Upset tummies at P&G: Sixth Circuit affirms class certification on “snake oil” theory

Rikos v. Procter & Gamble Co., — F.3d —-, 2015 WL
4978712 (6th Cir. June 16, 2015)
 
A court of appeals affirms the certification of a consumer
protection class action, a rarity worth noting.
 
Plaintiffs bought Align, P&G’s probiotic nutritional
supplement, and found that the product did not work as advertised—that is, it
did not promote their digestive health. They sued for violation of various
state unfair or deceptive practices statutes, and  the district court certified five single-state
classes from California, Illinois, Florida, New Hampshire, and North Carolina. “While
there is a consensus within the medical and scientific communities that
utilizing bacteria as a therapeutic measure in human disease is promising,
current knowledge of the use of bacteria for these purposes remains fairly
primitive.” Overall “[m]edical understanding of probiotics in humans is still in
its infancy.” Align is a nonprescription supplement sold in a capsule that is
“filled with bacteria and [otherwise] inert ingredients.”
 
P&G initially had trouble convincing consumers of
Align’s value, given its premium price point, though it eventually launched
Align nationwide through a comprehensive advertising campaign, which included
in-person physician visits, television and print advertisements, in-store
displays, and product packaging.
 
Commonality: P&G argued that there was no common injury,
only anecdotal evidence that Align didn’t work for the named plaintiffs.  Consumer satisfaction, and repeat purchases,
showed Align’s benefits—along with at least some studies that appeared to
concluded that Align was effective in promoting digestive health.  Dukes
doesn’t require plaintiffs to show that all class members were in fact injured
at the certification stage—rather that their claims depend on a common
contention capable of classwide resolution. 
The common question here was whether Align is “snake oil” and thus does
not yield benefits to anyone.  If true,
that would make P&G liable to the entire class “every class member was
injured in the sense that he or she spent money on a product that does not work
as advertised.”  Consumer satisfaction
isn’t the right way to think about injury in the false advertising
context.  It’s misleading to state that a
product is effective when that effectiveness rests solely on a placebo effect.
See, e.g., FTC v. Pantron I Corporation, 33 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 1994).
 
Typicality: basically the same, though P&G framed its
argument as being that “many of the unnamed class members have no interest in
pursuing restitution, nor in crippling the product. Indeed, this lawsuit may be
antithetical to their interests.” That didn’t make the named plaintiffs
atypical in the relevant sense.
 
Predominance:  P&G
alleged that some putative class members weren’t exposed to its marketing
campaign; they may have bought Align based on advice from a family member,
friend, or physician.  But the plaintiffs
all bought Align because it allegedly promoted digestive health. “That is the
only reason to buy Align.” And there was evidence showing that P & G
undertook “a comprehensive marketing strategy with a uniform core message, even
if its packaging has changed somewhat over time: buy Align because it will help
promote your digestive health.”  P&G
argued that doctors could recommend Align based on their independent judgment,
but P&G developed the probiotic and the campaign that promoted it to
doctors.
 
Reliance and causation: under each state’s laws, the
plaintiffs could prove what was necessary on a classwide basis as long as (1)
the alleged misrepresentation that Align promotes digestive health is material
or likely to deceive a reasonable consumer, and (2) P & G made that
misrepresentation in a generally uniform way to the entire class.  California is Tobacco II.  Illinois’ ICFA
requires a showing of damage to the plaintiff as a result of the deception—that
is, proximate cause from the false advertising. 
If the challenged representation was made to all putative class members
and was material, it’s capable of classwide proof.  Florida’s FDUTPA case law is divided, but
many courts have held that it doesn’t require proof of actual, individualized
reliance, only a showing that the practice was likely to deceive a reasonable
consumer, at least as long as there’s a generally uniform material
misrepresentation.  New Hampshire’s Consumer
Protection Act also doesn’t require proof of individual reliance or causation;
materiality is a proxy for causation and an objective question that can be
answered classwide.  North Carolina’s
UDTPA requires reliance, but reliance can be proved circumstantially, and a
consumer protection class action can be certified on those grounds, especially
since the alleged misrepresentation here was the reason to buy Align. 
Plaintiffs were prepared to show materiality and the existence of a
generally uniform misreprentation; that sufficed.
 
P&G argued that Align actually works, at least for some
consumers, which is to say that the scientific evidence might show that Align provides
benefits for some purchasers, but not all, requiring individualized proof of
injury.  But this is a factual dispute;
plaintiffs argued that P&G’s studies were flawed and that Align didn’t
work, at least not any more than placebo. 
Plaintiffs’ theory was not that the effectiveness of Align was variable,
but that it hadn’t been shown that Align worked for anyone.  P&G’s
effectiveness argument went solely to the merits, and plaintiffs provided
enough evidence to support plaintiffs’ theory of liability. The fact that the
common answer might be that Align does work for some people doesn’t transform
the classwide issue into one precluding certification.  If there’s an identifiable subclass of people
for whom it works or doesn’t work, the district court could even revisit the
issue of certification.
 
The court’s holding was is consistent with the Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Halliburton
Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc.
, ––– U.S. –––– (2014), which held that, at
the class-certification stage, defendants in private securities fraud class
actions must be able to present evidence rebutting a particular presumption of
classwide reliance available in these kinds of cases. “The Halliburton Court’s holding is limited to allowing rebuttal
evidence on issues that affect predominance, not evidence that affects only the
merits of a case,” and P&G’s evidence went only to the merits; in any
event, P&G was allowed to put forth its evidence, so Halliburton was satisfied.
 
Relatedly, P&G argued that plaintiffs failed to present
a viable theory of classwide damages under Comcast
Corp. v. Behrend
, ––– U.S.–––– (2013). 
If Align is snake oil, then there’s no problem with the damages theory;
a full refund of the purchase price would satisfy Comcast, since “there is no reason to buy Align except for its
purported digestive benefits—‘[i]t is a capsule filled with bacteria and inert
ingredients. If, as alleged, the bacteria does nothing, then the capsule is
worthless.’” Even if some customers were satisfied, for whatever reason, “either
0% or 100% of the proposed class members were defrauded. There is no evidence
that some proposed class members knew of the alleged falsity of Defendant’s
advertising yet purchased Align anyway.”
 
P&G also contested class standing, on similar grounds
(Align may have worked for some of them). 
There was no need to enter a circuit split over whether it’s sufficient
for a named class plaintiff to have standing, given the snake oil theory of the
case.
 
Further, the proposed class was sufficiently
ascertainable.  Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300 (3d Cir. 2013), is not the law
of the Sixth Circuit, and there was no reason to follow Carrera, given the strong criticism to which that decision has been
subject and the Third Circuit’s subsequent caution against a broad reading of
that case.  Ascertainability requires the
court to be able to resolve the question of class membership with reasonable
accuracy by reference to objective criteria. 
Purchases of Align in California, New Hampshire, Illinois, North
Carolina, or Florida could be determined with reasonable—but not
perfect—accuracy. “Doing so would require substantial review, likely of
internal P & G data. But as the district court pointed out, such review
could be supplemented through the use of receipts, affidavits, and a special
master to review individual claims.” 
Here, customer membership cards and records of online sales—more than
half of Align’s sales—could be used; also, P&G’s studies showed that “an
overwhelming number of customers learned about Align through their physicians,”
so verification could be accomplished through a signed statement from a
customer’s physician.
 
A concurrence by Judge Cohn suggested bifurcating the
proceedings and first looking for whether there was scientific evidence that
Align promotes digestive heath for anyone, which might allow early dismissal of
the case.
 
A dissent by Judge Cook would have found that the district
court abused its discretion by failing to conduct a rigorous inquiry into
certification.  Plaintiffs didn’t offer
proof in support of their argument that Align was “snake oil” that produces
nothing more than a placebo effect.”[A]ll the available evidence tends to show
the opposite: that consumers benefit more or less from Align based on their
individual gastrointestinal health. P & G’s scientific studies and
anecdotal evidence tend to show, at the very least, that patients suffering
from irritable bowel syndrome (IBS) benefit from Align.”  The certified class included both IBS patients
and healthy consumers, so plaintiffs failed to show that their theory of
liability lends itself to common investigation and resolution.  Whether Align works similarly for each class
member “is relevant to certification and therefore not beyond the scope of the
court’s rigorous analysis.” Also, the majority therefore affirmed a class
definition that included a “clutch” of members without standing.  Plaintiffs’ “promise to conduct the
definitive trial of Align that accounts for all variables of human physiology”
was insufficient under Dukes and its
progeny.

