getting friends to leave fake reviews isn’t enough for direct liability

BHRS Gp.,
LLC v. Brio Water Technol. Inc., 2020 WL 9422352, No. 2:20-CV-07652-JWH-JCx
(C.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2020)

BHRS,
which makes water cooler products, sued its competitor Brio for state and
federal false advertising and trade libel.  BHRS alleged that studies showed that online
product reviews, especially Amazon reviews, have a significant impact on
consumer decision-making. BHRS alleged that multiple customers who posted
negative Amazon reviews of BHRS products and positive reviews of Brio products are
connected (through social media, family, school, or geographic location) to
individuals in Brio’s management and other individuals employed by Brio.

Reflecting
the continuing confusion in the courts about fake reviews, the court dismissed
the claims.

First,
BHRS didn’t sufficiently allege that Brio itself made the challenged
statements. For example, BHRS alleged that one of the reviewers attended high
school with the son of Brio’s CEO, and that the two were currently classmates
at the University of Southern California and Facebook friends. However, there were
no allegations that any individual acting on behalf of Brio “instructed or
otherwise engaged” him with respect to his review of the BHRS product. These
allegations didn’t satisfy Rule 9(b) or establish any legal relationship between
Brio and the reviewers.

Also,
BHRS didn’t adequately allege “how” the statements were false, because the
reviews contained “vague, generalized statements of opinion about the quality
of, and the respective reviewers’ experience with, the BHRS product.” (I didn’t
reproduce them, but some of the statements might have been found to be factual
by a different court, such as claims about quality of manufacture or
comparative ease of use, but the real question is of course whether these were
actual reviews of the product at all–that’s the key alleged falsity, and it is falsifiable.)

This
largely disposed of all the claims. As for trade libel, BHRS failed to plead
special damages. And, because BHRS didn’t allege that it relied on the
allegedly false statements, it didn’t sufficiently allege reliance for UCL
claims. (There is a clear split on this question in district courts.)

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IIC decision also says some things about false advertising: materiality may not be presumed from literal falsity

Select
Comfort Corp. v. Baxter; 996 F.3d 925 (8th Cir. 2021)

You
probably know that the court of appeals sent this case back for retrial on an
initial interest confusion theory. I won’t say much about that, though I do
have a big question, but there are also false advertising aspects of the case.

The
parties compete in the market for adjustable air mattresses and related
products. Plaintiffs’ registered trademarks include “SLEEP NUMBER”, “WHAT’S
YOUR SLEEP NUMBER”, “SELECT COMFORT”, and “COMFORTAIRE.” The defendants
allegedly “compounded internet-related confusion by making fraudulent misrepresentations
and failing to dispel confusion when consumers contacted Defendants’ call
centers.” The case went to a jury only on point of sale confusion, not initial
interest confusion, and the jury found in defendants’ favor (including a
finding, untouched on appeal, that Select Comfort did not have trademark rights
in “Number Bed”).

TM:
The court of appeals found that, because there was a question of fact about how
sophisticated mattress consumers are, the initial interest confusion theory
should be submitted to the jury. I have practical questions: Given that a jury
already found no likely point of sale confusion, can point of sale confusion
evidence be part of the retrial? The court of appeals heavily relied on
evidence of “actual confusion” in reversing—but is that evidence of IIC? Should
the jury instructions limit the jury to deciding whether there was initial
interest confusion? The most relevant comment made by the court of appeals is
not super helpful in answering these questions: “As a practical matter, the
ability to determine the inferences the jury drew from the evidence is
substantially clouded by (1) the interrelated nature of the infringement,
dilution, and misrepresentation claims in this case, (2) the mixed verdict, and
(3) our conclusion that summary judgment and instructional error occurred.”
(The dilution claims are now out of the case because Select Comfort didn’t
meaningfully appeal the jury’s rejection thereof.) The court or appeals also
commented that relying on IIC might change the available damages and relief—how
exactly?

The
evidence of internet use:

Defendants
had used Plaintiffs’ actual trademarks as paid search terms and as identical
phrases in their own web-based advertising in text pages, combined text and
graphical pages, as terms embedded in linked internet address urls, and in
other fashions. Examples included website links that presented Plaintiffs’
trademarks as identical phrases (e.g. personalcomfortbed.com/vSleepNumber or
https://ift.tt/3lbQA40). In addition, Defendants used phrases
similar to Plaintiffs’ trademarks, often with words broken up in a
grammatically non-sensical fashion. Examples included the use of terms such as
“Sleep 55% Off Number Beds” and “Comfort Air Beds on Sale” in online
advertisements.

There
was also disputed survey evidence on actual consumer confusion, and “instances
of actual confusion, often from transcripts of call-center interactions,
messages from customers, or messages from call-center employees.”

The
transcripts and recordings of call-center interactions appeared to show that
Defendants’ call-center employees at times attempted to promote confusion and
at other times attempted to dispel confusion. Finally, evidence included
statements from Defendants’ principals in which they described confusion as
between Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ brands as a “good thing” and, in response
to reports of confusion, indicated that their advertisements were “working.”

