Are you being served? Omission claim based on “virtualized” server survives

Schellenbach v. GoDaddy.com
LLC, 2017 WL 192920, No. CV-16-00746 (D. Ariz. Jan. 18, 2017)
In 2014, GoDaddy
issued a press release titled “GoDaddy Launches New Dedicated and VPS Servers
with Added Support for Designers and Developers.” Plaintiffs are website
designers based in Los Angeles. They bought a “Dedicated Server” hosting plan
maintained by Defendant. Plaintiffs allege that, after experiencing “crippling
performance issues relating to the server[,]” they hired an independent server
expert to diagnose and resolve those issues. They learned that they were
actually being provided with a virtualized server, and alleged that they were
deceived by GoDaddy’s failure to disclose this. 
They brought claims for fraudulent concealment under Arizona law,
negligent misrepresentation under California law, violations of the Arizona
Consumer Fraud Act (“ACFA”), and violations of California’s FAL and UCL.
The court considered
printouts from GoDaddy’s website that were incorporated in the complaint.  GoDaddy argued that one page’s identification
of the Dedicated Server as a “single-tenant VM” constituted a clear disclaimer
of the virtualized nature of the server. However, GoDaddy didn’t show that
plaintiffs or other members of the public understood “VM,” and also the page
was from a time after plaintiffs allegedly stopped using the service.
GoDaddy argued that
the ACFA claim was barred by a one-year statute of limitations, but the
discovery rule applied, and that couldn’t be sorted out on a motion to
dismiss. 
GoDaddy then argued
that it didn’t have any duty to disclose. 
However, the ACFA itself imposes a duty “to refrain from an omission of
any material fact with intent that others rely thereon.”  The virtual nature of the “dedicated server”
was plausibly a material fact, and plaintiffs sufficiently alleged intentional
concealment and reliance.  This also
preserved the claim for fraudulent concealment under Arizona law.
However, the
California negligent misrepresentation claim was dismissed, because that
required a positive assertion; an implied assertion or omission wasn’t enough.

FAL and UCL: The
California courts have, though not with consistency, identified four
circumstances in which an omission may constitute actionable fraud: “(1) when
the defendant is in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff; (2) when the
defendant had exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to the plaintiff;
(3) when the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff;
and (4) when the defendant makes partial representations but also suppresses
some material facts.”  The court found
that (2), GoDaddy’s exclusive knowledge, plausibly applied here. 

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Pipe dreams: expert spokesperson liable for false statements about competing product

Underground
Solutions, Inc. v. Palermo, 188 F. Supp. 3d 717 (N.D. Ill. 2016)
This case is part of
contentious relations between Eugene Palermo, a scientist/paid expert for one
underground pipe maker, and UGSI, a maker of competing pipe.  Previous case about plaintiff’s website
impersonating defendant Palermo.
  Previous ruling finding jurisdiction over
Palermo in this case
.
UGSI sued Palermo
for trade libel, intentional interference with prospective economic advantage
(dismissed after discovery), and false advertising under California law and
§43(a) for his statements as a paid spokesperson for a competitor.  In this opinion, UGSI won partial summary
judgment on liability on the Lanham Act claim; Palermo won summary judgment on
the trade libel claim; and summary judgment was otherwise denied.
Different kinds of
pipe with varying properties are used for municipal and industrial water
transmission, including ductile iron pipe, high-density polyethylene (HDPE)
pipe, and polyvinyl chloride (PVC) pipe. “[E[ach type of pipe exhibits varying
degrees of resistance to puncture, cracking, and other types of pipe failure.”  Rapid crack propagation (RCP) is exactly what
it sounds like and can happen up to several hundred feet per second; it can
happen in any type of pipe under varying conditions depending on the pipe’s diameter
and wall thickness, the internal operating pressure of the pipe, and the pipe’s
chemical makeup. Although RCP can’t occur in 100% water pressurized pipe, the
inclusion of a small amount of air in a pipe could enable RCP failure.
Source: http://ift.tt/2j5y5MA
This is RCP in plastic pipe

UGSI is the only
producer of Fusible PVC pipe, which is thermally fused instead of jointed. Palermo
is “a scientist who has been involved in the pipe industry for roughly forty
years,” who now operates a consulting firm providing litigation consulting and
failure analysis services. During the relevant period, Palermo had a consulting
agreement with Performance Pipe, which made HDPÈ pipe. Along with two HDPE pipe
interest groups, “Performance Pipe paid Palermo to attend trade shows and give
presentations about Fusible PVC pipe.”

