Everything’s legal in Jersey: NJ SCt makes class certification harder in price disclosure case

Dugan v. TGI Fridays, Inc., 171 A.3d 620 (N.J. 2017)
Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants failed to fairly
disclose prices charged to customers for alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages.
The New Jersey Supreme Court held that one set of plaintiffs failed to show
that common issues of law and fact predominated because they argued a price
inflation theory that New Jersey law didn’t support. However, other claims that
the restaurants violated New Jersey’s consumer protection law (the NJCFA) by
increasing the price charged to a customer for the same brand, type, and volume
of beverage in the course of the customer’s visit to the restaurant, without
notifying the customer of the change.  Consumers with that specific claim could
proceed with class certification.
The first set of plaintiffs alleged that TGIF had a practice
of offering certain beverages in New Jersey TGIF restaurants’ menus without
listing their prices of those beverages, violating the NJCFA as well as a
regulatory provision governing “merchandise that is not price marked at the
point of purchase.”  In the original
complaint, named plaintiff Dugan claimed that during a visit to a TGIF
restaurant she was charged $2.00 for a beer at the bar and later charged $3.59
for the same brand of beer after moving to a table.  Dugan admitted that during the visit to a TGIF
restaurant in which she paid different prices for two orders of identical
beverages at the bar and at the table, she did not read the beverage section of
the menu, though she later submitted she had looked at the TGIF menu on many
occasions and expected to pay the same price at the bar that she paid when she
sat at a table. Training materials for TGIF servers stated that servers seating
customers should hand opened menus to customers.  Plaintiffs also submitted a TGIF consultant’s
analysis of consumer behavior in the ordering of beverages in restaurants in
which customers informed of beverage prices spent an average of $1.72 less per
visit than the customers to whom the prices were not disclosed.
This group couldn’t show commonality; they didn’t claim what
they bought was defective, deficient, or worthless, but rather received what
they ordered.  However, they couldn’t
prove that every claimant in their multi-million-member class would have
purchased fewer or less expensive beverages, or none at all, had TGIF informed
him or her of the beverage prices. The research underlying the $1.72 per visit
damages claim wasn’t similar to anything else that had been accepted as a
method of proving ascertainable loss and causation in a CFA class action; it
was too similar to rejected “fraud on the market”/price inflation damages
calculations.
For the second group (the Bozzi class), there were common
questions of fact relating to the defendant’s pricing practices and “at least
one common question of law—whether increasing the price of a beverage during a
customer’s restaurant visit without informing the customer constitutes an
unlawful practice.”  Existing records
would apparently enable the parties to determine where and when each class
member was charged disparate prices for the same brand, type, and volume of
beverage on the same restaurant visit, allowing them to account for happy hours
and other restaurant-specific practices.
However, neither group could proceed under the Truth-in-Consumer
Contract, Warranty and Notice Act (TCCWNA), a statute enacted “to prevent
deceptive practices in consumer contracts” that contained unenforceable or
invalid terms that nonetheless deceived consumers into thinking the terms were
enforceable and deterred them from asserting their rights. Thus, covered
entities must not use “any provision that violates any clearly established
legal right of a consumer or responsibility of a seller ….” Plaintiffs argued
that by failing to list prices for beverages on the menus, the defendant
restaurants violated plaintiffs’ “clearly established” legal rights and
defendants failed to meet their “clearly established” legal responsibilities
requiring the prices to be plainly marked. However, there were too many
individual questions.  The TCCWNA
addressed “contract[s],” “warrant[ies],” “notice[s],” and “sign[s]” and didn’t apply
when a defendant failed to provide the consumer with a required writing. At a
minimum, a claimant would have to prove that he or she was presented with a
menu during his or her visit to the restaurant in order to establish liability,
which couldn’t be resolved by customer receipts or other documents. It wasn’t
enough to show evidence that TGIF servers were instructed to hand menus to
customers; that didn’t even prove that any individual consumer received a menu.  The majority thought that inferring that
servers complied with corporate policy would be to wrongly allow a claim
element to be proven for the class as a whole with a single piece of evidence; the
dissent would allow such an inference, but even the plaintiffs conceded that
not all customers received the menu at issue. 
The majority also doubted whether defendants violated a “clearly
established legal right” or a “clearly established … legal responsibility.” No
published opinion held that restaurants and other food service businesses couldn’t
offer food or beverages to customers without listing the prices for those items
on their menu. “Moreover, as plaintiffs acknowledge, many food-service
businesses in New Jersey—ranging in size from corporate chain restaurants to
family-owned delicatessens and diners—routinely offer customers food and
beverage specials and other items without designating in writing the prices for
those items.” Even if a menu lacking beverage prices were a relevant writing
within the meaning of TCCWNA, that was a dubious result because a penalty of
$100 per violation would lead to a total of more than a billion dollars.
Justice Albin dissented, arguing that the majority wrongly raised
barriers to class actions.  TGIF could
charge what it wanted, but it couldn’t fail to list beverage prices when it
knew through its own study that consumers would pay, on average, $1.72 more per
meal without such prices.  “TGIF does not
pretend to be in compliance with the law; rather, its defense is that a class
action is not a proper vehicle to be used by the patrons victimized by TGIF’s
practices. However, a single consumer, even if defrauded, cannot engage in
costly litigation over a sum involving, at most, several dollars. Only through
a class action that aggregates thousands of small claims of similarly defrauded
patrons can a viable lawsuit proceed.” 
Justice Albin pointed out that TGIF itself labeled the price
consumers were willing to pay the “fair” price, as opposed to the “think-twice”
price; “the beauty of not placing beverage prices on menus in violation of the
CFA is that uninformed patrons do not know when their purchases have exceeded
the ‘fair’ price and reached the ‘think-twice’ price. TGIF learned through the
study what is commonly known—that an informed consumer will make rational
pricing decisions.”  To prevent that,
TGIF made the corporate decision not to put alcohol prices on the menu: “TGIF
determined that it did not pay to conform to the law and that it was more
profitable to capitalize on the ignorance of its patrons. From TGIF’s own
statistical analysis comes the calculation of ascertainable loss to its patrons
and the gain to itself.” 
This common issue was qualitatively more important than the
others, and individual differences could be addressed later on; the statistical
evidence here was acceptable evidence of ascertainable loss.  Plaintiffs’ theory wasn’t “fraud on the
market.”  First, the CFA didn’t require
proof of reliance, but only a causal connection between the unlawful practice
and ascertainable loss. Second, plaintiffs weren’t trying to avoid their burden
of proving a causal nexus between TGIF’s statutory violation and the
ascertainable loss suffered by TGIF’s patrons. 
“Moreover, the majority is mistaken if it is suggesting that
the CFA does not protect consumers from price gouging.  The purpose of requiring that the price of
merchandise be listed at the point of sale … is to allow consumers to make
informed decisions in making purchases.”  Justice Albin also would have allowed the
TCCWNA claims to proceed. At the pleading stage, the fair inference was that
TGIF’s servers complied with corporate policy and that patrons received menus.  Moreover, “[t]he plain and simple statutory
language clearly indicates that TGIF is required to list beverage prices on its
menus”: the law prohibits the sale of “merchandise” without a price at the
point of sale; merchandise included goods; clearly, beverages were goods, and
at the very least, were included in “anything offered … to the public for
sale.” “TGIF did not have to wait for a published opinion by this Court to
reach this common-sense conclusion.”  The
majority hinted that the law might not apply to beverages on menus, meaning
that restaurants wouldn’t be required to post any prices, since there’s no difference between a hamburger and a
milkshake. Even if the Attorney General has never sued to enforce this
provision, the CFA vests individuals with the power to act as private attorneys
general as a separate enforcement mechanism. There’d be no point in remanding
the Bozzi class-certification case for further proceedings, as the majority
did, if there was still a question about whether restaurants must place
beverage prices on their menus.  Further,
the majority didn’t explain why in the Bozzi case it vacated the trial court’s
injunction, which mandated that the relevant defendant restaurants list
beverage prices on menus. If the law was too broad, the legislature could act
to fix it.  Now, however, any relief from
TGIF’s violation of consumer fraud law would have to come from the AG. 

