Depressed sales and asserted loss of prestige aren’t irreparable harm

Puma SE v. Forever 21, Inc., No. 17-cv-02523 (C.D. Cal. Jun.
2, 2017)
H/T Sarah Burstein. 
Puma sued Forever 21 for allegedly counterfeiting its Fenty line of
shoes.  (Puma asserted copyright
infringement and design patent infringement as well as trademark infringement.)
Here, the court denies a preliminary injunction for want of a showing of
irreparable harm.
Puma focused on the argument that Forever 21’s knock-offs
diminished the Fenty line’s prestige, supported by the declaration of its Global
Director of Brand and Marketing, Adam Petrick. Petrick’s declaration said that
Forever 21’s “fast fashion” knock-offs diminish the excitement following a
Fenty shoe release because consumers can purchase the “same-looking product” at
a lower cost. Some Forever 21 customers may believe they’ve bought the real,
hyped shoe, and others may be discouraged from buying the Fenty shoes because
of the ready availability of the cheaper copycat.  Petrick claimed that knock-off shoes drive
consumers away not only from Fenty shoes but also from other Puma shoes that they
would otherwise buy. As a result, Puma has already seen “lower-than-expected
conversion of sales of other Puma shoes” as a result of the knock-off shoes,
and the Fenty “Bow Slide” shoe, released in March 2017, allegedly took longer
than expected to sell out.
The court was not impressed. 
The evidence of harm was limited to a single declaration, plus some “exhibits
containing website printouts and news articles concerning Forever 21.”  But more importantly, “unsupported and
conclusory statements regarding harm [plaintiff] might suffer” are
insufficient. The claims that knock-offs “diminish[] the brand value for Puma’s
consumers,” and that “the prestige of the Puma brand is diminished,” these claims
weren’t tied to actual evidence; the court here found them little more than
platitudes.  No facts in Petrick’s
declaration about actual consumer perception, or evidence of Puma’s actual
reputation, supported Puma’s claims about likely loss of prestige. “Puma must
do more than simply submit a declaration insisting that its brand image and prestige
have or will be harmed.”  Petrick’s
statement that some Forever 21 consumers might believe they’d bought the real
shoe was just speculative, and regardless, under Herb Reed, evidence that “simply underscores customer confusion” is
not enough to prove irreparable harm.  The other statements were equally speculative,
and no better than that present in Herb
Reed
.

Additionally, Puma needed to show that money damages would
be inadequate.  Even accepting Petrick’s
statements that knock-off shoes “drive[] consumers away” from Puma shoes, that
“sales of Fenty Puma shoes have been slower,” that the “Bow Slide has seen
decreased sales compared to Puma’s projected sales,” and that although the Bow
Slide has been sold out, “it took longer than expected,” Puma didn’t submit any
evidence to show how such sales or market share losses cannot be compensated
with money damages. The court wasn’t convinced that the alleged harm here was “so
unquantifiable that money damages would be insufficient.” 

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Copyright v. false advertising in medical devices

Healthmate Int’l, LLC v. French, 2017 WL 2389715, No.
15-0761 (W.D. Mo. Jun. 1, 2017)
The parties (including defendant Rampant Lion) compete to sell
TENS units, which administer electrical current to portions of the body in
order to relieve pain. Healthmate registered three copyrights for graphical
displays on TENS units. The displays have a series of picture-based icons that
symbolize the TENS unit’s various functions and a battery-shaped icon with
hashmarks meant to symbolize the amount of energy remaining in the TENS unit.
Some of the displays also include icons that represent parts of the body, a
clock or timer, or an “intensity” meter (a bar with hashmarks intended to
indicate the current’s intensity). Healthmate alleged that defendants infringed
by using substantially similar displays on their own TENS units.

comment: um, no

Defendants attempted to rebut the presumption of
copyrightability by arguing that the claimed matter (1) was an uncopyrightable
“method of operation” or (2) was not original. The court refused to grant
summary judgment on these theories.  Even
assuming that Lotus v. Borland was
the correct framework, Healthmate was claiming the pictures it put on the TENS
units’ buttons, not the buttons themselves. 
(Well, that “derivative work” claim looks more like the latter to me.)  The pictures weren’t themselves the method of
operation, even if they were physically placed on the buttons, and thus were
copyrightable.  On originality, there was
conflicting testimony about whether the icons were copied from a competitor and
therefore not original.  There were also
factual issues precluding summary judgment on infringement.
Rampant Lion counterclaimed for violation of the Lanham Act
and other torts.  Healthmate’s website
indicated that some of the products were “FDA approved.” “However, to the FDA,
‘approved’ technically means that each individual device is inspected, like the
USDA inspects all meat sold in the United States, which they [Plaintiff’s
products] are not.” A product that is “FDA cleared” means (to the FDA and
others who know the technical meaning to be attached to the phrase) that the
product in question is substantially similar to another device that is already
legally marketed for the same use. Here, Healthmate’s products were “FDA
cleared” but not “FDA approved.” Some of Healthmate’s product descriptions used
“FDA cleared,” and some used both phrases.  (I would have gone with literal falsity here:
there’s a specific meaning in the industry, and Healthmate’s own use of the two
phrases indicates that it recognized and presumably intended people to rely on
the difference.)
Healthmate argued that its statement was mere puffery, or
merely ambiguous.  The court disagreed
with the former—“FDA approval” isn’t merely boasting or exaggeration, nor is it
a general claim of superiority. It alleges a specific historical, falsifiable
fact.  Healthmate argued that lots of
people in the industry used “FDA approved” in a way common in the TENS unit
industry, but there was no support for the proposition that falsity becomes
puffery just because others in the industry make the same false statement.
However, “FDA approved” was not literally false.  The FDA’s distinction between approval and
clearance wasn’t the test, but rather whether “the false message will
necessarily and unavoidably be received by the consumer.”  The court reasoned that the process necessary
for the FDA to “clear” TENS units—which did occur for Healthmate’s
units—qualified under the dictionary definition of “approval” even if there was
a regulatory or technical difference between “clearance” and “approval.”  “Considerable context (namely, the FDA
regulations) is required to understand why the phrase ‘FDA approved’ was
inaccurate, so the false impression will not be necessarily and unavoidably
received by consumers.”  (Who are the
usual customers to whom the website is directed? How much do they know? This
might be a case where health professionals would be more likely to be deceived
than ordinary patients.)
Without literal falsity, Rampant Lion needed evidence of
consumer reaction, which it did not have.  Bad faith and willfulness, even if shown,
couldn’t substitute for a showing of actual or potential deception because such
a presumption only applies to false comparative advertising, not at issue here.
 Summary judgment on the Lanham Act counterclaim
for Healthmate.