How
much of this is even relevant for determining whether IIC exists?

False
advertising: the jury found for Select Comfort on seven false advertising
claims and for defendants on the remaining eight, awarding about $160,000 in disgorgement
and nothing on lost profits.

The
court of appeals held that the instructions erroneously allowed the jury to
presume materiality from literal falsity. The instructions allowed a
presumption of materiality from “(1) a literally false statement; (2) a false
statement relating to the inherent quality or characteristic of a product; or
(3) a deliberately false or misleading statement that was comparative or
implicated a competitor or its product.” (1) was the error. (2) and (3) “are
essentially definitions for materiality that describe types of statements
reasonable persons would recognize as likely to influence a purchasing
decision.” But literal falsity doesn’t necessarily entail materiality. “[A]n
inference of a statement’s materiality based merely upon its falsity is neither
so clear nor direct that it might support a burden-shifting presumption in a
plaintiff’s favor.” Thus, it was error, and not harmless error, so the court of
appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial on those seven claims.

 

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Journalism about investment isn’t commercial speech

Crash
Proof Retirement, LLC v. Price, 2021 WL 1387501, No. 2:20-cv-05906-JDW (E.D.
Pa. Apr. 13, 2021)

Competing
in the marketplace of ideas can ground a defamation claim, but not a false
advertising claim. Crash Proof, which offers retirement planning counseling,
alleged, inter alia, that Price violated the Lanham Act by writing an article
that criticized Crash Proof’s investment strategy. “But the Lanham Act does not
regulate critical speech. It regulates commercial speech, which Mr. Price’s
article is not.”

Price
is a former stockbroker who continues to write and give investment seminars. TheStreet
published an article by Price titled, “If It Sounds Too Good to be True, It
Will Probably Cost You.” About half the article criticizes Crash Proof and
questioning how it could offer a risk-free investment opportunity with a 5% to
8% interest rates with “no fees whatsoever.” He wrote: “if you believe Crash
Proof’s claims, there’s a bridge in Brooklyn I’d like to sell to you.” He
challenged Crash Proof’s claims “that there are no fees attached to [its]
services” because “[w]ho do you know who works for free?” He speculated “that
Crash Proof was taking a huge cut of the principal for themselves right off the
top.” In summary, he called Crash Proof a scam that preys on desperate people
who plunge “huge pieces of their life savings into products with no chance of
success.”

The
other half of the article described an alternative investment strategy for
those who “seek reasonable total returns while accepting a very small degree of
risk….” He didn’t refer to any specific product. It is, in Crash Proof’s
words, “an unoriginal, oft-written about, stock-based investment strategy of
owning blue-chip stocks while selling in-the-money call options….”

Crash
Proof sued Price for violations of the Lanham Act and the Pennsylvania Unfair
Competition statute, as well as common law claims for commercial disparagement
and tortious interference with business relations.

As the
description of the article indicates, this is an easy case: the article doesn’t
propose a commercial transation. It doesn’t promote any product or service.
Nothing in the article, or in the complaint, suggested that Price was
trying to get consumers to buy a service that he sold instead of Crash Proof’s.
Under the allegations of the complaint, he was retired, and an unoriginal
strategy disclosed in the article itself “could not even be a veiled attempt to
steer customers to a single competitor.” It didn’t matter whether or not TheStreet
paid Mr. Price for the article.

The
court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims (but
I can’t imagine the statutory unfair competition claims do any better on a
First Amendment analysis).

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Microsoft dodges some false advertising claims based on its security offerings

Tocmail
Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 2020 WL 9210739, No. 20-60416-CIV-SMITH (S.D. Fla.
Nov. 6, 2020)

From
the deepest depths of backlog: Tocmail alleged that Microsoft’s deceptive
promotions of its cyber-security service, Safe Links, constituted false
advertising and contributory false advertising. Tocmail alleged that it sold
the only patented solution for cloud-based hacking, specifically the cloud
security flaw of IP-Cloaking. IP Cloaking allegedly allows hackers to pass
security scanners by sending benign links to the scanner and, then, once
approved by the scanner, proceed to send malicious content to the end user. Microsoft
offers a product, Safe Links, that Microsoft claims protects users against
cloud-based hacking. This allegedly harmed Tocmail’s reputation by convincing
over 100 million users of the Microsoft product that its product offers no
value to them.

Drawing
all inferences in Tocmail’s favor, the court found that it properly alleged reputational
and economic harm within the zone of interests protected by the Lanham Act.

Proximate
causation: Microsoft argued that the harms alleged were too speculative. “But
courts have found allegations based on the diversion of business from one party
to the other enough for purposes of pleading proximate causation.”

Specific
alleged falsehoods:

A
Microsoft product video stated, inter alia:

Sophisticated
attackers will plan to ensure links pass through the first round of security
filters by making the links benign, only to weaponize them once the message is
delivered. Meaning that the destination of that link is altered later to point
to a malicious site. Time is important when thwarting this type of attack. 20% of
all clicks happen within just five minutes of when an email is received, and
with Safe Links, we’re able to protect users right at the point of click by
checking the link for reputation and triggering detonation if necessary.