Palermo’s PowerPoint
slideshow for these presentations, which was also uploaded to his website, was
called “Plastic Pipe for Water Distribution—What You Need to Know About RCP and
Butt Fusion Integrity.”  The presentation
was “primarily focused on illustrating the high RCP risk associated with
butt-fused PVC pipe.”  Palermo pointed
out that PVC pipe was more prone to RCP than HDPE and that “butt-fused PVC
pipe’s RCP risk is even higher because without bell-and-spigot joints to
relieve pressure, cracks can spread farther and faster without meeting
resistance.”
sample slide from presentation

The slide show began
with a list of all known Fusible PVC RCP failures in the field: 20 across the
US, ranging in length from 43 feet to 3,300 feet. He included “pictures of
massive cracks in the butt-fused PVC pipe at some failure sites, and he
provided details of the damage done and replacement requirements.” Palermo then
discussed laboratory test results.  Palermo
showed a graph—which the court found to be unambiguous—indicating that when a
PVC pipe has 10% air volume, its critical pressure (the pressure over which RCP
is more likely) is 2.3 bar, and from about 10.8% to 100% air volume, its
critical pressure is 1.6 bar. The next slide reported the pipe’s critical
pressure as “1.6 bar for DR 19 PVC pipe with ≥10% air.” His HDPE graph from the
study showed that the pipe’s critical pressure was over 7 bar at 10% air
volume, and roughly 3 bar at 23% air volume. He also included data for modern
HDPE pipes, whose critical pressure he placed at over 10 bar, which meant that
“RCP is never an issue.”  Palermo then shared
the results of a “Bent Strap Test” and a “Tensile Test” conducted on butt-fused
polyethylene pipe and butt-fused PVC pipe: the former passed and the latter
failed.
The result was that
some people exposed to the slide show or presentation “expressed reticence to
use or recommend Fusible PVC as a result.”  “Julie Morrison, a consulting engineer in
Illinois, testified that she had been open to the possibility of recommending
Fusible PVC for a project in Illinois but had changed her mind after finding
and reading Palermo’s presentation online.” A project manager in Illinois
received an e-mail from a contractor, with Palermo’s slide show attached,
expressing grave concerns, and UGSI produced a slide show of its own to rebut
Palermo’s report and retain the contractor’s business.
For the Lanham Act
claim, UGSI argued: (1) Four of the crack lengths that Palermo disclosed in his
presentation are grossly inaccurate and that he represented that cracks spread
hundreds or thousands of feet farther than they actually did.  (The most extreme alleged misrepresentation
was 300 feet for 3 feet; the least was 2200/1700.)  (2) PVC’s critical pressure at 10% air volume
in the study was the more favorable figure of 2.3 bar, not 1.6 bar.  (3) He misleadingly used an old study without
pointing out that Fusible PVC uses pipe that benefits from many years of
scientific advancement in PVC pipe. (4) Even Palermo’s accurately reported
crack lengths were misleading, because Palermo described them without
disclosing the installation or maintenance errors that caused them to rupture
in the first place. (5)  It was
misleading to report results from the bent-strap test and the tensile test
because these testing models are not designed to test PVC.
Palermo responded
that his statements were not “commercial advertising or promotion” but
noncommercial speech.  However, he was
paid to deliver “presentations to anonymous purchasers and prospective
consumers at trade shows throughout the country.”  That triggered the Lanham Act. 
The court found
clear falsity in that the study reported that at 10% air volume, the critical
pressure of PVC was 2.3 bar, but Palermo clearly said it was 1.6 bar in his
slide based on the study.  Although he
defended his value as an approximation, his slides didn’t say that, and their
only basis was the S4 study that said otherwise.  This was literal falsity.  The court didn’t separately discuss
materiality—a real blow for Palermo, it seems to me, given the real difference
in critical pressures between PVC and HDPE, and the other uncontested crack
lengths.
Palermo didn’t
dispute that he was wrong about the amount of pipe that needed to be replaced
in one place and the crack lengths in three instances. He argued that “his
underestimating a 200-foot crack occurring in a Tampa, Florida project…[that]
was substantially longer than 200 feet” is evidence “[t]hat [he] did not set
out to exaggerate crack lengths.”  But, “for
liability purposes it does not matter whether Palermo made one literally false
claim whose inaccuracy was favorable to UGSI,” when there were other literally
false statements unfavorable to it.  UGSI
was entitled to summary judgment on liability for these statements.
UGSI further argued
that the remaining challenged statements were deceptive. UGSI contended that
its pipe had a different chemical makeup that made it substantially superior to
the pipe used in the experiments fifteen years previous; that showing critical
pressure with varying amounts of air was misleading because properly handled
pipe will never contain more than 2% air; that accurately reporting crack
lengths was misleading without disclosing the initiating event; and that PVC was
not meant to be tested by the methodologies Palermo used.  There were factual disputes about each of
these.  For example, Palermo and his
expert both testified that water-pressurized pipe in the field commonly
contains up to 10% air volume.  (I am
especially sympathetic to Palermo’s argument that, notwithstanding that RCP
might not have happened without mishandling/mis-installation or random error, it’s
reasonable to assume that there will be some of that in the future.  The court, though, found that a jury could
conclude that describing RCP without disclosing what caused it is misleading.)
Palermo argued that
UGSI lacked a survey to show misleadingness, but surveys are not required as a
matter of “an iron rule.”  (No pun
intended?)  The evidence of concerns from
two engineers caused by seeing the slide show supported “a reasonable inference
that the slide show’s false or misleading statements confused these consumers,
for their worries were apparently assuaged only after UGSI presented
information to rebut Palermo’s claims.”
Palermo finally
argued that UGSI didn’t show harm, as required by Lexmark, because one of the concerned engineers had no
decision-making authority, while the others ended up using Fusible PVC anyway.  “It cannot be the law that where a plaintiff
succeeds in retaining its customers by spending an abundance of time, energy,
and money to combat false advertising, the defendant who produced and
disseminated the false advertisement or commercial promotion escapes liability
for violating the Lanham Act.” The evidence that UGSI needed to produce its own
rebuttal presentation “permits a reasonable inference that Palermo’s
presentation directly led to a diminution in goodwill and reputation for
Fusible PVC.”
Trade libel under
California law: This requires that the defendant made a false statement of
fact, the statement was made with actual malice, and the false statement
diverted business away from the plaintiff or diminished the value of the
disparaged product.  UGSI argued that,
when a person disparages a plaintiff’s only product, he necessarily defames the
plaintiff personally, triggering the lower negligence standard for a defamation
claim by a private party. The court disagreed. 
Also, UGSI failed to adduce evidence that shows that “particular
purchasers…refrained from dealing with [it],” and that it was deprived of any
particular transactions. “Unlike claims under the Lanham Act, trade libel
claims under California law must be centered on particular losses emanating
from lost business opportunities.”  Thus,
Palermo was entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

