Initial interest false advertising (aka bait and switch) in Google ads

Beacon Plumbing & Mechanical Inc. v. Sposari Inc., 2016
WL 5795282, No. C15-1613 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 17, 2016)
Beacon sued defendants, including Sposari, which does
buisiness as Mr. Rooter Plumbing Services, for trademark infringement and
dilution (federal claim dismissed) and related claims.  The internet ads at issue said “Call 24/7
Beacon Plumbing” and displayed the address “beacon.callnow-plumber.com.”  However, the ads eld to a website advertising
“Mr. Rooter Plumbing.”  The court found
that the false advertising allegations plausibly alleged materiality.  It was plausible that a consumer who clicked
on this ad could experience actual confusion and “conclude that Beacon Plumbing
and Mr. Rooter Plumbing are the same entity.” This mistake, “combined with
intent to purchase plumbing services from Beacon Plumbing,” would likely influence
a purchasing decision.  Though Beacon
didn’t cite cases finding initial interest confusion cognizable as such for a
false advertising claim, the argument made sense. (It’s also usually known as “bait
and switch” in false advertising law.)
The ACPA claim failed, however, because “beacon” in “beacon.callnow-plumber.com”—is
a third-level domain, and third-level domain names aren’t within the ACPA’s
reach.

The Washington Consumer Protection Act claim required, along
with falsity causing harm to the plaintiff, a public interest impact.  A practice must have “the capacity to deceive
‘a substantial portion’ of the public.” Relevant factors include: “(1) Were the
alleged acts committed in the course of defendant’s business? (2) Did defendant
advertise to the public in general? (3) Did defendant actively solicit this
particular plaintiff, indicating potential solicitation of others? (4) Did
plaintiff and defendant occupy unequal bargaining positions?” Also, “intentional
trademark infringement can satisfy the public interest impact element.” Given
that (1) and (2) were allegedly present, and the allegations of intentional
infringement, the court found that the CPA claim could continue.

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Don’t sell a business and then keep running it

