Reading list: Kate Crawford and Tarleton Gillespie

Rebecca Tushnet, What is a Theorist For? The Recruitment of Users into Online Governance, JOTWELL (August 14, 2015) (reviewing Kate Crawford & Tarleton Gillespie, What is a flag for? Social media reporting tools and the vocabulary of complaint, New Media & Society (2014), available at SSRN)

from Blogger http://ift.tt/1NfHddg

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , | Leave a comment

Reading list: Kate Crawford and Tarleton Gillespie

Rebecca Tushnet, What is a Theorist For? The Recruitment of Users into Online Governance, JOTWELL (August 14, 2015) (reviewing Kate Crawford & Tarleton Gillespie, What is a flag for? Social media reporting tools and the vocabulary of complaint, New Media & Society (2014), available at SSRN)

Posted in my writings, reading list | Leave a comment

Pure mourning: Pom fails to get preliminary injunction again

Pom Wonderful LLC v. 
Pur Beverages LLC, No. 13-cv-06917 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2015) 
 
Pom fares no better its second time around. Although the
court of appeals previously found likely confusion between its marks and
defendant’s “pūr pŏm” energy drink (which allegedly contains no pomegranate
juice at all) and remanded for a re-analysis of the remaining preliminary injunction
factors, Pom was unable to show irreparable harm distinct from its showing on
likely confusion. 
 
The harm at issue must not merely be irreparable; it must
also be imminent. “Speculative injury does not constitute irreparable injury
sufficient to warrant granting a preliminary injunction.” Thus, unsupported and
conclusory statements about harm are insufficient. Herb Reed.  A finding of
reputational harm “may not be based on ‘pronouncements [that] are grounded in
platitudes rather than evidence.’”
 
Pom argued three varieties of irreparable harm: (1) the POM
mark would lose distinctiveness and potentially become generic; (2) it would lose
its return on its investment in its mark; and (3) its reputation and goodwill
would be harmed.
 
As for loss of distinctiveness, Pom offered the declaration
of Fernando Torres, the Chief Economist at IPmetrics LLC, an intellectual
property consulting firm.  Torres stated
that the problem with free riders like Pur is that infringement “will
eventually destroy the value of the reputational investment embodied in the
trademark.” He opined that, because Pom Wonderful has cultivated a distinctive
brand using the POM mark, “allowing a third party to make a confusing use of
‘pom’ under the guise of a generic abbreviation for the ingredient pomegranate
would help push the valuable POM trademarks toward generic use.” Such a “loss
of distinctiveness” couldn’t be quantified in terms of lost sales or lost
profits.  The court was unimpressed.  “Although Torres cites economic theory to
supports his opinions, the opinions are not tied to actual evidence, and
constitute little more than assertions grounded in ‘platitudes rather than
evidence’” (quoting Herb Reed).  His conclusions “would apply in any trademark
infringement case where the plaintiff owns a distinctive trademark.” A risk isn’t
a likelihood of irreparable harm.
 
There was no evidence that the “distinctiveness” or
perceived value of Pom’s mark would likely be affected negatively by Hubbard’s
use of “pūr pŏm,” including no evidence that consumers’ association of the POM
mark with Pom Wonderful had weakened since pūr pŏm entered the market or that
other companies had attempted to market pomegranate beverages under “pom” in
the more than two years since Pur began doing done so. “Such evidence might
make irreparable harm likely, as opposed to just merely possible.” But Torres
merely assumed that others would, in the future, begin using the POM mark on
their products after observing Hubbard do so. That was mere speculation on this
record.  Plus, Torres said it takes time
for genericide to occur, and didn’t opine that this period could run during the
pendency of the trial.  Ultimately, the
court found, his opinions were “little more than speculative statements
regarding the type of harm that can arise in any trademark infringement case.”  His evidence was non-specific to Pom Wonderful
“and equally applicable to any trademark infringement case. Consequently, it is
not sufficient to show a likelihood of irreparable harm.”
 
Pom quoted defendant Hubbard’s statement to the press in
response to the question, “Would you consider changing your drink’s name, and
why or why not?”
 
I will prove that pom means
pomegranate.  When I do, it will make
their standard word trademark of ‘POM,’ that is currently incontestable,
invalid. They will lose their registration of the mark under the theory of
genericness. Although it may be true that when they initially got the standard
word mark of ‘POM’ it had no meaning at the time. They, and numerous other
makers of pomegranate flavored products, have widely used the term pom to
describe pomegranate flavoring. Just like I do with my product.  The term has now become generic, and thus,
not deserving of Federal Trademark Registration. . . . Mark my words: I will be
the company that makes Pom Wonderful lose their trademark ‘POM.’ I will then
allow the consumer packaged goods industry to use the properly used, and widely
known term ‘pom’ to describe its pomegranate flavored products, without the
threat of a bully company suing every person or company that utters those three
letters in sequence.
 
Pom argued that this was an admission that “part of his
reason for using ‘pŏm,’ as part of his energy drink’s name, is to pave the way
for others to use POM as a flavor descriptor, turning this incontestable mark
into a non-protectable generic word.” 
But the court found that these statements weren’t about this case, but
rather about ongoing cancellation proceedings before the TTAB, wherein Pur
argued that Pom abandoned its word mark by using “P♥M” rather than “POM.” Risks
connected to the cancellation petition weren’t connected to the purported
infringement, and didn’t adequately demonstrate likely irreparable harm from
that infringement.
 
Plus, even attributing this statement to the current
infringement, that didn’t show irreparable harm, just because it might become
generic “over time” if third parties begin to use it in a descriptive and/or
generic sense.  Pom actively polices its
trademark and this hypothesized use has yet to begin.  Again, this was merely speculative.
 