Tocmail
alleged that “it is literally false that Safe Links protects users by
‘thwarting this type of attack’ [that is, the described attacked of
sophisticated hackers].” The court disagreed, because on its face the statement
didn’t claim that Safe Links thwarts this type of attack, but rather that time
is important in thwarting this type of attack. Comment: Necessary implication
is made for these situations. There is no communicative reason for identifying
this type of attack if it’s not one that Safe Link thwarts “right at the point of
click.”

Next
statement:

[A]ttackers
sometimes try to hide malicious URLs within seemingly safe links that are
redirected to unsafe sites by a forwarding service after the message has been
received. The ATP Safe Links feature proactively protects your users if they
click such a link. That protection remains every time they click the link, so
malicious links are dynamically blocked while good links can be accessed.

But
Tocmail alleged that Safe Links does not do this. Microsoft argued that its
statement didn’t make “any promises, guarantees or other representations.” “Defendant’s
argument is belied by the express language of this statement, which promises
customers protections against attackers’ malicious links.” Falsity was
sufficiently alleged.

“You
Don’t Need Any Other Security Products. With ATP You’re Covered”: This was a
statement made by a Microsoft customer (possibly touted by Microsoft), and was
just opinion.

The
name “Safe Links”: “Safe” is sometimes puffery and sometimes not, depending on
context. In the context of a product name, it was “a very general claim that
characterizes classic puffery, as opposed to a specific assertion describing
absolute characteristics of Defendant’s product.”

“Safe
Links Ensures Hyperlinks in Documents are Harmless”: Also sufficiently alleged
to be literally false.

Contributory
false advertising: Tocmail alleged that that “[a]lmost all email cybersecurity
vendors participate in a coordinated, industry-wide deception that promotes
‘time-of-click’ redirection as the solution to links that appear benign to
cloud scanners yet send users to somewhere dangerous.” Microsoft allegedly
works with third parties to offer Safe Links alternatives paired with Microsoft
cloud services, and these “third parties cannot offer their services without
Microsoft providing access.” “Microsoft benefits from its cloud users being
assured that time-of-click redirection guarantees that they will never download
malware from a protected link.” Additionally, Tocmail alleged that “Microsoft
continues to supply its service to those it knows or has reason to know are
engaged in false advertising directly in regards to the service being
supplied.”

This
wasn’t enough to state a claim for contributory false advertising. “[T]he mere
sale of products in the course of an ordinary business relationship, without
more, cannot justify a finding that a defendant induced, encouraged, caused,
procured, or brought about false advertising.” A plaintiff must show that the
defendant “actively and materially furthered the unlawful conduct—either by
inducing it, causing it, or in some other way working to bring it about.” Tocmail
didn’t plead enough details to plausibly infer knowing or intentional
participation by Microsoft.

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competitor has state, federal standing to challenge nondisparaging false ads

Jerome’s
Furniture Warehouse v. Ashley Furniture Industries, Inc., 2021 WL 1541649, No.
20CV1765-GPC(BGS) (S.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2021)

Jerome’s
alleged false advertising under state and federal law based on Ashley’s alleged
false advertising  “intended to deceive
customers into falsely believing that it offers prices and financing that
cannot be beaten by Plaintiff or other competitors.” Arizona’s AG pursued
Ashley and there was a consent judgment, but Jerome’s wanted more.

Jerome’s
identified four misrepresentations: First, Plus claims, such as “40% OFF PLUS!
60 MO. NO interest NO down payment NO minimum purchase.” However, the offer is
allegedly “either 40% off already inflated prices or 60 months interest free
payments,” and the ads are allegedly misleading because they don’t disclose “that
most of the merchandise at the Ashley stores are excluded from the advertised
sale due to on site “manager’s specials” and/or other exclusions discovered
once a customer enters the stores. “The disclaimer that the sale in the ad
cannot be combined with any other promotion or discount is on the second page
of the ad and in microscopic fine print.” An email from Ashley’s Senior Vice
President of Business Development says 80% read the headline, only 20% of those
then read the content.” Jerome’s reps visited a store offering “50% off plus 60
months no interest,” but the promotion didn’t apply to nearly all items within the
upholstery and dining department and all “14-piece packages” because they were
already marked down with “manager’s special.” In the bedroom section, the items
were marked up to roughly double Jerome’s prices for similar pieces. A
salesperson explained that “PLUS” meant the second sales term was “another”
sales option available but the representatives could not receive both.

Second,
alleged misrepresentations of “regular price” to falsely inflate the “savings”
to be realized from its “sale price.” For example, one ad stated the “regular
price” of the Ballinasloe 3-piece sectional sofa as $2,299 and offered a sale
price of $1,150, but the actual regular advertised price for the set on its
website was allegedly $1,300. This violates FTC regulations. Another email
quote from that Senior VP: “Raise prices, then offer a discount if willing to
wait for delivery…the longer you wait the more you save, up to 40% off for 4
months.”

