4th Cir. affirms dismissal where P didn’t allege specific lost consumers or quantify lost sales

Wall & Associates, Inc. v. Better Business Bureau of
Central Virginia, Inc., — Fed.Appx. —-, 2017 WL 1437215, No. 16-1819 (4th
Cir. Apr. 24, 2017)
The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of Wall’s complaint
for false advertising based on statements by the BBB.  Lexmark
requires a plaintiff to show not only false or misleading advertising but also
that such statements caused it actual damages. 
Wall didn’t properly allege causation. 
The false advertising alleged in the complaint was that the BBB falsely
advertised and promoted a system for assigning letter grade ratings to
businesses as “national, uniform, unbiased, and objective” when in reality the
system was implemented based on “subjective, biased, and personal criteria.” Wall
alleged that it was damaged by receiving received a letter grade rating
resulting from “subjective, biased, and arbitrary decisions” when consumers
believed that it had been subjected to a review process that is “national,
uniform, unbiased, and objective” in nature.
Wall’s complaint, however, does not
identify a single consumer who withheld or cancelled business with it or
pointed to a particular quantum of diverted sales or loss of goodwill and
reputation resulting directly from reliance on any false or misleading
representations by Defendants of the letter grade rating system as objective
and unbiased. Given the absence of such fact allegations, Wall did not
adequately allege the necessary proximate cause between its alleged injury and
Defendants’ allegedly violative conduct.

Does that mean that every plaintiff should identify consumers
or allege quantified losses, or will more general allegations suffice when the
harm is more direct/the advertising claim being challenged is more central to
the decision?

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My IP collection widens

Today: Lardashe jeans–it’s quite possible they’d even fit me:

Jordache Enters. v. Hogg Wyld (10th Cir. 1987)

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Reading list: empirical evidence about FTC’s substantiation standard

Sungho Cho &Yongjae Kim, Empirical Rationalization of
Prior Substantiation Doctrine: Federal Trade Commission v. Reebok &
Sketchers, 29 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 55 (2016) (not apparently available online—update
that website, Loyola Consumer Law Review!)
ABSTRACT

Companies frequently make efficacy claims in advertisements
to introduce new products featuring innovative technology. When such claims are
supported by information obtained from scientific research or expert
testimonials, they are subject to the doctrine of prior substantiation. Under
the doctrine, an advertisement claim based on seemingly credible authorities
must be substantiated by a reasonable basis before it is released to the
general public. Otherwise, the advertisement will be in violation of Section
5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act that prohibits “unfair or deceptive
acts affecting commerce.” This study investigates the rationale of the legal
rule in light of consumer behavior theories. While the doctrine has been
normatively rationalized, it has not been empirically examined. Given the
paucity of relevant research, this study will test consumer attitudes and
cognitive reactions toward different types of advertisement messages, such as,
one with establishment claims and the other without such cognitive contents.
The study administered real advertising video clips used by Reebok and
Sketchers, disputed in two settled cases where the Federal Trade Commission
alleged that the defendants failed to satisfy the legal standard of the
substantiation rule. The findings of this study support the rationale of the
rule on the ground that the Reebok advertisement clip delivering expressive
establishment claims about its product efficacy would likely have more of an
immediate impact on consumers’ purchasing intention than Sketchers’ ad without
such cognitive information. Implications and future research along with limitations
are also discussed.