Electrology Laboratory, Inc. v. Kunze, 169 F.Supp.3d 1119
(D. Colo. 2016)
Larry Paul Kunze a/k/a Lorenzo Kunzel sold his family
business, plaintiff ELI (d/b/a Rocky Mountain Laser College/RMLC), “but
couldn’t give it up. So, as the evidence revealed, even while negotiating the
sale of ELI to the purchasers … , Mr. Kunze was trying to figure out how to
continue the same business he was selling.” 
The purchasers sued and, understandably, prevailed on most of their
claims (though the court admirably resists the temptation to condemn all his conduct together, even the parts that would be unobjectionable on their own); Kunze did, however, show that he was entitled to relief on his
counterclaim and third-party claim for breach of the Promissory Note given in
partial payment for the purchase of ELI.
ELI operated RMLC to provide aesthetic laser use education
and training; provided aesthetic laser services to clients; and earned income
from the sale of laser equipment.  The
laser education course provided 40 hours of training with a curriculum approved
and regulated by the Colorado Department of Higher Education.  To market classes and sell laser equipment,
ELI maintained a customer list identifying students who took the RMLC laser
education course. ELI the files under lock and key and protected the lists on
the computer system with a password.  ELI
awarded its students “Certified Laser Specialist” or “CLS” certificates,
showing they were trained at RMLC. The website at laserlaser.com was the
primary source of ELI’s ads, though it also used a number of other domain names.  Because of his many years in the industry,
Kunze was well known in the aesthetic laser education industry. But:
While Mr. Kunze was a “gifted”
teacher, he was not as educated or experienced as he touted. While ELI’s
business and Certified Laser Specialist were recognized by some in the
industry, they were also not as Mr. Kunze represented. Instead, Mr. Kunze
intentionally made numerous misrepresentations … , including misrepresentations
concerning the extent of his education, experience, and certifications; the
number of CLS certifications that ELI had awarded to RMLC students; and that
Certified Laser Specialist was a registered trademark when it was not.
After the sale, Kunze kept teaching students, employees of a
former ELI student, who thought that they were getting an education from RMLC.
The former ELI student believed that “what was important was receiving a
certificate from ROCKY MOUNTAIN LASER COLLEGE and being taught by Mr. Kunze.” She
also thought that the Certified Laser Specialist certification was important
because Kunze said it was. 
Kunze taught a shorter class for his own business, American
Laser College, but still used ELI’s RMLC marks and curriculum as if they were
his own. He handed out RMLC business cards, and used RMLC interchangeably with
American Laser College so that the students thought the entities were the same.
He awarded the students CERTIFIED LASER SPECIALIST certificates, and issued the
certificates under RMLC’s name. Kunze backdated the certificates as if they
were issued in 2010 and put a stamp on those certificates implying the
certificate or course was sanctioned by the Texas Department of Education when
it was not.
Kunze also made disparaging remarks about ELI and its new
owners.  He continued to compete with
ELI, using its curriculum, marks, pictures, and/or information to do so.  He used RMLC interchangeably with the name of
his entity, American Laser College, as if they were affiliated. “He directed
customers to contact him for laser education, but used ELI’s refund and other
policies along with pictures of ELI’s facilities and students to do so.” The
laserlaser.com website had no working link to ELI’s website, even though ELI
was relying on the website to drive student traffic to its business.  Some of the students Kunze taught were
surprised or confused when they received Certified Laser Technician
certificates from an entity they had never heard of, Rock Creek.  However, the students were seeking laser
certification and didn’t really care whether whether they’d be deemed Certified
Laser Technicians or Certified Laser Specialists (the latters was what had been
respresented to them).
After saving the information for his own account, Kunze also
deleted about 60 gigabytes of data from ELI’s server, which included a list of
ELI’s customers—its students and clients. There were other problems, but you
get the idea.
For some of Kunze’s misrepresentations (e.g., his background
and qualifications, the need for a CLS certificate), the court found no
connection between them, even assuming the purchasers relied on them, and
plaintiffs’ damages.  Also, ELI’s
purchasers were skeptical of Kunze’s financial claims and conducted their own
due diligence.  Kunze knowingly falsely
represented to the purchasers that Certified Laser Specialist and CLS were
registered trademarks, and these were material claims on which the purchasers
relied.  ELI itself suffered damage from
this—its diminished ability to protect its interest in the marks in this very
suit and Kunze’s post-sale attempt to register the marks on his own behalf—but
the purchasers didn’t establish damage in their own rights.  Kunze also knowingly concealed his failure to
file ELI’s tax returns or pay ELI’s taxes, but that wasn’t material or harmful
to the purchasers since ELI owed that amount anyway (and paying the resulting penalties
only harmed ELI).  The court found that
there were some breaches of contract, but not everything that plaintiffs
