Amicus supporting rehearing in MTM v. Amazon

IP Professors, with excellent assistance from Cathy Gellis.

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Limiting remedies when a descriptive fair use defense fails

Anhing Corp. v. Thuan Phong Co., No. CV 13-05167, 2015 WL
4517846  (C.D. Cal. Jul. 24, 2015) 
 
This post-trial ruling covers a lot of detailed ground on
descriptive fair use, unclean hands, and remedies.  Anhing successfully sued Thuan Phong for
trademark infringement; the court denied Thuan Phong’s motions and granted a
permanent injunction. [NB: the Westlaw version gets rid of most of the
non-English orthography; I tried to fix that but my apologies for missing instances.] 
 
Anhing imports food and related products, and has a private
label brand, “MỸ THO,” which has existed for thirty-five years. Here are two of
its rice products:   Anhing registered
MY-THO (no tilde) for rice sticks and rice vermicelli in 1986.  According to the registration, “MY–THO” has a
dual meaning in Vietnamese of “beauty and longevity” and “pretty autumn.” At
some point, Plaintiff also began selling rice noodles in packaging with the
words “MỸ THO” accompanied by ®. 
 

Thuan Phong is a company that began and continues to operate
in the city of Mỹ Tho, Vietnam.  It makes
rice paper, sold under the TUFOCO logo. The package features BÁNH TRÁNG MỸ THO
in red lettering across the top and three green bamboo trees.  In 2008, it registered the mark and design “BÁNH
TRÁNG MỸ THO TUFOCO DAC BIET DE LAM GOI CUON VA CHA GIO VIET NAM BAMBOO TREE
HIEU BA CAY TRE VIETNAMESE RICE PAPER” for rice paper.  In 2010, Thuan Phong introduced a rice noodle
product with similar packaging.   
 

The parties began doing business together in 2004, when
Thuan Phong agreed to make rice paper for Anhing’s White Elephant Brand private
label.  In 2010, Anhing discovered Thuan
Phong’s US sales of rice paper with BÁNH TRÁNG MỸ THO on the label, which
Anhing considered confusingly similar to its BÁNH TRÁNG MỸ-THO rice paper, and
Anhing had the same objections to Thuan Phong’s “BÁNH PHỞ MỸ THO” rice noodles,
given Anhing’s “BÁNH PHỞ MỸ-THO” rice noodles. 
In response to Anhing’s requests, Thuan Phong maintained that the terms
weren’t used as marks, but rather as information about the geographic source of
the products.  However, Thuan Phong
agreed to discontinue these particular phrases and to sell under “BÁNH PHỞ SẢN
XUẤT TẠI THᾺNH PHỞ MỸ THO” and “HỬ TIỀU SẢN XUẤT TẠI THᾺNH PHỞ MỸ THO.”  These phrases state more clearly in
Vietnamese that their rice noodles are produced in the city of Mỹ Tho.  Anhing wasn’t satisfied, because the geographic
designations would still appear at the top of Defendant’s packaging, with the
words “MỸ THO” in bold red lettering and in the same font size as the rest of
the words on the packaging. Thuan Phong refused to move the words “MỸ THO” to
the bottom of its packaging, and it didn’t change its rice paper packaging or
add similar prepositional phrases.     
 

Anhing sued for infringement of its registered “MY-THO” mark
as well as for infringement of its unregistered MỸ-THO mark and for its
unregistered trade dress.  A jury found
willful infringement of the registered mark and lack of fair use.  However, the jury found that Anhing didn’t
prove ownership of a valid mark in “MỸ-THO” (with tilde) or likely confusion
with respect to its trade dress.  The
equitable issues remaining for the court were Thuan Phong’s affirmative
defenses of laches and unclean hands, a counterclaim under the UCL, and Anhing’s
request for a permanent injunction. Thuan Phong also sought judgment as a
matter of law.   
 
The court rejected Thuan Phong’s laches defense based on
Anhing’s delay in filing suit. Thuan Phong argued that Anhing knew about the
infringement as early as 2004, when one of its representatives visited Thuan
Phong’s factory, but failed to file suit until July 2013.  Laches doesn’t bar a suit against a deliberate
infringer, where the public’s right not to be confused is paramount and where
the infringer’s hands are unclean. Given the jury findings and instructions,
its finding of “willful use” amounted to a finding of willful
infringement.  The jury was instructed
that it should award profits if it found willful infringement and skip an
accounting otherwise, and it stated $8690.52 as Thuan Phong’s profits attributable
to infringement.  Separately, Thuan Phong
failed to show prejudice either in its ability to bring evidence forward or in
its reliance on Anhing’s inaction to grow its business, given its position that
it wasn’t using MỸ THO as a mark but as a statement of information—any delay
couldn’t therefore have injured its brand or reputation.
 
The court further rejected Thuan Phong’s unclean hands
defense based on (1) Anhing’s use of ® on rice products not disclosed in its
registration for the “MY THO” trademark and next to the unregistered “MỸ-THO”
mark; (2) geographic misleadingness; and (3) inequitable conduct in securing
its registration. Inequitable conduct must relate to the use or acquisition of
the plaintiff’s claimed rights to justify the defense, but need not be illegal
or criminal.
 
