It’s an ex-Lanham Act case without evidence of materiality

Not Dead Yet Manufacturing Inc. v. Pride Solutions, LLC, 2018
WL 688324, No. 13 C 3418 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 2, 2018)
Previous
discussion.
  The court reconsidered
its summary judgment decisions on plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, but
left the false advertising result the same. 
The parties make “stalk stompers”—that is, “devices that attach to the
front of a combine or tractor to flatten cornstalks after they have been cut.”  The allegedly false statements at issue
concerned defendants’ ads claiming to have the “original” stalk stomper, when
in fact plaintiff introduced the innovation at issue (thus also bringing about
related patent claims).  Not Dead Yet
argued that literal falsity was a factual issue to be determined at trial, and
that the court should not have held that the challenged claims were at least
ambiguous and thus not literally false. Without evidence of actual consumer
confusion, the court granted summary judgment for defendants.
Summary judgment on a fact issue can still be appropriate if
the evidence wouldn’t allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the
nonmoving party on that issue.  Moreover,
“[t]he Seventh Circuit appears to recognize that a district court may make the
initial determination regarding a statement’s ambiguity and the need for
evidence of actual consumer confusion. See Schering-Plough Healthcare Prod.,
Inc. v. Schwarz Pharma, Inc., 586 F.3d 500, 513 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[A plaintiff]
cannot just intone ‘literal falsity’ and by doing so prove a violation of the
Lanham Act.”).”  [I’m teaching this case
tomorrow!] “Determining whether a statement is clear or ambiguous is the type
of exercise that courts routinely conduct,” and other cases have done so as a
matter of law.

Regardless—and contributing to continued uncertainty on exactly
what a matter of law/matter of fact is when interpreting advertising—the court
reaffirmed its prior result based on Not Dead Yet’s failure to show likely
injury because it failed to show that the “original” claim would have any
effect on consumers’ purchasing decisions. 

from Blogger http://ift.tt/2nM58d4

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged | Leave a comment

Equinox in equipoise: no preliminary injunction for hotel mgmt co against fitness co’s expansion to hotels

Equinox Hotel Management, Inc. v. Equinox Holdings, Inc., No.
17-cv-06393, 2018 WL 659105 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2018)
Equinox Hotel, a “San Francisco-based hospitality company
specializing in developing, operating, and revitalizing hotel properties,” provides
hotel management services as well as consulting for hotel development
projects.  It sought but didn’t get a
preliminary injunction against Equinox Holdings, a sports club hoping to expand
into the market for the operation or promotion of hotels or the performance of
hotel-related services.
Equinox Hotel has a registered mark for the management of
others’ hotels.

It also has pending applications for “hotels; hotel
development services; hotel management services; restaurant services; and hotel
consulting and advisory services.”

Equinox Holdings is a “ ‘fitness giant’ operating
EQUINOX-branded luxury health clubs nationwide, in addition to PURE Yoga, Blink
Fitness, and Soul Cycle Facilities.” Between 2007 and 2009, Equinox allegedly
attempted to register two “EQUINOX word mark[s] for ‘Hotels’ ” with the PTO,
which were rejected due to “a likelihood of confusion” with the registered
Equinox Hotel mark and ultimately abandoned by defendant.  In 2014, Equinox Holdings applied again to
register a mark for ‘Hotels focused on lifestyle, wellness, and fitness”:
  

That application has been published for opposition. Equinox Holdings
also has a new logo and registration application for that logo, which has been
the primary logo at its fitness centers since 2000.

Equinox Holdings allegedly “plans to open at least 50
hotels” under its mark, and “has begun construction on its first hotel in New
York City and plans to open this hotel in 2018 or 2019.”
The court found that likely confusion couldn’t be found on
this record.  “Equinox” is conceptually
strong for hotels, and Equinox Holdings has substantial marketplace strength, so
the strength factor favored Equinox Hotels.  The proximity of the parties’ services,
however, was unclear because the parties disagreed over the relevant
consumers.  Equinox Hotel markets its
hotel management services primarily to businesses such as third-party branded
hotels, which Equinox Holdings doesn’t intend to do.  But the services required to run Equinox Holdings
hotels will be the same “services” which plaintiff provides. “On this record,
the Court cannot determine whether this is a distinction without a difference.”
Equinox Hotel would like to brand its own Equinox hotels.  But it had insufficient evidence of likely
expansion. It has offered hotel-related services to third-party branded hotels
for over twenty years yet has never developed an Equinox-branded hotel.  Its desire to do so, and alleged ability to do
so “at any moment,” was insufficient under the circumstances.  Ultimately, the court found the services “moderately
related,” but the record left the court unpersuaded either way and so this
factor was neutral. Relatedly, “in a reverse confusion case…the degree of
care exercised is determined with reference to the senior user’s customers.” The
record was mixed with respect to the type of services and nature of customer to
whom the parties market, so this was also neutral.  And the same lack of evidence of expansion
also meant that the likelihood of expansion factor favored Equinox Holdings.
The court found that similarity only “narrowly” favored
Equinox Hotel because of the extra words in that party’s mark and visual
differences between the marks.  I’m going
to call this an instance of what Barton Beebe calls “stampeding”—given the
arbitrary nature of the mark and the predominance of the word in both marks, I’d
think Equinox Hotel would do better than “narrowly” prevailing on this factor.
Equinox Hotels identified eleven instances of alleged actual
confusion, including: a trade show attendee who stated that that he found it
“interesting to see what you guys are doing with starting your new hotel
fitness brand”; emails from Hotel Management Magazine and Hotel Business Design
to Equinox Hotels seeking to discuss Equinox Holding’s “growth from a wellness
brand to a hotel brand”; a prospective partner who believed Equinox Hotel was
associated with Equinox Holdings; an email from one of Equinox Hotel’s current
vendors which requested contact information regarding Equinox Holdings; and an
email supposedly showing that a marketing manager responsible for listing
attendees at an industry summit was confused as to whether the parties were
related.  Eleven instances over the
thirty months in which Equinox Holdings announced its intention to expand was
too sporadic to support a finding of actual confusion.  Again, I’m a bit surprised by this
conclusion, though I’m not convinced it’s wrong, either—with defendant not yet
even operating any hotels, a more receptive court might have found that confusion
even before Equinox Holdings actually expanded was probative of much more actual
confusion once it started doing hotel business.
As for marketing channels, Equinox Hotel argued that the
parties “attend industry trade shows and conferences to promote the company” and
“use the same trade publications to promote their services, including Hotel
Business and Hotel Management Magazine.”  Equinox Holdings rejoined that it advertised
its Equinox-branded luxury hotels primarily “on social media and through
stylish print ads in consumer magazines that target its customer base, and has
no plans to advertise in trade journals.” There was no evidence that it
advertised in industry journals, or that Equinox Hotel advertised on social
media or in consumer magazines. This factor tipped in favor of Equinox Holdings
on the current record.
Intent favored Equinox Hotel because Equinox Holdings was
aware of the former’s marks based on the latter’s prior rejected trademark
applications and an unsuccessful attempt to buy the Equinox Hotels marks in
2014, but “as this is a reverse confusion case intent plays a less critical
role.”
Despite its finding of lack of likely success on the merits
(and not even bothering with the old “serious questions going to the merits”
alternative), the court proceeded to analyze irreparable harm, and also found
none had been shown.  In a reverse
confusion case, the junior user overwhelms the senior user. While Equinox
Hotel argued that  its corporate
identify “will be washed away by the rising tide of publicity associated with” the
defendant’s Equinox-branded hotels, eleven confusion incidents over the course
of 30 months was insufficient to a “threat of being driven out of business” if
the motion for a preliminary injunction were denied, especially given the court’s
intention to hold a prompt, pre-opening trial.
Similarly, “potential loss of goodwill or loss of control
over one’s reputation…may constitute irreparable harm for purposes of
preliminary injunctive relief.” But to show this, a plaintiff “must do more
than simply submit a declaration insisting that its reputation and goodwill
have been harmed.” It didn’t; again, the limited instances of confusion failed
to show a “total” loss of control over its business reputation without an injunction.
Equinox Hotel argued that Equinox Holdings lacks a “track
record as a hotel operator,” and if it performed badly, its poor reputation
“will become Equinox Hotels’ reputation.” However, other record evidence
suggested that Equinox Holdings had a strong reputation for customer service, and
there was also evidence indicating that Equinox Hotel’s reputation for customer
service wasn’t strong. Given the lack of any record, and the absence of a hotel
opening before trial, harm arising from poor performance by Equinox Holdings
was too remote to warrant preliminary injunctive relief.
Specifically addressing one of Mark McKenna’s points about
the actual harm of confusion, the court also found that the potential loss of
business opportunities wasn’t irreparable harm. Equinox Hotel offered one
declaration that a prospective partner did not reach out to it because the
prospective partner believed that it was associated with Equinox Holdings, which
was “too large an entity for the type of deals he works on.”  This was a weak showing of one potential loss
across the over two years since Equinox Holdings announced its plans, and even
that didn’t show that the prospective partner ultimately declined to do the
deal.
Finally, the balance of the hardships favored Equinox
Holdings, because it announced its hotel plans in April 2015, but Equinox
Hotel didn’t sue until November 2017, then waited three more weeks to seek a
preliminary injunction. Because of the delay, Equinox Holding spent 30 months
developing and promoting its hotel brand, and delay, “standing alone,
constitutes grounds for rejecting [a] motion for preliminary injunction.”

