TM claimant may add false advertising claims as direct competitor

Entrepreneur Media, Inc. v. Roach, 2021 WL 4134836, No.
8:20-cv-01690-JVS-AD (C.D. Cal. Jul. 1, 2021)

Entrepreneur, a frequent trademark claimant, sought to amend
its complaint and add new parties to the TM claims here. Entrepreneur has 15
federal registrations that include the word “entrepreneur.” Roach, meanwhile, makes
frequent use of the phrase “The Unstoppable Entrepreneur” and applied to
register the phrase for “Business consultancy; Business marketing consulting
services.” Entrepreneur’s opposition remains pending.

Of note: In the discussion of adding another defendant, the
court noted defendants’ argument that this was being done to harass: Defendants
alleged that “Entrepreneur’s counsel stated that Entrepreneur’s allegations
were likely to be highly publicized, and that he intended to refer Defendants’
dissatisfied customers to plaintiffs’ lawyers,” which they interpreted as a
threat. This “inference of intention to harass” was reasonable, but not
inevitable. “Entrepreneur’s desire to bring forth a claim for false advertising
against a competitor in a similar market is not unusual behavior.”

Along with adding a defendant, Entrepreneur might eventually
be allowed to add a false advertising claim, based on facts that were allegedly
discovered only during Roach’s deposition. Roach’s webinar slide deck allegedly
contained false statements to potential customers that Roach’s program is the
“only” program guaranteed to double someone’s revenue in twelve months. The
deck allegedly also referred to “9 Free Bonuses,” that a reasonable consumer
would allegedly conclude are sold separately. And, in deposition, Entrepreneur
allegedly learned for the first time that some of the customers in defendants’
advertised “Unstoppable Entrepreneur Success Stories” never enrolled in the
Unstoppable Entrepreneur Program. (Defendants rejoined that they came from
defendants’ pre-rebranding coaching program, but that factual dispute doesn’t
matter at this stage.)

However, there was not good cause to challenge the words
“flexible” and “risk free” on defendants’ website when a consumer attempts to
purchase the Unstoppable Entrepreneur Program. Entrepreneur allegeed that it
learned only after deposition that “this information is potentially misleading
to consumers because the purchase of the plan is locked in, and a consumer must
pay full price for the program.” But the website displaying two payment plans
along with specific information regarding the payment methods was publicly
available prior to the deposition, and the contract contained the specific
payment terms, which Entrepreneur acknowledged. “What Entrepreneur learned in
the Roach deposition was the same information that could be uncovered by
reading Defendants’ standard contract: that Defendants expected signing
consumers to continue contractual payment regardless of whether the consumer
wanted to leave the program midway through.”

Nor would amendment for the other statements necessarily be
futile, though further allegations would be required. Entrepreneur fell within
the statute’s zone of interests—alleged lost sales and reputational injury. And
Entrepreneur alleged that “but for” defendants’ false advertising, consumers
would not have been misled and diverted away from Entrepreneur. Although some
courts might well agree that this was merely conclusory, this court found that
sufficient. The parties could be considered “fellow commercial actor[s]” “because
both offer the same goods and services including coaching services consulting,
books, and podcasts,” and thus diversion from falsity was plausible.

In addition, Entrepreneur successfully alleged falsity under
Rule 9(b) by identifying the alleged falsehoods in the webinar slide deck.
Entrepreneur alleged that the Unstoppable Entrepreneur Program was not
guaranteed to double someone’s revenue in twelve months because many consumers
enrolled in the Unstoppable Entrepreneur Program did not achieve that result,
and that other programs could do so. And it was plausible that a consumer
viewing the “free bonuses” might reasonably conclude that they are able to be
purchased separately.

However, there were missing details that were required: Entrepreneur
didn’t state with particularity “when” the slide deck was presented (even a
date range), how often it was presented, how it was presented, or by which
defendant.

As to the allegedly false testimonials, likewise
Entrepreneur alleged the “what” (false testimonials) and the “how” (testimonies
provided by people who were not allegedly enrolled in the Unstoppable
Entrepreneur Program), but not the where and when. “Although Entrepreneur’s
Reply contends that the success stories are currently available on Defendants’
website, the proposed FAC fails to mention where the testimonials appear or
have appeared.” So the motion to add a false advertising claim was denied
without prejudice.