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TM/(c) questions of the day

Which, if any, raise any TM or copyright concerns?

matchboxes with book covers

“phone app sticky notes”

Scented erasers with possibly recognizable trade dresses

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Dastar bars TM claim based on unlicensed copying of footage

Fioranelli v. CBS Broadcasting Inc., No. 15-CV-952, 2017 WL
1400119, — F. Supp. 3d – (S.D.N.Y.  Jan.
19, 2017)
Fioranelli, a photojournalist who was one of four reporters
allowed to enter the World Trade Center site on September 11, 2001, sued for
copyright infringement and related claims. 
In 2014, he registered copyrights on both his own commercially available
documentary of the events, as well as raw footage of the photographs he took
that day.  In 2002, he settled a previous
lawsuit with CBS and granted a limited, nonexclusive license to CBS to use his
work “in all regularly-scheduled and breaking news programming and all news
magazine programs … and in the advertising, publicity and promotions therefor,
produced by CBS owned television stations and CBS News.”  In 2005-2006, allegedly in violation of the
License Agreement, CBS allegedly sublicensed some or all of the 9/11 Material
to at least fifteen companies.
The court first found that Fioranelli stated a claim for
copyright infringement, not just breach of a license agreement, given that the
acts alleged went outside the license. “[I]f ‘a license is limited in scope and
the licensee acts outside the scope, the licensor can bring an action for
copyright infringement.’ ”  The
allegations here were “wholly outside the scope of the License Agreement.” Inducement
claims against many of the defendants were, however, dismissed for want of
specifics.
The court also got rid of Fioranelli’s Lanham Act and
state-law claims on Dastar and
preemption grounds.  Fioranelli argued
that he was allowed to bring a Lanham Act claim “to address the activity of
Defendants that directly affected his business and not just his copyright
rights,” that he had a registration and the plaintiff in Dastar didn’t, and that he produced a tangible good—his footage—not
just an idea.
Dastar applies to
copyrighted and public domain material alike. 
The allegations that “CBS has engaged in false designation of origin and
false descriptions of fact regarding Plaintiff and his work” and that the other
defendants “individually published [the 9/11 Material] as part of their own
media products,” and thereby “have caused or are likely to cause confusion, to
cause mistake, or to deceive as to the origin of Plaintiff’s Work among the
public” stated “the exact type of claim that the holding in Dastar prohibits.”
Consumers who viewed the 9/11 Material as part of
defendants’ programs were “not falsely informed about the origins of the
[material] because [Defendants] did in fact produce” it. Just like the creator
of the footage in Dastar, Fioranelli
was the originator, not the “producer of tangible goods” protected by the
Lanham Act.

The state-law claims fared similarly. The only extra element Fioranelli could
identify was that his claims were based on “damage to his business,” but he
didn’t explain how the alleged damage to his business was the result of
anything other than defendants’ unauthorized copying.

Because the infringing acts alleged commenced before
Fioranelli secured copyright registrations, he was not entitled to statutory
damages or attorney’s fees (though the court declined to address at this time
the argument that the court’s inherent supervisory power allowed it to award
attorney’s fees regardless). 

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“Australian for [American] beer” isn’t deceptive, court rules

Nelson v. MillerCoors, LLC, 15-CV-7082, 2017 WL 1403343, —
F. Supp. 3d – (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2017)
The court dismissed Nelson’s complaint, invoking lots of
different consumer protection laws, based on Miller’s allegedly misleading
marketing of Foster’s Beer, “an Australian-style beer brand.”  Foster’s began exporting to the US in 1972,
and its can labels sported “multiple references to Australian culture and
symbols,” namely “an image of a Red Kangaroo, the national symbol of Australia,
and the Southern Cross constellation,” which is “a main component on the
Australian national flag.” In 2011, all Foster’s Beer sold in the United States
became domestically brewed. MillerCoors allegedly tricked consumers “into
believing they are purchasing the same [imported] product as they had in the
past precisely because it has maintained the same packaging for Foster’s over
time, despite the fact that the Foster’s sold in the United States is also
brewed domestically.  Nelson also pointed
to MillerCoors’s “overall marketing campaign, online and in advertisements,”
including: (1) the brand slogan “Foster’s Australian for Beer”; (2) the “How to
Speak Australian” television ads “depict[ing] Foster’s as being a product from
Australia by using Australian accents and scenery”; and (3) the official
website for Foster’s Beer, which, as of December 2015:
• Noted Foster’s Beer is made out
of hops that are only grown in three locations in Australia, and that “[t]hese
hops and an exclusive Foster’s yeast are what give Foster’s its bold refreshing
taste. The secret yeast doesn’t produce sulfur harshness that other beers can
exhibit, which means that Foster’s taste is never skunky and always
Australian,”
• Advertised, ‘ “Foster’s is
available in more than 150 countries, making it the largest-selling Australian
beer brand in the world,” ’ and
• Displayed “an outline of the
country of Australia, references to [the beer’s] roots and history in
Australia, and use of Australian symbols and phrases including ‘How to Speak
Australian,’ ‘Foster’s — Australian for Beer,’ and a video screen with images
of rugby players.”
This allegedly exploited consumers’ willingness “to pay a
premium for high quality, imported beer.”