Loss of return on investment by preventing Pom from fully
exploiting its reputation: Pom argued that Pur’s use “limit[s] Pom’s ability to
control the reputation of its recognized brand and the perception of Pom’s
premium quality products.” This was again speculative and not supported by
evidence. Torres claimed that post-infringement, the value the trademark lost
due to the infringing activity is never recouped, but the testimony offered
wasn’t specific to Pom.  Since it would be
true in every infringement case, this claim couldn’t be “squared with the rule
that a plaintiff must adduce evidence of likely irreparable harm to obtain an
injunction.”
 
Harm to reputation and goodwill: Pom argued that (1) the
infringement damaged its ability to communicate a consistent brand message; (2)
Pom’s reputation as a seller of healthy beverages conflicted directly with
consumers’ perception of energy drinks; and (3) Pom lacked control over the
quality of Pur’s products.
 
As for the brand message claim, Pom argued that it focused on
communicating that it uses only 100% pure pomegranate juice in its products.
Pom has expended substantial resources marketing products that contain only
100% pomegranate juice and litigating against companies that market their
products as “pomegranate juice” when the products are predominantly cheaper
“filler juices.” Because Pur’s product contained no pomegranate juice, any
association between Pom and Pur would harm Pom’s brand. Likewise, while Pom “prides
itself [on] advertising that is sophisticated, smart and witty,” Pur’s ads are
often “low-brow and tasteless.”  But
there was no evidence of harm to Pom’s goodwill.  Though Pur had been selling its products for more
than two years, there was no evidence Pom’s customers were aware of Pur’s
product or that they had a negative reaction to it or to Pur’s
advertising.  It was certainly “possible”
that Pom’s reputation and/or goodwill could be damaged by having less control
over its brand messaging, but it didn’t show that such harm was likely.
 
There is a distinction between a likelihood of irreparable
harm and a showing of actual harm.  But
one way to show likely irreparable harm is to show actual confusion or harm
right now.  Post-Herb Reed cases have therefore, when granting injunctive relief,
often relied on “some evidence of actual confusion or actual harm,” including
confusion surveys.  (NB: Confusion is not
harm; harm is harm.  Also, a survey doesn’t
necessarily show actual confusion of plaintiff’s
customers, unless the parties compete directly, so it doesn’t inherently show
the damage that the court said it was looking for.)  Among other cases, the court cited OTR Wheel
Engineering, Inc. v. West Worldwide Services, Inc., 602 Fed. Appx. 669 (9th
Cir. Mar. 18, 2015), which affirmed a preliminary injunction and found that
there was some evidence of irreparable harm where the infringing product was
sold to the plaintiff’s major customer, which led to a dispute between the
plaintiff and its customer—“a nonquantifiable injury to the goodwill it had
created with its customer.”  In Life
Alert Emergency Response, Inc. v. LifeWatch, Inc., 601 Fed. Appx. 469 (9th Cir.
Feb. 4, 2015), there was a declaration “reporting numerous and persistent
complaints from would-be customers who received robo-calls for what they believed
were Life Alert products,” as well as emails and social media posts
substantiating the threat to Life Alert’s reputation and goodwill.
 
Negative association with energy drinks: Pom noted that
energy drinks have been associated with 224 adverse event reports to the FDA
between Jan. 2012-Nov. 2014.  But that
didn’t go far enough to show that Pur was a disreputable product, or that Pom’s
customers associated Pur’s product with Pom or saw energy drinks as
disreputable. Again, absent evidence about Pom’s consumers, this was merely
conclusory and speculative.
 
The court distinguished and disagreed with E&J Gallo
Winery v. Grenade Beverage, LLC, No. 1:13-cv-00770- AWI-SAB, 2014 WL 4073241,
*1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2014), report and recommendation adopted, 2014 WL
5489076, *1 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2014), which had accepted a similar theory of
harm involving Gallo wine v. EL GALLO for energy drinks.  Gallo said it didn’t want to be associated with
energy drinks because it believed that mixing alcohol and energy drinks
promoted irresponsible behavior.  The
court reasoned: “While Plaintiff may not have introduced admissible evidence to
support the proposition that energy drinks are associated with irresponsible
drinking or that an association with energy drinks would be harmful to
Plaintiff’s reputation, it is enough that Plaintiff has introduced evidence of
loss of control over their own business reputation.”
 
Not only is this case on appeal, it’s directly at odds with Titaness
Light Shop
, in which the 9th Circuit rejected a plaintiff’s
speculative theory that its customers wouldn’t want to be associated with
defendant’s product, which was sold on “a website that supposedly catered to
marijuana growers.” “[A]ssertions by a representative of the plaintiff that its
goodwill and reputation would be harmed if consumers associated its product
with an item that did not fit the plaintiff’s brand image” were not sufficient.
The Ninth Circuit in Titaness observed
that the plaintiff did not show that its “customers [were] aware of the
website, [that they] would associate the products on the site with    marijuana, or [that they] would stop
purchasing Sunlight products if they mistakenly believed that Sunlight was
marketing to marijuana growers.”  
 
Basically, the Ninth Circuit ruled that “it was not
sufficient for a movant to assert that it had developed a particular brand
image and that any association with a product inconsistent with that image
would harm its reputation.”  But that’s
what Gallo accepted and what Pom
asked the court to accept here.  More
fundamentally, Gallo essentially
presumed irreparable harm without evidence other than its likely success on the
merits.  “If a conclusory assertion that
a third party has used the plaintiff’s mark in a way that is ‘directly contrary
to [plaintiff’s] philosophy,’ or that plaintiff does ‘not want to associate
itself or its [ ] trademark’ with the third party or its business were
sufficient to satisfy a plaintiff’s burden, it is likely that irreparable harm
would be found in any case where plaintiff was able to demonstrate a likelihood
of success on the merits.”
 