The court also dismissed California UCL and FAL claims with
prejudice. They were based on fraud, and in fraud-based cases, the plaintiff
has to assert its own reliance rather
than the reliance of third parties, even though consumer confusion is the kind
of harm at which these laws are directed.

from Blogger http://ift.tt/2GRpnij

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , | Leave a comment

Claims to “introduce” product to US not untrue just because of prior minimal sales

LuxSoma LLC v. Leg Resource, Inc., 2018 WL 583119, No. 15
Civ. 4838 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2018)
LuxSoma sued defendant ORI for breach of an implied contract
that allegedly granted it exclusive rights to distribute ORI legwear in the US,
induced by defendants Leg Resource and its President.  The court granted summary judgment to Leg
Resource on LuxSoma’s false advertising claim.
LuxSoma argued that the Leg Resource made material
misstatements when it announced in 2012, that (1) it would introduce ORI
products to the U.S. market and (2) it was ORI’s exclusive distributor.  An ad in Women’s Wear Daily also stated that
ORI was “gearing up for a journey to North America” and that Leg was ORI’s
exclusive distributor. LuxSoma alleged falsity because LuxSoma was ORI’s
exclusive distributor and had previously sold ORI merchandise at kiosks in
Dallas, Texas.

The court disagreed. 
The “introducing” statement couldn’t have deceived a substantial portion
of the intended audience.  “When the
statement was made, LuxSoma’s sales were minimal and geographically confined to
Dallas, Texas. As ORI stated, ‘the U.S. market was still open’ ‘because
[LuxSoma’s] sales were so small,’ and ‘[t]he sales in the U.S. were so small
there was no[t] really a presence of the product.’”  LuxSoma admitted that it had sold a “paltry”
500 to 1,000 pairs of ORI legwear in Dallas, sales that were “far too small and
much too geographically concentrated to raise a triable dispute” on
deceptiveness.  And the exclusive
distributorship statement was true when made.

from Blogger http://ift.tt/2E66hXe

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged | Leave a comment

Allegedly false statements on package/instructions didn’t plausibly harm competitors, court rules

Telebrands Corp. v. Everstar Merchandise Co., No. 17-2878, 2018
WL 585765 (D.N.J. Jan. 29, 2018) (magistrate judge)

Telebrands sells novelty stuff; Everstar, a competitor, allegedly copied its
stuff in unlawful ways.  Relevant to this
blog, Telebrands alleged that Everstar engaged in false advertising under
§43(a) by printing false information on the packaging of its GALAXY LASER and
NORTHERN LIGHTS LASER products, as well as within the operating instructions
for those products.  The statements
allegedly understated the maximum power output of the lasers (whose output was
actually in excess of that allowed by the FDA), misleading consumers into
thinking the lasers would be safe to use. 
Rather than dealing with this as a matter of “commercial advertising or
promotion,” as I would have guessed, the court used Lexmark and proximate cause.

First, the court reasoned, Telebrands didn’t allege that
Everstar characterized the statements on the packaging in any way that
indicated safety.  [Necessary implication
much?]   Nor were there any alleged comparisons or
references to Telebrands products, nor were there any allegations about how consumers
“might have acted differently had the packaging information been accurate, or,
alternatively, if the packaging did not include any representations regarding
power output.” Thus, there were no allegations about how the misstatements
persuaded consumers to purchase Everstar’s products.  Likewise, Telebrands didn’t allege that the
safety instructions were available to consumers before purchase, so they couldn’t
affect purchasing decisions.  Telebrands
suggested in its argument that “[t]he dangerous nature of Defendants’ products
will harm Telebrands’ sales and may ultimately destroy the market for decorative
holiday laser lighting products,” but this wasn’t in the complaint, which
referenced sales diversion.  “If
Plaintiffs intend to plead injuries suffered as a result of harm to the
industry in general, they must add allegations making that clear.”