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TM complainant fails to sink its teeth into unrelated false advertising claims

Vampire Family Brands, LLC v. MPL Brands, Inc., No. CV
20-9482-DMG (ASx), 2021 WL 4134841 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2021)

VFB sued MPL for Lanham Act, UCL, and FAL violations based
on MPL’s “vampiro” cocktail. Unsurprisingly, the trademark claims survive a
motion to dismiss, but associated false advertising claims don’t.

VFB owns several trademark registrations including
“Vampire,” specifically for wine and pre-mixed alcoholic beverages other than
beer, and “Vampyre,” specifically for spirits. “VFB’s marks are visible to the
public in many places, including on VFB’s website, in the public records of the
USPTO, and in various national media due to VFB’s continuous marketing of its
products.” [Seriously? It seems more like a concession of lack of market
penetration if you have to rely on your own website and the PTO’s records to
show public recognition!] In 2017, VFB began selling a pre-mixed canned Bloody
Mary cocktail as “Vampire Gourmet Bloody Mary Cocktail,” allegedly made with
actual tomatoes and vodka. But it isn’t actually being made/distributed right
now, though VFB argued that it was coming back.

MPL sells a pre-mixed alcoholic cocktail labeled “Vampiro.” The
label asserts that it is “a fizzy grapefruit cocktail” made with “100% Blue
Agave,” although the ingredients list does not contain grapefruit. It is made
of agave wine, not from distilled spirits. Likewise, MPL also sells a
ready-to-drink “margarita wine cocktail” that doesn’t contain tequila or any
distilled spirit and is also made with agave wine.

VFB alleged trademark infringement, and that the Vampiro
Cocktail label’s claims that it is made from 100% agave and with grapefruit were
false advertising that would tarnish and dilute VFB’s marks. Similarly, VFB
alleged that a real “margarita” is made with tequila and, therefore, the
absence of tequila from MPL’s Margarita Cocktail constituted false advertising.
“Because the alcohol tax is approximately ten times that of the tax on wine,
VFB argues that Defendants gain an unfair competitive advantage against it and
other makers of alcoholic cocktails that use distilled spirits, rather than wine,
in their cocktail recipes.”

As I noted above, claims that “vampiro” was the generic name
of a Mexican cocktail or constituted descriptive fair use didn’t suffice to
grant a motion to dismiss. As to use as a mark, the court reasoned that the use
of “Vampiro” on MPL’s product as pictured in the images submitted by both
parties “shows that the word is in stylized, large font across the center of
the beverage can, in white font against a red background.” The description
“FIZZY GRAPEFRUIT COCKTAILWITH CITRUS & SPICE” was in smaller font beneath
“Vampiro,” “giving the impression that the smaller text is a descriptor and
Vampiro is a mark for the product.”

False advertising: Article III standing existed, but not
Lanham Act standing. VFB could establish injury in fact through “a chain of
inferences showing how defendant’s false advertising could harm plaintiff’s
business.” MPL argued that there was no concrete injury because VFB does not
currently sell any pre-mixed cocktail products. However, VFB’s CEO and counsel
[um] attested that “VFB has arrangements with another manufacturer to produce
more of the Vampire Bloody Mary and with experienced industry salespeople to sell
the product, and that VFB will resume sales after the current pandemic
subsides. VFB also submitted a new Certificate of Label Approval to the TTB for
the Vampire Bloody Mary in January 2020. “This evidence that VFB is prepared to
sell the Vampire Bloody Mary indicates that VFB could suffer non-speculative,
imminent harm from Defendants’ actions.” The relative cheapness of defendants’
“cocktails” could give them a competitive advantage. This was enough for
Article III standing.

Statutory standing, however, was more demanding:

Because VFB does not currently sell
the Vampire Bloody Mary and its previous sales were limited distributions at
beer festivals or a handful of liquor stores, VFB does not identify any
economic injury flowing from Defendants’ current advertising of the Margarita
Cocktail and Vampiro Cocktail. VFB does not allege prior economic injury, and
any future economic injury VFB may suffer when it restarts distribution of the
Vampire Bloody Mary is too attenuated to be considered proximately caused by
Defendants’ advertising.

And it was even more attenuated to argue that defendants’
allegedly false advertising of the Margarita Cocktail and Vampiro Cocktail harmed
VFB’s sales of other types of alcohol, specifically Vampire wine and Vampyre
vodka. The alleged falsity of the grapefruit/cocktail/margarita claims couldn’t
plausibly “directly cause consumers to purchase less of VFB’s red wine or
vodka, considering the differences between the types of beverages.” Even if
consumers were misled into thinking that the products contained distilled
spirits or natural ingredients, “it is not clear why those consumers seeking to
purchase a pre-mixed cocktail would instead reach for wine or vodka.
Characterizing VFB and Defendants as direct competitors because both make
alcoholic beverages would dramatically expand the ‘zone of interest’ in which a
plaintiff may sue for false advertising under the Lanham Act.”

