Reading list: Margaritha Windisch, Unveiling the Bond Between Artists and Their Work: A Vignette Study

Unveiling the Bond Between Artists and Their Work: A Vignette Study

38 Pages

Posted: 12 Feb 2025

Last revised: 19 Feb 2025

Margaritha Windisch

Date Written: January 31, 2025

Abstract

This paper empirically measures the bond between artists and their
work. In a pre-registered vignette study, the impact of generative AI
(Artificial Intelligence) in the creation process on the relationship
between artists and their creations is investigated. The study provides
evidence for the personality-rights theory of copyright law, predominant
in continental Europe, which emphasizes a close personal bond between
creators and their creations. While other theories of copyright law,
such as the incentive and the labor theory, have already received much
attention from the empirical research community, the personality-based
approach to copyright law has been primarily discussed as a mere
theoretical concept. To address this knowledge gap, over 200 art
students from the five top art schools in Switzerland participated in an
online vignette study where they were randomly assigned to go through
the creation process of visual artwork using either (i) traditional
drawing tools on a canvas, (ii) digital drawing software on a tablet, or
(iii) an AI image generator. The results record the degree of the
participants’ emotional attachment to their artwork and indicate a
nuanced relationship between technological tools and the artist’s bond
to their work. While there is no significant di!erence in emotional
attachment between traditional and digital drawing tools, using an AI
image generator leads to a statistically significant decrease in the
artist’s bond to their work and their perception of the work as their
own intellectual creation. These findings suggest that the use of
generative AI tools to create artwork impacts the extent to which
artists can personally express themselves in their artistic endeavors,
which has significant implications for policymakers in the fields of
copyright law and technology as they navigate the landscape of copyright
protection and authorship of AI-generated works. 

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2025/04/reading-list-margaritha-windisch.html

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , | Leave a comment

Canadian-origin “Truffettes de France” are plausibly misleading

James v. Chocmod USA Inc., 2025 WL 950509, No. 1:22-cv-01435
JLT SKO (E.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2025)

Plaintiffs sued over defendant’s “Truffettes de France”
(trans. “Truffles from France”), which are, despite the name, made in Canada. They
brought the usual
California claims
.

Even if the truffles were not physically different, and if—as
defendant argued—it uses the same recipe in France as it does in Canada and
doesn’t charge more based on place of manufacture, California law holds that
there is a cognizable injury. As the California Supreme Court held in Kwikset:

To some consumers, processes and
places of origin matter. … Whether a wine is from a particular locale may
matter to the oenophile who values subtle regional differences.

For each consumer who relies on the
truth and accuracy of a label and is deceived by misrepresentations into making
a purchase, the economic harm is the same: the consumer has purchased a product
that he or she paid more for than he or she otherwise might have been willing
to pay if the product had been labeled accurately. This economic harm—the loss
of real dollars from a consumer’s pocket—is the same whether or not a court
might objectively view the products as functionally equivalent. … Two wines
might to almost any palate taste indistinguishable—but to serious oenophiles,
the difference between one year and the next, between grapes from one valley
and another nearby, might be sufficient to carry with it real economic
differences in how much they would pay.

Chocmod tried to defend by arguing that it had trademark
rights in its brand name and thus no reasonable consumer would be deceived, particularly
because the back label “explicitly states” that they were made in Canada. Initially,
Moore v. Mars Petcare US, Inc., 966 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2020), held:

[B]rand names by themselves can be
misleading in the context of the product being marketed. Descriptive brand
names require of the consumer “little thought,” which can make consumers
susceptible to purchasing because “they won’t have the time or interest to read
about [the product] on [the] website or the back of the box.” Thus, a product
called “One a Day” gummy vitamins, which required two gummies a day for a full
dosage, is explicitly misleading.

The court rejected Chocmod’s argument that “any reasonable
consumer should … be expected to review the packaging to determine the
country of origin, if that is something the consumer feels is important.” The front-label
representations were plausibly misleading to reasonable consumers, who aren’t
required to look beyond the front of the box. Only if reasonable consumers
couldn’t think they’d answered their questions with the front of the package—only
if they’d “necessarily require more information before reasonably
concluding that the label is making a particular representation”—do courts
consider the back as potentially resolving an inherent ambiguity.  (Emphasis mine.)

The brand name “Truffettes de France,” or “Truffles from
France,” was not ambiguous and would plausibly mislead a reasonable consumer.
This was much clearer than ambiguous images or phrases addressed in other
cases. Cf. Culver v. Unilever United States, Inc., 2021 WL 2943937 (C.D.
Cal. June 14, 2021) (front labels “Paris,” Depuis 1747,” and “Que Maille”;
court explicitly distinguished “de Paris”); Eshelby v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 664
F. Supp. 3d 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (“L’Oreal Paris” on front label could lead
reasonable consumers to think that the company originated in Paris, but not that
any particular product was); La Barbera v. Ole Mexican Foods Inc., 2023 WL
4162348 (C.D. Cal. May 18, 2023) (“Phrases like ‘The Taste of Mexico!’ are at
once true in every meaningful sense and meaningless; the point is that they are
different in kind from stating the Products are from Mexico.”).