from Blogger http://ift.tt/2Fv2DTF

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , , | Leave a comment

New York GBL Section 349 covers ordinary trademark claims, court rules

Plaintiffs, eight
professional models and actresses, alleged that the owners and operators of a
strip club on Long Island (Summit) unlawfully used Plaintiffs’ images in social
media advertisements in violation of the Lanham Act and New York General
Business Law § 349.  The magistrate recommended
rejecting Summit’s motion to dismiss.
As to the Lanham
Act claim, Summit argued that plaintiffs failed to allege that they are
sufficiently well known such that the misappropriation of their images would
likely cause confusion. Beyond alleging that they were “well known
professional models,” plaintiffs listed appearances in national magazines and
television programs, as well as associations with other celebrities. “It is
borderline facetious to suggest that Plaintiffs who purportedly have appeared
on the Jay Leno Show, Chapelle’s Show, and Shark Tank, or who have appeared in
magazines such as Vogue and Esquire, or who have publicly appeared with Kim
Kardashian have failed to make plausible allegations of public recognition. And
the purported extent of Plaintiffs’ social media following—as many as two
million Facebook followers, seven-hundred thousand Instagram followers, and
one-hundred thousand Twitter followers—further corroborates those allegations
with factual specifics.” [Consider how revelations about fake followers might
affect plausibility.]
Summit argued that plaintiffs’ claims were really right of
publicity claims, but they could bring false endorsement claims too. “[T]here
is no bright line level of ‘celebrity’ necessary to sustain a claim for false
endorsement; rather, all that is necessary is that the plaintiff’s ‘identity
carries some “level of consumer recognition.” ’ ” Even without the use of names
or other identifying info in the ad, the plaintiffs plausibly alleged that the
ads would be perceived as endorsements. [Interesting issue—usually an
appearance in an ad, without substantial celebrity among the target audience or
identifying information, is just perceived as an actor’s appearance, as the FTC
Endorsement Guide indicates.  Is it
different with strip club ads?]
In addition, the magistrate engaged in extensive analysis to
conclude that the Section 349 claims shouldn’t be dismissed on the ground that consumer
confusion was a sufficiently consumer-directed harm under the law, rejecting
the majority view that “consumer-oriented conduct” under Section 349 requires
something more than mere confusion.  The
New York Court of Appeals has not ruled on the matter, and the court found that
the lower New York courts and federal courts that had required something more
than confusion were misguided.
Historically, the Little FTC Acts were designed to allow
more enforcement of FTCA-type regulations than the FTC was actually engaging
in.  Adding a private right of action
stripped away various safeguards against overenforcement “such as political
accountability, finite resources, and a statutory public interest requirement.”  Many courts didn’t like that and thus “invented
limiting principles to restrict the scope of litigation,” but this response was
lacking in principle.  Specifically, in
New York, the 1970 version of Section 349 allowed only the AG to sue, while in 1980,
the Legislature extended a cause of action to “any person who has been injured
by reason of any violation of this section.”
This broad language clearly allowed both consumers and
non-consumers to sue, but then “some businesses tacked Section 349 claims onto
ordinary commercial disputes,” which went too far.  Thus,  courts
limited standing to conduct that is “consumer-oriented,” a rule that “strikes
an appropriate balance by preventing businesses from tacking deceptive
practices claims onto their purely commercial disputes while also allowing
affected businesses to act as vicarious defenders of consumers.”  But a practice commentary published in 1988
by Richard A. Givens, a former regional director of the FTC “invented the
principle that trademark infringement actions fall outside of the scope of
Section 349.”  Courts followed that
commentary, making it the majority view.
The majority view was unpersuasive.  “The text of the statute outlaws all
deceptive conduct, which would appear to include trademark infringement claims.
The text may not be dispositive, but there must at least be a reason to depart
from such clear language.” There was not. 
First, there was reason to think that the legislature intended to
include trademark infringement in the consumer protection statute, and
certainly didn’t intend to exclude
it. “The motivating concern behind Section 349 was the perceived inadequacy of
the existing set of consumer protection laws targeted at specific conduct,” and
so Section 349 was designed to be “an umbrella covering all forms of deceptive
conduct.” The drafters even “intentionally chose not to reject other proposed
legislation that included enumerated prohibitions,” to avoid any judicial limitation
to acts of a similar nature. But included on that list—the list that drafters
thought was too narrow!—were practices likely to cause “confusion or of
misunderstanding as to affiliation, connection, or association with, or
certification by, another.”  The drafters
even included trademark in their survey of existing laws they “hoped to
encompass and expand upon.”  “Given this
background, the logical conclusion is that the legislature intended to include
trademark infringement in the ambit of Section 349. After all, … trademark
protections are a form of consumer protection.”
Second, the policy concerns were unpersuasive. Though Section
349 provides for one-way attorney fee shifting, such awards are
discretionary.  And the minority view wouldn’t
open the floodgates for trademark claims unrelated to consumer protection
because the requirement of materiality would limit claims: “a plaintiff by
definition cannot prevail without proving that deception is likely to misdirect
consumers’ purchases, which is precisely the harm that the statute seeks to
prevent.”
Third, courts in the majority have argued that consumer-oriented
harm has to be enough to justify FTC intervention, but the Supreme Court has explicitly
found that mere confusion is sufficiently within the public interest to warrant
FTC intervention:
If consumers or dealers prefer to
purchase a given article because it was made by a particular manufacturer or
class of manufacturers, they have a right to do so, and this right cannot be
satisfied by imposing upon them an exactly similar article, or one equally as
good, but having a different origin. … The result of respondents’ acts is
that such purchasers are deceived into purchasing an article which they do not
wish or intend to buy, and which they might or might not buy if correctly
informed as to its origin. We are of opinion that the purchasing public is
entitled to be protected against that species of deception, and that its
interest in such protection is specific and substantial.
FTC v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212, 216-217 (1933). Additionally,
the FTC itself has been very interested in the deceptive use of endorsements, the
precise conduct at issue here, regardless of the subject matter.

Although punitive damages aren’t allowed under the Lanham Act,
they are under state law, so punitive damages claims based on Section 349 survived.

