ABA Blawg 100/Hall of Fame

I’ve made the ABA
Blawg Hall of Fame
, as well as the Blawg
100
, which is very nice.  I believe it’s in part a reward for
persistence, as I’ve been at this since 2003 (though I only got serious in
2005), making the blog older than my children. 
A number of other interesting IP blogs made the list, including
Hall-of-Famer Eric Goldman; check it out!

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TM question of the day, high heel edition

We know that Louboutin’s red sole mark is only valid as applied to shoes with contrasting uppers.  So, do these shoes infringe?  (In case it’s hard to tell, I’d describe the sole color as a fairly bright pink.)  Do they dilute?

pink, white, silver

If they can dilute, could a different but also unusual-for-soles color dilute?  Wouldn’t any unusual and contrasting color make consumers think of Louboutin?

white with–dare I say–Tiffany blue contrasting sole

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Breakfast break: energy claims not misleading by US standards

Spector v. Mondelēz International, Inc., 178 F.Supp.3d
657 (N.D. Ill.
2016)
Mondelēz makes belVita Breakfast Biscuits and
Breakfast Bites. Spector allegedly bought packages of Breakfast Biscuits in
reliance on the package representations of “NUTRITIOUS STEADY ENERGY ALL
MORNING”:
 ​

The relevant graphic uses a clockwise arrow
representing a four-hour period of time between 8 a.m. and noon:

The Breakfast Bites icon is similar, but
contains the phrase “4 hours”:

The back of the Breakfast Bites box states that
a single serving is “[a] nutritious start to a busy morning,” which is “a
nutritious, convenient, on the go breakfast choice that contains slow-release
carbs from wholesome grains to help fuel your body for 4 hours”:

Spector alleged that this was misleading, in
that it portrays the products as “perfect for an ‘on-the-go’ lifestyle due to
their being ‘portable.’ ” However, th products actually provide four hours of
nutritious steady energy only if they are combined with a serving of low-fat
milk. The disclosures on the Australian website for belVita allegedly showed
that “Defendant fails to state in its United States advertising that the
purported studies on which Defendant claims to rely require that the Products
be consumed with at least a serving of low-fat milk in order to obtain the
benefits Defendant touts.”
The back of the Breakfast Biscuits box, which
repeats the claim of four hours of “nutritious steady energy all morning” while
suggesting that Breakfast Biscuits be “enjoy[ed]…as part of a balanced
breakfast with a serving of low-fat dairy and fruit,” allegedly conveyed that
milk was optional.
Pleading a violation of the Illinois Consumer
Fraud Act requires a plaintiff to satisfy Rule 9(b).  The fundamental defect here was that Spector
pled no facts, such as personal
experience or third-party studies, showing that the products don’t provide
“nutritious steady energy” as promised.  Spector’s allegation of falsity was merely
conclusory. 
Spector argued that the studies cited by Mondelēz
on its Australian website were sufficient to form the basis of a plausible
claim that the “nutritious steady energy” claim was actually false because the
Australian website supposedly said that a glass of milk was required.  Under
Illinois law, “[l]ack of substantiation is deceptive only when the claim at
issue implies there is substantiation for that claim, i.e., if
defendants had claimed something along the lines of ‘tests show that [the
product in question] is [ ] effective ….” Here, though, the products’
packaging didn’t imply there was substantiation for the “nutritious steady
energy” claim.  [I disagree—in the modern
world, a health or nutrition claim is a scientific claim, especially when
quantified for “four hours,” and necessarily implies some degree of scientific
substantiation.]
Further, while the Australian website did imply the existence of
substantiation for the “nutritious steady energy” claim, Spector didn’t allege
she ever saw the substantiation claim on that website and thus she couldn’t
have relied on it.  But she was using the
Australian substantiation as evidence that the US package was false, not as
something she relied on.  Mondelēz argued
that, because Spector herself made the studies part of the complaint, the court
could examine them, but the court found merit to Spector’s point that she was
citing the description of the studies, not the studies themselves.  So the court proceeded without evaluating the
study data.
The Australian website allegedly claimed that “belVita
Breakfast biscuits† provide carbohydrates that are continuously and gradually
absorbed and released throughout the morning,” with the † leading to the statement,
“belVita Breakfast plus a glass of low-fat milk,” below this chart:

Although these disclaimers were
repeated multiple times, the court found it clear that they didn’t say that “one must consume the Products with low-fat milk in
order to achieve four hours of energy.” “The actual statements do no more than
refer to the fact that milk was consumed with the Products in the cited
studies.” Plaintiff confused correlation with causation. This was not enough to
rise to the level of plausibility under Twiqbal,
especially since her claims sounded in fraud. 
“In the context of this case, the Court concludes that Plaintiff must do
more than allege ‘the neutral facts necessary to identify the transaction.’”  This was necessary to protect Mondelēz from
the stigma of fraud.  Further Illinois
courts are “always watchful that the Act not be used to transform nondeceptive
and nonfraudulent omissions into actionable affirmations.” An omission is
actionable only “where it is employed as a device to mislead.”
Also, Spector lacked a relevant injury under
ICFA.  Although she alleged a financial
injury—she wouldn’t have bought the products or paid as much for them had she
known the truth—that wasn’t enough under ICFA. 
Illinois cases established that a plaintiff who alleges deceptive
advertising about the effectiveness of a product has not suffered an injury if
she “believed the [product] [was] effective and never complained to anyone that
[it] did not work.” Spector never alleged that she didn’t get four hours of
steady energy.
The same defects doomed her claims for breach of
express warranty and unjust enrichment.

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Fourth Circuit rejects attempt to control references to expert services with IP

File under “we need a federal anti-SLAPP law.”