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Fifth Circuit upholds mandatory self-abnegating disclosure to correct competitor’s harassment

Test Masters Educational Services, Inc. v. Robin Singh
Educational Services, Inc., No. 13-20250 (5th Cir. Aug. 21, 2015)
 
The parties, test prep companies, have competing claims to
TESTMASTERS as a trademark, and have been litigating for over a decade.  Plaintiff TES operates under the name
Testmasters; it was founded in 1991, initially concentrating on engineering
licensing exams but expanding to others, including the LSAT. Until 2002, TES
offered live courses only in Texas, primarily in Houston; it has since expanded
outside Texas.  Singh started offering
test preparation courses under the name “TestMasters” in 1991. Singh initially
offered only LSAT courses in California, but has since expanded to offer
courses nationwide for a variety of exams.
 
Singh applied for registration in 1995; the PTO first denied
the application on the basis of other similar marks, but approved the
application “after determining that none of the three marks were still in use.”
At that point, Singh discovered that TES already owned the domain name
“testmasters.com” and sent TES a demand letter. 
Litigation ensued, and continued. 
In 2002, the Fifth Circuit held that TESTMASTERS was descriptive, that
TES’s rights to the mark were limited to Texas, and that Singh had failed to
prove that the mark had acquired secondary meaning.  After the second lawsuit, in 2005, Singh was
enjoined from interfering with TES’s use of the mark in Texas, and Singh was
permitted to challenge TES’s claim to the mark outside of Texas.
 
Also, TES applied for nationwide registration in 2001; Singh
opposed.  In 2011, after a lot of stuff I’m
sure everyone involved wishes they could’ve skipped too, the TTAB denied the
applications, holding that the mark was descriptive and that TES had failed to
demonstrate “substantially exclusive use” of the descriptive mark. In April
2013, the district court affirmed the TTAB’s decision, granted Singh summary
judgment on TES’s infringement claims, and dismissed Singh’s infringement
counterclaims based on collateral estoppel. 
There was also a contempt issue, of which more below.
 
On appeal, TES argued that Singh lacked standing to oppose
the registration, because he’d previously lost on the secondary meaning issue.  But he’d only been enjoined from pursuing
registration, not from claiming trademark rights, so he had standing.  TES further argued that it had presented
enough evidence of secondary meaning in “unrestricted geographic and subject
matter areas” to survive summary judgment. 
It had not.  The evidence showed
that both parties had used the mark for a while, and that Singh’s company was
larger and did significantly more business outside Texas.  Both parties advertised extensively, TES
mostly to engineering students and Singh primarily to LSAT takers.  TES’s survey was flawed because, though it
asked engineering exam-takers whether they associated “Testmasters” with one
company, it didn’t determine which one that was for the 50.7% who said
yes.  Plus, the survey was directed only
at people taking engineering exams and half of those polled were from Texas. As
for direct consumer evidence, the court of appeals agreed with the district
court that “[e]ach party’s evidence shows that, in its strongest subject matter
area, it is well-known and there may be some consumer confusion.”
 
What TES needed to show to prove its case was that the mark
had “secondary meaning on a nationwide basis for all test preparation courses.”
At most, it showed that the mark has acquired a secondary meaning for
professional engineering examinations, not any other test preparation services.
 
Singh argued that the district court erred in finding him
collaterally estopped from claiming secondary meaning.  It didn’t. 
Singh claimed that the passage of 13 years changed things enough to
justify giving him another bite at the apple: among other things, his annual
revenues increased from just over $3 million in 2001 to an average of $14
million between 2008 and 2010. But “[e]vidence of increased business success alone
is insufficient to show a significant intervening change” to justify rejecting
collateral estoppel.
 
The court of appeals vacated a contempt order against Singh’s
lawyer, Daniel Sheehan, but not against Singh. 
In 2003 and 2004, the district court enjoined Singh from registering the
mark, interfering with TES’s attempt to register the mark, and using the mark
in Texas/directing the mark at Texas; then added an order barring Singh from “threatening,
or harassing [TES], its employees, its staff, or TES’s counsel, counsel’s
employees, or counsel’s staff.” (A bar on direct communication was reversed by
the court of appeals; the threat/harassment prohibitions were upheld.)
 
According to TES, Singh continued to advertise in Texas,
instructed employees to post negative comments about TES on various websites,
and aided in the posting of defamatory videos online. One posting referenced a
state-court paternity suit involving TES’s founder, calling him a “deadbeat
dad” and mentioning the minor child involved in the suit by name.  At the contempt hearing, the court ordered
Singh’s lawyer incarcerated to get Singh to remove the postings, which Singh took
steps to do; the court also ordered Singh to remove the harassing posts. 
 
TES then requested additional contempt sanctions, which were
granted in part, and the district court ordered Singh to publish a “remedial
posting” on “ripoffreport.com” in response to the “deadbeat dad” post he had
previously made, requiring him to post: “Robin Singh and Robin Singh
Educational Services previously posted on March 25, 2010, a Complaint Review of
Dr. Haku Israni and his website testmasters.com. Singh and Dr. Israni were
involved in litigation at that time and Singh would now like to retract his
prior complaint. No credence should be paid to that complaint or any of its
contents.”
 
Singh argued that the contempt sanctions and remedial order
violated the First Amendment. The court of appeals disagreed.  Harassment isn’t protected by the First
Amendment, even when the harassment is published on the internet and not
directly communicated to the target.
 
Singh also argued that the remedial statement violated his
First Amendment right not to speak, and that he was forced to say things that were
simply untrue, because he didn’t “wish” to retract his complaint and believed
that credence should be given to his
claims.  Singh’s statements were
commercial speech.  Though the post
focused on TES’s founder’s personal life, “Singh must have made it with the
economic interest of harming TES.”  A
required disclosure related to commercial speech need only be “reasonably
related to the [government’s] interest in preventing deception of consumers.” Because
the original posting was deceptive, the district court’s order was reasonably
related to its interest in preventing consumer deception by correcting the
misleading information.  Singh’s
objection to the language indicating he’d like to retract the statements didn’t
identify a “relevant” falsehood.  “Whether
Singh enjoyed taking this medicine is an insignificant question of phrasing.”
 
[Note that under the panel opinion in the NAM v. SEC case,
this result couldn’t occur.  The Ripoff
Report complaint isn’t “advertising” even if it is commercial speech, and the
like/credence wording would seem to trigger the controversiality/not purely
factual limit as interpreted therein.]

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DC Circuit panel doubles down on invalidating conflict minerals disclosure

Nat’l Ass’n of Mfgrs v. SEC, No. 13-5252 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 18,
2105)
 
After the AMI en banc decision, the panel
granted rehearing of National Association of Manufacturers v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359
(D.C. Cir. 2014).  The panel, over a
dissent, confirmed its initial ruling that the conflict mineral SEC disclosure
rule was unconstitutional, in the process saying some dumb things about what
constitutes commercial speech (the panel didn’t think product labels count) and
some very troubling things about legislative factfinding (apparently not
allowed in the face of controversy).  Basically, the panel majority strongly
disagrees with the AMI en banc, so
there.
 
The AMI en banc
majority held that Zauderer covers
more than mandatory disclosures that cure misleading advertising, and also
covers disclosures that serve other governmental interests, such as allowing
consumers to choose American-made products.
 
The majority here began by responding to the dissent, which
pointed out that US law has a lot of disclosure requirements for securities
issuers, and First Amendment challenges to them really died in the 80s.  But—SEC, get nervous—“Charles Dickens had a
few words about this form of argumentation: ‘“Whatever is is right”; an
aphorism that would be as final as it is lazy, did it not include the
troublesome consequence, that nothing that ever was, was wrong.’” And anyway,
even the SEC agrees that the conflict minerals disclosure regime is very
different from the “economic or investor protection benefits” that SEC rules
ordinarily strive to achieve.
 
Zauderer doesn’t
cover all commercial speech, only “advertising or product labeling at the point
of sale,” so Central Hudson
applied.  The Supreme Court, after all,
didn’t apply Zauderer in Hurley v.
Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995)
or United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001), and corporations
generally have free speech rights.  The
conflict minerals disclosures are supposed to be made on company websites and
reports to the SEC, so they aren’t advertising, even assuming they’re
commercial speech.  [Like I said, get
nervous, SEC.]
 