Evidence that customers have a negative perception of energy
drinks in general or of pūr pŏm in particular would probably have sufficed to
show irreparable harm, but that wasn’t present. 
“It would be reasonable to infer likely harm to a plaintiff’s reputation
or goodwill if it could demonstrate that the consuming public has a negative
perception of defendant’s product, a product that is sold under a confusingly
similar mark.”  (Note the structural
similarity here with showing materiality in false advertising—courts generally
don’t require successful plaintiffs to show that the false claim is material to
the exact same people who receive the false message, according to the plaintiff’s
survey; showing that it is the kind of claim that is material in the relevant
context suffices.  At long last, and at
the remedy stage, irreparable harm is being used to reintroduce a materiality
standard to trademark.)
 
Lack of control over the quality of Pur’s products: Pom
argued that it was at risk if even “a single incident of poor quality control
or a single consumer getting ill from drinking pūr pŏm” was reported. Again,
this would be true in every trademark infringement case. There was no evidence
that pūr pŏm had caused illness, or facts allowing a reasonable inference that
this would occur in the future.
 
Pom argued that the danger to it was great because Pur’s
principal was Hubbard, “a litigious and shifty business owner with a checkered
past.” Pom proffered evidence that Hubbard has been charged with theft,
criminal trespass, assault, and attempting to elude the police, and that he had
routinely been “vengeful” in previous litigation to which he has been a party.  As Pom noted, Hubbard had filed a cancellation
petition.  But Hubbard explained that he
did so based on research indicating that Pom Wonderful has never used POM as a
trademark without the “o” in the shape of a heart. Thus, he asserts, Pom was
improperly granted a trademark and/or that it abandoned the word mark by not
using “POM” in commerce. The court would not impute bad faith to Hubbard based
on the fact that he exercised his legal right to file such a petition; plus,
that’s unrelated to irreparable harm from continued infringement.
 
Pur said that all its remaining inventory was pūr pŏm as
opposed to other products; Pom argued that this made clear that Pur was relying
on confusion to stay in business.  That
might be true, or maybe he hadn’t been successful in selling pūr pŏm, which
would cut against finding irreparable harm.

from Blogger http://ift.tt/1WirmP3

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , | Leave a comment

11th Circuit recognizes contributory false advertising theory

Duty Free Americas, Inc. v. Estee Lauder Companies, Inc.,
— F.3d —- (2015), 2015 WL 4709573, No. 14–11853 (11th Cir. Aug. 7, 2015)
 
Plaintiff DFA operates duty free stores in many
international airports nationwide.  It
sued Estée Lauder, arguing that Estée Lauder’s refusal to do business with DFA,
and its communication of that fact to airport authorities evaluating whether to
offer rental space to DFA, violated federal and state law, alleging attempted
monopolization in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act; contributory false
advertising, in violation of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act; and tortious
interference with a prospective business relationship, in violation of Florida
law. The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of these claims.
 
DFA is one of about ten major operators of duty free stores
in the US, with leases in 13 international airports in eleven cities. “It
competes with other duty free operators for the limited rental space available
in U.S. airports servicing international flights.” Leases generally last from
5-10 years.  Interested duty free
operators bid for space, explaining what they’d carry and how much they’d
pay.  There’s a minimum annual guarantee
plus a percentage of sales revenue. Beauty products are a substantial component
of duty free stores’ products, and Estée Lauder is the “largest manufacturer of
beauty products sold in duty-free stores in U.S. airports.” In 2010, Estée
Lauder’s market share of cosmetics sold in duty free stores was approximately
45.71%, while its market share for skin care products was over 50%.  Newcomers to the duty free beauty products
market are apparently rare.
 
DFA bought Estée Lauder beauty products to sell in its duty
free stores until June 2008, during which time Estée Lauder set two different
prices for each product—a suggested domestic retail price and a lower suggested
travel retail price.  Duty free operators
could buy at wholesale travel prices that were lower than wholesale domestic
prices, set by discounting the suggested travel retail prices—for most of the
time, the suggested travel retail price for beauty products offered customers a
10% discount off of the suggested domestic retail price.  Estée Lauder required operators to carry the
full line of products within a particular brand and carry the company’s
less-popular fragrances if they wanted to sell cosmetics. “Estée Lauder also
mandated that operators reserve display space of a certain size and quality for
its products and that they keep excess inventory in stock, and routinely
threatened to cut off all product supply when duty free operators resisted
these conditions.”
 
Then Estée Lauder announced plans to eliminate the
differences between its suggested domestic retail prices and suggested travel
retail prices, which would increase the prices DFA paid for Estée Lauder
products and eliminate the discount that DFA’s customers gained by shopping at
duty free stores. As a result, DFA ended its business dealings with Estée
Lauder; DFA sought to revive the relationship, but Estée Lauder refused.  This caused DFA trouble in subsequent bidding
for retail space at four international airports.
 
For example, when Newark’s Liberty International Airport
issued a request for proposals, Estée Lauder’s President of Travel Retailing
Worldwide sent a letter to the leasing agent responsible for administering
Newark’s bidding. The letter included a list of duty free operators that sold
Estée Lauder products—the three other bidders, but not DFA.  It said: “We are confident that each of these
authorized retailers brings the expected quality of in-store execution and
required operational excellence necessary to represent our brands and service
your valued passengers.” DFA lost the bid; it ranked second to last, with the
explanation being “Duty Free Americas does not have the rights to sell Est[é]e
Lauder brands.”  Other bidders, in other
bids, emphasized their ability to sell Estée Lauder.
 
The Sherman Act claims failed, of course.
 
On the false advertising claim, DFA alleged that Estée
Lauder was subject to contributory liability for DFA’s competitors’ false
advertising.  Estée Lauder argued that
the Lanham Act doesn’t recognize contributory liability for false advertising,
but the court of appeals disagreed.
 
In trademark, contributory liability is well-recognized, and
for the same reasons, contributory false advertising should be as well.  §43(a), after all, contains both trademark
and false advertising provisions, sharing the same introductory clause.  That suggests that “the two causes of action
should be interpreted to have the same scope,” especially since they have the
unitary purpose of protecting commercial actors against unfair competition.  “It would be odd indeed for us to narrow the
scope of the false advertising provision—a cause of action plainly intended to
encompass a broader spectrum of protection—and hold that it could be enforced
only against a smaller class of defendants.”