California FAL: Proposition
64 restricted standing under the FAL to “any person who has suffered injury in
fact and has lost money or property as a result of a violation” of the law. The
resources expended to create UGSI’s corrective presentation and meet with
clients qualified as lost money or property. 
(I wonder about that—if these were salaried employees doing the work,
wouldn’t they have been paid anyway?) 
Nor did UGSI need to show its own
reliance on the false statements to prevail; Proposition 64 wasn’t designed to
preclude competitors from bringing false advertising claims.  Summary judgment denied.

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Mass. anti-SLAPP law/litigation privilege doesn’t cover p’s nasty statements about competitor to customers

Riverdale Mills
Corporation v. Cavatorta North America, Inc., 189 F.Supp.3d 317 (D. Mass. 2016)
Previous decision—denying a recall when the
falsely advertising competitor had already notified consumers—discussed here
.  The
parties compete in the market for wire mesh used to make marine traps.  Riverdale makes “Aquamesh.” Metallurgica makes
“SEAPLAX,” sold in the US by Cavatorta. Both brands are purportedly “galvanized
after welded” (GAW), which is allegedly better than “galvanized before welded”
(GBW). In 2015, Riverdale learned of a production error at Metallurgica that
caused a non-SEAPLAX, non-GAW product to be delivered to certain customers in
the United States and Canada.
Riverdale sued for
false advertising.  The court enjoined
defendants (1) from manufacturing and selling mesh labeled as GAW if it was not
actually GAW; (2) from making false statements in advertising that SEAPLAX was
GAW if it was not in fact GAW; and (3) to immediately properly label all
SEAPLAX product that was not GAW. 
Larry Walsh, vice
president of sales and marketing at Riverdale, sent emails to twelve customers
of Cavatorta with a 3-page excerpt from defendants’ memorandum in opposition to
the motion for preliminary injunction and two affidavits from defendants. The
emails varied; “all referenced the attached materials and stated that
Plaintiff’s attorney would contact the customers and request additional
information.” One email also stated: “If you did get GBW that was labeled GAW
you should have received a notice from [Cavatorta] and some sort of monetary
compensation …. For a full year [Defendants] were selling mislabeled product
and traps are falling apart very quickly.” Another email characterized
Cavatorta’s product as “defective wire.”
Metallurgica and
Cavatorta counterclaimed for tortious interference with business relations and
violations of Chapter 93A, based on communications that Riverdale had made to
some of Cavatorta’s customers during the pendency of this lawsuit.
Riverdale argued
that Riverdale’s communications with Defendants’ customers were protected by
the litigation privilege, which “protects statements made in the institution or
conduct of litigation or in conferences and other communications preliminary to
litigation.” “[T]he relevant inquiry is not who made the statement, or to whom
it was made, but whether the statement is pertinent to the supervening
litigation,” even if the statements were uttered maliciously.  However, the privilege does not protect
“unnecessary or unreasonable publication to parties outside the litigation
….”
Defendants argued
that Riverdale knew before sending the emails that all of the
customer-recipients had already been made aware of the issues with the SEAPLAX mesh,
and that Walsh wasn’t seeking any information from them.  The court agreed that the privilege didn’t
apply.  “The recipients were outside of
the litigation, and it did not serve Riverdale’s prosecution of the case to
reiterate its claims and forward the selected pleadings to Defendants’
customers, many—if not all—of whom already knew about the lawsuit.…The purpose
of the privilege is not served by giving Riverdale immunity to send gratuitous
communications to the customers of its competitors.”
However, defendants
still failed to state a (counter)claim. 
Though they sufficiently alleged the existence of specific relationships
and Riverdale’s intent to harm them, they made no specific allegations of harm,
such as customers who ended their relationships or bought less as a result.

Riverdale also moved
to dismiss the counterclaims pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 59H (the
anti-SLAPP statute), which covers claims based on the targeted party’s “exercise
of its right of petition.” The courts have construed “petitioning activity” as
including all “statements made to influence, inform, or at the very least,
reach governmental bodies—either directly or indirectly.” Riverdale argued that
its emails were petitioning activity because the statements mirrored the
allegations contained in the pleadings.  However, “the mere replication of protected
statements sent to governmental entities is not alone dispositive.”  Given the context—direct competition, careful
selection of what to send, and the fact that only two customers were later
subpoenaed—“the emails have a distinctly commercial flavor.” Thus, the emails
were not petitioning activity, and the anti-SLAPP statute didn’t apply.

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National Constitution Center Podcast on Tam

Deborah Gerhardt, Ilya Shapiro,  and I discuss Tam.
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The podcast can be found at the National Constitution Center’s website, as well as on iTunes and other platforms.

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Seen around town: transformative works of the day, inauguration edition.