from Blogger http://ift.tt/2DMYUAm

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , , , | Leave a comment

Confusion with firm sued for sexual harassment causes irreparable harm

Newmark Realty Capital, Inc., v. BGC Partners, Inc., No.
16-cv-01702 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2017)
Newmark Realty Capital (founded 1991) and defendants BGC
Partners and Newmark & Co. Real Estate “traditionally operated in distinct
sectors of the real estate market and in distinct geographical areas.” Newmark
Realty provides mortgage services in the field of commercial real estate, at
first in California and now with offices in seven states, with 65 people
working for it and “originating and servicing loans for properties” located all
over the country.  Newmark Realty
arranges debt and equity financing through various sources on behalf of
commercial real estate developers and investors, and services loans for lenders
in 39 states and DC.  Newmark Realty has
registrations for NEWMARK REALTY CAPITAL and a similar word and design mark,
registered for “financial services, namely, mortgage banking, mortgage
brokerage, loan servicing, investment brokerage and investment consulting in
the field of commercial real estate.” 
Defendant BGC acquired Newmark & Co. Real Estate in 2011
and I’ll refer to them interchangeably. 
Newmark & Co. began as Harris, Newmark & Co., co-founded by Saul
Newmark in Manhattan around 1929. The company changed its name to Newmark &
Co. Real Estate in the late 1950s. By 1979, “the company owned and managed
properties in New York and around the country.” Newmark & Co.’s business in
the late 1970s to mid-1980s focused on the purchase, sale, and management of
its holdings in New York and other states, and grew thereafter.  Newmark & Co. began to use “Newmark
Capital Group” and “Newmark Capital Markets” in 1993 as a division focusing on
capital markets work. Around 1999, Defendant publicly announced “Newmark Realty
Capital, LLC,” later folded into Newmark Capital Markets. Newmark & Co. opened
offices in Connecticut and New Jersey in 1992 and 1993, respectively. In 2000,
Defendant established offices in Los Angeles, Long Beach, and Washington D.C.
Many of these new offices launched under the Newmark name such as “Newmark
Partners,” “Newmark of Southern California,” “KTR Newmark,” and “Newmark
Pacific.”  Newmark & Co. is by far
the bigger company, with thousands of employees to Newmark Realty’s 65.
Both companies expanded geographically over the years and defendants
expanded substantially into the mortgage services sector occupied by Newmark
Realty, which owns an incontestable registration for NEWMARK in its service
area. The court partially granted Newmark Realty’s motion for a preliminary
injunction against defendants’ use of “Newmark,” either alone or as part of
other company names, as applied to services in which Newmark & Co. lacked prior
nationwide rights as the senior user in that category.
There’s lots of interesting detail about expansion over time
and about the relationship between various financial services.  The court found that confusion was likely and
indeed ongoing based on Newmark & Co.’s use of NEWMARK, NEWMARK KNIGHT
FRANK, NEWMARK GRUBB KNIGHT FRANK, and other combinations.  There was significant evidence of actual
confusion, including initial interest confusion, by sophisticated financial
services customers, including situations where Newmark Realty’s executives had
to spend 15 minutes explaining their lack of connection with Newmark & Co.;
consumers thought they’d merged with defendants; they were invited to a
ribbon-cutting ceremony where Newmark & Co. had been the entity to arrange
financing; etc. Defendants’ own infringement counterclaims, while not exactly a
confession that confusion was likely, supported that conclusion. 
NEWMARK REALTY CAPITAL was registered in 2002 and is now
incontestable; to avoid liability, Newmark & Co. needed to show common law
senior rights in a mark used before that date. 
Given that defendant could trace a Newmark lineage to 1929, they argued
that they had done so. The court only partially agreed.  “Two distinct markets are relevant in this
case: (1) real estate sales and leasing services and (2) mortgage services for
commercial real estate.”  Defendant
showed prior nationwide rights in the former, but not the latter.  That is, defendant’s nationwide services went
to brokering sales and leases between landlords and commercial tenants, not to
offering mortgage/financing services.
The NEWMARK REALTY CAPITAL covers “financial services,
namely, mortgage banking, mortgage brokerage, loan servicing, investment
brokerage and investment consulting in the field of commercial real estate,” and,
though the court found this to be a close call, defendant didn’t satisfy its
burden to show that it had acquired a nationwide right to use NEWMARK for those
services before 2002, even though the record showed involvement in some
transactions related to mortgage services before 2002.  These sporadic transactions were concentrated
in the New York area, or at best also extending to the Washington, D.C. area.  Defendant’s nationwide ads, and its nationwide
reputation as shown in industry publications, weren’t for “mortgage brokerage”
and “investment sales and financing services” but for sales and leasing.
Defendant’s representations to the PTO also provided “strong
evidence” that it did not provide mortgage services; these representations didn’t
rise to the level of judicial estoppel, but they were persuasive evidence
nonetheless.  In order to register its
own trademarks, defendant repeatedly told the PTO that its business differed
from mortgage banking, mortgage brokerage, loan servicing, investment brokerage
and investment consulting in the field of commercial real estate, labeling them
“distinct financial services with different target markets,” and claiming that
defendant was “primarily a commercial landlord and tenant representative and
did “not provide [mortgage] services,” meaning that the parties operated in
“two different lines of business.” 
Nor did defendant get priority under the natural zone of
expansion doctrine.  This doctrine holds
that “[w]hen a senior user of a mark on product line A expands later into
product line B and finds an intervening user, priority in product line B is
determined by whether the expansion is ‘natural’ in that customers would have
been confused as to source or affiliation at the time of the intervening user’s
appearance.” The senior user must thus show that consumers would have been
confused “at the time of the junior user’s first use of its mark.”  Defendant didn’t provide any evidence on
likely confusion in 1991 through 2002.
Newmark Realty argued that Newmark & Co. couldn’t show
continuous use of NEWMARK, as required to use the senior common law user
defense.  Defendant’s arguments of use
for mortgage services had already been rejected; the next question was whether
its adoption of NEWMARK KNIGHT FRANK in 2006 and then NEWMARK GRUBB KNIGHT FRANK
in 2012 changed that.  “Hence, the
question is: did Defendant stop using NEWMARK by adopting a new mark?” [Now
NEWMARK is starting to look to me like a placeholder for some other TRADEMARK.]
 The court concluded that it did not. “As
long as [a] party can show bona fide use and that consumers recognize the old
mark as the source, there is no reason why it cannot use multiple marks at the
same time.” In the aggregate, there was sufficient evidence that Newmark &
Co. continued to use NEWMARK as a shorthand identifier to the industry, media,
and clients, and third parties had done the same.  NEWMARK was used in a “ ‘deliberate and
continuous, not sporadic, casual or transitory’ manner in a trademark sense
rather than a mere abbreviation.”
The court did, however, reject defendant’s argument that its
use of NEWMARK-formative brands such as “Newmark Knight Frank,” “KTR Newmark,”
Newmark Cornish & Carey,” “ARA, A Newmark Company,” and “Newmark Grubb
Pearson Commercial” constituted continuing use for purposes of the prior use
defense.  [This is an interesting
question: the senior unregistered user is frozen into place, both
geographically and in terms of goods/services; I see the argument that it
should likewise be frozen into place in its mark, though this is the first case
I am aware of to address the issue head-on.] 
Likewise, the standard for tacking is stringent: it requires that “two marks
are so similar that consumers generally would regard them as essentially the
same.” The standard is exceedingly strict: “The marks must create the same,
continuing commercial impression, and the later mark should not materially
differ from or alter the character of the mark attempted to be tacked.” However,
the court found that it didn’t need to assess tacking for real estate sales and
leasing services because Newmark & Co. was likely to prevail on showing
prior and continuous use of NEWMARK. For mortgage services, however, defendant
hadn’t sufficiently shown that the marks “create the same, continuing
commercial impression” with some kind of consumer perception evidence.
Irreparable harm got interesting! Though Newmark Realty didn’t
show any quality difference between the parties’ mortgage services, the court
accepted two other alleged irreparable injury: (1) the effect of a sexual harassment
lawsuit against Newmark & Co. on Newmark Realty’s reputation and goodwill,
and (2) loss of business opportunities.
In early 2017, defendant and several of its Los Angeles
executives were sued for sexual harassment, a lawsuit that’s been covered by
the media.  Herb Reed says that “[e]vidence of loss of control over business
reputation and damage to goodwill could constitute irreparable harm,” and “[t]here
are abundant instances showing clients being confused that Plaintiff was involved
in the sexual harassment suit due to the name ‘Newmark.’”  [Query whether the relief granted can fix
that. The court later simply asserts that “an injunction barring Defendant from
branding itself using confusingly similar marks would deter the threatened loss
of potential customers, and reduce confusion among the customers and thus the
reputational harm imposed on Plaintiff.”]
Notably, the court said that “not all litigation against a
competitor who uses a similar name would be seen as causing reputational harm
sufficient to support a preliminary injunction,” but, “at this particular time,
a lawsuit alleging sexual harassment and assault against Defendant takes on a
different dimension” given the ongoing public attention to claims of sexual
harassment and assault that have “rocked” many industries. “It is no
exaggeration to say that such claims are toxic to business.”
Similarly, loss of business opportunities constituted
irreparable harm. Newmark Realty clearly showed a “threatened loss of
prospective customers” from solicitations by Newmark & Co.’s employees. For
example, one person submitted a declaration indicating that his assistant
screens out cold calls including those from Newmark & Co. because he does
not have a relationship with them, but callers from Newmark & Co. have nonetheless
been able to bypass the assistant by referring to themselves as being from
“Newmark.” The threatened loss was greater because Newmark & Co. acquired
Berkeley Point Capital, a major competitor of Newmark Realty in mortgage
services, and Newmark & Co. has stated that Berkeley Point “will become
part of Newmark [Knight Frank].” “Plaintiff, with a staff of only about 65
people, also faces a heightened risk of losing its identity to the much larger
Defendant who has over 4,000 employees and independent contractors.” 

