it’s not defamatory to conflate 2 legally distinct entities when unity is what they wanted consumers to perceive

RainSoft v. MacFarland, No. 15-432 WES, 2018 WL 4696737
(D.R.I. Sept. 30, 2018)
MacFarland runs lazymanandmoney.com, where he blogs about
companies who provide consumer products and services. He and his wife “sat
through an in-home demonstration of RainSoft’s water-treatment products.” The
demo was  conducted by Oster, an employee
of Basement Technologies (a local RainSoft dealer) who used a script that was
written by RainSoft that didn’t mention Basement Technologies; the Basement Technologies/RainSoft
agreement was intended to foreground RainSoft’s brand name and reputation.
MacFarland’s first RainSoft post, “Is Home Depot’s Water
Test from RainSoft a Scam?” the post mixed narration – “The salesman was super
nice, and very friendly with our dog.” – and critique. McFarland called the
in-home presentation a “magic show”: the demo ostensibly showed RainSoft’s
products purifying McFarland’s tap water, but McFarland wondered if the bottles
used in the demo might have been doctored—“I’m not saying they were, but it’s
possible.” He also accused RainSoft of making “false promises,” using
“high-pressure sales tactics,” and other “slightly deceptive practices.”  The putatively “false promises” included that
RainSoft’s filtration system would save him $20,000 in appliance-replacement
costs over 20 years – this MacFarland “highly doubt[ed].”  The “high-pressure sales tactics” included
offering five years of free soap if MacFarland purchased a RainSoft system on
the spot. Because it did not include the cost of labor, MacFarland also found
RainSoft’s lifetime warranty deceptive. His first post concluded that the
products weren’t worth their price: “I don’t want to say that the RainSoft EC4
product doesn’t work…. From what I’m reading though, the quality is closer to
midlevel, but it is really high-priced ….” He ended by asking his readers for
more feedback on water purification systems, including any RainSoft experiences.
Despite his skepticism, MacFarland and his wife – who MacFarland “recognized
… was impressed by the product” – gave Oster a $100 check to keep the
free-soap option open.
His second post, “RainSoft Scam? (Part 2),” recounted a
conversation he had had with a “RainSoft representative” in which he haggled
$1,000 off the price Oster quoted him.  He
told the story of a trip he made to Lowes where a “representative in plumbing
was shocked” that Home Depot, where he learned of RainSoft, would “only connect
[MacFarland] to this shady RainSoft company,” rather than show him “a range of
filtration systems from various manufacturers.” The post again mentioned
Oster’s “magic tricks” and “bad logic,” before answering the scam question by
saying he was “leaning towards yes, but you are free to make your own
decisions.”
His third post, “Yep. RainSoft Scammed Me Out of $100,” reported
that Oster cashed the $100 check that had held open the free-soap option,
contrary to MacFarland’s expectations. He warned, “if you suspect a company to
be a scammer, don’t even give them an inch, they’ll take a mile.” He later
added an update to the top of this post: “RainSoft’s parent company, Aquion,
saw this and … sent me a $100 check to make it right.”
Finally, “How to Get Clean, Purified Water (at [t]he Best
Price)” “recounted a spat MacFarland had, in the comments section of one of his
other RainSoft posts, with someone he suspected was, though who denied being, a
RainSoft dealer. MacFarland called that glowing review a “comment scam.” The
post reiterated MacFarland’s previous complaints about RainSoft and added
another about the vagueness of RainSoft’s guarantee that if a customer finds a
better-performing product, the customer keeps the RainSoft system gratis. (“There’s
no real fine print[,] … and the terms are ambiguous ….”).) MacFarland then
summoned “a little common sense” to piece together a “formidable water
purification system” – hyperlinking to other companies’ products – “[t]hat’s
less than 1/6th the cost of what RainSoft was going to charge.”  “I’m not a water purification expert,”
MacFarland wrote, “but I know basic problem solving, scientific process, and
consumer scams ….”
MacFarland also reiterated in comments his position that
“RainSoft salesmen” were “selling fear” via “scammy sales tactics” and “magic
shows.”
After RainSoft sued, MacFarland posted “What is a Scam
Anyway?” stating that when he uses the word ‘scam’ he does not necessarily mean
to connote illegal activity, but instead, more colloquially, a “confidence
trick.” MacFarland’s reluctance to make legal claims stems, he said, from the
fact that he does not “possess a 100% understanding of all laws.” Discovery
revealed that he wrote this post to “cover [his] ass,” which is to say, to
circumvent MacFarland’s understanding of Illinois precedent (the original
location of the case) that treated the word ‘scam’ as “libel per se.”  Viewed in the light most favorable to RainSoft,
the evidence showed that MacFarland always knew that Basement Technologies and
RainSoft were distinct entities. He thought RainSoft had “a point” when it
attempted to educate him on the finer points of its relationship with Basement
Technologies, but that its argument was “most[ly] … bullshit.”
The court found that MacFarland’s negative statements could
be divided into two categories: nonactionable epithets (“scam,” “shady,” “magic
tricks,” “bad logic,” etc.) and “more-sober assessments” (“false promises,”
“high-pressure sales tactics,” and “slightly deceptive practices,” as well as
the implication that Oster worked for RainSoft, not Basement Technologies). The
first category was protected by the First Amendment as “imaginative expression”
or “rhetorical hyperbole.”  “Any reader
of his RainSoft posts would reasonably understand these as metaphor.” Though MacFarland’s
post on the meaning of “scam” had no legal import, it accurately described some
of the word’s many meanings. First Circuit precedent establishes that “the
assertion ‘X is a scam’ is incapable of being proven true or false.”
Category two was protected by “other First Amendment
overlays: the concept of false ideas, issues of public concern, and substantial
truths.” In particular, “[a]n opinion whose factual basis is expressed and
(substantially) true is protected speech.” Minor inaccuracies about an issue of
public concern are fine if the gist or sting is true. Here, MacFarland’s
opinions about “false promises,” “high-pressure sales tactics,” and “slightly
deceptive practices” were all accompanied by their factual bases. RainSoft didn’t
materially challenge MacFarland’s account of Oster’s presentation, and thus
failed to create a disputed factual issue on material falsity. Without
challenges to the factual account, “the law acts a bulwark against liability
for the opinions MacFarland draws from these facts, no matter how unwarranted.”
As for the Basement Technologies/RainSoft distinction, the
court still found substantial truth. A statement is substantially true unless
“it would have a different effect on the mind of the reader from that which the
pleaded truth would have produced.” Just as the difference between being a
member, rather than a mere friend, of the white supremacist Aryan Brotherhood
was immaterial to a reasonable member of the law-abiding contemporary
community, Bustos v. A & E Television Networks, 646 F.3d 762 (10th Cir.
2011) (even though this distinction was life-threatening to the wrongly portrayed
Hispanic inmate involved), the difference between Basement Technologies and
RainSoft was also immaterial.  “Basement
Technologies was under contract to sell only RainSoft products, and to ‘protect,’
‘embrace,’ and ‘promote’ the RainSoft brand ‘in every customer facing
opportunity” to ensure that someday ‘every person in the world [would]
recognize the RainSoft® trademark.’ … Basement Technologies was basically a de
facto arm of RainSoft.” The legal differences were “just too fine to have
piqued public concern.”
False advertising: This wasn’t commercial advertising or
promotion. MacFarland sold ad space (and there was no evidence that his alleged
misrepresentations deceived those
customers), and gained revenue from affiliate links, but his own “product” was
free advice, which hadn’t been shown to be commercial speech. Running ads and
receiving promotional kickbacks isn’t enough to turn content into commercial
speech.  The affiliate links “were
clearly incidental to his objective of providing consumers information.” Overstating
the matter (at least as to commercial speech), the court concluded that “[t]he
First Amendment … protects us while we freely discuss how we should live and
love, how to wage war and keep peace, how best to govern ourselves. And
equally, or almost, how to filter tap water on a budget.”

