Initial comments on 1201: fixing what’s broken

I’ve been reading through the initial
comments on 1201 for the Copyright Office’s inquiry
.  One overarching thought: current “winners”—successful
exemption proponents—unanimously say the current process is broken.  Current losers—unsuccessful exemption
opponents—occasionally express openness to minor tweaks, such as a meaningless
presumption of renewal if there’s no
opposition, but say the process is fine. 
This rather unusual configuration of complaints suggests something about
how inherently skewed the process is: spending roughly 500 hours per exemption
(and that’s just on the proponents’ side, excluding opponents and the Copyright
Office) to double the word count of last time’s exemption, increasing its complexity and decreasing its utility, is a victory only
compared to the even worse alternative.
 
Also, a small but telling point: The Copyright Alliance
touts Anyclip.com as a DRM success: “On this site, users are able to search an
online library, which as of December 2011 included access to over 12,000 films
and over 50,000 clips. The site allows users to compile clips into playlists
(as a professor might wish to do for classroom use) and access the library with
any API to incorporate clips into an application that the user is
developing.”  Except that’s not what the site does in 2016;
it’s an ad platform for integrating ads into “premium” clips, not a consumer
site allowing users to compile playlists. 
I guess DRM didn’t prove all that helpful after all.  More generally: copyright owners’ business
models do not take care of fair use, and it’s past time to stop pretending that
they can.  (Also, cite checking has
relevance beyond law school.  Just sayin’.)

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Copyright Office notice of inquiry on 1201

Comments I’ve seen so far:

Organization for Transformative Works comment (of which I am very proud!)

Public Knowledge

New America’s Open Technology Institute

New Media Rights

Joint Libertarian Comments (R Street, FreedomWorks, and Niskanen Institute)

International Documentary Association

Consumers Union

Consumer Technology Association

Center for Democracy & Technology

University of Virginia Library

Harvard Cyberlaw Clinic

Library Copyright Alliance

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Anonymous defamatory posts are “advertising or promotion” under Lanham Act

Romeo & Juliette Laser Hair Removal, Inc. v. Assara I
LLC, 2016 WL 815205, No. 8-cv-0442 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 29, 2016)
 
R&J sued Assara and a number of related people eight
years ago.  The parties compete to offer
laser hair removal services. Tayar, Shuman, and Jay Shuman were involved in
Assara in various capacities.
 
Starting in 2006, negative posts about R&J appeared on the
internet consumer forums HairTell.com, Yelp.com, CitySearch.com, and
consumerbeware.com from anonymous users who claimed to have used the
plaintiff’s laser hair removal services. The posts came from Shuman, Tayar, and
Assara employees.  One, for example, said
that the poster, claiming to be a “27 year old female” with “light complexion”
and “black hair,” had heard “a horror story” about R&J—that he had heard
from a former Romeo & Juliette technician that the plaintiff had
over-applied EMLA cream to a client, who then “suffered a heart attack” and
came “very close” to dying. There was no evidence of such an incident or that the
true poster had heard that it occurred. 
Others described R&J’s staff as unprofessional and rude; the service
as expensive; and claimed that a test performed by R&J “burned” skin.  And so on. 
Some of the posts promoted Assara instead.  Tayar even wrote that “criticisms” of R&J
had been “blown out of proportion”: “Assara Laser is a good place, but so is
Romeo.”  At the same time, he damned with
faint praise, describing the plaintiff as “not that bad” while noting the
plaintiff’s “staff turnover” and long waiting time.
 
R&J started off the case with claims for trademark
infringement (based on keyword buys) and federal dilution, which have blessedly
dropped out of the case, leaving only false advertising/disparagement-related
claims, and only claims for injunctive relief and attorneys’ fees.  Defendant Will Shuman, appearing pro se and
on behalf of the other defendants, informed the Court that Assara was no longer
in business. In support of their motion to dismiss for mootness, the defendants
submitted a two page “Covenant Not to Compete and Covenant Not to Disparage
Agreement.” The Covenant provided that the signatories—the individual
defendants—“shall not, for a period of 10 years, compete in the business and
industry of laser hair removal … and … shall not publish, in any commercial
context, any statements online regarding the quality or characteristics of the
business or services of” the plaintiff.
 