Devil’s Advocate, LLC
v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., No. 15-1048, 2016 WL 6871905, — Fed.Appx. —- (4th
Cir. Nov. 22, 2016)

John W. Toothman is
a lawyer and the founder of Devil’s Advocate, a consulting firm that provides
expert testimony about the reasonableness of legal fees. In 2008, Zurich became
embroiled in a coverage dispute in Texas state court.  In 2010, a lawyer representing, contacted
Toothman about serving as an expert witness in the case. Toothman responded by
email, indicating his availability and attaching a copy of a blank form billing
agreement, his resume, and additional information about Devil’s Advocate’s
services. The Billing Agreement left blank spaces for fee terms; nobody at
Zurich signed it.  After a further
request, plaintiffs proposed a fee of “2.1% of the gross amount of the fees we
would review and report upon,” and stated that the proposal was “preliminary,
prior to our engagement and full review of available information.” 
Zurich didn’t accept
the proposal but told Toothman that, because the deadline for designating
experts had passed, Zurich needed leave of court to designate him as an expert
witness, which was a condition precedent to Zurich’s acceptance of the proposal.
In several emails, Toothman indicated that he knew he had not yet been retained.  Toothman ultimately sent an estimate of
nearly $70,000 and an invoice for half that amount; Zurich denied ever agreeing
to its terms.
Toothman then took
the position that “[payment of the full fee was triggered when Zurich
designated me as its expert on December 3, 2010.” Zurich withdrew its request
for leave to designate him as an expert witness in the Texas litigation. Plaintiffs
responded by suing Zurich, alleging claims of breach of contract, unjust
enrichment, conversion, unauthorized use of name, trademark infringement, and
copyright infringement.  None of these
worked, in the district court or on appeal.
Unjust enrichment:
no sufficient allegation of actual benefits conferred on Zurich.  Plaintiffs knew that Zurich was submitting
their materials to the court, and that getting court approval was a condition
precedent to getting plaintiffs hired. 
The assertion that the mere use of their names would promote a better
settlement was “wholly speculative” and anyway not realized by Zurich because
it withdrew its motion to designate Toothman as an expert before settling the
Texas litigation.
Unauthorized use of
Devil’s Advocate’s corporate name and Toothman’s personal name. Virginia Code §
8.01-40(A), in pertinent part, says:
Any person whose name, portrait, or picture is used without having
first obtained the written consent of such person, or if dead, of the surviving
consort and if none, of the next of kin, or if a minor, the written consent of
his or her parent or guardian, for advertising purposes or for the purposes of
trade, such persons may maintain a suit in equity against the person, firm, or
corporation so using such person’s name, portrait, or picture to prevent and
restrain the use thereof; and may also sue and recover damages for any injuries
sustained by reason of such use. …
But a corporate
entity is not a “person” for purposes of the Virginia statute. And Toothman’s
name wasn’t used for advertising purposes, defined as “a publication which,
taken in its entirety, was distributed for use in, or as part of, an
advertisement or solicitation for patronage of a particular product or
service.”   Use in a court filing or
email to opposing counsel isn’t advertising or use in the course of business; we
are unable to discern what additional legal services Zurich could have intended
to solicit.”
Trademark
infringement: time-barred under Virginia’s two-year statute of limitations for
fraud.

Copyright infringement: first, plaintiffs’ proposal lacked substantial
similarity to the designation Zurich filed in Texas, an inquiry that could be
made at the motion to dismiss stage.  The
proposal discussed “Appellants’ conflicts, Toothman’s familiarity with the
parties involved, his academic and professional experience, an overview of the
billing structure, and some observations on the Texas litigation.” In terms of
extrinsic similarity, the expert designation “generally summarizes the subject
matter on which Zurich’s two experts would testify without specifying the material
about which either intended to opine.” There was “little if any similarity,”
and likewise it was “implausible that any intended audience could view these
two documents as intrinsically similar.”
Zurich also didn’t
infringe the copyright to Toothman’s resume; its use was fair under Bond v.
Blum, 317 F.3d 385 (4th Cir. 2003).  The
material was factual; Zurich’s use “was not for profit or in a traditionally
commercial sense”; the amount taken didn’t interfere with any legitimate
purpose copyright exists to serve; and there was no interference with a market
because there was no market for Toothman’s resume as such.
Breach of contract:
there was no meeting of the minds.
Conversion of name
and reputation: a plaintiff can’t show the necessary element that the defendant
wrongfully exercised dominion or control over property, thereby depriving
plaintiff of its possession, where he consented to the use of the property.  The facts indicated Toothman’s implied
consent: “Toothman knew that, in order to obtain permission to designate him as
an expert, Zurich needed to disclose his name to the court and opposing
counsel, and he permitted such disclosure.”

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Court tentatively holds that NY’s GBL covers damage via personal injury

