Pro tip: don’t refer to delayed TM claim as “lottery ticket”

Dropbox secured a rare laches ruling based in significant part on internal discussions by the other claimant to “dropbox” about how delaying a claim until after Dropbox’s IPO would increase the payout.  Via DuetsBlog.

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Truthful report about injunction not misleading, even if injunction shouldn’t have been issued

Peek v. Whittaker, 2016 WL 6806265,  No. 13-cv-1188 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 2016)
The parties, floor care businesses, are in a litigation
deathmatch; this case is a follow-on to a state court lawsuit.  Whittaker sold carpet cleaning machines and
fluids to other businesses that needed to clean their carpets. Whittaker’s
Director of Sales was Paul Offutt, who worked under a contract that included a
non-compete provision.  When Whittaker
told Offutt that Offutt’s contract would not be renewed upon its expiration in
June 2008, Stephen Peek told Offutt “The hell with them. Why don’t you look
into doing something with me? Let’s do something together.” The two created
Clear Floor Care, LLC and took on another Whittaker employee, who took
documents with him.
“Whittaker got wind of this, and sued in state court to nip
this new venture in the bud.”  He
obtained a preliminary injunction barring the defendants from directly or
indirectly engaging in any business that competed with Whittaker, soliciting
current, former, or prospective customers of Whittaker, soliciting employees of
Whittaker, or using any of Whittaker’s trade secrets. Several years later, in
April 2013, “after extended discovery, and after the non-compete provision in
Offutt’s contract had timed out, the state court went in the other direction
and granted summary judgment to Peek et al., concluding that Whittaker was
unable to prove its claims that the state court defendants had actually taken
or used any trade secrets.”
Peek then sued, arguing that the state court lawsuit was
baseless, and that Whittaker knew as much from Day One.  The court rejected Lanham Act claims based on Whittaker’s
statements about the lawsuit.  Whittaker
sent the preliminary injunction order to three people who worked for two
companies (Tandus and Shaw Carpet). These companies were “carpet mills” who weren’t
customers of Whittaker nor potential customers of Clear Floor Care, LLC, but
they make carpet cleaning and maintenance recommendations to their customers.
By contrast, the parties’ clients or potential clients are
organizations in need of carpet cleaning equipment, such as convention centers
and personal care facilities. There was no evidence that any such entity
received a copy of the preliminary injunction order. Thus, the dissemination
wasn’t “commercial advertising or promotion.” 
Even if the carpet mills had constituted a relevant purchasing public,
dissemination to three people wouldn’t be enough.

Moreover, Peek couldn’t show deceptiveness.  The preliminary injunction existed, and Peek
couldn’t show misleadingness.  Even if
the injunction had been procured with false testimony, that wouldn’t deceive
relevant purchasers because it was a real injunction.  “It was not as if Whittaker disseminated an
injunction that it did not have, or stated that the injunction prohibited the
Plaintiffs from doing more than what they were actually prohibited from doing.
Whittaker disseminated an actual injunction that had the full force of law.”

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When Lexmark raises the standard: competitor fails to show harm causation from literal falsity

Snac Lite, LLC v. Nuts ‘N More, LLC, 2016 WL 6778268, No. 14-cv-01695
(N.D. Ala. Nov. 16, 2016)
Snac Lite sued NNM for misrepresenting the protein content
of its specialty nut butters.  The court
granted summary judgment, despite past literally false advertising, because of
Snac Lite’s inability to show harm causation. 
While Lexmark appears expansive,
it can have contractionary effects at the summary judgment stage.
Snac Lite sells four types of peanut butters and almond
butters with added pea protein, flax seed, and other nutrients, marketing them
as more healthy alternatives to traditional, non-fortified nut butters; it also
adds sugar. Its products sell at higher retail prices than many mass market
peanut butters.  Snac Lite sells its
products at grocery stores such as Walmart, Publix, Giant Eagle, Shop Rite,
Kroger, and HEB, as well as GNC, Vitamin Shoppe, and other “mom and pop health
food stores.”  In 2012, Snac Lite
recalled all its products due to salmonella contamination at one of its
manufacturers’ facilities. Snac Lite didn’t resume selling its products for
several months after the recall while it looked for a new manufacturer.
NNM also sells enhanced high protein peanut and almond
butters, using added whey protein, fiber, organic flax, and the sweetener
xylitol, derived from birch; it has more flavors than Snac Lite (e.g.,
cinnamon). NNM also promotes its products as enhanced alternatives to
traditional nut butters, and its nut butters sell for even more per jar.  NNM’s “brand personality” is
fitness-oriented, and its products are sold at fitness and supplement shows,
GNC stores, Whole Foods stores, and through online retailers. Unlike Snac Lite,
NNM often uses social media websites and touts its products by highlighting its
“celebrity” customers.  In March 2013, NNM
appeared on the network television show Shark
Tank
, pitching to prospective investors. As part of their pitch, NNM’s
representatives touted its nut butters as containing 14 grams of protein per
serving. NNM ultimately obtained capital from two of the investors on the show,
and appeared in two of the show’s follow-up episodes.
Snac Lite had 21 of NNM’s products independently tested and
found a protein content less than eighty percent of the amount of protein
claimed in NNM’s labels and advertising. Until 2014, NNM’s products featured
the claim “14 grams of protein” on their nutrition labels and elsewhere on the
products, displays, and in advertising. 
In 2014, NNM reformulated the products and changed its labeling and
advertising to reflect the “new” protein content, 12 grams.
Snac Lite tried to show damages with two experts; neither
sufficed.  One, Dr. Robicheaux, spoke to
employees at two GNC stores in Birmingham, Alabama and reviewed email messages
sent to a representative of NNM. He conducted internet research to determine
the benefits of a high protein diet, and to learn more about NNM’s target
customers.  He concluded that the
determinant attribute for potential buyers of high protein nut butters is
protein content, and that misrepresentation of protein content was thus likely
to materially deceive potential customers, leading to a significant diversion
of sales from other high protein nut butter sellers.
The court excluded Dr. Robicheaux’s proffered opinion
because it was unreliable and not supported by a reliable methodology.  He didn’t speak to any customers, conduct
customer surveys, conduct focus groups, or interview any authorized
representative of NMM’s distributors or retailers. He didn’t analyze NMM’s
marketing strategy, either.  While survey
or market research isn’t required to show causation, there needed to be
something to show the impact of false advertising on  Snac Lite’s sales.  That is, causation requires the expert to
show “both that consumers chose Defendant’s products over Plaintiff’s products,
and that consumers’ choices were connected to Defendant’s false
advertising.” 
He also failed to account for additional variables that might
have affected the parties’ sales positions. Experts don’t need to exclude every
possible alternative cause, but “in order to provide reliable testimony an
expert must take into account most relevant factors as to causation.”  NMM’s appearance on Shark Tank was an important factor that needed to be taken into
account, as was the salmonella recall. 
Given the recall, Dr. Robicheaux’s assumption that all of Snac Lite’s sales
losses since 2012 were attributable to NMM’s alleged false advertising was
unlikely.
Similar problems attended the testimony of another witness,
a CPA, who simply calculated all of Snac Lite’s sales declines following 2012,
and then reduced that amount by sales of any product Snac Lite’s representative
admitted were not directly affected by NMM’s presence in the nut butter market.
He didn’t interview any of NMM’s customers and admitted that he couldn’t
otherwise determine why a particular customer would choose to buy less from Snac
Lite. “Notably, in a Lanham Act false advertising case, there is a heightened
risk associated with causation testimony that ignores the competitive market as
a whole.”
NMM thus received summary judgment on the key issue of
causation. Courts may presume causation where a defendant engages in deceptive
comparative advertising, but that wasn’t alleged here.  Courts can presume deception from literal
falsity, but even then the plaintiff must prove harm causation, “here, that
consumers chose Defendant’s products rather than those of Plaintiff.”
There was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
parties were direct competitors, even though they had different nutritional
profiles and were sold in different flavors through different marketing efforts
and strategies.  Direct competition isn’t
required under Lexmark, and the
differences between the parties were not “so vast that they are vying for
different consumers and markets, and therefore no action of Defendant could
have harmed Plaintiff.”  They both sell
premium nut butter products, which are distinguishable from traditional nut
butters, and their products were “available at stores that sell products
intended to promote healthy living.”
Nonetheless, there wasn’t sufficient evidence of harm
causation.  Snac Lite sought lost
profits, requiring it to establish actual lost sales as a result of the false
advertising, which it couldn’t do.  Along
with comparative advertising, courts can presume causation in “two-player
market” cases and trademark infringement cases, but this case involved none of
those situations.  Snac Lite needed to
connect its losses to the false advertising, and it couldn’t, while NMM
presented evidence of other causes; Snac Lite even experienced losses with
respect to certain retail customers who never stocked NMM’s products.