Unfair competition under §43(a)(1)(B) and New York law: The
court granted summary judgment against Assara and Shuman, but not against
Tayar, Jay Shuman, or Dr. Tayar (Tayar’s father, an investor).  The court addressed whether pseudonymous
comments on internet forums constituted commercial advertising and promotion,
and held that they were. “In pursuit of their commercial interests, the
defendants repeatedly posted disparaging comments to public fora used by
consumers to select laser hair removal services. By anonymously disparaging the
plaintiff’s business and simultaneously promoting Assara, the defendants acted
in pursuit of their economic interests.”
 
Assara, through its employees and officers, and Shuman made
literally false statements by describing experiences that hadn’t occurred, or a
“horror story” he hadn’t heard and that hadn’t happened. “Most of these posts
concerned essential characteristics of the plaintiff’s business, for instance,
physical reactions to its treatments or rudeness by its staff.”  Literal falsity created a presumption of
harm.  However, the court denied summary
judgment as to Tayar, who was actually treated at R&J and whose postings
principally said that service was slow and that the R&J employees were
rude, which were largely matters of opinion. 
There was also no evidence that Dr. Tayar or Jay Shuman made any of the
challenged statements.
 
The New York common law unfair competition claim was
resolved in the same way; it required bad faith in addition to the Lanham Act
evidence, but that was shown because Assara and Shuman deliberately posted
false statements.
 
Defamation: The bare accusation that a product does not
conform to its advertised quality does not, without more, defame the owner of
the product, but disparaging the integrity and professionalism of the competitor’s
business is actionable as per se defamation, not requiring a showing of special
damages.  The evidence showed that Assara
and Shuman defamed R&J by claiming that its staff were unprofessional,
intrusive, and dishonest, even causing physical injuries. The fact that the
statements were purely fictitious showed actual malice.  Defendants argued that they were merely
making statements of opinion, but the statements described fictitious
treatments for fictitious clients.  That
the clients didn’t exist and the treatment didn’t occur was readily
falsifiable, making the statements at issue factual, not opinion.
 
Product disparagement: This requires proof of special damages,
unless the statements at issue “impeach[ ] the integrity or business methods of
the [entity] itself.”   This too had been
shown.
 
Injunctive relief under §43(a): A permanent injunction
against Assara and Shuman was warranted. 
“Because comments posted on the internet will have a lasting impact on a
business’s reputation, and because that impact will be impossible to measure,
monetary damages are inadequate to compensate the plaintiff for the unlawful
activities of the three defendants.” 
Defendants would suffer no hardship from an injunction, given that they
already pledged through the covenant that they would not further disparage R&J.
An injunction would provide “greater peace of mind” to R&J and better
protect its investment in its business. 
The public interest also favored fair competition and the accurate
description of business services.
 
An injunction was warranted even though the internet
postings at issue ended in 2009. 
Defendants denied their responsibility for many years, forcing R&J
to engage in expensive and time-consuming third party discovery to pin the
blame on them.  Only in 2012 did
defendants begin to acknowledge authorship of at least some of the defamatory
statements; because of this litigation strategy and the long pendency of the litigation,
“there is no reliable inference to be drawn as to when the defendants
altogether ceased the improper activities at issue here or the likelihood of
their recurrence.”  Given these unique
facts, the time gap didn’t preclude an injunction.
 
Defendants argued that there was no need for an injunction
since Assara went out of business in 2015 and both Tayar and Shulman signed the
covenant.  The court disagreed.  “This has been lengthy and hard fought
litigation. Without the issuance of an injunction, reinforced by the contempt
powers associated with an injunction, there will be inadequate protection
against the recurrence of the defendants’ sharp business practices and the need
for renewed litigation.”  Plus, R&J
showed that Assara was still registered as an active entity with the New York
Department of State, and Assara’s website was still live; there was also no
impediment to Shuman opening another laser hair removal business, named Assara
or something else.
 
Thus, Assara and Shuman would be enjoined from publishing
false statements about R&J on internet forums. The court left the specifics
for another order, which is sad because I wanted to know if they’d be required
to delete/request deletion of the existing defamatory comments.
 