The wrongful use of ® disturbed the court; some evidence
suggested that the misuse was not inadvertent. 
But it still was not sufficiently related to the subject matter of
Anhing’s claims based on “MY–THO,” especially given the Ninth Circuit’s focus
on balancing the parties’ willfulness and harms to each other.  (Given that the marks are so similar, it
seems likely that they’d qualify for tacking if Anhing went ahead and tried to register
MỸ-THO.)

Geographic deceptiveness: If the jury found that MỸ THO is confusingly similar
to MỸ-THO, Thuan Phong argued, Anhing shouldn’t be allowed to use the mark,
because Mỹ Tho is a city.  But the jury
didn’t find confusing similarity in the abstract; it found that Thuan Phong’s
use of MỸ THO as a trademark was confusingly similar to Anhing’s mark, which
didn’t mean that MỸ-THO was misleading or deceptive as to geographic source.  Also, this too was unrelated to Anhing’s
acquisition or use of the right it claimed.  (Hmm. 
Neither of these reasons seems right to me.  Geographic terms can be used as marks, so
there’s no incompatibility between geographic indication and source indication;
indeed that’s why we have a descriptive fair use doctrine—to preserve others’
rights when a descriptive term has successfully been used as a mark.  And if the term is geographically deceptive, then Anhing’s claim against a producer
who is in fact from the location is fundamentally related to its deceptive
appropriation of a geographic term (or a confusingly similar version of the
term, since I can’t see why the confusion wouldn’t go both ways).)  The court says that the right at issue is “MY–THO,”
and so whether MỸ-THO is understood as a geographical reference is irrelevant,
and that the connection between the terms is too tenuous to support an unclean
hands defense.  But the connection was
strong enough to make the terms confusing!
 
The court further found insufficient evidence of geographic
deceptiveness. Though all of Anhing’s products were made in Thailand, there was
conflicting evidence over whether the phrases displayed on its packaging was a
geographic reference or pure trademark use. 
Thuan Phong didn’t offer persuasive evidence to show that the mark’s
“primary significance” was to refer to the city of Mỹ Tho, or any evidence of
actual consumer confusion.   The products were all labeled as having been produced
in Thailand.   
 
Unsurprisingly, Anhing’s failure to disclose the existence
of the city when it registered its mark also failed to constitute sufficient
inequitable conduct to justify an unclean hands defense. There was no evidence
of Anhing’s knowledge of the city, understanding that it should disclose the
city’s existence, or intent to deceive the PTO.
 
There was also no basis for Thuan Phong’s UCL counterclaim
based on the misuse of ® because there was no evidence that such use caused Thuan
Phong to suffer any damages. Nor did a claim based on alleged misrepresentation
of source succeed—the jury could reasonably have concluded that MY-THO didn’t
stand for a geographic location in most consumers’ minds.
 
The court also rejected Thuan Phong’s motion for judgment as
a matter of law, focused mostly on its descriptive fair use defense.  Though the jury’s finding of likely confusion
didn’t preclude the fair use defense under KP
Permanent
, the evidence supported a finding of use as a mark.  Even after Thuan Phong’s changes, the words
still appeared prominently at the top and in bold red lettering, albeit in the
same font and color as other words indicating the type of product (rice
noodles) and the prepositions indicating geographic source.  “The jury could have found Defendant’s refusal
to move the reference to ‘MỸ THO’ to the bottom or back of its packaging, or to
reduce the size of the lettering, as evidence Defendant did not take sufficient
precautionary measures despite its knowledge of potential infringement,” and
likewise the jury could have found that its failure to change the wording on
its rice paper packaging indicted an intent to attract public attention. The
jury could have found that Thuan Phong displayed MỸ THO more prominently than
other design features, such as its blue “TUFOCO” logo and the three green
bamboo trees. 
 
Likewise, the jury could have found a lack of good faith,
given Thuan Phong’s conduct after Anhing sent its C&D.  Thuan Phong expressly acknowledged a
likelihood of confusion and agreed to modify the wording on its packaging to
more clearly state its products were produced in Mỹ Tho, but refused to move
this “information statement” to a less prominent place on its packaging. That
refusal, combined with the lack of evidence that Thuan Phong consulted legal
counsel, was sufficient to support a finding of lack of good faith.  (Wow!) 
Finally, the jury was entitled to find that the use was not purely
descriptive, because of testimony that Mỹ Tho isn’t a famous city and consumers
don’t associate the words with a geographic place. “[T]he evidence is
consistent with a finding that consumers do not interpret the words to refer to
Mỹ Tho city, and that Defendant did not use the words in a trademark sense.”

As to willfulness, though there was evidence that Thuan Phong independently
designed its rice paper packaging before the parties began doing business
together, and chose to use “MỸ THO” not to refer to competing products but to
inform consumers where its products were produced, that didn’t negate willful
infringement given its continued use of the term after it became aware of the
MY-THO mark. Nor did Thuan Phong’s own registration, from 2008, preclude a
finding of willfulness. Though the registration was evidence of lack of
willfulness, it couldn’t be viewed in isolation, and was undermined by Thuan
Phong’s own statements in response to the C&D:
 
The words “BÁNH PHỞ MỸ THO” on the
packing of Anhing Corporation and on the packing of Thuan Phong Company are
likely to cause confusion in the marketplace. Thuan Phong [C]ompany does not
want to use alike name of Anhing’s rice noodle (sic ). We will correct the name
of our product on packing clearly in order that it will be quite different to
the name of product of Anhing Corporation (sic).
 