Similarly, though Snac Lite sought disgorgement of NMM’s
products, it would only be entitled to that remedy if it established a
violation of the Lanham Act, and that requires causation.  Indeed, the court doubted whether Snac Lite
had standing under Lexmark.  At the summary judgment stage, mere
allegations weren’t sufficient, though disputed facts had to be construed in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Under Lexmark, a plaintiff must “ordinarily show economic or reputational
injury flowing directly from the deception wrought by the defendant’s
advertising” in order to have standing. Without “intending to conflate”
causation and proximate causation, the court held that, at a minimum, some
evidence of proximate causation is required at the summary judgment stage.  Pre-Lexmark
caselaw suggesting that causation need not be established for disgorgement was
no longer good law.

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Jaszi festschrift–abbreviated panel 4

Pam Samuelson
Reflections
Praised Jaszi’s
leadership in fighting White Paper, Digital Future Coalition; the DMCA could
have been much worse. Reached out to people who think about copyright ownership
who aren’t lawyers.
Panel 4 – Pedagogy
Plus
Joseph Liu and Alfred
Yen, In Praise of a Classic
Copyright textbook,
now in 10th edition.  Reflections
on the textbook based on creation of own textbook.  Jaszi’s textbook: narrative thread strong,
but over 1000 pages.  That could make it
difficult for students to swallow, or, if you assigned only chunks, lost
narrative thread.  Their own book: 750
pages—can go through whole thing; fewer case notes.
Jack Lerner
DMCA exemption:
making the case with the facts with extensive factfinding for filmmakers.  Lots of different jobs for students in
developing facts, discussing with experts, preparing testimony. 

[sick child; had to
leave—sorry!]

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Jaszi Festschrift, Panel 3 Fair use