alleged.
Defendants argued that the economic loss rule barred all of
plaintiffs’ claims, including statutory claims, except for those based on
breach of contract. However, a breach of a duty arising independently of any
contract duties between the parties may support a tort action.  And “if the legislature intended to provide a
remedy in addition to a contractual one, the statutory remedy would trump the
economic loss rule.”
For trade secrets: neither ELI’s written materials nor the
curriculum as a whole were trade secrets. Protection efforts were minimal, and
the effort a competitor would require to recreate the materials wasn’t that
great. Also, there wasn’t evidence of any “unified process, design and
operation of which, in unique combination,” gave ELI a competitive advantage. “[W]hat
ELI seeks to protect and to preclude Mr. Kunze from using are his skills and
experience as a teacher—his interactive or engaging teaching style acquired
over years of teaching the course. This is what was of great value to ELI.” But
his general skill and experience isn’t a trade secret.
The student/customer list could be, and was, a trade secret,
given ELI’s efforts to keep control over it. 
ELI was entitled to injunctive relief and damages, including exemplary
damages, for Kunze’s misappropriation of the list and use of the list to sell
equipment to students.  This wasn’t
precluded by the economic loss rule because state trade secret law created a
duty on Kunze independent of his contractual duties.
So too with the Lanham Act claims, which didn’t arise from
any contractual duty. Even if the Lanham Act claims had been within the scope
of the contract, Congress intended to provide statutory rights and remedies
independent of breach of contract. 
Here, Kunze’s use of the RMLC marks constituted false
designation of origin, though his use of Certified Laser Specialist and CLS did
not.  The RMLC marks had secondary
meaning and Kunze’s use caused confusion. 
But Certified Laser Specialist and CLS weren’t protectable marks, on
this record.
False advertising: The Tenth Circuit hasn’t yet decided
whether materiality is required separately from falsity/misleadingness, but
even without materiality, ELI couldn’t win most of its claims.  ELI’s damages didn’t arise from Kunze’s
misrepresentations about his “pedigree.” 
Kunze intentionally and willfully
made numerous false and/or
misleading statements concerning the nature, characteristics, or qualities of
his goods and services. Such statements included his credentials to support his
skills/abilities to perform laser education services (some false, others
misleading); his affiliation with ROCKY MOUNTAIN LASER COLLEGE and ability to
issue CERTIFIED LASER SPECIALIST certificates (false); that ROCKY MOUNTAIN
LASER COLLEGE and American Laser College are affiliated or the same (false);
and that CERTIFIED LASER SPECIALIST is a registered trademark (false).
The RMLC affiliation-related claims were material, but not
the others. “[W]hile the evidence supports that receiving some certification
was important to the consumers, for many consumers it mattered not whether it
was a CLS or a CLT.”  Since the RMLC
affiliation-related claims were literally false and intentional, no evidence of
confusion was required; ELI was damaged thereby because students signed up for
Kunze’s courses thinking they were RMLC courses but didn’t get RMLC
certificates, so RMLC suffered in both sales and reputation.
The court exercised its equitable discretion to treble the
damages it found ELI to have suffered (lost class revenues) because overall
damages were hard to ascertain and Kunze’s actions were willful.  Because this was an “exceptional” case, the
court also awarded attorneys’ fees.  Kunze “intentionally used ELI’s marks for his
own benefit … and he continued to use the marks even after the Amendment was
terminated and ELI requested Mr. Kunze to stop doing so. Mr. Kunze offered no
credible explanation as to why he was entitled to do so.”  The court also awarded prejudgment interest.
Colorado Consumer Protection Act: The CCPA requires a
significant impact on the public, for which relevant considerations include:
“(1) the number of consumers directly affected by the challenged practice, (2)
the relative sophistication and bargaining power of the consumers affected by
the challenged practice, and (3) evidence that the challenged practice has
previously impacted other consumers or has the significant potential to do so
in the future.” Making defamatory statements about ELI was purely a private
wrong.  However, the false website advertising
directed to the market generally had a public impact, given the length of time
and the number of websites on which Kunze posted his false and misleading
advertisement.  Students were likely to
be unsophisticated consumers with bargaining weaknesses, and some enrolled
believing they’d get a RMLC certificate. 
However, there was insufficient evidence that Kunze’s false claims about
his affiliations with other organizations, his credentials, and the like
affected any consumers.  Given the
court’s finding of bad faith in the actionable misrepresentations, it also
trebled ELI’s damages under state law.
Kunze also lost on defamation/libel per se based on
statements to ELI’s landlord, one plaintiff’s banker, ELI’s laser supplier, and
ELI’s students.  The plaintiffs were
private figures, and the statements were defamatory per se (about ELI’s financial solvency), so defamation was presumed; the court awarded
a total of $50,000.