Defendants argued unclean hands because R&J’s owner engaged
in “astroturfing” in praise of his business. Even assuming that to be true,
R&J’s astroturfing wasn’t related to the defendants’ defamatory posts. No
one testified that defendants’ posts were prompted or justified by R&J’s
glowing descriptions of its own business.  And false accusations that R&J physically
injured its clients “represent serious misconduct.”
 
Laches also didn’t apply; R&J had been seeking an
injunction since it filed its 2012 motion for summary judgment, and anyway,
defendants didn’t show how they’d been prejudiced.  Nor was the case moot, despite a declaration
from Shuman stating that Assara ceased operations, that each of the defendants
except Shuman had left New York, and that Assara “will never re-open.”  Nonetheless, defendants didn’t show that it
was “absolutely clear” that their wrongful conduct would not recur. The covenant
had “significant authenticity and execution issues.” Further, “the defendants’
misrepresentations during this litigation counsel against reliance on the
representations they offer today.” Moreover, as recently as November 24, 2015,
Shuman wrote to the supplier that he and Tayar were “discussing selling” an old
laser and “purchasing or leasing a later model.” “Given the malicious nature of
the internet postings, as well as the deceit involved in litigating this case,
a simple promise by the defendants to cease their disparagement is not enough
to moot this matter.”

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Land o’ (non)confusion: no dilution or reverse confusion with dissimilar goods

Hugunin v. Land O’ Lakes, Inc., No. 15-2815 (7th Cir. Mar.
1, 2016)
 
This opinion reflects what you might call Judge Posner’s
trademark mix of good sense and arrogance/lack of reasons enabling one to
formulate an actual rule for future application.
 
Since 1997, James Hugunin made and sold fishing tackle in a
town in northeastern Wisconsin, which is called Land O’ Lakes because it is
located in a region dotted with lakes; the region is also called Land O’ Lakes.
He registered LAND O LAKES as the trademark of his fishing tackle in 2000; the
registration lapsed, and his application to re-register was held in abeyance
pending resolution of this suit.
 
Defendant, a large agricultural cooperative, sells butter
and other dairy products throughout the United States, and has used the LAND O
LAKES mark since the 1920s. In 1997, the dairy company became the “official
dairy sponsor” of a sport-fishing tournament, the Wal-Mart FLW Tour, and began
advertising its dairy products in fishing magazines. In 2000, it found out
about Hugunin’s registration and threatened him with infringement
liability/told him that he needed a license from the dairy company. After he
refused to comply, the dairy company opposed his new registration.
 
The court expressed its puzzlement that the dairy company
should have been worried, given the differences in the parties’ products. It
doesn’t sell any fishing-related products that could be confused with
Hugunin’s. “It would be strange indeed for a dairy company to manufacture a
product so remote from milk, butter, and cream, and there is no sign that the
dairy company intends to take the plunge.” The dairy company sponsored the
fishing tournament and advertised in fishing magazines “because fishermen, like
the rest of us, are consumers of dairy products.”
 
The court was equally puzzled as to why Hugunin sued the
dairy company for trademark infringement. Hugunin claimed to have trouble
attracting investors worried about being sued for trademark infringement/having
the name enjoined. The dairy company counterclaimed for dilution. The district
court dismissed the dilution claim as barred by laches, but the court of
appeals—not even pausing to make clear that this was a proper ground—reached
out to explain that, even without laches, the dairy company would have lost. In
Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 2002), Judge Posner explained
dilution as involving increased consumer search costs, such that consumers
would have to “think harder—incur as it were a higher imagination cost—to
recognize the name as the name of the store”; blurring “reduces the distinctness
of the trademark as a signifier of the trademarked product or service,” and
tarnishment is a subset of blurring. (Pause to note that this theory is not
borne out by the evidence of how consumers actually think.)
 