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Click fraud claim against Google fails

Singh v. Google Inc., 2017 WL 2404986, No. 16-cv-03734 (N.D.
Cal. Jun. 2, 2017)
Singh alleged that Google falsely induced small businesses
to participate in AdWords, resulting in payment for invalid clicks. Singh
alleged: (1) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (2)
violations the UCL; (3) violations of the FAL; and (4) fraud in the inducement.
The court granted Google’s motion to dismiss.
Because advertisers are charged by the click, Google
maintains policies and practices to prevent click fraud, and the Google Ad
Traffic Quality Resource Center states that “advertisers are not charged for
[invalid] clicks or impressions.” Singh challenged Google’s representations
that click fraud occurred infrequently and that Google had robust systems in
place to effectively filter out the “vast majority” of invalid clicks and
prevent customers for being charged for those clicks.
The contractual claim failed.  Google acknowledges the existence of click
fraud and the possibility that an advertiser would be charged for fraudulent
clicks. Singh argued that the implied covenant covered frustration of purpose,
and that his expectations were informed by the false and misleading
representations in Google’s public postings. But Singh didn’t explain how the
extra-contractual statements can provide the basis for a claim for breach of
the implied covenant, particularly where, as here, the contract contained an
integration clause.
UCL, FAL, fraudulent inducement: A UCL claim can’t rest on a
claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  Unfairness: “An act or practice is unfair if
the consumer injury [1] is substantial, [2] is not outweighed by any
countervailing benefit to consumers or to competition, and [3] is not an injury
the consumers themselves could reasonably have avoided.” This is a balancing
test; a practice will be found unfair “when it offends an established public
policy or when the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or
substantially injurious to consumers.”  Singh alleged that Google misrepresented the
likelihood that customers would actually incur charges for a significant volume
of invalid clicks by assuring them that (1) such clicks represent a small
percentage of all clicks; (2) that Google filters out the “vast majority” of
all such clicks; and (3) customers would only pay when interested individuals
click on their ad. But Google disclosed the risk of click fraud in its contract
and elsewhere, and provided a process allowing advertisers to be compensated
for charges related to invalid clicks.
Perhaps most significantly, Singh didn’t plausibly plead that
Google misrepresented the likelihood that customers would actually incur
charges for a significant volume of invalid clicks. Singh’s conclusory
allegations that the claims process provided by Google to deal with invalid
clicks was illusory was insufficient. 
The court applied Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading requirements for fraud
to Singh’s challenges to the following claims:
• “[I]nvalid [or fraudulent] clicks
account for less than 10% of all clicks on AdWords ads.”
• “When Google determines that
clicks are invalid, we try to automatically filter them from your reports and
payments so that you’re not charged for those clicks.”
• “Advertisers rely on the
relevance of our ad placement, our reporting statistics, and the quality of the
clicks their ads receive. Publishers in turn count on advertiser participation,
relevant ads which create a good experience for users, and an accurate and
reliable source of income which contributes to the success of their websites
and business. We take this trust seriously and we know that the Google
advertising networks couldn’t exist without it.”
• “[Google has] a global team which
is dedicated to staying on top of your concerns, monitoring traffic across
Google’s ad network, and preventing advertisers from paying for invalid
traffic.”
• “The vast majority of all invalid
clicks on AdWords ads are caught by our online filters. These filters are
constantly being updated and react to a wide variety of traffic patterns and
indications of click fraud attacks.”
• Investigations prompted by customer
inquiries are “relatively rare” and such investigations identify invalid clicks
representing less than .02% of all clicks.
• “[C]harges are solely based on
Google’s measurements for the applicable Program, unless otherwise agreed to in
writing.”

Singh needed to explain his allegations that these
statements were fraudulent.  He relied on
an “experiment” he conducted, as well as a 2013 article in the Atlantic. Singh
alleged that he created four advertisements, in two pairs, one of which was a
“Standard Ad” and the other an “Experimental Ad” that was gibberish. He
asserted that no person would have clicked on the Experimental Ads, and
therefore extrapolated that all clicks on the Experimental Ads were fraudulent
or invalid; comparing that to the Standard Ads, he concluded that 35-50% of all
clicks on AdWords ads were fraudulent. The experiment was “utterly implausible
and would not be admissible in any form.” 
Nor could Singh use the Atlantic article to bolster his claims. The
article allegedly states that 60 percent of all Internet traffic is the result
of bots, many of which consist of software that provides false ad views. Among
other things, the article undermined Singh’s allegations that he was not aware
of the possibility that the rate of click fraud might be high; as to falsity, “neither
the experiment nor the magazine article says anything about the efficacy of
Google’s filters.” Nor did Singh adequately allege that he was ever charged for
invalid clicks. 