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allegedly perfidious salesman protected from passing off liability, but might have engaged in false advertising

Burton v. Label, LLC, No. 15-CV-5793 (VSB), 2018 WL 4759735
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2018)
Label, founded by the Millers, sells bespoke and custom
men’s clothing throughout the United States. Schwartzman (for whom Burton is
the trustee) worked for Label as Vice President of Sales. While employed at
Label, he established his own bespoke tailoring and made-to-measure men’s
clothing company, named Trusgan, and thereafter provided his services to Label
as an employee of, and through, Trusgan. Label hired a company called ADP to
automate its employee payroll system, and began paying Trusgan for
Schwartzman’s services through ADP. Allegedly, as a result of an error, ADP
began paying Schwartzman’s salary twice through two payroll accounts, and
blamed him when it was discovered (after he told Label he was leaving). The
Label defendants allegedly began a “campaign of calumny” accusing Schwartzman
of fraud and embezzlement, and telling customers that Schwartzman’s claim that
he could offer Label’s products at a cheaper price is false because they’d
received commitments from their suppliers not to do business with Schwartzman.
Label counterclaimed, alleging various claims against
Schwartzman, including violation of the Lanham Act. The Millers allegedly began
receiving customer complaints about Schwartzman’s quality of service, and he
allegedly tried to steal customers for his own side business during Label work
hours and using Label resources. He allegedly surreptitiously contacted Label
clients, misrepresented that he was placing orders for them through Label, and
instead placed the orders through his own company. In one case, a supplier
asked whether the “orders were still under Label,” to which Schwartzman
replied, “all these orders are under me not Label,” and “I was only sending
them to you because I can’t risk them accidentally being sent through Label.” A
client allegedly complained to Label about the fit of the order, delivery
times, and customer service, believing that Label had been responsible.
Schwartzman allegedly told Label customers that he was opening up his own business
and that “he could continue to service these customers at this new business
where he would provide better customer service and pricing than Label, while
offering the same exact product.” The counterclaims told the alternate story in
which the salary double-dipping was indeed Schwartzman’s doing.
After Schwartzman left Label, Label allegedly discovered
that Schwartzman “represented … that he could easily handle former Label
clients through Trusgan, because Schwartzman had these Label clients’
measurements and other information regarding their previous orders from Label”
and that “he can beat LABEL’s pricing … by 20% to 30% while offering the
exact same product, from the same manufacturers and using the same fabrics.”
The Lanham Act counterclaims had two theories: first, while
employed by Label, Schwartzman sold what he represented to be Label products
but were not in fact Label products; second, after leaving Label, he told
customers that he could offer the same product, but cheaper. The court rejected
both claims on the pleadings.
False association: As an example, Schwartzman placed an
order with a Label supplier, explaining that the order was for Schwartzman, not
Label. Schwartzman’s client subsequently mistakenly complained to Label about
“the fit of the order, delivery times, and customer service.” Assuming that
Schwartzman was indeed using his position as a Label salesman to sell items
represented to be Label goods by placing orders with Label suppliers, “he was
simply unlawfully pocketing proceeds that belonged to his employer; he was not
falsely representing the origin of his own goods. Selling trademarked goods
under its trademarked name is not a violation of the Lanham Act.” Basically first sale, except not quite.
Label argued
that it offered not just clothes, but customer service, but that theory didn’t
work here. While “distribution of a product that does not meet the trademark
holder’s quality control standards” may result in devaluation of the mark and
thus not a genuine product, the trademark holder must allege that “(i) it has
established legitimate, substantial, and nonpretextual quality control
procedures, (ii) it abides by these procedures, and (iii) the non-conforming
sales will diminish the value of the mark.” Here, the quality-of-service
argument “makes no sense in light of the fact that Schwartzman was the Vice President
of Sales at Label, making the quality of service he provided one and the same
as the quality of service Label provided.” The complaint even alleged that
customer gripes about “the fit of the order, delivery times, and customer
service,” were of the type that “had become routine with respect to
Schwartzman’s work.” “Thus, there is no distinction between the goods
Schwartzman sold as Label goods and actual Label goods supplied under
Schwartzman’s watch.”
The false advertising claim had more purchase in theory, but
was inadquately pleaded. First, commercial advertising or promotion wasn’t
pled, merely “isolated disparaging statements” that “do not have redress under
the Lanham Act.” Label “makes no attempt to define the relevant market, but
claims to have over 750 clients,” and didn’t specify the number of the clients
Schwartzman allegedly contacted. 
Likewise, the allegations of falsity would need more specificity to
proceed; Label’s briefing indicated that it could replead to state that
Schwartzman lacked access to their fabrics and suit styles.