In order to state a claim for contributory false advertising claim, “[f]irst,
the plaintiff must show that a third party in fact directly engaged in false
advertising that injured the plaintiff. Second, the plaintiff must allege that
the defendant contributed to that conduct either by knowingly inducing or
causing the conduct, or by materially participating in it.”  This participation requires that “the
defendant actively and materially furthered the unlawful conduct—either by
inducing it, causing it, or in some other way working to bring it about.”  Participation could include direct control or
monitoring of a third party’s false advertising.  “It is also conceivable that there could be
circumstances under which the provision of a necessary product or service,
without which the false advertising would not be possible, could support a
theory of contributory liability.”
 
In order to adequately plead contributory false advertising,
the court asked whether the complaint suggests a plausible inference of knowing
or intentional participation, examining “the nature and extent of the
communication” between the third party and the defendant regarding the false
advertising; “whether or not the [defendant] explicitly or implicitly
encouraged” the false advertising; whether the false advertising “is serious
and widespread,” making it more likely that the defendant “kn[ew] about and
condone[d] the acts”; and whether the defendant engaged in “bad faith refusal
to exercise a clear contractual power to halt” the false advertising.
 
The complaint identified five allegedly false claims.  One duty free bidder said: “Given that Estée
Lauder brands account for 20% of cosmetic and fragrance sales, at least in
Orlando, and cosmetic and fragrance sales constitute one of the largest sources
of revenue for duty free stores, a lack of access to Estée Lauder brands would
cast doubt on the validity of DFA’s projected revenue streams.” Two other
statements were to the same effect, and a fourth was that “DFA sales
project[ions] are deemed to be unreasonable and not sustainable in light of the
history.” Finally, one bidder said that “DFA may have made misrepresentations
about its ability to carry Estée Lauder brands.”
 
However, the complaint didn’t adequately allege that Estée
Lauder contributed to any of the statements. 
Alleging that Estée Lauder had knowledge of the false claims but
continued to supply the duty free operators was not enough: mere sale of Estée
Lauder products was no basis for holding Estée Lauder liable “for any
disparaging statements its customers make in the course of their own separate
business relations.” Estée Lauder sales were “too unrelated to the making of
the allegedly false or misleading statements to form a basis for
liability—under either an inducement or participation theory.”  And no facts in the complaint suggested the
existence of coordinated action or encouragement, or inducement, between Estée
Lauder and the operators on the decision to make the disputed claims to airport
authorities. There was no allegation that Estée Lauder monitored, controlled,
or participated in duty free operators’ bids, either here or in general.
 
Finally, DFA tortious interference claim failed, for similar
reasons.  DFA didn’t allege that Estée
Lauder ever expressed its opinions about DFA to airport officials.  The letter vouching for the quality of other
duty free operators could not be read to implicitly disparage the quality of
all other unmentioned entities in the same industry. Adequately alleged
inducement of misrepresentations might qualify as tortious interference under
Florida law, but see above.

from Blogger http://ift.tt/1Wirm1y

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , , | Leave a comment

Pure mourning: Pom fails to get preliminary injunction again

Pom Wonderful LLC v.  Pur Beverages LLC, No. 13-cv-06917 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2015) 
 
Pom fares no better its second time around. Although the court of appeals previously found likely confusion between its marks and defendant’s “pūr pŏm” energy drink (which allegedly contains no pomegranate juice at all) and remanded for a re-analysis of the remaining preliminary injunction factors, Pom was unable to show irreparable harm distinct from its showing on likely confusion. 
 
The harm at issue must not merely be irreparable; it must also be imminent. “Speculative injury does not constitute irreparable injury sufficient to warrant granting a preliminary injunction.” Thus, unsupported and conclusory statements about harm are insufficient. Herb Reed.  A finding of reputational harm “may not be based on ‘pronouncements [that] are grounded in platitudes rather than evidence.’”
 
Pom argued three varieties of irreparable harm: (1) the POM mark would lose distinctiveness and potentially become generic; (2) it would lose its return on its investment in its mark; and (3) its reputation and goodwill would be harmed.
 
As for loss of distinctiveness, Pom offered the declaration of Fernando Torres, the Chief Economist at IPmetrics LLC, an intellectual property consulting firm.  Torres stated that the problem with free riders like Pur is that infringement “will eventually destroy the value of the reputational investment embodied in the trademark.” He opined that, because Pom Wonderful has cultivated a distinctive brand using the POM mark, “allowing a third party to make a confusing use of ‘pom’ under the guise of a generic abbreviation for the ingredient pomegranate would help push the valuable POM trademarks toward generic use.” Such a “loss of distinctiveness” couldn’t be quantified in terms of lost sales or lost profits.  The court was unimpressed.  “Although Torres cites economic theory to supports his opinions, the opinions are not tied to actual evidence, and constitute little more than assertions grounded in ‘platitudes rather than evidence’” (quoting Herb Reed).  His conclusions “would apply in any trademark infringement case where the plaintiff owns a distinctive trademark.” A risk isn’t a likelihood of irreparable harm.
 
There was no evidence that the “distinctiveness” or perceived value of Pom’s mark would likely be affected negatively by Hubbard’s use of “pūr pŏm,” including no evidence that consumers’ association of the POM mark with Pom Wonderful had weakened since pūr pŏm entered the market or that other companies had attempted to market pomegranate beverages under “pom” in the more than two years since Pur began doing done so. “Such evidence might make irreparable harm likely, as opposed to just merely possible.” But Torres merely assumed that others would, in the future, begin using the POM mark on their products after observing Hubbard do so. That was mere speculation on this record.  Plus, Torres said it takes time for genericide to occur, and didn’t opine that this period could run during the pendency of the trial.  Ultimately, the court found, his opinions were “little more than speculative statements regarding the type of harm that can arise in any trademark infringement case.”  His evidence was non-specific to Pom Wonderful “and equally applicable to any trademark infringement case. Consequently, it is not sufficient to show a likelihood of irreparable harm.”
 