The court found no reasonable consumer would be
deceived.  The label clearly discloses
the brewing location and isn’t hidden or in small text. “The idea that
consumers purchase products based on certain of a label’s statements or images
(e.g., pictures of a constellation and a kangaroo) but are blind to others
(e.g., a statement in plain English of where Foster’s Beer is brewed) in close
proximity on that label strains credibility.” 
Disclaimers fail to cure allegedly misleading representations on the
front of packaging “only where the alleged misrepresentation is clearly stated
and the disclaimer is exceedingly vague or requires consumers to make
inferences.”  The disclaimer here was
explicit: “BREWED AND PACKAGED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF FOSTER’S AUSTRALIA LTD,
MELBOURNE, AUSTRALIA BY OIL CAN BREWERIES, ALBANY GA AND FORT WORTH TX.”
[Really? The first geographical words the consumer encounters is “Australia,”
twice.] Likewise, “© Oil Can Breweries, Fort Worth, TX” is displayed on the
Foster’s webpage, which was “inarguably clear as to the brewing location.” 

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Ninth Circuit bars consumer claims challenging assertions of clinical proof

Kwan v. SanMedica Int’l, — F.3d –, No. 15-15496, 2017 WL
1416483 (9th Cir. Apr. 21, 2017)
Kwan alleged that SanMedica’s product SeroVital was falsely
advertised as effective, and the district court dismissed her complaint as a
lack of substantiation claim not actionable under California consumer protection
law. The court of appeals affirmed.
SanMedica advertised, inter alia, that its product had been
clinically tested and shown to produce a 682% increase in human growth hormone
(HGH), which had multiple physical and cosmetic benefits.  To proceed in a challenge to this claim, Kwan
would apparently need to allege “that one or more of the authorities alluded to
actually studied or tested the formula SeroVital contains and found that it
does not produce a 682% mean increase in HGH levels, or that Plaintiff herself
did not experience such an increase when using the product, or that a study
exists somewhere demonstrating that a 682% increase is categorically impossible
to achieve in an over-the-counter pill.” Instead, she only alleged that the study
relied upon to make the claim was “not an example of scientific evidence
recognized by experts, was never peer-reviewed, and was never published in a
peer-reviewed journal.”  So even if
affirmative statements about the existence of clinical tests proving
effectiveness are material to consumers, California law doesn’t allow
challenges to those statements merely because the consumer might be able to
show that the test didn’t demonstrate
the truth of the affirmative statement.
I think this is a mistake—with such evidence, the challenger
has shown that the statement about
clinical proof
is false, even if she hasn’t falsified another part of the
ad; the Lanham Act also doesn’t allow mere lack of substantiation claims, but
Lanham Act jurisprudence correctly recognizes that there can be separable
statements about the proof behind
another statement—and advertisers make those statements in order to convince
consumers that their statements are credible.