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Amazon not liable for use of TM in review

Sen v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2018 WL 4680018, No. 16-CV-01486-JAH-JLB
(S.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2018)
Sen owns the trademark “Baiden” for skin-exfoliation
products. Amazon bought “Baiden” through Google’s AdWords program and on other search
engines. In 2012, Sen sued Amazon for this conduct and settled; the parties couldn’t
agree on the terms of a long-form agreement, but the court enforced the terms
of a settlement Memorandum of Understanding.
Now Sen sued again for infringement and false designation of
origin/false advertising, alleging the unauthorized use of the Baiden mark in
advertising as well as in an online review that promoted a competing
product.  The infringement claim based on
keyword/pay-per-click ads was barred by claim preclusion.
Contributory/vicarious liability for use in a review: Amazon
user “Nanners” wrote that she initially purchased the Baiden Mitten, but she
declared that a competing product is cheaper and delivers similar benefits.  This claim was barred by nominative fair use.
Nanners’s review used the trademark to identify her subject; she used it “only
to the extent necessary to identify the product she is reviewing” and didn’t
use Baiden’s logo [query: could she have posted a picture of the product she
received? I think the answer has to be yes]. 
Nothing else in the review suggested sponsorship or endorsement and indeed
the idea that there are “monumentally cheaper” competitors suggested the
opposite.
Tortious interference based on pay-per-click ads: precluded;
the claim shared a transactional nucleus of facts with the initial trademark
claim.  Tortious interference based on
the review: barred by CDA §230.

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Defamation, but not false advertising, claim survives against niche publisher that added wrong info about allegations of wrongdoing