Michael Donaldson, Reflections:
More lobbyists in Congress for © industries than there are members of Congress.  But fair use guidelines for documentary film
weren’t threatening, especially once there was insurance for filmmakers who
used the guidelines.  Good fair use
decisions, e.g. on replicating scenes from Deep
Throat
for Lovelace.  Fictional films based on factual situations:
pushback from studios, which clear everything; they don’t care.  Clear the spines of books visible on a
bookshelf. Independent filmmakers don’t have time, personnel, or money to do
that and have to rely on fair use. We found it fairly easy to call these films
hybrids, so when they were dealing w/historical facts we used the same logic as
in best practices.  Three-question safe
harbor developed in our office. When we write our opinion letters we start with
the statute, though it’s not always as much help as one would like; our safe
harbor/best practices are more helpful.  Difference
b/t major studios and small filmmakers: Major studios only relied on fair use
in biopic about Steve Jobs, and sadly cut down substantially on the amount of
the commercial they were using.  Ringgold case: the defendant didn’t
develop an argument for why it was important to use the print on the wall to
signal commitment to African-American culture; the script didn’t call attention
to why it was important to use that print (but that wasn’t necessary for the
lawyers to explain why it was an important signifier of African-American church
culture).
Panel 3 – Fair Use
Jonathan Band,
Copyright and the Telling of History
Recent fair use
decisions have significantly helped solve the problem copyright causes
historians, a shorthand for people who want to make use of historical clips—documentary
filmmakers, academics, etc.  Long © term
is the source of the problem.  Search
engine precedents: thumbnails, snippets. 
Visible uses in the course of search are fair.  Preservation and identification have become
much easier.  Use in telling the story is
also a transformative purpose.  Bill
Graham v. Dorling Kindersley. Original use was to tell people where/when the
concert was; reuse had historical purpose.  (By contrast, use just to make you laugh might
not work, as in recent Who’s on First case.)
More complicated: Bouchat
v. Ravens: Baltimore Ravens logo.  Flying
shield logo turned out to be infringing, so they redesigned it.  But they have all this footage of the games
in the first three season where they used the infringing shield. Under what
circumstances can you use the footage? 
Multiple decisions, some make more sense than others; one decision
disallowed the use in NFL highlight films because they didn’t think it was
really historical, only entertaining and promotional for Ravens games/NFL.
Using still images, even in a display in corporate office, was more museum-like
and fair use. Later case: telling more of a story about the draft picks, and
that was seen to be a fair use.  That’s
more like a real documentary than the highlight films; he’s not sure that line
makes sense.  The complicating factor is that
the Ravens and the NFL were the initial infringers; maybe a 2 strikes rule (for
football). 
Fox News v. NJ
Management Gp.: used image of 9/11 fireman juxtaposed against Iwo Jima photo;
Fox was trying to say that they didn’t need to license that b/c they were
commemorating the event.  The court thought
it was more promotional for a broadcast/part of advertising.  Skeptical of transformative purpose. 
Recent fair use
jurisprudence can address how family members or owners of estate want to use ©
to protect the image of a dead person: MLK Jr. and the movie Selma, where they rewrote speeches to
avoid threats.  So they don’t use King’s
actual words but paraphrases. Fair use is a critical tool in preventing the
airbrushing of history.  Prof. Jaszi has
made this tool much more effective in preventing such airbrushing.
Rebecca Tushnet, Fair
Use Hopefulness
I’m here to praise
Professor Jaszi’s work making fair use useful: empowering communities and
individuals to rely on fair use, rather than leaving it, as Larry Lessig
famously said, merely the right to hire a lawyer.  Professor Jaszi has spent decades working to
improve the situation of creators in the real world as they navigate copyright
law’s affordances and constraints, because he believes that there are measurable
improvements that can be made even when, as has for too long been the case, the
political system is captured by large institutions with little regard for fair
use or for the budding creators that are the seed corn of culture.  The law’s recent encounters with fandom
provide some reason to think that Professor Jaszi’s eternal hopefulness is
justified.
In media fandom, a
set of communities often constituted primarily by people who identify as women,
practices of remix and appropriation are performed for pleasure and in order to
provide the community with more of what it wants, a “more” that the supposedly
endless productivity of capitalism has been unable or unwilling to provide in
return for money.  Through iteration,
individuals recognize themselves as creators and as part of a community,
sharing meanings and developing identities. 
Although fandom
communities are far from utopias, and can partake of the worst features of
mainstream culture (fans are, after all, people), they also offer feminist
models for understanding the dialogue between individual and community at the
heart of almost all creative practice. 
The apparent contradictions embodied by fanworks—produced by individuals
in a communal context, created by authors while explicitly acknowledging
copying, intermingling noncommercial activities with works created for
commercial profit—find in fandom communities a partial but productive synthesis.
In the legal
literature as well as elsewhere, there are increasing numbers of thick
descriptions of fan communities, types of fanworks—fan art has a different
trajectory than fan fiction or fan video—and different national or historical experiences
of fanworks.  In addition, fanworks are
now increasingly part of the copyright “test suite,” used to examine
implications of various rules or rule changes.  
A rule that would treat noncommercial fanworks as infringing is, by
default, an unattractive one to most copyright academics and even some
policymakers.  I’m very happy about that.
Scholars have also explored
other low-IP spaces, trying to glean why they could remain so creatively
productive despite a lack of propertization.  
Noncommercial fan creators joined an ever-growing list of exemplars of
well-functioning creative communities with only glancing intersection with the
intellectual property system, including stand-up comedians;  American fashion designers;  high-end chefs;  roller derby performers;  magicians; 
tattoo artists;  typeface
creators;  substantial parts of the
pornography industry;  graffiti
artists;  athletes;  and drag queens.  Recent work by Jessica Silbey and others also
shows that even in supposedly “high-IP” spaces, the actual process of creating
and monetizing copyrightable works and patentable inventions relies much more
on intrinsic motivations, attribution, and behavioral norms than on law.  
Meanwhile, a lot was
going on in other areas of copyright law and scholarship.  In the courts, fair use was finally resuming
its role as an important guarantor of free expression.   No longer was fair use merely the “right to
hire a lawyer,” as Larry Lessig famously disparaged it.  In particular, the concept of
“transformativeness,” which is to say, adding a new meaning, message, or
purpose to the existing work, began to have real bite in identifying works that
copyright owners should not be allowed to control, even in the absence of
savage criticism of the original.  
Fanworks are regularly transformative—even when they’re celebratory,
they create new readings and meanings for the originals that inspired
them.  Recent cases involving
noncommercial video are also promising in more readily finding fair use.
Outside the courts,
we’ve seen greater flexing of fair use muscles as well.  Patricia Aufderheide and Peter Jaszi have
shepherded the development of fair use best practices in various
communities.   These include best
practices in online video, though that project (in which I participated)
doesn’t fully cover fan practices.   The various
best practices projects are one implementation of a larger idea: creative
communities can engage in deliberation about how to respect earlier creators’
rights while also preserving important freedoms for subsequent creators.  The best practices projects turn implicit
knowledge into useful guidelines for newcomers as well as providing good
examples for people to think with.
Fan creators have
been participating in legal dialogue in other ways.  The Digital Millennium Copyright Act barred
circumvention of technical measures used to prevent copying,  but provided for a temporary exemption
process where the anticircumvention rules hampered noninfringing uses.  In 2010, following submissions from fans
collected and curated by the OTW, the Copyright Office for the first time
recognized the needs of noncommercial remix artists, including fanvidders, to
make clips of video using high-quality source.  
It specifically mentioned fanvids in its rulemaking, and again when the
exemption was renewed and expanded in 2012, 
and again in 2015.   Although the
Copyright Office does not bind courts in copyright infringement cases, the fact
that fairly conservative copyright lawyers recognized that at least some
fanvids constituted fair use was another indication that fair use law has moved
to where fans need it to be.  (Quite
relevantly, Professor Jaszi was vital in convincing the Electronic Frontier
Foundation that it was worth trying to get an exemption for noncommercial video
makers like vidders, after AU’s IP Clinic helped Peter Decherney secure the
first use-specific exemption for film studies classes in 2007.  We discussed how to frame our arguments with
him, which was very valuable in successfully presenting our evidence to the
Copyright Office.  And I was not as
hopeful as Prof. Jaszi: after the first time I testified, I wrote in my journal
that “Today I did a very good job at something where the extent to which I did
a good job doesn’t matter and should,” but Peter’s optimism was more justified.) 
Outside the United
States, there were also important developments. 
Most notably for fan scholarship, Canada enacted an exception for
noncommercial remix or “user-generated content,” known as the YouTube exception
although it applies to far more than video and audio remix.   Because of this exception, Canada is
arguably ahead of the US in protecting noncommercial transformative works.  In 2014, the Australian Legal Reform
Commission recommended the introduction of fair use into Australian law,
predicting that change’s positive effects on 
“musical compositions, new films, art works and fan fiction.”   Similarly, Peter Yu has been working
tirelessly for reform in Hong Kong that would, among other things, protect
remix and fanworks.  Naming a thing is
usually a predicate for assigning it legal meaning and value, and so these are
important positive developments for noncommercial transformative works.
Fans have also begun
to engage in deliberate activism around copyright reform.  New York Times best-selling author Naomi
Novik, also a fan writer and vidder who helped found the Organization for
Transformative Works (OTW), testified before Congress at hearings on fair
use.   Among other legal initiatives, the
OTW helped renew and expand existing exemptions to §1201’s prohibition on
circumventing digital rights management technologies in order to make remix
videos.  Fan video makers provided the
bulk of the evidence used to secure the remix exemptions, and are likely to
continue to do so.   Even in individual
interactions, fan creators increasingly adopt the language of transformative
fair use, deploying the arguments of fan-friendly lawyers.
Fandom is, after
all, a training ground that teaches people that they can speak creatively, and
that their speech is often welcome.  And
it’s a place where communities of like-minded people meet up and do things
together.  Political possibility is thus
inherent in participatory fandom: transformative fandom is definitionally about
the possibility that things might be different.
Professor Jaszi’s
long-term project of creating numerous fair use best practices is a
particularly striking example of using within-community dialogues to have a
broader impact; but there are also other ways in which the presence of multiple
voices can change how we think about creativity and creative freedoms.
“Work” is a noun in
copyright, but a verb in the everyday practice of creativity.  One of the implications of thinking about
process is that valuable acts of creativity occur even when the results are
similar to those that have come before, because it represents the creative
development of the individual.  And as
Jessica Silbey’s interviews with professional creators and the people who
support them have revealed, economically successful authors and fans are not
all that far apart in their needs and concerns for process. 
Work from across
many kinds of creative spaces also shows that creators place value on
attribution across communities, though with specific twists: in each community,
some creations or credits are shared and others aren’t.  Credit plays an important role in
incentivizing production and structuring community relations and in-community
hierarchies.  Credit is also highly
context-dependent in terms of what suffices for proper credit and who’s
credited.  This extensive variation suggests
some of the problems with a legal attribution right, which can never be as
responsive to context as community norms.
Likewise, communities
always have people who do the difficult and underappreciated work of making the
community function—for the derby girls David Fagundes studied, the work was running
the master name roster, but it can be making sure that the chairs are set up
and that the coffee is brewed for a local meeting, or paying the website
hosting costs and writing the code for a fan fiction archive, something Abigail
De Kosnik has written about.   If we
value communities, we need to know more about how to keep those structural
features in place, especially as they seem to degrade in broader society—and we
need to think about how gendered expectations of work have contributed to their
structural invisibility.  
How should the law
react to the kinds of variations we see? 
I have a few lessons to suggest. 
One direct legal
lesson from the seemingly endless variety among fanworks is the importance of
epistemic humility.  Because different
audiences may read a new work in varying ways, some may see parody and
transformation while others see merely repetition.  To take a recent copyright example, where
some people saw feminist toy company Goldieblox’s rewriting of the Beastie Boys
song “Girls” as feminist and critical, others claimed that the original song
was already mocking the sexism Goldieblox sought to criticize in its ad for an
engineering toy directed at girls.   The
lesson of this inevitable multiplicity is that no one group’s reactions should
be prioritized in assessing transformativeness; where an interpretive community
finds a new meaning or message in a new work based on an existing work, that
should strongly favor fair use.
A broader, though
perhaps less helpful, lesson for the law is that it doesn’t do particularly
well at regulating relations within communities.  The creative ecosystem is a blooming, buzzing
confusion of different kinds of creators, and of norms that differ as between
insiders and outsiders.   For example, in
many areas of media fandom, creating unauthorized new stories based on the work
of profit-seeking copyright owners isn’t just fine, it’s constitutive of
creative fandom.  However, doing the same
thing to a work of fan fiction—creating a fanwork of a fanwork—without the
original creator’s permission is highly controversial.  Fan art is routinely sold, but “pulling to
publish”—removing fan fiction from online distribution and rewriting it so that
it can be sold as a separate work—is controversial, perhaps precisely because
it seems to be withdrawing a gift that has been reciprocated with gifts of
feedback and praise.   These differing
norms by medium are an example of the kind of context sensitivity—and lack of
fully settled rules—that communities routinely produce and that generic legal
regimes find hard to replicate.
Low IP-communities
are also spaces of creative risk-taking. 
In transformative fandom, any given story is just one of many featuring
the same characters; you can kill them all and see if that works, and give them all babies and happily ever
after and see if that works, and so on.  Similarly,
fanworks can easily experiment with form—not just the short story (for which
there is an extremely limited commercial market) but also with poetry, mixed
media, and other innovations.   Fanworks
are also well-known for experimenting with content, especially sexual content, and
for providing stories that feature heroes other than straight white men.   People
who are drawn in by the presence of favorite characters are willing to take
more chances in their media consumption than they otherwise would.
When they succeed,
the experiments found in fandom can also be the source of important and
economically significant innovations.  Fifty
Shades of Gray is a controversial example, but it involves a classic innovation
story of the kind studied by Eric von Hippel: a “user” who did not
professionally produce the text at issue customized it for her own particular
interests (rewriting Twilight without supernatural elements and with a lot of
explicit sex).  The customized version
proved popular with other users.  This
altered version was then commercialized (during which process some of the
rougher edges were smoothed over).  The
example of Fifty Shades has led commercial publishers to seek to satisfy a
previously unrecognized market for written erotica that appeals to women, a
market they had been unable even to see before a revised fanwork illuminated
the demand. 
So, another lesson
is that the ability to move into and out of the formal economy is an important
part of the creative cycle.  To deem an
experimental act of creativity infringing because of its potential connection
to economic reward risks shutting down that generative flow. Just as Uber,
Airbnb, and other startups are trying to turn once limited, often freely
offered personal interactions into monetized transactions in which a
third-party intermediary makes most of the profit, copyright owners see the
possibility of controlling every creative expression related to their
works.  But to do so would be both futile
and potentially deadly to creativity.
Feminists working in
intellectual property need to talk about the way that our pleasures are
mobilized in order to keep us providing uncompensated value to copyright
owners: after all, we like it.   One
ongoing goal is to make economic hybridity less repressive and exploitative
than the coopation offered by initiatives such as Kindle Worlds.  As commercial entities move from suppression
to cooptation, our legal and practical strategies must change as well.  Continued insistence that commercial
motivations are not fatal to fair use defenses is one important part of these
strategies. But supporting communities through other ways, such as preserving
permeable noncommercial spaces and through using nonprofit law, is also
important and doesn’t rely on IP law as such.
To borrow a famous
line, women can make our own history, but we do not make it as we please; we do
not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing
already, given and transmitted from the past. 
Remix is a way of taking what we’re given and making it better.  It remains for us to keep choosing our
conditions, recognizing that our choices are partial and constrained but not
therefore meaningless.  Remix, then, is
fundamentally a hopeful act: it reminds us that things could be different. 
Michael Madison,
Patterns and Fair Use in Copyright 2: The Sequel
Past work: found
patterns in fair use decisions
. A descriptive claim: a community or group
is present; this can predict a fair use finding.  Social science links behavior of individuals
in communities to creative outputs, not in a linear way but a probabalistic way.
Trying to step beyond norms and customs as such (responding to Jennifer Rothman’s
criticism) to look at groups, whether commercial or noncommercial, small or
large.
What do the cases
decided since the end of 2003 tell us? 
Provisional results: to a significant degree, those patterns still
matter.  What’s changed?  Google cases, Kelly v. Arriba Soft—different valence
compared to the history; the word Madison uses is info “infrastructure”—to
evoke Brett Frischmann’s work on infrastructure.  I don’t think it’s a social pattern or
community activity, so a gap has opened up compared to 2004 where I saw social
groups as explaining most of the cases.
Storytelling no
longer quite captures the idea that defendants might be legitimately engaged in
acts of affirmative creation of new artwork, whether in narrative form or
otherwise.
There’s a gap opened
up b/t the path of legal doctrine that focuses on transformative use as Campbell and the idea of social patterns
as an independent explanatory variable. 
Jaszi liked the idea of talking about socially patterned activity,
aligning with transformativeness under Campbell.
Since then, transformativeness acquired a gravitational pull of its own, no
longer as clearly derived from or driving patterns of social activity.
Micro observation:
linkage b/t socially patterned idea and what Jaszi & team did in best
practices.  Influential b/c they had a
strong descriptive and normative foundation. Worry about whether normative foundation
is still as robust as it was—need to keep working to ensure they’re founded in
where the law is.  Madison is invested in
knowledge commons, community self-governance as a way of dealing with
knowledge, linked to “IP without IP” studies.
Patricia Aufderheide,
The Impact of Codes of Best Practices in Fair Use
Worked w/more than
ten different communities on best practices. Each is distinctive, and we’ve
learned a lot.  The method: deeply research
actual practices to understand the community’s problems, facilitate discussions
about balancing their interests as people who own © and people who need ©
material.  Evidence-based action.