Here, there was an actual representation about the truffles’
county of origin, which was “so misleading” that a reasonable consumer “need
not search elsewhere for the truth.” Chocmod argued that the product name was
no different from French onion soup, French fries, Belgian chocolates, Mexican
burritos, or Chinese chicken salad. The court was open to the idea that “French
truffles” would be insufficient to satisfy the reasonable consumer test. But “from
France” was different. The label didn’t make representations about style or
recipe, which would be different. Moreover, “the reasonableness of a consumer’s
belief that a salad or other perishable item was shipped from another country
is incomparable to his relative belief as to a shelf-stable product like
chocolate, which was, in fact, shipped from another country—Canada.”

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2025/04/canadian-origin-truffettes-de-france.html

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , | Leave a comment

is selling stolen goods trademark infringement?

Tentantable.com, LLC v. Aljibouri, 2025 WL 959656, No. 22-CV-78-LJV
(W.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2025)

Not sure I’ve seen this before! Is selling stolen goods
trademark infringement? No, this court says, and that has to be right.

Plaintiffs sell “various inflatable products such as bounce
houses[,] water slides, and…air blowers used to inflate such products,” as
well as “party tents, pole tents, [and] banquet tents with associated tables
and chairs.” They claim trademark rights in “Zoom Blowers,” “ ‘Pogo’
inflatables,” and “PartyTentsDirect.com.” They also alleged rights in “a black
and yellow housing for an air blower.” Their application “for the yellow and
black color scheme” is pending at the PTO.

Defendant Mohammed Aljibouri began working at Tentandtable
as a “warehouse supervisor” in October 2019. After he quit, they allegedly discovered
that had been “entering orders” and “making deliveries” of the plaintiffs’
goods for which they had no record and had not been paid. He also had
“stole[n]…property” from the plaintiffs’ warehouse. And even after he left,
he made unauthorized orders by signing in as a Tentandtable user.

Defendants sold the plaintiffs’ products, which “bear[ ] the
[p]laintiffs’ names and trademarks[,] including Tentandtable.com, Zoom Blowers,
Pogo Bounce House[,] and Partytentsdirect.com.” They also allegedly sold yellow
and black air blowers that look “similar[ ]” to the plaintiffs’ air blowers.

The RICO claims failed because they were RICO claims.

Trademark infringement as to the allegedly stolen goods: Selling
goods that have been altered so that they “do not meet the trademark owner’s
quality control standards”—or failing “to observe a restrictive condition on
the sale of a product”—and thereby causing “consumer confusion” may be
infringing. But “repackaging of goods is not trademark infringement if it does
not deceive the public or damage the mark owner’s goodwill.” But the complaint
didn’t allege these things. “[T]he mere fact that the defendants sold the
plaintiffs’ goods with the plaintiffs’ trademarks without their permission is
not enough to state a Lanham Act claim.”

Burton v. Label, LLC, 344 F. Supp. 3d 680 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), rejected
similar claims against a former employee, where the allegations were that the
former employee had “use[d] his position as a Label salesman to sell items
represented to be Label goods by placing orders with Label suppliers” and then
keeping the profits for himself. Unlawfully pocketing proceeds that belonged to
an employer does not constitute false designation of origin. ML Fashion, LLC v.
Nobelle GW, LLC, 2022 WL 313965 (D. Conn. Feb. 2, 2022), likewise rejected
Lanham Act claims based on sales of unaltered but allegedly stolen goods. There
was no actionable misrepresentation-by-omission that they had the right to sell
the goods.

As for the more conventional trade dress claims, they failed
too. First, a trade dress plaintiff must “offer ‘a precise expression of the
character and scope of the claimed trade dress.’ ” This is vital to assessing
protectability, infringement, and the scope of any relief. The court was
unconvinced that plaintiffs had provided the requisite articulation here. The
complaint focused on the air blowers’ yellow and black “design[ ],”
“configuration,” “scheme,” and “appearance.” But they said little more than
“yellow and black.” And a “focus on the overall look of a product does not
permit a plaintiff to dispense with an articulation of the specific elements
which comprise its [trade] dress.” Images attached to the complaint couldn’t
relieve plaintiffs of this burden. Still, the Second Circuit has cautioned that
“a plaintiff that articulates the components of its trade dress with the
requisite precision should not have its claims prematurely dismissed”
regardless of whether the trade dress claimed is sufficiently distinctive.

So the court turned to distinctiveness and found it insufficiently
pled. (It was also skeptical about conclusory allegations of nonfunctionality.)

Product design trade dress always requires secondary meaning,
including the primarily color-based claim here. Plaintiffs did not succeed in
the “formidable task” of pleading secondary meaning for product design. The
complaint was silent on the first four factors courts consider: (1) advertising
expenditures, (2) consumer studies linking the mark to a source, (3)
unsolicited media coverage of the product, and (4) sales success. As to (5),
attempts to “plagiarize” the mark, plaintiffs alleged copying by defendants,
but not by anyone else. “[C]urts have found that when a complaint alleges that
only the defendants have violated the plaintiff’s trade dress, this factor
weighs against an inference of secondary meaning.” As the court noted, “if
allegations of the defendant’s plagiarism were itself enough, this factor
always would weigh in favor of finding acquired secondary meaning.” Finally, the
length of the mark’s use was pled as being since January 2015, and the complaint
didn’t specify that they have used this design “exclusively,” although plaintiffs
referred to the design as “unique.” “But even assuming the plaintiffs have
sufficiently alleged more than seven years of exclusive use, that would not be
enough to state a plausible claim in the absence of any facts relevant to the
other factors.”

The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over remaining claims.