Seen on my way back from the Tam oral argument:

Activist Comics

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9th Circuit rejects Slep-Tone’s anti-copying claim couched as TM claim

Slep-Tone
Entertainment Corp. v. Wired for Sound Karaoke & DJ Servs., LLC, No.
14-17229 (9th Cir. Jan. 18, 2017) (per curiam)
Slep-Tone makes karaoke
music tracks under the trademark “Sound Choice.” They’re released on CDs in a
format known as “CD-G,” which accompanies karaoke music with graphics, lyrics,
and singing cues when played on compatible equipment.  Karaoke operators may prefer ripped files for
convenience; Slep-Tone now allows one digital copy per source CD-G subject to
various conditions.  It alleged that
defendants performed shows using unauthorized media-shifted files, and that
this infringed its trademark rights.  The
district court concluded that “[t]his attempt to stuff copyright claims into a
trademark container fails.” 
The court of appeals
affirmed: “[w]hether we call the violation infringement, unfair competition or
false designation of origin, the test is identical—is there a ‘likelihood of
confusion?’” And there was not.
Slep-Tone argued
that, because the ripped files showed its marks and trade dress when performed,
consumers would be confused into thinking that the tracks originated with
Slep-Tone, rather than with defendants. 
But that theory didn’t identify “consumer confusion about the source of
an appropriate ‘good,’” only possible confusion over the source of content. Dastar says “origin” has to mean
tangible goods offered for sale.  And,
though Dastar was about §43(a), the
same standard applies to §32.  Slep-Tone
identified the new digital files created by ripping as the relevant tangible
goods.  But those “new goods” weren’t relevant goods.  The “good” at issue must be the “ ‘tangible product
sold in the marketplace’ rather than the creative content of that product.”
Phx. Entm’t Partners v. Rumsey, 829 F.3d 817, 828 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting
Dastar, 539 U.S. at 31).
There wouldn’t be
confusion about the source of the tangible good sold in the marketplace,
because “[c]onsumers are not aware of the new, media-shifted digital files
about which Plaintiff asserts confusion.” 
Any confusion isn’t about the source of the goods.  There’s no use of the Sound Choice marks “in
connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising” of
the files under 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) or “in connection with” the files under
§ 1125(a)(1).
[Query whether this
result is consistent with the Second Circuit’s recent pronouncement that
confusion over sponsorship or affiliation must also be considered before
rejecting a confusion theory.]
This is really a
case about unauthorized copying, and Dastar
cautions against creating a “species of mutant copyright law” under the Lanham
Act.  Slep-Tone was really complaining
about allegedly unauthorized use of the content
of the karaoke tracks, and Dastar
bars such claims.  “The words of the
Lanham Act should not be stretched to cover matters that are typically of no
consequence to purchasers.” Hey, it’s materiality!  Hi, materiality! 