Copyright Office adopted Rothman’s critique that these are unreliable b/c not
negotiated w/rights owners [critique from the right].  Jim Gibson says: they could become ceilings
and not floors [critique from the left].
What evidence?  Insurers started routinely accepting fair use
claims.78% of filmmakers surveyed started to understand fair use; they thought
it was very valuable, especially younger filmmakers who saw it as essential
tool. We asked how many had had fair use claims rejected? 1-3% reported
problems—that is an industry standard, where 99% of insurers accept claims and
97% of broadcasters.  In 2005, Donaldson’s
firm didn’t handle any fair use issues for Sundance; 2010, they’ve got 5 films
using fair use, and 730 different fair use issues (two films used lots of
clips); 2015, they’ve got more than 25 (lost the exact number) sprinkled
throughout types of fair use.
Communications
scholars’ best practices. Less successful story, b/c communications
associations that adopted code haven’t been particularly interested in
promoting it.  The codes do nothing; the
community must absorb and use the code. Nonetheless, saw changes in 5 years
among communications scholars. More people know
they’ve employed fair use; they are more frustrated when they can’t get fair
use claims accepted. Sad news: only 1/3 know they have a code of best
practices. Most of the people who use the code find it helpful. People doing multimedia
publishing are a subset who know about fair use and are using the code heavily.
Best practices for
fair use in the visual arts: in survey, nearly 2/3 of them knew about the code
10 months after release.  Half who knew had
used the code.  Increased likely use of
fair use. Also huge institutional change w/in 10 months. Major publications in
the field, including the leading publication which is by College Art
Association—changed default to fair use; Yale Univ. Press created similar
guidelines; museums changed institutional policies internally; MIT and
Smithsonian Presses in negotiations. These institutional changes have huge
effects, similar to insurers.
Creating the
document opens the door to what might happen. Culture of community will change
if and only if leaders circulate the information and institutions take the
opportunity.
Critics: Unreliable?  Not to insurers, broadcasters,
publishers.  Is it a ceiling or a floor?
We do have uses that keep expanding.  The
same thing happened with open courseware. 
Documentary filmmakers move from a position of believing they’re doing
something that might be illegal to believing that they have a right to do it to
believing that they’re entitled to defend it in public, as at the DMCA
hearings.
Brandon Butler,
Rationalizing and Operationalizing Non-Transformative Fair Use
He’s from U. Va.,
founded by the “he who lights his taper from me” guy (a civics lesson from a
slaver).  Transformative fair use &
why it works so well: you need to know your purpose, the other guy’s purpose,
and how much you took.  That’s a very
different situation from life w/o transformativeness. Takes the user’s point of
view—the client in the clinic or the community for best practices. They’re in
the driver’s seat explaining why they want the use. The normative force is
clear, unequivocal and even constitutional: you aren’t begging.
Alternatives:
varieties of market failure: HathiTrust, no interest in market; Georgia State:
favored purpose + market failure. Fails b/c the details are often arcane:
Georgia State involves 600 pages of market information which no librarian could
ever know ex ante.
Jennifer Urban (remotely
from Berkeley), Comments
Shift in the way
fair use is thought about, theorized, and practice.  Cluster of work in scholarly world that is
loosely empirical—Sag, Beebe, Madison, Samuelson—making sense of the case law
for practical application. Tushnet, Silbey etc. talk about how practice has
changed naturally with this as tools have become more democratically available.
Shift from individual view of fair use to community view underpins the
statements of best practices. 
How do statements of
best practices fit into broader landscape of change? From lawyer’s perspective,
change relationship b/t lawyer & client, and ability to counsel the client.  Demystifying fair use: article w/Tony
Falzone.  Triad relationship between
practitioner/creator, lawyer, and gatekeeper/distributor/superior in creator’s
organization.  Each participant
encounters a set of barriers to making a fair use.  For the practitioner there are things like
downside risk, permission culture, lack of expertise, unclear legal boundaries,
difficulty negotiating w/gatekeepers when you don’t speak copyright, wish to be
ethical/collegial, desire to avoid expense of lawyers.  Newcomers may not know limits of
collegiality/ethics.
Gatekeepers:
permission culture is a big thing; very aware of downside risk. They often don’t
want to be blockade and would like to give more leeway, but they’ve come to
believe that a norm of licensing is actually required, and that makes them less
flexible.  Lawyer faces highly contextual
caselaw; worries about downside risk to client; has limited sense of community
norms.  Together, those things in the past
set up fair use as an unusable right.
Best practices
address all these issues together, shifting from jargon to community vocab. Go
from unclear cases that have to be analogized to common specific scenarios
encountered in the field and allow decisions based on known facts.  Practitioners can reflect ethical practices
of her community. She has the tools to negotiate w/gatekeepers about what she’s
trying to do in concrete terms.  Specific
and applicable examples can diminish the distance b/t case law and this situation;
helps to calculate practical risk.  Teaches
the lawyer the community norms and vocabulary for whatever community we work with.  Some people develop expertise w/ communities,
e.g. Donaldson for documentary film, but best practices allow more people to do
that, to compress education in the community’s practices.
There is no way to
completely remove downside risk, w/o reform of remedies. But best practices can
put that into perspective. There’s even insurance for documentary
filmmakers.  Simple steps can move a
creator and a community from essentially being unable to use fair use to being
able to use it on a regular basis. Poets routinely paid permissions even for
critical commentary in a scholarly article. 
Hope that best practices can move them. 
Relatively simple statements can have profound effect w/in
communities. 
There are definitely
skeptics; she was a friendly one at the outset. Her concern was the concern for
defining a ceiling/failure to update as practices change. But as she’s worked
w/clients over the years and her students have, she’s come around to the view
that they can describe the most important situations practitioners encounter
and that they can be updated over time.
Too permissive/dream
of fair use?  When she hears that from a
lawyer, she invites them to read 3 of the statements; the statements are
careful and ethical.

It’s easy to forget
how strong the skeptics were at the start.
Jaszi comment: thinks Gibson is now no longer as serious a critic and now has agreed. Also, insurance isn’t just for movies. You can get E&O insurance for books. It’s possible that while we wait for remedy reform, the missing piece of all this, we need to experiment more with the additional possibilities of insurance.

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Jaszi festschrift: Panel 2 – Authorship