Third,
alleged misrepresentations of quality by inflating “regular” prices, leading
consumers to think they’re getting higher quality. 
Fourth,
alleged misrepresentations of time limits on sales, when the real terms of the
promotions seldom change at all. Jerome’s
alleged that it was well known that bait and switch worked in the industry
because higher volumes of “foot traffic” lead to higher sales.

The
court found that the complaint satisfied Rule 9(b). Jerome’s identified
specific ads making the challenged claims; it did not need to identify specific
deceived customers.

The
court also rejected Ashley’s dumb argument that Jerome’s didn’t sufficiently
allege that the ads were in interstate commerce because Jerome’s only
identified one billboard ad. The complaint alleged that the billboard was
materially identical to other billboards used by Ashley throughout Southern
California and the rest of the country, and that there was website advertising (accessible
throughout the country).

Also
of note here: the court applies a presumption of materiality from literal
falsity, which is becoming a more contested thing.

Injury:
Ashley argued that there was no plausible harm to Jerome’s because consumers
could compare the parties’ prices. A plaintiff alleging competitive injury
under the “false advertising” prong “need only believe that he [or she] is
likely to be injured in order to bring a Lanham Act claim.” Moreover,
commercial injury is presumed “when defendant and plaintiff are direct
competitors and defendant’s misrepresentation has a tendency to mislead
consumers.” (Citing pre-Lexmark precedent, but probably fine especially
in situations like this.)

State
claims: The court found competitor standing under the UCL and FAL; the
plaintiff didn’t itself have to rely on the false claims if it was
injured thereby.

Sonner’s effect on restitution and
injunctive relief claims by a competitor: Jerome’s argued that it properly
alleged that legal remedies were inadequate because of the inability to
ascertain the amount of future damages from Ashley’s continued, future
misconduct. The court agreed with respect to the injunctive relief requested,
but not with respect to restitution. Anyway, Jerome’s wasn’t entitled to
restitution because it hadn’t given any specific money to Ashley. “Compensation
for a lost business opportunity is a measure of damages and not restitution to
the alleged victims.”

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Apple’s “buy” button that doesn’t result in ownership may mislead consumers

Andino
v. Apple, Inc., 2021 WL 1549667, No. 2:20-cv-01628-JAM-AC (E.D. Cal. Apr. 20,
2021)

iTunes
allows consumers to “Rent” or “Buy” movies, television shows, music and other
content. Renting is less expensive; buying leads the content to appear in a
consumer’s “Purchased” folder.

Plaintiff
alleged that this was deceptive, given that “Apple reserves the right to
terminate the consumers’ access and use of content at any time, and in fact,
has done so on numerous occasions.” He brought the usual California claims and
the court declined to dismiss the claim in full.

Injury
in fact: The issue was not whether he might one day lose the content in full,
but whether he spent money he wouldn’t have spent on something he didn’t “own.”
That was sufficiently alleged injury. Likewise, failure to rely on the “buy”
representation in the future was continuing threatened injury for injunctive
relief.

The
court also agreed—consistent with the
persuasive article by Aaron Perzanowski and
Chris Hoofnagle
—that
“buy” was plausibly deceptive. It commonly means to acquire possession. “It
seems plausible, at least at the motion to dismiss stage, that reasonable
consumers would expect their access couldn’t be revoked.” Apple also argued
that, because a user could download purchased content for full and irrevocable
access, the “Buy” and “Purchased” language was accurate. That was a factual
dispute inappropriate at the motion to dismiss stage.

While Sonner
directed the dismissal of CLRA etc. claims for equitable relief, money damages
weren’t an adequate remedy for future harm, so the inunctive relief claim
survived.

 

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Coffee lawsuits brewing

Two cases, suggesting a newly discovered litigation vein.

Ashton v. J.M. Smucker Co., No. EDCV 20-992 JGB (SHKx), 2020
WL 8575140 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2020)

Plaintiffs alleged that representations on the front of
Folgers ground coffee cans, including “MAKES UP TO 240 6 FL OZ CUPS,” “MAKES UP
TO 210 6 FL OZ CUPS,” and “MAKES UP TO 360 6 FL OZ CUPS,” were false in
violation of NY and California laws.

On the back of all the products,
Defendants instruct consumers that they should use one tablespoon of ground
coffee to make one serving/cup of coffee. Based on standard measurements,
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants grossly overstate the number of servings the
Products can make. For example, Defendants represent that the 30.5 oz canister
“MAKES UP TO 240 6 FLZ OZ.” However, to make 240 servings, 240 tablespoons (or
1200 grams) of ground coffee are needed. However, the 30.5 oz canister only has
865 grams of ground coffee, 72% of the amount of ground coffee needed to make
up the represented amount of cups…. On average, the 39 different varieties of
Products at issue contain enough ground coffee to make only 68.25% of the
servings promised on the packaging.

Did plaintiffs suffer cognizable injury? They alleged that
they “would have paid significantly less for the Products had [they] known that
the Products did not contain enough ground coffee to make the represented
number of cups of coffee.” This was sufficiently concrete and particularized
injury. They need not allege that they actually attempted to make the
represented servings, because they alleged uniform underfilling. And they
alleged standing for injunctive relief because “they would like to continue
purchasing the Folgers ground coffee products because they like the taste.”