The court also granted injunctive relief.  ELI would suffer irreparable harm because
competing sales of laser equipment would erode its customer base, and damages
would be difficult to determine because ELI wouldn’t be able to monitor Kunze’s
sales.  “ELI presented insufficient
evidence of continuing sales to support an award of damages subsequent to the
termination of the parties’ relationship, but it is this very difficulty in
discovering Mr. Kunze’s use (and resulting damages) that supports the issuance
of injunctive relief.”

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GW Design Law: Ecommerce remedies

AFTERNOON SESSION 1: Design Patents & Ecommerce
Moderator: Judy Yee, Microsoft
Howard Hogan, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher: Counterfeiting is
a growing problem, but sometimes they don’t use a copyrighted work of
authorship but are still selling a knockoff of a design. © and TM have more
developed bodies of law on secondary infringement.  Contributory & vicarious liability—right to
supervise & financial interest in continuing infringement = liability.
Gucci v. Frontline (SDNY 2010).  Companies that process credit card payments
are effectively giving loans to merchants. We looked at merchants’
applications; they weren’t particularly shy about the fact they were selling
fakes. Used words like “replica” or admitted sourcing Gucci from China.  Entity called Durango, going out to midmarket
banks, saying you only get 2% on a typical transaction, but if you take a high
risk credit card merchant you can get 4-5%. Asserted Durango was inducing
infringement, encouraging banks to get in the business of helping the sale of
infringing goods. Against banks, we asserted contributory infringement. Opposite
to Perfect 10, you’re allowing sites to take orders/materially contributing to
the infringement.  SDNY issued a decision
that purports not to disagree w/Perfect 10 but really does; cites a lot to the
dissent. Can be held contributorily liable if they help sites take orders w/
their eyes open.
Christopher V. Carani, McAndrews, Held & Malloy, Ltd.: WD
Wash, Milo & Gabby v. Amazon, fully briefed at the 9th Circuit
though no argument scheduled. Design patent case: not interested in selling on
Amazon, only boutique children’s items. 
Found third-party seller using pictures of makers’ own children using
the pillows. No dispute that there is infringement of registered design patents
(though we don’t know what people actually received).  Is this “offering for sale” when Amazon
provides its website?  Amazon calls
itself a virtual shopping mall, which isn’t liable for goods particular vendors
sell, pre-notice. They don’t have title or the ability to transfer title. This
case could open up the floodgates/create a firewall for the gears of commerce.
[Not sure about these metaphors.] 
District court rules that Amazon isn’t liable, but said it was troubled
by that conclusion and impact on small retailers. Amazon can disavow
responsibility for offering to sell.  The
statute requires: make, use, offer to sell, sell, or import; also a specific
provision for active inducement of a patent. Requires knowledge of the patent,
knowledge of the infringement for inducement. 
What about fulfilled by Amazon?  3d party sellers who put their products up on
Amazon: seller uses Amazon as a warehouse.
When ecommerce sites appear notice: different from TM
situation b/c word searching can easily find Tiffany knockoffs.  Design patent infringement analysis requires
more expert analysis.  Not conducive to
spot judgment. Customs also knows this—will allow © and TM as predicate but
they won’t use design patent, patent, or even trade dress w/o order from court
or ITC.  Amazon points out that it took
down M&G copiers within a week.
Hogan: Taking the patentee position in this debate; not
always his position.  Brick & mortar
principles not automatically abrogated online. There’s no intent element.  Liability exists if you do infringe/sell
infringing goods. Mom & pop shops on a larger scale; they don’t have teams
of att’ys go through each product, but can be liable if they sell infringing
goods.  Customer doesn’t care who has
title to the good or in whose warehouse it sits. Online marketplace should also
be held liable like a brick and mortar store.
Carani: that same theory would apply without any knowledge
at all. Craigslist would have the same liability. FedEx sells a package and
delivers it.
Yee: but Amazon takes a portion of the sale.
Carani: but that’s a factor independent of knowledge—it would
sweep even the NYT, FedEx, etc.  A lot of
design patent att’ys are filing junk claims on partial designs.  Impact on damages is huge, but consider
partial designs & injunctive relief. 
You’re asking us to pull stuff down, but you might not even be able to
get an injunction. Why should we have to police when we wouldn’t be ordered to
take it down?
Yee: Staff required to respond to requests is an issue, but
TM and © takedowns do work. Can imagine a similar system for design patents
where you have to provide the claim chart. Shouldn’t be as rigorous as on the
utility side.
Carani: Congress did respond with the DMCA, and Congress
didn’t do that for design patent. eBay came up with VERO, self-regulation. A
little of fox guarding henhouse—false positives. Concept fallacy: people have a
design patent on a multicomponent tool and think they can stop any other
version of the tool.
Hogan: there is a difference in kinds of online mktplaces.
The more involved the platform is in determining what consumers see, the more
it’s fair to hold them liable for infringing products. eBay and Amazon both
have algorithms to get consumers shown products they’re likely to want.
Agnostic as to which merchant makes the sale. Alibaba is different.  Biggest retailer in the world. They make
their money selling “assessed status” to merchants—paying Alibaba to come up in
searches on their site. They go to factories, create videos, involved in
marketing. Then get a percentage of all transactions through their payment
system.
Carani: we don’t hold the NYT liable for advertising, or for
housing a product in their warehouse, or for delivering a product.  The ability to combine all these services
into a convenient one-stop shop shouldn’t be penalized—it’s efficient.
Yee: what about a company whose product is knocked off by
hundreds of companies through your website? What should they do?
Carani: look at reviews of sellers. Some of the
responsibility is on the consumers. 
Buyer beware. But ultimately you may have to go to the source.
Hogan: courts in the US are there to protect US businesses
and US consumers. Companies that invest in developing products deserve
protection. Who should bear the burden? The company that can more easily write
the algorithm to identify goods being sold at suspiciously low prices/coming
from incorrect sources? [How does the algorithm know suspicious prices or
sources?]  On eBay, more than 70% of
sellers are from outside the US.
Carani: ITC is active here; Razr scooters.  China does include design patents etc; it
creates painful problems in China where they just don’t have the information to
make the difficult conclusions—just too cumbersome to take on, especially given
Amazon’s size.
Hogan: it used to be easier to store large quantities of
infringing goods: trucks, warehouses. Increasingly, products are drop-shipped
one at a time.  So customs will always be
important, but more come through small orders shipped directly to the buyer.  You don’t want to hold customs liable for a
mistake; but a physical store would be liable if it let an infringing good
through.
Carani: indemnification is a real thing that can flow down.
Box stores are in much the same situation—Wal-Mart is selling 50 million
products. We like the online marketplace b/c of the variety.  There is much more of a vetting process; if
we impose liability on Amazon, there will be more vetting of everyone and that
will increase transaction costs/the overall costs of the products themselves.
Q: images are misleading—can you get them taken down?
Yee: Online marketplaces respond more quickly to TM/©
takedowns, but they give the sellers the opportunity to respond and come back
with just slight changes. Design patent requests come down and stay down if
they come down at all.
Hogan: M&G case: they didn’t assert © in the Cozy
Critters themselves, but in images of their son in front of the pillow. Image
search tech is growing by leaps and bounds. 
Often the most dangerous third-party merchants are taking photos right
off of brand website. Does require diligence; counterfeiters are inventive in
getting around screening.
Q: complaint about Amazon’s algorithm suggesting cheaper
knockoffs even when a person has made an effort to find the seller’s actual
page.
Q: another wrinkle is that there are a lot of grey market
goods out there; may be represented as grey market goods even if they aren’t.
Q: Note that you can find the M&G pillows with the
M&G pictures on Amazon right now, with a sale/review from August—isn’t
Amazon on notice?
Yee: Amazon may not know that particular store is
infringing.
Carani: that’s part of the case; every time they’ve been
given notice, Amazon has taken the store down. 
Survey of other countries: Japan, Europe, Korea—they all look at notice;
once there’s notice, they attach liability. 
Purist approach to US statute: even knowledge might not be enough.  Clarification: Notice means notice specific
to the location/seller, not notice “this product is counterfeit”; may also
require attention to sellers with previous strikes.
Q: platforms play games—they take down a seller but allow it
to come back under a new name.
Carani: the problem is that they create new entities/new
names.  If you see someone who’s never
sold a good before, some of the responsibility rests with the consumer.
Q: unrealistic to expect brand owner to file serial DMCA
notices.  Is it more onerous to platform
or brand to but the duty on them? It’s not a close question.
Carani: Rests w/consumers as well.  Birkenstock pulled out of Amazon.
Q: not every brand has that market power.
Hogan: anonymity is an issue; we have to keep in mind the
value of anonymity as well as the risks it creates.
Carani: Legal title was the key to the analysis in the
M&G case below.