“Use of an infringing mark, in the face of warnings about
potential infringement, is strong evidence of willful infringement.” Likewise,
failure to consult trademark counsel where such consultation would be
reasonable supported a finding of willfulness.
 
Similarly, the evidence supported a finding of likely
confusion, despite what the defendant characterized as minimal evidence of
actual confusion.
 
The jury also awarded $10,000 in actual damages, which was supported
by reasonable inferences given Anhing’s evidence that experienced a decline in
sales after Thuan Phong entered the domestic marketplace, selling apparently
identical/confusing staple products at a cheaper price; Anhing’s other brands
didn’t suffer a decrease in sales at the same time.  The amount awarded was about 10% of Anhing’s
claimed losses, making it a reasonable inference from the evidence.
 
Anhing also secured a permanent injunction. “Evidence of
intangible injury, such as a loss of customers or damage to a party’s goodwill,
can constitute irreparable harm. Evidence of a loss of control over one’s
business reputation may also suffice.” 
The trial evidence showed the necessary loss of control/harm,
particularly because of testimony that Thuan Phong’s products were of inferior
quality.  “That the jury found a
likelihood of confusion substantiates this conclusion and further supports a
finding of irreparable injury.”  (In
other words: likely confusion is irreparable injury, so eBay doesn’t matter.) 
 
Irreparable injury meant legal remedies were
inadequate.  “The evidentiary burden
Plaintiff faced in establishing its actual damages at trial also favors injunctive
relief [even though Anhing submitted evidence on actual damages and the jury
made a finding]. Perhaps most important, however, is the risk that Defendant
will continue to engage in infringing conduct.”
 
The balance of hardships favored Anhing; Thuan Phong argued
that it would be harmed by being unable to adequately convey the geographic
source of its products, but the fair use finding made this argument fail,
though it affected the appropriate scope of an injunction. The public interest
likewise favored a tailored injunction preventing confusion while allowing fair
use.
 
Anhing argued that Thuan Phong should be limited to using
the phrase “Mỹ Tho Industrial Zone” on the back of its packaging, in black ink
and no more than 4 centimeters in length and 0.2 centimeters in height. There
was no evidentiary basis for requiring Mỹ Tho “Industrial Zone”; the parties
didn’t show that consumers would more readily recognize “Mỹ Tho Industrial
Zone” as an indication of geographic source than simply “Mỹ Tho.” Nor was there
an evidentiary basis for the requirement the source statement be in black ink. Thuan
Phong’s packages use red, blue, green, and white ink; black ink is only used on
the back, to convey information not included in its trade dress, such as
nutrition facts, ingredients, and directions for use. Because the jury found no
likely trade dress confusion, requiring black ink would be an unfair limitation
on Thuan Phong’s trade dress rights. A ban on putting a source statement on the
front of the products was also overly burdensome; some of Anhing’s own products
included a statement of geographic source on the front. The jury’s confusion
finding didn’t mean that any and all uses of Mỹ Tho on the front of packaging
would necessarily infringe.  The same
reasoning led the court to reject an absolute size constraint. “Certainly, the
jury’s finding of willful infringement requires a change to Defendant’s current
use of ‘MỸ THO.’ But it does not require the wholesale relegation of any and
all reference to the words to an entirely inconspicuous location.”  The court allowed a six-month sell-off period,
given that Anhing hadn’t shown that six more months of use would cause a
significantly increased risk of harm.
 
Thus, Thuan Phong was enjoined from using “Mỹ Tho” in a manner
likely to cause confusion; use in the same/similar manner as existing packages
would be likely to cause confusion.  It
had to immediately cease importing infringing products to the US.  It would be permitted to use Mỹ Tho as a
location designator: “The text of the location designation shall state, in
Vietnamese, ‘Product made in Mỹ Tho, Vietnam’ or ‘Produced in Mỹ Tho,Vietnam,’”
and it couldn’t be bigger than the letters TUFOCO in Thuan Phong’s logo.  If on the front of the package, it couldn’t
be at the top, above the “TUFOCO” logo and three bamboo trees. Thuan Phong was
also ordered to immediately notify its distributors and customers in writing
that it wasn’t associated with, affiliated with, sponsored by, or otherwise
related to Anhing, including a copy of the final permanent injunction, and it
had to immediately notify its wholesalers in writing that they were required to
discontinue sales of the infringing products.     

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Transformative use of the day, Lululemon edition

I can’t wait to carry this bag around and watch the double-takes.  (Would also fit well on Welcome to Night Vale.)