Pom quoted defendant Hubbard’s statement to the press in response to the question, “Would you consider changing your drink’s name, and why or why not?”
 
I will prove that pom means pomegranate.  When I do, it will make their standard word trademark of ‘POM,’ that is currently incontestable, invalid. They will lose their registration of the mark under the theory of genericness. Although it may be true that when they initially got the standard word mark of ‘POM’ it had no meaning at the time. They, and numerous other makers of pomegranate flavored products, have widely used the term pom to describe pomegranate flavoring. Just like I do with my product.  The term has now become generic, and thus, not deserving of Federal Trademark Registration. . . . Mark my words: I will be the company that makes Pom Wonderful lose their trademark ‘POM.’ I will then allow the consumer packaged goods industry to use the properly used, and widely known term ‘pom’ to describe its pomegranate flavored products, without the threat of a bully company suing every person or company that utters those three letters in sequence.
 
Pom argued that this was an admission that “part of his reason for using ‘pŏm,’ as part of his energy drink’s name, is to pave the way for others to use POM as a flavor descriptor, turning this incontestable mark into a non-protectable generic word.”  But the court found that these statements weren’t about this case, but rather about ongoing cancellation proceedings before the TTAB, wherein Pur argued that Pom abandoned its word mark by using “P♥M” rather than “POM.” Risks connected to the cancellation petition weren’t connected to the purported infringement, and didn’t adequately demonstrate likely irreparable harm from that infringement.
 
Plus, even attributing this statement to the current infringement, that didn’t show irreparable harm, just because it might become generic “over time” if third parties begin to use it in a descriptive and/or generic sense.  Pom actively polices its trademark and this hypothesized use has yet to begin.  Again, this was merely speculative.
 
Loss of return on investment by preventing Pom from fully exploiting its reputation: Pom argued that Pur’s use “limit[s] Pom’s ability to control the reputation of its recognized brand and the perception of Pom’s premium quality products.” This was again speculative and not supported by evidence. Torres claimed that post-infringement, the value the trademark lost due to the infringing activity is never recouped, but the testimony offered wasn’t specific to Pom.  Since it would be true in every infringement case, this claim couldn’t be “squared with the rule that a plaintiff must adduce evidence of likely irreparable harm to obtain an injunction.”
 
Harm to reputation and goodwill: Pom argued that (1) the infringement damaged its ability to communicate a consistent brand message; (2) Pom’s reputation as a seller of healthy beverages conflicted directly with consumers’ perception of energy drinks; and (3) Pom lacked control over the quality of Pur’s products.
 
As for the brand message claim, Pom argued that it focused on communicating that it uses only 100% pure pomegranate juice in its products. Pom has expended substantial resources marketing products that contain only 100% pomegranate juice and litigating against companies that market their products as “pomegranate juice” when the products are predominantly cheaper “filler juices.” Because Pur’s product contained no pomegranate juice, any association between Pom and Pur would harm Pom’s brand. Likewise, while Pom “prides itself [on] advertising that is sophisticated, smart and witty,” Pur’s ads are often “low-brow and tasteless.”  But there was no evidence of harm to Pom’s goodwill.  Though Pur had been selling its products for more than two years, there was no evidence Pom’s customers were aware of Pur’s product or that they had a negative reaction to it or to Pur’s advertising.  It was certainly “possible” that Pom’s reputation and/or goodwill could be damaged by having less control over its brand messaging, but it didn’t show that such harm was likely.
 
There is a distinction between a likelihood of irreparable harm and a showing of actual harm.  But one way to show likely irreparable harm is to show actual confusion or harm right now.  Post-Herb Reed cases have therefore, when granting injunctive relief, often relied on “some evidence of actual confusion or actual harm,” including confusion surveys.  (NB: Confusion is not harm; harm is harm.  Also, a survey doesn’t necessarily show actual confusion of plaintiff’s customers, unless the parties compete directly, so it doesn’t inherently show the damage that the court said it was looking for.)  Among other cases, the court cited OTR Wheel Engineering, Inc. v. West Worldwide Services, Inc., 602 Fed. Appx. 669 (9th Cir. Mar. 18, 2015), which affirmed a preliminary injunction and found that there was some evidence of irreparable harm where the infringing product was sold to the plaintiff’s major customer, which led to a dispute between the plaintiff and its customer—“a nonquantifiable injury to the goodwill it had created with its customer.”  In Life Alert Emergency Response, Inc. v. LifeWatch, Inc., 601 Fed. Appx. 469 (9th Cir. Feb. 4, 2015), there was a declaration “reporting numerous and persistent complaints from would-be customers who received robo-calls for what they believed were Life Alert products,” as well as emails and social media posts substantiating the threat to Life Alert’s reputation and goodwill.
 
Negative association with energy drinks: Pom noted that energy drinks have been associated with 224 adverse event reports to the FDA between Jan. 2012-Nov. 2014.  But that didn’t go far enough to show that Pur was a disreputable product, or that Pom’s customers associated Pur’s product with Pom or saw energy drinks as disreputable. Again, absent evidence about Pom’s consumers, this was merely conclusory and speculative.
 
The court distinguished and disagreed with E&J Gallo Winery v. Grenade Beverage, LLC, No. 1:13-cv-00770- AWI-SAB, 2014 WL 4073241, *1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2014), report and recommendation adopted, 2014 WL 5489076, *1 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2014), which had accepted a similar theory of harm involving Gallo wine v. EL GALLO for energy drinks.  Gallo said it didn’t want to be associated with energy drinks because it believed that mixing alcohol and energy drinks promoted irresponsible behavior.  The court reasoned: “While Plaintiff may not have introduced admissible evidence to support the proposition that energy drinks are associated with irresponsible drinking or that an association with energy drinks would be harmful to Plaintiff’s reputation, it is enough that Plaintiff has introduced evidence of loss of control over their own business reputation.”
 