Deception was also plausible. “While it is certainly
possible that consumers would understand that the Products could make up to the
stated servings by using less ground coffee than recommended per cup, it is
also possible that consumers would expect to be able to make the represented
servings following the recommended brewing instructions.”

Breach of warranty claims also survived, because the “makes
up to” representations were plausibly affirmations or promises about the number
of cups that could be made.

Defendants sought dismissal of nationwide class allegations,
arguing that applying California’s laws to a nationwide class would violate their
due process rights. This was better resolved at the certification stage, since
defendants would have to show material differences in the treatment of this
specific claim; precedent does not hold that “nationwide classes are, as a
matter of law, uncertifiable under California’s consumer protection laws.”

Lorentzen
v. Kroger Co., 2021 WL 1573719,  No. 2:20-cv-06754-SB-RAO
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2021)

Kroger’s
private label coffee says on the front that it “makes about” a specified number
of cups of coffee (e.g., “Makes About 225 Cups”). Instructions on the back of
the packaging direct consumers “to use the following measurements: ‘[o]ne
rounded tablespoon of coffee for each 6 fl oz. of cold water’ or ‘1/2 cup of
coffee for every 10 servings.’ ” Lorentzen alleged that, if you did that, you
get “a 47-54% deficiency in the total number of servings per canister when
following the single serving instructions.” She brought the usual California
statutory claims.

Rejecting
most other California courts’ reasoning, the court didn’t allow her to
represent a class of purchasers of other sizes/flavors of the coffee, even if
it had the same allegedly misleading representations. “Substantial similarity,”
the court thought, was “inconsistent with the basic concept of standing,” even
though by definition every consumer bought a different bag of coffee with a
different iteration of the allegedly false claim on it; I don’t see why this
reasoning doesn’t make the class action form unconstitutional (and perhaps that
is coming next). She couldn’t bring claims based on false advertising on which
she did not rely. She couldn’t suffer injury based on products she didn’t buy.
(Again, including other bags of the same product in the same size, which she also
didn’t buy.)

For
the size/flavor she did buy, she plausibly pled deception and injury.

“Even
with the ‘qualifying language’ about a consumer’s preference for his or her ‘desired
strength’ of coffee, the Court cannot say as a matter of law that a reasonable
consumer would expect the yield to be cut in half when brewing coffee as
instructed.” Likewise, a reasonable consumer might not rely on the weight
disclosed on the front label to figure out the truth. This wasn’t an “up to”
claim about wi-fi speeds, which can be expected to vary, but a representation
about a specific number of cups from a product with a defined amount in a
package, and it wasn’t a case of missing by a few but by nearly half.

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Informational functionality is a thing now

Sulzer Mixpac AG v. A&N Trading Co., No. 19-2951 (2d
Cir. Feb. 18, 2021)

The parties compete in the U.S. market for mixing tips used
by dentists to create impressions of teeth for dental procedures, such as
crowns. Reversing the district court, the court of appeals held that Mixpac’s
alleged trade dress—its use of yellow, teal, blue, pink, purple, brown, and
white on different mixing tips—was functional. The colors signify diameter and
enable users to match a cartridge to the appropriate mixing tip.

The full system consists of a dispenser-like caulking gun, a
cartridge containing two cylinders, and a mixing tip. Mixpac makes all three
parts of the system and is a leading supplier of mixing tips. A mixing tip
blends components as they pass through the tip from the cartridge. “To
accommodate different types of dental procedures, mixing tips vary in their
diameter, the length of the helixes that mix component materials, and cap
sizes.”

Mixpac owned twelve U.S. trademark registrations for
particular colors on mixing tips. It also had previously secured a default
judgment against one of the key defendants for trade dress infringement of a
different trade dress; the district court awarded $41,250 in damages and
imposed a $20,000 fine, which remain unpaid.

Mixpac’s Director of Technology and Innovation testified
that applying the colors to the mixing tips adds significant time and cost to
the production. He agreed with Mixpac’s Director of Market Segment Healthcare
that all mixing tips of a given color had the same diameter, and Mixpac’s
catalog uses color to identify the diameter. A general practice dentist
testified as an expert for Mixpac that he does “not use, or select, a
replacement mixing tip based on [c]olor alone because each of the two-component
materials used is unique.”

In connection with previous litigation, a Mixpac employee
declared that, “[t]o assist in identifying Mixpac’s product and to enable users
to quickly select a mixing tip that matches the proper cartridge, [Mixpac]
chose a unique and arbitrary color coding system.” He further declared that the
“colors of the cartridge cap are matched to the mixing tip to indicate the
proper size and mixing ratio for the dental materials.” Another employee
declared that “Mixpac uses a color code with its mixers to enable an end user
to quickly identify the appropriate [t]ip that is matched with the same colored
cartridge cap.” Mixpac’s advertising materials assert that “[i]n order to
simplify handling MIXPAC is using color-coded mixers and outlet caps. The color
of the outlet cap used for a certain dental product identifies the mixer best
suited for th[e] product.” Third-party websites advertise mixing tips based
primarily on their colors under Mixpac’s system, and materials manufacturers
rely on Mixpac’s color-coding in their product use instructions—Mixpac sells to
a lot of different manufacturers who fill its cartridges with their own
materials.