The dissent takes this on very well, but I also find the
majority’s analysis here disingenuous; there is a large and contentious
literature about what constitutes commercial speech, but Hurley is not part of it, because no one thought that Hurley’s parade involved commercial
speech.  The distinction Hurley made was commercial/noncommercial,
not advertising/commercial speech that is not advertising; “advertising” is
standard shorthand for commercial speech. 
 
The majority noted the dissent’s objection to the anomalous
result that requiring producers to put the conflict minerals disclosure on
their product boxes—a much more onerous requirement—is judged by more relaxed
standards than the SEC reporting requirement, but said that was AMI’s fault for “stretching Zauderer to cover laws compelling
disclosures at the time of sale for reasons other than preventing consumer
deception.”  And the disingenuousness
intensifies!  Apparently Zauderer doesn’t apply when a commercial
entity engages in false or misleading commercial speech that isn’t
“advertising”?  That is nonsensical.  The panel majority doesn’t like AMI, I get it, but there are reasonable
ways to limit AMI and unreasonable
ones.  Perhaps this is basically a dare
to the overall circuit to take this case en banc if the government so desires,
but the reasoning is just embarrassing.
 
Anyway, even if AMI
and Zauderer applied, the conflict
minerals disclosure would still violate the First Amendment, because it might
not work to end war in the Congo.  Though
the court assumed that “ameliorat[ing] the humanitarian crisis in the DRC” was
a sufficient interest under AMI and Central Hudson, disclosure hadn’t been
shown to be effective at achieving that interest.  Statements by two Senators, members of the
executive branch, and a United Nations resolution were insufficient, especially
given the cost of compliance, which was in the billions, and hundreds of
millions of dollars each year. (I do not understand what the cost of compliance
has to do with effectiveness, but let’s just call that a conflation of several Central Hudson steps; it’s hardly the
worst offense of this opinion.)  The
prospect that companies will simply avoid mineral suppliers with a connection
to the DRC wouldn’t reduce the humanitarian crisis: “The idea must be that the
forced disclosure regime will decrease the revenue of armed groups in the DRC
and their loss of revenue will end or at least diminish the humanitarian crisis
there. But there is a major problem with this idea – it is entirely unproven
and rests on pure speculation.”
 
In commercial speech cases the government cannot rest on
“speculation or conjecture.”  Congress
didn’t hold pre-enactment hearings on the likely impact of disclosure, and post-enactment
hearings contained testimony both pro and con. 
Post hoc evidence suggested that the law may have backfired: “miners are
being put out of work or are seeing even their meager wages substantially
reduced, thus exacerbating the humanitarian crisis and driving them into the
rebels’ camps as a last resort.”  Other
sources support the disclosure, but its effectiveness was not “proven to the
degree required under the First Amendment to compel speech.”
 
[Part of the problem is the failure of the government to
defend an investor’s interest in refusing to participate directly in or benefit
directly from harm-generating activities, even if that refusal does not stop
the harm and only allows the investor to walk away
from Omelas
.  The best explanation of
this interest as a distinct one in legal terms is Douglas Kysar’s Preferences
for Process
: The Process/Product Distinction and the Regulation of Consumer
Choice.  Disclosure, which allows
investors (and potentially consumers) to make this choice to implicate or not
implicate themselves, directly furthers that exact interest.]
 
That was enough to doom the regulation, but the disclosure
was also not “purely factual and uncontroversial,” as required by Zauderer and AMI.  You could read this
phrase as descriptive rather than definitional in Zauderer, but AMI said it
was a separate requirement for upholding the disclosure, and the panel was,
after all, bound by AMI.  [OK, now the majority is just acting like a jerk.  Brutus is an honorable man and all that.]
 
“Uncontroversial” must mean something different than “purely
factual.”  It has to be controversial for
some reason other than a dispute about factual accuracy.  We could understand this as a fact/opinion
divide,
 
[b]ut that line is often blurred,
and it is far from clear that all opinions are controversial. Is Einstein’s
General Theory of Relativity fact or opinion, and should it be regarded as
controversial? If the government required labels on all internal combustion
engines stating that “USE OF THIS PRODUCT CONTRIBUTES TO GLOBAL WARMING” would
that be fact or opinion? It is easy to convert many statements of opinion into
assertions of fact simply by removing the words “in my opinion” or removing “in
the opinion of many scientists” or removing “in the opinion of  many experts.” It is also the case that
propositions once regarded as factual and uncontroversial may turn out to be
something quite different.
 
A footnote discussed changing scientific opinions on the
contribution of dietary cholesterol to blood cholesterol, and when the
assessment of factual correctness ought to be made, at enactment or at the time
of challenge/controversy.  [Though it did
not discuss the extensive body of law that deals with whether starting a factual
statement with “in my opinion” means that the statement is one of opinion and
not fact.   Spoiler: no. 
So the minor premise is wrong too. 
In my opinion.]
 
Anyway, the AMI en
banc viewed country of origin of disclosures for meat as “uncontroversial,” but
that was puzzling, rather than providing guidance.  There was definitely a dispute about those
disclosures, since they were challenged at the WTO.  [Again, disingenuous.  AMI
didn’t give a great definition of “uncontroversial” by any means, but no one
disputed that meat required to be labeled as having been slaughtered in the US
was in fact slaughtered in the US—unlike the cholesterol example.  Those origin labels were the paradigmatic
disclosures that were controversial “for reasons other than dispute over
factual accuracy.”  I also note that we’re
not going to hear about biased disclosure regulations surrounding abortion in
this discussion, because abortion’s First Amendment is just different.]
 
The dissent’s alternative was to read “uncontroversial” as “accurate,”
which made the phrase redundant.  “Is
there such a thing as a ‘purely factual’ proposition that is not ‘accurate’?  [Well, yes. 
“My car is red” is a purely factual proposition.  It is not accurate, at least if I said
it.]  Accurate information can also be
misleading, anyway, so it’s a bad line.
 
Nor could the statutory 
definition  of “conflict free” save
the law, because the government doesn’t get to force companies to use its
preferred language.  [FDA, get more
nervous.]  As NAM said, “companies could
be compelled to state that their products are not ‘environmentally sustainable’
or ‘fair trade’ if the government provided ‘factual’ definitions of those
slogans – even if the companies vehemently disagreed that their [products] were
‘unsustainable’ or ‘unfair.’” The majority continued:
 
A famous example of governmental
redefinition comes to mind:
WAR IS PEACE
FREEDOM IS SLAVERY
IGNORANCE IS STRENGTH
George Orwell, Nineteen
Eighty-Four.
 
[Professor Tushnet is impressed, and wonders where,
rhetorically, there is to go from here.] “Conflict free” is an ideological
statement, since gold doesn’t fight conflicts; the disclosure requires
companies “to tell consumers that its products are ethically tainted, even if
they only indirectly finance armed groups.” 
Companies are allowed to disagree with that assessment, even by
remaining silent.
 
Judge Srinivasan dissented. 
There are lots of “garden-variety” disclosure obligations for securities
issuers that no one [but the majority] thinks are a First Amendment
problem.  The conflict minerals
disclosure “provides investors and consumers with useful information about the
geographic origins of a product’s source materials”—an interest specifically upheld as time-honored in AMI. 
The term “DRC conflict free” is statutorily defined; if the issuer can’t
determine, after investigation, that a product is “DRC conflict free” under the
statutory definition, it must say so in a report disclosing that the product
has “not been found to be ‘DRC conflict free.’”
 
The requirement to make that
disclosure, in light of the anticipated reaction by investors and consumers,
aims to dissuade manufacturers from purchasing minerals that fund armed groups
in the DRC region. That goal is unique to this securities law; but the basic
mechanism—disclosure of factual information about a product in anticipation of
a consumer reaction—is regular fare for governmental disclosure mandates.
 
There was no First Amendment objection to the
source-investigation obligation.  Nor was
there a challenge to the obligation to list products that fail to qualify as
“DRC conflict free” in a report for investors. They just objected to the
requirement to describe the listed products with the catchphrase “not been
found to be ‘DRC conflict free.’” But the prescribed shorthand phrase couldn’t
materially change the constitutional calculus. 
This shorthand “comes amidst a set of mandated disclosures about the
measures undertaken to determine the source of minerals originating in the DRC
or adjoining countries.” So the meaning would be apparent in context, and the
SEC also allowed issuers to elaborate however they wanted, including the
statement that this is “a phrase we are obligated to use under federal
securities laws to describe products when we are unable to determine that they
contain no minerals that directly or indirectly finance or benefit armed groups
in the DRC or an adjoining country.” At that point, there would seem to be
nothing arguably confusing or misleading about the content of the Rule’s
mandated disclosure.
 