from Blogger http://ift.tt/2BeY1Db

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , , , | Leave a comment

Tick tick boom: Lyme-blocking claim avoids preliminary injunction

Merial, Inc. v. Zoetis, Inc., 2017 WL 4466471, No. 1:17-CV-1624
(N.D. Ga. Jun. 6, 2017)
Thorough discussions of the effect of disclaimers on literal
falsity/misleadingness are rare, so this one is useful. Merial makes NexGard, flea-and-tick
removal treatments; the latter was the first U.S. prescription monthly
flea-and-tick medication for dogs that could be administered orally. Zoetis
launched its own oral flea-and-tick product, Simparica. The parties’ products
are only dispensed by licensed vets. 
Zoetis ran a TV ad with a display banner stating: “In a
study, Simparica blocked Lyme disease transmission.” A disclosure continues:
“In a study, Simparica killed >98% of deer ticks in existing infestations
within 12 hours, while Lyme disease is typically transmitted in 24-48 hours. In
another study, Simparica was shown to block Lyme transmission from deer ticks.”

A voice-over later states: “Studies show that at the end of
the month, Simparica killed more ticks in less time than both Frontline and
NexGard,” while an animated dog uses its back paws to kick dirt over boxes of
Frontline Plus and NexGard.  The
disclosure on screen: “Studies showed that at the end of the month, 24 hours
after infestation, Simparica killed more deer ticks than Frontline and more
Lone Star, Gulf Coast, brown dog, and deer ticks than NexGard.”