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Overstock ordered to pay multimillion penalty for falsely advertising comparison prices

People v. Overstock.Com, Inc., — Cal.Rptr.3d —-, 2017 WL
2391814, No. A141613 (Cal. Ct. App. Jun. 2, 2017)
The trial court found that Overstock, an online retailer
whose value proposition is “the lowest prices on the Internet,” had engaged in
unfair business practices and false advertising; it granted injunctive relief
and imposed $6,828,000 in civil penalties. The court of appeals affirmed.  One lesson here: there is a lot of documentary evidence, mainly in
emails to suppliers and internal emails, that Overstock knew it was
manipulating price claims; compliance didn’t seem to become a priority in the
company until far too late.
Overstock started mostly with products from businesses that
were liquidating excess inventory, but now gets most of its goods from third
party “fulfillment partners.”  Its
product pages used various terms to compare prices.  At the beginning of the relevant period, it
showed a “List Price” for the product, with the number stricken through, then
Overstock’s price, then a calculation of the difference in dollars and
percentages.  It eventually changed “List
Price” to “Compare at” and then to “Compare.” A company executive testified
that advertisement of reference prices gave customers confidence that they were
shopping at a site that offered real savings. An employee email stated that
“compare at” pricing “definitely helps entice the customer to purchase.”
Products that did not have “compare at” prices suffered reduced sales.  (From 70-90% of Overstock’s products weren’t
at issue here, because they had a list price derived from standard industry
data—these were mostly books, movies, music, and games.)
Before late 2008, Overstock had no process in place to
ensure that all comparison prices were verified. Its policies allowed the list
price to be set by finding the highest price for which an item was sold in the
marketplace, but Overstock didn’t consider whether other Internet retailers had
made any substantial sales at the comparison price. An Overstock manager told
employees, “I need you to find the HIGHEST selling price. We found out it can
include freight, which will make it even higher.”  Another email: “Oh, I think it’s been
established that the ‘List Price’ is egregiously overstated. This place has got
some balls.” Overstock at least sometimes asked a supplier to raise its own
website price to make Overstock’s prices look better or to “bump up” the
manufacturer’s suggested retail price (MSRP). 
Overstock also sometimes used “formulas” to derive list prices, such as
doubling or tripling the cost to Overstock or the usual wholesale cost.
In 2007, a Shasta County resident bought two identical patio
sets that showed a list price of $999 and an Overstock price of $449. He
believed that, because of that supposed retail price, the sets would be of good
quality, but they weren’t. One of the tables had a sticker showing it was sold
by Wal-Mart for $247. Although he received a full refund, the patio set
remained on Overstock’s web site, with the same purported list price, for
“quite a while.” He wasn’t the only one to complain; he also reported the
matter to the district attorney.
In response to the resultant investigation, Overstock sent a
letter to its fulfillment partners about acceptable ways to set a “list price.”  Then Overstock changed its term from “List
Price” to “Compare At,” but for a year there was no change in Overstock’s
policy on how comparison prices were set and Overstock did not have a process
in place to verify that a product had been sold at the comparison price.
Overstock employees still discussed with suppliers the possibility of raising
their MSRP so that Overstock could show a higher discount and Overstock
continued to use comparison prices that were the highest price at which an item
was offered for sale.  Among a random
selection of ten of the top 100 selling products from each Overstock department
in 2008, “compare at” prices were on average 15% higher than the highest actual
selling price on line. Among 10 products from the top 100 items with the
greatest “you save” percentage, the “compare at” prices were 33% higher, and
among a random selection of ten additional products from each department, the
“compare at” prices were 13% higher. 
Overstock then removed the “compare at” pricing from most of
its products and allowed them to be re-posted only if the fulfillment partner
provided a verified reference price. Sales of products without a “compare at”
price dropped 6% or more; conversion increased 9% when “compare at” prices were
added. Overstock also formed a “pricing validation team” to verify that the
items it sold were actually sold elsewhere at “compare at” prices, and to
re-verify those prices every 90 days. The team sought to verify the highest
street price for the product. There were still instances in which Overstock
discussed the possibility of the partners raising the prices for their products
on their own websites or on Amazon in order to create a higher comparison
price. The team sometimes verified a high street price for an item that was
similar, rather than identical, to that sold on Overstock.
Overstock received numerous complaints from customers that
the “compare at” prices were inflated.
The People’s expert testified at trial that, as advertised
reference prices increase, the price that a consumer thinks something costs, perception
of product quality, and the “perceived value” of the product all increase,
which makes consumers less likely to continue comparison shopping and more
likely to buy.  Although consumers often
discount reference price claims, the claims still affect their perceptions, and
many don’t think the reference prices are inflated. Overstock’s expert concluded
that a majority of Overstock’s customers didn’t notice or care about reference
prices. However, he acknowledged that ARP’s can increase customer loyalty and
that between 70-75% of participants in a survey he conducted believed such
terms as “MSRP,” “compare,” and “compare at” reflected “regular average”
prices.
Along with rejecting Overstock’s challenge to the
application of a four-year statute of limitations, the court of appeals also
held that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s factual findings
that it violated the FAL and the UCL.
Overstock argued that its list prices were “fair
estimate[s]” insofar as they were based on markups that are generally used to
set retail prices over wholesale, and that the trial court had no reason to
conclude that “List Price” was more than an estimate.  But on the face of the advertising itself,
the trial court’s conclusion that “List Price” means “list price”—which Webster’s
defines as “the basic price of an item as published in a catalog, price list,
or advertisement”—required no other logical or evidentiary support.
The trial court also ruled that Overstock knowingly misled
consumers when it used prices from similar products and formulas to set some
reference prices during the time that it used the terms “Compare at” and
“Compare,” unaccompanied by qualifiers such as “similar.”  Experimental and survey results indicated
that, “with respect to any particular nomenclature, a significant portion of
consumers view the given label as reflecting a ‘regular/average price’” for the
same product.  Overstock argued that the
People didn’t submit substantial evidence that consumers were actually misled,
but that’s not the standard: likely deception is. 
The misleading character of these terms appeared on their
faces. “Specifically, the use of strikethrough font (‘Compare at $190.00’)