The court of appeals found that it wasn’t enough to allege that
the “clinically tested” representation and the health benefit claims falsely
implied that the marketing claims of SeroVital’s health benefits were
clinically proven by credible scientific proof. That was just a lack of
substantiation allegation, repackaged. 
The court rejected Kwan’s invocation of Lanham Act establishment claim
precedent because doing so “would clearly violate recognized California law on
the burden of proof placed on the plaintiff.” 
As readers are probably aware, the burden is also on the plaintiff to
show falsity under the Lanham Act; the Lanham Act precedent, however, makes
clear that statements or implications about proof can themselves be false.  Kwan wasn’t trying to shift the burden of
proof, as the court accused her of doing; she was challenging the truth of some
of SanMedica’s claims.

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Sixth Circuit has nominative fair use sans la lettre

Oaklawn Jockey Club, Inc. v. Kentucky Downs, LLC, No.
16-5582 (6th Cir. Apr. 19, 2017)
Query: Does the Sixth Circuit’s refusal to adopt nominative
fair use, and its insistence on a separate doctrine of “use as a trademark,”
make a difference?  After all, many
courts applying “nominative fair use” conduct the same back-of-the-envelope
mini-confusion inquiry in determining whether there can be any liability as we
see from the court here.
“In 2010, the Kentucky Horse Racing Commission amended its
regulations to permit gambling on historical horse races.”  This is a way of letting people gamble
without live races.  “Customers receive
anonymized information about the historical horses, handicap the race, and place
their bets,” or there’s also apparently an “automatic” feature that skips the
handicapping, so it’s basically a slot machine. 
After bets are placed, the regulations require, “the terminal shall
display a video replay of the race, or a portion thereof, and the official
results of the race. The identity of the race shall be revealed to the patron
after the patron has placed his or her wager.” In defendants’ product, the
replay isn’t an actual replay, but “computer-generated, generic, and lasts for
only a few seconds; it shows only the order of finish and does not attempt to
visually recreate the racetrack that originally hosted the race.”  It does display the track name as part of
substantiating the results.
 

from the brochure
The track owner-plaintiffs have registered marks for their
racing tracks.  They alleged that the use
of their marks was likely to confuse consumers into believing that they are the
source of the video recreation and endorse its accuracy.  Also, the game-maker’s ad brochure includes a
screenshot of a video replay that uses the track names of Mountaineer Casino
Racetrack & Resort, Rockingham Park, and Turf Paradise, though the owners
of these tracks weren’t parties to this suit. The brochure states that “[t]he
Encore RBG System and its individual games have successfully undergone the
rigorous testing of Gaming Laboratories International (GLI), the gold standard
in technical review and authorization of wagering software and hardware.”
“Trademark use” is required before the multifactor confusion
test is applied.  “When the mark is used
in a way that does not deceive the public we see no such sanctity in the word
as to prevent its being used to tell the truth.” Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty,
264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924). “If defendants are only using [the] trademark in a
‘non-trademark’ way—that is, in a way that does not identify the source of a
product—then trademark infringement and false designation of origin laws do not
apply.” Interactive Prods. Corp. v. a2z Mobile Office Sols., Inc., 326 F.3d
687, 695 (6th Cir. 2003).
Well, how do you know? 
The inquiry focuses on “whether a consumer is likely to notice [the
plaintiff’s trademark] . . . and then think that the [defendant’s product] may
be produced by the same company[.]”  Why
is this not a poor woman’s confusion test? 
This is left as an exercise for the reader. In fact, the court described
its earlier Hensley case in these
terms: “Because there was no likelihood of consumer confusion regarding whether
the plaintiff trademark owner was the source of the defendant’s products, we
held that the defendant’s use of the trademark was a permissible non-trademark
use.”
The track owners argued that the display of their marks was a
trademark use because it confuses consumers into believing that the track owners
provided or verified the video replays.  The court of appeals disagreed, pointing out
that there were no live feeds of races or actual video replays.  (If there had been, would that have been
likely to confuse?)  “These depictions
are sufficiently different from the Track Owners’ product—live horse racing at
their venues—that the minimal use of the trademarks, preceded by the word
‘Location,’ would not confuse consumers into believing the videos were provided
by Plaintiffs.”  It could be true that
there is such a thing as “an Oaklawn® horse race,” and thus “deciding where to
watch a live horse race or which live-broadcast race to watch [note: not which
source to watch it via] may be similar to deciding which brand of computer to
purchase.”  But here, “the fact that a
race occurred at Oaklawn or Churchill Downs is relevant only as a factual
matter—it is used so consumers can substantiate the race’s result, not to
promote the quality of Exacta’s product.”
It was fair to say that the marks were used “to substantiate
or legitimize the video,” but “only in the sense that they provide consumers
with the requisite details to verify the video game’s accuracy.”  If the game displayed inaccurate results, it
was unlikely that a consumer would blame or complain to the tracks; the target
of complaint would be defendants, the parties actively representing the
accuracy of the results.  “The term
‘Location’ preceding the trademarks sufficiently explains to consumers that the
trademarks are being used in a wholly descriptive manner and does not cause a
likelihood of confusion as to the source of the video,” especially since the
replay didn’t depict the facilities.
As for Exacta’s advertising materials, the only display of
specific track names appeared in a screenshot of a video replay, and the
brochure touts defendants’ own expertise and goodwill.  “Because this was a non-trademark use of
Plaintiffs’ trademarks, we need not reach the question whether the fair-use
defense applies.”  Sure, fine, whatever.