Merial alleged that the first claim relating to blocking
Lyme disease is literally false because Simparica does not “block” Lyme disease,
and that the second claim of killing ticks faster was literally false because
the studies on which Zoetis relied didn’t demonstrate that at the end of the
month Simparica kills “more ticks in less time” as compared to Frontline Plus
and NexGard.
First, Merial argued that no study supports the conclusion
that Simparica worked similar to a vaccine and could completely block Lyme
disease itself. Rather, Simparica at most reduces opportunities for ticks
carrying the Lyme disease-causing pathogen to bite dogs by killing the ticks themselves.  Zoetis responded that killing ticks
effectively blocked the transmission of the disease-causing pathogen, which was
sufficient, and that the “clarifying text” informed the interpretation of the
ad.  Merial responded that the text was
too small and difficult for consumers to read.
“A disclosure is adequate if it is actually communicated to
consumers.”  Zoetis offered an affidavit
that the disclosure was “compliant with network advertising guidelines, which
means that the network compliance attorneys have … confirmed that the
[Clarifying Text is] on screen for a sufficient amount of time to be
comprehensible by viewers.” Zoetis also offered evidence that it conducted
testing and displayed the Clarifying Text for a sufficient length of time for a
consumer to read the information. The court determined that it was appropriate
to consider the disclosure as part of its falsity analysis, because the claim “primes
the viewer to look to the Clarifying Text by stating ‘[i]n a study, Simparica
blocked Lyme disease transmission,’” and the disclosure explains how Simparica blocked Lyme disease.  The disclosure was also part of the full
context of the ad, especially because it appeared simultaneously with the ad,
and Zoetis provided evidence that the text was sufficient to reach consumers.  For purposes of a preliminary injunction,
Merial didn’t show that the disclosure should not be considered.
Merial then didn’t show that, taken together, the claims
were likely literally false.  Merial
argued that Zoetis’s studies didn’t actually test for Lyme disease; only one
study tested for the presence of the pathogen; and only five to ten percent of
dogs exposed to the pathogen exhibit symptoms of Lyme disease.  But the study that didn’t test for the
pathogen still tested for deer ticks, which are the main vectors of Lyme
disease in the United States, and the other study showed that the drug
interfered with the pathogen.  Even
without the disclosure, “block” wasn’t likely literally false, because “block”
can mean to hinder/interpose an obstruction according to the dictionary, and
the drug could arguably do that.  Zoetis’s
interpretation was also reasonable because others use “block” in the same way,
such as an NIH article, “Tick Talk: Block Tick Bites and Lyme Disease” that
noted that “the best way to avoid Lyme and other tick-borne illnesses is to
prevent tick bites in the first place.”  Also, in the context of the entire ad, which showed
Simparica working by killing ticks before they transmit diseases, there was no
claim that Simparica is a vaccine that acts directly on pathogens.
Merial’s challenge to the “faster killing” claims also
failed at this stage.  Merial argued
that, even if Simparica killed more ticks after twenty-four hours, the results
were mixed on whether Simparica killed more ticks at eight or twelve hours. But
the disclosure indicated that the 8/12 hour marks weren’t relevant, because it
specified that “[s]tudies show that at the end of the month, 24 hours after
infestation, Simparica killed more ticks” than Frontline Plus and NexGard.  Also, even on its own, the faster killing
claim hadn’t been shown to be literally false. 
Because the 8 and 12 hour marks were, on the whole, inconclusive as to
which medicine killed more ticks, it was okay to look to the twenty-four hour
mark (the only other mark tested) to determine who killed more ticks in less
time. (The court also found that “killed more ticks in less time” could have
multiple meanings, depending on when the kill rate was measured.)

Merial also argued that the Lyme Disease Claim wrongly went
beyond the studies to claim that Simparica was superior to Frontline Plus and
NexGard across all types of dogs, ticks, and geographies. The parties offered
conflicting affidavits on whether studies mainly using Beagles and certain tick
types could be used in support of broader claims, but that wasn’t enough at
this stage. 

from Blogger http://ift.tt/2nvACqL

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , | Leave a comment

showing falsity of a noncomparative “tests prove” claim

Strategic Partners Inc. v. Vestagen Protective Techs., Inc.,
2017 WL 5897711, No. 16-CV-05900 (C.D. Cal. Jul. 31, 2017)
Vestagen sells specialty textiles for healthcare
applications, while SPI sells medical apparel; their medical garments with
antimicrobial fabrics compete.  Vestagen
alleged the falsity of SPI’s statement in its website FAQ that the
antimicrobial technologies it uses on its Certainty and Certainty Plus “start[
] to work upon contact with unwanted bacteria,” rendering bacteria “ineffective
immediately.”  Vestagen argued that this statement
literally false because SPI only had test data taken twenty-four hours after
the fabrics were inoculated with bacteria. SPI offered four declarations
asserting that the statement was true, creating a material issue of fact. 
Vestagen argued that the lack of test data directly
supporting the statement showed literal falsity.  While literal falsity can be shown by showing
that product testing is “not sufficiently reliable to permit one to conclude
with reasonable certainty that [it] established the claim made,” those cases
involve comparative superiority claims, but this statement wasn’t a comparative
claim, and there was no legal authority that such an ad needed proof through
test data.
The inventiveness of lawyers is legendary, but this distinction
makes no sense.  The rationale for the
rule about showing the falsity of “tests prove” statements has nothing to do
with comparative advertising.  It’s about
scientific evidence and its greater credibility with customers; when consumers
see a statement apparently based on scientific rather than anecdotal data, they
have more reason to credit it.  Thus,
“tests prove X” can be proved false either by showing “not X,” or by showing
“tests don’t prove X”; either one will falsify the claim actually made by the
defendant.
Regardless, the court ruled in addition that, based on the
definition of “ineffective” and justifiable inferences in SPI’s favor, “rendering
a bacteria cell ineffective immediately is not necessarily inconsistent with an
inability to stop germs instantaneously.” The fabric could immediately render
the cell incapable of replicating efficiently, or of not remaining viable as
expected, even without killing it immediately. 
Vestagen couldn’t prevail on this evidence at this stage.