UCL/FAL claims: Only survived to the extent they were
congruent with the trademark claims.

 

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“first urgent care” practice claim isn’t material or literally false

American Family Care, Inc. v. Medhelp, P.C., 2021 WL 4149782,
No. 2:19-CV-01325-LSC (N.D. Ala. Sept. 13, 2021)

Not having a materiality or harm requirement really makes a
difference in trademark cases compared to false advertising cases—look at the
reasons this false advertising claim fails.

AFC sued MedHelp for Lanham Act false advertising. AFC supplies
urgent care, family/primary care, and occupational health services nationwide;
its first clinic opened in Hoover, Alabama (Birmingham’s largest suburb), in
1982; no other urgent care clinics were operating in Birmingham.  But, for several years, MedHelp advertised on
its website that “MedHelp was founded in 1982 as the first Urgent Care/Family
Practice in Birmingham.” (In the 1980s, “urgent care” wasn’t in use, and such
clinics were typically called “freestanding emergency rooms,” “minor emergency
rooms,” “immediate care clinics,” or “walk-in clinics.”)

First, the court found that “founded in 1982 as the first
Urgent Care/Family Practice in Birmingham” was ambiguous because there is no
consistent definition of the term “urgent care.” And it was also ambiguous
whether “Birmingham” meant with or without its suburbs. [Comment: There is a
missing step here not revealed in the court’s decision: is MedHelp’s claim
truthful under any plausible definition? Maybe, but the court should
have clarified; if there are multiple possible meanings but the defendant’s
claim isn’t truthful using any of them, then other courts have found literal
falsity, which makes sense given the justifications for the literal/implicit
division.]

Since the ad was “merely misleading,” AFC needed evidence of
consumer deception, which it did not have.

In addition, AFC failed to show materiality, despite its
argument that the claim conveys “broader qualities including, but not limited to,
‘experience,’ ‘trust,’ and ‘competence’ that are important in choosing a health
care provider.” AFC’s expert cited two studies: a conjoint analysis of patient
decisions in two German hospitals and research involving health-seeking
preferences of elderly Filipinos. But the expert failed to link German and
Filipino preferences to US urgent care preferences.

Finally, AFC also failed to show injury. Its expert relied
on evidence that first movers should have a 24-30% market share advantage, but
there wasn’t any evidence that AFC was the first mover in the US urgent care
market and indeed a witness testified that there were “less than a hundred”
urgent care clinics when AFC opened its clinic in Hoover. Nor did the expert
discuss other potential causes like customer service, negative publicity (AFC
was sued for insurance fraud), or technology. Further, there wasn’t evidence
that the misleading first-mover claim “caused AFC to lose any profits, goodwill,
or business opportunities”; there wasn’t even any evidence on how many people
saw the claim.

With all this, the TMA’s presumption of irreparable harm was
no help.

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Second Circuit requires confusion for counterfeiting

Hamilton International Ltd. v. Vortic LLC, No. 20-3369-cv
(2d Cir. Sept. 14, 2021)

A small note about this case affirming a finding that
vintage Hamilton pocketwatch movements converted to wristwatches were not
likely to cause confusion under Champion and Polaroid: While it’s
not really a great leap forward for refurbished goods—at most, the Second
Circuit refused to take further bites out of the doctrine, and its emphasis on
consumer sophistication may even make things harder for Etsy jewelry makers—it
may be less noticeable that the court appears to have joined the
Ninth Circuit
in requiring likely confusion before counterfeiting can be
found.

The court of appeals found that the district court’s “analysis
of Hamilton’s trademark infringement claim under the Lanham Act necessarily
compelled judgment in favor of Vortic and Custer on Hamilton’s remaining
claims. This is because each of those claims required some showing of a
likelihood of consumer confusion. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (federal
counterfeiting claim requiring the plaintiff to show that the use of the
counterfeit mark is “likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive”) ….” [Side note: A little weird to say that state law blurring claims
fail for want of confusion, but I’ll take it—the court says that state dilution
factors “resembl[e] the Polaroid factors and similarly focus[] on confusion.”
Dilution: what is it good for? Absolutely nothing!]