Ultimately, the court denied Newmark Realty’s request to
enjoin Newmark & Co. from “using the single word ‘Newmark’ as a trademark
to denote the source of any professional services of any nature whatsoever, in
any form whatsoever, whether oral or written.” However, it was appropriate to enjoin
“using the word ‘Newmark,’ alone or in combination with any other words, as a
trademark to denote the source of any commercial real estate financial
services, i.e., mortgage banking, mortgage brokerage, loan servicing,
investment brokerage and investment consulting, in the field of commercial real
estate, in any form whatsoever, whether oral or written.”  Even if Newmark & Co. had invested
millions in building its own NEWMARK brand, the injunction didn’t bar it from
using NEWMARK for its real estate sales and leasing services or other types of
services not covered by Newmark Realty’s trademark registration.  Anyway, even as to mortgage services, the harm
inflicted on Newmark & Co. was its own fault; based on its representations
to the PTO, Newmark & Co. was likely aware of Newmark Realty’s trademark
rights for the relevant services.

from Blogger http://ift.tt/2EnzJp7

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , | Leave a comment

Pure disparagement by competitor is commercial speech even without invitation to buy

Monat Global Corp. v. Kavanaugh , 2018 WL 501616, No. 17-cv-1666
(M.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 2018)
The parties sell competing hair products. Kavanaugh
allegedly orchestrated an “[I]nternet smear campaign” by posting false comments
on Facebook about Monat’s products and marketing tactics, e.g., that Monat’s
products duplicate the formula of non-party Wen’s products, which the FDA
reportedly investigated after receiving 1,300 complaints about balding and
scalp irritation. At least 5,000 people, including many “salon owners,
stylists, or [others] in the hair[-]care industry,” allegedly view Kavanaugh’s
Facebook posts. [Wonder how many that drops to given Facebook’s algorithms.]

Defendants argued that none of Kavanaugh’s statements
constitutes “commercial” advertising subject to the Lanham Act because they
didn’t tout the defendants’ products or encourage a prospective customer to
patronize the defendants. Instead, the statements attempted to discourage a
transaction with someone else. “Even a statement that expressly proposes no
transaction might constitute commercial speech if included in an advertisement
that mentions a particular product and if profit motivates the statement.”
Given that the statements specifically mentioned Monat’s products and that
Monat alleged a profit motive for the statements, plaintiff adequately alleged
that the statements were commercial speech.

from Blogger http://ift.tt/2DNECXB

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , | Leave a comment

CFP: Yale/Stanford/Harvard Junior Faculty Forum

Request for Submissions
Yale/Stanford/Harvard Junior Faculty Forum
June 13-14, 2018, Harvard Law School

Yale, Stanford, and Harvard Law
Schools are soliciting submissions for the 19th session of the Yale/Stanford/Harvard
Junior Faculty Forum, to be held at Harvard Law School on June 13-14, 2018. Twelve
to twenty junior scholars (with one to seven years in teaching) will be chosen,
through a blind selection process, to present their work at the Forum. One or
more senior scholars will comment on each paper. The audience will include the
participating junior faculty, faculty from the host institutions, and invited
guests. The goal of the Forum is to promote in-depth discussion about particular
papers and more general reflections on broader methodological issues, as well
as to foster a stronger sense of community among American legal scholars,
particularly by strengthening ties between new and veteran professors.

TOPICS: Each year the Forum invites submissions on selected topics in public
and private law, legal theory, and law and humanities topics, alternating
loosely between public law and humanities subjects in one year, and private law
and dispute resolution in the next. For the upcoming 2018 meeting, the topics
will cover these areas of the law:


– Administrative Law

Constitutional Law—theoretical foundations

Constitutional Law—historical foundations

Criminal Law

Critical Legal Studies

Environmental Law

Family Law

Jurisprudence and Philosophy

Law and Humanities

Legislation and Statutory Interpretation

Public International Law

Race/Gender Studies/Antidiscrimination

Workplace Law and Social Welfare Policy

A jury of accomplished scholars, not necessarily from Yale, Stanford, or
Harvard, will choose the papers to be presented. There is no publication
commitment. Yale, Stanford, or Harvard will pay presenters’ and commentators’
travel expenses, though international flights may be only partially reimbursed.

QUALIFICATIONS: Authors who teach at a U.S. law school in a tenured or
tenure-track position and have not have been teaching at either of those ranks
for a total of more than seven years are eligible to submit their work.
American citizens or permanent residents teaching abroad are also eligible
provided that they have held a faculty position or the equivalent, including
positions comparable to junior faculty positions in research institutions, for fewer
than seven years and that they earned their last degree after 2008. International
scholars are not eligible for this forum, but are invited to submit to the Stanford
International Junior Faculty Forum. We accept co-authored submissions,
but each of the coauthors must be individually eligible to participate in the
JFF. Papers that will be published prior
to the Forum are not eligible.
There is no limit on the number of
submissions by any individual author. Junior faculty from Yale, Stanford, and
Harvard are not eligible. 


PAPER SUBMISSION PROCEDURE:
Electronic submissions should be
sent to Rebecca Tushnet at
rtushnet@law.harvard.edu,
with the subject line “Junior Faculty Forum.” The deadline for submissions is March 1, 2018. Remove all references to
the author(s) in the paper. Please include in the text of the email and also as
a separate attachment a cover letter listing your name, the title of your
paper, your contact email and address through June 2018, and which topic your
paper falls under. Each paper may only be considered under one topic. Any
questions about the submission procedure should be directed both to Rebecca
Tushnet and her assistant, Andrew Matthiesen (
amatthiessen@law.harvard.edu).