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2025/04/is-selling-stolen-goods-trademark.html

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged | Leave a comment

district court misunderstands “fake sale” claims, finds price not to be a “statement”

Nguyen v. Lovesac Co., 2025 WL 950511, No.
2:24-cv-01293-TLN-JDP (E.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2025)

Weird decision finding that a price isn’t an actionable
representation, which—even if true—ignores the difference between a
price and a putative former price represented by a strikethrough, which
implicates specific provisions of consumer protection law enacted precisely to
protect consumers from false and misleading price comparisons. Nguyen alleged
that Lovesac inflates its product prices for the sole purpose of marking them
at a discounted “sale” price.  Price
quotes allegedly include a purported “discount” the customer is receiving on
their purchase, which correlates with a “limited time sale” and a fictitious
strikethrough reference price accompanied by a purported percentage off. Lovesac
allegedly warrants to consumers that their purchase received a certain “% off”
of their purchase, resulting in “-$XX” to the initial subtotal.

The court initially found that Nguyen didn’t sufficiently
allege which sofa he purchased, though he did allege the price. He didn’t allege
any “particular size, fill, material, or any of the other customizable features
he purchased.” The complaint also failed to allege, about the investigation
purporting to show that the “sales” were not really sales, “what products were
tracked, what the prices were on specific dates, whether any individual item
prices were identified or tracked, whether the investigation included the
specific ‘Sactional’ items Plaintiff purchased, or any other meaningful details
about the investigation.”

More concerningly, the court rejected Nguyen’s allegations of
misleadingness where the product he bought “displayed an original,
strike-through price of $7,175.00, representing [a] purported $1,793.75
‘discount.’ ” The court instead relied on cases holding that “the price of a
product can[not] constitute a representation or statement about the product.” Parent
v. Millercoors LLC, No. 3:15-cv-1204-GPC-WVG, 2016 WL 3348818 (S.D. Cal. June
16, 2016); Boris v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 3d 1163 (C.D. Cal. 2014).
But a “price” is not a juxtaposition with a putative former/regular price—as
evidenced by the fact that legislatures around the country bar specifically false
advertising relating to “sales.” It’s not the actual selling price that makes
the misrepresentation—it’s the struck-through price presented as some sort of
ordinary price. But the court missed that distinction: “pricing about the
product alone cannot constitute a representation or statement about the
product.”

The California Supreme Court, however, has specifically held that a consumer who buys a product in reliance on a false/misleading reference price has suffered an injury. Hinojos v. Kohl’s Corp., 718 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Dhruv Grewal & Larry D. Compeau, Comparative Price Advertising: Informative or Deceptive?, 11 J. PUB. POL’Y & MKTG. 52 (1992) (“By creating an impression of savings, the presence of a higher reference price enhances subjects’ perceived value and willingness to buy the product. . . . [E]mpirical studies indicate that as discount size increases, consumers’ perceptions of value and their willingness to buy the product increase, while their intention to search for a lower price decreases.”)). As the Hinojos court pointed out, the “what a great bargain!” effect is exactly why the California legislature barred the practice.

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2025/04/district-court-misunderstands-fake-sale.html

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , | Leave a comment

trademark question of the day

 

“One Wing to Rule Them All” ad from Moby Dick. “Marinated in Moby’s secret spices and flame-kissed to perfectoin, these delicious wings have the power to put fellowships at risk!”

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2025/04/trademark-question-of-day.html

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged | Leave a comment

advertising game device’s legality amidst gambling prosecutions could violate the Lanham Act

TNT Amusements, Inc. v. Torch Electronics, LLC, 2025 WL
947506, No. 4:23-CV-330-JAR (E.D. Mo. Mar. 28, 2025)

The parties compete in the market for “retail amusement
devices.” TNT owns and leases out traditional arcade games and similar
amusement equipment (e.g., foosball and pool tables, dart boards, pinball
machines, juke boxes) to various retailers. Torch leases putatively “no-chance”
gaming machines. TNT alleged that Torch operates illegal slot machines and
touts them as legal. Here, the Lanham Act false advertising claim survives for
a jury, but the RICO claims are tossed out on summary judgment because they’re RICO
claims.

I’m going to try to strip down the extensive regulatory background, but
gambling is heavily regulated in Missouri. Relevant definitions include:

(4) “Gambling”, a person engages in
gambling when he or she stakes or risks something of value upon the outcome of
a contest of chance or a future contingent event not under his or her control
or influence, upon an agreement or understanding that he or she will receive
something of value in the event of a certain outcome. …

(11) “Slot machine”, a gambling
device that as a result of the insertion of a coin or other object operates,
either completely automatically or with the aid of some physical act by the
player, in such a manner that, depending upon elements of chance, it may eject
something of value. A device so constructed or readily adaptable or convertible
to such use is no less a slot machine because it is not in working order or
because some mechanical act of manipulation or repair is required to accomplish
its adaptation, conversion or workability. Nor is it any less a slot machine
because apart from its use or adaptability as such it may also sell or deliver
something of value on a basis other than chance.

Possession of a gambling device is a Class A misdemeanor.
Any building used for unlawful gambling is considered a public nuisance.

Torch’s game machines feature at least five game themes, and
each theme offers several play levels. “A game theme is a series of visual
images displayed to entertain the player, revealing a combination of winning or
losing symbols on each turn. A play level dictates the payment required to play
the next turn.”

picture of a “no chance” device

The record showed that the software for a Torch device has a
randomly selected starting point for each theme/play level combo. “From any
given starting point, for each turn of play, the software cycles through
pre-determined and finite sequential pools of 60,000 to 100,000 outcomes,
depending on the game theme,” like a counter (but not in numerical order)
ticking forward one at a time until it cycles back to the beginning. “There is
nothing a player can do to alter the payout amount of a turn before or after
the player inserts money.”