The district court found nonfunctionality because of the
added production cost of the tips and the fact that “[o]ther companies in the
industry use different colors or no colors for their dental products including
dental mixing tips.” “Most important of all with respect to functionality is
the fact that alternative designs are obviously and clearly available without
impairing the utility of the product.” It acknowledged that “a small minority”
of dentists “have [probably] asked for a yellow tip or a blue tip.”

Although there are colorless tips, A&N argued that color
coding helps users identify useful product characteristics, such as diameter,
thus affecting their quality. The evidence didn’t show that use of color was
“essential” to the product. However, the evidence “firmly establishes that the colors
signify diameter, which in turn assists users with selecting the proper
cartridge for their needs.” This ability to speed up matching tips with
cartridges “improve[d] the operation of the goods.” The colors served roughly
the same communicative function as the colors of flash-frozen ice cream in
Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Frosty Bites Distribution, LLC, 369 F.3d 1197 (11th Cir.
2004), or the colors of pills in Inwood v. Ives. The district court
erred by not asking, per Louboutin, whether the colors affected the
quality of the tips.

Though A&N’s expert witness testified that choosing a
mixing tip based on color alone would be “stupid,” “the functionality doctrine
does not require that a product’s functional feature be the only reason why
relevant consumers purchase it.” Functionality made secondary meaning
irrelevant.

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organic protein is generic, but trade dress comes to the rescue

Orgain,
Inc. v. Northern Innovations Holding Corp., 2021 WL 1321653, No. 8:18-cv-01253-JLS-ADS
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2021)

The parties compete in the market for nutritional supplements. Orgain
alleged that defendants infringed its trade dress in selling a competing
plant-based nutritional supplement adorned with the “organic protein” phrase in
black font against a white background, framed by green bands that circumscribe
the top and bottom of the packaging, as well as a green leaf motif and colored
boxes highlighting the dietary profile of the product. Defendants allegedly
altered the packaging of their nutritional supplement on multiple occasions to
more closely resemble Orgain’s packaging.

Orgain’s claimed trade dress

accused product

First,
defendants showed that “organic protein” is generic. Under the Ninth Circuit
“who-are-you/what-are-you” test, “organic protein” is a what.  Each word was
generic, and the combination didn’t add meaning (citing Booking.com).  And Orgain itself used the phrase
generically, e.g., “organic protein is the engine of all Orgain products.”
Orgain’s owner stated that “[he] made it [his] mission to formulate a drink
that would actually make a difference in [his] health. It had to be … high in
organic protein ….” Orgain’s website says: “Orgain™ provides 255
nutrient-dense calories with a perfect 2:1 ratio of organic carbohydrates to
organic protein,” and the FAQ answer to “what’s in Orgain?” is “16 grams of the
highest quality Organic Protein to help build lean muscle.”  Orgain
argued that these were merely descriptive uses, but didn’t explain why, and
Orgain had the burden of proof to show protectability.

Likewise,
there was evidence that other companies in the nutritional supplement market use
“organic protein” generically in connection with their products. Again, Orgain
couldn’t win by arguing that those uses were also descriptive. Indeed, in many
of the documented uses, “organic protein” was used as the title of the product,
just as Orgain used it; Orgain failed to explain why those uses were
descriptive and defendants’ use was allegedly infringing.  

Survey
evidence is the “ultimate test” for genericness, Booking.com (ugh), so
Orgain offered a “modified Teflon survey” from Hal Poret that concluded
that 74% of respondents believed the term “organic protein” was descriptive.
Defendants’ Teflon survey found that 88% of consumers understand
“organic protein” to be a category of products rather than a brand name. You
will not be surprised to hear that the dueling surveys did not manage to create
a genuine issue of material fact.

Poret
reasoned that the Teflon format, dealing with a term that started life
fanciful, had to be modified when the plaintiff was claiming rights in a
descriptive term. Thus, respondents were instructed that “[g]eneric terms
identify a type or category of product,” while “[d]escriptive terms describe an
ingredient, characteristic, quality, feature, or function of a product.”

The
survey listed “automobile,” “ice cream” and “allergy medicine” as examples of
generic terms and “hatchback,” “Rocky Road,” and “non-drowsy” as examples of
descriptive terms. To advance to the main questionnaire, respondents had to
identify “yogurt” and “bottled water” as generic and “lemon lime” and “natural”
as descriptive. Respondents who made it through were presented with a list of
words or terms to identify as “generic” or “descriptive”: organic protein,
creamy chocolate, lactose free, protein drink, and nutritional supplement.

But
the survey “side-stepped the key inquiry—namely, whether respondents understood
‘organic protein’ to refer to Orgain’s goods or whether they understood the
term to refer to a category of products.”

True,
“generic” and “descriptive” are separate legal definitions along the
distinctiveness spectrum. But the genericness inquiry is not about where
consumers categorize the mark along the distinctiveness spectrum. Rather, the
genericness inquiry asks whether consumers perceive the term as identifying a
common name for a certain type or class of products.