Carias v. Monsanto Co., 2016 WL 6803780, No. 15-CV-3677 (E.D.N.Y.
Sept. 30, 2016)
The plaintiffs filed a putative class action claiming
injuries based on their use of Monsanto’s herbicide Roundup. Along with
products liability claims, they brought claims under New York General Business
Law §§ 349 and 350. The court dismissed claims under the GBL for injunctive
relief and design defect claims are dismissed, but not others.
The primary ingredient in Roundup is glyphosate; the EPA
approved Roundup and its labeling. The label says that “Glyphosate targets an
enzyme found in plants, but not in people or pets.” There are no warnings of
serious health risks to humans.  In 2015,
the International Agency for Research on Cancer classified glyphosate as
“probably carcinogenic to humans.” The plaintiffs alleged that, in reliance on
the “plants not people” statement, they purchased Roundup on “several
occasions” over the past four years and “used and/or [were] exposed to the use
of Defendant’s Roundup products in their intended or reasonably foreseeable
manner.” They allege that their “exposure to glyphosate caused” various
maladies, including non-Hodgkins lymphoma, pancreatic cancer, renal pelvis
cancer, “a pituitary gland tumor,” leukemia, “irritable bowel syndrome/leaky
gut disease,” diabetes, and kidney disease.
Plaintiffs alleged that the “plants not people” statement
was false because glyphosate inhibits organisms from producing the enzyme EPSP
synthase, which is found in gut bacteria in human stomachs and intestines. The
total microbiota found in humans can weigh up to five pounds, but gut bacteria are
vulnerable to being killed off by glyphosate.
Monsanto argued that FIFRA preempted the failure-to-warn and
GBL claims, as did the EPA’s conclusions in various contexts that, as a factual
matter, glyphosate does not pose a chronic health risk to human and is not
carcinogenic.  Multiple district courts
have rejected these arguments, and this one did too, mainly because false
statements about safety cause pesticides to be misbranded under FIFRA, and
states can impose their own remedies for conduct that violates FIFRA.  EPA’s approval of the label, and statements
about safety, weren’t factual findings entitled to preemptive force for these
purposes.  However, plaintiffs’ request
for injunctive relief under the GBL was preempted because it would require
Monsanto to change the label.
Monsanto also tried to rely on the GBL § 349(d) safe harbor
for acts that comply with federal agency rules, regulations, or statutes.  EPA’s approval of the Roundup label didn’t
suffice given FIFRA’s language, which makes clear that FIFRA doesn’t absolve
pesticide makers from liability for misbranding. 
Further, plaintiffs plausibly pled that “plants not people”
was false or misleading.  It could be
literally false to say that the relevant enzyme is “found in plants, but not in
people or pets,” because it is, in fact, found in the gut bacteria of humans. Further,
plaintiffs plausibly alleged that this statement was “inherently misleading
because it creates the impression that glyphosate has no affect [sic] on people
or pets, when in reality, it directly affects both people and pets—by
killing-off beneficial gut bacteria.”
Monsanto argued that plaintiffs were relying on a strained
parsing of the word “in,” but the court didn’t find it implausible. “Notably,
defendant does not point to a single case granting a motion to dismiss where
the statement at issue was literally false or the statement at issue was even
remotely similar to one at bar.” 
Monsanto wanted to dispute that Roundup affects gut bacteria in a manner
that is any way detrimental to human health. Not on a motion to dismiss.  If Monsanto was right, then it would have a
strong argument that “plants not people” is not material.  (Why? 
People are allowed to care about whatever they care about; advertising
law usually doesn’t judge the wisdom of their preferences.  Also, I remember a time when the effect of H.
pylori on ulcers was a matter for debate and even mockery—if Roundup does
affect gut bacteria, a reasonable consumer might care even if the scientific
consensus was that no harm has been shown.)
Further, plaintiffs alleged a cognizable injury.  Monsanto argued that exposure to glyphosate
by ingesting it on agricultural crops wasn’t related to plaintiffs’ purchases
of the Roundup consumer products at issue in their GBL claims. But plaintiffs
also alleted that they were exposed to the Roundup products they purchased. “[C]omplicated
questions of causation are normally not decided on a motion to dismiss.”  Monsanto further contended that personal
injuries aren’t actionable harms under the GBL, a matter on which there was
scant authority.  The GBL allows any
person “injured” by reason of a violation of the statute can recover “actual
damages.”  The plain language thus covered
personal injuries.  (The court contrasted
New Jersey law; the comprehensive New Jersey Products Liability Act is the
right authority for personal injury claims, not the New Jersey consumer
protection law, but New York doesn’t have a comprehensive products liability
statute.)  Although the court was
skeptical that GBL §§ 349 and 350 should apply to personal injury claims, “which
have traditionally been pursued through product liability suits under New York
common law, defendant has not persuaded the Court at this time.”  The court was willing to revisit the issue on
fuller briefing at a later stage.

In a footnote, the court noted that “causation for the GBL
claims appears to be a particularly difficult hurdle as plaintiffs will
presumably have to prove that their injuries were caused by the specific
Roundup products that they purchased and used even though the plaintiffs were
also exposed to glyphosate through numerous other sources—a point noted in
plaintiffs’ own complaint.”  Further, the
court cautioned that a fee award would be unlikely “when, as here, the
plaintiffs have suffered substantial and high-value personal injuries and
allege product liability-type claims under the guise of the GBL. The instant
suit is unlike most GBL § 349 claims, which involve statutory damages or
minimal actual damages, and where the prospect of an attorney’s fees award may
be necessary to attract competent counsel.” 
And, “[b]ecause of the nature of the injuries alleged by the named
plaintiffs here, the Court has grave doubts that class treatment will be
appropriate in this suit.”  Apparently
the court wasn’t willing to hand plaintiffs an unalloyed victory.

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Pro tip: don’t refer to delayed TM claim as “lottery ticket”

Dropbox secured a rare laches ruling based in significant part on internal discussions by the other claimant to “dropbox” about how delaying a claim until after Dropbox’s IPO would increase the payout.  Via DuetsBlog.

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Truthful report about injunction not misleading, even if injunction shouldn’t have been issued

Peek v. Whittaker, 2016 WL 6806265,  No. 13-cv-1188 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 2016)
The parties, floor care businesses, are in a litigation
deathmatch; this case is a follow-on to a state court lawsuit.  Whittaker sold carpet cleaning machines and
fluids to other businesses that needed to clean their carpets. Whittaker’s
Director of Sales was Paul Offutt, who worked under a contract that included a
non-compete provision.  When Whittaker
told Offutt that Offutt’s contract would not be renewed upon its expiration in
June 2008, Stephen Peek told Offutt “The hell with them. Why don’t you look
into doing something with me? Let’s do something together.” The two created
Clear Floor Care, LLC and took on another Whittaker employee, who took
documents with him.
“Whittaker got wind of this, and sued in state court to nip
this new venture in the bud.”  He
obtained a preliminary injunction barring the defendants from directly or
indirectly engaging in any business that competed with Whittaker, soliciting
current, former, or prospective customers of Whittaker, soliciting employees of
Whittaker, or using any of Whittaker’s trade secrets. Several years later, in
April 2013, “after extended discovery, and after the non-compete provision in
Offutt’s contract had timed out, the state court went in the other direction
and granted summary judgment to Peek et al., concluding that Whittaker was
unable to prove its claims that the state court defendants had actually taken
or used any trade secrets.”
Peek then sued, arguing that the state court lawsuit was
baseless, and that Whittaker knew as much from Day One.  The court rejected Lanham Act claims based on Whittaker’s
statements about the lawsuit.  Whittaker
sent the preliminary injunction order to three people who worked for two
companies (Tandus and Shaw Carpet). These companies were “carpet mills” who weren’t
customers of Whittaker nor potential customers of Clear Floor Care, LLC, but
they make carpet cleaning and maintenance recommendations to their customers.
By contrast, the parties’ clients or potential clients are
organizations in need of carpet cleaning equipment, such as convention centers
and personal care facilities. There was no evidence that any such entity
received a copy of the preliminary injunction order. Thus, the dissemination
wasn’t “commercial advertising or promotion.” 
Even if the carpet mills had constituted a relevant purchasing public,
dissemination to three people wouldn’t be enough.

Moreover, Peek couldn’t show deceptiveness.  The preliminary injunction existed, and Peek
couldn’t show misleadingness.  Even if
the injunction had been procured with false testimony, that wouldn’t deceive
relevant purchasers because it was a real injunction.  “It was not as if Whittaker disseminated an
injunction that it did not have, or stated that the injunction prohibited the
Plaintiffs from doing more than what they were actually prohibited from doing.
Whittaker disseminated an actual injunction that had the full force of law.”