Margaret Chon, What Berne Article 15(4) Tells Us
Decolonization and development: only one country, India, initially
designated an authority to facilitate compulsory licensing and even after Berne
was amended only two dozen countries have taken advantage of the option.  Non implementation of provision on TRIPS and
public health—the story that these development-oriented provisions tell is one
of disconnect, not development; asymmetry, not alignment. 
Anonymity/anonymous authorship.  History in which women couldn’t risk being
known as writers/having a public identity. 
Attention to quilting as quintessential type of anonymous folklore that
is gendered female.  As interesting:
Woolf’s quote towards the end of her life that “anon is dead.” She was
responding to the cult of the romantic author. It was anonymity that appealed
to the nostalgia of modernist British writers for balladeers etc.: prizing
aesthetic of anonymity.  Individuality in
authors and in fragmentation of authorship prevented works from being absorbed
into the public as part of their consciousness as ballads were.
Romantic anonymity: not the same as the traditional pool of
cultural knowledge that is supposedly the opposite of romantic authorship.  Berne tells us that publisher is
representative of published author and the state is the representative of the
unknown author/collective. The latter is pressed into the service of building a
national identity. But that division ignores the dynamism of the anonymous
creator.  Reasons for anonymity: Standing
out from the mass; call attention to author’s shame or risk; to promote a cause;
expressions for political minorities. 
Recent mural by Banksy: will be protected by gov’t of Calais even as it
destroys the surrounding “Calais jungle.” 
Promoting the state undermines local political authorities who might act
as custodians, and erases the need to create further devolution of authority to
create space for dissent.
Christine Farley
Jaszi’s lessons: Authorship should not obscure the need for
cultural commons; authorship has been a contested concept for a long time.
Because of the romantic author, it’s hard to focus on the reality of collective
creativity.
AI as a challenge to the concept of authorship. But has
there ever been the romantic author? In the heyday of Renaissance art, the
artist might not have touched the canvas; Jeff Koons & Andy Warhol; we’ve
always had mechanical aids to authorship as well. 16th Century:
Vermeer & other artists used camera obscura to help them with their art.
Algorithmic art: poetry can now be created by
computers.  Procedurally generating
works: signal and noise are the same thing. 
Visual art likewise.  If art
demands intentionality, that’s not art. But artists have always challenged that
requirement: Dada’s art of chance & others. 
Still, there is someone pulling the strings/causing something to
happen.  Is this new environment
different in the sense of shared autonomy? 
The singularity is near, focused on intelligence/thought (not directly
on art).  A human can take a leap of
faith without following an orchestrated pattern.  A human is capable of subtlety and nuance; AI
research says these are cliches that we will get beyond; there is no last
frontier for the human mind.
New ways of extending authorship metaphor/be on guard for
ways in which that might happen.  If we
have a corporation generating all of the works and can maintain that control
rather than creating a commons of cultural production, this could be a big
problem.
Robert Brauneis, How to Fix Copyright Registration: A Proposal
to Institute Graduated,
Periodic Registration Fees
Jaszi was involved in the §412 report. Provides incentive to
create useful record; also, since statutory damages are exceptional, one ought
to have to act in some exceptional but not difficult way to get them.  Is the CO currently providing information
about ownership etc. in an optimal way? 
No.  The registration records don’t
even always contain names of authors of the registered works, making it
much  more difficult to determine when
the term of © has ended or who holds the power to terminate transfers. 
Why have courts sanctioned this practice? Before electronic
registration, it was expensive and error-prone tedium of typing; afterwards,
still concerns about system capacity. 12 million records of works potentially
still under copyright until 1977 that are not electronically searchable or online
through the CO.  1.2 million renewal
registrations 1950-1992 not electronically searchable/online. Most registered
works are in the public domain but we don’t know easily which ones.  Credit for figures: Zvi Rosen.
Recording documents: Means of submission, paper only; PTO
electronic only.  Per year recordings:
11,000, v. 400,000. Staff of 12 v. 10 for PTO recording division. Average time
from receipt to online cataloging 225 days v. one day.  Fee: $105 plus $35 per additional titles v.
$0 recording costs at PTO. 
Lots of other things to be done: registration system that
has API that would allow integration of registration application into authoring
software like Photoshop, Pro Tools. 
Integration of copyright information into user software (Spotify, Shazam).  Why not enough resources?  Total 2015 budget $48 million, only $28
million from fees.  Library of Congress
has to balance its requests w/other asks, around $600 million, with CO only a
small part.  PTO’s budget is $3 billion,
all from fees. 
Those who benefit more from the PTO pay more. Diachronic
differentiation: PTO changes fees over time. 
Relatively small application fee going in, $280. But as you get more
confident in proceeding, you pay more, $2560 total by issuance.  Maintenance fees at 3.5 years, 7.5 years,
11.5 years, increasing over time to a total of $15160. Also synchronic
differentiation: discounts for small/medium enterprises of 50%, 75% for micro
enterprises.  The result is a 24:1 ratio
between what a micro enterprise pays at issuance versus what a regular
enterprise would pay for a full term patent.
42.5% of patent office budget is maintenance fees.  Substantial percentage of filing, search and
examination fees are 31.3%. 
Differentiation in copyright registration is $55 for standard, $35 for
single work, single claimant who is also the author.  1.5:1 ratio, and so the movie Avatar with $2.8 billion in revenue is
paying 1.5 as much as the author of the Let’s
Go Crazy
video of her kid, Stephanie Lenz, with no revenue.
So we should pursue periodic registration fees &
graduated registration fees.  Maintenance
fees are prohibited for non-US works by Berne Convention & TRIPS.  [How many registered works are non-US
works?]  However, periodic fees to maintain
the additional benefits of registration are not: statutory damages and
attorneys’ fees across the life of the ©. 
Since they’re extraordinary, one should have to do something extra to
receive them—and it shouldn’t necessarily be just once.  For US works, ability to file infringement
suit could be added.  We could also
extend the enterprise size differentiation of the PTO.  More radically: that has always correlated
badly with the value of the work. Thought experiment: graduated fees for
graduated statory remedy, attorney’s fee ceilings.  For $0, could give you actual damages.  $50: $200-$10,000; $200 gets more, and $800
gets $750 up to maximum.  [Might have to
integrate that with small claims proposal.]
Graduated fees lead applicants to value their own works and
evaluate their own desire to monetize those works. [Could you change over time
and step up for subsequent infringements if infringement became common/the work
became valuable? As long as there was no retroactive applicability, that could
make sense.]
Is this a political nonstarter? Maintenance fees and SME
discount came in 1985, and 2013 created the micro discount.  Odd crossing of paths: patent got more
formality oriented as copyright entered Berne era.
Marc Perlman, How to Do Things With Romantic Ideology
First mentioned by Umbreit 1938, taken up by Benjamin Kaplan
in 1967, who saw Romantic ideology as still influential.  Jaszi in 1981 followed Kaplan but suggested
that the Romantic fever had broken b/c imitation was widespread in serious
literature.  Litman (1990): romantic
model of authorship was still alive. Influence of poststructuralist literary
theory in 1990s made intertextuality part of critiques of © expansion. 
Most appeals to history advance a causal thesis about how
literary theory influences law.  Called
into question: may be implausible or at least overstated.  I argue that even if the causal thesis is
correct, that wouldn’t itself delegitimize Romantic authorship, which might be
a good/correct idea, like the conservation of energy.  There is no simple relationship between law
and social norms; law is a site of struggle. Customary law: it can be hard to
determine exact contents of norm except in the smallest groups. Literary
imitation and borrowing was affirmed as legit by many in pre-Romantic literary
circles, but there were also constant accusations of plagiarism in pre-Romantic
literature.  Gap between aesthetics in
the books and aesthetics as lived.  Cries
of plagiarism were raised both for literal copying and for tenuous
similarities.
Is Romantic authorship normative in our society today?  Kaplan and Litman thought so, but Jaszi
thought imitation had lost its stigma.
Seeing how differently ancestors thought can unfreeze our
minds, contemplate radical reform. It was the search for such inspiration that
motivated Kaplan.  As things were
different in the past, they probably need not be as they are. But there are
problems w/this view: it is not easy to get from “things have been otherwise”
to “things could be otherwise.”  Have
been = often informal norms. As jurists, when we posit “could be” we usually
posit revision of formal laws.  Difficult
enough to read laws from practices; equally difficult to turn practices into
laws. We need historical interpretations that are highly contextualized.  Trap of exoticism, others.
Anecdote about 15th c. Chinese painter used to
support © minimalism by Lewis Hyde.  In
ancient China creativity was an act of reverence toward earlier generations; to
copy the work of those who came before was respect and not theft. Quotes Shen
Zhou: if my poems and paintings should prove to be some aid to forgers, what is
there for me to grudge about?  From Wen
Fong 1962, used to demonstrate tolerance by painters towards forging of their
own works.  But the full quote is about
signing forgeries; someone asked the master to stop.  “When people beg me for my paintings, do you
suppose they merely want them for enjoyment … they merely want them for making
profit for them.”  Shen Zhou &
colleagues were prominent intellectual/social leaders; as gentleman painters,
they weren’t supposed to accept any fee, and demands were often a nuisance.
They would thus be willing to lend their names to imitations. Not a purely
selfless display, but highly contextualized. He wasn’t supposed to earn money; those
who clamored for his paintings had found a way to profit that he couldn’t
use.  He looks less like a defender of
the commons and more like a sly critic of the venality of his “admirers.”

What then?  Romantic
ideology thesis is a polemical weapon.  Weapons
are inherently disloyal tools, don’t care about uses to which they’re put.
Historical examples can also turn against their masters. The only sure way to
prevent betrayal is to avoid historical examples entirely.  Scholar asks what is; jurist asks what ought
to be. Scholar has no special expertise in ought, but may enable jurist to
liberate her imagination.