The basic rule is that, “when the government requires
disclosure of truthful, factual information about a product to consumers, a
company’s First Amendment interest in withholding that information from its
consumers is ‘minimal.’”  That’s enough
to sustain this rule.  Though the
disclosure “invites public scrutiny,” that’s also true of other requirements,
such as required calorie count or nutritional information.  Even under Central Hudson, this requirement would survive, given that
commercial speech is valued for different reasons than non-commercial speech—it
helps consumers through providing them information.
 
Whether Zauderer
or Central Hudson applies depends on
whether a regulation adds information to the flow of truthful commercial
speech, or suppresses some truthful commercial speech. Under that standard, Zauderer obviously applies.  The speech at issue is commercial: it
requires manufacturers to disclose information about product composition. The
fact that this disclosure appears on websites and annual reports filed with the
SEC doesn’t change its status as commercial speech; United States v. Philip
Morris USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (per curiam), “treated
corrective statements about products required to be included on the company’s
website as commercial speech” in response to Philip Morris’ argument that such
disclosures couldn’t be commercial speech because they were unattached to
ads.  Philip
Morris
held that commercial speech “include[s] material representations
about the efficacy, safety, and quality of the advertiser’s product, and other
information asserted for the purpose of persuading the public to purchase” (or,
given the corrective disclosures at issue, not to purchase) “the product.” 
 
The newly minted subclassing of Zauderer to only some instances of commercial speech contradicted Zauderer’s core rationale, which is that
First Amendment protection for commercial speech is justified only by its
informational value to consumers.  Its
results were silly—“[a]fter all, if faced with the choice between an annual
website report and product packaging, a seller would predictably opt for the
former,” but the majority’s approach made it easier to impose a packaging
disclosure requirement than a website disclosure.  As I noted above, this had nothing to do with
AMI, since the new rule applies to
anti-deception disclosures as well.  Zauderer “unsurprisingly used the word ‘advertising’
numerous times in the relevant part of the opinion, but only because that was
the particular factual context in which the case arose. For what it’s worth,
the Court also used ‘commercial speech’ and ‘commercial speaker’ a number of
times in the same part of the opinion when explaining the rationale for the
relaxed First Amendment standard it set forth, and it also did so when framing
the question it addressed in that part of its opinion.”  Nor did AMI
even stop to address whether “labels” were more like “advertising” than
like “non-advertising commercial speech,” because Zauderer applies to commercial speech.  Hurley
isn’t a commercial speech case, and United
Foods
merely described Zauderer’s
outcome.
 
Under Zauderer,
this disclosure was purely factual and uncontroversial—a standard that must be
assessed in light of Zauderer’s
rationale, which is the value of commercial speech in providing consumers with
useful information about products and services. That value is supported by the
disclosure of purely factual and accurate information; thus Zauderer requires that the factual
disclosure must be non-deceptive, and cannot prescribe “what shall be orthodox
in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion.”  The disclosure must be uncontroversially
factual: there could be no “disagree[ment] with the truth of the facts required
to be disclosed.” “[E]ven if the disclosure qualifies as ‘purely factual,’ it
would still fall outside of Zauderer
review if the accuracy of the particular information disclosed were subject to
dispute.”  The meaning of “uncontroversial”
should be tethered to the core question of whether the disclosure is “factual.”
Were it not so, AMI should have come
out the other way, as the panel majority recognized.
 
Under those principles, the requirement to identify whether
a product has “been found to be ‘DRC conflict free’” calls for disclosure of
“purely factual and uncontroversial” information, because “DRC conflict free”
is a defined term of art.  It’s not
misleading, especially in its context, which is a description of the
manufacturer’s attempts to identify the source of the minerals it uses.  The SEC, for example, approved this language:
 
Because we cannot determine the
origins of the minerals, we are not able to state that products containing such
minerals do not contain conflict minerals that directly or indirectly finance
or benefit armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or an adjoining
country. Therefore, under  the federal
securities laws we must describe the products containing such minerals as
having not been found to be ‘DRC conflict free.’ Those products are listed
below.
 
That’s not a confession of an ethical taint.  The fact that the issuer would prefer not to
say anything doesn’t distinguish this from many other disclosures, like calorie
counts, nutritional information, and disclosures about the presence of mercury.
“Such disclosures of course can elicit a reaction by consumers—that is often
the point, as with the country-of-origin rule upheld in AMI—but the disclosures still remain factual and truthful.” 
 
Under this rule, the government can’t misleadingly redefine “peace”
to mean “war”—a consumer would have no reason to suppose that this redefinition
had occurred.  Likewise, statements of
opinion such as “this product is environmentally unsustainable” are outside Zauderer, as compared to “this product releases
x units of ozone in y hours,” a pure fact. 
There could be difficult questions at the margin, but that’s
standard.  Also, “constitutional
protections outside of the First Amendment might constrain the government’s
ability to compel disclosures—for instance, if the disclosures facilitated
private discrimination. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984).”  But that didn’t matter here.
 
The dissent would also have found that the disclosures
survived Central Hudson.  The government’s interest isn’t just to
promote peace in the DRC.  It’s to do so “by
reducing funding to armed groups in the DRC region from trade in conflict
minerals.” And, like country of origin labeling, the disclosure rule “operates
on the basis of assumptions about the reaction of investors to disclosures
about a product’s place of origin.”  This
is a substantial government interest. 
The disclosure directly advances that interest.  AMI
held that “evidentiary parsing is hardly necessary when the government uses a
disclosure mandate to achieve a goal of informing consumers about a particular
product trait.”  The requirement of due
diligence on product supply chains plus disclosure of the results of that due
diligence “encourages manufacturers voluntarily to reduce their reliance on
conflict minerals from the DRC and adjoining countries,” and disclosure further
enables consumers and investors to exert pressure on manufacturers to minimize
the use of conflict minerals from the DRC region.  This was a sufficiently reasonable fit between
means and ends.
 
Moreover, deference to the political branches’ predictive
judgment was more warranted in the arena of foreign affairs.  Nor did the cost of implementation affect the reasonability
of the means chosen.  Recall that the
production audit doesn’t raise First Amendment questions; once that’s done,
obligating issuers to use a shorthand phrase and put it on their website/in SEC
reports isn’t unduly burdensome. 
[Yes!  Food manufacturers don’t
get to include the cost of determining the calorie count of a food in the costs
of disclosure—at least not if we don’t want the First Amendment to become
super-Lochner.]
 
Even if there were uncertainty about Congress’s predictive
judgments about the effect of the disclosure on the conflict in the DRC, the
court should defer to the political branches’ assessments, and Congress
determined that trade in conflict minerals was helping to finance conflict.  In Holder
v. Humanitarian Law Project
, 561 U.S. 1 (2010), the Court deferred to the
political branches’ foreign policy judgments even under strict scrutiny; the
more so here. Plus, constitutionality should not turn on a post hoc referendum
on a law’s effectiveness at a particular point in time. “Otherwise, a law’s
constitutionality might wax and wane depending on the precise time when its
validity is assessed.”  The relevant
question is whether, at enactment, the disclosure regime was reasonably
designed to reduce the funding of armed groups in the DRC. [This is different
from assessing the truthfulness of
the disclosure over time, which is the cholesterol example.]
 
Moreover, the rule was having its desired effect even if its
larger effects were uncertain: companies in the US were now avoiding
DRC-sourced minerals, which was the direct aim. Unintended ripple effects
shouldn’t invalidate the law; those should be for the political branches to
judge.

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The platonic ideal of fair use: critical remix of municipal video

City of Inglewood v. Teixeira, No. 15-cv-01815 (C.D. Cal.
Aug. 20, 2015)
 
Teixeira lives in Inglewood, California, and posts videos on
YouTube as “Dehol Trouth.”  The City
argued that he infringed the City’s copyright in recordings of its city
council’s meetings, and here it loses comprehensively.  One hopes a motion for the defendant’s attorneys’ fees is forthcoming.
 