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Limiting remedies when a descriptive fair use defense fails

Anhing Corp. v. Thuan Phong Co., No. CV 13-05167, 2015 WL 4517846  (C.D. Cal. Jul. 24, 2015) 
 
This post-trial ruling covers a lot of detailed ground on descriptive fair use, unclean hands, and remedies.  Anhing successfully sued Thuan Phong for trademark infringement; the court denied Thuan Phong’s motions and granted a permanent injunction. [NB: the Westlaw version gets rid of most of the non-English orthography; I tried to fix that but my apologies for missing instances.] 
 
Anhing imports food and related products, and has a private label brand, “MỸ THO,” which has existed for thirty-five years. Here are two of its rice products:   Anhing registered MY-THO (no tilde) for rice sticks and rice vermicelli in 1986.  According to the registration, “MY–THO” has a dual meaning in Vietnamese of “beauty and longevity” and “pretty autumn.” At some point, Plaintiff also began selling rice noodles in packaging with the words “MỸ THO” accompanied by ®. 
 

Thuan Phong is a company that began and continues to operate in the city of Mỹ Tho, Vietnam.  It makes rice paper, sold under the TUFOCO logo. The package features BÁNH TRÁNG MỸ THO in red lettering across the top and three green bamboo trees.  In 2008, it registered the mark and design “BÁNH TRÁNG MỸ THO TUFOCO DAC BIET DE LAM GOI CUON VA CHA GIO VIET NAM BAMBOO TREE HIEU BA CAY TRE VIETNAMESE RICE PAPER” for rice paper.  In 2010, Thuan Phong introduced a rice noodle product with similar packaging.   
 

The parties began doing business together in 2004, when Thuan Phong agreed to make rice paper for Anhing’s White Elephant Brand private label.  In 2010, Anhing discovered Thuan Phong’s US sales of rice paper with BÁNH TRÁNG MỸ THO on the label, which Anhing considered confusingly similar to its BÁNH TRÁNG MỸ-THO rice paper, and Anhing had the same objections to Thuan Phong’s “BÁNH PHỞ MỸ THO” rice noodles, given Anhing’s “BÁNH PHỞ MỸ-THO” rice noodles.  In response to Anhing’s requests, Thuan Phong maintained that the terms weren’t used as marks, but rather as information about the geographic source of the products.  However, Thuan Phong agreed to discontinue these particular phrases and to sell under “BÁNH PHỞ SẢN XUẤT TẠI THᾺNH PHỞ MỸ THO” and “HỬ TIỀU SẢN XUẤT TẠI THᾺNH PHỞ MỸ THO.”  These phrases state more clearly in Vietnamese that their rice noodles are produced in the city of Mỹ Tho.  Anhing wasn’t satisfied, because the geographic designations would still appear at the top of Defendant’s packaging, with the words “MỸ THO” in bold red lettering and in the same font size as the rest of the words on the packaging. Thuan Phong refused to move the words “MỸ THO” to the bottom of its packaging, and it didn’t change its rice paper packaging or add similar prepositional phrases.     
 

Anhing sued for infringement of its registered “MY-THO” mark as well as for infringement of its unregistered MỸ-THO mark and for its unregistered trade dress.  A jury found willful infringement of the registered mark and lack of fair use.  However, the jury found that Anhing didn’t prove ownership of a valid mark in “MỸ-THO” (with tilde) or likely confusion with respect to its trade dress.  The equitable issues remaining for the court were Thuan Phong’s affirmative defenses of laches and unclean hands, a counterclaim under the UCL, and Anhing’s request for a permanent injunction. Thuan Phong also sought judgment as a matter of law.   
 
The court rejected Thuan Phong’s laches defense based on Anhing’s delay in filing suit. Thuan Phong argued that Anhing knew about the infringement as early as 2004, when one of its representatives visited Thuan Phong’s factory, but failed to file suit until July 2013.  Laches doesn’t bar a suit against a deliberate infringer, where the public’s right not to be confused is paramount and where the infringer’s hands are unclean. Given the jury findings and instructions, its finding of “willful use” amounted to a finding of willful infringement.  The jury was instructed that it should award profits if it found willful infringement and skip an accounting otherwise, and it stated $8690.52 as Thuan Phong’s profits attributable to infringement.  Separately, Thuan Phong failed to show prejudice either in its ability to bring evidence forward or in its reliance on Anhing’s inaction to grow its business, given its position that it wasn’t using MỸ THO as a mark but as a statement of information—any delay couldn’t therefore have injured its brand or reputation.
 
The court further rejected Thuan Phong’s unclean hands defense based on (1) Anhing’s use of ® on rice products not disclosed in its registration for the “MY THO” trademark and next to the unregistered “MỸ-THO” mark; (2) geographic misleadingness; and (3) inequitable conduct in securing its registration. Inequitable conduct must relate to the use or acquisition of the plaintiff’s claimed rights to justify the defense, but need not be illegal or criminal.
 