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scientific studies don’t have to be of D’s product exactly for plausibility

Rosenfeld v. AC2T, Inc., 2021 WL 4197176, No.
1:20-cv-04662-FB-PK (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2021)

Rosenfeld alleged that defendants fraudulently marketed a
mosquito control product called “Spartan Mosquito Eradicator.” Spartan’s
advertising allegedly touted that the product will “significantly decrease[ ]
[mosquito] population within 15 days,” and “[p]rovid[e] up to 95% mosquito
control for up to 90 days.” It purported to work through three crucial
ingredients: sugar, salt, and yeast. Spartan advertised that when the product
is mixed with water and ingested by a mosquito, the “crystalline structure” of
salt cuts the mosquito’s stomach, “causing it to rupture.” Meanwhile, the
fermentation process of the yeast produces carbon dioxide inside the mosquito,
also causing its stomach to rupture.

Rosenfeld alleged that none of this was true, as a matter of
biology. He cited a number of studies to bolster his allegations.  

Although the allegation that “[S]partan is ineffective for
mosquito control because it does not kill mosquitoes or decrease mosquito
populations” was not in itself sufficient for plausibility, he cited scientific
studies to support it. AC2T argued that, because those studies did not test
Spartan’s particular chemical formulation, but rather tested only its
constituent ingredients, they cannot support conclusions regarding Spartan’s
effectiveness or establish the plausibility of the complaint.

Not so. Plausibility is the standard; a “claim that a
product physically cannot work is a valid legal theory.” The theory was factually
substantiated with “studies indicating that Spartan’s individual active
ingredients cannot work in the manner that Spartan’s detailed advertising
represents.” Their weight or interpretation was a question of fact that couldn’t
be resolved on a motion to dismiss.

 

 

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Video game skates away from liability to pro skateboarder

Miller v. Easy Day Studios Pty Ltd, 2021 WL 4209205, No.
20cv02187-LAB-DEB (S.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2021)

Gordon v. Drape did mess things up in the Ninth
Circuit, but core Rogers cases are still simple. Defendants paid Zachary
Miller, a professional skateboarder, to assist in developing a video game,
called Skater XL. “Miller believed that the extent of his agreement with
Defendants was to model various clothing outfits, which would then be captured
by a technique called photogrammetry and applied to a generic character in the
video game. Miller alleges that he didn’t consent to the use of his image or
likeness in the game, yet one of the characters in it appears to be his exact
replica.” He sued for violations of the Lanham Act and state-law claims.

Miller alleged that defendants told him that the motion
capture was for a “generic” character in the video game that wouldn’t resemble
Miller or have any identifiable characteristics, and assured him that the video
game “won’t have your name anywhere or anything if you’re worried about that.” He
was paid $250.

Skater XL allows users to “simulate skateboarding tricks and
techniques in a realistic skateboarding environment.” Users can select from
five different skater characters, including four professional skateboarders and
a nameless “generic” skater avatar. “The first four characters are explicitly
identified by name and image in the game, while the latter generic character
has no name or identifying characteristics. This generic character can be
customized according to user preference, including customizing its gender,
race, hair color, clothing, and accessories.” However, Miller alleged that the
generic avatar was an “exact copy” of him, and easily identifiable as him.

False endorsement: Rogers applies; realism is
artistically relevant. “[T]here can be no doubt that including the likeness of
a real-life skateboarder in a video game seeking to simulate real-world
skateboarders and skateboarding environments obviously has at least some
artistic relevance to the work.”

The depiction was not explicitly misleading as to
endorsement
, which is what is required by the second prong of the test. The
court here states it nicely:

Miller argues that Defendants’
actions were explicitly misleading because at least two individuals contacted
him after recognizing his character in the video game. But this misses the
point. The issue here isn’t whether other consumers could simply recognize
Miller’s likeness in the game, but rather whether they would be misled into
believing his association with the game means he is somehow endorsing it.
Although the issue of customer confusion is factual in nature, it’s simply not
plausible that the inclusion of the only anonymous skateboarder in the game,
among four other explicitly identified skateboarders, would convince consumers
that Miller endorsed their video game.

As in the previous Brown video game case, “[t]he
anonymous character’s mere presence in Skater XL doesn’t equate to “an explicit
attempt to convince consumers that [Plaintiff] endorsed the game[ ].”

False advertising: Miller failed to plead statutory
standing. He didn’t compete with defendants. He didn’t allege that he lost
endorsement agreements or suffered any reputational injury, other than in
conclusory fashion. Thus, he failed to plead proximate causation. [Compare
trademark claims!]