First, California law barred the City from claiming
copyright in its video. “California law establishes a strong presumption in
favor of public access to public materials and places significant limits on how
public entities may restrict access to such materials.”  In the absence of an affirmative grant of
authority to claim copyright, a California public entity may not do so.  There was no such grant here.  The City tried to argue that the Supremacy
Clause overrode California law and allowed it to claim copyright, but the
Supremecy Clause doesn’t forbid a state from choosing whether or not it wants
copyright protection for its entities’ works, and probably the Copyright Act
couldn’t require it to allow copyright claims. 
The California legislature has expressly granted its entities to assert copyright
protection for software, Cal. Gov. Code § 6254.9 (and educational material and
materials produced by the Department of Toxic Substances Control, go figure),
but not video, as a California appellate case cited favorably by the California
Supreme Court made clear.
 
Regardless, Teixeira’s videos were fair use as a matter of
law, on the pleadings.  Even assuming, as
alleged and contrary to Teixeira’s representations, that the videos were used
for commercial purposes, every factor heavily favored fair use.  Teixeira used carefully chosen portions of
the larger works to comment on and criticize the City Council’s acts and
members.

The videos “consist of his narrating his criticism of Mayor Butts over slides
or other text, documents – such as a report by the Inglewood city clerk – and
video clips, some of which are taken from the City Council Videos over which
the City claims a copyright interest.” 
The shortest was 3 minutes and 43 seconds and the longest was 15 minutes,
and the clips used were considerably shorter. 
“Some of the clips are used unadorned but they are most often frequently
overlaid with Teixeira’s oral and written commentary and criticism, as well as
music. Even when unadorned, they form only part of longer videos, with the
clips contrasted with documents, sound recordings, and other video clips,
accompanied with Teixeira’s written and oral commentary.”  This was highly transformative.  Not only did they offer criticism and
commentary, but fair use “generally provides a greater scope of protection when
the works involve[d] address matters of public concern.”
 
Los Angeles Times v.
Free Republic
, CV–98–07840– MMM, 2000 WL 565200 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2000),
was inapposite, because that case found that “limited commentary added to
verbatim copies was not sufficient” to justify the amount of copying: full,
verbatim copies.  Teixeira’s use was
wholly different sort: his clips were “carefully chosen and heavily edited,”
juxtoposed with other materials, and surrounded by Teixeira’s commentary. “No
person wishing to find out what occurred during a lengthy City Council meeting
would be satisfied with viewing any of the Teixeira Videos.”  (Side note on “carefully chosen”: on a motion
to dismiss, presumably this means “as a matter of law, the clips directly
relate to the criticism in the rest of the videos.”)  Even if they were commercial, the first
factor tilted heavily in favor of fair use.
 
Nature of the work: Copyrightable, but barely creative.  Favored fair use.
 
Amount used: Small portions. 
The longer videos, 15 minutes long, contained clips from an over
four-hour-long video; the clips were all under a minute long and most under 15
seconds.  The shortest Teixeira video was
3:43 and was “almost wholly comprised of a single clip from the City Council
meeting,” which was the longest clip used in any of the accused videos.  Throughout, the vide included music added by
Teixeira, “but more importantly, his commentary runs along the bottom of the
screen as [Mayor Butts talks,” ridiculing his physical and verbal tics and
specifically identifying points at which Butts is allegedly lying. The source
video was over three hours.
 
The City argued that Teixeira failed to show that his
copying was “essential” to his purpose, and that each topic addressed at the
meetings was “an independent and entire work.” No: review of the videos made it
clear that Teixeira copied only the parts of the City Council videos that served
his purpose of commenting on them, or criticizing particular statements by
Butts. The City’s “exceptionally narrow view of an ‘entire’ work is without
merit and contrary to the purpose of the fair use doctrine, which permits the
use of reasonable quantities of a work for the purpose of criticism and
comment.”  This factor strongly favored
fair use.
 
Market effect: there is no market for the City Council
videos, and the accused videos were no substitute.  The City argued that Teixeira’s copying
denied it  the opportunity to “recoup its
expenses” and “deprives [the City] of potential revenue.”  But California law prevents public agencies from
charging the public anything more than the “direct costs of duplication” when
providing public records, thus prohibiting the City from recouping its cost of
production.  There could be no commercial
market for the videos.  This factor
strongly favored fair use.
 
Thus, fair use as a matter of law. The City accused Teixeira
of wanting “to criticize the City without doing his own work” by “posting
substantially all of the full [City Council Videos] with [his] comments posted
on top of them.” “Even if the City’s characterization of the Teixeira Videos
were accurate, fair use would allow such use for the purpose of commentary.”

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Ashley Madison and false advertising

I’m sure there’s a dirty joke in here somewhere: the Ashley
Madison hack apparently exposed the site’s promise of equal numbers of men and women
seeking opposite-sex affairs as untrue
, with women running more at 15% of
the site.  I don’t agree with this presentation
of the issue:
 
[W]hatever the site’s claims, its
apparent gender imbalances probably isn’t enough to call it a scam. “In the
law, there’s this idea of puffery. Salespeople, and that’s what they are, are
allowed to exaggerate,” says Hofstra University law professor Miriam Albert.
 
“A saleslady at Lord and Taylor
says, ‘That dress looks awesome on you,’ when in reality, you’re packed like a
10-pound sausage into a 5-pound casing. She’s allowed to say that and you can’t
sue her for it because you’re not relying on her to make the purchase.”
 
Similarly, there were some women on
the site, so even if there weren’t as many as Biderman publicly claimed, the
difference may not be enough to deem it fraud. “If what they’re really saying
is ‘It’s evenly split,’ and someone went into it with that basis, I bet you
could get your money back,” Albert says. “I’m just not sure it rises to the
level of actionable fraud. It’s the cusp between puffery and fraud. It’s a
slippery slope.”
 
Puffery of the “you look great in that” type is opinion;
“this site has half women and half men” is not opinion. Exaggerating numbers is
a classic example of a misrepresentation that can be sufficient to constitute
false advertising.  I’m not sure what’s
slippery about the slope here—other than the aforesaid dirty joke.

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Consumers can’t bring the claim that Pom could against Minute Maid

Stansfield v. Minute Maid Co., 2015 WL 4873685, No.
4:14cv290 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 13, 2015)
 
The court kicked out consumer protection claims based on the
same falsity alleged in Pom Wonderful v.
Coca-Cola
, on the ground that they were preempted by the FDCA.  Minute Maid’s “pomegranate and blueberry
flavored blend of five juices” is 99.4% apple and grape juices, 0.3%
pomegranate juice, 0.2% blueberry juice, and 0.1% raspberry juice.  Plaintiffs alleged that the principal display
panel was misleading. They alleged that they paid a price premium because they
believed the product had sufficient pomegranate and blueberry juice to provide
the associated benefits, and didn’t know it was mostly apple and grape juice.
 

The FDCA expressly preempts state laws that aren’t identical
with its requirements.  Under the FDCA, a
food is misbranded if its label does not bear “the common or usual name of the
food, if any there be,” or if information required to appear on its label “is
not prominently placed thereon with such conspicuousness (as compared with
other words, statements, designs, or devices, in the labeling) and in such terms
as to render it likely to be read and understood by the ordinary individual
under customary conditions of purchase and use.” In addition, a food is misbranded
if its labeling is “false or misleading in any particular.” If a food violates
an implementing regulation, and so is misbranded under § 343, plaintiffs may bring
a parallel claim under state law to impose an identical requirement.  But Minute Maid argued that the challenged
aspects of the label were authorized.
 
Plaintiffs’ first theory was that the label didn’t bear the
“common or usual name of the food.”  FDA
regulations require the name to “accurately identify or describe, in as simple
and direct terms as possible, the basic nature of the food or its
characterizing properties or ingredients.” Moreover, if the proportion of a
characterizing ingredient “has a material bearing on price or consumer
acceptance or when the labeling or the appearance of the food may otherwise
create an erroneous impression that such ingredient[ ] … is present in an
amount greater than is actually the case,” the regulation presumes that the
percentage of that ingredient will be declared unless a more specific rule says
otherwise.  However, there’s a more specific
regulation for multiple-juice beverages. 
“[W]here the named juice is not the predominant juice, the common or
usual name for the product shall … [i]ndicate that the named juice is present
as a flavor or flavoring.”
 