MiMedx Group, Inc. v. DBW Partners LLC, No. 17-1925 (JDB), 2018
WL 4681005 (D.D.C. Sept. 28, 2018)
MiMedx, a seller of medical products, sued DBW, which offers
business and regulatory analysis to paid subscribers, for libel, slander,
defamation, false light invasion of privacy, tortious interference with
business relations, and false advertising under the Lanham Act after defendants
published articles that questioned MiMedx’s sales practices.  One article, “MiMedx: Channel Stuffing
Accusations Resurface in Recent Counterclaim; Former Employees Corroborate
Allegations; A Close Look at Potential Risk,” outlined allegations MiMedx’s
former employees made in court filings against MiMedx claiming that the company
had artificially inflated its sales and revenue figures by distributing more
products to retailers than the retailers could sell. An email described the
article: “we detail channel stuffing allegations and recent counterclaims which
may pose as a regulatory risk for the company. The article examines the
allegations made by customers & former employees, the company’s response to
these claims, and the potential legal risks for MiMedx” and ended with an
invitation to “schedule a call” with DBW for more information. DBW now acknowledges
that the reference to “customers” was a mistake.
As part of its “ongoing examination of allegations of
channel stuffing made by former MiMedx employees,” DBW also submitted a FOIA
request to the Department of Veterans Affairs, Office of the Inspector General
(OIG), and dermined that an OIG investigation “involve[d] documents related to
MiMedx.” MiMedx allegedly informed DBW “off-the-record that MiMedx had
initiated contact with the OIG, that MiMedx was voluntarily working with the
OIG, and that MiMedx was specifically not a target of the investigation.” DBW
published another article titled “VA Office of Inspector General Confirms
Investigation Involving MiMedx Documents,” relaying DBW’s conclusions from its
FOIA request, and also promoted the article via email. Both emails reached at
least some MiMedx shareholders.
DBW allegedly served “as a ‘shill’ for bearish traders in
MiMedx stock” including “friends, family, affiliates, and/or even … [DBW]
themselves.” MiMedx’s stock price declined after the two articles were published.
Libel, slander, defamation: DBW argued that falsity wasn’t
pled; the single word “customers” wasn’t defamatory in that it didn’t render
the first email substantially false and it didn’t cause any incremental harm
compared to the unchallenged bulk of the publication. MiMedx argued that “the
use of the word ‘customers’ … substantively changed the meaning of the entire
communication” because “there is a significant difference between allegations
by a company’s customers and its disgruntled former employees” and further
because it “made it appear that the article contained new or additional allegations
that might corroborate the former employees’ allegations.”
The court concluded that adding “customers” was at least
“capable of defamatory meaning” under DC law and allegations of wrongful
commercial practice would “tend[ ] to injure” MiMedx’s “trade, profession or
community standing.” Under Georgia law, whether the statement was defamatory was
ambiguous, when construed in context of the entire publication as required.  Either way, this survived a motion to dismiss.
 DBW argued, citing case law, that “[c]orporate
plaintiffs are treated as public figures as a matter of law in defamation
actions brought against mass media defendants involving matters of legitimate
public interest,” but MiMedx argued that DBW wasn’t a mass media defendant and the
court declined to judicially notice otherwise. MiMedx might be able to show
facts indicating that it was a private figure for these purposes.
The court didn’t specifically address the FOIA related allegations; it seems to me that those should have to go, as not reporting MiMedx’s preferred interpretation of what seem like uncontested facts doesn’t seem defamatory.
False light: a corporation has no personal right of privacy
and therefore no cause of action for false light invasion of privacy.
Tortious interference: this requires allegations of specific
lost business.  Pleading “customers,
investors, and creditors” isn’t enough, so this claim was also dismissed.
Lanham Act false advertising: MiMedx failed to allege a competitive
injury related to MiMedx’s commercial interests, such as customers withholding
trade or lost revenue; it didn’t even allege that the misleading communications
reached customers (as opposed to shareholders).

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Non-TM owner can plead false advertising claim for confusing use of TM it used to own

Desmond v. Taxi Affiliation Services LLC, 2018 WL 4589999,
No. 17 C 8326 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 25, 2018)
Desmond is the Chapter 7 Trustee for the Bankruptcy Estate
of Yellow Cab Affiliation, a former Chicago taxicab affiliation with over 1600
dues-paying members who licensed the design mark from YCA. He sued a bunch of
defendants for allegedly engaging in a scheme to render YCA insolvent, so that
it could not pay its creditors, and then establishing a new company that
appropriated YCA’s valuable trade dress. After a passenger was injured in a
taxi and sued YCA as a defendant, some of the defendants here allegedly
established defendant TAS to prevent creditors from reaching YCA’s assets. For
example, TAS collected and retained all payments from YCA members pursuant to
their affiliation agreements with YCA, then transferred some of that money,
disguised as “management fees” and “referral fees,” to YCA’s officers and
directors; some defendants bought and sold taxicab medallions using YCA’s money
but failed to distribute any of the profit to YCA.
After the injured passenger got a $26 million judgment
against YCA in 2015, YCA filed for bankruptcy and TAS refused to provide
further services, forcing YCA to shut down. Certain defendants quickly formed
New YCA (Yellow Cab Association, Inc.) to solicit members away from YCA. New
YCA used mobile data terminals and other taxicab equipment that belonged to
YCA. New also YCA used the same color scheme and design mark that YCA had used,
merely replacing “Affiliation” with “Association.” This allegedly tricked
customers into believing that New YCA and YCA were one and the same.
Lanham Act and coordinate state claims: Trademark ownership
is required for a likely confusion claim, but not for a false advertising
claim. YCA doesn’t own the design mark at issue, so this was a false advertising
claim. The allegations here satisfied Rule 9(b): the use of the color yellow,
the design mark, and a similar name plausibly constituted a false statement of
fact implying YCA’s affiliation with New YCA, and the other elements were
sufficiently alleged, at least as against New YCA.

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Another malware misattribution claim fails