The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over the state claims.

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Another reason for statehood: DC law can’t confer organizational standing beyond Article III

Clean Label Project Found. v. Garden Of Life, LLC, 2021 WL
4318099, No. 20-3229 (RC) (D.D.C. Sept. 23, 2021)

CLP, a non-profit, sued Garden of Life, a seller of prenatal
supplements, for unlawful trade practices in violation of the District of
Columbia Consumer Protection Procedures Act. The court found no standing for
want of an injury in fact.

To further its mission, CLP had an accredited third-party
chemistry laboratory perform quantitative testing on Garden’s products, and the
results found that they “contained quantifiable levels of heavy metals as well
as detectable amounts of WHO Class II Pesticides and BPA,” substances that CLP
asserts “are extremely dangerous to a fetus.” The CPPA permits nonprofit
organizations to bring actions “on behalf of itself or any of its members, or
on any such behalf and on behalf of the general public,” and also allows
“public interest organization[s]” to bring actions “on behalf of the interests
of a consumer or a class of consumers.”  (Note that because DC has been denied
statehood, there are no state courts to turn to instead.)

For organizational standing, the organization must “show[ ]
that a defendant’s actions have ‘perceptibly impaired’ the organization’s
ability to provide services, such that there has been a ‘concrete and
demonstrable injury to the organization’s activities—with [a] consequent drain
on resources.’ ” A “mere setback” to an organization’s “abstract social
interests is not sufficient.”

Neither of CLP’s arguments—that Garden’s false and misleading
statements interfered with its overall educational mission and that the statutory
violation was itself sufficient for injury in fact—worked.

CLP didn’t properly allege a “drain on the organization’s
resources” resulting from the conflict between Garden’s acts and its mission. Even
if Garden’s falsehoods interfered with “educat[ing] customers with regard to
food labeling truth and transparency,” there was no evidence of any concrete
harm that accrued to CLP as a result. There was no claim that CLP was required
to increase the resources it devoted to programs independent of the lawsuit.

As for the statutory standing argument, “Article III
standing requires a concrete injury even in the context of a statutory
violation.” As another court wrote, “D.C. law is clear that the CPPA is meant
to extend as far as Article III’s requirements will permit—but it can go no
further than that” [because DC has been denied statehood].

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FB’s “Russian state-controlled media” label wasn’t commercial advertising or promotion

Maffick LLC v. Facebook, Inc., 2021 WL 1893074, No.
20-cv-05222-JD (N.D. Cal. May 11, 2021)

Facebook’s application of “Russia
state-controlled media” label to a news page on Facebook was not commercial
advertising or promotion.
Mentioned here mostly to highlight the differences in pleading standards
applied to trademark and false advertising claims. Who here thinks that the
following language wouldn’t suffice in a run-of-the-mill trademark complaint?

Facebook’s
false and misleading labeling of Maffick has actually deceived and has the
tendency to deceive a substantial segment of the public and is material in that
it is likely to influence economic decisions by Maffick’s existing and
potential customers and business relations. Facebook has thus caused and
threatened to cause Maffick significant reputational harm and damage to its
business interests, including lost sales.

For a
false advertising claim, “[t]his is ipse dixit and not the pleading of facts.” Maffick
provided no clues about how the alleged deception of the public by the “Russia
state-controlled media” label might have affected the “economic decisions by
Maffick’s existing and potential customers,” whoever they might be, and how
those “decisions” caused a commercial injury to Maffick’s sales or business
reputation.

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Regulatory safe harbor bars claim over meaning of “gigabyte”

Dinan
v. SanDisk LLC, 844 Fed.Appx. 978, No. 20-15287 (9th Cir. 2021)

SanDisk
allegedly violated the usual California consumer protection statutes by using
gigabyte (“GB”) to mean 1,000,000,000 bytes (“the decimal definition”), when plaintiffs
assumed gigabyte as used by SanDisk meant 1,073,741,824 bytes (“the binary
definition”). The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. California’s
safe harbor doctrine protected SanDisk’s labeling, because relevant statutes clearly
permitted the use of the metric system as published by the National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST), and NIST publications instruct that the
metric prefix “giga” and the symbol “G” mean 1,000,000,000, which corresponds
to the decimal definition of gigabyte.