The wrongful use of ® disturbed the court; some evidence suggested that the misuse was not inadvertent.  But it still was not sufficiently related to the subject matter of Anhing’s claims based on “MY–THO,” especially given the Ninth Circuit’s focus on balancing the parties’ willfulness and harms to each other.  (Given that the marks are so similar, it seems likely that they’d qualify for tacking if Anhing went ahead and tried to register MỸ-THO.)
Geographic deceptiveness: If the jury found that MỸ THO is confusingly similar to MỸ-THO, Thuan Phong argued, Anhing shouldn’t be allowed to use the mark, because Mỹ Tho is a city.  But the jury didn’t find confusing similarity in the abstract; it found that Thuan Phong’s use of MỸ THO as a trademark was confusingly similar to Anhing’s mark, which didn’t mean that MỸ-THO was misleading or deceptive as to geographic source.  Also, this too was unrelated to Anhing’s acquisition or use of the right it claimed.  (Hmm.  Neither of these reasons seems right to me.  Geographic terms can be used as marks, so there’s no incompatibility between geographic indication and source indication; indeed that’s why we have a descriptive fair use doctrine—to preserve others’ rights when a descriptive term has successfully been used as a mark.  And if the term is geographically deceptive, then Anhing’s claim against a producer who is in fact from the location is fundamentally related to its deceptive appropriation of a geographic term (or a confusingly similar version of the term, since I can’t see why the confusion wouldn’t go both ways).)  The court says that the right at issue is “MY–THO,” and so whether MỸ-THO is understood as a geographical reference is irrelevant, and that the connection between the terms is too tenuous to support an unclean hands defense.  But the connection was strong enough to make the terms confusing!
 
The court further found insufficient evidence of geographic deceptiveness. Though all of Anhing’s products were made in Thailand, there was conflicting evidence over whether the phrases displayed on its packaging was a geographic reference or pure trademark use.  Thuan Phong didn’t offer persuasive evidence to show that the mark’s “primary significance” was to refer to the city of Mỹ Tho, or any evidence of actual consumer confusion.   The products were all labeled as having been produced in Thailand.   
 
Unsurprisingly, Anhing’s failure to disclose the existence of the city when it registered its mark also failed to constitute sufficient inequitable conduct to justify an unclean hands defense. There was no evidence of Anhing’s knowledge of the city, understanding that it should disclose the city’s existence, or intent to deceive the PTO.
 
There was also no basis for Thuan Phong’s UCL counterclaim based on the misuse of ® because there was no evidence that such use caused Thuan Phong to suffer any damages. Nor did a claim based on alleged misrepresentation of source succeed—the jury could reasonably have concluded that MY-THO didn’t stand for a geographic location in most consumers’ minds.
 
The court also rejected Thuan Phong’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, focused mostly on its descriptive fair use defense.  Though the jury’s finding of likely confusion didn’t preclude the fair use defense under KP Permanent, the evidence supported a finding of use as a mark.  Even after Thuan Phong’s changes, the words still appeared prominently at the top and in bold red lettering, albeit in the same font and color as other words indicating the type of product (rice noodles) and the prepositions indicating geographic source.  “The jury could have found Defendant’s refusal to move the reference to ‘MỸ THO’ to the bottom or back of its packaging, or to reduce the size of the lettering, as evidence Defendant did not take sufficient precautionary measures despite its knowledge of potential infringement,” and likewise the jury could have found that its failure to change the wording on its rice paper packaging indicted an intent to attract public attention. The jury could have found that Thuan Phong displayed MỸ THO more prominently than other design features, such as its blue “TUFOCO” logo and the three green bamboo trees. 
 
Likewise, the jury could have found a lack of good faith, given Thuan Phong’s conduct after Anhing sent its C&D.  Thuan Phong expressly acknowledged a likelihood of confusion and agreed to modify the wording on its packaging to more clearly state its products were produced in Mỹ Tho, but refused to move this “information statement” to a less prominent place on its packaging. That refusal, combined with the lack of evidence that Thuan Phong consulted legal counsel, was sufficient to support a finding of lack of good faith.  (Wow!)  Finally, the jury was entitled to find that the use was not purely descriptive, because of testimony that Mỹ Tho isn’t a famous city and consumers don’t associate the words with a geographic place. “[T]he evidence is consistent with a finding that consumers do not interpret the words to refer to Mỹ Tho city, and that Defendant did not use the words in a trademark sense.”
As to willfulness, though there was evidence that Thuan Phong independently designed its rice paper packaging before the parties began doing business together, and chose to use “MỸ THO” not to refer to competing products but to inform consumers where its products were produced, that didn’t negate willful infringement given its continued use of the term after it became aware of the MY-THO mark. Nor did Thuan Phong’s own registration, from 2008, preclude a finding of willfulness. Though the registration was evidence of lack of willfulness, it couldn’t be viewed in isolation, and was undermined by Thuan Phong’s own statements in response to the C&D:
 
The words “BÁNH PHỞ MỸ THO” on the packing of Anhing Corporation and on the packing of Thuan Phong Company are likely to cause confusion in the marketplace. Thuan Phong [C]ompany does not want to use alike name of Anhing’s rice noodle (sic ). We will correct the name of our product on packing clearly in order that it will be quite different to the name of product of Anhing Corporation (sic).
 
“Use of an infringing mark, in the face of warnings about potential infringement, is strong evidence of willful infringement.” Likewise, failure to consult trademark counsel where such consultation would be reasonable supported a finding of willfulness.
 
Similarly, the evidence supported a finding of likely confusion, despite what the defendant characterized as minimal evidence of actual confusion.
 