FURTHER INFORMATION: Inquiries concerning the Forum should be sent to Matthew Stephenson (mstephen@law.harvard.edu) or Rebecca Tushnet (rtushnet@law.harvard.edu) at Harvard Law School, Richard Ford (rford@stanford.edu) at Stanford Law School, or Christine Jolls (christine.jolls@yale.edu) or Yair Listokin (yair.listokin@yale.edu) at Yale Law School.

Richard Ford

Christine Jolls
Yair Listokin
Matthew Stephenson

Rebecca Tushnet

from Blogger http://ift.tt/2ERvQI5

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged | Leave a comment

That’s swell: court rules that NY doesn’t impose “use in commerce” limit on unfair competition

Can’t Live Without It, LLC v. ETS Express, Inc., — F.Supp.3d —-, 2018 WL 401778, No. 17-cv-3506 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2018)
Plaintiff S’well sued ETS for trademark infringement and related claims based on its sales of the Force and Swig Bottles, which have the exact same shape as plaintiff’s S’well and S’ip Bottles, respectively. The court denied ETS’s motion for summary judgment, among other things holding that §349 and §350 don’t incorporate whatever is left of the Lanham Act’s “use in commerce” requirement, which meant that ETS’s partial motion for summary judgment as to its use of the S’well name was only partly granted.
S’well has a registration for the shape of its S’well bottle, on the Principal Register as of 2017. “The S’well Bottle has been very successful, obtaining substantial amounts of free, unsolicited media coverage, selling millions of bottles and an increasing number each year, and generating millions of dollars in income.”  (Turns out I own a bottle with this shape, whose maker I don’t know; I didn’t buy it on the basis of the shape, either as source indicator or as an especially aesthetic shape, though it is pleasantly curved.)  S’well sells to consumers, retailers, and a custom program in which an imprint of a company’s name or logo is added to the bottle and the company then resells or gives away the bottles.

The S’ip and the S’well

ETS is a drinkware company that sells various water bottles, including ones that are “patterned after” retail brands. The Force Bottle is one of ETS’s most popular products and is shaped identically to the S’well Bottle. ETS operates in the “promotion products market” rather than the retail market, meaning it fulfills orders placed by intermediaries for custom-printed products and the intermediaries then sell those products to businesses that give them away as promotions, though ETS does sell Force Bottles directly to some retailers — including, at least, college bookstores and a coffee shop chain with locations throughout California. Some distributors also sell to retailers who sell Force Bottles to end-users either online or in retail stores.
The Force

The Swig

ETS’s argument against the distinctiveness of the S’well bottle was that consumers couldn’t possibly associate the bottle shape here at issue with any single source because so many different businesses manufacture similarly shaped bottles. Declarations from various ETS employees stated that they purchased S’well-like bottles from various stores and websites, providing pictures, descriptions, and receipts, and ETS identified 130 different sources of water bottles that had the same shape. There’s no numeric rule about how many other sources prevent distinctiveness.  “If, for example, one source has such a large market share and strong brand awareness that the public strongly associates its mark with that brand, consumers will likely assume that products bearing that mark are associated with that brand, regardless of the number of ‘knockoff’ manufacturers. The number of manufacturers is therefore a relevant, but not determinative factor.”  [NB: This reasoning, which I accept, puts the lie to trademark owners’ claims that they have to enforce their trademarks to the hilt to avoid losing them. As long as the trademark retains trademark significance, it’s not going to be a problem.]
S’well submitted “substantial evidence suggesting that the public in fact does associate this particular shape with S’well, including undisputed, significant levels of advertising expenditures, sales success, and unsolicited media coverage.” ETS salespeople in emails with distributors themselves referred to the Force Bottle as a “S’well knockoff,” a “swell like option,” “S’well-like,” and “the ones that look like Swell,” and online retailers advertised Force Bottles similarly.  “These comparisons would be meaningless if the audience did not associate the shape with the brand.”
Nor did ETS show functionality.  S’well submitted material to the PTO indicating that the S’well and S’ip contain “mouths” that are big enough for ice cubes but small enough for “drip-free sipping” and are located in the center of the bottle, so users never need to rotate the bottle to begin drinking. ETS also argued that the circular shape is the “strongest and the easiest to make,” and that the bottles’ “smooth tapering at a relatively shallow angle from the base to the mouth permits the bottles to be emptied completely with relatively minor tilts.” The alternative, straight sides with a sharp angle just before the mouth, creates “a ‘catch basin,’ so that the liquid in the bottle, rather than smoothly flowing out, is trapped in the depression where the angle changes until the bottle is tilted further, at which point it comes rushing out all at once, leading to spills and other dangers.” [As a certified spiller of things, I can testify to the truth of this.]  However, ETS didn’t submit evidence on its claims, and it wasn’t self-evident that they were true—for example, a rectangular shape might likely be easier to stack and ship. S’well’s founder also declared that she made several aesthetic choices when she designed the bottles that she knew would be more expensive.
ETS also offered no evidence suggesting that no other designs could have these same functional benefits; S’well hadn’t registered “all water bottles with gently sloping sides.” In fact, ETS’s argument that “both the S’ip and S’Well Bottles have ideal shapes, despite the two being shaped differently, suggests that these benefits may be available in other shapes as well.” Nor did ETS make arguments about the distinctive bottle cap, which is part of S’well’s trade dress.
Likely confusion: again, summary judgment was unavailable, given the evidence of distinctiveness/strength and the similarity of the parties’ products.  Though ETS argued that the products
were sold in separate markets to sophisticated consumers who would not confuse them, ETS submitted
no empirical research or data analysis. S’well submitted evidence of distributors specifically requesting “S’well Bottles” from ETS, which appeared to fill the orders with Force Bottles without correction. And 10-15% of S’well’s business was in the promotional market, while ETS sold directly to at least some retailers and some distributors, who then sell Force Bottles to retailers or directly to end-users online, so there was some market overlap.  In addition, post-sale confusion among end consumers was still possible.
And listen to this take on status goods: “Nor does it matter, as ETS argues, that the two bottles are of the same physical quality, particularly where, as here, there is evidence that they are not of the same expressive quality” (citing magazine article describing S’well Bottles as “suddenly a feverish must-be-associated-with-thing among a certain stylish, in-the-know set”). “The purchase of one product under the mistaken belief that it is another product is a prototypical harm against which the Lanham Act protects.”
There was also evidence of actual downstream confusion. “At least one retailer mislabeled Force Bottles as ‘Swell Bottles’ on its shelves, and several consumers have contacted S’well customer service in the mistaken belief that they had S’well Bottles, when in fact they had Force Bottles or, perhaps, similar bottles from other brands.” An internet survey indicated that 59% of S’well’s target demographic — female potential purchasers of stainless steel water bottles — associated the shape at issue with S’well, and calculated an overall net confusion rate of 26.6% between the S’well and Force Bottles.
ETS argued that it didn’t know about S’well before it decided to make the Force bottle, and learned about it only after researching the bottle shape requested by customers.  Given S’well’s success, that was a disputed issue, and anyway ETS learned of S’well before the Force bottle was actually produced.  Evidence also suggested that ETS “made changes to the Force Bottle for the express purpose of making it more similar to the S’well Bottle.”  ETS’s “Retail Brands Guide” compared its products to retail products, which was distributed to at least some customers.  A jury could find bad faith.
Under §§ 349 and 350 of the NY GBL, a plaintiff must show “that a defendant has engaged in (1) consumer-oriented conduct that is (2) materially misleading and that (3) plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the allegedly deceptive act or practice.”  Consumer-oriented conduct must threaten an injury “to the public interest over and above ordinary trademark infringement or dilution.”  However, the court rejected federal district court precedent that something like “potential danger to the public health or safety” is required, reasoning that the New York courts interpret these laws broadly. “New York courts distinguish not between minor economic harms and threats to public safety, but between disputes that are essentially between two parties, such as contract disputes, and “acts or practices [that] have a broader impact on consumers at large.”  However, the court still granted ETS’s motion for summary judgment on those claims, because S’well didn’t show a genuine dispute about whether Force bottles were inferior to S’well bottles. Though there had allegedly been complaints “from time to time” about customer misuse leading to leaks and the “imprint” on Force Bottles coming off, but even setting aside hearsay problems with this evidence, S’well might have shown that Force bottles weren’t perfect but did not show that its bottles were any better.
S’well also argued that ETS’s plastic Impact bottle was not made of stainless steel and argued that this would harm consumers, but S’well didn’t address the Impact bottle in its complaint, and anyway no reasonable consumer boying plastic Impact Bottles would think she was buying a stainless steel S’well Bottle, nor would she infer that S’well’s steel bottles were somehow worse simply because a plastic version existed.  She might think there was a link to S’well somehow, “but that consumer confusion is insufficiently consumer-oriented to state a claim under New York’s deceptive practices and false advertising statutes.”
False designation/unfair competition under federal and state law: S’well moved for summary judgment in its favor based on claims that ETS (1) misleadingly suggested to its customers that Force Bottles were a type of S’well Bottle, and (2) sold Force Bottles to customers who requested S’well Bottles without informing them of the difference. ETS argued that there was no relevant “use in commerce.”  The court disagreed with 1-800 Contacts, but Rescuecom didn’t overrule it, so there is still some “use in commerce” requirement for infringement.  The use of a mark in the sale of products, as opposed to services, where the mark isn’t attached to the product/associated with it physically, doesn’t fall within the §1127 definition of “use in commerce.”  The only “printed” version of the S’well mark was in ETS’s Retail Brands Guide, but that use was more like use “in the sale or advertising” of the product than it was to a sales display. Anyway, no reasonable juror could find that this guide could confuse a distributor into thinking that the Force Bottle was a version of the S’well Bottle, as it clearly stated that the two were simply similar, and the Guide had dozens of other retail brands along with their ETS analogues.
Because of 1-800 Contacts, “even if ETS employees actually provided Force Bottles to distributors seeking S’well Bottles without informing them, and even if ETS representatives really did suggest in emails to distributors that Force Bottles were a type of S’well Bottle, ETS nonetheless did not violate Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act because of an absence of applicable ‘use in commerce.’” This ended the Lanham Act claims, but the court didn’t belive that New York courts would impose a similar limit on common law unfair competition claims, which are “adaptable and capacious.”  “Palming off — that is, the sale of the goods of one manufacturer as those of another — was the first theory of unfair competition endorsed by New York courts, and has been extended to situations where the parties are not even in competition.”
Because ETS was allegedly using S’well’s exact mark, Polaroid analysis was not required; “[u]se of the exact same mark is inherently confusing.”  So the key question was how ETS employees had actually used the S’well name.  S’well identified multiple emails in which various distributors asked for “S’well” or “Swell” bottles and ETS employees didn’t clarify in those email threads that they only sold Force Bottles. In one email, a distributor requested S’well Bottles, and asked that ETS “try to get these exact brands and items!” Another email involved a new customer who asked for a quote and sample of S’well Bottles.
ETS rejoined that these requests were in fact for Force bottles, and “a lot of people call it just ‘the S’well shape.”’ ETSs CEO testified that “they “try” to train their sales staff to correct customers who ask for S’well Bottles, but repeat customers consistently respond that they know they are getting the Force Bottle and are just referring to the shape, sometimes growing frustrated by being corrected.”
Another employee similarly testified that repeat customers “get upset sometimes if you keep asking them to confirm what item they’re looking for,” saying things like, “’Dang it, Jen. You know what I’m looking for. Stop asking me. You know it’s the Force.”’  A reasonable juror could find either way.