PC Drivers Headquarters, LP v. Malwarebytes, Inc., 2018 WL
2996897, No. 18-CV-234-RP (W.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 2018)
PC Drivers “offers software designed to help customers
optimize the processing speed of their computers and identify software drivers
ready to be updated.” Malwarebytes sells software that blocks various programs
on its customers’ computers, including software deemed malicious or potentially
unwanted (the latter of which are called PUPs). PC Drivers contends that, in
January 2018, Malwarebytes inappropriately branded one or more of its programs
as a PUP, which can make PC Drivers’ software inoperable and block access to PC
Drivers’ website. This happened before, and when the software received
certification from a newly developed third-party certifier called AppEsteem,
Malwarebytes stopped labeling the programs as PUPs. PC Drivers alleged that it
continues to carry AppEsteem certification and that its programs have not
changed substantially.  PC Drivers sued
for false advertising, trademark infringement [what?], trademark dilution, tortious
interference with contractual relations; promissory estoppel; and related
claims.  (Similar
litigation against Malwarebytes discussed here:
§230 blocked liability.)
The court declined to grant a preliminary injunction, despite
evidence that Malwarebytes has not been cooperative with PC Drivers as PC
Drivers has attempted to figure out the problem. PC Drivers also argued that it
was the victim of an act of retaliation taken by Malwarebytes against AppEsteem
in response to AppEsteem’s threat to list Malwarebytes as a “deceptor.” But
that wasn’t enough.
Malwarebytes argued that §230’s statutory Good Samaritan protection
for blocking and screening of offensive material rendered it immune to all these
claims.
PC Drivers argued that Malwarebytes wasn’t an “interactive
computer service” under the statute, but it was, because the phrase is to be broadly
applied using the definition “any information service, system, or access
software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to
a computer server ….” Malwarebytes “provide[s] users with access to the new
malware definition content that is available on its servers.”
PC Drivers also argued that the immunity didn’t apply to
Malwarebytes’ own statements, but “this requirement is present only in §
230(c)(1).”  I’m not sure this is
responsive: Malwarebytes might be immune for the blocking and any consequences
proximately caused by the blocking itself, but not immune for things it said
about the blocking, which could independently cause damage.
Finally, PC Drivers alleged that Malwarebytes did not act in
good faith. But § 230(c)(2)(A)’s good-faith requirement (for “any action
voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of
material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious,
filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or
not such material is constitutionally protected”) doesn’t extend to §
230(c)(2)(B) (“any action taken to enable or make available to information
content providers or others the technical means to restrict access to material
described in paragraph [A]”) under the statute.
Malwarebytes argued that PC Drivers’ federal unfair
competition claim fell under the safe harbor because it wasn’t an IP claim. “Although
the specific provision does not address intellectual property, it is a part of
the Lanham Act, which as a whole ‘pertain[s] to intellectual property,’” so
some courts call all 43(a) claims clawed back from §230 immunity, while others don’t.
The court didn’t resolve the issue because there was no likely success on the
merits regardless.
PC Drivers alleged that Malwarebyte’s designation of PC
Drivers’ software as a PUP was misleading. But this wasn’t false: the
designation “potentially unwanted program” “inherently carries with it the
acknowledgment that it is only a guess as to whether the program is or is not
unwanted,” and “unwanted” “looks more like a subjective opinion than a factual
assertion.”
Dilution: There was no evidence of fame.
Infringement: PC Drivers alleged that there was likely
confusion about association, authorization, endorsement, affiliation, or
sponsorship. Understating the matter, “the Court notes that this claim is
strange when viewed in conjunction with PC Drivers’ other claims.” Malwarebytes
invoked nominative fair use. There was no evidence that Malwarebytes used PC
Drivers’ mark in any way other than listing the name of the website to explain
what it is blocking. The PUP label “implies anything but endorsement; customers
told by Malwarebytes that PC Drivers’ software might be unwanted are not likely
to think that PC Drivers endorses Malwarebytes.” There was only one reference:
to the domain name download.driversupport.com. It was unclear how Malwarebytes could
the user of the name of the website it was blocking without using the domain
name. [Another case where “use as a mark” would also be useful to explain why
this is ok.]

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Blast from the past: nominative fair use avant la lettre

Polyglycoat Corp. v. Environmental Chemicals, Inc., 509
F.Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)

Found this in an unrelated search and it made me think about
the utility (if any) of the nominative fair use category. Plaintiff sued
defendant for advertising of defendant’s automotive silicone paint finish
remover called POLYCRACKER. Plaintiff’s Polyglycoat, a protective paint finish
sealant for automobiles, was heavily referenced on Polycracker’s label and its
launch ad in Auto Body Repair News, a trade journal:

The words “Polyglycoat TM Remover” appear conspiciously on
the POLYCRACKER label, one page of the ad consists solely of the bold-lettered
statement “WIPE AWAY POLYGLYCOAT TM”, and the body of the ad contains such
statements as “There’s nothing more troublesome for auto body shops than
silicone finishes like Polyglycoat” and “Take off Polyglycoat with the wipe of
a cloth.”
In terms of the Polaroid factors, the court found strong
secondary meaning in the relevant market, the use of an identical mark, product
relatedness sufficient to generate confusion, and an intent to “capitalize on
the popularity of the POLYGLYCOAT mark and product in the field.” There was no
evidence of actual confusion, but “a reasonable likelihood of confusion is
inferred from defendant’s use of plaintiff’s exact trademark to promote its
related product, the absence of a viable alternative explanation by defendant
for its appropriation of the POLYGLYCOAT mark, and other circumstances of the
relevant market.”
Thus, an injunction was warranted to keep Polyglycoat off
the Polycracker label “either as it now appears, or any other way by which the
mark is singled out as the generic, shorthand term standing for the species of
paint finish sealants which POLYCRACKER is said to remove.” Defendant was also
enjoined from singling out the mark in ads, e.g., “WIPE AWAY POLYGLYCOAT,”
“Take off Polyglycoat,” “normal prep solvents … do not remove polyglycoat,”
“The Polyglycoat wipes off easily,” and “say good-bye to Polyglycoat problems.”
However, in the absence of falsity or misleadingness,
defendant couldn’t be prevented from advertising that its product could remove
automotive silicone finishes including POLYGLYCOAT, “the most popular and
perhaps the most durable brand.” Thus, it could continue using the name “in
such conjunctive phrases as ‘silicone finishes like Polyglycoat R.’” In any
such use, the mark couldn’t appear in letters which distinguish it from the
other words in the conjunctive phrase by size, color, typeface or any other
characteristic. And a long disclaimer was required:
POLYGLYCOAT R is a registered trademark of the Polyglycoat
Corporation, Scarsdale, New York, for its protective coating and sealant for
automotive finishes. The term Polyglycoat as used herein means the product
manufactured and sold by that company, and is used without the permission of
Polyglycoat Corporation. POLYCRACKER is neither manufactured nor in any way
sponsored or authorized by Polyglycoat Corporation.
This disclaimer probably did nothing but increase
defendant’s advertising costs, since consumers weren’t particularly likely to
read it.  And aside from the required
disclaimer, this seems like pretty much the result you’d get from nominative
fair use today (since courts would probably interpret the initial ad, at least,
as using “too much” of the mark, as in the Playboy v. Welles case). 
What, if anything, does having nominative fair use as a
defined concept add?  The current Second
Circuit treatment is worse than nothing, since the NFU factors actually negate
the significance of the other key Polaroid factors, like strength and identity
of the marks, and can’t be weighed against them in an understandable way.  “Weighing” implies that enough strength and
similarity (always present in a NFU situation) ought to be able to overwhelm
the NFU factors, but they really don’t. The original concept from the Ninth
Circuit was a way to formalize the obvious fact that there are some cases in
which the multifactor test factors (particularly strength, similarity, and relatedness
of goods) don’t point to the correct result. 
In particular, the multifactor test doesn’t match our understanding of
cases in which the trademark is clearly being used as a comparator or subject
of discussion. I haven’t fully figured out my take on this, but I do think we
need some doctrinal indicator to judges that there are times when the
multifactor test is a bad idea, so that we don’t have to rely on the variable
common sense of individual judges and in particular district court judges’
understandable fear of getting reversed when courts of appeals say that you have
to use the multifactor test no matter what (except with Rogers, in the Second Circuit).

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Pa. Supreme Court fixes ridiculously overbroad holding of puffery