Torch devices only take bills, “so, if there is a balance of
$0.25 when a player decides to stop playing, there is no way to recover that
amount.” Each device has an optional “prize viewer” that allows the player to
preview the next payout amount, but only the next payout amount. “So, for
example, if a player selects the prize viewer and sees that the next payout
amount is $0 and she wants to obtain a better result, she must play through
that $0 turn and continue playing. She cannot skip ahead. If she wants to know
the payout of the second, third, or any future turn, she must pay for and play
through those additional turns.” Using the prize viewer doesn’t change the
odds, though “Torch devices are configured to enable the commercial operator to
adjust the settings to require a player to pay extra to use the prize viewer.” According
to a specialist with the Missouri Gaming Commission, absent the preview
feature, Torch machines “essentially play just like a slot machine.”

Torch advertises that the devices are not gambling machines.
Until September 2022, its website said:

Torch’s No Chance Game Machines are
legal. Torch’s No Chance Game Machines are an innovative non-gambling game
machine.

Why are No Chance Game Machines
different?

Under Missouri law, a “gambling
device” is defined as having three elements: consideration (money in), prize
(money out), and chance (unknown outcome).

Torch’s No Chance Games obviously
have the elements of “consideration” and “prize”, but have been carefully
designed to eliminate the element of “chance” (which Missouri law defines as
the material component of a gambling device). If the player does not like the
predetermined outcome, they can choose not to play. If they have a balance on
the machine, they can redeem their balance at any time.  

The “Prize Viewer” option on NCGs
eliminates chance.

In mid-September 2022, Torch revised its website to state
only this:

Torch’s No Chance Games are the
first of an entirely new entertainment concept; a game in which there is no
element of chance.

Importantly, the player may view
each and every outcome which may entitle them a prize before playing the game.
They may simply touch the “Prize Viewer” button on the game console and view
the result of the game before playing. As such, the player can decide if they
want to play the game or not based on the pre-determined outcome.

Each Torch device bears a disclaimer:

The Amusement Device to which this
disclaimer is attached provides each player of the device with information on
the specific outcome of each electronic amusement game offered thereon. The
information with respect to each such outcome is provided prior to such
player’s participation in any such game. Consequently, this amusement device is
designed to provide no contest and no chance in the games offered to its
players.

… In Missouri (as in most states),
in order to be considered “gambling,” an element of chance or a contest must be
present in the activity … As noted above, this amusement device is designed to
offer no contest of chance as the outcome is known by players before any
amusement game is initiated. Therefore, the activity offered by this device
clearly does not meet the definition of “gambling.” As a result, this amusement
device does not fit any definition of “gambling device” in the state of
Missouri and is not prohibited for use by you. …

Torch “no chance” ad

Its ad flyers make similar claims, as do its oral representations.
“As such, Defendants have not taken measures to prevent problem gamblers or
gambling addicts from playing Torch devices, nor have they taken measures to
prevent children from playing other than instructing customers not to allow it.”
Torch doesn’t have a gaming license.

At least 20 locations where defendants operate Torch devices
are current or previous customers of TNT. There have been as many as 15,000
Torch devices in Missouri. TNT’s customers have directed TNT to remove at least
19 machines from overlapping locations in order to make room for Torch devices.
The Torch games displaced TNT games because they made more money (and revenue
is split with retailers).

You will not be surprised to learn that the history of evading
gambling regulations is long:  

Over 100 years ago, in City of
Moberly v. Deskin, 155 S.W. 842 (Mo. App. 1913), a Missouri appellate court was
asked to determine whether a slot-machine-like gum dispenser was a gambling
device. The machine had a prize preview feature showing in advance what the
player would receive on the next play. The defendant argued that each turn was
a separate and independent business transaction and there was no chance
involved as the player knew in advance what he would receive for his nickel. The
court rejected this theory, finding the defendant’s position “unsound” because
the “contrivance” was clearly intended to “allure” the player into continuing
in the hope of a better outcome.

Deskin is still good law; Missouri legalized some gambling
in 1994 but made no change in its definitions that would abrogate its rule. The
parties, other operators, and officials have nonetheless debated the legality
of “no-chance” prize viewer games and proposed various legislative changes specifically
drafted to encompass machines with a preview feature, but nothing has happened
yet. In January 2017, Torch obtained a legal opinion from a Chicago law firm
concluding that “no chance” gaming devices were legal under Missouri law, and Torch
maintained this position in contacts with prosecutors. After Torch’s owner met
with the Phelps County prosecuting attorney, the latter informed local law
enforcement that he would not pursue prosecution involving Torch devices. But,
around the same time, local officials in Franklin County warned Torch that the
Missouri Gaming Commission deemed the devices illegal and the prosecutor would
“absolutely consider prosecution regardless of Phelps County opinion.” TNT also
secured an advisory opinion from the Missouri Gaming Commission in 2019 that the
devices were indeed gambling devices and slot machines notwithstanding the
prize viewer feature. Torch’s lawyer acknowledged the Commission’s position but
recommended that Torch maintain its public stance that that “MGC has nothing to
say about Torch’s games.” In 2023, defendants were denied a business license in
Branson based on the Gaming Commission’s position that Torch devices are
illegal, and a Platte County prosecutor successfully charged a business with a
class E felony for operating “no chance” prize viewer devices in local
convenience stores in 2019. Other attempted prosecutions were dismissed or are
ongoing, as are fights over seizures of Torch machines as illegal gambling
devices. “In their field investigations, Commission representatives observed
consumers playing Torch devices like slot machines without using the prize
viewers.”