The jury also awarded $10,000 in actual damages, which was supported by reasonable inferences given Anhing’s evidence that experienced a decline in sales after Thuan Phong entered the domestic marketplace, selling apparently identical/confusing staple products at a cheaper price; Anhing’s other brands didn’t suffer a decrease in sales at the same time.  The amount awarded was about 10% of Anhing’s claimed losses, making it a reasonable inference from the evidence.
 
Anhing also secured a permanent injunction. “Evidence of intangible injury, such as a loss of customers or damage to a party’s goodwill, can constitute irreparable harm. Evidence of a loss of control over one’s business reputation may also suffice.”  The trial evidence showed the necessary loss of control/harm, particularly because of testimony that Thuan Phong’s products were of inferior quality.  “That the jury found a likelihood of confusion substantiates this conclusion and further supports a finding of irreparable injury.”  (In other words: likely confusion is irreparable injury, so eBay doesn’t matter.) 
 
Irreparable injury meant legal remedies were inadequate.  “The evidentiary burden Plaintiff faced in establishing its actual damages at trial also favors injunctive relief [even though Anhing submitted evidence on actual damages and the jury made a finding]. Perhaps most important, however, is the risk that Defendant will continue to engage in infringing conduct.”
 
The balance of hardships favored Anhing; Thuan Phong argued that it would be harmed by being unable to adequately convey the geographic source of its products, but the fair use finding made this argument fail, though it affected the appropriate scope of an injunction. The public interest likewise favored a tailored injunction preventing confusion while allowing fair use.
 
Anhing argued that Thuan Phong should be limited to using the phrase “Mỹ Tho Industrial Zone” on the back of its packaging, in black ink and no more than 4 centimeters in length and 0.2 centimeters in height. There was no evidentiary basis for requiring Mỹ Tho “Industrial Zone”; the parties didn’t show that consumers would more readily recognize “Mỹ Tho Industrial Zone” as an indication of geographic source than simply “Mỹ Tho.” Nor was there an evidentiary basis for the requirement the source statement be in black ink. Thuan Phong’s packages use red, blue, green, and white ink; black ink is only used on the back, to convey information not included in its trade dress, such as nutrition facts, ingredients, and directions for use. Because the jury found no likely trade dress confusion, requiring black ink would be an unfair limitation on Thuan Phong’s trade dress rights. A ban on putting a source statement on the front of the products was also overly burdensome; some of Anhing’s own products included a statement of geographic source on the front. The jury’s confusion finding didn’t mean that any and all uses of Mỹ Tho on the front of packaging would necessarily infringe.  The same reasoning led the court to reject an absolute size constraint. “Certainly, the jury’s finding of willful infringement requires a change to Defendant’s current use of ‘MỸ THO.’ But it does not require the wholesale relegation of any and all reference to the words to an entirely inconspicuous location.”  The court allowed a six-month sell-off period, given that Anhing hadn’t shown that six more months of use would cause a significantly increased risk of harm.
 
Thus, Thuan Phong was enjoined from using “Mỹ Tho” in a manner likely to cause confusion; use in the same/similar manner as existing packages would be likely to cause confusion.  It had to immediately cease importing infringing products to the US.  It would be permitted to use Mỹ Tho as a location designator: “The text of the location designation shall state, in Vietnamese, ‘Product made in Mỹ Tho, Vietnam’ or ‘Produced in Mỹ Tho,Vietnam,’” and it couldn’t be bigger than the letters TUFOCO in Thuan Phong’s logo.  If on the front of the package, it couldn’t be at the top, above the “TUFOCO” logo and three bamboo trees. Thuan Phong was also ordered to immediately notify its distributors and customers in writing that it wasn’t associated with, affiliated with, sponsored by, or otherwise related to Anhing, including a copy of the final permanent injunction, and it had to immediately notify its wholesalers in writing that they were required to discontinue sales of the infringing products.     
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Transformative use of the day, Lululemon edition

I can’t wait to carry this bag around and watch the double-takes.  (Would also fit well on Welcome to Night Vale.)

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Somehow the Coke bottle survived this dilutive free riding

1962 Doyle Dane Bernbach ad for the VW Beetle:

Headline: 2 shapes known the world over.

Text: Nobody really notices Coke bottles or Volkswagens any more. They’re so well known, they blend in with the scenery…. (The only reason you can’t buy a VW at the North Pole is that the Volkswagen people won’t sell you one. There’s no VW service around the corner.) We hear that it’s possible to buy yourself a Coke at the North Pole, though. Which makes us suspect there’s only one thing that can get through ahead of a Volkswagen. A Coke truck.

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Somehow the Coke bottle survived this dilutive free riding

1962 Doyle Dane Bernbach ad for the VW Beetle:

Headline: 2 shapes known the world over.

Text: Nobody really notices Coke bottles or Volkswagens any more. They’re so well known, they blend in with the scenery…. (The only reason you can’t buy a VW at the North Pole is that the Volkswagen people won’t sell you one. There’s no VW service around the corner.) We hear that it’s possible to buy yourself a Coke at the North Pole, though. Which makes us suspect there’s only one thing that can get through ahead of a Volkswagen. A Coke truck.