Commonwealth v. Golden Gate National Senior Care LLC, —
A.3d —-, 2018 WL 4570102, No. 16 MAP 2017 (Pa. Sept. 25, 2018)
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reinstated a bunch of claims
against a bunch of nursing homes under the state Unfair Trade Protection and
Consumer Protection Law, though not unjust enrichment claims. In essence, the
nursing homes allegedly made materially misleading statements about the nature
and quality of the care provided to their nursing home residents. They
allegedly knowingly failed to provide the level of care they advertised, as
they purposefully understaffed the facilities so as to maximize their profits. Chain-wide
misrepresentations included brochures, videos, websites, and video
advertisements, with claims such as:
“Snacks and beverages of various
types and consistencies are available at any time from your nurse or nursing
assistant.”
“We have licensed nurses and
nursing assistants available to provide nursing care and help with activities
of daily living …. Whatever your needs are, we have the clinical staff to
meet those needs.”
“Clean linens are provided for you
on a regular basis, so you do not need to bring your own.”
“A restorative plan of care is
developed to reflect the resident’s goals and is designed to improve wellness
and function. The goal is to maintain optimal physical, mental and
psychological functioning.”
“A container of fresh ice water is
put right next to your bed every day, and your nursing assistant will be glad
to refill or refresh it for you.’ ”
“We work with an interdisciplinary
team to assess issues and nursing care that can enhance the resident’s
psychological adaptation to a decrease of function, increase levels of
performance in daily living activities, and prevent complications associated
with inactivity.”
In truth, residents allegedly routinely have to wait hours
for food, assistance with toileting, changing of soiled bed linens, and other
elements of basic care, and sometimes must forego them entirely.
On the individual facility level, the AG alleged misrepresentations
in the resident assessment and care plans created for each resident: services
promised in the care plans were not provided because of intentional
understaffing. Also, the facilities allegedly generated billing statements
which indicated that certain care was provided when it was not, which were then
paid by public funds when residents received Medicaid or Medicare. The facilities
allegedly further deceived the Pennsylvania Department of Health by temporarily
increasing the number of staff on hand during inspections and by willfully
creating inaccurate and/or falsified resident care records for review.
The Commonwealth Court found the marketing and advertising
materials to be mere puffery: too broad or vague, or merely expressing an
intent. Then the court held that resident assessments, care plans and bills
weren’t covered by the UTPCPL because they weren’t advertising but rather
isolated statements to potential customers, or in the case of resident care
plans were created after a customer was admitted to a facility. The court also
found that the allegations about care deviating from promises were too
conclusory and unspecific. The AG didn’t identify any  “particular care plan … from which the
Facility deviated, or … identify[ ] any specific bill for services that were
not provided.”  Further, the AG didn’t allege
“how a consumer could be misled by a billing statement to believe that he
received services or assistance that he had not in fact received, or how an
un-itemized per diem charge could convey to a consumer that a particular
service had been provided in the first place.”
Here, the state supreme court identified two types of
puffery: (1) “hyperbolic boasting or bluster that no reasonable consumers would
believe to be true” and (2) “claims of superiority over a competitor’s product,”
though the examples are “statements that a laboratory imaging device provided ‘unprecedented
clarity,’ or the advertisement of a product as ‘the complete sports drink,’” so
I’m pretty sure “claims of superiority” is implicitly modified by “vague or
general,” especially since the court continues by saying that a key
characteristic of puffery is that “consumers understand that the statements are
not to be takenliterally. … It is these characteristics – the patently
hyperbolic or excessively vague character that dissuades any reasonable
consumer from placing reliance thereon as fact – that render puffery
non-actionable under the UTPCPL.”
Puffery is usually a question of fact. It was so here:
We hesitate to conclude that
consumers seeking a nursing home would necessarily find statements promising to
provide food, water, and clean linens to be hyperbolic in any respect, or to be
vague statements of optimism or intent. To the contrary, for residents of
nursing homes, many of whom are physically compromised and require assistance
with day-to-day living activities, regular access to these items is essential,
and there is no reason to think that a consumer would not take these statements
seriously.
Plus, the lower court didn’t consider the overall
context.  For example, it held that, “We
believe that respecting your individuality and dignity is of utmost
importance[,]” qualified as puffery “based on the preface alone” – that is,
based on the use of the phrase “we believe,” which was impermissible slicing
and dicing (something that’s also basic First Amendment defamation doctrine). Nor
was “[a] container of fresh ice water is put right next to your bed every day,
and your nursing assistant will be glad to refill or refresh it for you” mere
optimism or vague, given the obvious message that “a resident will have ready
access to water every day,” something that would be highly relevant to an
immobile resident.
The lower court also erred in holding that statements in
patient assessments, care plans and billing statements weren’t actionable
because they weren’t ads, applying the definition of advertising elaborated by
judges under the Lanham Act. Though some provisions of the UTPCPL specifically
mention advertising, the court pointed to two relevant UTPCPL provisions
covering conduct other than advertising. Subsection (v) prohibits conduct
“[r]epresenting that goods or services have sponsorship, approval, characteristics,
ingredients, uses, benefits or quantities that they do not have or that a
person has a sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation or connection that he
does not have,” and subsection (xxi) prohibits “[e]ngaging in any other
fraudulent or deceptive conduct which creates a likelihood of confusion or of
misunderstanding.”  The court declined to
rewrite the statute to impose the “advertising” limitation on all the provisions.
It further pointed out that other subsections prohibit “failing to comply with
the terms” of a written guarantee or warranty and “making solicitations for
sales of goods or services” without first providing certain information, making
clear that the statute overall wasn’t intended to be limited to “advertising”
under the Lanham Act.
Likewise, the lower court erred in finding the complaint
insufficiently detailed. The AG pled factual allegations based on interviews
with former employees and residents’ family members, as well as on information
from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid services; the complaint included
representative examples of the alleged failures.  “Pennsylvania is a fact-pleading
jurisdiction; as such, a complaint must provide notice of the nature of the
plaintiff’s claims and also summarize the facts upon which the claims are
based.” But there’s no requirement to plead the evidence upon which the pleader
will rely to later prove the claims. The defendants were informed of the claims
against them, even without identifying particular patients, care plans,
assessments, or bills.
In addition, the lower court erred in holding that the state
couldn’t seek return of monies spent because it wasn’t a “person” under the
statute. The relevant statutory phrase is “person in
interest,” that is, “those whose interests were
affected by the enjoined conduct, i.e., those who lost money or property
because of the enjoinable conduct that was found to violate the UTPCPL.” This included the state when it was the one that lost money, especially given the rule of construction that this consumer protection statute
is to be interpreted liberally.  

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modifying a false advertising injunction is justified when likelihood that claim is false has changed

De Simone v. VSL Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. TDC-15-1356, 2018
WL 4567111 (D. Md. Sept. 24, 2018)
De Simone sought modification of a preliminary
injunction governing statements it could make about a probiotic product, VSL#3