Torch’s challenge to TNT’s standing went nowhere; the
parties were direct competitors and there was enough evidence for a jury to
conclude that there was a causal connection between Torch’s sales and TNT’s
claimed losses. TNT provided evidence of TNT machines that were replaced with
Torch devices and its witness also testified that many customers have asked her
if TNT offers products similar to Torch games. There were other possible
explanations why customers removed TNT devices, such as wanting newer equipment
or more profitable devices, but that was a fact question for the jury.

What about falsity? Torch made extensive claims that the
devices didn’t involve chance and weren’t gambling devices. Were these non-actionable
statements of opinion, or potentially falsifiable? Courts sometimes refuse to
consider statements about legality to be falsifiable in the absence of a “clear
and unambiguous statement” from the regulator. For example, Coastal Abstract
Service, Inc. v. First American Title Insurance. Co., 173 F.3d 725 (9th Cir.
1999), held that, “[a]bsent a clear and unambiguous ruling from a court or
agency of competent jurisdiction, statements by laypersons that purport to
interpret the meaning of a statute or regulation are opinion statements, and
not statements of fact.” The court thought the Eighth Circuit would agree, and
cited Dental Recycling N. Am., Inc. v. Stoma Ventures, LLC, No. 4:23 CV 670
CDP, 2023 WL 6389071 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 2, 2023) (allowing Lanham Act claim where a
defendant represented that its product was compliant with EPA regulations when
technically it was not; reasoning that “an opinion by a speaker who lacks a
good faith belief in the truth of the statement is actionable”).

Under these circumstances, the evidence was sufficient to go
to a jury. The representations on Torch’s website and devices were clearly
intended to be “reasonably interpreted as a statement of objective fact” and
not merely opinion. And the anti-gambling law requires only “an element of
chance.” “[I]t is now undisputed that Torch devices contain random entry points
at each play level in each game theme.” There could be as many as three million
potential outcomes, reflecting “a material degree of chance such that a jury
could find literally false Defendants’ unambiguous representation that ‘chance
has absolutely no role.’” The law even says “a slot machine is no less a slot
machine when it delivers something of value on a basis other than chance –
e.g., large sequential pools.” The court didn’t see a meaningful difference
between randomly reshuffling each time and “random-entry-point 100,000-outcome
pools yielding three million possibilities.” There was absolutely no reason for
the state to intend to regulate one technology and not the other. See Thole v.
Westfall, 682 S.W.2d 33, 37 (Mo. App. E.D. 1984) (“In the slot machine games,
the objects that appear on the screen are determined by the devices’ electronic
circuitry and the player has no control over which combination of objects will
appear. Thus, from the player’s point of view, winning is purely a matter of
luck, a matter of chance.”). [Exactly!]

In addition, the decidedly mixed and often unfavorable results
of Torch devices’ encounters with the law provided context to show “Torch’s
actual knowledge that its legal assurances were false, or at least patently
misleading.” Unlike cases where no clear guidance existed at the time of the
statements, “Defendants have been well aware since 2018 that the Missouri
Gaming Commission, state and local law enforcement, numerous county
prosecutors, and at least one state circuit court have deemed Torch devices
illegal under Missouri law.” The Platte County conviction, for example, was a
“clear and unambiguous ruling from a court … of competent jurisdiction” even
without appellate review, and the Gaming Commission’s 2019 opinion was “an
equally clear declaration by the competent agency. On this record, Defendants
cannot credibly claim that their unambiguous representations of legality –
asserted as unequivocal fact on the website and on each device – were mere lay
opinions lacking the benefit of clarity from a court or agency.”

Even without literal falsity, a jury could readily find
misleadingness/deceptiveness, “especially given that law enforcement officials
explicitly warned Defendants that their customers would be prosecuted for
operating the devices. Torch was so acutely aware of this real risk that it
offered to fund customers’ legal defense. This belies good faith and at least
creates a triable issue as to Defendants’ knowledge.”

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2025/04/advertising-game-devices-legality.html

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged | Leave a comment

game over for allegations relating to misattributed/distorted consumer complaints

Skillz Platform Inc. v. Papaya Gaming, Ltd., 2025 WL 918411,
24cv1646(DLC) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2025)

Previously,
the court partially granted Skillz’s motion to dismiss Papaya’s amended counterclaims;
Papaya sought leave to file further amended counterclaims, which the court denied.

The parties compete in the market
for mobile games that allow users to spend and win money (and in-game prizes). “Users
of Papaya’s games typically compete with between five and twenty opponents. …
The Skillz platform hosts games, each of which allows gameplay between only two
players, created by third-party developers.” Skillz allegedly “engaged in a
multipronged campaign to discredit Papaya in the eyes of the public and law
enforcement officials regarding Papaya’s use of robots or ‘bots.’”