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When Lexmark raises the standard: competitor fails to show harm causation from literal falsity

Snac Lite, LLC v. Nuts ‘N More, LLC, 2016 WL 6778268, No. 14-cv-01695
(N.D. Ala. Nov. 16, 2016)
Snac Lite sued NNM for misrepresenting the protein content
of its specialty nut butters.  The court
granted summary judgment, despite past literally false advertising, because of
Snac Lite’s inability to show harm causation. 
While Lexmark appears expansive,
it can have contractionary effects at the summary judgment stage.
Snac Lite sells four types of peanut butters and almond
butters with added pea protein, flax seed, and other nutrients, marketing them
as more healthy alternatives to traditional, non-fortified nut butters; it also
adds sugar. Its products sell at higher retail prices than many mass market
peanut butters.  Snac Lite sells its
products at grocery stores such as Walmart, Publix, Giant Eagle, Shop Rite,
Kroger, and HEB, as well as GNC, Vitamin Shoppe, and other “mom and pop health
food stores.”  In 2012, Snac Lite
recalled all its products due to salmonella contamination at one of its
manufacturers’ facilities. Snac Lite didn’t resume selling its products for
several months after the recall while it looked for a new manufacturer.
NNM also sells enhanced high protein peanut and almond
butters, using added whey protein, fiber, organic flax, and the sweetener
xylitol, derived from birch; it has more flavors than Snac Lite (e.g.,
cinnamon). NNM also promotes its products as enhanced alternatives to
traditional nut butters, and its nut butters sell for even more per jar.  NNM’s “brand personality” is
fitness-oriented, and its products are sold at fitness and supplement shows,
GNC stores, Whole Foods stores, and through online retailers. Unlike Snac Lite,
NNM often uses social media websites and touts its products by highlighting its
“celebrity” customers.  In March 2013, NNM
appeared on the network television show Shark
Tank
, pitching to prospective investors. As part of their pitch, NNM’s
representatives touted its nut butters as containing 14 grams of protein per
serving. NNM ultimately obtained capital from two of the investors on the show,
and appeared in two of the show’s follow-up episodes.
Snac Lite had 21 of NNM’s products independently tested and
found a protein content less than eighty percent of the amount of protein
claimed in NNM’s labels and advertising. Until 2014, NNM’s products featured
the claim “14 grams of protein” on their nutrition labels and elsewhere on the
products, displays, and in advertising. 
In 2014, NNM reformulated the products and changed its labeling and
advertising to reflect the “new” protein content, 12 grams.
Snac Lite tried to show damages with two experts; neither
sufficed.  One, Dr. Robicheaux, spoke to
employees at two GNC stores in Birmingham, Alabama and reviewed email messages
sent to a representative of NNM. He conducted internet research to determine
the benefits of a high protein diet, and to learn more about NNM’s target
customers.  He concluded that the
determinant attribute for potential buyers of high protein nut butters is
protein content, and that misrepresentation of protein content was thus likely
to materially deceive potential customers, leading to a significant diversion
of sales from other high protein nut butter sellers.
The court excluded Dr. Robicheaux’s proffered opinion
because it was unreliable and not supported by a reliable methodology.  He didn’t speak to any customers, conduct
customer surveys, conduct focus groups, or interview any authorized
representative of NMM’s distributors or retailers. He didn’t analyze NMM’s
marketing strategy, either.  While survey
or market research isn’t required to show causation, there needed to be
something to show the impact of false advertising on  Snac Lite’s sales.  That is, causation requires the expert to
show “both that consumers chose Defendant’s products over Plaintiff’s products,
and that consumers’ choices were connected to Defendant’s false
advertising.” 
He also failed to account for additional variables that might
have affected the parties’ sales positions. Experts don’t need to exclude every
possible alternative cause, but “in order to provide reliable testimony an
expert must take into account most relevant factors as to causation.”  NMM’s appearance on Shark Tank was an important factor that needed to be taken into
account, as was the salmonella recall. 
Given the recall, Dr. Robicheaux’s assumption that all of Snac Lite’s sales
losses since 2012 were attributable to NMM’s alleged false advertising was
unlikely.
Similar problems attended the testimony of another witness,
a CPA, who simply calculated all of Snac Lite’s sales declines following 2012,
and then reduced that amount by sales of any product Snac Lite’s representative
admitted were not directly affected by NMM’s presence in the nut butter market.
He didn’t interview any of NMM’s customers and admitted that he couldn’t
otherwise determine why a particular customer would choose to buy less from Snac
Lite. “Notably, in a Lanham Act false advertising case, there is a heightened
risk associated with causation testimony that ignores the competitive market as
a whole.”
NMM thus received summary judgment on the key issue of
causation. Courts may presume causation where a defendant engages in deceptive
comparative advertising, but that wasn’t alleged here.  Courts can presume deception from literal
falsity, but even then the plaintiff must prove harm causation, “here, that
consumers chose Defendant’s products rather than those of Plaintiff.”
There was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
parties were direct competitors, even though they had different nutritional
profiles and were sold in different flavors through different marketing efforts
and strategies.  Direct competition isn’t
required under Lexmark, and the
differences between the parties were not “so vast that they are vying for
different consumers and markets, and therefore no action of Defendant could
have harmed Plaintiff.”  They both sell
premium nut butter products, which are distinguishable from traditional nut
butters, and their products were “available at stores that sell products
intended to promote healthy living.”
Nonetheless, there wasn’t sufficient evidence of harm
causation.  Snac Lite sought lost
profits, requiring it to establish actual lost sales as a result of the false
advertising, which it couldn’t do.  Along
with comparative advertising, courts can presume causation in “two-player
market” cases and trademark infringement cases, but this case involved none of
those situations.  Snac Lite needed to
connect its losses to the false advertising, and it couldn’t, while NMM
presented evidence of other causes; Snac Lite even experienced losses with
respect to certain retail customers who never stocked NMM’s products.

Similarly, though Snac Lite sought disgorgement of NMM’s
products, it would only be entitled to that remedy if it established a
violation of the Lanham Act, and that requires causation.  Indeed, the court doubted whether Snac Lite
had standing under Lexmark.  At the summary judgment stage, mere
allegations weren’t sufficient, though disputed facts had to be construed in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Under Lexmark, a plaintiff must “ordinarily show economic or reputational
injury flowing directly from the deception wrought by the defendant’s
advertising” in order to have standing. Without “intending to conflate”
causation and proximate causation, the court held that, at a minimum, some
evidence of proximate causation is required at the summary judgment stage.  Pre-Lexmark
caselaw suggesting that causation need not be established for disgorgement was
no longer good law.