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ABA amicus in Lee v. Tam

The ABA’s
amicus in Lee v. Tam
 in favor of neither party is largely strong (though I don’t agree with everything
therein) but does contain one argument that is unworthy of the ABA’s trademark
experts:
The theory that otherwise valid
marks become unprotectable because they are unregistrable also cannot be
reconciled with Section 43(c) of Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2012), which protects
the distinctiveness of famous marks against likely dilution. Under that
statute, whether or not a mark is registered is merely one of four nonexclusive
factors used to determine whether a mark is sufficiently famous to qualify for
protection. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2). The nonexistence of a registration
therefore does not preclude actions brought under that statute.
This is a classic fallacy of the excluded middle.  It is completely consistent with §43(c) that
dilution protection could be available for a registrable but unregistered mark but not for an unregistrable mark.  The ABA takes the position that unregistrable only sometimes means invalid and unprotectable; I strongly doubt that it wants invalid marks to be given dilution
protection—but on their theory that registration isn’t dispositive to dilution,
such marks should be eligible.  (Actually, the ABA’s position that invalid marks ought to get some “protection” under the common law and §43(a) implies that maybe the ABA does want dilution to be potentially available.  However, that “protection” has historically been not a prohibition on use but an obligation on the second-comer to sufficiently distinguish itself from another’s generic, functional, or abandoned use, which is a confusion-based remedy that has no obvious purchase on dilution.  Even the remedy suggested by the court of appeals in Belmora to implement Bayer’s §43(a) right based on its Mexican rights was supposed to respect the defendant’s rights to use its registered mark in the US.)

The difficulty with the ABA’s theory overall, though it is
not an insurmountable one, is that there is no statutory guide for which
unregistrable marks ought to be considered “invalid” and thus entirely
unprotectable versus which should be merely
unregistrable and protectable under §43(a). 
History may provide some guidance, but it’s actually pretty wobbly on a
lot of the categories of unregistrable marks. 
This is one of the points I make in my forthcoming
article on registration
.

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Jaszi festschrift, Panel 1 – Traditional Knowledge

Intellectual Property and the Public Interest: Toward a
Festschrift for Peter A. Jaszi
Boatema Boateng, “Tradition” and the Production of the Other
in Intellectual Property Law
Jaszi’s questioning of received wisdom of copyright law is a
key influence.  How different cultural
forms have been shoehorned into © while others have been denied entry.  A matter of power, as well as overlooked similarities
among kinds of knowledge production. It must be more than coincidence that
forms still denied protection are produced by global South and by specific
subject populations in North and South. 
Ghana’s protection under ©: while fabric designs were protected under
industrial design, other elements of local culture weren’t protected for a long
time.  But in 1860s-70s Britain began to
turn interest in Ghana from slave raids to territorial control and resource exploitation
(gold). Asanti made adinkra cloth; resisted British control, but Empire claimed
elements of Asanti culture through ©. 
Britain had no qualms about questions of originality that now dog
protection for a range of cultural forms—it simply used © to claim cultural
forms for itself.  Reinforces her view
that protection distinctions are matters of politics, not philosophy.  It’s easy to assign formal equivalence to
positions in debates over protection for traditional cultural forms, especially
in UN.  Yet for most ex-colonies, modern
nationhood doesn’t translate to modernity in the eyes of outside
observers. 
Forms of subjugation changed over time: dominationàideas
of underdevelopment.  Most former colonies
have gained formal independence, adopting trappings of modern nationhood
including legal systems.  But this doesn’t
make them fully modern, as you can see from the persistence of the concepts of
modernity and of tradition, tribe, etc. 
Culture and knowledge of indigenous people defined as folklore,
traditional cultural expressions—serves to fix the people who produce this
knowledge in a subordinate position to the people of Europe.  Exclusions from IP law exist in US quilts on
the basis of gender & categories of art v. craft; it’s clear in quilting
that this isn’t traditional knowledge and yet it still raises the same
questions of originality/entitlement raised with TK. 
Not all gloom & doom: possible creative use of these
categories to push at boundaries of resistance. 
Indigenous people do innovate! 
But the double standard has facilitated shoehorning of software to © and
patent while firmly resisting protection for cultural expressions of global
South. Key issues are not only about what’s protected and why but also about
whether those who produce have gained full admission to the benefits of
humanity.
Lorraine Aragon, The Third Enclosure: In Search of Porous Fences
around Traditional Cultural Expressions
Third enclosure: shift from covering material fixations to
claiming indigenous elements with blurry boundaries as national property.  Romantic authorship doesn’t seem to be part
of this law. Her work began with religion in Indonesia.  Rice fields were reallocated annually; “owners”
were the deities and people were the managers. 
Most Indonesian traditional artists show little interest in either IP or
cultural property claims, while high-level officials support regulation of
TCEs.  Jaszi investigated effects on
artists; talked to lots of artists and gov’t officials (w/Aragon).  Jaszi wrote final report, 2010. Discusses
promises and perils of conventional IP, and what sui generis right would
provide.  Mobilizing IP in discussion v.
TCEs.  Production (arts) v. product
(TCEs).  Conventional IP is robust and
tested internationally, but TCE protection isn’t.  IP is a metaphor, and so is culture—it’s a
noun of process, not a product: the tending of something—crops or animals
(Raymond Williams, keywords).  We tend to
use it in anthropology as an adjective rather than as a noun, which seemed too
fixed.
From traditional arts to Ethnicity, Inc. Perfect storm of
financial pressure to move from natural to cultural resources + human rights
and cultural heritage rhetoric.  Yet out
of touch w/how art process works, how authority works, how IP works.  Law as politics, like North Carolina’s HB 2 “bathroom
bill.”  Giant solution to relatively
small problem. Gov’t and media tap into public anxieties—cultural theft, sexual
boundaries.  Incapable of being
implemented: the Indonesian law has no implementing regulations; NC is not
going to check birth certificates at bathroom doors.  Multi-scale politics and aspiration: speaking
to issues working at higher or lower levels on political scale.  Cultural theft in Indonesia: the enemy is
always Malaysia, accused of stealing many genres (though they’re shared in a
long history).  Indonesia: 4th
most populous nation, thousands of ethnic groups, hundreds of islands, lots of
hybridity already. Political intervention: expressions are matched w/provinces
which are matched w/ethnic groups as if everyone was matched at the
border.  A process of fixation.  Invented traditions. 
Dizzyingly different to distinguish between traditional
works and new creations based on traditional elements: Jaszi said that old
forms were once new forms, and new forms are always based on elements from the past.  Disrupted the narrative of modern innovation
v. old static existence.  Invented
traditions aren’t not just nostalgic fictions, but often forgotten/unforeseen
art trajectories.  Art repertoires as
extended minds. 
District officials have attempted to © traditional “chicken
eye” pattern.  Optimism: Indonesia has
always had plural legal systems, always in dialogue.  We know that Indonesian producers are clever
in managing their own knowledge; it’s not democratic or evenly distributed, but
it is locally negotiable as top-down is not. 
Related or neighboring rights for performers not well-recognized in
Indonesia; could be important for some groups. 
Other possibilities: certification marks, etc.  We don’t want this law to be an eminent
domain, top-down law, where the commons becomes “waste”—traditional arts’
functionality is ignored when it’s not monetized. But Indonesia has many arts
entrepreneurs—might want a legal boost, but not legal dynamite.
Ruth Okediji, Traditional Knowledge and the Public Domain
Property rights regulate distribution/use of scarce
resources; so when nations agree to grant property rights in intellectual
creation, they’re not only encouraging investment but setting baseline for
competitive relations among different people. Every property right contracts
the interests of others/adjusts the competitive landscape.  A neutral way to express concerns: new rights
harm the public domain, a powerful concern w/particular resonance at WIPO. 
“Traditional knowledge”: search for language to anchor claim
for protection against piracy—indig. groups have used the same language as “authors”—they
claim there’s no such thing as a global commons.  Recognize public domain as important
consideration, but it’s clear that early acknowledgements proceed from
different premises. Some countries view public domain as a threshold for
protection, and others view it as distraction raised by elites from the global
North or of little relevance for interests that lie beyond the traditional
patent/©/TM fields.  Public domain is
thus a lightning rod in int’l negotiations. 
Attempt to find common ground often cedes principles for which we are
contending. 
Indigenous groups have real concerns.  “Common heritage of mankind” developed global
knowledge infrastructure using plant genetic resources and TK.  Int’l institutions have been built around the
idea that this belongs to the public and should be freely/methodically
exploited by big institutions.  But the
idea that public domain only represents the attempt to recontrol or reallocate
resources of the global South goes too far. 
Need to assert definitions of public domain as part of TKE; remains skeptical
that current proposals are actually in furtherance of global South;
privatization and prevention of border-crossing will defeat the very purposes
for which we value knowledge. Property begets property in a vicious cycle.  The purpose of the public domain isn’t to
deny property rights but to establish a zone in which human beings, communities
are able to engage in the oldest act of human expression, the creation of
knowledge itself.
Fumi Arewa
Nollywood films: the film production quality weren’t to
global standard in early days, but that’s changing—Toronto film festival
premiere.  Authorship comes in all kinds
of places and forms. Nigeria had very little IP enforcement during the
emergence of Nollywood: huge global film industry, challenging assumptions
about IP.  IP is very important for
creative people, but we over and underestimate its importance in various
situations, which Jaszi has drawn attention to in his work.  Attitudes have been shaped by external
pressure saying that IP rights are really really wonderful.  Nollywood producers were a tough nut to crack
on fair use; they thought fair use was bad for filmmakers. Jaszi, in two hours,
got them to start thinking about how fair use could be an important part of IP
and important for them.  Developing
countries need an IP agenda appropriate to their situations, not externally
derived, despite reality that much of IP will be TRIPs-derived. She wants to
know what IP does for them and for
domestic creators.  IP has been
externally derived for a long time—a lot of IP laws on the books.  Digital colonialism: take a second look at
historical narratives about lawmaking. 
During the colonial period, people were upfront about what they think.
Legal systems in places like Nigeria were overlapping and didn’t take account
of conflicts; they just copied British laws or laws from other colonies.  No consideration of local or public interest
in discussions of laws, which are often still on the books.  Countries are starting to look at this
overhang of externally derived law, but it can still harm economic development.
Irene Calboli, (remotely from Singapore) Geographical
Indications, Economic Development, and Cultural Heritage: Good Match or
Mismatch?
Asian interest in GIs is serious, going far beyond pressure
of EU.  Anti-American, anti-New World in
EU version, but also interested in protecting GIs as potential for marketing
products internationally. To what extent that potential really exists is up for
discussion; it can help or can be useless. 
Case by case.