from Blogger http://ift.tt/2jMOyrp

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged | Leave a comment

reasonable consumers expect real estate agents to be licensed, but remedies are still limited by the 1A

People ex rel. Flippo v. Silva, 2017 WL 5712601, No. H041209
(Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 28, 2017)
Susana Silva operated Estates on the Bay, which advertised
itself as a professional real estate company, while her real estate broker’s
license was revoked. Defendants’ activities included grossly overstating a
borrower’s income on mortgage loan applications.  After a bench trial, the court found violations
of the FAL and UCL and awarded civil penalties, restitution, and injunctive
relief. The court of appeals upheld the liability finding but remanded on the
remedies.
Defendants argued that Estates on the Bay’s website wouldn’t
confuse reasonable consumers into thinking Silva had a valid real estate
license, as she was required to do in order out to carry out real estate brokerage
or selling.  The website had a page
entitled “My Resume,” and the top of the webpage stated, “Estates on the Bay –
A Professional Real Estate Company.” The body included: “Our experience in the
Real Estate industry will provide you the knowledge and expertise that you need
throughout the entire buying or selling process. As you choose one of our real
estate agents, and/or loan agents our job to you is to price your home
effectively from day one ….”  Defendants
argued that there was no reference to Silva, and that even if “the use of the
first-person-plural to refer to a corporation and its agents is somehow flawed,
it is at most the mildest of innocuous puffery posing none of the risks the
[false advertising law] protects against.”
Likely deception is generally a question of fact.  The court of appeals found that the website wasn’t
too vague to be actionable: “a reasonable consumer would expect that a
corporate entity holding itself out as a professional real estate company and
offering real estate services requiring a license would in fact have the
necessary license(s) to carry out those services, and specifically that all its
agents/employees who were carrying out those services would be licensed to the
extent necessary to lawfully conduct those services.”  Given the trial court’s findings that Silva
violated the licensing law, and that Estates on the Bay permitted this,
substantial evidence supported the liability finding.
As for the UCL, the violation was in connection two mortgage
loans that they brokered for one borrower, Rosa, by deliberately and knowingly
overstating Rosa’s income on mortgage loan applications to induce the lenders
to fund the loans. These overstatements unjustly enriched defendants at Rosa’s
expense, and that the practices were “a repeat by Silva of the very conduct
which led the [Department of Real Estate] to revoke her license.” However, the
court apparently imposed a separate penalty for every day the sales were
pending, for a total of $21,500.  The UCL
allows the People to ask for “a civil penalty not to exceed two thousand five
hundred dollars ($2,500) for each violation.” “In assessing the amount of the
civil penalty, the court shall consider any one or more of the relevant
circumstances presented by any of the parties to the case, including, but not
limited to, the following: the nature and seriousness of the misconduct, the number
of violations, the persistence of the misconduct, the length of time over which
the misconduct occurred, the willfulness of the defendant’s misconduct, and the
defendant’s assets, liabilities, and net worth.”
What a “violation” is must be determined case by case, and
can be calculated per victim or per act. The amount is reviewed for abuse of
discretion.  The court assumed that it
would have been proper for the court to determine that there were two
violations based on income misrepresentations in loan applications that induced
the funding of two loans, or that there were three violations based on three
victims (Rosa and the two lenders), or that there were four violations based on
income misrepresentations affecting Rosa and a lender as to each of the two
properties.  However, the evidence didn’t
support the conclusion that false income representations were made to one or
more victims on a daily basis for 86 days. Thus, the court remanded for
recalculation.
An order of restitution to Rosa was affirmed, in the amount
of $29,575, based on the commissions defendants received for brokering the
loans and for a “yield spread premium” they received for getting her to take a
higher interest rate than her credit entitled her to. Though defendants argued
that she got what she paid for—refinancing—the court accepted the argument that
the loans were only issued because of the misrepresentations.  However, Rosa was not entitled to recovery of
a prepayment penalty in connection with paying off the existing mortgage that
she refinanced through defendants.  The
UCL allows recovery of restitution, not compensatory damages, and the
prepayment penalty went to the bank, not to the defendants.  However, the court pointed out that this
could potentially be considered in setting the amount of the civil penalty.
In terms of injunctive relief, the court of appeals affirmed
the imposition of recordkeeping requirements on defendants.  The court also ordered “Silva and [her codefendant
and sister] Gobert shall not jointly engage in the sale (this specifically
includes acting as real estate agents or brokers) or financing (specifically
including, but not limited to, originating, negotiating or soliciting loans) of
real estate.” Defendants argued that this interfered with their constitutional
rights to engage in lawful work and their constitutional rights to association as
sisters.  But they didn’t have a constitutional
or statutory right to work with each other in real estate. They could
individually work in real estate, if they complied with the rest of the
injunction, and they could associate with each other; along with the ability to
modify the injunction over time, that was enough.  Defendants’ argument that they’d already
dissolved the business didn’t matter, given their past behavior of violating
the law after Silva’s license revocation (of which Gobert knew).  Even assuming that the injunction burdened
the constitutional right of association, it was no more than necessary to serve
the compelling interest in protecting the public.