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4th Circuit denies rehearing in In re GNC

😦

If this ruling sticks and is actually applied in Lanham Act cases (something of which I am uncertain), then the resulting circuit split would probably justify Supreme Court review, given the Court’s newfound interest in 43(a)(1)(B).

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4th Circuit denies rehearing in In re GNC

😦

If this ruling sticks and is actually applied in Lanham Act cases (something of which I am uncertain), then the resulting circuit split would probably justify Supreme Court review, given the Court’s newfound interest in 43(a)(1)(B).

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ISHTIP at Penn, part 9

Session 6 | Josh Sarnoff (DePaul University), Moderator
 
In Search of a Trade Mark: Search practices and Bureaucratic
Poetry
Jose Bellido and Hyo Yoon Kang (University of Kent, UK)
Commentator | Amanda Scardamaglia (Swinburne Law School)
 
Enhanced searching: bureaucratic poetry—early manual
searches. TM office was tasked with organizing words and devices for the first
time: a new commodity of commercial information in signs and words and the
ability to find them on the register. 
Needed a system of classification to register marks; classifications
changed over time to reflect commercial change. 
Patent system classified according to subject matter; a different
endeavor.
 
TM clerk was very different from patent counterparts—technical
expertise v. experts in delicate art of distinguishing and classifying signs
and words.  TM agent emerged, esp. after
1883 amendments opening registration for invented words, leading to significant
increase in number of applications. Agents were skilled in navigating and
searching the register.  Profession
attempted to limit access to registration data, as patent agents had before
them; closing of profession was linked to increasing openness of TM
registers.  Index clerks and TM
abstractors: index w/range of general marks; divisional index of devices
arranged according to things like birds, buildings, and beasts; index arranged
alphabetically by prefixes and terminal endings/suffixes—third index was the
most important. 
 
Significant impact on development of TM law—led to
deconstruction of words and assisted w/creating new marks by creating
comparisons.  Deconstruction of words was
evident in TM infringement cases as well, which focused on comparing sequences
of letters in the same way.  Indexes were
strategic—could find out about what competitors were doing b/c they’d register
preemptively. Initially available only to agents but eventually opened to
public, though agents were still powerful actors who specialized in searching
the register.
 
Index cards and punched cards; final phase of computerized
searching and privatization of search services—entrusted to private services,
with a direct and immediate impact on search. 
Computerization affected registrations: TMs were redesigned for
mechanical purposes; transformed the way search happened—algorithms made it
possible to search across subjects & geography quickly. Removed obstacles
to manual search.  Transformed registry
from visual markers of ownership to a metalevel database.
 
Discussion points: evidence of how the processes impacted
the legislation itself?  Registries
internationally were introduced around the same time.  What indexes if any were used at that time?
Did that impact others’ indexes?  Did
others’ indexes affect Britain’s? What were the tradeoffs in moving from
mechanical to digital?  Paper says
openness increased, but was the info the same?
 
Bellido: we wanted to explore bureaucratic property. Were
surprised that first TM clerks in UK were A.E. Housman, Griffin, and other
poets and antiquaries.  Bureaucratic poetry: indexing techniques have
something to say about how TMs were conceived and developed.
 
Kang: TM is more complicated than patent b/c of two
different forms of numbering—application number, then publication/registration.
Can be complicated to retrieve full info. 
Shows how unstable the nature of property is in legal practice.
 
Bellido: the more open the register was, the more experts
could claim to be able to navigate this massive endeavor.  Legal expertise is founded in the management
of retrieval tools that may look more technical/less interesting to legal
scholars, but it’s everyday routine that constitutes the subjectivity of the TM
expert.
 
Kang: relates to issue of legal agency: what does TM law
actually do?
 
Bellido: registration practice can make the TM a
thing/object of law/property even before there is a product in the market.
 
Kang: complicate picture of TM as consumer-driven. 
 
Bellido: registering invented words: impact on the legal
profession—agents could then sell the possibility of providing new words to
companies. We haven’t touched colonial indexing.   
 
You sometimes see trolling behavior around descriptive
words/changing descriptive words around to try to make them registrable.  Or an agent could identify marks that were
not quite as good but were usable until the register relaxed its standards.
 
The Modern Expansion of Trademark Rights, and How One
Forgotten Treaty Made It Possible
Christine Haight Farley (American University Washington)
Commentator | Dan Hunter (Swinburne Law School)
 
Big claim: a forgotten treaty did a lot more than we thought
it did in creating TM rights.  Hunter is
not sure that this treaty made expansion of rights possible.
 
Paper is a detective story. 
Interamerican Convention on Trademark and Commercial Protection (IACTCP)
(1929).  TM comes from one of two or
maybe three/4 foundations: passing off, concerns over confusion, search costs.  Does this convention give us new insights
into the foundations of TM law?  Offers unfair
competition as a distinct foundation. 
Can we tell that the convention is a contributor to the modern day
understanding?  Even if we could, so
what?  The lawyer’s question: what does
that tell us? 
 
Why was the convention ignored?  The architect of both IACTCP and the modern
Lanham Act (1946) was one man, Edward S. Rogers, founder of first specialized
TM firm and lover of unfair competition. 
 