Not only is this case on appeal, it’s directly at odds with Titaness Light Shop, in which the 9th Circuit rejected a plaintiff’s speculative theory that its customers wouldn’t want to be associated with defendant’s product, which was sold on “a website that supposedly catered to marijuana growers.” “[A]ssertions by a representative of the plaintiff that its goodwill and reputation would be harmed if consumers associated its product with an item that did not fit the plaintiff’s brand image” were not sufficient. The Ninth Circuit in Titaness observed that the plaintiff did not show that its “customers [were] aware of the website, [that they] would associate the products on the site with    marijuana, or [that they] would stop purchasing Sunlight products if they mistakenly believed that Sunlight was marketing to marijuana growers.”  
 
Basically, the Ninth Circuit ruled that “it was not sufficient for a movant to assert that it had developed a particular brand image and that any association with a product inconsistent with that image would harm its reputation.”  But that’s what Gallo accepted and what Pom asked the court to accept here.  More fundamentally, Gallo essentially presumed irreparable harm without evidence other than its likely success on the merits.  “If a conclusory assertion that a third party has used the plaintiff’s mark in a way that is ‘directly contrary to [plaintiff’s] philosophy,’ or that plaintiff does ‘not want to associate itself or its [ ] trademark’ with the third party or its business were sufficient to satisfy a plaintiff’s burden, it is likely that irreparable harm would be found in any case where plaintiff was able to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits.”
 
Evidence that customers have a negative perception of energy drinks in general or of pūr pŏm in particular would probably have sufficed to show irreparable harm, but that wasn’t present.  “It would be reasonable to infer likely harm to a plaintiff’s reputation or goodwill if it could demonstrate that the consuming public has a negative perception of defendant’s product, a product that is sold under a confusingly similar mark.”  (Note the structural similarity here with showing materiality in false advertising—courts generally don’t require successful plaintiffs to show that the false claim is material to the exact same people who receive the false message, according to the plaintiff’s survey; showing that it is the kind of claim that is material in the relevant context suffices.  At long last, and at the remedy stage, irreparable harm is being used to reintroduce a materiality standard to trademark.)
 
Lack of control over the quality of Pur’s products: Pom argued that it was at risk if even “a single incident of poor quality control or a single consumer getting ill from drinking pūr pŏm” was reported. Again, this would be true in every trademark infringement case. There was no evidence that pūr pŏm had caused illness, or facts allowing a reasonable inference that this would occur in the future.
 
Pom argued that the danger to it was great because Pur’s principal was Hubbard, “a litigious and shifty business owner with a checkered past.” Pom proffered evidence that Hubbard has been charged with theft, criminal trespass, assault, and attempting to elude the police, and that he had routinely been “vengeful” in previous litigation to which he has been a party.  As Pom noted, Hubbard had filed a cancellation petition.  But Hubbard explained that he did so based on research indicating that Pom Wonderful has never used POM as a trademark without the “o” in the shape of a heart. Thus, he asserts, Pom was improperly granted a trademark and/or that it abandoned the word mark by not using “POM” in commerce. The court would not impute bad faith to Hubbard based on the fact that he exercised his legal right to file such a petition; plus, that’s unrelated to irreparable harm from continued infringement.
 
Pur said that all its remaining inventory was pūr pŏm as opposed to other products; Pom argued that this made clear that Pur was relying on confusion to stay in business.  That might be true, or maybe he hadn’t been successful in selling pūr pŏm, which would cut against finding irreparable harm.
Posted in http://schemas.google.com/blogger/2008/kind#post, trademark | Leave a comment

11th Circuit recognizes contributory false advertising theory

Duty Free Americas, Inc. v. Estee Lauder Companies, Inc., — F.3d —- (2015), 2015 WL 4709573, No. 14–11853 (11th Cir. Aug. 7, 2015)
 
Plaintiff DFA operates duty free stores in many international airports nationwide.  It sued Estée Lauder, arguing that Estée Lauder’s refusal to do business with DFA, and its communication of that fact to airport authorities evaluating whether to offer rental space to DFA, violated federal and state law, alleging attempted monopolization in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act; contributory false advertising, in violation of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act; and tortious interference with a prospective business relationship, in violation of Florida law. The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of these claims.
 
DFA is one of about ten major operators of duty free stores in the US, with leases in 13 international airports in eleven cities. “It competes with other duty free operators for the limited rental space available in U.S. airports servicing international flights.” Leases generally last from 5-10 years.  Interested duty free operators bid for space, explaining what they’d carry and how much they’d pay.  There’s a minimum annual guarantee plus a percentage of sales revenue. Beauty products are a substantial component of duty free stores’ products, and Estée Lauder is the “largest manufacturer of beauty products sold in duty-free stores in U.S. airports.” In 2010, Estée Lauder’s market share of cosmetics sold in duty free stores was approximately 45.71%, while its market share for skin care products was over 50%.  Newcomers to the duty free beauty products market are apparently rare.
 
DFA bought Estée Lauder beauty products to sell in its duty free stores until June 2008, during which time Estée Lauder set two different prices for each product—a suggested domestic retail price and a lower suggested travel retail price.  Duty free operators could buy at wholesale travel prices that were lower than wholesale domestic prices, set by discounting the suggested travel retail prices—for most of the time, the suggested travel retail price for beauty products offered customers a 10% discount off of the suggested domestic retail price.  Estée Lauder required operators to carry the full line of products within a particular brand and carry the company’s less-popular fragrances if they wanted to sell cosmetics. “Estée Lauder also mandated that operators reserve display space of a certain size and quality for its products and that they keep excess inventory in stock, and routinely threatened to cut off all product supply when duty free operators resisted these conditions.”
 