Defendants also challenged two aspects of the injunction as
unconstitutional prior restraints: (1) a requirement that they use their best
efforts to remove any reference to Silva’s broker’s license from all media,
including electronic media and social or business websites, such as LinkedIn,
Facebook and Google and (2) a requirement that they submit any real
estate-related advertising to the Monterey County District Attorney’s Office at
least 15 days in advance of publication. 
“[A]n injunctive order prohibiting the repetition of expression that ha[s]
been judicially determined to be unlawful [does] not constitute a prohibited
prior restraint of speech,” but such an order must be in the narrowest terms
that will accomplish a permissible goal. 
Under this standard, the ban on any advertising about real estate
services, property management, or real estate financing without first obtaining
written consent from the district attorney or a court order was too broad: the injunction
required preapproval of (1) advertising that could be unrelated to activities
requiring a real estate license, and (2) advertising that didn’t contain any
reference, express or implied, to Silva’s licensing status. The court of appeals
remanded for tailoring more closely to the unlawful conduct in this case. Likewise,
requiring the removal of any reference to Silva’s broker’s license from all
media also was broader than necessary. “For example, to the extent the
reference to her license includes the start and end dates of her licensure, the
representation might not be false or misleading depending on the context.” 

from Blogger http://ift.tt/2ir1WF2

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , , , , | Leave a comment

AIPLA scholarships & contests for students

Sidney B. Williams scholarship for law students from underrepresented minority groups interested in IP law.


Jan Jancin award for law students with a demonstrated record in the study of IP.

Moot Court on patent issues.


Robert C. Watson award for best student paper on IP.

from Blogger http://ift.tt/2AKNGOP

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , | Leave a comment

Closure gets closure from Second Circuit

Schutte Bagclosures Inc. v. Kwik Lok Corp., No. 16-2767 (2d
Cir. Nov. 2, 2017): In a summary opinion, the Second Circuit affirmed a district
court finding
that the design of Kwik Lok’s bag closures, albeit registered
as a mark by the PTO, was functional and thus unprotectable by trademark law,
as well as the belt-and-suspenders finding that no confusion was likely.  Thanks to an eagle-eyed correspondent who
should probably buy this
vase
as a reward for learning so much about bag closures.

from Blogger http://ift.tt/2BhxqkC

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged | Leave a comment

Allegedly outdated comparison not enough to justify TRO in sophisticated industry

NEXTracker, Inc. v. Array Technologies, Inc., 2017 WL
5625926, No. 17-cv-06582 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2017)
The parties (NX and ATI) compete in the market for solar
tracking devices, which “adjust the positioning of solar panels…to increase
the efficiency of their solar power capture.” In September 2017, TUV, “which
appears to be a non-governmental testing and assessment organization,” issued a
report comparing the operational costs of two different solar tracking
architectures and concluding that “Architecture 1” — a tracker “driven by a
single motor linked by a rotating driveline to multiple tracker rows” — is
associated with lower lifetime operational costs than “Architecture 2” — “a
system where each row operates as a self-contained unit with…dedicated
tracker system components.” NX alleged that “Architecture 1” is ATI’s
technology and that “Architecture 2” shows an NX product.
Apparently in response to NX’s objections, TUV retracted the
report, but NX alleged that ATI widely disseminated the report both before and
after the retraction.  NX sought a TRO
based on its false advertising, trade libel, and defamation claims, which the
court denied.
First, NX didn’t show falsity or misleadingness; the TUV
report didn’t mention NX or its products by name, and though it showed an NX
product, NX didn’t provide evidence that the relevant claimed trade dress (NX’s
“signature gold-colored paint” and “distinctive curve-shaped tube”) had
acquired secondary meaning such that consumers would perceive a reference to NX
systems in particular, rather than “Architecture 2” systems in general.  
Even assuming that the association existed, NX still failed
to show likely success on the merits.  NX
argued that the report was false or misleading because “Architecture 2” was a
three-year-old NX design, whereas the system described as “Architecture 1” was
ATI’s latest tracker.  But the report
didn’t purport to compare systems of the same generation or age, and it wasn’t
false or misleading just because it compared systems of two different
vintages.  “Such a comparison may even be
useful in the solar industry because, as NX itself argues, ‘Solar trackers are
a long-term investment — they can remain operational for many decades.’ It
also seems possible that solar industry participants savvy enough to identify ‘Architecture
2’ as an NX system might also recognize that the featured device was not
necessarily the latest model.”  Nor did
the record justify a finding that the report falsely described the NX system,
as NX alleged. NX claimed that the report made false statements about its
gears, its positioning of solar modules, and its use of struts, but never
clarified whether those statements were false only as to current NX products or
as to the prior ones too.  ATI argued in
opposition that the statements were true for the tested NX products, which was uncontested
in NX’s reply brief.
Although TUV retracted the report, the evidence showed that
NX’s objections, rather than independent concerns about the veracity of the
report, drove the retraction, stating that TUV  “did not subjectively entertain any serious
doubt about the truth of the statements in the report,” but still believed that
it was “in the best interest of all parties to retract the Report and conduct a
diligent investigation of NEXTracker’s allegations about the Report.”