The challenged conduct included an
alleged “false-front organization called 4 Fair Play” that “solicited
complaints from consumers about Papaya and other competitors of Skillz.” As
alleged:

Skillz forwarded
these complaints to state attorneys general. But before doing so, it added
stock language to the complaint, which said “I’m a resident of your state and I
would like to make you aware of a mobile game that is defrauding consumers like
me out of their hard-earned money. I strongly believe the following games use
AI or ‘bots’ to scam players by pretending that those are real players.” It
then listed the games selected on the complaint form. Skillz did not tell
complainants it was adding this language. Most complaints that 4 Fair Play
received did not mention bot use, but the stock language, which misleadingly
appeared to have been written by the complainant, was added to them anyway.
Skillz “spot checked” the complaints that it forwarded to law enforcement, but
it otherwise did not vet them to make sure they came from real people.

This Skillz-added material in the forwarded consumer complaints
was not alleged in the previous counterclaims.

The 4 Fair Play website also included short quotations purportedly
from consumers complaining about Papaya’s games. “These testimonials, each one
or two sentences long, were attributed to consumers identified only by initials
and state of origin … or by the game they had played.” Skillz itself allegedly
drafted some of those testimonials, and they had not come from real consumers. “Other
testimonials did come from real consumers but had been edited by Skillz.” The
fact that these weren’t real consumers or real quotes was added to the proposed
counterclaims.

[Gotta say, if we had a working FTC, this would be the kind
of thing that the FTC considers deceptive, though it might well leave the
parties to private remedies given their incentives to litigate and the lack of
direct sales from the website.]

Finally,

[p]ortraying itself as a “public
policy group conducting research,” 4 Fair Play contacted Skillz employees … and
offered recipients $300 for participating in interviews meant to “better
understand the mobile gaming industry.” An internal guide, which was edited by
Skillz executives, encouraged interviewers to ask questions about Papaya’s use
of bots. The involvement of Skillz and 4 Fair Play in this scheme was hidden.

Despite NDAs, two former Papaya employees participated in
interviews and “disclosed information about when and why bots are used and the
coding behind the bots, among other things.” Using this information, Skillz
publicly accused Papaya of using bots. It also sued Papaya for false
advertising about lack of bots. The proposed counterclaims added an unfair
competition claim based on these facts.

The existing surviving counterclaims relate to Papaya’s challenges
to Skillz’ advertising that its own platform did not use bots, matched players
evenly, and allowed customers to withdraw cash at any time.

The new allegations didn’t change the outcome for Papaya.
Misleadingly adding to consumer complaints before sending them to state law
enforcement doesn’t violate the Lanham Act because it’s not “commercial
advertising or promotion.” It also doesn’t violate NY GBL § 349 because it
doesn’t involve consumer-facing representations/consumer-oriented conduct.

That leaves defamation, but falsity requires pleading that
the alleged statement is not “substantially true,” meaning that it “could have
produced no worse an effect on the mind of a reader than the truth pertinent to
the allegation.” But Papaya didn’t allege that “the substantive content of this
stock language was false—just that it was misattributed.” Nor did it allege
that state authorities ever did anything with these communications or that they
became public. There was thus no allegation of harm, “reputational or
otherwise.” The statements couldn’t be per se actionable, which requires proof
that the statement “impugns the basic integrity or creditworthiness of a
business.” But, while “the integrity of Papaya’s business practices and its
deception of the public about its historic use of bots to compete with
customers in its games of ‘skill’ are at the heart of this case,” Papaya didn’t
deny such undisclosed historic use in the proposed amended complaint, and thus
wouldn’t be able to prove the falsity of the supposedly defamatory statement at
trial. Footnote: “In recent depositions, none of Papaya’s individual deposition
witnesses denied the historic use of bots, as they all asserted their Fifth
Amendment rights against self-incrimination rather than testifying to any
potentially disputed facts.” [Yikes!]

Misattribution of testimonials: Both Lanham Act and GBL
claims require materiality, and Papaya didn’t allege that the content of
the testimonials (accusing Papaya of using bots or being unfair generally) were
false, nor that numerous real consumers were not submitting complaints along
these lines. Even if the consumers “(barely) identified by the website –‘J.P.
from Florida,’ ‘Bingo Cash Player,’ and the like” didn’t write “the specific
words included in the displayed testimonials,” it was not plausible that the misattribution
was material and caused injury.  

[N]o reasonable jury could find
that anyone’s purchasing decisions would have been affected (or that consumers
would be affected in any other meaningful sense) by the fact that a real “J.P.
from Florida” did not say the words, “I have genuinely never played a game that
is so rigged in my life.” While parties generally “should be given the
opportunity to develop their evidence to demonstrate materiality,” the
pleadings must set forth some plausible basis for the defendant to ultimately
be held liable.

Finally, the interview scheme wasn’t actionable. “The
essence of an unfair competition claim under New York law is that the defendant
misappropriated the fruit of plaintiff’s labors and expenditures by obtaining
access to plaintiff’s business idea either through fraud or deception, or an
abuse of a fiduciary or confidential relationship.” Although Skillz allegedly used
deceptive means to obtain information about Papaya’s business, there were no
allegations that Skillz actually did anything with that information. Yes,
Skillz told reporters that Papaya was using bots in its games. But according to
the complaint itself, “Skillz was publicly accusing Papaya of using bots well
before the interviews took place anyway.” Given that context, “characterizing
the accusation that Papaya used bots as a trade secret is a stretch at best.” And
even if it was, this conduct wasn’t unfair competition.