The same analysis applied to Kentucky common law trademark infringement and
unfair competition claims.

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9th Circuit revives class action against allegedly mislabeled baby food

Bruton v. Gerber Prods. Co., 2017 WL 1396221, — Fed.Appx. —-, No. 15-15174 (9th Cir. Apr. 19, 2017)

Bruton sued Gerber, alleging that labels on certain Gerber baby food products included claims about nutrient and sugar content that were impermissible under FDA regulations incorporated into California law. The district court ruled against her.  The court of appeals, over a partial dissent, reversed and remanded.

First, the district court erred in dismissing Bruton’s claim for unjust enrichment/quasi-contract, because it was unclear at the time whether California allowed a separate unjust enrichment claim, but the California Supreme Court has subsequently clarified California law, allowing an independent claim for unjust enrichment to proceed.

Second, the district court erred in finding that a class would not be “ascertainable.” Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 844 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2017), held that there was no separate “administrative feasibility” requirement for class certification.

Third, there was a genuine dispute of material fact on Bruton’s claims that the labels were deceptive in violation of the UCL, FAL, and CLRA.  The theory of deception doesn’t require literal falsity, but rather that “(a) the presence of the claims on Gerber’s products (in violation of FDA regulations), and (b) the lack of claims on competitors’ products (in compliance with FDA regulations), made Gerber’s labeling likely to mislead the public into believing that Gerber’s products were of a higher quality than its competitors’ products…. [I]t may be literally true that Gerber’s products are ‘As Healthy As Fresh,” but due to external facts—that Gerber does not comply with the FDA regulations that otherwise prevent its competitors from making the same claim—Gerber’s labels mislead in their implications.”

This theory of deception made sense:

Shoppers in a supermarket aisle look for cues about quality in the products they buy. If a shopper sees two products on a shelf and one says “Supports Healthy Growth & Development,” while the other makes no similar claim and is cheaper, a likely inference is that the first product will be viewed as healthier, explaining why it costs more. If the products had been of the same quality, then competitive pressures would have driven the maker of the second product to use the same attractive label. In the baby food market in particular—where measuring the effect of a particular food on one’s own baby’s growth and development is not practical—consumers have to make quality judgments before the baby is fed, based on what they see in front of them at the store. When everyone plays by the rules, this process works reasonably well. But when the maker of one product complies with a ban on attractive label claims, and its competitor does not do so, the normal assumptions no longer hold, and consumers will possibly be left deceived.