Plaintiffs didn’t argue that the product didn’t taste like
pomegranate and blueberry juice. Instead, they said that, because there is so
little pomegranate and blueberry juice in the beverage, as a causal matter the
juice was not getting a pomegranate and blueberry flavor from those juices, but
rather from “other natural flavors.” The FDA explained that it believed the use
of “flavor” would inform consumers that the juice was present “in an amount
sufficient to flavor the beverage” but wouldn’t “imply that the content of that
juice is greater than is actually the case.” Thus, under plaintiffs’
interpretation of the regulation, “if a named minority juice actually flavors
the beverage, then the label may say as much.”
 
The court disagreed: the regulation said that
non-predominant but named juices should be indicated with the words “flavor” or
“flavoring”; there was no requirement of “gustatory causation.”  On the facts alleged, the product complied with
the regulation.
 
Plaintiffs then argued that the NLEA didn’t block challenges
to the label “as a whole” or “in a respect not specifically required or
authorized by a federal preemptive regulation.” Aspects of labels that are
required or permitted by a more specific provision “by definition, are not considered
‘false or misleading’ under federal law.”  But the rest of the label must still comply
with the law and not be “false or misleading in any particular.”   In Pom
Wonderful
, the government argued that “compliance with FDA’s juice-naming
regulations does make the juice’s name nonmisleading,” and that the FDA “could
not (and would not) bring an enforcement action against a manufacturer … for
naming its product ‘Raspcranberry; raspberry and cranberry flavored juice
drink,’ if raspberry and cranberry juices were present as flavors, even if the
drink was primarily white grape juice.”
 
So, to escape preemption, plaintiffs had to identify some aspect
of the label that wasn’t required or permitted by the regulations which a
reasonable jury could find made the label false or misleading.  Plaintiffs pointed to the depiction of fruit
on the label; the placement, lettering, type-size, and spacing of the juice
name; and other labeling statements.
 
As to the name, the regulations say that when a product
doesn’t have enough of an ingredient to “independently characterize” the food,
the word “flavored” has to be used in letters at least half as big as those of
the characterizing ingredient.  It was
the appropriate size here.  In addition,
the juices not named in the product’s name were appropriately represented in “BLEND
OF 5 JUICES.”
 

Fruit vignette: The use of a vignette triggers the
requirement that the characterizing flavors— blueberry and pomegranate—be
“followed by the word ‘flavored’ in letters not less than one-half the height
of the letters in the name of the characterizing flavor.” Minute Maid complied.  Plaintiffs nonetheless argued that the
vignette was misleading because “it displays oversized pomegranate and
blueberries at least as prominently as an apple and grapes, even though there
is virtually no pomegranate or blueberry juice in this product.” The FDA hasn’t
issued formal regulations about the content of fruit vignettes, though it did
discuss them in the preamble to the juice labeling regulation, which was
entitled to Skidmore deference.  The preamble stated that a vignette didn’t
need to include each juice source, as long as the written label was appropriate,
so “a vignette depicting raspberries would not necessarily be misleading if the
statement of identity were ‘raspberry juice in a blend’….”  Nor did the FDA impose a specific size
requirement because the size and shape of juice sources vary, and it didn’t determine
that there were useful ways to display quantitative relationships.  However, ultimately the vignette couldn’t
contradict the other label statements—a determination the agency said it would
make on a case by case basis.
 
Under this guidance, Minute Maid “did precisely what the FDA
said to do,” even though it could have had pomegranate and blueberry in the
vignette.  There were no other arguments
that the vignette was misleading for other reasons, such as taste or including
a juice source that wasn’t really in the product.
 
Finally, plaintiffs argued that they could challenge the
label “as a whole.”  But the regulations
required or permitted certain aspects, and the label tracked the FDA’s guidance
on misleading use.  The court wouldn’t
allow the whole to be more misleading than the sum of its parts.

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Court finds misleading omissions can deprive ISP of 230 protection

General Steel Domestic Sales, LLC v. Chumley, No.
14-cv-01932, 2015 WL 4911585 (D. Colo. Aug. 18, 2015)
 
General Steel sued Chumley and Atlantic Building, of which
he was CEO, for false advertising, libel, and intentional interference with
prospective business advantage (plus civil conspiracy).  It alleged that defendants used the internet
to harm General Steel and get business by running ads in response to searches
for the words “General Steel,” “General Steel Buildings,” “steel buildings,”
and “metal buildings.” Many of these ads allegedly contain derogatory
information about General Steel and contain links to a portion of the Armstrong
Steel Corporation website which does the same.
 
There were twenty statements on the Armstrong Steel website
at issue.  One part of the website was
called “Industry Related Legal Matters” (IRLM), created by Chumley; it had 37
posts, 20 of which were alleged to be unlawful. 
Each post contains a “read more” button that links to third-party
website; each post also contains an excerpt from the document which can be seen
in full when the “Read More” button is pushed. 
For example, one post’s heading was “Class Action Complaint – Heinbaugh
et al v. General Steel Domestic Sales, LLC.” Its first paragraph was a quotation
from courthousenews.com describing a class action lawsuit filed against General
Steel, with the words “U.S. District Court of Colorado” added before the
quotation, which read: “General Steel Corp. and its CEO Jeffrey Knight ‘infamous’
telemarketers of steel-buildings, systematically defrauded their customers, in
defiance of court orders, by, among other things, taking nonrefundable deposits
and then refusing to deliver buildings for the price advertised, a class-action
complaint claims in Federal Court.”
 
Other posts included “Attorney General Madrid Warns New
Mexico Churches About Colorado Metal Building Company” and “General Steel
Domestic Sales, LLC v. Chumley,” the latter of which described the claims and
counterclaims in a 2010 case, but didn’t mention the dismissal of certain
counterclaims.  Another post, “Rock Limo
Service v. General Steel Domestic Sales,” included quotations from a court case
describing a contract and ending with this sentence: “Petitioners demanded
return of their deposit, but General Steel refused to pay it.” The “Read More”
link led to the full text, affirming an arbitrator’s award finding that General
Steel properly retained the deposit because Rock Limo breached the relevant
contract.  The IRLM Page contains a
general disclaimer: “These external hyperlinks represent allegations made by
parties (which may or may not ultimately be adopted by a judge/jury) and
findings of fact and law by judges/arbitrators. Some of the cases mentioned
here may be ongoing, dismissed, settled and/or may not be final.”
 
As for defendants’ search ads, they included:
 
Don’t Send Them A Deposit – ArmstrongSteelBuildings.com Ad
http://ift.tt/1b8Fhxt
Until You’ve Seen These Lawsuits. Read This Before It’s Too
Late!
 
Before You Send a Deposit – Do Your Research First Ad
http://ift.tt/1b8Fhxt (855) 882-6555 Read This Before It’s Too Late!
View Gallery – Virtual Building – Design It Online –
1.800.345.4610
 
Steel Building *Lawsuits* – ArmstrongSteelBuildings.com
http://ift.tt/1b8Fhxt +1 800-345-4610 4.8 rating for
armstrongsteelbuildings.com
Rock Limo Lost $125,383 in Deposits *Beware* Research Before
You Buy! Court Rulings · Lawsuits · Buyer Beware · Complaints
 
‘General Told Her ‘We Will Keep You In Court Until We Break
You’ ‘
Court Rulings · Lawsuits · Buyer Beware · Complaints
 
General Steel argued that defendants “collected old
documents from long-resolved General Steel litigation and wholly created a
website conveying facts that are false as to General Steel’s current
operations. In addition, the title of the IRLM Page, “Industry Related Legal
Matters,” was allegedly misleading because it appeared to be an objective site
disclosing industry lawsuits, but actually is a page targeting General Steel. 
 
Defendants argued that the CDA gave them immunity.  General Steel responded that they wholly or
partially developed the information at issue, and thus didn’t qualify.  To be responsible, a service provider must “in
some way specifically encourage[] development of what is offensive about the
content,” which is to say what is unlawful or legally actionable.  (Interpreting the Accusearch case, which some worried represented an expansion of ISP
liability—as with Roommates, it may
be that the case actually sets a limit that preserves most ISPs’ immunity.)  Merely inviting or encouraging third parties
to post content isn’t development of that content.  Even ratifying or adopting third party content,
including through the posting of commentary, isn’t development.  Nor is minor editing, as long as the changes don’t
contribute to the false, misleading, or otherwise unlawful nature of the
underlying information.
 