S’well also argued that ETS told customers that its Force bottle was a version of the S’well bottle specific to the promotional products market. In one email chain, a distributor asked, “What is the retail brand that looks like this?” and the manager responds, “The S’well bottle is the retail version of this bottle.” The distributor’s question suggested that he understood the lack of affiliation, and that the Force just “looked like” the S’well; a reasonable juror could find that the employee meant only to convey the similarity.  Other email chains were similarly ambiguous.  Interestingly, the court indicated that the success of S’well’s claim would turn on “the credibility of the ETS witnesses regarding what they meant to communicate in these emails,” rather than the messages their interlocutors received; I would have gone the other way.

from Blogger http://ift.tt/2DEF5vW

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , | Leave a comment

Beyond Belmora: foreign TM owner proceeds under Lanham Act and Inter-American Convention

S.A.S. v. Latinfood U.S. Corp., Civ. No. 16-6576, —
F.Supp.3d —-, 2017 WL 6940696 (D.N.J. Dec. 29, 2017)
Industria, a Colombian food corporation and Colombian owner
of the Zenú and Ranchera marks, sued Latinfood, for reasons you can guess when
you learn that they are doing business in the US as Zenú Products Co.  Applying Belmora,
the court allows the various Lanham Act claims to proceed, and cites Christine
Haight Farley’s work
in also allowing claims under the Inter-American
Convention for Trademark and Commercial Protection (IAC).  Copyright claims weren’t discussed in the
motion to dismiss.
The Zenú mark “has been used for more than sixty years to
identify meat, sausage, beans and other packaged food products in Colombia and
elsewhere,” while the Ranchera mark “has been used extensively in Colombia and
elsewhere for more than 25 years, and is among the most well-known trademarks
for sausages and meat products.” Industria claimed fame across Latin America
and alleged that people “residing in Colombia, individuals who have travelled
to Colombia and individuals who have moved from Colombia to the United States
are familiar with the [Zenú] and Ranchera trademarks and [Industria’s] food
products sold under the [Zenú] and Ranchera marks.” (Id.)
Industria Ranchera