followed by ‘today’s price’ and then a precise calculation of the purported
savings, clearly suggests the actual item’s price has been reduced.”  Plus, the evidence showed that Overstock’s
practice invited other abuses, such as using items that weren’t truly similar.
In one case, an Overstock email said: “Comparing this dress to a DVF dress is
like comparing a Lexus to a Geo Metro.” Another email to a fulfillment partner
said: “Just make sure similar size and materials [are used for comparison]. The
higher [the price] the better.”  The
FTC’s Guides Against Deceptive Pricing also supported this conclusion, since it
requires that comparisons be to merchandise “of essentially similar quality and
obtainable in the area.”
There was also sufficient evidence that Overstock’s use of
formulas was misleading. Overstock manipulated markups to achieve a specific
amount of “savings” for the consumer, e.g., “If the item is a true close out
and can’t be found anywhere online I will make sure the MSRP listed provides a
40 to 60 percent discount.” “Advertisements showing a ‘compare at’ price
followed by a calculation of savings down to the penny, without informing
consumers they are looking at an estimated (and possibly manipulated) price,
manifestly had the capacity to mislead.”
Likewise it was misleading for Overstock to set ARP’s “based
on the highest price that can be found without regard to the prevailing market
price and without any disclosure of the practice.”  One customer testified that she was
“outraged” to learn that Overstock used the highest available price, which she
called “lying.”  The FTC’s guide likewise
wanted realistic comparison prices.  The
People’s expert also testified about a study that showed 72% of participants
thought such terms as “regular price,” “compare at” or “manufacturer’s
suggested list price” represented either the price an item usually sold at or
its price at most other stores, rather than a fictitious, inflated price. Overstock’s
own survey, conducted by a third party, showed that more than half of
respondents wanted price comparisons to reflect the “Average retail price,” and
Overstock’s own expert agreed that a substantial majority of consumers thought
that the terms at issue represented “regular average” prices.  Many actual customers complained that the “Compare
at” prices were inflated.
The FAL applies to an untrue or misleading statement “which
is known, or which by the exercise of reasonable care should be known, to be
untrue or misleading,” and Overstock argued that there wasn’t sufficient
evidence that it knew its practices would mislead consumers.  When formulas or “similar” products were used
during the “List Price Era,” Overstock knew the term “List Price” was false.  As for the rest, the same evidence that
supported misleadingness strongly supported an inference that Overstock knew or
should have known of this likely impact. 
Overstock argued that its own hyperlinked disclosures showed
that Overstock wasn’t knowingly misleading. But Overstock’s own disclosures
about how it defined “compare” proved nothing about what the advertisements
would reasonably be expected to convey to the consumer. (Those disclosures said
“List price is not necessarily the lowest price at which the product is
commonly sold, and often will be higher than the actual price at which the
product is sold.” Overstock conceded that its disclosures “may not have been
prominent enough” to affect consumer understanding.)
Proof of knowledge can be circumstantial. The “you save”
calculation in the advertisement would be useful only if consumers perceived
the ARP as a “real” price. “That this was consumers’ perception—and that
Overstock knew this—is demonstrated by the irate communications to Overstock
when customers discovered the ARP’s were not real, but inflated prices,” e.g.:
“[T]his is not the truth since there is NO place that this camera truly sells
for $250.77…. You are advertising lies. This is NOT an incredible savings.
The market price of this camera is $99.99, NOT $250.77.”
Penalties: Both the UCL and the FAL authorize civil
penalties of up to $2,500 for each violation:
In assessing the amount of the
civil penalty, the court shall consider any one or more of the relevant
circumstances presented by any of the parties to the case, including, but not
limited to, the following: the nature and seriousness of the misconduct, the
number of violations, the persistence of the misconduct, the length of time
over which the misconduct occurred, the willfulness of the defendant’s
misconduct, and the defendant’s assets, liabilities, and net worth.
The trial court did not measure the number of violations by
the number of Californians who saw the offending advertisements or by the
number of sales made through the offending pages, which would both have resulted
in penalties of hundreds of millions of dollars.  Instead, the trial court used the number of
days Overstock violated the statutes, with a daily penalty of $3,500,
calculated as $1,000 for each of the three types of violations (basing ARP’s on
formulas, nonidentical products, and the highest possible price), with an
additional $500 for “the lack of controls that led to various abuses.”  From the date the validation team process was
implemented and Overstock no longer used formulas, the daily penalty dropped to
$2,000.
The trial court found the “ ‘seriousness of the misconduct’
” was moderate in that the misconduct was less egregious than that in other
reported cases, Overstock’s prices were at or below those of its competitors,
and the misconduct affected only some of Overstock’s product lines. But the
offending practices were numerous and persistent, on thousands of product
pages. The court found that Overstock’s conduct was willful, in that it was
inconsistent with the guidelines of the FTC and the BBB. The trial court also
noted that it had declined to order restitution to customers because of the
difficulty of identifying an appropriate award or appropriate recipients, and
that this lack of restitution was a factor in setting the appropriate penalty,
which was the minimum necessary to fulfill the statutory purpose.
Overstock argued that this penalty was an abuse of the
court’s discretion; the court of appeals disagreed. Among other things, the
court rejected Overstock’s argument that there was no “concrete injury” to
consumers. “The fact that Overstock in fact (according to its undisputed
evidence) offered the lowest prices in the market does not mean no injury
occurred.”  The false ads decreased
consumers’ search intentions, increased their perception of the transaction’s
value, and increased the likelihood that they’d return.  There was no restitution awarded because it
was too hard to calculate, not because there was no harm.  Although the penalties here were larger than
those upheld in any published case, that didn’t make them excessive.
Nor did Overstock’s “it’s the government’s fault because
they let us get away with it for so long” argument succeed.  The People didn’t sue until more than three
years after the Shasta County DA began investigating it, and it took an
additional three years for the matter to proceed to trial, allowing penalties
to accumulate. But Overstock waived this issue by never raising it in the trial
court.  Even if it weren’t waived, it was
silly; Overstock was aware of the investigation since 2007 and negotiated a
tolling agreement to delay the start of litigation. “In the meantime, it chose
to continue the offending practices.”
Nor was the penalty so grossly disproportionate to the
gravity of its offense that it violated the Eighth Amendment. “The penalty the
court set was both far below the maximum allowed by statute and well within
Overstock’s ability to pay.”