[I
think what this gets at is that surveys can detect secondary meaning, but
they’re not going to be great at distinguishing among conceptual categories,
and why would they be? But this means that Booking.com punts to surveys
in order to eliminate genericness whenever there is enough secondary meaning.
Some people like that result; I do not.] The Poret survey didn’t ask consumers
“is this a name of a type of product or is this a source-identifier?” It could
have done so. But instead, it provided “no evidence” of whether the consuming
public viewed “organic protein” as a mark that identifies Orgain’s products.

Even
if this evidence were relevant, the definitions of “generic” and “descriptive”
were overlapping and confusing. The supposedly descriptive examples “Hatchback”
for vehicle, “Rocky Road” for frozen dessert, and “Non Drowsy” for allergy
medication were

likely
to confuse survey participants when viewed in light of the definitions
provided. For example, “non-drowsy” is a type or category of cold medicine, and
“Hatchback” is a type or category of car. By the Poret Survey’s own definition,
those terms are therefore generic.

The
questions compounded the problem by asking respondents to categorize five terms
as descriptive or generic, but didn’t bother to tell them for what.

Defendants’
survey, on the other hand, was perfectly persuasive.

Even
if the evidence had created a fact issue on descriptiveness, Orgain failed to
show secondary meaning. Orgain had a survey that arguably showed secondary
meaning of its trade dress (though 36% net recognition is in *gulp* territory,
I would think), but it didn’t test “organic protein” separately.

Nonetheless,
there were triable issues of material fact on the overall trade dress claim.

Nonfunctionality:
Though individual elements like having a term in black font against a white
background might be functional, and green and a green leaf might commonly be
used to identify “organic” or healthy products, “[the] focus [is] not on the
individual elements [of the trade dress], but rather on the overall visual
impression that the combination and arrangement of those elements create.” And
since Orgain only claimed exclusive rights in the specific combination of
elements it listed, it could show nonfunctionality.

The
court found that Orgain didn’t show that its trade dress was inherently
distinctive; it was not enough to contend that “the specific combination of
elements in the [claimed trade dress] has not been adopted by anyone other than
[Defendants].” Defendants proffered evidence that Orgain’s competitors use
packaging with similar aesthetic elements, including jar-shaped containers;
labels using color block; the term “organic protein” on the label; a green leaf
to denote “organic” food; and color bands. This showed that the claimed trade
dress was “a mere refinement of a commonly-adopted and well-known form of
ornamentation for a particular class of goods” and not “unique or unusual in
[this] particular field.” Even without that, the claimed trade dress featured a
“common, basic” package shape and label design.

However,
Orgain created a fact issue on secondary meaning. “While some courts have,
indeed, found a 36% showing did not raise a factual issue precluding summary
judgment and instead weighed against a finding of secondary meaning,
other courts have found a 35% showing to be persuasive evidence of secondary
meaning.” There was also circumstantial evidence of secondary meaning,
including evidence of actual confusion. The evidence: 16 Amazon reviews, 23
social media posts, and 13 direct communications from consumers, some of which
tended to show actual confusion, e.g., an Amazon review stating, “DON’T BUY!!!
Bought this thinking it was Orgain on accident (which I use daily and absolutely
love)”  and others that involved
communications with Orgain itself: “Any chance you can look into the
similarities of ‘Purely Inspired’ packaging? I bought it on Amazon thinking it
was your company’s product and upon getting it realized it wasn’t Orgain!”
Also, marketing representatives mistakenly placed Orgain’s shelf talkers—the
advertisements that stick out from shelves in stores—on defendants’ products in
Walmart stores, or vice versa. This evidence was “substantial, but not
overwhelming given the size of the relevant market and the fact that the
parties’ products have co-existed on the market since 2015.”

There
was also a genuine dispute about copying. Orgain argued that “because Orgain’s
name came up in surveys that Defendants conducted in support of rebranding
their label, and because the rebranded labels look more like Orgain’s than
Defendants’ previous label, it must be inferred that Defendants copied Orgain’s
label to trade on its success.” Defendants’ survey indicated that 77% of those
surveyed preferred (what became) their new label, and that the new green theme
and the colorful display of nutrition facts, which are parts of Orgain’s
claimed trade dress, contributed to the new label’s popularity. In another of
defendants’ surveys, consumers were asked to write the names of all the
plant-based protein brands they knew of, and Orgain was a frequent response. And
a revised label used a more prominent “organic protein” mark on this the new
label, which Orgain pointed to as proof of intent to copy. Defendants pointed
to other evidence that tended to disprove copying and treat Orgain as one of
many competitors, including studies that didn’t even include Orgain in their
comparisons.

Even
without other circumstantial evidence, there was some direct and circumstantial
evidence meriting trial.