Part of Industria website

Industria’s Zenú products include “the [Zenú] mark in a red
stylized font underlined by a brush-stroke type line against a white
background.” Words indicating the type of food contained in the packaging are
“often written diagonally underneath the [Zenú] mark.” Canned products an
additional “thick colorful band at the bottom of the label where additional
information such as the weight or quantity of the product is conveyed in white
type.” Industria maintains a website “that is accessible by the public,
including consumers in the United States, at http://www.zenu.com.co.”
Industria’s Ranchera mark is “always displayed in a red
‘western’ or ‘rancher-inspired’ font which is then outlined first in white and
then in black.” It “curves slightly upward in the middle of the word.” A “rancher
theme” is used across the Ranchera packaging.  
Industria has numerous relevant trademark registrations in
Colombia, and an International Registration from 2014 from WIPO; it filed an
application to extend the IR at the PTO in 2014.  Prior US registrations have lapsed.  In 2014, Industria also filed a 44(e)
application for “ZENÚ (Stylized)” for various food products which was barred by
Latinfood’s US-registered Zenú mark.  Industria
also applied in the US for “RANCHERA (stylized)” for various meats, based on
Sections 1(b) and 44(e), in 2016.
Latinfood allegedly began copying Industria’s marks around
2011.  Latinfood allegedly touted its
possession of “ ‘an exclusive distribution and importing rights agreement for
the tri-state area’ with a major product manufacturer in Colombia.” Latinfood
allegedly uses the identical stylized logo and trade dress for Zenú, as well as
its trade dress, and its website, http://www.zenu.us.com, “closely mimics both the
domain name and trade dress presented on [Industria]’s website,
http://www.zenu.com.co.” The labels were also allegedly substantially similar to
Industria’s copyrighted labels.  Indeed,
Latinfood allegedly attempted to buy 400,000 Zenú labels from Industria’s own Zenú
label provider in Medellin.
Latinfood website: note Ranchera listing 3d row left

Latinfood applied to register the Zenú mark for various
meats in the US in 2013, claiming 2011 as its year of first use. Industria alleged
that this was fraudulent and in bad faith, and that Latinfood’s claimed
specimens were in fact Industria products. Latinfood’s Zenú registration has been
cited by examiners under 2(d) in Office Actions blocking Industria’s
applications, allegedly preventing it from offering its goods for sale in the
US under the Zenú mark.  (It’s legal to
sell stuff without registering the marks, but I see why there’s a problem.) In
2014, Industria began a cancellation proceeding before the TTAB, which is still
pending.  (One suspects that Belmora played a role in encouraging
Industria to move to litigation.) 
A similar story can be told for the Ranchera mark, though
Latinfood’s application for registration was ultimately denied by the PTO
because of a third-party registration. However, Latinfood is allegedly still
selling products bearing the mark.
Industria further alleged that the Latinfood product labels
falsely suggested affiliation with Industria’s business in Colombia, for
example by identifying the company as “Zenu Products US Inc.” instead of
Latinfood, suggesting that it’s a US-based Industria affiliate. The labels also
include a “linea de exportation” designation, meaning “export line” in English,
further implying “that Latinfood products are produced outside of the United
States, much like [Industria]’s products from Colombia would be.” Latinfood
products are allegedly often “featured in the import/foreign sections of the
groceries in which they are sold and are sold alongside products from other
Latin American companies.”  Latinfood
sales representatives allegedly advised store owners that Latinfood has full
rights to the distribution of ZENÚ- and RANCHERA-marked products, misleading
them into believing that they’re dealing with Industria.  The suggestion that the products are imported
was allegedly also false because a majority of the goods were manufactured and
labeled in the US. 
In addition, www.zenu.us.com
was allegedly “confusingly similar” to Industria’s www.zenu.com.co, and described Latinfood’s products
as being part of “una deliciosa tradición,” suggesting an affiliation with Industria’s
sixty year old brand.
Under Belmora, the
Lanham Act claims were ok even though Industria didn’t allege its own use in
commerce in the US of the Zenú and Ranchera marks.  Belmora
wasn’t binding on this court, but the judge found its reasoning persuasive;
there was no “use in commerce” requirement in §43(a), only the Lexmark requirement of standing to bring
false advertising, trade dress infringement, and false association claims,
which was sufficiently pled, even if it might ultimately be difficult to prove.  So too with the claims for cancellation of
Latinfood’s registered mark for fraud. 
Industria sufficiently alleged that Latinfood’s sale of allegedly “sub-par
and noninspected products” harmed Industria by altering consumers’ estimation
of products using the mark and damaging its reputation.  Proximate cause was sufficiently alleged by
allegations that Latinfood targeted Colombians and other consumers familiar
with Industria’s mark, damaged Industria’s goodwill by selling subpar/different
products, and foreclosed Industria’s registration and use of the Zenú mark in
the United States.
Separately, the court specifically rejected any attempt to
impose any more rigorous pleading standard on a Lanham Act false advertising claim
than Iqbal/Twombly requires.  A 1985
case in the Third Circuit was probably no longer good law.  But regardless of the standard, Industria satisfied
it. Industria’s allegations about Latinfood’s use of “Zenu Products US Inc.,” its
use of www.zenu.us.com, its labeling of
its products as imported and representations to have an exclusive distribution
and importing rights agreement with a major product manufacturer from Colombia,
and its allegedly false importation labels for food from manufacturers in the
United States sufficed to state a claim.
The court also held that the IAC creates private rights of
action.  Though there is a presumption
that treaties, even those labeled as “self-executing,” do not create private
rights, the Supreme Court has already held that the IAC is self-executing, and
the court proceeded to examine the terms of the treaty itself, which “was the
culmination of the efforts of many years to secure the cooperation of the
American States in uniform trade mark protection.”  Beneficiaries under the Convention are
defined as (1) nationals of contracting states, and (2) domiciled foreigners
who own a manufacturing or commercial establishment or an agricultural
development in any of the contracting states. The language of the IAC strongly
supported the conclusion that it was intended to create private rights to those
benefited parties.  Even if knowledge of
the other mark were a required element under the IAC, which was not supported
by any authority, Industria sufficiently alleged such knowledge.

Latinfood also made a number of arguments about the
interplay between the IAC and Section 44 of the Lanham Act.  In particular, the last clause in Article 7
of the IAC says “the opposer may claim for himself the preferential right to
use such mark in the country where the opposition is made or priority to
register or deposit it in such country, upon
compliance with the requirements established by the domestic legislation in
such country and by this Convention
” (emphasis added).  Latinfood argued that Industria couldn’t
bring an Article 7 claim because it didn’t comply with §44(b) and (d).  However, international treaties “may grant
rights broader than those granted by domestic law, including the Lanham Act.
Contrariwise, Section 44(d) is not the only potentially applicable section of
the Lanham Act.”  In addition, Section
44(h) of the Lanham Act limited remedies to those “appropriate in repressing
acts of unfair competition,” and Latinfood argued that Industria’s claims didn’t
fall within Chapter IV of the IAC, which is the Chapter devoted to “Repression
of Unfair Competition.” “The resolution of these Section 44 issues will depend
on the development of the facts and the precise contours of the overlapping (or
not overlapping) claims under U.S. law and the treaty. This case is going
forward in any event. These may turn out to be redundant claims, alternative
claims, or supplementary claims; it simply is not clear at present.” 

from Blogger http://ift.tt/2mEFSVz

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , | Leave a comment