As for injunctive relief, “‘The remedial power granted under
these sections is extraordinarily broad. Probably because false advertising and
unfair business practices can take many forms, the Legislature has given the
courts the power to fashion remedies to prevent their “use or employment” in
whatever context they may occur.’”  Although the issue was close, the trial court
didn’t abuse its discretion in enjoining the use of formulas, which Overstock
had abandoned in 2008. At and after trial, Overstock continued to take the
position that the use of formulas was proper, and even after ceasing the use of
formulas, it continued to use other misleading practices.  Given the record evidence about Overstock’s
use of inflated MSRPs, it could also be enjoined from unqualified use of the
term, and it could be required to re-validate every 90 days. The fact that it
started doing so voluntarily, after litigation began, didn’t make an injunction
inappropriate.

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Reversing meaning is transformative in use of composition, court rules

Smith v. Cash Money Records, Inc., No. 14-cv-02703 (S.D.N.Y.
May 30, 2017)
In 1982, Jimmy Smith recorded a mostly instrumental album
released by Elektra/Asylum Records titled Off the Top.  The last track is a spoken-word recording
titled “Jimmy Smith Rap” (JSR):
Good God Almighty, like back in the
old days. You know, years ago they had the A&R men to tell you what to
play, how to play it and you know whether it’s disco rock, but we just told
Bruce that we want a straight edge jazz so we got the fellas together Grady
Tate, Ron Carter, George Benson, Stanley Turrentine. Stanley was coming off a
cool jazz festival, Ron was coming off a cool jazz festival. And we just went
in the studio and we did it. We had the champagne in the studio, of course, you
know, compliments of the company and we just laid back and did it. Also, Grady
Tate’s wife brought us down some home cooked chicken and we just laid back and
we was chomping on chicken and having a ball. Jazz is the only real music that’s
gonna last. All that other bullshit is here today and gone tomorrow. But jazz
was, is and always will be. We may not do this sort of recording again, I may
not get with the fellas again. George, Ron, Grady Tate, Stanley Turrentine. So
we hope you enjoy listening to this album half as much as we enjoyed playing it
for you. Because we had a ball.
In 2013, defendants released an album titled Nothing Was the
Same (the “Album”) by Aubrey Drake Graham (Drake). The last song on the album
is “Pound Cake/Paris Morton Music 2,” whose opening samples about 35 seconds of
JSR:
Good God Almighty, like back in the
old days. You know, years ago they had the A&R men to tell you what to
play, how to play it and you know whether it’s disco rock, … but we just went
in the studio and we did it. We had … champagne in the studio, of course, you
know, compliments of the company, and we just laid back and did it…. So we hope
you enjoy listening to this album half as much as we enjoyed playing it for you.
Because we had a ball. …Only real music is gonna last, all that other bullshit
is here today and gone tomorrow.
Some words were rearranged or deleted, but no words were
added. Defendants licensed the JSR recording, but not the composition, whose
copyright was not registered with the Copyright Office or any PRO before the Album’s
release. Smith’s estate argued that it would not have granted a license for the composition
because Jimmy Smith “wasn’t a fan of hip hop.”
The Estate registered the composition copyright thirty-one
years after initial publication, after the sampling; it was not evidence that
the copyright was valid, and there was a disputed issue of fact on authorship.  The lyrics of JSR indicated that it was a
behind-the-scenes recollection of the recording of Off the Top. The statement
on the Off the Top album cover explains that it was recorded with “no charts,
music format or nothing . . . just playing what we felt . . . off the top of
our heads,” but that went only to the recording process, not to the authorship
of the rap.  
Defendants weren’t entitled to summary judgment on
substantial similarity, even if the sampled portion was mostly clichés. The
anti-dissection rule/total concept and feel rule meant that the standard was “a
subjective assessment better suited for a jury than a court.”
However, the fair use analysis went a lot better for
defendants.  The court rejected two
variants: first, that the omission of references to Off the Top made the words
applicable to the process of making Drake’s album, and second, that the
addition of background music, rearrangement of some words, and
contextualization in a seven-minute hip hop track was transformative.  But those things just made the use a
derivative work rather than a pure copy. The use of the words to describe
Drake’s recording process was a use for the “same” purpose as the original.
However, by editing the recording from “Jazz is the only
real music that’s gonna last” to “Only real music is gonna last,” “Drake
transformed Jimmy Smith’s dismissive comment into a statement on the relevance
and staying power of ‘real music,’ regardless of genre.”  The original statement was “an unequivocal
statement on the primacy of jazz over all other forms of popular music.” Defendants’
use transformed this “brazen dismissal of all non-jazz music” into a statement
that “real music,” not limited to jazz, is “the only thing that’s gonna last.”  This was new meaning and a sharply different
purpose.  Plaintiffs argued that the use
couldn’t be transformative because the copied portions weren’t readily
identifiable as JSR and because the track didn’t identify Jimmy Smith.  But this wasn’t a parody case, where
recognizability was important; it was more like Blanch v. Koons:
The critical question is “how the
work in question appears to the reasonable observer,” not the quality or
accessibility of the commentary. The average listener of Pound Cake would
understand the sampled portions of JSR as a statement that, regardless of how a
song was made or how one might classify it, “only real music is gonna last.” Because
this purpose is “sharply different” from Jimmy Smith’s purpose in creating the
original track, Defendants’ use is transformative and this factor weighs in
favor of a finding of fair use.
Factor two: who cares? 
Factor 3: 35 seconds of a one-minute track was okay.  Fair use doesn’t require taking no more than
necessary; the amount was reasonable in proportion to defendants’ needs. The
lines describing the recording of Off the Top “serve to drive the point [on the
importance of ‘real’ music] home.”  That
is, the use makes the point that “many musicians make records in similar ways
(e.g. with the help of A&R experts or the stimulating effects of
champagne), but … only ‘real’ music—regardless of creative process or
genre—will stand the test of time.”  