Little farms in France and indigenous people want
recognition—a moral rights aspect to GIs. 
Understandable, but fundamental issue with value of component inputs,
foodstuffs v. products that go through more processing.  There can be excellent spillovers for land,
people, sustainable development when consumers can be convinced to pay.  Public interest for consumers: accurate
product information; narrative of trace-marks. 
We need to tailor GI protection for better and more transparent ways for
consumers to know where products are from and how they are made. Local developers won’t be able to cheat if the
how is clear.  

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Jaszi festschrift, Panel 1 – Traditional Knowledge

Intellectual Property and the Public Interest: Toward a
Festschrift for Peter A. Jaszi
Boatema Boateng, “Tradition” and the Production of the Other
in Intellectual Property Law
Jaszi’s questioning of received wisdom of copyright law is a
key influence.  How different cultural
forms have been shoehorned into © while others have been denied entry.  A matter of power, as well as overlooked similarities
among kinds of knowledge production. It must be more than coincidence that
forms still denied protection are produced by global South and by specific
subject populations in North and South. 
Ghana’s protection under ©: while fabric designs were protected under
industrial design, other elements of local culture weren’t protected for a long
time.  But in 1860s-70s Britain began to
turn interest in Ghana from slave raids to territorial control and resource exploitation
(gold). Asanti made adinkra cloth; resisted British control, but Empire claimed
elements of Asanti culture through ©. 
Britain had no qualms about questions of originality that now dog
protection for a range of cultural forms—it simply used © to claim cultural
forms for itself.  Reinforces her view
that protection distinctions are matters of politics, not philosophy.  It’s easy to assign formal equivalence to
positions in debates over protection for traditional cultural forms, especially
in UN.  Yet for most ex-colonies, modern
nationhood doesn’t translate to modernity in the eyes of outside
observers. 
Forms of subjugation changed over time: dominationàideas
of underdevelopment.  Most former colonies
have gained formal independence, adopting trappings of modern nationhood
including legal systems.  But this doesn’t
make them fully modern, as you can see from the persistence of the concepts of
modernity and of tradition, tribe, etc. 
Culture and knowledge of indigenous people defined as folklore,
traditional cultural expressions—serves to fix the people who produce this
knowledge in a subordinate position to the people of Europe.  Exclusions from IP law exist in US quilts on
the basis of gender & categories of art v. craft; it’s clear in quilting
that this isn’t traditional knowledge and yet it still raises the same
questions of originality/entitlement raised with TK. 
Not all gloom & doom: possible creative use of these
categories to push at boundaries of resistance. 
Indigenous people do innovate! 
But the double standard has facilitated shoehorning of software to © and
patent while firmly resisting protection for cultural expressions of global
South. Key issues are not only about what’s protected and why but also about
whether those who produce have gained full admission to the benefits of
humanity.
Lorraine Aragon, The Third Enclosure: In Search of Porous Fences
around Traditional Cultural Expressions
Third enclosure: shift from covering material fixations to
claiming indigenous elements with blurry boundaries as national property.  Romantic authorship doesn’t seem to be part
of this law. Her work began with religion in Indonesia.  Rice fields were reallocated annually; “owners”
were the deities and people were the managers. 
Most Indonesian traditional artists show little interest in either IP or
cultural property claims, while high-level officials support regulation of
TCEs.  Jaszi investigated effects on
artists; talked to lots of artists and gov’t officials (w/Aragon).  Jaszi wrote final report, 2010. Discusses
promises and perils of conventional IP, and what sui generis right would
provide.  Mobilizing IP in discussion v.
TCEs.  Production (arts) v. product
(TCEs).  Conventional IP is robust and
tested internationally, but TCE protection isn’t.  IP is a metaphor, and so is culture—it’s a
noun of process, not a product: the tending of something—crops or animals
(Raymond Williams, keywords).  We tend to
use it in anthropology as an adjective rather than as a noun, which seemed too
fixed.
From traditional arts to Ethnicity, Inc. Perfect storm of
financial pressure to move from natural to cultural resources + human rights
and cultural heritage rhetoric.  Yet out
of touch w/how art process works, how authority works, how IP works.  Law as politics, like North Carolina’s HB 2 “bathroom
bill.”  Giant solution to relatively
small problem. Gov’t and media tap into public anxieties—cultural theft, sexual
boundaries.  Incapable of being
implemented: the Indonesian law has no implementing regulations; NC is not
going to check birth certificates at bathroom doors.  Multi-scale politics and aspiration: speaking
to issues working at higher or lower levels on political scale.  Cultural theft in Indonesia: the enemy is
always Malaysia, accused of stealing many genres (though they’re shared in a
long history).  Indonesia: 4th
most populous nation, thousands of ethnic groups, hundreds of islands, lots of
hybridity already. Political intervention: expressions are matched w/provinces
which are matched w/ethnic groups as if everyone was matched at the
border.  A process of fixation.  Invented traditions. 
Dizzyingly different to distinguish between traditional
works and new creations based on traditional elements: Jaszi said that old
forms were once new forms, and new forms are always based on elements from the past.  Disrupted the narrative of modern innovation
v. old static existence.  Invented
traditions aren’t not just nostalgic fictions, but often forgotten/unforeseen
art trajectories.  Art repertoires as
extended minds. 
District officials have attempted to © traditional “chicken
eye” pattern.  Optimism: Indonesia has
always had plural legal systems, always in dialogue.  We know that Indonesian producers are clever
in managing their own knowledge; it’s not democratic or evenly distributed, but
it is locally negotiable as top-down is not. 
Related or neighboring rights for performers not well-recognized in
Indonesia; could be important for some groups. 
Other possibilities: certification marks, etc.  We don’t want this law to be an eminent
domain, top-down law, where the commons becomes “waste”—traditional arts’
functionality is ignored when it’s not monetized. But Indonesia has many arts
entrepreneurs—might want a legal boost, but not legal dynamite.
Ruth Okediji, Traditional Knowledge and the Public Domain
Property rights regulate distribution/use of scarce
resources; so when nations agree to grant property rights in intellectual
creation, they’re not only encouraging investment but setting baseline for
competitive relations among different people. Every property right contracts
the interests of others/adjusts the competitive landscape.  A neutral way to express concerns: new rights
harm the public domain, a powerful concern w/particular resonance at WIPO. 
“Traditional knowledge”: search for language to anchor claim
for protection against piracy—indig. groups have used the same language as “authors”—they
claim there’s no such thing as a global commons.  Recognize public domain as important
consideration, but it’s clear that early acknowledgements proceed from
different premises. Some countries view public domain as a threshold for
protection, and others view it as distraction raised by elites from the global
North or of little relevance for interests that lie beyond the traditional
patent/©/TM fields.  Public domain is
thus a lightning rod in int’l negotiations. 
Attempt to find common ground often cedes principles for which we are
contending. 
Indigenous groups have real concerns.  “Common heritage of mankind” developed global
knowledge infrastructure using plant genetic resources and TK.  Int’l institutions have been built around the
idea that this belongs to the public and should be freely/methodically
exploited by big institutions.  But the
idea that public domain only represents the attempt to recontrol or reallocate
resources of the global South goes too far. 
Need to assert definitions of public domain as part of TKE; remains skeptical
that current proposals are actually in furtherance of global South;
privatization and prevention of border-crossing will defeat the very purposes
for which we value knowledge. Property begets property in a vicious cycle.  The purpose of the public domain isn’t to
deny property rights but to establish a zone in which human beings, communities
are able to engage in the oldest act of human expression, the creation of
knowledge itself.
Fumi Arewa
Nollywood films: the film production quality weren’t to
global standard in early days, but that’s changing—Toronto film festival
premiere.  Authorship comes in all kinds
of places and forms. Nigeria had very little IP enforcement during the
emergence of Nollywood: huge global film industry, challenging assumptions
about IP.  IP is very important for
creative people, but we over and underestimate its importance in various
situations, which Jaszi has drawn attention to in his work.  Attitudes have been shaped by external
pressure saying that IP rights are really really wonderful.  Nollywood producers were a tough nut to crack
on fair use; they thought fair use was bad for filmmakers. Jaszi, in two hours,
got them to start thinking about how fair use could be an important part of IP
and important for them.  Developing
countries need an IP agenda appropriate to their situations, not externally
derived, despite reality that much of IP will be TRIPs-derived. She wants to
know what IP does for them and for
domestic creators.  IP has been
externally derived for a long time—a lot of IP laws on the books.  Digital colonialism: take a second look at
historical narratives about lawmaking. 
During the colonial period, people were upfront about what they think.
Legal systems in places like Nigeria were overlapping and didn’t take account
of conflicts; they just copied British laws or laws from other colonies.  No consideration of local or public interest
in discussions of laws, which are often still on the books.  Countries are starting to look at this
overhang of externally derived law, but it can still harm economic development.
Irene Calboli, (remotely from Singapore) Geographical
Indications, Economic Development, and Cultural Heritage: Good Match or
Mismatch?
Asian interest in GIs is serious, going far beyond pressure
of EU.  Anti-American, anti-New World in
EU version, but also interested in protecting GIs as potential for marketing
products internationally. To what extent that potential really exists is up for
discussion; it can help or can be useless. 
Case by case.