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Lee v. Tam post-argument

Lee v. Tam
My thoughts on
observing the argument: I was surprised how much attention the Justices paid to
the copyright comparison.  The SG centered
his response around the idea that copyright is historically a mechanism to
stimulate expression, while trademark lacks the same speech-promoting role (and
indeed serves a speech-suppressing function). 
I might have spent more time saying that, under unconstitutional
conditions doctrine, an exclusion from copyrightability for disparaging works
would almost by definition be trying to affect speech outside the government
program at issue—that is to say, it would be trying to leverage the
government’s power to grant protection to expression
to deter people from speech that includes disparaging ideas; therefore the unconstitutional conditions analysis would be
sharply different if Congress decided to disallow copyright in disparaging
works.
I have no prediction
at all.
Post-argument panel
at AU:
John Connell, Archer
Law (Counsel for Respondent)
Denial of
registration is always b/c gov’t finds mark disparaging, offensive to 3d
party.  Gov’t disfavors that. That’s
inherently viewpoint discrim b/c positive/neutral views are permitted to
register.  Lanham Act is widely available
to broad range of mark holders. 
Selectively denying mark b/c of negative views expressed by mark is
viewpoint discrimination.
Ilya Shapiro, Cato
Institute (representing Cato Institute on amicus brief): added examples of
offensive marks like Raging Bitch beer. 
Beyond black letter law on viewpoint discrimination or unconstitutional
conditions. Not thrown into jail, but denied a gov’t benefit for exercising his
first amendment rights.  TM registration
is an important statutory right—easier to defend infringements. Record label
won’t sign w/o registration.
Mike Carroll: how
does Wash. Football team dispute bear on this?
Jesse Witten,
Drinker Biddle (representing Amanda Blackhorse, et al. on amicus brief)
No question that our
case hangs over Tam, especially locally. 
Overshadowing our case is the n word. 
If you open the door to the Slants, you have to issue registrations for
everything. Maybe that’s good policy, maybe not, but many judges will be leery
of official registrations for incredibly racist marks.  We have examples of horrific marks registered
before the statute was changed in the 1940s. 
Gov’t felt it couldn’t be quite as brazen.  Intended to complement gov’t’s brief.  Simple argument: there’s no burden on the
speaker.  Can still make claims under
§43(a).  TM empowers you to silence
somebody else. It’s not a 1A issue, it’s an exception to the 1A.  Refusal of registration reduces marginal
ability to silence, but that’s not a 1A right. 
J. Sotomayor asked some relevant questions. 
Q: unregistered
owner can bring claim?
Prof. Rebecca
Tushnet, Georgetown University (representing Law Professors on amicus brief)
TM is a right to
suppress speech.  If Tam gets trademark
protection for the expressive aspects of his mark, he is able to suppress other
speakers—including a racist band using the term to express its racism.  This characteristic of TM and TM registration
means that 1A analysis targeted at traditional punishments is
inappropriate—there is no neutral baseline. 
It also highlights that the gov’t is regulating only the registration
aspects, not the expressive aspects of the mark.
Not denied a gov’t
benefit outside the contours of the gov’t program itself. Unconstitutional
conditions is a doctrine that prevents attempts to leverage a gov’t benefit to
change constitutionally protected behavior outside the program.  Gov’t can decline to pay for abortion, but it
can’t decline to provide other health care to someone who has exercised her
const’l right to abortion.  Simon Tam can
register TMs in logos, names, other features; if he were denied any TM
registration until he changed the name, Shapiro would be right.
Why is viewpoint
discrimination bad?  Because it targets a
particular group for suppression. 
Disparagement bar doesn’t do that. 
Hating gays is a viewpoint; hating is not.  Materiality: do consumers care about the