Factor 4: There was no evidence of an usurpation of the
market for JSR or derivative works.  As “a
spoken-word criticism of non-jazz music at the end of an improvisational jazz
album,” JSR targeted a “sharply different primary market” than Pound Cake, a
hip-hop track. Plaintiffs never attempted to establish a market for licensed derivative
uses until defendants used JSR.  Thus, it
would be unreasonable to conclude that defendants took “sufficiently
significant portions of the original as to make available a significantly
competing substitute.” 

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Certified party lacks standing to challenge certifier’s claims to fairness

Camarda v. Certified Financial Planner Board of Standards,
Inc, 2015 WL 13159050, No. 13-00871 (D.D.C. Jul. 6, 2015)
Westlaw’s impenetrable algorithm threw this up, and I’m
blogging it now because of the relatively rare discussion of direct causation
under Lexmark.  Jeffrey Camarda and Kimberly Camarda, two
financial advisors, sued the Certified Financial Planner Board of Standards (not
to be confused with that other, more prominent CFPB), a non-profit organization
that sets and enforces professional standards in personal financial planning by
granting rights to certificants to use the certification marks owned by
defendant. The Camardas were certified to use defendant’s marks for 22 years
and 14 years respectively.
The contract between CFPB and its certificants permits CFPB
to enforce its standards of professional conduct through disciplinary proedures.  Among other things, a certificant may
describe his or her practice as “fee-only” if, and only if, all of the
certificant’s compensation from all of his or her client work comes exclusively
from the clients in the form of fixed, flat, hourly percentage or
performance-based fees. In 2011, each plaintiff received a notice of investigation
that they may have violated CFPB rules on “fee-only” claims and were given a
chance to respond. After an evidentiary hearing, the hearing panel found two
allegations supported and recommended to defendant’s disciplinary and ethics
commission that a public letter of admonition be issued; plaintiffs appealed
the commission’s decision to a five-person appeals committee, which affirmed.
First, plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim failed “because
a plaintiff may not re-litigate the disciplinary proceedings of a private
organization in court.”  [Query about the
interaction between this idea and the rule that certification marks must be, in
essence, fairly available—the court points out that plaintiffs didn’t lose the
ability to use the certification mark, but I can imagine a situation where that
wasn’t enough if disfavored parties expected public condemnations as the price
of using the mark.]  Here, there was no
breach, because the CFPB followed its own rules and procedures.  “In reviewing a disciplinary action by a
private organization, courts do not ‘second-guess’ the organization’s
interpretation of its own rules or its evaluation of the evidence.”  Plaintiffs alleged that they were singled out
for enforcement in violation of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. But violation
of this duty required either bad faith or conduct that was arbitrary and
capricious, of which there was no evidence; allegedly selective enforcement isn’t
enough.
A common law unfair competition claim failed because the
parties weren’t competitors. Under D.C. law, the common-law tort of unfair
competition “is not defined in terms of specific elements, but by the
description of various acts that would constitute the tort if they resulted in
damage,” including: “defamation, disparagement of a competitor’s goods or
business methods, intimidation of customers or employees, interference with
access to the business, threats of groundless suits, commercial bribery,
inducing employees to sabotage, false advertising or deceptive packaging likely
to mislead customers into believing goods are those of a competitor.” But as a
noncompetitor, the CFPB couldn’t be liable for unfair competition.  In addition, the plaintiffs didn’t show
unfairness, because the CFPB was contractually authorized to enforce discipline
standards against them.

The Lanham Act claim failed, not because of lack of direct
competition, but because of the related problem of causation.  Under Lexmark,
a plaintiff “ordinarily must show economic or reputational injury flowing
directly from the deception wrought by the defendant’s advertising.”  Plaintiffs alleged that the CFPB made false or
misleading claims about its “fair enforcement of its rules regarding
professional conduct and its adherence to the Disciplinary Rules.”  Even assuming falsity, that statement didn’t
cause the plaintiffs any direct harm. The harm was from the sanctions imposed
on the plaintiffs, which the CFPB had every right to impose.  The harm from falsely advertising procedures
as fair was “too indirect an injury to sustain liability under section 43(a).”