and its relationship to De Simone’s now-competing product, Visbiome.  (I was a bit critical at the time.) They
sought to be able to advertise that ExeGi Pharma was the exclusive provider of
the “De Simone Formulation,” the term they have coined for the combination of
probiotic strains developed by De Simone and first commercialized in the United
States as VSL#3; to cite clinical studies with the term “VSL#3” in the title as
part of their promotional materials; and to engage in other speech critical of
VSL#3.
As relevant here, the prior order required ExeGi to refrain
from “stating or suggesting that the license agreement” between De Simone and
VSL had “expired,” or asserting that “VSL#3 will no longer be on the market.” At
the time, both products, though differently branded, used the same formulation.
Thus, Visbiome’s exclusivity statements were false advertising. The court also
enjoined (apparently 100% truthful) Visbiome statements that studies with
“VSL#3” in the title constituted studies relating to the “De Simone
Formulation.”
The De Simone parties returned to court, arguing that the
VSL product was no longer made under De Simone’s formulation, resulting in a
clinically different composition; VSL agreed that production was now elsewhere
but argued that the changes weren’t clinically significant, and that any
changes were the result of De Simone’s breach of his fiduciary duty so they
shouldn’t be allowed to be communicated to the public.  [You can tell my feelings about that last
part.]
A court has the power “to modify an injunction in adaptation
to changed conditions.”
The court didn’t let De Simone speak truthfully by citing
studies that use the term VSL#3 in the title (while studying the De Simone
formulation). The court previously found the extensive use of the citations to
be confusing and concluded that “[e]ven if ExeGi has a reason to refer to those
studies because Visbiome is, as a scientific matter, the same formulation that was
subjected to those trials, that scientific equivalence cannot be used as an
opportunity or excuse to erode VSL’s trademark.”  Again, “eroding” a trademark isn’t a thing,
but the court determined that the change in the VSL product’s formulation
didn’t constitute a relevant change for trademark purposes.  [Which is an interesting variant on the fact
that trademark doesn’t actually protect the public from changes in quality
initiated by the trademark owner.]  So
now, the De Simone defendants are infringing if they truthfully refer to the
studies, while VSL might be falsely advertising (if the formulation is indeed
materially different) if they refer to the studies. 
However, conditions did change as to representations of
exclusivity. At the time of the old order, while the license agreement between
De Simone and VSL had recently expired, VSL continued to have inventory of
product produced under that agreement, so De Simone’s statements at that time
that they were the “exclusive” provider of the De Simone formulation
constituted false advertising. That’s no longer true, and promotional materials
including those touting VSL#3 as dairy-free, now made clear that VSL#3 and
Visbiome were no longer exactly the same, removing the factual predicate of the
injunction about exclusivity statements. At a minimum, the likelihood of
success of a false advertising claim against the exclusivity statements had
changed: though VSL had offered explanations for the composition discrepancies,
and criticized De Simone’s published studies as biased, they hadn’t submitted a
comparable published study indicating that the current versions of VSL#3 and
Visbiome were identical or even functionally equivalent. Plus, the balance of
equities had shifted because VSL#3 has been marketed as “the same quality
product, containing the same genus and species of bacteria, in the same
proportions that you have come to expect,” while ExeGi couldn’t dispute that.
Thus, the injunction would no longer bar assertions that the
licensing agreement between De Simone and VSL has expired and that ExeGi is the
exclusive provider of the De Simone formulation, but the court refused to
declare broadly that ExeGi is free to “engage in commercial speech critical of
its competitor’s products.” This was warranted particularly because the De
Simone parties had a history of stretching the court’s orders to the breaking
point, and also because a trial was upcoming to resolve the factual disputes.
Until trial, the exclusivity statement would have to read: “We believe that
ExeGi is the exclusive provider of the De Simone Formulation because it is our
position that the current version of VSL#3 uses a different formulation.
Whether VSL#3 presently uses the De Simone Formulation is the subject of
pending litigation in federal court.”

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falsity from former customer satisfies Lexmark standard; not so for once-potential customer

Frompovicz v. Niagara Bottling, LLC, No.. 18-54, 2018 WL
4465879  (E.D. Pa. Sept. 18, 2018)
Prior
ruling covered here
. Plaintiff (on behalf of a putative class) is a
water extractor. Defendant Land is a directly competing extractor and the
bottler/distributor defendants who use his water are Niagara, Ice River, and
Crossroads. Land allegedly extracts well water, which “does not satisfy the
FDA’s definition of ‘spring water’ ” and which is permitted by the Pennsylvania
Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) as a “well water” site, and not a
“spring water” site. Land’s water allegedly “has been extracted, handled, or
treated with equipment or techniques that are inconsistent with a ‘spring
water’ classification criteria” and “has tested as containing more particulates
or trace elements than are otherwise permissible or recommended under industry
standards for ‘spring water.’ ”  Niagara
and Ice River sourced their spring water from plaintiff before switching to
Land, and Crossroads also considered plaintiff’s water before choosing
Land.  Plaintiff also allegedly bottled
and sold his own water directly.
Plaintiff satisfied Lexmark’s
zone of interests test by alleging that his spring water sales were depressed
as a result of the misleading labels. Also, Niagara allegedly “falsely told
industry participants that Plaintiff should not be dealt with, and has
misrepresented to the public that Plaintiff’s spring water…is contaminated.”
Land also allegedly disparaged the plaintiff, which affected the necessary
commercial interest in reputation or sales.
Proximate cause: simple as to Land, because they’re direct
competitors. Lexmark also allows
suits against indirect competitors, though the circumstances have to be
relatively unique. Here, the alleged disparagement by Niagara qualified: “when
a party claims reputational injury from disparagement, competition is not
required for proximate cause.”  Plaintiff
also alleged that if the bottler defendants wanted to meet the demand for
spring water without Land’s “phony” spring water, they’d have to use his and
other putative class members’ true spring water. The bottler defendants argued
that this allegation was merely speculative because there was no reason to
think they would have bought from Land instead. But as to defendants who
formerly bought from Land, the theory that they would have continued to buy
from him in the absence of the mislabeling was a plausible theory of proximate
cause.  Crossroads never bought from
Land, though, and it wasn’t enough to allege that they were in negotiations at
one point.
The Pennsylvania unfair competition claims were preempted by
the FDCA, which has promulgated
 a standard of identity
for bottled water, including a definition of “spring water.” The allegation
that it was misleading to market Land’s water as “spring water” when the
Pennsylvania DEP permit identified the source as a “well water” site was
precisely the kind of claim prohibited by the FDCA.  The FDCA also impliedly preempts a state law
claim based on conduct that is wrongful only because it conflicts with the FDCA
or FDA regulations.  Land’s allegations
were, in effect, a prohibited attempt to enforce alleged violations of the FDCA
and FDA regulations.

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