 Both California and federal law expressly
authorize use of the metric system in commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 204 (“It shall be
lawful throughout the United States of America to employ the weights and
measures of the metric system….”); Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 12301.
California law expressly provides that the definitions and tables for weight
and measure “as published by the National Institute of Standards and Technology
… shall govern weighing and measuring equipment and transactions in this
state.” And NIST has made clear that “giga” is a metric prefix that means
1,000,000,000.

 

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Mars and Quaker dodge chocolate/child slavery claims, but Starbucks doesn’t

Myers v.
Starbucks Corp., 2021 WL 1921120, No. 5:20-cv-00335-JWH-SHKx (C.D. Cal. May 5,
2021)

Myers
sued Mars, Quaker Oats, and Starbucks under the CLRA and UCL, alleging claims
related to use of child slaves to produce cocoa. Child slavery, which allegedly
produces most of the cocoa Americans consume, is horrific both for the enslaved
children and for the environment, promoting deforestation in the Ivory Coast.
Consumers would prefer “chocolate that destroys neither the rainforest nor the
lives of millions of children,” but the supply chain makes detecting
malfeasance difficult: “small farms sell to intermediaries, who mix together
beans from many farmers to sell to grinders or traders and then to
manufacturers.” Although chocolate is often untraceable, some companies have
traced their cocoa from bean to chocolate bar and have eliminated child slavery
from their supply chains. “However, the World Cocoa Foundation has conceded
that it cannot eradicate child labor in cocoa production by 2025.”

All
defendants advertise their cocoa as humanely produced. The back of Mars Dove
Dark Chocolate products say: “[w]e buy cocoa from Rainforest Alliance
Certified™ farms, traceable from the farms into our factory,” and Mars used the
seal of Rainforest Alliance Certification, “a third-party certifier which holds
itself out as the benchmark for the sustainable production of cocoa,” on
packaging. However, “Mars can, at best, trace only 24% of its cocoa back to
farms,” because the ethically sourced beans were allegedly intermingled with
slave-produced beans at its factories.

Quaker
Oats advertised that its Chocolate Chip Chewy Bars “support sustainably sourced
cocoa through [the non-profit entity] Cocoa Horizons.” But the bars were
allegedly not sustainably sourced, and only 26% of the farms from which Cocoa
Horizons sources its cocoa had programs to prevent child labor.

Starbucks
labels its Hot Cocoa Mix as “made with ethically sourced cocoa” and administers
an internal certification program known as “COCOA.” Starbucks was allegedly “fully
aware that the farms it sources its cocoa from use child and slave labor.”

The
court granted the motion to dismiss as to Mars and Quaker, but not Starbucks.

Mars:
The use of the Rainforest Alliance seal didn’t amount to a specific affirmative
misrepresentation. Myers alleged that only 24% of the chocolate was traceable,
and alleged that Mars intermingles its beans for Dove Dark Chocolate
specifically and can’t trace its sources. But the court parsed the Mars
statement like it was looking for perjury: Mars said that it buys traceable
beans, not that it only buys traceable beans. That was true, and so it
wasn’t an affirmative misrepresentation. Likewise, Mars only claimed that it
bought traceable beans, not that the product on which it advertised its
purchases of traceable beans contained those beans. This reasoning seems
indifferent to the idea of “misleadingness” rather than falsity. But the court
thought that Myers didn’t allege “facts sufficient to show that a reasonable
consumer would read Mars’ packaging to mean the opposite of what it says.” [The
opposite?]

Quaker:
Likewise, because Quaker Oats advertised “support” for sustainably sourced
cocoa, not any specific result, the label was not misleading.

Starbucks:
Previously, the court dismissed an earlier version of the complaint because Myers
had not pleaded facts sufficient to allege that the COCOA program was “a sham.”
Also, alleged environmental misconduct didn’t matter, because “ ‘ethically
sourced’ is generally understood to refer to labor practices.” (This court is
not very interested in finding out what reasonable consumers actually might
think.)

Myers
revised her argument: because “no company, including Starbucks,” can claim
slave-free chocolate, a reasonable consumer would be misled by chocolate
advertised as “ethically sourced.”

This,
the court accepted for purposes of the motion, though it was still skeptical.
Myers successfully alleged that “child slavery is endemic to the chocolate
trade; that it is difficult or impossible to produce chocolate without labor
from child slaves; that a reasonable consumer is sensitive to these concerns
and would consider ethically made chocolate and reliance on child slavery
mutually exclusive; and that Starbucks claims that its hot chocolate is made
from ethically sourced cocoa.”

Her
desire to buy chocolate again also gave her standing for injunctive relief.

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