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Free to good home: parody t-shirts

I’m cutting down on my collection a bit as I move.  Let me know if anyone wants these:

Moose/Batman logo; 2 priceless tees; “Lacoste Intolerant”

Beer parody

Campbell’s, Seuss, Starbucks, Morton Salt; pole lamp not included

ETA: dug out more

Another rude Starbucks, Ho Depot, McDonald’s/Marijuana

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9th Circuit accepts irreparable harm finding in TM licensee breach case

2Die4Kourt
v. Hillair Capital Management, LLC, — Fed.Appx. —-, 2017 WL 2304376, No.
16-56217 (9th Cir. May 26, 2017)
 
The district court enjoined Hillair from
using trademarks/publicity rights owned by 2Die4Kourt, Kimsaprincess, Inc.,
Khlomoney, Inc., Kourtney Kardashian, Kim Kardashian West, and Khloe Kardashian
(“[k]ollectively, Kardashians”).  Hillair
was a licensee; the agreement contemplated that Hillair would make quarterly
royalty payments based on product sales. “Although the Kardashians were
supposed to provide invoices for the royalty payments owed to them, the
Agreement states that their failure to do so did not affect their ‘rights to
receive the amounts due,’” so Hillair’s argument that it was okay that it never
made any royalty payments in the absence of an invoice failed.  Anyway, Hillair continued to use the
Kardashian marks during the agreement and after its termination.  “A party to a contract cannot both refuse to
perform its obligations and continue to avail itself of the contract’s
benefits, even if it believes that the other party has breached.”
The district court didn’t abuse its
discretion in rejecting Hillair’s unclean hands defense.  The Kardashians’ alleged breaches of the
licensing agreement (apparently their behavior with respect to competing
products) weren’t equivalent to false advertising, since Hillair didn’t
identify false statements about any products.
The district court also didn’t abuse its
discretion in finding that the balance of equities favored the Kardashians even
though Hillair presented evidence demonstrating that it likely would be forced
to shut down, terminate its employees, and default on its obligations if it was
enjoined, because this irreparable harm resulted from allegedly infringing
conduct.  To the extent Hillair was
challenging the finding of irreparable harm to the Kardashians, the court again
didn’t abuse its discretion.  “While
irreparable harm may not be presumed based on a likelihood of success in a
trademark action, ‘[e]vidence of loss of control over business reputation and
damage to goodwill c[an] constitute irreparable harm,’” and using the
Kardashian’s trademarks after the termination of their agreement to release an
unapproved line of cosmetics was “enough to support a finding, at this early
stage, that the Kardashians likely will lose some measure of control over their
business reputation in the absence of injunctive relief.”  
Comment: This isn’t exactly consistent with the requirement of proof imposed in non-licensee cases, but it’s the 9th Circuit.

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Fee award justified in case involving fraud on the PTO

Amusement Art, LLC v. Life is Beautiful, LLC, 2017 WL 2259672, No. 2-14-cv-08290
(C.D. Cal. May 23, 2017)
Initial ruling discussed here.  Defendant LIB hosts the Life is Beautiful festival in Las Vegas, Nevada—an annual event that features music, art, food, and other programming. One of the logos initially associated with the event was an image of a heart made of splattered paint. Amusement Art is owned by artist Thierry Guetta and his wife Debora Guetta. Guetta’s first solo art exhibition, held in 2008, was entitled “Life is Beautiful” and Guetta incorporated that phrase into some of his artwork. Guetta also previously produced artwork depicting a heart accented by splattered paint. Amusement Art sued for trademark and copyright infringement and related claims.
After the lawsuit began, LIB determined that a number of the statements of use Amusement submitted to the PTO to receive “Life is Beautiful” registrations were false. Although Amusement voluntarily surrendered 8 of its registrations, it continued to claim a 2014 registration in connection with festivals and art events.  The court granted LIB’s motion for summary judgment on all claims and its counterclaims for cancellation.  As for the trademark claims based on “Life is Beautiful,” the court found them barred by the doctrine of unclean hands.  For trademark claims based on the heart design, the design didn’t function as a mark, nor did Amusement show that the design was valid and protectable.  On the copyright claim, no rational jury could find the two images were “virtually identical,” “as is required when asserting a copyright claim based on a ubiquitous image such as a heart design.”
Here, the court granted LIB’s fee request as to the Lanham Act claims, but not the copyright claim, reducing its request through various deductions to a bit over $922,000 in total, out of a request for roughly twice that.  Applying Octane Fitness, the court reasoned that a party’s bad motivation or fraudulent conduct is “archetypal” conduct warranting fee-shifting under the Lanham Act.  Thus, fraud on the PTO is routinely deemed to be exceptional.  Given the extent of the fraudulent conduct in this case, the court found that LIB was entitled to recover for fees incurred in connection with the “Life is Beautiful” trademark claims.  The infringement claims were initially based on eight fraudulently-obtained registrations where Amusement claimed the use of the “Life is Beautiful” mark in connection with 257 categories of goods, but it obtained the registrations by staging photographs and submitting false declarations. Amusement responded that it surrendered the eight fraudulently-obtained registrations and that the infringement claim was ultimately premised on a ninth registration that was not fraudulently-obtained. Nope.  Amusement “attempted to fraudulently ‘secure a monopoly over most plausible uses of the phrase “Life is Beautiful” without actually investing any resources into developing the goodwill of their brand.’ Plaintiff then subjected others to the burden of litigation on the basis of all of those marks.”  Its abandonment of the fraudulently obtained marks didn’t clean its hands, nor did it make this case unexceptional.
LIB argued that the weakness of the heart design infringement claim also justified a fee award. Amusement’s 30(b)(6) witness stated that she considered the heart design a copyright image rather than a trademark image. Also, there was a lack of evidence substantiating Amusement’s claim that the limited use of the design in Guetta’s artwork rose to the level of a protectable trademark. The court agreed that the claim was “exceptionally weak.” Even if the court ignored the corporate representative’s statement, Amusement submitted “no evidence of actual use of the mark as a trademark and no evidence that the mark would be recognized by a consumer as a source identifier. … [T]his case is not one where there was inadequate evidence to create a triable issue but rather almost no evidence.”
However, the court denied fees on the copyright claim.  LIB pointed to the absence of any evidence of direct copying and the visual differences between the images.  Amusement did own a valid copyright, though, and “the evidence suggests this action was brought in good faith to protect that copyright. Moreover, although the court concluded that a copyright claim pertaining to a ubiquitous image such as this heart design must be evaluated under the virtually identical standard, it was not unreasonable for Plaintiff to urge a less stringent standard.” There were in fact similarities between the images, even if not enough to create a triable issue of fact. Nor were deterrence interests served by awarding fees, since owners of valid copyrights “are entitled to bring enforcement actions against images that bear visual similarity to their copyrighted design.”
As for apportioning the time spent between Lanham Act and other claims, including congruent state law claims, much of the work related to all the claims.  Moreover, the parties addressed the state law claims for unfair competition and common law trademark infringement only as derivative of the Lanham Act claims.  Ultimately, the court concluded that work related to the Lanham Act claim made up 60% of the total reasonable attorneys’ fees here.  