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Jaszi festschrift–abbreviated panel 4

Pam Samuelson
Reflections
Praised Jaszi’s
leadership in fighting White Paper, Digital Future Coalition; the DMCA could
have been much worse. Reached out to people who think about copyright ownership
who aren’t lawyers.
Panel 4 – Pedagogy
Plus
Joseph Liu and Alfred
Yen, In Praise of a Classic
Copyright textbook,
now in 10th edition.  Reflections
on the textbook based on creation of own textbook.  Jaszi’s textbook: narrative thread strong,
but over 1000 pages.  That could make it
difficult for students to swallow, or, if you assigned only chunks, lost
narrative thread.  Their own book: 750
pages—can go through whole thing; fewer case notes.
Jack Lerner
DMCA exemption:
making the case with the facts with extensive factfinding for filmmakers.  Lots of different jobs for students in
developing facts, discussing with experts, preparing testimony. 

[sick child; had to
leave—sorry!]

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Jaszi Festschrift, Panel 3 Fair use

Michael Donaldson, Reflections:
More lobbyists in Congress for © industries than there are members of Congress.  But fair use guidelines for documentary film
weren’t threatening, especially once there was insurance for filmmakers who
used the guidelines.  Good fair use
decisions, e.g. on replicating scenes from Deep
Throat
for Lovelace.  Fictional films based on factual situations:
pushback from studios, which clear everything; they don’t care.  Clear the spines of books visible on a
bookshelf. Independent filmmakers don’t have time, personnel, or money to do
that and have to rely on fair use. We found it fairly easy to call these films
hybrids, so when they were dealing w/historical facts we used the same logic as
in best practices.  Three-question safe
harbor developed in our office. When we write our opinion letters we start with
the statute, though it’s not always as much help as one would like; our safe
harbor/best practices are more helpful.  Difference
b/t major studios and small filmmakers: Major studios only relied on fair use
in biopic about Steve Jobs, and sadly cut down substantially on the amount of
the commercial they were using.  Ringgold case: the defendant didn’t
develop an argument for why it was important to use the print on the wall to
signal commitment to African-American culture; the script didn’t call attention
to why it was important to use that print (but that wasn’t necessary for the
lawyers to explain why it was an important signifier of African-American church
culture).
Panel 3 – Fair Use
Jonathan Band,
Copyright and the Telling of History
Recent fair use
decisions have significantly helped solve the problem copyright causes
historians, a shorthand for people who want to make use of historical clips—documentary
filmmakers, academics, etc.  Long © term
is the source of the problem.  Search
engine precedents: thumbnails, snippets. 
Visible uses in the course of search are fair.  Preservation and identification have become
much easier.  Use in telling the story is
also a transformative purpose.  Bill
Graham v. Dorling Kindersley. Original use was to tell people where/when the
concert was; reuse had historical purpose.  (By contrast, use just to make you laugh might
not work, as in recent Who’s on First case.)
More complicated: Bouchat
v. Ravens: Baltimore Ravens logo.  Flying
shield logo turned out to be infringing, so they redesigned it.  But they have all this footage of the games
in the first three season where they used the infringing shield. Under what
circumstances can you use the footage? 
Multiple decisions, some make more sense than others; one decision
disallowed the use in NFL highlight films because they didn’t think it was
really historical, only entertaining and promotional for Ravens games/NFL.
Using still images, even in a display in corporate office, was more museum-like
and fair use. Later case: telling more of a story about the draft picks, and
that was seen to be a fair use.  That’s
more like a real documentary than the highlight films; he’s not sure that line
makes sense.  The complicating factor is that
the Ravens and the NFL were the initial infringers; maybe a 2 strikes rule (for
football). 
Fox News v. NJ
Management Gp.: used image of 9/11 fireman juxtaposed against Iwo Jima photo;
Fox was trying to say that they didn’t need to license that b/c they were
commemorating the event.  The court thought
it was more promotional for a broadcast/part of advertising.  Skeptical of transformative purpose. 
Recent fair use
jurisprudence can address how family members or owners of estate want to use ©
to protect the image of a dead person: MLK Jr. and the movie Selma, where they rewrote speeches to
avoid threats.  So they don’t use King’s
actual words but paraphrases. Fair use is a critical tool in preventing the
airbrushing of history.  Prof. Jaszi has
made this tool much more effective in preventing such airbrushing.
Rebecca Tushnet, Fair
Use Hopefulness
I’m here to praise
Professor Jaszi’s work making fair use useful: empowering communities and
individuals to rely on fair use, rather than leaving it, as Larry Lessig
famously said, merely the right to hire a lawyer.  Professor Jaszi has spent decades working to
improve the situation of creators in the real world as they navigate copyright
law’s affordances and constraints, because he believes that there are measurable
improvements that can be made even when, as has for too long been the case, the
political system is captured by large institutions with little regard for fair
use or for the budding creators that are the seed corn of culture.  The law’s recent encounters with fandom
provide some reason to think that Professor Jaszi’s eternal hopefulness is
justified.
In media fandom, a
set of communities often constituted primarily by people who identify as women,
practices of remix and appropriation are performed for pleasure and in order to
provide the community with more of what it wants, a “more” that the supposedly
endless productivity of capitalism has been unable or unwilling to provide in
return for money.  Through iteration,
individuals recognize themselves as creators and as part of a community,
sharing meanings and developing identities. 
Although fandom
communities are far from utopias, and can partake of the worst features of
mainstream culture (fans are, after all, people), they also offer feminist
models for understanding the dialogue between individual and community at the
heart of almost all creative practice. 
The apparent contradictions embodied by fanworks—produced by individuals
in a communal context, created by authors while explicitly acknowledging
copying, intermingling noncommercial activities with works created for
commercial profit—find in fandom communities a partial but productive synthesis.
In the legal
literature as well as elsewhere, there are increasing numbers of thick
descriptions of fan communities, types of fanworks—fan art has a different
trajectory than fan fiction or fan video—and different national or historical experiences
of fanworks.  In addition, fanworks are
now increasingly part of the copyright “test suite,” used to examine
implications of various rules or rule changes.  
A rule that would treat noncommercial fanworks as infringing is, by
default, an unattractive one to most copyright academics and even some
policymakers.  I’m very happy about that.
Scholars have also explored
other low-IP spaces, trying to glean why they could remain so creatively
productive despite a lack of propertization.  
Noncommercial fan creators joined an ever-growing list of exemplars of
well-functioning creative communities with only glancing intersection with the
intellectual property system, including stand-up comedians;  American fashion designers;  high-end chefs;  roller derby performers;  magicians; 
tattoo artists;  typeface