General Steel pointed out that the posts weren’t submitted
by third parties, but rather created by Chumley.  However, “nothing in § 230 or the relevant
case law limits § 230 immunity to information submitted directly to a website
by a third party.”  Here, everything came
from the internet, so cases finding that §230 didn’t cover publication of material
submitted to an ISP that was not intended for public distribution were
irrelevant.  Thus, the links received §
230 immunity, and so did the summaries, because the addition of “U.S. District
Court” was inconsequential.  General
Steel claimed that the excerpts highlighted inflammatory and disparaging parts
of the documents.  (With respect to the
arbitration, a false light-like theory of responsibility for development would
make sense to me—it’s kind of like editing out the “not” in an otherwise
nondefamatory statement.) 
 
At many points, the defendants created their own summaries
of allegations made by others. 
Defendants also didn’t post a court order finding them liable for willful false advertising targeting General Steel.  Still, General Steel didn’t claim that the
links went to inaccurate versions of the documents, or that the page contained
inaccurate quotations.  Ultimately, the
court found that defendants developed some of the information:
 
To the extent the defendants chose
certain summaries and quotations describing the referenced court proceedings,
failed to accurately describe the proceedings as a whole, and posted those
quotations and summaries on the IRLM Page, the defendants developed the
information they posted on that page. These editorial choices can be seen as a
choice to emphasize unflattering allegations made against General Steel without
summarizing or quoting information which reflects the nature and outcome of the
court proceeding described…. Highlighting the unflattering allegations without
providing other relevant information reasonably can be seen as contributing to
the allegedly defamatory or otherwise actionable nature of the underlying
information. Such actions specifically encourage development of what is
allegedly unlawful or legally actionable about the content and, thus,
constitutes development of the information for the purpose of § 230 immunity.
 
However, certain summaries and quotations were “reasonably
accurate” summaries of the underlying information developed by third parties,
and thus covered by §230. “By organizing, quoting, and summarizing this
information, the defendants did nothing to specifically encourage the
development of what General Steel claims is unlawful or legally actionable
about the underlying content.”  By
contrast, other posts highlighted content that was allegedly
unlawful/actionable.
 
The search ads also weren’t subject to §230 immunity, since
the defendants created and developed their content.
 
General Steel argued that Lanham Act claims were exempt from
§230 immunity because of §230’s IP exclusion.  The court ruled that General Steel’s claim was
brought under §43(a)(1)(A), but then called it a “false advertising claim,”
which it is—and thus mistakenly held that General Steel’s Lanham Act claims
weren’t subject to §230: “Particularly given this [statutory placement of false
advertising language in a trademark law], a false advertising claim under §
1125 implicates trademark law, an ilk of intellectual property law.”  Sigh (though it’s not clear this matters to
the outcome, since the court seemed to focus its analysis on the content it
found defendants to have created).
 
For similar reasons, the court found the fair report
privilege applicable to some of the posts, not others.
 
Truth: defendants argued that “Rock Limo Lost $125,383 in
Deposits” was true.  But this created a
material issue of fact about whether the statement clearly implied that the loss
resulted from wrongful behavior by General Steel.  The court found that disputed issues of
material fact about the ads precluded summary judgment on the grounds of truth
for the Lanham Act/tortious interference claims.
 
Defendants argued that General Steel failed to present
evidence of customer confusion.  Given
General Steel’s theory of intentional deception, no extrinsic evidence of
confusion would be required.  Likewise,
General Steel’s experts provided sufficient evidence of the loss of one or more
contracts to take the tortious interference claim to trial.

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Copyright infringement is channeled into (c), not state or Lanham Act claims

Quadratec, Inc. v. Turn 5, Inc., 2015 WL 4876314, No.
13–6384 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 13, 2015)
 
The parties compete to sell removable soft tops and other
aftermarket parts and accessories for Jeep vehicles. Quadratec alleged that it
invests substantial resources in the advertising of its products by “creating
tens of thousands of unique photographs” and writing descriptions of the
photographs, which “differentiate it from all of its competitors in the
automotive market.” Except for Turn 5, which allegedly engaged in extensive
copying of its images and descriptions (including a Quadratec photo with a
superimposed Turn 5 logo on it), despite Quadratec’s demands that it stop.  (Why no 1202 CMI claim?  Although it seems unlikely to have concealed copyright infringement, so quite probably futile, though that doesn’t distinguish it from various other claims asserted.)  Further, Quadratec alleged that Turn 5 falsely
advertised its Baricade Soft Top products by falsely claiming that they exceeded
original equipment manufacturer standards and are made from Black diamond
sailcloth material (though this allegation isn’t addressed in this
ruling).  Quadratec registered its images
and sued.
 
Copyright infringement: though the complaint alleged that
images other than those specifically identified might have been infringed, it
also provided sufficient notice about particular registered images, and
Quadratec wouldn’t be allowed to base claims on unidentified images. However,
statutory damages/attorneys’ fees claims were dismissed because in all cases
the infringements began before the registrations; allegations that Take 5 began
infringing new parts of the
registered work post-registration were insufficient because statutory damages
go on a work by work basis.
 
§43(a)(1)(A): Dastar
barred this claim. There was no misrepresentation of the origin of the goods
for sale.  Quadratec argued that it was
claiming false designation of the origin of the services at issue, here providing catalog services. That is, Take 5’s
use of the product presentations was likely to confuse Quadratec’s customers
into believing that “identical product presentations in both Plaintiff’s and
Defendant’s catalogs” means that the “catalog sources are the same or otherwise
affiliated.”
 
But Dastar
precludes this argument.  Neither party
is in the business of selling catalog services, only aftermarket Jeep
products.  There could be no confusion as
to the origin of those goods.  The Lanham
Act doesn’t create a cause of action for plagiarism of marketing.
 
§43(a)(1)(B): Again, this failed because there was no
alleged misrepresentation about the
products for sale
, rather than about the source of the marketing materials
used to sell them.
 
Misappropriation: preempted by the Copyright Act.  The alleged deceit involved was not an extra
element because it occurred only by way of reverse passing off, which meant that
there was nothing fundamentally different from a copyright infringement claim.
 
Unjust enrichment: Ditto. 
Quadratec alleged that Take 5 received benefits beyond the mere intrinsic
value of the Quadratec materials, because it diverted profits and goodwill from
Quadratec and saved money on advertising that it could use to lower its prices
in competition with Quadratec.  The
alleged financial benefit in the form of reduced overhead didn’t make the
unjust enrichment claim qualitatively different than the copyright infringement
claim.

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Connecticut taxi companies’ claims against Uber fail

Greenwich Taxi, Inc. v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 2015 WL
4774989, No. 14cv733 (D. Conn. Aug. 13, 2015
 
Plaintiffs sued Uber for violating the Lanham Act, the
Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), and RICO, as well as for
intentional interference with contractual relationships. The court dismissed
the amended complaint with leave to amend.
 
Plaintiffs alleged that Uber began taxicab and/or livery
operations in Connecticut without complying with state laws and regulations.  Uber allegedly partners with plaintiffs’ drivers,
each of “who[m] make[s] an illegal side deal with Uber to take its customers
while simultaneously working a normal shift with his or her authorized
company.”  Uber allegedly “misrepresents
to customers its compliance with Connecticut laws and regulations,
misrepresents its insurance coverage, misrepresents the safety of its drivers,
misrepresents its affiliation with lawfully operating taxicab and livery
companies, and misrepresents its fares.”
 
False advertising: the court noted that the pleading
standard applicable is Rule 8, not Rule 9(b). 
See John P. Villano Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 130, 131
(S.D.N.Y.1997) (“No matter how parsed, a claim of false advertising under the
Lanham Act … is not identical to a claim of fraud. Fraud requires, not just
the making of a statement known to be false, but also, inter alia, a specific
intent to harm the victim and defraud him of his money or property…. By
contrast, no fraudulent intent … is required under 15 U.S.C. § 1125.”).
 
Under Dial A Car, Inc. v. Transp., Inc., 82 F.3d 484 (D.C.Cir.1996),
violations of Connecticut transportation laws and regulations aren’t actionable
as false advertising; given that it wasn’t clear whether state transportation
laws applied to Uber, Uber’s representations that it complied with the law
couldn’t be false or misleading.
 
