claim that entity sells unapproved drugs does not misrepresent “origin, sponsorship, or approval” for Lanham Act purposes

Peptide Tech LLC v. Avidia Bank, 2026 WL 1506049, No.
25-13179-MJJ (D. Mass. May 28, 2026)

Plaintiff sells peptides; Avidia is a bank and acquiring
bank for merchants who accept credit and debit card payments. Doe defendants
allegedly reported Peptide Tech to Mastercard, leading Mastercard to place
Peptide Tech on the Member Alert to Control High-Risk Merchants (“MATCH”) List.
Plaintiff brought claims for breach of contract, tortious interference with
business relationships, violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A (a state false
advertising provision), and violation of the Lanham Act. The court granted the
motion to dismiss.

“To accept debit and credit card payments, merchants must
obtain payment processing services through a payment processor and a member
bank, also known as an acquirer. These payment processing services are
contracted with payment card brands … [whose] rules govern participants in the
payment processing system, including payment processors, acquirers, and
merchants.” Avidia is an acquirer with whom Peptide Tech entered into a
merchant processing agreement. Peptide Tech identified its business category as
“Research Chemicals,” and alleged that it doesn’t sell peptides for human
consumption, but to research labs, which is legal.

“MATCH is a Mastercard-maintained database that identifies
merchants terminated by acquirers due to suspected high-risk behavior, such as
fraud, excessive chargebacks, or regulatory violations.. Placement on MATCH
effectively eliminates a business’s ability to accept credit card payments for
its products.”

 

Avidia allegedly recommended, supported, or otherwise caused
Peptide Tech to be placed on the MATCH List, causing significant monetary harm.

Breach of contract claims failed for want of terms plausibly
breached; tortious interference failed for want of pleading actual malice.

The Ch. 93A claims failed as repackaged breach of contract
claims; the agreement plainly said that Avidia could terminate the relationship
in its “sole discretion,” and there were no facts pled that Avidia misled payment
card entities; Peptide Tech merely speculated that Avidia incorrectly
communicated to them that Peptide Tech’s products were unapproved.  

Lanham Act: Peptide Tech argued that Avidia violated §
1125(a)(1)(A)’s ban on false statements “likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive as to the … origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or
her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person,” because it
allegedly communicated that Peptide Tech was selling unapproved drugs.

But §43(a)(1)(A) is for trademarks, and Peptide Tech didn’t
plausibly allege trademark confusion: “marketplace confusion about whether
goods are affiliated with or approved by another person.” A false suggestion
that a plaintiff’s products were “unapproved or illegitimate”  “does not allege confusion about the origin of
Plaintiff’s products, affiliation with another entity, or sponsorship or
approval by another person in the Lanham Act sense.”

§43(a)(1)(B) false advertising: No commercial advertising or
promotion.

from Blogger https://tushnet.blogspot.com/2026/06/claim-that-entity-sells-unapproved.html

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