The court also declined to find irreparable harm likely;
much of the harm alleged by NX likely already occurred because of the report’s
alleged wide dissemination.  Although NX
argued that a TRO could help at the margins, NX “fail[ed] to quantify the
reputational injuries it will suffer if ATI continues to distribute the report”
and thus failed to show irreparable injury.

from Blogger http://ift.tt/2Bj76aN

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , | Leave a comment

Another court declines to apply GNC where plaintiff alleges only negative studies

Yeldo v. MusclePharm Corp., 2017 WL 5499588, Case No.
17-11011 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 16, 2017)
Yeldo brought a putative class action alleging that
MusclePharm used misleading marketing practices to promote its glutamine dietary
supplement, whose label and online ads indicate that it “enhances muscle growth
and recovery, supports rebuilding and recovery from the toughest workouts,
reduces catabolism and supports an anabolic environment, aids in muscle growth,
causes faster recovery, and helps consumers rehydrate, rebuild, and recover
faster and more efficiently.” Although glutamine naturally found within the
body plays a role in muscle growth, recovery, and immunity support, Yeldo
alleged that “glutamine supplementation has been found to be completely
ineffective at mimicking these physiological responses.” Yeldo based his claims
on nine scientific studies finding no benefit from glutamine.
The court found that Yeldo plausibly alleged falsity.  Although the court accepted that a plaintiff
must plead the existence of a study that tests the combination of ingredients
used in a given product, that means the active ingredient/s in
combination.  Here, the product at issue
relied only on one active ingredient. The studies alleged “support the
proposition that glutamine supplementation has no effect on muscle performance
or strength, muscle growth, recovery, or performance during exercise,” even if
they didn’t test MusclePharm’s specific products or dosages. 
MusclePharm argued that some of the studies supported its
claims, making the case more like In re GNC Corp., 789 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 2015),
which (wrongly) held that literal falsity is impossible unless all reasonable
experts disagree with the advertising claim. Here, the complaint didn’t concede
that any scientists found glutamine effective, and MusclePharm merely
“cherry-pick[ed] sentences from the papers’ introduction sections, which
summarize the findings of other studies or hypothesize conditions where
supplemental glutamine may create the represented effects.”  Because the conclusions supported Yeldo’s
argument, he stated a claim.  Weighing
the merits of these scientific findings to determine which is most credible
wasn’t appropriate on a motion to dismiss. [Which is why GNC is wrong.]
Nor did Yeldo need to plead how and when he consumed the product
or whether he experienced the advertised benefits; he alleged that he bought
and consumed the product and either would not have done so or would not have
paid as much for the product if he’d known defendant’s representations were
false. That monetary harm was sufficient. However, his negligent
misrepresentation claim was barred by the economic loss doctrine.
Yeldo also had Article III standing to seek injunctive
relief, because consumer protection statues, which provide for injunctive
relief, could never be invoked to enjoin deceptive practices if the complaining
consumer’s standing dissipated the moment she discovered the alleged deception
and could no longer be fooled.
Yeldo’s claims weren’t preempted by the FDCA, since that
statute deems food misbranded when the label contains a statement that is “false
or misleading in any particular,” and so Yeldo’s claims paralleled the FDCA’s
requirements; the conduct at issue would also give rise to liability under
Michigan common law even if the FDCA had never been enacted. Nor did the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction bar these claims.