 

 

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2025/03/game-over-for-allegations-relating-to.html

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged | Leave a comment

honey producers have statutory standing to challenge Bayer’s claims to direct purchasers that herbicides were safe

Coy’s Honey Farm, Inc. v. Bayer Corp., MDL
No.:1:18-md-02820-SNLJ, No. 1:21-CV-089-SNLJ, 2025 WL 901264 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 25,
2025)

Coy’s s a beekeeping and honey-producing operation. It
alleged that dicamba-based herbicide products, including those produced by
defendants, moved away from the targeted dicamba-tolerant plants and damaged
non-tolerant vegetation surrounding plaintiff’s beekeeping operation. This
allegedly resulted in reduced honey production and loss of bees. The court
allows Lanham Act false advertising claims (and others) to proceed. I think the
proximate cause question is interesting, but the other claims may have obscured
the specific proximate cause question with respect to false advertising, since
there was a material issue of fact on proximate causation of damage to the bees/honey.

The Lanham Act claim is based on defendants’ alleged false
representations that their dicamba products were safe for the type of use that
allegedly let them to volatize and spread to surrounding areas after being
applied to the intended target of soybean and cotton fields. Misled purchasers
then used the dicamba as directed, which “allegedly resulted in the destruction
of a great deal of plant habitat for the honeybees, and, in turn, caused the
bees to produce less honey. Thence, plaintiff profited less.” There was a fact
issue on whether that had happened.

But was there Lanham Act standing? Lexmark held that
a plaintiff must “allege an injury to a commercial interest in reputation or
sales proximately caused by the defendant’s misrepresentations.” That is, a
Lanham Act plaintiff must be a commercial actor suffering commercial injuries
instead of being a “consumer who is hoodwinked into purchasing a disappointing
product.” “Here, there is no question that plaintiff is a commercial actor, and
plaintiff has alleged a loss in sales due to defendants’ misrepresentations.”
The “due to” is doing a lot of work there—I’m open to the argument that the
honey producers are at least as distant from the false advertising as the
landlord of a business that suffers damage from false advertising. But
proximate cause is, of course, a legal rather than factual conclusion.

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2025/03/honey-producers-have-statutory-standing.html

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , | Leave a comment

National Republican Senatorial Committee loses ROP/Lanham Act/UCL claims against alleged “Scam PAC”

National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Red Senate, 2025
WL 819711, No. 8:24-cv-02301-JVS-KES (C.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2025)

NRSC sued Red State, alleging that it was exploiting Senator
Rick Scott’s “name, image, and likeness without his consent to deceive and scam
potential donors…” Red State is a Super PAC, which may accept “unlimited
contributions” from nearly any domestic source “so long as it does not
coordinate its public communications with any federal candidate.” But NRSC
alleged that it was a scam, misleading donors “into believing that their
contributions will support a particular candidate or cause, when in reality the
Scam PAC plows that cash into endless fundraising that ultimately funds little
more than the salaries of its officers and its preferred vendors, who profit
handsomely.”

NRSC alleged that, according to FEC disclosures, Red Senate
raised over $2.6 million in the 2019-2020 election cycle and spent over $1.1
million in total disbursements during the cycle, including over $1 million in
operating expenses. The 2021-2022 election cycle had similar numbers, and, at
the time the complaint was filed, Red Senate had raised over $300,000 in the
current election cycle, and spent over $500,000, with approximately $450,000
going towards operating expenses. Thus, NRSC alleged, Red Senate merely
compensates vendors and keeps any leftover cash, harming the candidates “they
purport to be supporting” in the process.

Red Senate allegedly allocates the bulk of its spending to
Wavecrest or Google Ads. According to the Google Ads Transparency Center, Red
Senate has paid between $35,000 to $40,000 for Google ads mentioning Senator
Scott, which were shown between 70,000 to 80,000 times throughout the United
States. The advertisements specifically state: “Red Senate for Rick Scott –
Keep Florida Red in 2024,” and “Red Senate for Rick Scott – Take Back Our
Senate in 2024.” Red Senate also reported making independent expenditures in
the 2024 Florida Senate race; however, as of October 2, 2024, none of the
reported expenditures expressly advocated for Senator Scott or his opponent. Rather,
“the reported expenditures served to raise funds for Red Senate while using
Rick Scott’s name and likeness.”

Senator Scott allegedly assigned his rights to NRSC, and,
“as the only national party committee solely purposed to supporting Republican
senate candidates,” NRSC claims to have an independent interest in stopping
false advertising and false personification of Republican candidates. NRSC sued
for California statutory and common law right of publicity violations, Lanham
Act false advertising, and unfair competition under California’s UCL.

The court took judicial notice of the existence of
disclaimers on Red Senate’s website, though not their accuracy, and did the
same for the content of FEC reports filed by Red Senate. And it took judicial
notice of the “fact that there has been significant news media coverage of
Senator Rick Scott, his 2025 campaign for re-election to the United States
Senate, and his opponent Debbie Mucarsel-Powell.”

Initially, NRSC’s statement that Senator Scott’s assignment was
exclusive was sufficient to establish standing to assert his claims as an
initial matter. But did Scott have statutory Lanham Act standing? He needed to
allege an “injury to a commercial interest in reputation or sales.” NRSC argued
that the parties competed in “the political-fundraising marketplace,” meaning that
“potentially millions of dollars were diverted from his campaign.” But the
complaint didn’t so allege; its only allegations focused on the deception of
donors. But the court granted leave to amend. (Seems like “commercial
advertising or promotion” is going to be an insuperable barrier here.)