So too
with likely confusion; you can tell how the various factors went. On actual
confusion, there were dueling surveys: Defendants’ Eveready survey found 4% net
confusion, while Orgain’s Squirt survey found 17% net confusion. A trial should
determine which survey was better, the “more suggestive” Squirt survey or the
Eveready survey, which arguably didn’t do as much to measure what would happen
if the products were encountered together in the marketplace. Query: what happens
if the jury concludes that the confusion stemmed primarily or entirely from
generic use of “organic protein”?

one entrant in P’s Squirt lineup

Another in the Squirt lineup

test image for Squirt lineup

Control image for Squirt lineup

Query: is this a good control image if “organic protein” is generic? Isn’t it testing in part for the effect of “organic protein” in the big font at the center?

State
law claims: Aside from arguments above, Orgain argued that, “trademark and
trade dress rights notwithstanding, Defendants engaged in unfair competition
because they copied Orgain’s design.” The court found that “triable issues of
fact preclude summary judgment on the issue of actual copying.” [Disturbing
insofar as it doesn’t address the core problem with the claim, if not
coextensive with the trade dress claim: strong federal policies preclude state
laws that purport to bar copying itself, as Sears/Compco/Bonito Boats
all teach.]

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Uber’s expansion into ads hits a TM hurdle

Uber Inc. v. Uber Technol., Inc., No. 20-cv-2320 (PKC)
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2021)

Uber Inc. has offered design and marketing services under
the name “Uber” since 1999. Uber Technologies, the one you know about, was
incorporated in 2010. As it grew and expanded into new services, Uber Inc. “found
itself on the receiving end of customer complaints, misdirected product
shipments, legal and regulatory correspondence, and other communications
intended for Uber Technologies.” And Defendants began saying that they planned
to expand into the display-advertising business: putting ads on a vehicle’s
digital signage, a rider’s mobile app, and on digital screens like electronic
billboards. Uber Inc. also alleged that its 2019 application to register a
trademark was stalled based on a description of services that overlapped with a
pending, competing ITU application filed by Uber Technologies in connection
with advertising, marketing and promotional services, including “promoting
third party goods and services.”

The court declined to dismiss the Lanham Act/NY law
complaint, with the exception of the duplicative unjust enrichment claim.

Uber Inc. describes its business as including graphic design
like logos, stationery and brochures; promotional events and mailings; and
consumer-oriented campaigns, like magazine advertisements. It’s allegedly been
retained by well-known brands, including BMW and Macy’s, and by companies
headquartered throughout the United States, and promotes itself mainly through
the websites http://www.uber-inc.com and http://www.uber.nyc. 

Meanwhile, Uber OOH [Out of Home], whose corporate
relationship to Uber Technologies was a bit unclear, describes itself as “The
Official Uber Advertising Network.”

Starting in 2012, Uber Inc. received an increasing number of
calls and communications intended for Uber Technologies. Confusion allegedly
grew more frequent with time, becoming “constant” in the last three years.

[O]ne of plaintiff’s customers sent
plaintiff a large payment that was intended for Uber Technologies, while
separately sending a payment to Uber Technologies that was intended for
plaintiff. A vendor mistakenly granted Uber Technologies access to plaintiff’s
account, resulting in plaintiff’s temporary inability to access its own account
and giving Uber Technologies access to plaintiff’s business information.
Plaintiff alleges that it has stopped attending trade shows and sometimes does
not answer calls due to overwhelming call volume intended for Uber
Technologies. 

This really does seem like a good candidate for “junior
should pay senior to change its name,” and in 2015 Uber Technologies offered
Uber Inc. $80,000 to do so. Uber Inc. counteroffered with $800,000, and
rejected Uber Technologies’ $120,000 response, believing that they were still
in different fields. But in 2019, Uber Technology allegedly began preparatory
steps to enter the advertising business.

In 2020, a site published under the “Uber OOH” name allegedly
stated that the company would assist clients in creating advertising.

Unsurprisingly, the complaint plausibly alleged reverse
confusion. Even with differences between the parties’ core services, the
complaint plausibly alleged Uber Technology’s advertising-related expansion
plans put it in competitive proximity to Uber Inc’s graphic design and
marketing services. Though the complaint failed to identify instances of actual
confusion among “prospective customers who were seeking out plaintiff’s
advertising and design services,” that wasn’t required, and confusion among
others offered “some factual support for the plausibility of plaintiff’s
claims.”

Forward confusion was also plausible; on a motion to
dismiss, the court did not agree that no consumer could plausibly confuse
plaintiff’s graphic design-intensive business with the mobile, digitally oriented,
“out of home” advertisements offered by defendants. The complaint quoted Uber
Technologies statements expressing “broad ambitions for their advertising
services, and not just advertisements displayed on vehicles.”

Nor did the complaint plead itself out of court on laches.
The period in NY is six years, and the complaint didn’t establish that Uber
Inc. knew it had an actionable claim more than six years before suit was filed.
“[K]nowledge of Uber Technologies’s use of an ‘Uber; mark and the receipt of
misdirected calls does not equate to knowledge that plaintiff had an actionable
claim under the Lanham Act.” Plus, Uber Technology’s offer in 2015 might
constitute its awareness that it was “entering contested ground,” weighing
against laches.  

State-law dilution claims, which don’t require fame, also
survived.

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