Even reviewing the nutritional information of the competing products wouldn’t help. “Consumers cannot easily check claims like ‘Supports Healthy Growth & Development,’ or ‘As Healthy As Fresh,’  against nutritional charts to determine their veracity. Consumers might believe, for instance, that the claims refer to the quality of the produce used or the particular canning process.”  Likewise, they can’t easily figure out the import of the absence of such claims.  Even for seemingly black and white claims like “No Added Sugar,” if Gerber’s product says “No Added Sugar,” and a competitor’s product doesn’t, the nutritional chart won’t the consumer whether any of the sugar in its product was added—it will simply list the amount of “Sugars.” “Nevertheless, the reasonable assumption would be that some of the sugar in that competitor’s product must have been added, or else the competitor would have used the attractive label ‘No Added Sugar.’”

Bruton also submitted enough evidence of likely consumer deception to create a genuine dispute of material fact. The key evidence was the labels.  “A reasonable jury observing Gerber’s labels and comparing them to those of its competitors could rationally conclude that Gerber’s labels were likely to deceive members of the public.”

The district court also erred in granting summary judgment to Gerber on Bruton’s claims that the labels were unlawful under the UCL, which “borrows” predicate legal violations and treats them as independently actionable. The reasonable consumer test is only a requirement under the UCL’s unlawful prong only when it is an element of the predicate violation. The predicate violation here was of California’s Sherman Law, which incorporates standards set by FDA regulations, which include no requirement that reasonable consumers be likely to be deceived.

Judge O’Scannlain dissented from the majority’s conclusion that there was a genuine issue of material fact about consumer deception.  Bruton’s testimony about her own confusion couldn’t satisfy the reasonable consumer standard, because “a few isolated examples of actual deception are insufficient” to create a material dispute over the likelihood of general consumer deception.  The majority’s reliance on the labels was insufficient because the labels weren’t clearly false, as compared to a label “Made in U.S.A.,” when significant parts of the labeled product weren’t made in the US.  “[T]he challenged statements themselves say nothing at all about the quality of Gerber’s products; they simply report—accurately—certain nutritional features of the products.”  Nothing “inherent” in the labels would support a leap from these correct statements to deceptive quality claims, especially because Gerber’s and competitors’ labels include detailed information about their ingredients. Judge O’Scannlain didn’t see any evidence that the challenged statements made Gerber’s labels objectively more “attractive” to a “a significant portion of the general consuming public,” or that consumers consumers would conclude that any price or quality difference between Gerber and its competitors was due “specifically to the challenged label statements (as opposed to any number of other reasons that may have led Gerber’s nationally recognized brand to carry more market power).”

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Georgetown Tech Law Review seeks submissions

From the editors:
The Georgetown Law Technology Review is soliciting content
for fall 2017 publication. Founded in 2015, the Review seeks to build a common
forum for technologists, lawyers, and policymakers to discuss the increasingly
complex intersections between law and technology. It leverages its presence in
Washington, D.C. to focus on legal and policy issues driven by cutting-edge
technological developments. The Review also collaborates with the Georgetown
Law Center on Privacy & Technology, the Georgetown Law Institute for
Technology Law & Policy, and the Georgetown-MIT Privacy Legislation
Practicum to promote and showcase innovative scholarship.
We welcome submissions on a wide variety of topics,
including but not limited to: intellectual property, privacy, cybersecurity,
fintech, and telecommunications. While the Review accepts traditional scholarly
articles, we are especially interested in shorter (5,000-15,000 word) pieces
focused on narrow and timely issues in law and technology. The submission
deadline to ensure fullest consideration for the fall issue is June 30, 2017,
though we are happy to accept submissions on a rolling basis.

If we can provide further information, or if you would like
to discuss a potential submission, please email us at
GLTR.Submissions@gmail.com or visit our website at http://ift.tt/2oOWJah.

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