from Blogger http://ift.tt/2z3Axfn

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , , , | Leave a comment

To the spoliator does not go the victory in corporate betrayal case

OmniGen Research, LLC v. Wang, No. 16-cv-268, 2017 WL
5505041 (D. Or. Nov. 16, 2017)
After OmniGen successfully moved for a default judgment in
its favor due to spoliation of evidence, the court awarded damages on OmniGen’s
trade secret, false advertising, and related claims.  Default means that the factual allegations of
the complaint, other than those about damages, will be taken as true.
While working for OmniGen, which makes feed addditives that
improve the health of dairy cows and other animals, defendant Wang breached his
contracts by secretly creating an OmniGen-clone Chinese business based on
stolen OmniGen research and information, forming at least two entities, Bioshen
and Mirigen.  He also applied for a
Chinese patent that covers a knockoff of an OmniGen product, and had fellow
individual defendant Zheng—who is Wang’s wife and … does not have a
background in biological sciences—listed as an inventor in his place, and
employed similar tactics with the contact information for Bioshen and Mirigen.  He presented an OmniGen Research slide
presentation (whose copyright OmniGen registered) as if it was his own at a
large scientific conference in China, with many slides altered only to add the
Mirigen logo.  At the conference, which
was attended by over a thousand people, including academics, government
officials, and business leaders, defendants’ marketing materials claimed to
employ “the most advanced modern green agricultural technology from the United
States.”  Wang represented the material
copied from OmniGen’s slides as Mirigen’s and Bioshen’s, as well the
innovations described therein.  [This
seems to be Dastar-barred at least as
a §43(a)(1)(A) claim, but in a default situation, don’t expect that to
matter.]  His acts also led to the
dissemination of confidential OmniGen research notes at the conference and
elsewhere.  Bioshen and Mirigen also
submitted a paper falsely describing research as part of their participation in
the conference: the paper described a study conducted with pigs by Bioshen and
Mirigen using their feed additive, when in fact the studies were conducted by
OmniGen on sheep and dairy cattle using its
feed additive. 
Unsurprisingly, the court found for OmniGen on its breach of
contract, intentional interference with economic relations, and trade secret
misappropriation claims.  As for false
advertising, the court also found for OmniGen, including for stating that
OmniGen’s slides were defendants’ work, for falsely describing the study, and
for falsely claiming that Mirigen and Bioshen were affiliated with a
‘professor’ at Oregon State University.” The court accepted the complaint’s
allegations that these statements were material because “they lend credibility
to Wang, Bioshen, and Mirigen, giving them the appearance of relying on
original scientific research and thinking.” The court further accepted that the
statements were made in commercial advertising or promotion, and that the
parties competed around the world, including in China.  Finally, and perhaps of greatest interest,
the court accepted that defendants’ conduct affected interstate commerce
because “Bioshen promotes itself as a U.S. company, attendees at the conference
included people who do business in the U.S. and who represent companies that do
business in the U.S., and people who review and comment on U.S. scientific
research.”
The court also found that Wang breached his fiduciary duties
to OmniGen, including, along with the above acts, intentionally sabotaging an
OmniGen study he was assigned to work on, and fabricating or falsifying
data.  OmniGen therefore repeated the
work he was assigned to do.
As to damages, they must be proved to a reasonable degree of
certainty, but where a defendant’s conduct makes damages difficult to
determine, courts allow “broad latitude” in quantifying damages. Defendants’ $821,000 initial investment in Mirigen reflected OmniGen’s
expectation interest under its agreements with Wang: if Wang had fully
performed, “the Chinese patent would have been assigned to OmniGen and the
investment garnered by that patent and other confidential information would
have accrued to Plaintiffs rather than Wang’s competing business entity. These
are concrete, certain, and quantifiable injuries under a contractual theory of
recovery.” OmniGen didn’t seek a separate award for the intentional interference
with economic relations.
On the trade secret claim, $821,000 was likewise reasonably certain
and a conservative valuation of what was misappropriated.  OmniGen was also entitled to punitive damages
due to Wang’s willful and malicious misappropriation, to a maximum of twice
actual damages; the court determined that this was warranted, resulting in a total
award of $2,463,000.  For copyright
infringement, the court accepted that infringement occurred post-registration,
entitling OmniGen to statutory damages. 
Although the court was required to accept that infringement occurred
post-registration, it wasn’t required to accept that the infringement was
willful, as this wasn’t alleged in the complaint, and thus the court awarded
the statutory minimum of $750.
Under the Lanham Act, OmniGen was entitled to damages,
including profits, but defendants’ discovery abuse and spoliation of evidence
related to damages prevented a precise calculation of Defendants’ profits.  The court found it equitable to award OmniGen
the $821,000 as the value of Mirigen. Treble damages could be awarded “if the
allegations in the complaint support it.” 
OmniGen was harmed by defendants’ knowingly false statements, and “[a]s
is common in such false advertising cases, quantifying damages is difficult
(especially where evidence has been systematically destroyed by the defendant).”  The court nonetheless declined to award
OmniGen an estimated $80,000 based on defendants’ head start/avoided costs of
conducting its own studies, finding them an improper measure of actual damages,
and one that would be punitive rather than compensatory. Nonetheless, the
$821,000 was a conservative proxy of damages, and so the court enhanced it to $2,463,000,
as justified by defendants’ intentional/willful conduct, especially in
destroying evidence.  Enhancing damages
would capture otherwise evanescent measures of goodwill, as well as deter
defendants and others similarly situated from engaging in unfair and deceptive
behavior.
Damages from Wang’s breaches of fiduciary duty were the
costs to re-create or repeat research projects because of Wang’s breaches of
fiduciary duty, or $252,000, as well as the recovery of all compensation paid during
his period of disloyalty as damages, or $92,000.
Because OmniGen was limited to a single recovery, the total
was $821,000 for breach of contract, misappropriation of trade secrets, and
false advertising; $344,000 for Wang’s breach of fiduciary duty;  $750 for copyright infringement; and $1,642,000
for enhanced damages under the Lanham Act/punitive damages under state trade
secret law.  [The language of the Lanham
Act that enhanced damages can’t be punitive seems not to do a lot of work,
given how the cases come out.]
The court likewise granted a permanent injunction.  The disclosure or threatened disclosure of
trade secrets or even non-trade secret confidential information was sufficient
to meet the irreparable injury requirement for a preliminary injunction, as was
the consumer confusion, loss of good will, and increased market place barriers
which can result, and, in this case, did result, from false advertising.  [Not clear whether this is entirely
consistent with Herb Reed.]  Damages/legal remedies were also inadequate
because the injuries were difficult to quantify, and they were also ongoing and
could worsen without an injunction.
However, the court would not enjoin
defendants from working for certain types of feed industry businesses; that was
too much of a restraint on trade, as well as unfairly limiting defendants’
ability to satisfy the judgment in this case. The defendants were enjoined against further use of confidential information and false advertising, and also required to assign to OmniGen all their interest in the
Chinese patent and application, as well as register the assignment with the
Chinese government.
The court’s injunction was worldwide, given that defendants’
wrongful actions included conduct in China.