Here, though, Judge Posner found a blurring theory
implausible, because the goods were too
different:
 
Everyone recognizes “Tiffany” as
the name of a luxury jewelry store on Fifth Avenue in New York (with stores in
other major cities), and seeing the name on a hot-dog stand a passerby might
think of the jewelry store and of the incongruity of a hot-dog stand’s having
the same name; he might think the jewelry store’s cachet impaired by the coincidence
and switch his patronage to Cartier or Harry Winston. [Ed. note: Yeah, right.] Many
consumers would recognize the name “LAND O LAKES” as referring to the dairy
company, but we can’t see how the company could be hurt by the use of the same
name by a seller just of fishing tackle. The products of the two companies are
too different, and the sale of fishing tackle is not so humble a business as
the sale of hot dogs by street vendors. And so it is beyond unlikely that
someone dissatisfied with LAND O LAKES fishing tackle would take revenge on the
dairy company by not buying any of its products, or that a customer would have
difficulty identifying Land O’ Lakes’ dairy products because he had seen the
LAND O LAKES mark used on Hugunin’s fishing tackle. … And the dairy company’s
mark is itself derivative from Minnesota’s catchphrase “Land of 10,000 Lakes,”
a phrase in such widespread use that the company could not insist that it was
the sole lawful user of the phrase in advertising for all products.
 
Out of this mishmash of rationales, let me select a few
possibilities: (1) While dilution doesn’t require similarity in goods and
services, sufficient dissimilarity may preclude dilution. The reason why is
left as an exercise for the reader. (2) Land O Lakes is not high-falutin’
enough to be blurred/tarnished the way a luxury brand could be by association
with fishing tackle; no one would feel the dairy company was passé, and overexposure isn’t
a concern for such a product. (3) Land O Lakes is already not unique and can’t
suffer more from one more use. Other thoughts?
 
Meanwhile, Hugunin’s trademark infringement claim was based
on his seniority in the fishing industry and alleged reverse confusion. “But
the dairy company’s use of the same trademark is confined to products so
different from Hugunin’s that few if any consumers would think that simply by
virtue of having an identical trademark the dairy company was competing with
Hugunin in a different industry.” The fishing-themed ads run by the dairy
company showed things like the “Land O’ Lakes Walleye Pro,” “a champion fisherman
whom Land O’ Lakes sponsors in fishing competitions in return for his promoting
its dairy products.” He’s shown sitting next to packages of Land O’ Lakes
butter and cheese, and the company’s logo is also on fishing boats during
tournaments.
 

The Land O Lakes Walleye Pro
In a line that defendants are sure to love, Judge Posner
writes, “But just as no one watching a NASCAR race and seeing a racing car emblazoned
with Budweiser’s logo would think that the beer company had entered the automobile
industry, so no one reading the ‘Walleye Pro’ ad or seeing a boat sponsored by
the dairy company would think that the advertiser sells fishing tackle.”
 
Hugunin also objected that the dairy company “permitted”
some competing producers and sellers of fishing tackle to use its trademark. If
they were licensees, the court continued, that might justify a claim of
trademark infringement—the dairy company might be intentionally encouraging
those competitors to infringe Hugunin’s mark in order to increase its own
revenues from licensing. “But there is no evidence that Land O’ Lakes has
issued any such licenses or is even aware that other producers of fishing
tackle have used its mark.”
 
Dismissal upheld.

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Trademark defendant wins rare unclean hands defense to injunction

Cochran Firm, P.C. v. Cochran Firm Los Angeles LLP, —
Fed.Appx. —, 2016 WL 770129, No. 15–55816 (9th Cir. Feb. 29, 2016)
 
A rare unclean hands win for a trademark defendant!  The Cochran Firm appealed the district court’s
order dissolving a preliminary injunction against Randy H. McMurray, P.C. and McMurray
individually.  The majority found that
the trial court implicitly made a finding of bad faith by the Firm, and
considered “evidence of actual deception of consumers, such as when a former
client attempted to obtain a judgment against the Firm.”  Moreover, the district court considered
whether the Firm’s misconduct had an “immediate and necessary relation to the
equity [it] seeks.”  In previous
proceedings, the court of appeals had noted, “The structure of [the Firm’s]
business is important in assessing whether [the Firm] has unclean hands.
Specifically, [the Firm] may be misusing the trademark to deceive the public
into believing it is a single, national firm, when in fact it is a network of
separate partnerships.”  Indeed, the
majority said in a footnote,
 
The Firm’s marketing of itself and
its regional offices as a “single” law firm is likely to bear an “immediate and
necessary relation” to the equity the Firm seeks. Given the singular form of
the noun “firm,” “The Cochran Firm” trademark suggests that all practices
bearing that mark are part of a single firm.
 
Nor did the district court abuse its discretion in using
California’s Rules of Professional Conduct’s definition of a law firm or expert
testimony to guide its findings.
 