feature at issue?  If a blanket ban on
disparagement is viewpoint based, then a ban on material falsehoods and not
immaterial falsehoods is also viewpoint based because it depends on whether
consumers care about the feature you’re discussing or not.
Shapiro: Agree that this
is about unconstitutional conditions. 
Also issues of scope of IP more broadly. If you’re going to have a
registration system, it’s the gov’t administering and not speaking.  It can’t discriminate in this way.
Joel MacMull, Archer
Law (Counsel for Respondent)
Notion that Simon
Tam has not been burdened.  Keep in mind:
this is a facial challenge to a constsitutional provision.  In all instances, §2(a) is discriminatory.
When you have a facial challenge, you don’t have to demonstrate individual
burden.  He can only continue using the
mark if he’s not second in time in a given territory.  He’s based in Portland Oregon—someone could
beat him if he didn’t have the benefit of the nationwide priority from the
registration, which would allow him to prevent other people from using it
nationwide.  43(a) isn’t a good enough
fallback for those reasons.
Jesse Witten: the
burden is that it’s harder for him to silence people outside of Portland?
MacMull: he may not
be first in these other territories.
Witten: SCt has
identified TM as an exception to free speech, not an instance of free
speech.  Gay Olympics case: passes muster
as a legit. regulation of commercial speech, satisfying intermediate scrutiny.
[RT: I hate that
case but think it’s distinguishable.]
Shapiro: none of
that has to do with registrability. Bracketing suppression, we take the law as
given, and it’s an equal protection question. 
Can your registration be denied b/c the gov’t doesn’t like it.
RT: on 43(a) and
distant users: why wouldn’t they have 1A rights to do so? Denying them rights
based on registration’s nationwide priority can’t be about protecting consumers
in Michigan who don’t know about the Portland Slants and can’t be confused.  It is about another objective: helping
businesses manage relations.
Carroll: what
happened at argument?
Connell: the Ct
wanted to rule unanimously against both sides. [h/t Mark Lemley]
Shapiro: Ct was
struggling w/how to write the opinion. Justices weren’t satisfied w/gov’t or
petitioners in terms of bright line for what they’re going to do.  He thinks 5 votes for pet’r; Breyer on fence;
Sotomayor leaning towards gov’t; Thomas was silent but was deciding vote on
Confederate flag case.  That’s distinguishable
b/c nobody thinks every TM is endorsed by the gov’t.
Witten: no established
doctrinal bucket.  I felt like a
surprisingly large number had an open mind. 
There are good arguments & weaknesses on both sides.
Connell: false
association/no names w/o consent is a right of publicity issue, a completely
different animal.
Shapiro: surprised
Court wasn’t that interested in vagueness issues.  Dykes on Bikes: name approved but logo
rejected b/c had name in it.  Denied to
Have you heard Satan is a Republican but not The Devil is a Democrat.
Carroll: SG said no
one rejected non-disparaging marks that were rejected.
Shapiro: Fag-dog has
been registered 2x and refused 2x.
MacMull: it’s the
gov’t’s burden.
Witten: open Qs: can
you do a facial challenge on vagueness grounds? 
SCt has said yes and no.  There
may be some cases that are really hard and others, like N-word, are not
hard.  Should not facially invalidate in
such cases.  Marsh v. Chambers: SCt
articulated a test that prayer was fine as long as it didn’t proselytize or
disparage. If that’s the word employed to interpret Establishment Clause, hard
to find that “may disparage” is vague.
MacMull: threw in
constitutional stuff as a side issue; initial issue was an evidentiary
one.  Vagueness, I long thought, was one
of the strongest arguments, but it was never the one the Court or the Fed Cir
en banc put in front of the parties. 
Q: reappropriation
as potential distinction?
MacMull: PTO
shouldn’t care about applicant’s intent, for many reasons not the least of
which is that intent can change.  Tam’s
intent could be different tomorrow.  TMs
are freely assignable [w/goodwill]. 