Significance of Inter-American TM Convention (1929)—self-executing,
and yet completely forgotten.  Modest
number of cases in TTAB and courts, startlingly small # of cases.  Yet this is law.  Why forgotten?  Or has it been?  Are Ps all just dumb?  That seems unlikely.  Erie
says there’s no general federal common law. Then there’s the Lanham Act §43(a),
but also and especially 44(h) and (i). 
The Lanham Act is, for all intents and purposes, federal common law, and
the paper suggests that 44(h) and (i) need to be more talked about, b/c §44 is
generally about recognizing TMs from outside the US; in fact Rogers included
them largely to include unfair competition w/in the American system.
 
Questions: is the paper trying to get us to apply the
Convention?  Are you arguing that unfair
competition is foundational to the Lanham Act? Just b/c it’s in the Lanham Act
doesn’t make it foundational.
 
Farley: A treaty still in force about TM—we don’t have many
of those in the US.  Modern parallels
were interesting about how the US makes the law of other countries and then has
a strategy of making US law also through that undemocratic process.  Beyond that, this text is so interesting b/c
of its novelties and timing, as well as the characters involved.  Inordinate influence of a couple of people
has no modern analogue.  We can
inadvertently make a mistake by privileging moments of development of IP; IP
has not always had pride of place in law, society, or commerce.  Especially in TM law: early 20th
c., it was a teeny field. TMs weren’t as valuable as they are; there was no TM
bar, certainly not in Latin America, just a handful of people in US.  These particular people could have outsized
influence.
 
The ground was shifting under their feet b/c the nature of
marketing was changing, markets were changing, global markets were
changing.  Amorphousness of IP and
particularly TM.  Doing this history,
evident how unsettled and indeterminate the foundations of TM are.  The story that we have an ancient idea of
unfair competition, within it a new thing called TM law, isn’t right. These
were simultaneously being developed and playing off one another.  Early development was a mess.  These guys are making up new law in this
treaty.  Provisions don’t appear anywhere
else.  Rights that suited US businesses
at that moment for expansion into Latin America.
 
Then the Lanham Act comes along, and federal common law is
pulled out.  Given the fact of the
treaty, and their overlapping author, and that Rogers argues the first TM
Supreme Court case after Erie, there
was a unique opportunity to write a new chapter in TM as clean, settled,
organized.  And we don’t get that. We get
slivers of clarity, and then this space/haze around the rights. We focus on
§43(a) as a site of expansion and a site for unfair competition, but these
sections in 44 are what the drafters intended.
 
US corporations exercise their rights under the treaty in
Latin America all the time; drafters expected that b/c of US dominance.  Lanham Act makes vague reference to the
treaty (was explicit reference in first draft); Rogers argued that the treaty
was self-executing and the SCt agreed. 
Conclusion: give those rights to go after unfair competition to US
citizens as well.  We didn’t get that.
§43(a) was reaction of patent bar trying to put the brakes on what Rogers was
trying to do in §44.  Rogers deals with
this by taking §43(a), designed as substitute for 44, in the law too. 
 
RT: Another suspect: What is unfair competition that isn’t infringement?  Trade secret misappropriation was a
possibility bruited about in the 1940s; maybe also antitrust violations.  But that kind of understanding seems impossible
to recover now, especially given other laws—no court is going to find that
there’s been a federal trade secret law for 70 years.  Trademark infringement-like activities that
aren’t infringement but are still unfair competition?  US courts have no current understanding of
what that gap might be: collapse b/t protection and registrability, absence of
a passing off category in US law.
 
A: Many law review articles written at the time clearly
stated that many things were under the umbrella of unfair competition but were
nowhere collected; some understanding that it would be collected in Lanham Act:
trade secret, tortious interference w/ business relations, antitrust.  Not so much interested in those things, but
is interested in what the haze might be surrounding the concept.  (What might a clever P’s lawyer argue?)
 
Possible to bring something like a TM case w/o a possibility
of confusion.  Rogers brought a case
where there were nonproximate goods, a different name but phonetically similar,
and no bad faith.  That was meant to be
one of the §44 cases—not really a theory of confusing the public, but
unfettered right to expand business.  Haze
of rights as buffer around TM rights. 
Rogers won, but we only talk about Frank Schecter, who lost; Rogers won
by making subtle moves.
 
Q: compare to avoision in tax law: indeterminancy of whether
someone is engaging in avoidance (ok) and evasion (not ok).  Infinite ingenuity of malefactors to get
around intent of law w/o letter of law.
 
Madison: concepts in the law having agency v. the agency of
individual humans like Rogers. Rhetorical constructs enabled by disciplinary
angles. 
 
Q: role of timing?
 
A: may have been related to the Depression; also to Erie and resulting uncertainty for TM
lawyers.  Treaty was a bit premature for
the Latin American market.  Responding to
a Europe in which the US lacked a big place, anticipating Americas as a market
to dominate. WWII meant that vision didn’t come about as anticipated.  Not that many businesses were demanding these
kinds of protections; just on the cusp.
 
Sarnoff: if the idea is to remember, do you expand rights in
unpleasant ways?  Is this a comedy and
not a mystery—a tale of laughter and forgetting?

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