Finally, McMurray’s own unclean hands didn’t bar him from
raising the defense.  The district court
didn’t abuse its discretion in finding that there was insufficient evidence to
support the Firm’s unclean hands argument, and even if there were sufficient
evidence, that the Firm was more culpable than McMurray.
 
Judge Callahan dissented, reasoning that unclean hands
findings should be rare in trademark cases. “The Firm’s marketing is not
misleading and has little to do with the trademark at stake.”  Worse, “[m]ulti-office businesses will be
surprised to learn that they are misleading the public by advertising
themselves as ‘single’ and ‘national’ in stature, and thus may not protect any
right they hold to their company’s name.” 
The dissent complained that the district court had wrongly federalized
the definition of a “law firm.”
 
Initially, the dissent emphasized the “increasingly limited
scope” of unclean hands in trademark infringement suits (as Mark McKenna might
say, tracking the shift from a business to a consumer protection focus of the
overall cause of action, given the dissent’s concession that unclean hands is
an “established defense”).  A defendant
must demonstrate by “clear, convincing evidence” that (1) plaintiff’s conduct
is inequitable and (2) the misconduct relates to the subject matter of
plaintiff’s trademark infringement claim.   Inequitable conduct requires a showing that
the plaintiff used the trademark to deceive consumers. “[E]ven where bad intent
is demonstrated, an appreciable number of consumers must also have actually
been deceived for the defense to succeed.”  Then, the defendant must show that the
plaintiff’s “misdeeds … have an immediate and necessary relation to the
equity that [the plaintiff] seeks in respect of the matter in litigation,”
generally requiring the trademark itself to be misleading or the plaintiff to
have acquired its rights with unclean hands. 
Using the mark as part of misleading advertising is much less likely to
have the requisite relation.
 
The district court’s findings that the Firm had
misrepresented (1) that it was “national” and (2) that its offices were part of
a “single” law firm were insufficient to the dissent.  First, the district court didn’t explicitly
find that the Firm acted in bad faith in advertising itself as a single,
national law firm, or any actual deception. 
Second, the district court didn’t find that the Firm’s marketing had an
“immediate and necessary relation” to the relief it sought—which was to stop McMurray
from trading on the Firm’s goodwill and deceiving the public into believing
that he is still a part of The Cochran Firm.
 
The “single firm” advertising wasn’t sufficiently
inequitable to bar relief.  There was no
survey evidence of deception, and the trademark itself wasn’t clearly
misleading, so “courts should demand at least some comparable evidence of
consumer deception.”  (Indeed, the
dissent said, surveys should rarely be necessary, because only egregiously
misleading marketing featuring the trademark should support an unclean hands
defense.)  The evidence cited by the
majority was that “a lawyer for a former client’s conservator named the Firm as
a defendant in a lawsuit seeking to recover a judgment”; the dissent dismissed
this as a mere litigation tactic, which didn’t show that the former client
herself was misled. 
 
The dissent would also have found that the district court
erred in relying on California’s Rules of Professional Conduct for lawyers to
inform its understanding of how the public understands the term “law firm.”  Even if the public did follow that
understanding, the dissent argued that the Firm’s “hub and spoke” structure
wasn’t contrary to any rule.  An ABA
opinion expressly condones, “at least from the ethical point of view,” the
franchise-like “licensing” of a law firm’s name “to create a national network
of firms, all of which will use the original firm’s name under a licensing
agreement by which the original firm will provide all marketing for the firms
in the network.”
 
The California Practice Guide to Professional Responsibility
similarly provides that franchising of a law firm’s name is permissible where
“the franchisor is in a partnership with each franchisee.” The dissent noted that
the Firm complied with this guidance, and also highlighted the district court’s
findings that the Firm had nationwide “prestige”; coordinated across offices on
class actions and multi-district litigation; had numerous nation-wide
standardized resources and procedures; required regional offices to carry
liability insurance; vetted employees and ensured “that the regional offices
are managed by a managing partner that Johnnie Cochran knew”; and exerted a
degree of “control over the regional offices.”
 
Thus, neither the “single” nor “national” branding was
inequitable, and “national” had no immediate and necessary relation to the trademark.
  