Then Estée Lauder announced plans to eliminate the differences between its suggested domestic retail prices and suggested travel retail prices, which would increase the prices DFA paid for Estée Lauder products and eliminate the discount that DFA’s customers gained by shopping at duty free stores. As a result, DFA ended its business dealings with Estée Lauder; DFA sought to revive the relationship, but Estée Lauder refused.  This caused DFA trouble in subsequent bidding for retail space at four international airports.
 
For example, when Newark’s Liberty International Airport issued a request for proposals, Estée Lauder’s President of Travel Retailing Worldwide sent a letter to the leasing agent responsible for administering Newark’s bidding. The letter included a list of duty free operators that sold Estée Lauder products—the three other bidders, but not DFA.  It said: “We are confident that each of these authorized retailers brings the expected quality of in-store execution and required operational excellence necessary to represent our brands and service your valued passengers.” DFA lost the bid; it ranked second to last, with the explanation being “Duty Free Americas does not have the rights to sell Est[é]e Lauder brands.”  Other bidders, in other bids, emphasized their ability to sell Estée Lauder.
 
The Sherman Act claims failed, of course.
 
On the false advertising claim, DFA alleged that Estée Lauder was subject to contributory liability for DFA’s competitors’ false advertising.  Estée Lauder argued that the Lanham Act doesn’t recognize contributory liability for false advertising, but the court of appeals disagreed.
 
In trademark, contributory liability is well-recognized, and for the same reasons, contributory false advertising should be as well.  §43(a), after all, contains both trademark and false advertising provisions, sharing the same introductory clause.  That suggests that “the two causes of action should be interpreted to have the same scope,” especially since they have the unitary purpose of protecting commercial actors against unfair competition.  “It would be odd indeed for us to narrow the scope of the false advertising provision—a cause of action plainly intended to encompass a broader spectrum of protection—and hold that it could be enforced only against a smaller class of defendants.”
In order to state a claim for contributory false advertising claim, “[f]irst, the plaintiff must show that a third party in fact directly engaged in false advertising that injured the plaintiff. Second, the plaintiff must allege that the defendant contributed to that conduct either by knowingly inducing or causing the conduct, or by materially participating in it.”  This participation requires that “the defendant actively and materially furthered the unlawful conduct—either by inducing it, causing it, or in some other way working to bring it about.”  Participation could include direct control or monitoring of a third party’s false advertising.  “It is also conceivable that there could be circumstances under which the provision of a necessary product or service, without which the false advertising would not be possible, could support a theory of contributory liability.”
 
In order to adequately plead contributory false advertising, the court asked whether the complaint suggests a plausible inference of knowing or intentional participation, examining “the nature and extent of the communication” between the third party and the defendant regarding the false advertising; “whether or not the [defendant] explicitly or implicitly encouraged” the false advertising; whether the false advertising “is serious and widespread,” making it more likely that the defendant “kn[ew] about and condone[d] the acts”; and whether the defendant engaged in “bad faith refusal to exercise a clear contractual power to halt” the false advertising.
 
The complaint identified five allegedly false claims.  One duty free bidder said: “Given that Estée Lauder brands account for 20% of cosmetic and fragrance sales, at least in Orlando, and cosmetic and fragrance sales constitute one of the largest sources of revenue for duty free stores, a lack of access to Estée Lauder brands would cast doubt on the validity of DFA’s projected revenue streams.” Two other statements were to the same effect, and a fourth was that “DFA sales project[ions] are deemed to be unreasonable and not sustainable in light of the history.” Finally, one bidder said that “DFA may have made misrepresentations about its ability to carry Estée Lauder brands.”
 
However, the complaint didn’t adequately allege that Estée Lauder contributed to any of the statements.  Alleging that Estée Lauder had knowledge of the false claims but continued to supply the duty free operators was not enough: mere sale of Estée Lauder products was no basis for holding Estée Lauder liable “for any disparaging statements its customers make in the course of their own separate business relations.” Estée Lauder sales were “too unrelated to the making of the allegedly false or misleading statements to form a basis for liability—under either an inducement or participation theory.”  And no facts in the complaint suggested the existence of coordinated action or encouragement, or inducement, between Estée Lauder and the operators on the decision to make the disputed claims to airport authorities. There was no allegation that Estée Lauder monitored, controlled, or participated in duty free operators’ bids, either here or in general.
 
Finally, DFA tortious interference claim failed, for similar reasons.  DFA didn’t allege that Estée Lauder ever expressed its opinions about DFA to airport officials.  The letter vouching for the quality of other duty free operators could not be read to implicitly disparage the quality of all other unmentioned entities in the same industry. Adequately alleged inducement of misrepresentations might qualify as tortious interference under Florida law, but see above.
Posted in http://schemas.google.com/blogger/2008/kind#post, secondary liability, tortious interference | Leave a comment

Noncommercial speaker can’t get fees for successfully defending Lanham Act claim

Tobinick v. Novella, 2015 WL 4698549,  NO. 9:14–CV–80781  (S.D. Fla. Aug. 6, 2015)
 
The defendant Society for Science–Based Medicine, Inc.,
which
won dismissal of Lanham Act claims against it
, moved for attorneys’ fees,
and the court denied the motion.  The
court had previously ruled that the allegedly false/defamatory statements
attributed to the Society weren’t commercial speech.  The court applied the standard allowing fee
awards in “exceptional” cases to require “malicious, fraudulent, deliberate, or
willful” behavior. 
 