As for other representations, they weren’t adequately pled to
be false or misleading.  For example, the
complaint didn’t sufficiently allege that Uber claimed to be a “ridesharing”
service. Plaintiffs alleged that Uber falsely claimed to have “partner”
drivers, but they didn’t plead what it meant to be a “partner” and what would
make that claim false or misleading. 
They further alleged that Uber does not regularly recheck insurance, but
they didn’t allege that Uber represented to customers that it does so. Likewise,
they pleaded that it is nearly impossible to collect on Uber’s liability
insurance and that the Connecticut Insurance Department issued a consumer alert
stating that Uber’s drivers may not be covered by their personal automobile
insurance. But they didn’t plead that Uber represented to customers that Uber’s
drivers are covered by their commercial or personal insurance.  Further, allegations that Uber’s user
agreement allows it to use “surge” pricing when demand becomes “high” or
“intense” and that “[t]he mechanism for determining [‘surge’ pricing] appears
arbitrary and unpredictable, made solely at the discretion of [Uber]” didn’t
support an inference that Uber made a representation to customers that its
pricing was simple.
 
False association under §43(a): Plaintiffs failed to allege
that they had recognizable trademarks on the cars driven by Uber “partners.”
 
RICO claims: dismissed.
 
CUTPA: Plaintiffs’ unfairness claims required some sort of
violation of public policy, but it hadn’t yet been established that Uber’s services
violated Connecticut law, and plaintiffs didn’t sufficiently allege
anticompetitive, immoral, or otherwise unfair conduct.
 
Tortious interference with contractual relationships: This requires
wrongful conduct such as
fraud, misrepresentation, intimidation or molestation.  Plaintiffs didn’t plead that Uber’s
interference with the contractual relationships between the plaintiffs and
their taxicab and livery drivers and between the plaintiffs and credit card
processing companies was tortious. Wooing the drivers wasn’t inherently
wrongful.
 

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No winner in Cablevision v. Verizon

Cablevision Systems Corp. v. Verizon New York Inc., —
F.Supp.3d —-, 2015 WL 4758072, No. 15–CV–456 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2015)
(magistrate judge)
 
Cablevision and Verizon sought to enjoin each other’s comparative
ads; the court denied both cross-motions for preliminary injunction. 
 
Verizon’s top three tiers, 150/150 upload/download Mbps,
300/300 Mbps, and 500/500 Mbps, all provide faster download speeds than
Cablevision’s fastest plan, and all five FiOS plans offer faster upload speeds
than any of Cablevision’s offerings, though a very small proportion of Verizon
customers subscribe to the top three speed plans.  The customer’s router constrains wireless
internet speed, like the nozzle on the end of a garden hose.  Verizon offers, at additional cost, the FiOS
Quantum Gateway router, which can support “throughput” speeds up to the fastest
FiOS tier (500/500Mbps). Thus, it advertises that FiOS provides the “fastest
WiFi available from any provider.”
 
Initially, it predicated its claim on a 2014 router study
that tested the FiOS router against another of other competing devices, but
“notably” not Cablevision’s router.  In a
second study, Verizon’s router outperformed Cablevision, “though in certain
instances by a narrow margin.”  However,
comparative router speed, standing alone, had little meaning.  After the second study, Verizon continued to
advertise “Fastest WiFi,” but based the claim on “Verizon’s combination of the
FiOS 500/500 Mbps Internet service tier with the FiOS Quantum Gateway router.”
 
FiOS did offer a faster connection once the router was
connected, especially with its more expensive plans.  Cablevision contended that WiFi speed,
technically speaking, “is the speed of that communication from a router to a
device such as a laptop or tablet.” But internet connection “is a common, if not
preeminent, WiFi application,” and may be used as a shortcut not only refer to
the WiFi itself but also to a wired connection to the internet accessed via
WiFi.  Verizon rejoined that consumers
understand the term primarily in the context of a wireless connection to the
internet, with evidence that included Cablevision’s own FAQ.
 
The judge found that, regardless of the technical
definition, consumers commonly understand WiFi to mean a wireless connection to
the internet. “[C]onsumers paying for WiFi are likely to be more concerned with
the speed provided by their Internet Service Provider, which permits them to
download music, movies, games and the like, rather than the theoretical
capability of the supplied router under laboratory conditions.”  Thus, there was no likely success on the
merits at this stage. 
 
Cablevision argued that Verizon’s earlier use of a router
study to support its claims meant that Verizon had picked its definition of
router speed and couldn’t change that definition in subsequent ads.  But the court saw these ads as distinct from
the older ads, and Verizon had discontiuned the ads with an “erroneous”
definition of speed, making relief as to them moot.
 
Meanwhile, Cablevision promoted that it offers subscribers
access to a network of “1.1 million hotspots.” What this meant was 65,000
outdoor public routers, about 100,000 routers located in small and medium
businesses, and roughly 1 million routers located in the homes of its
residential customers. Each “smart” router installed by Cablevision includes a
second channel—a “dual SSID”—which provides a public access point for all Cablevision
customers, unless it’s disabled. These routers provide WiFi service at distances
of 135’ or more.

Verizon argued that these hotspots weren’t truly public, because they came from
private homes, and numerous ads suggested that they were in public places.  Cablevision’s website contained a claim that
it maintained hotspots at “1 million public locations like train stations,
restaurants, cafes and parks,” which would clearly be misleading.  Cablevision agreed to discontinue making this
claim, absent a change of circumstances, “which change would presumably involve
the construction of 900,000 or so hotspots in public locations.”
 
Cablevision also claimed to offer a “better data network”
than Verizon, and stated that Verizon “two-times” it customers by charging for
cellular data usage from customers that have already paid for WiFi access at
home. It was undisputed that, when connected to WiFi, mobile devices can access
data faster than when connected via cellular towers. But it was also beyond
dispute that Verizon’s cellular towers provided far broader geographic coverage
than Cablevision’s WiFi network. And Verizon did impose separate data charges
on its customers, under certain circumstances, for data obtained via cellular
towers.
 
In addition, Cablevision recently launched the Freewheel, an
all-WiFi communication device. Freewheel is a Motorola Moto–G model smartphone
configured to function only using WiFi connections rather than traditional
cellular telephone towers. This is a relatively low-cost mobile device that
can, where WiFi is available, make and receive phone calls, text and surf the
Internet.  Verizon argued that references
to the device as a “phone” and comparisons to cellphones and smartphones were
misleading. Internal Cablevision marketing research—focus group studies of
preliminary Freewheel ads—suggested that certain viewers could be confused
about the nature of the device and the extent of the “coverage” of the Cablevision
WiFi network.
 
The court turned to images to show the “gestalt” of the ads,
which characterized Freewheel “as something new and different from a cellular
phone.”
 

Cablevision argued that Verizon delayed too long to get a
preliminary injunction.  The judge agreed
that Verizon’s “inordinate” delay of more than six months as to all the
non-Freewheel ads weighed “heavily” against a finding of irreparable harm.
 
1.1 million hotspots: Verizon argued literal falsity based
on Cablevision’s failure to disclose that 87% of the hotspots emanate from
residential locations.  But the ability
to use the WiFi at distances of 135′ or more meant that “signals from
residential routers can be accessed from the street or sidewalk,” which are
public places.  Thus the judge found
neither express nor implicit falsity.
 
“Better data network”: “better” did not necessarily mean
geographic coverage.  A WiFi-connected
consumer would get faster downloads than she’d get from a cell tower.  The multiplicity of meanings made “better”
puffery.
 
Freewheel: Verizon argued that, to the extent that
Cablevision called the Freewheel a “phone” or “smartphone,” those statements
were literally false.  However, the
Freewheel actually was a “Motorola Moto–G model smartphone.” The fact that it
was configured only to work on WiFi didn’t change its “essence” as a telephone,
just as “phone” can mean cell phones, “historical” (ouch!) landline telephones
or cordless handsets. So there was no literal falsity.
 
The main argument was that consumers would think they were
getting cellular phone service from the Freewheel.  This was an implied falsehood claim, though,
and Verizon didn’t have evidence of deception. 
(Claims that Freewheel was “better than cellular” were mere
puffery.)  The Cablevision focus groups
weren’t enough, even though the company conducting the work for Cablevision
warned that “[c]omparisons to cellular in messaging exposed during the groups
helped create the perception that Freewheel service (including talk/text) will
be ubiquitous given respondents’ near universal coverage experience with cell
service for talk/text/data[.]”  While focus
group information isn’t always reliable, especially when it favors the party
who conducted it, the judge didn’t need to decide here because the ads shown to
the focus groups were preliminary drafts, to which substantial changes were
made. 

 
Those changes included specific
qualifications of the text to make clear that “it’s a WiFi phone” rather than a
“cell phone,” and a checklist indicating people for whom the phone might be
appropriate.  Thus, the focus groups
didn’t show that the ads actually run were deceptive.

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