 
The dissent closed by warning that many law firms use a
similar structure.  “The closeness of
bonds between the offices that comprise a firm varies significantly by office
and firm. It does not follow that regional offices that operate more
independently mislead the public or violate rules of professional conduct by
holding themselves out as part of a larger, single law firm.”

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Fraud claim by NY AG against Donald Trump revived on appeal

People ex rel. Schneiderman v. Trump Entrepreneur Initiative
LLC, — N.Y.S.3d —-, 2016 WL 783216, 2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 01430 (Sup. Ct. Mar.
1, 2016)
 
Snarky political note: It doesn’t appear that Trump could object to this ruling on the grounds that the judges were “Hispanic.”  (Looking forward to learning more about that recusal argument: Your Honor, my client is too biased to be judged by you.)
 
The AG sued Donald Trump individually and “several business
entities bearing his name.”  Trump, with others,
incorporated Trump University LLC in 2004; “Trump University purported, by way
of seminars and mentoring programs, to instruct small business owners and
individual entrepreneurs in real estate investing.”  In 2005, the NY State Department of Education
notified Trump and Trump University that they were violating the New York
Education Law by using the word “University” when it was not actually chartered
as one, and by operating without a license to offer student instruction or
training in New York State. Trump University would not be subject to the
license requirement if it had no physical presence in New York State, moved the
business organization outside of New York, and ceased running live programs in
the State. Trump University thus told the state that it would merge its operation
into a new Delaware LLC, and would stop holding live programs in New York State.
 
The AG alleged that Trump University failed to do as it
promised.  New York learned in 2009 through
newspaper advertisements and a student complaint to the AG that Trump
University was continuing to provide live programming and instruction in New
York.  In 2010, the Department of
Education sent Trump University another demand letter; Trump University finally
filed a certificate of amendment to its Articles of Organization, formally
changing its name to TEI.  But TEI still
lacked a license to operate, and the State sent another letter, at which point
TEI informed it that TEI had ceased to operate.
 
In 2013, the AG sued for injunctive relief, restitution,
disgorgement, damages, and civil penalties for conduct between 2005 and 2011, when
respondents allegedly operated an unlicensed, illegal educational institution.
In addition, respondents allegedly intentionally misled more than 5,000
students nationwide, including over 600 New York residents, into paying as much
as $35,000 each to participate in live seminars and mentor programs that the
students thought were part of a licensed university.  The ads represented that real estate experts “handpicked
by Trump himself” would teach successful strategies for real estate investing,
including quotes attributed to Trump such as “I can turn anyone into a
successful real estate investor, including you” and “In just 90 minutes, my
hand-picked instructors will share my techniques, which took my entire career
to develop …. Then just copy exactly what I’ve done and get rich.” At the free
seminars urging further investment, instructors played a video featuring Donald
Trump telling prospective students, “We’re going to have professors that are
absolutely terrific—terrific people, terrific brains, successful, the best” and
noted that they were “all people that are handpicked by me.”
 
In fact, according to the AG, Trump did not handpick the
instructors, participate in the creation of the content, or review any
curricula; “indeed, only one of the live event speakers for Trump University
had even ever met Donald Trump.”  But
people still relied on these claims.  In
an affidavit submitted to the Attorney General, one student stated that he “had
some trust in the program because it was run by Donald Trump” and was “led to
believe that … based on Trump’s marketing materials, the course professors
had been handpicked by Donald Trump.” The AG alleged that the instructors had
been inadequately vetted and in fact had little or no experience in real estate
investing, instead having prior work experience such as food service management
and graphic design.  Moreover, the “free”
seminars were merely extended ads attempting to induce students to enroll in
increasingly expensive seminars.  While
speakers represented that an initial three-day $1,495 seminar would teach
students all they needed to know to be successful real estate investors, “the
instructors at those three-day seminars then engaged in a ‘bait and switch,’
telling students that they needed to attend yet another seminar for an
additional $5,000 in order to learn more about particular lenders.” They also
urged students to sign up for “Trump mentorship packages, which ranged anywhere
from $10,000 to $35,000” and supposedly provided “the only way to succeed in
real estate investment.”
 