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high-tech look can’t fool reasonable consumers about orthotics

Kommer v. Bayer Consumer Health, — F.Supp.3d —-, 2017 WL
2231162, 16 Civ. 1560 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2017)
Bayer sells Dr. Scholl’s foot care products, including the
Dr. Scholl’s Custom Fit Orthotics Inserts. In many stores, they are sold
alongside defendants’ point-of-sale kiosk, the Dr. Scholl’s Custom Fit
Orthotics Foot Mapping Kiosk, which features a platform for customers to stand
on and a computer monitor at top. 

The instructions direct customers to remove
their shoes and step onto the Kiosk platform; the system recommends the best
Insert model for the user’s feet. There are fourteen different models of
pre-fabricated, pre-packaged Inserts, and the Kiosk will always recommend one
of the models. The Dr. Scholl’s website touts the custom fit kiosk to “recommend
the Custom Fit Orthotic Inserts that are right for you.”  The complaint alleged that the arch
measurements from the kiosk were imprecise, depending on an individual’s weight
and stance, and that reliance on arch measurements isn’t sufficient to
prescribe a custom fit orthotic.  Kommer
experienced foot pain; he paid $333 for custom orthotics, then tried the kiosk
and ended up buying the recommended inserts for $50, allegedly higher than
similar inserts that sell for $10.  He
alleged that, had he known the truth that the inserts were “standardized, mass
produced over-the-counter shoe inserts” he would not have bought them, and that
his foot pain increased after using them while his prescribed orthotics
relieved the pain. 
The basic claims, brought under N.Y. GBL §§ 349 and 350,
were that defendants (1) misled consumers into believing that the Inserts were
“functionally equivalent” to orthotics fitted and prescribed by a medical
professional, and (2) misled customers into believing that the Inserts are
individualized to a consumer’s “unique physical characteristics,” and not
simply “generic, pre-fabricated, mass-produced, over-the-counter shoe inserts.”
The allegedly misleading acts included the use of “Custom Fit Orthotic” in the
product name, the Kiosk’s use of “pseudo-technology,” and the use of
designations “such as ‘CF440’ ” on the Insert models—designations which Kommer
alleged weren’t found on other Dr. Scholl’s products, and which “suggest a
level of precision and exactitude that is not present in the product.”
The court first found that Kommer lacked Article III standing
to seek injunctive relief, regardless of the public policy reasons for allowing
such standing.  Kommer essentially
conceded that he wouldn’t buy the inserts, or be misled by the marketing, again
in the future.
The court also found that Kommer hadn’t plausibly alleged
material misleadingness, which is evaluated from the objective standpoint of a
reasonable consumer. “At the point that the consumer is directed to select a
pre-packaged Insert stacked along shelves on the side of the Kiosk … it is no
longer reasonable for him to think that he is getting a product ‘individually
designed’ for his feet.”

In the alternative, Kommer argued that the marketing would
lead consumers to believe that the Inserts are the functional equivalent of
prescribed, individually-made orthotics.  But the kiosk instructions also contained a disclaimer:
“The Dr. Scholl’s Custom Fit Orthotic Center uses state of the art technology
to measure your feet, but does not diagnose medical conditions. It is not
intended to take the place of your podiatrist. See your podiatrist as needed
for diagnosis and treatment of medical conditions.”  Disclaimers aren’t always sufficient, but
this one was. It was printed in “reasonably-sized font right at the top of the
Instructions” and was sufficiently clear even before a consumer made a purchase
or even stepped on the kiosk. Nor was it inconsistent with defendants’ other
representations, and it was unclear how designations such as “CF440” would lead
a reasonable consumer to believe that he was getting over-the-counter inserts comparable
to prescribed ones, “particularly when Plaintiff does not allege that such
designations are unique to, or even typical of, the latter.”  Kommer didn’t explain how “high
technology-looking” marketing was inherently deceptive.  “To the extent that a consumer may
overestimate the function of the Kiosk … the disclaimer provides adequate clarification
of its capabilities.”

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