California’s UCL requires “the plaintiff to be the one ‘who
has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of the
unfair competition.’ ” Consequently, “an injured [party’s] assignment of rights
cannot confer standing on an uninjured assignee.” NRSC’s allegation of its own
interest in stopping false advertising and false personification of Republican
candidates was not enough to satisfy this burden; again, there was leave to
amend.

As for the California claims, they were subject to
anti-SLAPP analysis. NRSC argued that its complaint “challenges Red Senate’s
deceptive conduct in fundraising—not the message it conveys in its ads,” so
that the lawsuit did not “arise from” any statements that Red Senate made “in
relation to political campaigns.” Instead, it arose from its post-speech
conduct—its spending allocation. (I thought political spending was speech.) The
court was unpersuaded by these arguments. “First, it is well settled that the
anti-SLAPP statute applies to conduct in furtherance of the right to free
speech, in addition to the protected speech itself. Second, even if the lawsuit
as a whole challenges Red Senate’s disbursement of funds, the right of
publicity claims specifically target Red Senate’s use of Senator Scott’s name
in Google ads.” The speech was itself allegedly wrongful, not merely evidence
of a wrongful act (fundraising misconduct). “[H]ad Red Senate never used
Senator Scott’s name in its Google advertisements, NRSC would have no right to
publicity claims.”

Thus, the burden shifted to NRSC to demonstrate a
probability of prevailing on the merits of its claims. For a common law cause
of action for commercial misappropriation, a plaintiff must prove: “(1) the
defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s identity; (2) the appropriation of
plaintiff’s name or likeness to defendant’s advantage, commercially or
otherwise; (3) lack of consent; and (4) resulting injury.” The statutory cause
of action requires commercial misappropriation.

Red Senate argued that its speech was related to a political
campaign, a matter of public interest, and that NRSC couldn’t prove that Scott’s
image was used “exclusively” for commercial gain. NRSC’s argument that Red
Senate’s speech was unprotected because it was fraudulent lacked sufficient
evidence. The exception for political speech isn’t limited to specific types of
political campaigns; nor does the “underlying purpose of one’s dissemination of
a political message” determine whether an exception applies. Motion to strike
granted, with leave to amend. (How could there be a successful amendment,
especially for the statutory cause of action?)

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2025/03/national-republican-senatorial.html

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , , , , | Leave a comment

Reading List: morality and trademarks in South Asia

Zehra Jafri, One Sari, Three Different Ways
to Drape It: Trademarks, Religion, Language, and Morality in Post-Colonial
India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh
, 40 UCLA Pacific Basin Law Journal 127 (2023)

 Abstract:

Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh
were all established on a sense of wanting to be a majority in a nation where
they were once “othered,” be it by the British, Hindu majority, or
Urdu-speaking majority. As a result, religious independence and mother-tongue/linguistic
independence are highly valued in these countries, and are the context by which
the morality of trademarks within the borders of these countries are assessed.
Notions of free speech traditions and political ideologies that also color
traditions are discussed, as they also run abreast trademark law. Although
these three countries once emerged from one land, they carry differences as
distinct and rich as the cultural and religious historical tensions that define
them. Each sought to create a space where their cultural and religious
identities were represented fairly. As thus, it is no surprise that religion is
such an important consideration that it was codified into each country’s
trademark law. 

This paper aims to illustrate what
each country deems as running afoul to notions of morality and religious
susceptibilities, and how that may have changed over time with politics and
other social factors. The factors that may have influenced these definitions is
assessed in depth by country, with homage to the political structures and free
speech traditions within which they are nested. A framework of what would and
what wouldn’t qualify as a registrable trademark under the morality bar is
posited through an analysis of government guidelines on registering trademarks,
case law, and a comparative analysis of certain marks that were treated one way
under one country’s standard but could be treated differently under different
standards from other countries.

 

Some interesting passages (footnotes omitted):

[U]nder Section 9(2)(c) [of Indian
trademark law], a mark is prohibited for registration as a trademark if it
contains or comprises of any matter likely to hurt the religious
susceptibilities of any class or section of the citizens of India. The Draft
Manual further explicitly acknowledges that it is a common trade practice in
India to use names and pictures of religious deities or symbols as trademarks. Accordingly
such use is not regarded per se as offending religious sentiments of any class
or section of public. However, such use in relation to certain goods may offend
the religious sentiments of the people. For example, the use of the names or
device of deities or religious heads on footwear will be considered distasteful
and will be open to objection. Similarly, use of Hindu Gods on beef or meat
products or use of names of Muslim saints on pork products would offend the
religious feeling of respective sections of the public and may attract
objection under this section. … The Draft Manual goes on to list illustrative
examples. The use of religious symbols (like OM) or names (e.g., Jesus) as
trademarks is likely to undermine/offend religious value and sentiments. Names
of gods or goddesses which are also used as personal names may be considered as
personal names for registration purpose, unless accompanied by the device of
such god or goddess.

 

… Not included in the explicit list
of unauthorized religious names in the trademark guidance are Islamic marks.
All of the explicitly prohibited religious deities and figures are Hindu, Jain,
and Sikh. By including only Hindu, Sikh, and Jain names in the official
guidance of prohibited marks, India may also project a certain vision of Indian
identity in line with the “pseudo-secularism” and Hindutva ideology espoused by
Modi and the BJP, which has its roots from the religious tension harbored from
the partition between India and Pakistan.

 

The author notes that marks containing “Allah” are, however,
apparently routinely refused.

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2025/03/reading-list-morality-and-trademarks-in.html

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , | Leave a comment