Little farms in France and indigenous people want
recognition—a moral rights aspect to GIs. 
Understandable, but fundamental issue with value of component inputs,
foodstuffs v. products that go through more processing.  There can be excellent spillovers for land,
people, sustainable development when consumers can be convinced to pay.  Public interest for consumers: accurate
product information; narrative of trace-marks. 
We need to tailor GI protection for better and more transparent ways for
consumers to know where products are from and how they are made. Local developers won’t be able to cheat if the
how is clear.  

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Peter Jaszi lecture, Confessions of a recovering auteurist

This was a lecture given in honor of Prof. Jaszi’s retirement from teaching, before a festschrift for his work.
New
Librarian of Congress said that she’d have the CO serve the interests of
authors—assumption that authors are ©’s beneficiaries.  Metaphor of authorship/idea that authors’
interests are at the heart of © protection: familiar discourse; can overwhelm
more nuanced discussions of © policy. One strong trope: The inspired geniuses
of cultural production often turn out to be really poor businesspeople: easily
led astray, don’t bother about money; too busy/distracted by the demands of art
itself to look after themselves and their poor, destitute families.  Specialness, high degree of entitlement plus
intense vulnerability: recipe for some kind of protective legal entitlement.
The problem is that often the real circumstances don’t
measure up to the archetype, though occasionally they do.  VC Andrews: passed away having founded an
extremely popular literary genre; left no manuscripts, but representatives of
estate surreptitiously hired a ghostwriter to continue the tradition. IRS tried
to get them to pay a lot of money, resulting in a great tax case. This is
authorship as it is lived, rather than the romantic vision.
Connections between authorship and public interest in
IP.  Authorship rhetoric is persistent and
ubiquitious.  Exchange of conceptual DNA:
celebration of author-genius that was so profound in literary culture jumped
over to © and took hold; dead in literary world but lives on in ©.  Inspired authorship as a way to explain, for
example, the history of American cinema: bodies of work that bore the
individual stamp of an author.  Epic v.
Killian Shows: auteur theory in court; D accused of infringing rights in DW
Griffith’s Birth of a Nation. Our client had only one viable defense, that the
renewal in this case hadn’t been validly filed. There was a renewal, but in
somebody else’s name.  We had to show
that Griffith was the author and thus the only one with the right to
renew.  Our job was literally to take the
premises of cinematic auteur theory and translate them into legal theory.  WFH doctrine under 1909 Act: © belonged to
whoever was in control, and if Griffith was in control there was no one else
who had a right to renew.
Won that case, but had an experience that caused him to
doubt: Killian—relationship b/t derivative work and source following renewal of
© in derivative work.  SCt in Stewart v.
Abend rejected the theory that one work was as good as the other: the
derivative work had as much right to exist as the source work; they should
enjoy autonomous and independent lives. 
Eventually we were taught that the derivative work was a secondary
contribution, subservient to and legally subject to the higher claims of the
author of the original work.  Began to
see concept of authorship as containing ideas of hierarchy: earlier have
greater claims than later; closer to source material = better claims than those
who worked primarily on secondary cultural materials.  Became worrying to him.  Led him to reader response theory, destablizizing
supremacy of author.
If they mention authorship in policy discussions, reach for
your wallet—and count your fingers. Element of flimflam, sometimes very
pronounced, along with sincere/profound influence on discourse.  The idea that © was supposed to provide
revenue for author, children, and grandchildren, so life extension justified
increased term. This is actuarial nonsense, but also historically just wrong.  No discussion of it in Berne etc.; just
inserted by WIPO guide to Berne Convention in 1976.  That’s the first assertion of the claim that
life + 50 was supposed to be for two generations.  Because it “fits” our general naïve belief in
the idea of authorial entitlement and vulnerability, it went over. 
We all contribute to the grip of authorial genius, not just
maximalists but minimalists.  When we,
the latter, make arguments for limits we tend to go back to constitutionalism:
© was supposed to encourage authors.  We
implicitly validate the authorship construct: something about what a special
class of people does is particularly important. 
We can argue about implications of that special importance—great deal of
protection or only a little encouragement, but we concede the proposition.  Yet: Copyright doesn’t always take authorship
seriously.  When you actually look at
doctrine, issues like the unprotectability of authors’ style, a truism of ©, or
how issues of collaboration are handled in ©, you immediately see a
misfit.  Lack of clear connection b/t
conclusions to which a sincere and thoroughgoing conviction of importance of
authorship would lead v. the conclusions we have actually arrived at. 
Manichean conflict b/t irreconcilable ideological visions:
(1) elevates creative process and unique invididuals responsible for it and (2)
asserts the paramount value of public access, openness, etc.
Real life “authors” have strong fairness claims.  Not metaphorical authors, but Wordsworth and
Coleridge but people who labor from day to day to make creative work to sell:
something more real/acute than is comfortable for theorists to
acknowledge.  1994: strong congressional
push to repeal §412 on requiring timely registration for eligibility for
statutory damages/fees; professional commission w/lots of industry &
academic representation deadlocked and its failure to endorse probably
contributed to the proposal’s demise.  We
have enough incentives to registration to provide the basis for a comprehensive
if not complete record of American creativity—and that was Jaszi’s argument:
though eliminating §412 might benefit small authors taken by surprise by the
fact that their earlier failure to act might subsequently bar them from
collecting reasonable compensation for infringement in later years, the
interests of the system, especially in having a database for business and
research purposes, justified turning away from those interests.  He is proud of preserving §412, but also has
some regret that it wasn’t possible to accommodate the real interests of
individual creators who are sometimes taken by surprise by the persistence of
this last real formality for US works. 
Even though the critique of authorship has made it easy, comfortable,
and respectable to take a hard line in some copyright policy situation, to
reject the trend towards mystification in favor of policy giving more weight to
collective interest of public at large, there is a real costs.
We have a related proposal now for a small claims
court.  Once again, finds self in
position of wondering whether the benefit is worth the cost. Cost here:
expedited processing may be inimical to flourishing and continued growth of the
idea of user rights, especially fair use. 

Authorship isn’t the same as cultural production, but both
are more widely distributed than ever. 
Mystifying concept of authorship v. cultural production as more inclusive,
descriptive, and even useful category.  Creators’
real problems often don’t have to do with piracy—usually business issues like
getting better contracts, even better deals from landlords. Don’t fetishize IP
as the heart of their concerns.  Indonesia:
talked to a lot of practitioners of traditional arts—puppeteers, carvers,
singers, etc.  They wanted space to show
off art; they identified problems w/schooling in the arts & failure to
teach about difference b/t traditional and Western music; younger people were
too enamored of Western culture to do the slow, difficult work of learning the
old forms. Somewhere at the very bottom of that list, a few people said that
they might benefit from IP even though they weren’t sure it had meaning for
them or what it is.  These were
struggling custodians of great and important traditions; they had far more
urgent things to think about.  Remixers,
fanfic writers, vidders, are important cultural contributors but they don’t
recognize themselves in the romantic genius conception.  Perhaps it’s time to focus more on the needs
of systems of cultural production and less on the requirements of authorship as
classically understood.  There are many
ways to talk about ©; shouldn’t just fall back on author-talk as a way of avoiding
what’s at stake.  Interests of users,
w/recognition that users are also makers, participants in systems of cultural
production, even if not all are people who would be recognized or want to be
recognized under rubric of authorship w/a capital A.  Authorship, real authorship, is not the gift
of the few but the fate of the many. 
Cultural participation and citizenship are linked; meaningful work may
become ever more scarce, and the question is whether we can grasp the
options/alternatives offered to us all as culture-makers by new creative tools
provided by tech.

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