While not involved in selecting instructors or determining
content, Donald Trump was allegedly significantly involved with the operation
and overall business strategy, including “attending frequent meetings” with another
key individual to “discuss Trump University operations.” Trump’s photographs
and signature appeared on all of Trump University’s advertising; “Trump
personally reviewed and approved all the ads that were in the newspapers.”
 
The AG brought claims for fraud under Executive Law § 63(12);
fraudulent and deceptive practices under General Business Law § 349; false
advertising under GBL § 350; violating Education Law § 224 by calling the
business “Trump University” when it was not, in fact, chartered as a university;
violating Education Law § 5000 et seq. by operating an unlicensed school that
did not meet State standards; and violating 16 CFR § 429, which, in connection
with a contract of sale, obliges a seller to include the buyer’s right to
cancel the transaction within three days.
 
The trial court dismissed the Education Law § 224 claim in
its entirety, and held that the AG was bound by a three-year statute of
limitations on all the statutory claims in the petition. But the court also
held that the Attorney General’s general fraud claims were viable and subject
to the six-year statute of limitations governing fraud actions.  Then the court granted dismissal of the fraud
claim under Executive Law § 63(12) (as opposed to the common law fraud),
stating that the statute does not provide a standalone cause of action for
fraud, and dismissed the claim for violation of 16 CFR § 429. The court denied
the AG’s request for a summary determination of liability, except for the claim
for violation of Education Law §§ 5001–5010.
 
This appeal followed. 
Executive Law § 63(12) states, in relevant part:
 
Whenever any person shall engage in
repeated fraudulent or illegal acts or otherwise demonstrate persistent fraud
or illegality in the carrying on, conducting or transaction of business, the
attorney general may apply, in the name of the people of the state of New York,
to the supreme court of the state of New York, on notice of five days, for an
order enjoining the continuance of such business activity or of any fraudulent
or illegal acts [and] directing restitution and damages … and the court may award
the relief applied for or so much thereof as it may deem proper.
 
“Fraud” is defined as “any device, scheme or artifice to
defraud and any deception, misrepresentation, concealment, suppression, false
pretense, false promise or unconscionable contractual provisions.” Fraud under
§ 63(12) may be established without proof of scienter or reliance, making it
different from common-law fraud.  The
Supreme Court thus concluded that the trial court erred in dismissing that
claim, because it can be brought as its own cause of action.  That fraud claim was subject to New York’s
residual six-year statute of limitations, though material issues of fact
precluded summary judgment in the AG’s favor. 
The court also affirmed the dismissal of seven affirmative defenses, and
commented that the court should have considered allegations relating to
post-May 2010 conduct (after the second letter).

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Hidden connections between doctors and the drugs they promote

The violations of the FTC Endorsement Guidelines seem very clear in the stories recounted by this Boston Globe investigation.  H/T ST.

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Transformative work of the day, Chris Christie edition

How many references can you spot in this Washington Post column?  Until I got to the last line of the column, I had a different title for this post, but Alexandra Petri got there before me.

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Open access-related jobs at Yale

Via Amy Kapcyzinski:

We are starting a new initiative here at Yale to do legal work and research to help improve access to clinical trial data.  

We need to hire a stellar young attorney (ideally with at least 5 years of experience) who can help us map out a legal strategy around these issues.  The person will get to work closely with faculty and students here, and Dave Schulz (a great First Amendment lawyer), and the position pays well ($100 – $130k) and has three years of guaranteed funding.

Job and project description is here:
http://ift.tt/1T6ntgn

There are also fellow positions that would be great avenues for young JDs who are interested in open access and transparency issues, or regulatory issues, from a policy or academic bent!

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On the importance of knowing your genre

I haven’t written about the Sherrilyn
Kenyon v. Cassandra Clare lawsuit over Darkhunters v. Shadowhunters
, though
I did read the complaint.  I didn’t find
the copyright claims to make it past assertions of similarity in ideas, though
trademark is often trickier these days. 
As a geek, however, I was interested to see that one piece of
evidence for infringement was both parties’ use of a particular runic symbol (Darkhunters and  Shadowhunters)—in part because, in what I’m sure was complete coincidence, that
very symbol is now playing a key role on this season of Sleepy Hollow.  This
recap
says it’s also used in Twin
Peaks
(and by the Nazis, so there’s one segue taken care of).  Pretty good evidence that it’s a mystical
trope!

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