creators;  substantial parts of the
pornography industry;  graffiti
artists;  athletes;  and drag queens.  Recent work by Jessica Silbey and others also
shows that even in supposedly “high-IP” spaces, the actual process of creating
and monetizing copyrightable works and patentable inventions relies much more
on intrinsic motivations, attribution, and behavioral norms than on law.  
Meanwhile, a lot was
going on in other areas of copyright law and scholarship.  In the courts, fair use was finally resuming
its role as an important guarantor of free expression.   No longer was fair use merely the “right to
hire a lawyer,” as Larry Lessig famously disparaged it.  In particular, the concept of
“transformativeness,” which is to say, adding a new meaning, message, or
purpose to the existing work, began to have real bite in identifying works that
copyright owners should not be allowed to control, even in the absence of
savage criticism of the original.  
Fanworks are regularly transformative—even when they’re celebratory,
they create new readings and meanings for the originals that inspired
them.  Recent cases involving
noncommercial video are also promising in more readily finding fair use.
Outside the courts,
we’ve seen greater flexing of fair use muscles as well.  Patricia Aufderheide and Peter Jaszi have
shepherded the development of fair use best practices in various
communities.   These include best
practices in online video, though that project (in which I participated)
doesn’t fully cover fan practices.   The various
best practices projects are one implementation of a larger idea: creative
communities can engage in deliberation about how to respect earlier creators’
rights while also preserving important freedoms for subsequent creators.  The best practices projects turn implicit
knowledge into useful guidelines for newcomers as well as providing good
examples for people to think with.
Fan creators have
been participating in legal dialogue in other ways.  The Digital Millennium Copyright Act barred
circumvention of technical measures used to prevent copying,  but provided for a temporary exemption
process where the anticircumvention rules hampered noninfringing uses.  In 2010, following submissions from fans
collected and curated by the OTW, the Copyright Office for the first time
recognized the needs of noncommercial remix artists, including fanvidders, to
make clips of video using high-quality source.  
It specifically mentioned fanvids in its rulemaking, and again when the
exemption was renewed and expanded in 2012, 
and again in 2015.   Although the
Copyright Office does not bind courts in copyright infringement cases, the fact
that fairly conservative copyright lawyers recognized that at least some
fanvids constituted fair use was another indication that fair use law has moved
to where fans need it to be.  (Quite
relevantly, Professor Jaszi was vital in convincing the Electronic Frontier
Foundation that it was worth trying to get an exemption for noncommercial video
makers like vidders, after AU’s IP Clinic helped Peter Decherney secure the
first use-specific exemption for film studies classes in 2007.  We discussed how to frame our arguments with
him, which was very valuable in successfully presenting our evidence to the
Copyright Office.  And I was not as
hopeful as Prof. Jaszi: after the first time I testified, I wrote in my journal
that “Today I did a very good job at something where the extent to which I did
a good job doesn’t matter and should,” but Peter’s optimism was more justified.) 
Outside the United
States, there were also important developments. 
Most notably for fan scholarship, Canada enacted an exception for
noncommercial remix or “user-generated content,” known as the YouTube exception
although it applies to far more than video and audio remix.   Because of this exception, Canada is
arguably ahead of the US in protecting noncommercial transformative works.  In 2014, the Australian Legal Reform
Commission recommended the introduction of fair use into Australian law,
predicting that change’s positive effects on 
“musical compositions, new films, art works and fan fiction.”   Similarly, Peter Yu has been working
tirelessly for reform in Hong Kong that would, among other things, protect
remix and fanworks.  Naming a thing is
usually a predicate for assigning it legal meaning and value, and so these are
important positive developments for noncommercial transformative works.
Fans have also begun
to engage in deliberate activism around copyright reform.  New York Times best-selling author Naomi
Novik, also a fan writer and vidder who helped found the Organization for
Transformative Works (OTW), testified before Congress at hearings on fair
use.   Among other legal initiatives, the
OTW helped renew and expand existing exemptions to §1201’s prohibition on
circumventing digital rights management technologies in order to make remix
videos.  Fan video makers provided the
bulk of the evidence used to secure the remix exemptions, and are likely to
continue to do so.   Even in individual
interactions, fan creators increasingly adopt the language of transformative
fair use, deploying the arguments of fan-friendly lawyers.
Fandom is, after
all, a training ground that teaches people that they can speak creatively, and
that their speech is often welcome.  And
it’s a place where communities of like-minded people meet up and do things
together.  Political possibility is thus
inherent in participatory fandom: transformative fandom is definitionally about
the possibility that things might be different.
Professor Jaszi’s
long-term project of creating numerous fair use best practices is a
particularly striking example of using within-community dialogues to have a
broader impact; but there are also other ways in which the presence of multiple
voices can change how we think about creativity and creative freedoms.
“Work” is a noun in
copyright, but a verb in the everyday practice of creativity.  One of the implications of thinking about
process is that valuable acts of creativity occur even when the results are
similar to those that have come before, because it represents the creative
development of the individual.  And as
Jessica Silbey’s interviews with professional creators and the people who
support them have revealed, economically successful authors and fans are not
all that far apart in their needs and concerns for process. 
Work from across
many kinds of creative spaces also shows that creators place value on
attribution across communities, though with specific twists: in each community,
some creations or credits are shared and others aren’t.  Credit plays an important role in
incentivizing production and structuring community relations and in-community
hierarchies.  Credit is also highly
context-dependent in terms of what suffices for proper credit and who’s
credited.  This extensive variation suggests
some of the problems with a legal attribution right, which can never be as
responsive to context as community norms.
Likewise, communities
always have people who do the difficult and underappreciated work of making the
community function—for the derby girls David Fagundes studied, the work was running
the master name roster, but it can be making sure that the chairs are set up
and that the coffee is brewed for a local meeting, or paying the website
hosting costs and writing the code for a fan fiction archive, something Abigail
De Kosnik has written about.   If we
value communities, we need to know more about how to keep those structural
features in place, especially as they seem to degrade in broader society—and we
need to think about how gendered expectations of work have contributed to their
structural invisibility.  
How should the law
react to the kinds of variations we see? 
I have a few lessons to suggest. 
One direct legal
lesson from the seemingly endless variety among fanworks is the importance of
