging and contain Redbubble tags. And if there are excess goods,
Redbubble has the right to dispose of those items.

Some of Redbubble’s artists uploaded trademark-infringing
images. When OSU sent Redbubble a C&D, Redbubble asked it to “specifically
identify each infringing design.” OSU sent Redbubble a letter containing photos
of nine offending items, but Redbubble told OSU that pictures, asking for URLs
or other identifying information. There was apparently no reply, and Redbubble didn’t
remove the offending products from its website. OSU sued for Lanham Act
violations and a violation of Ohio’s ROP for use of the persona of a former
employee who had transferred his rights to OSU.

The district court found that Redbubble did not “use” OSU’s
trademarked images in operating its business model under the Lanham Act because
it only acted as a “transactional intermediary” between buyers, sellers,
manufacturers, and shippers.

OSU didn’t preserve a theory of vicarious liability, so the
court considered only direct liability. (OSU claimed not to have known about Redbubble’s
relationship with third-party vendors, but it could have amended the complaint
once it learned more.)

Fortunately for OSU, the court of appeals held that the
Lanham Act extends direct liability beyond manufacturers, sellers, and those
“who apply infringing marks to sales displays or other related advertising
materials.” eBay and Amazon are not subject to direct liability, and neither
are sellers of domain names, but there’s a line to be drawn.

“[O]ne key distinction between a
direct seller who “uses” a trademark under the Act and a mere facilitator of
sales who does not is the degree to which the party represents itself, rather
than a third-party vendor, as the seller, or somehow identifies the goods as
its own. A retailer who sells products directly to a customer at a
brick-and-mortar store is indisputably a seller to whom the Lanham Act applies.
An online marketplace like eBay that clearly indicates to consumers that they
are purchasing goods from third-party sellers is not. … Here, although the
record is sparse, it appears that products ordered on Redbubble’s website do
not yet exist, come into being only when ordered through Redbubble, and are
delivered in Redbubble packaging with Redbubble tags. Under those facts, the
district court erred in affirmatively placing Redbubble on the passive end of
the liability spectrum.

Use of a third party to manufacture goods sold on the site,
and the degree of control and involvement exercised by Redbubble over the
manufacturing, quality control, and delivery of goods to consumers, were
relevant to “whether the offending goods can fairly be tied to Redbubble for
the purpose of liability.” The record needed further development. Still, “it
appears that Redbubble brings trademark-offending products into being by
working with third-party sellers to create new Redbubble products, not to sell
the artists’ products.” That’s more than just being a passive facilitator.
Plus, it calls the goods “Redbubble products” and “Redbubble garments,” so it
goes beyond Amazon.

As for the ROP claims, the question was whether Redbubble
used “any aspect” of the ex-employee’s persona for a “commercial purpose.”  While Amazon doesn’t make editorial choices
about book covers [note judicial factfinding that seems both untethered to any record and somewhat improbable as a blanket statement], Redbubble is different. “Redbubble interweaves its brand
with the products it sells.” Plus, the text of Ohio’s ROP statute prohibits
using a persona in connection with a product, advertising a product, or
soliciting the purchase of a product. “That broad language expands liability
beyond directly selling trademark-infringing goods.” So even if Redbubble was
passive, the ROP would apply. [And also it seems that cases letting Amazon off
the hook wouldn’t apply to Ohio ROP claims either. More First Amendment
conflicts coming!]

Record development was required because it wasn’t clear that
OSU could win. It wasn’t clear what “Redbubble products” and “Redbubble
garments” really meant. Redbubble never takes title. Factual gaps: “facts
regarding the precise nature of Redbubble’s contractual relationships with
third-party manufacturers and shippers”; “the precise degree to which Redbubble
is involved in” selecting and imprinting trademark-infringing designs upon its
products; “details as to Redbubble’s involvement in the process for returning
goods”; “detail[s] on how Redbubble characterizes its own services”; and facts
about “defenses to liability[,] such as possible fair use defenses or defenses
that confusion is not likely.”

from Blogger https://ift.tt/3DL6Y44

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , , | Leave a comment

Homeopathy claims weren’t unfair in the absence of proven falsity

Allen v. Hyland’s, Inc., 2021 WL 718295, No. CV 12-1150-DMG
(MANx) (C.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2021)

This class action, about whether certain homeopathic
products didn’t perform as indicated on the packaging, went to a jury trial
that ended in Hyland’s favor on breach of warranty, Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act,
and CLRA claims. The court then ruled for Hyland’s on the equitable UCL/FAL
claims, guided by the jury verdict. However, the court of appeals reversed in
part because “[t]he UCL’s prohibition of unfair business practices sweeps more
broadly than the CLRA, Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, or express warranty.” The UCL
claim in fact “encompassed both a deceptive advertising theory and an unfair
business practices theory.” Because UCL unfairness applies to practices that
are against public policy; that are “immoral, unethical, oppressive,
unscrupulous or substantially injurious”; or that cause unforeseeable injuries
to consumers that are not outweighed by countervailing benefits, “[t]he jury’s
narrow findings as to deceptive advertising do not resolve [Plaintiffs’]
broader unfair practices theory” in their equitable UCL claim.

The court deferred to the jury’s implicit factual
determination that plaintiffs failed to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the products cannot relieve the symptoms represented on
Defendants’ products’ packaging. Plaintiffs failed to submit “evidence of
definitive scientific research to meet their burden of proof as to the products
at issue.” Though several did testify that they wouldn’t have bought the
products if they knew the products had only a placebo effect, they didn’t meet
their burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the only medical
benefit was via the placebo effect. Defendants’ products followed FDA labeling
regulations (or lack thereof), indicating numeric dilution levels, ingredient
names, and the word “homeopathic,” which by definition means the administration
of remedies in minute doses. Defendants didn’t disclose the absence of
controlled clinical trials or other medical testing, but they weren’t required
to do so, despite the FTC’s determination that many consumers mistakenly
believe manufacturers of homeopathic products test their products on people to
show their effectiveness.

“While aspects of homeopathy are inconsistent with modern
understandings of physics and chemistry, Defendants presented evidence that
some clinical trials have shown favorable results from homeopathic treatment,
as compared to a placebo or conventional treatment.” And there was evidence
that “homeopathically prepared materials have an effect on animals and on human
cells,” and that consumers are generally satisfied with the products.

Starting with an unfairness test borrowed from the FTCA, the
factors that define unfairness are: “(1) the consumer injury must be
substantial; (2) the injury must not be outweighed by any countervailing
benefits to consumers or competition; and (3) it must be an injury that
consumers themselves could not reasonably have avoided.” Because the jury found
either that defendants’ products may perform as promised for some people or
that plaintiffs failed to show otherwise, the court couldn’t find on this
record that “the only conceivable benefit the products provide is as a
placebo.” Thus, plaintiffs didn’t show substantial injury, especially with the evidence
showing high levels of consumer satisfaction.

An alternative balancing test asks whether the alleged
business practice “is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or
substantially injurious to consumers and requires the court to weigh the
utility of the defendant’s conduct against the gravity of the harm to the
alleged victim.” This too hadn’t been shown. The ingredients are safe and the
FDA doesn’t require randomized controlled trials for homeopathic products.
There was scientific controversy over whether they worked.

Under a final test, “that the public policy which is a
predicate to a consumer unfair competition action under the ‘unfair’ prong of
the UCL must be tethered to specific constitutional, statutory, or regulatory
provisions.” And plaintiffs couldn’t do this either. The FTC’s recent
Enforcement Policy was issued after the trial.

from Blogger https://ift.tt/3zKSLl9

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , , | Leave a comment