Shapiro: vile marks
are registrable, but that’s not a guarantee of success in the commercial
marketplace. College football teams changed names b/c they found it untenable.
It wasn’t the gov’t telling them to do so. Private solutions matter.  If The Slants’ name hurts ticket sales, that
will take care of the problem.

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video of Evil Twin debate on Tam

Available here.  Tomorrow I’ll have my third NPR interview on Tam; interest seems quite high.

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Transformative work of the day, Lin-Manuel Miranda edition

What’s Next?  Since I’m working on 512 roundtable reply comments right now, it seems particularly appropriate to remind everyone that clips can be fair use.

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It’s a Tam, Tam, Tam world

Along with a podcast for the American Constitution Center and an NPR interview running the morning of the Tam argument (next Wednesday), I’ll also be on a post-argument panel at AU–the panel before features none other than Tam himself.

American University Washington College of Law 

Program on Information Justice and Intellectual Property 
Presents
Supreme Court Series:
Lee v. Tam
Post Argument Discussion

Wednesday, January 18, 2017
3:15pm Registration
3:30pm Policy Panel
4:15 Legal Panel
Reception to follow

NT01 Ceremonial Classroom in Warren Building
American University, Washington College of Law
4300 Nebraska Ave., NW Washington DC 20016 

Registration & CLE information:Lee v. Tam

In PIJIP’s ongoing Supreme Court Series, a panel of counsel for amici and parties will discuss the case on the afternoon following oral argument before the Court.


Issue in Lee: Whether the disparagement provision of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1052(a), which provides that no trademark shall be refused registration on account of its nature unless, inter alia, it “[c]onsists of . . . matter which may disparage . . . persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute” is facially invalid under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.

Prof. Michael Carroll, American University Washington College of Law (Moderator)

3:30pm – First Panel – Policy Discussion

  • Simon Tam, The Slants (Respondent)
  • Prof. Victoria Phillips, American University Washington College of Law
4:15pm – Second Panel – Legal Discussion
  • John Connell, Archer Law (Counsel for Respondent)
  • Joel MacMull, Archer Law (Counsel for Respondent)
  • Jesse Witten, Drinker Biddle (representing Amanda Blackhorse, et al. amicus brief)
  • Prof. Rebecca Tushnet, Georgetown University (representing Law Professors on amicus brief)
  • Ilya Shapiro, CATO Institute (representing CATO Institute on amicus brief)

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