epistemic humility.  Because different
audiences may read a new work in varying ways, some may see parody and
transformation while others see merely repetition.  To take a recent copyright example, where
some people saw feminist toy company Goldieblox’s rewriting of the Beastie Boys
song “Girls” as feminist and critical, others claimed that the original song
was already mocking the sexism Goldieblox sought to criticize in its ad for an
engineering toy directed at girls.   The
lesson of this inevitable multiplicity is that no one group’s reactions should
be prioritized in assessing transformativeness; where an interpretive community
finds a new meaning or message in a new work based on an existing work, that
should strongly favor fair use.
A broader, though
perhaps less helpful, lesson for the law is that it doesn’t do particularly
well at regulating relations within communities.  The creative ecosystem is a blooming, buzzing
confusion of different kinds of creators, and of norms that differ as between
insiders and outsiders.   For example, in
many areas of media fandom, creating unauthorized new stories based on the work
of profit-seeking copyright owners isn’t just fine, it’s constitutive of
creative fandom.  However, doing the same
thing to a work of fan fiction—creating a fanwork of a fanwork—without the
original creator’s permission is highly controversial.  Fan art is routinely sold, but “pulling to
publish”—removing fan fiction from online distribution and rewriting it so that
it can be sold as a separate work—is controversial, perhaps precisely because
it seems to be withdrawing a gift that has been reciprocated with gifts of
feedback and praise.   These differing
norms by medium are an example of the kind of context sensitivity—and lack of
fully settled rules—that communities routinely produce and that generic legal
regimes find hard to replicate.
Low IP-communities
are also spaces of creative risk-taking. 
In transformative fandom, any given story is just one of many featuring
the same characters; you can kill them all and see if that works, and give them all babies and happily ever
after and see if that works, and so on.  Similarly,
fanworks can easily experiment with form—not just the short story (for which
there is an extremely limited commercial market) but also with poetry, mixed
media, and other innovations.   Fanworks
are also well-known for experimenting with content, especially sexual content, and
for providing stories that feature heroes other than straight white men.   People
who are drawn in by the presence of favorite characters are willing to take
more chances in their media consumption than they otherwise would.
When they succeed,
the experiments found in fandom can also be the source of important and
economically significant innovations.  Fifty
Shades of Gray is a controversial example, but it involves a classic innovation
story of the kind studied by Eric von Hippel: a “user” who did not
professionally produce the text at issue customized it for her own particular
interests (rewriting Twilight without supernatural elements and with a lot of
explicit sex).  The customized version
proved popular with other users.  This
altered version was then commercialized (during which process some of the
rougher edges were smoothed over).  The
example of Fifty Shades has led commercial publishers to seek to satisfy a
previously unrecognized market for written erotica that appeals to women, a
market they had been unable even to see before a revised fanwork illuminated
the demand. 
So, another lesson
is that the ability to move into and out of the formal economy is an important
part of the creative cycle.  To deem an
experimental act of creativity infringing because of its potential connection
to economic reward risks shutting down that generative flow. Just as Uber,
Airbnb, and other startups are trying to turn once limited, often freely
offered personal interactions into monetized transactions in which a
third-party intermediary makes most of the profit, copyright owners see the
possibility of controlling every creative expression related to their
works.  But to do so would be both futile
and potentially deadly to creativity.
Feminists working in
intellectual property need to talk about the way that our pleasures are
mobilized in order to keep us providing uncompensated value to copyright
owners: after all, we like it.   One
ongoing goal is to make economic hybridity less repressive and exploitative
than the coopation offered by initiatives such as Kindle Worlds.  As commercial entities move from suppression
to cooptation, our legal and practical strategies must change as well.  Continued insistence that commercial
motivations are not fatal to fair use defenses is one important part of these
strategies. But supporting communities through other ways, such as preserving
permeable noncommercial spaces and through using nonprofit law, is also
important and doesn’t rely on IP law as such.
To borrow a famous
line, women can make our own history, but we do not make it as we please; we do
not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing
already, given and transmitted from the past. 
Remix is a way of taking what we’re given and making it better.  It remains for us to keep choosing our
conditions, recognizing that our choices are partial and constrained but not
therefore meaningless.  Remix, then, is
fundamentally a hopeful act: it reminds us that things could be different. 
Michael Madison,
Patterns and Fair Use in Copyright 2: The Sequel
Past work: found
patterns in fair use decisions
. A descriptive claim: a community or group
is present; this can predict a fair use finding.  Social science links behavior of individuals
in communities to creative outputs, not in a linear way but a probabalistic way.
Trying to step beyond norms and customs as such (responding to Jennifer Rothman’s
criticism) to look at groups, whether commercial or noncommercial, small or
large.
What do the cases
decided since the end of 2003 tell us? 
Provisional results: to a significant degree, those patterns still
matter.  What’s changed?  Google cases, Kelly v. Arriba Soft—different valence
compared to the history; the word Madison uses is info “infrastructure”—to
evoke Brett Frischmann’s work on infrastructure.  I don’t think it’s a social pattern or
community activity, so a gap has opened up compared to 2004 where I saw social
groups as explaining most of the cases.
Storytelling no
longer quite captures the idea that defendants might be legitimately engaged in
acts of affirmative creation of new artwork, whether in narrative form or
otherwise.
There’s a gap opened
up b/t the path of legal doctrine that focuses on transformative use as Campbell and the idea of social patterns
as an independent explanatory variable. 
Jaszi liked the idea of talking about socially patterned activity,
aligning with transformativeness under Campbell.
Since then, transformativeness acquired a gravitational pull of its own, no
longer as clearly derived from or driving patterns of social activity.
Micro observation:
linkage b/t socially patterned idea and what Jaszi & team did in best
practices.  Influential b/c they had a
strong descriptive and normative foundation. Worry about whether normative foundation
is still as robust as it was—need to keep working to ensure they’re founded in
where the law is.  Madison is invested in
knowledge commons, community self-governance as a way of dealing with
knowledge, linked to “IP without IP” studies.
Patricia Aufderheide,
The Impact of Codes of Best Practices in Fair Use
Worked w/more than
ten different communities on best practices. Each is distinctive, and we’ve
learned a lot.  The method: deeply research
actual practices to understand the community’s problems, facilitate discussions
about balancing their interests as people who own © and people who need ©
material.  Evidence-based action.