The Society argued that Tobinick pursued the Lanham Act
claims knowing them to be frivolous, given the requirement of commercial
speech.  The articles at issue,
challenging the were published on the Science-Based Medicine blog, whose relationship
with the Society was not entirely clear. 
But the court found that this case had been serious enough to require
six months between filing and dismissal, and had required oral argument.  Indeed, the court converted the motion to
dismiss into a motion for summary judgment and considered dozens of exhibits.  The issue of whether the speech was
commercial required a “lengthy and detailed” ruling, and the court’s ruling was
the first substantive ruling on the Lanham Act claim; before that, plaintiffs
didn’t have reason to know they’d lose.

from Blogger http://ift.tt/1ICXFkp

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , | Leave a comment

Be very afraid: another court refuses to find irreparable harm despite confusion

Williams v. Green Valley RV, Inc., 2015 WL 4694075, No.
8:15–CV–01010 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2015)
 
Basically, in the Ninth Circuit, you might not be able to
get a preliminary injunction in a trademark case unless the defendant’s quality is bad enough to generate complaints to you.
 
Williams does business as RVMAX, selling used recreational
vehicles (RVs) in Loomis, California. In 2008, Williams registered RVMAX as a
service mark for his business. 
Defendants do business as RV MAX in Colton, California, selling RVs.  (465.5 miles apart, according to Google—one is
relatively close to San Francisco and the other to Los Angeles.)  Williams sued for service mark infringement
and false advertising under state and federal law, along with cybersquatting.
 
Irreparable harm is required for a preliminary injunction;
evidence of such harm could come from  “[e]vidence
of loss of control over business reputation and damage to goodwill.” Herb Reed
Enters., LLC v. Fla. Entm’t Mgmt., Inc., 735 F.3d 1239, 1250 (9th Cir. 2013).
But evidence that “simply underscores customer confusion” is not enough; to
accept that would simply collapse likely success with irreparable harm. A
moving party cannot merely produce evidence of “unsupported and conclusory
statements regarding harm [plaintiff] might suffer.”
 
Williams, unsurprisingly, presented evidence of consumer
confusion such as “calls from customers, vendors, and debtors seeking to reach
Defendants’ dealerships.”  He argued that
this confusion inherently risked harm to his goodwill.  No (fuzzy) dice.  “Plaintiff’s evidence of irreparable harm is
nothing more than a regurgitation of consumer confusion evidence, which is the
exact type of evidence explicitly rejected by the Ninth Circuit in Herb Reed.”  The claim that his goodwill could be harmed
by a bad experience with defendants was “pure speculation.”  His confusion evidence was “highly relevant”
to likely success on the merits, but “wholly insufficient” for irreparable
harm.
 
Although the issue on likely success was “quite simple”
here, the court could not reach the merits because Williams failed to show
irreparable harm.
 

from Blogger http://ift.tt/1L48z6E

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , | Leave a comment

Noncommercial speaker can’t get fees for successfully defending Lanham Act claim

Tobinick v. Novella, 2015 WL 4698549,  NO. 9:14–CV–80781  (S.D. Fla. Aug. 6, 2015)
 
The defendant Society for Science–Based Medicine, Inc., whichwon dismissal of Lanham Act claims against it, moved for attorneys’ fees, and the court denied the motion.  The court had previously ruled that the allegedly false/defamatory statements attributed to the Society weren’t commercial speech.  The court applied the standard allowing fee awards in “exceptional” cases to require “malicious, fraudulent, deliberate, or willful” behavior. 
 
The Society argued that Tobinick pursued the Lanham Act claims knowing them to be frivolous, given the requirement of commercial speech.  The articles at issue, challenging the were published on the Science-Based Medicine blog, whose relationship with the Society was not entirely clear.  But the court found that this case had been serious enough to require six months between filing and dismissal, and had required oral argument.  Indeed, the court converted the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment and considered dozens of exhibits.  The issue of whether the speech was commercial required a “lengthy and detailed” ruling, and the court’s ruling was the first substantive ruling on the Lanham Act claim; before that, plaintiffs didn’t have reason to know they’d lose.
Posted in fees, http://schemas.google.com/blogger/2008/kind#post | Leave a comment

Be very afraid: another court refuses to find irreparable harm despite confusion

Williams v. Green Valley RV, Inc., 2015 WL 4694075, No. 8:15–CV–01010 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2015)
 
Basically, in the Ninth Circuit, you might not be able to get a preliminary injunction in a trademark case unless the defendant’s quality is bad enough to generate complaints to you.
 
Williams does business as RVMAX, selling used recreational vehicles (RVs) in Loomis, California. In 2008, Williams registered RVMAX as a service mark for his business.  Defendants do business as RV MAX in Colton, California, selling RVs.  (465.5 miles apart, according to Google—one is relatively close to San Francisco and the other to Los Angeles.)  Williams sued for service mark infringement and false advertising under state and federal law, along with cybersquatting.
 
Irreparable harm is required for a preliminary injunction; evidence of such harm could come from  “[e]vidence of loss of control over business reputation and damage to goodwill.” Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Fla. Entm’t Mgmt., Inc., 735 F.3d 1239, 1250 (9th Cir. 2013). But evidence that “simply underscores customer confusion” is not enough; to accept that would simply collapse likely success with irreparable harm. A moving party cannot merely produce evidence of “unsupported and conclusory statements regarding harm [plaintiff] might suffer.”
 
Williams, unsurprisingly, presented evidence of consumer confusion such as “calls from customers, vendors, and debtors seeking to reach Defendants’ dealerships.”  He argued that this confusion inherently risked harm to his goodwill.  No (fuzzy) dice.  “Plaintiff’s evidence of irreparable harm is nothing more than a regurgitation of consumer confusion evidence, which is the exact type of evidence explicitly rejected by the Ninth Circuit in Herb Reed.”  The claim that his goodwill could be harmed by a bad experience with defendants was “pure speculation.”  His confusion evidence was “highly relevant” to likely success on the merits, but “wholly insufficient” for irreparable harm.
 
Although the issue on likely success was “quite simple” here, the court could not reach the merits because Williams failed to show irreparable harm.
 
Posted in http://schemas.google.com/blogger/2008/kind#post, trademark | Leave a comment