The court also awarded attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to
the Lanham Act, the Oregon Trade Secrets Act, and Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C)
(relating to spoliation of evidence).  As
for the Lanham Act, the complaint’s allegation of intentional and willful false
advertising was, “on its own, sufficient to establish the substantive weakness
of Defendants’ litigation position.” 
Defendants also litigated in an unreasonable manner, including Wang’s
attempt to evade service by lying to the process server, an initial default,
discovery violations, and a destruction of evidence “beyond anything previously
witnessed by this Court.” The award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to the Oregon
Trade Secrets Act and Lanham Act applied to the entire action and not just the
individual claims under which the fees are authorized, because the claims all
involved a common core of facts and were interrelated. Fees awarded were nearly
$990,000.

from Blogger http://ift.tt/2zSxERM

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , , , , | Leave a comment

We got the empire, now as then: Rogers precludes record label suit against Fox show

Twentieth Century
Fox Television v. Empire Distribution, Inc., No. 16-55577 (9th Cir. Nov. 16,
2017) 
“Empire
Distribution, founded in 2010, is a well-known and respected record label that
records and releases albums in the urban music genre.”  Then came Fox’s TV show Empire, “which
portrays a fictional hip hop music label named ‘Empire Enterprises’ that is
based in New York” and “features songs in every episode, including some
original music.” Columbia Records releases music from the show, and Fox
promotes the show and its music through live musical performances, radio play,
and consumer goods such as shirts and champagne glasses bearing the show’s “Empire”
brand.  Fox sought a declaratory judgment
of noninfringement and Empire counterclaimed for infringement and dilution. The
district court granted summary judgment to Fox, relying on Rogers v. Grimaldi, and the court of appeals affirmed.
Empire argued that
at least some of Fox’s uses weren’t part of expressive works and thus outside Rogers: Fox allegedly used the “Empire”
mark “as an umbrella brand to promote and sell music and other commercial
products.” The court of appeals found that these were only “technically”
outside the title or body of an expressive work: works protected by Rogers “may be advertised and marketed
by name.”  There was no reason to think
the TV show was a pretextual expressive work “meant only to disguise a business
profiting from another’s trademark”; Fox’s promotional activities, “including
those that generate revenue, are auxiliary to the television show and music releases,
which lie at the heart of its ‘Empire’ brand.”

A footnote in Rogers says that Rogers’ limiting construction of the Lanham
Act wouldn’t apply to titles that are confusingly similar to other titles,
because the public interest in sparing consumers this type of confusion
outweighs the slight public interest in permitting authors to use such titles.
But appellate courts haven’t cited this footnote, and even the Second Circuit
applied Rogers in the subsequent Cliffs Notes case involving conflicting
titles.  Any such exception might be “ill-advised
or unnecessary,” and was anyway inconsistent with Ninth Circuit precedent speaking
of Rogers as the test that applies
when expressive works are accused.
Applying Rogers: Empire argued that, in order for
Rogers to apply, the mark must have
attained a meaning beyond its source-identifying function.  [Which, not for nothing, “empire” does—it just
had that meaning before Empire entered the scene.] But that’s merely a
consideration—expressive uses often, but not always, occur “when a brand name
enters common parlance and comes to signify something more than the brand
itself,” and Rogers is broader. Then,
unfortunately, the court commented that “a mark that has no meaning beyond its
source-identifying function is more likelyto be used in a way that has ‘no artistic
relevance to the underlying work whatsoever,’ because the work may be “merely
borrow[ing] another’s property to get attention’” (citing Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books, sigh)—which of course is
inconsistent; if the mark didn’t have some sort of meaning beyond source
identification, it wouldn’t make sense to use it to get attention for an
expressive work.
Here, Fox used the
common English word “Empire” for artistically relevant reasons: “the show’s
setting is New York, the Empire State, and its subject matter is a music and
entertainment conglomerate, ‘Empire Enterprises,’ which is itself a figurative
empire.”  Prong one was satisfied. There
was no additional requirement, as argued by Empire, that the junior work refer
to the senior mark. “A title may have artistic relevance by linking the work to
another mark, as with ‘Barbie Girl,’ or it may have artistic relevance by
supporting the themes and geographic setting of the work, as with Empire.”

The title wasn’t
explicitly misleading.  Empire Distribution
argued that the “relevant inquiry . . . is whether the defendant’s use of the
mark would confuse consumers as to the source, sponsorship or content of the
work.” But that’s the general likelihood-of-confusion test, which applies
outside the Rogers context of expressive works. Likely consumer confusion wasn’t
the key, but rather whether there was “an ‘explicit indication,’ ‘overt claim,’
or ‘explicit misstatement’ that caused such consumer confusion.” Fox’s Empire
show contained no overt claims or explicit references to Empire Distribution, and
thus wasn’t explicitly misleading; game over. 

from Blogger http://ift.tt/2hIEjYi

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , | Leave a comment