Copyright Office adopted Rothman’s critique that these are unreliable b/c not
negotiated w/rights owners [critique from the right].  Jim Gibson says: they could become ceilings
and not floors [critique from the left].
What evidence?  Insurers started routinely accepting fair use
claims.78% of filmmakers surveyed started to understand fair use; they thought
it was very valuable, especially younger filmmakers who saw it as essential
tool. We asked how many had had fair use claims rejected? 1-3% reported
problems—that is an industry standard, where 99% of insurers accept claims and
97% of broadcasters.  In 2005, Donaldson’s
firm didn’t handle any fair use issues for Sundance; 2010, they’ve got 5 films
using fair use, and 730 different fair use issues (two films used lots of
clips); 2015, they’ve got more than 25 (lost the exact number) sprinkled
throughout types of fair use.
Communications
scholars’ best practices. Less successful story, b/c communications
associations that adopted code haven’t been particularly interested in
promoting it.  The codes do nothing; the
community must absorb and use the code. Nonetheless, saw changes in 5 years
among communications scholars. More people know
they’ve employed fair use; they are more frustrated when they can’t get fair
use claims accepted. Sad news: only 1/3 know they have a code of best
practices. Most of the people who use the code find it helpful. People doing multimedia
publishing are a subset who know about fair use and are using the code heavily.
Best practices for
fair use in the visual arts: in survey, nearly 2/3 of them knew about the code
10 months after release.  Half who knew had
used the code.  Increased likely use of
fair use. Also huge institutional change w/in 10 months. Major publications in
the field, including the leading publication which is by College Art
Association—changed default to fair use; Yale Univ. Press created similar
guidelines; museums changed institutional policies internally; MIT and
Smithsonian Presses in negotiations. These institutional changes have huge
effects, similar to insurers.
Creating the
document opens the door to what might happen. Culture of community will change
if and only if leaders circulate the information and institutions take the
opportunity.
Critics: Unreliable?  Not to insurers, broadcasters,
publishers.  Is it a ceiling or a floor?
We do have uses that keep expanding.  The
same thing happened with open courseware. 
Documentary filmmakers move from a position of believing they’re doing
something that might be illegal to believing that they have a right to do it to
believing that they’re entitled to defend it in public, as at the DMCA
hearings.
Brandon Butler,
Rationalizing and Operationalizing Non-Transformative Fair Use
He’s from U. Va.,
founded by the “he who lights his taper from me” guy (a civics lesson from a
slaver).  Transformative fair use &
why it works so well: you need to know your purpose, the other guy’s purpose,
and how much you took.  That’s a very
different situation from life w/o transformativeness. Takes the user’s point of
view—the client in the clinic or the community for best practices. They’re in
the driver’s seat explaining why they want the use. The normative force is
clear, unequivocal and even constitutional: you aren’t begging.
Alternatives:
varieties of market failure: HathiTrust, no interest in market; Georgia State:
favored purpose + market failure. Fails b/c the details are often arcane:
Georgia State involves 600 pages of market information which no librarian could
ever know ex ante.
Jennifer Urban (remotely
from Berkeley), Comments
Shift in the way
fair use is thought about, theorized, and practice.  Cluster of work in scholarly world that is
loosely empirical—Sag, Beebe, Madison, Samuelson—making sense of the case law
for practical application. Tushnet, Silbey etc. talk about how practice has
changed naturally with this as tools have become more democratically available.
Shift from individual view of fair use to community view underpins the
statements of best practices. 
How do statements of
best practices fit into broader landscape of change? From lawyer’s perspective,
change relationship b/t lawyer & client, and ability to counsel the client.  Demystifying fair use: article w/Tony
Falzone.  Triad relationship between
practitioner/creator, lawyer, and gatekeeper/distributor/superior in creator’s
organization.  Each participant
encounters a set of barriers to making a fair use.  For the practitioner there are things like
downside risk, permission culture, lack of expertise, unclear legal boundaries,
difficulty negotiating w/gatekeepers when you don’t speak copyright, wish to be
ethical/collegial, desire to avoid expense of lawyers.  Newcomers may not know limits of
collegiality/ethics.
Gatekeepers:
permission culture is a big thing; very aware of downside risk. They often don’t
want to be blockade and would like to give more leeway, but they’ve come to
believe that a norm of licensing is actually required, and that makes them less
flexible.  Lawyer faces highly contextual
caselaw; worries about downside risk to client; has limited sense of community
norms.  Together, those things in the past
set up fair use as an unusable right.
Best practices
address all these issues together, shifting from jargon to community vocab. Go
from unclear cases that have to be analogized to common specific scenarios
encountered in the field and allow decisions based on known facts.  Practitioners can reflect ethical practices
of her community. She has the tools to negotiate w/gatekeepers about what she’s
trying to do in concrete terms.  Specific
and applicable examples can diminish the distance b/t case law and this situation;
helps to calculate practical risk.  Teaches
the lawyer the community norms and vocabulary for whatever community we work with.  Some people develop expertise w/ communities,
e.g. Donaldson for documentary film, but best practices allow more people to do
that, to compress education in the community’s practices.
There is no way to
completely remove downside risk, w/o reform of remedies. But best practices can
put that into perspective. There’s even insurance for documentary
filmmakers.  Simple steps can move a
creator and a community from essentially being unable to use fair use to being
able to use it on a regular basis. Poets routinely paid permissions even for
critical commentary in a scholarly article. 
Hope that best practices can move them. 
Relatively simple statements can have profound effect w/in
communities. 
There are definitely
skeptics; she was a friendly one at the outset. Her concern was the concern for
defining a ceiling/failure to update as practices change. But as she’s worked
w/clients over the years and her students have, she’s come around to the view
that they can describe the most important situations practitioners encounter
and that they can be updated over time.
Too permissive/dream
of fair use?  When she hears that from a
lawyer, she invites them to read 3 of the statements; the statements are
careful and ethical.

It’s easy to forget
how strong the skeptics were at the start.
Jaszi comment: thinks Gibson is now no longer as serious a critic and now has agreed. Also, insurance isn’t just for movies. You can get E&O insurance for books. It’s possible that while we wait for remedy reform, the missing piece of all this, we need to experiment more with the additional possibilities of insurance.

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