Hogan: statute doesn’t define “sale” or “offer for sale.”  Analogy: consignment stores.

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GW Design Law conference: current state of the law

Morning Session 2: The Current State of the Law Under 35
U.S.C. § 102, 103 and 112
Moderator: Daniel Gajewski, Sterne, Kessler, Goldstein &
Fox: Issues include continuation practice; maybe new rules coming.  Skechers sought invalidation of a Nike
patent, alleging noncompliance w/ the written description requirement in 112 by
the introduction of new matter.  Nike changed
a photo to a line drawing, and dotted some lines out.  IPR case. 
Changing certain lines, and changing lines to dotted lines claimed new
matter.  Board found 112 satisfied
despite relatively minor differences in way line drawing represented photo—Skechers
went into too great detail rather than looking at it like an ordinary designer.  “Range of reasonableness” enough to provide
sufficient written description via photos. 
“Show and delineate” requirement—the shoe upper was reduced to broken
lines; Skechers argued that one wouldn’t have recognized the design from the
disclosure. Board disagreed.  We aren’t
persuaded that the photos fail to clearly show and delineate the claimed
midsole elements of the design in addition to the upper and outsole elements,
showing that the inventor had possession of the invention.
Perry J. Saidman, Saidman DesignLaw Group: Black letter:
must disclose every element. To anticipate a claim, the disclosure must
anticipate each element of the claim.  1997:
Anticipation requires the earlier design to be identical in all material
respects to the claimed design.  Int’l Seaway
v. Walgreens, Fed. Cir. 2009: the worst decision from the Fed. Cir.  What happened to the law of anticipation:
ordinary observer test must logically be the sole test for anticipation.  If two designs are substantially the same
there’s infringement; thus if the prior art is substantially the same as the
design, the design is anticipated by prior art. 
No longer required to be identical. But these are not the same
things. 
Some people say this is no big deal.  Actual 102 rejections by the PTO show
appalling consequence where prior art has an extra element that the design
doesn’t.  Net effect: more anticipation
rejections than ever before. Very subjective: no analysis necessary.  102 rejections w/o 103 rejections: Alice in
Wonderland effect.  The PTO is now in the
business of deciding infringement, if the anticipation test and the infringement
test are the same. [Shouldn’t there be the possibility of 102 rejections w/o
103 if they are in fact separate bases?] 
By focusing on 102, PTO avoids the rigorous test of 103 for primary and
secondary references.  [Note that if
vagueness is a First Amendment problem for TMs, design patent might have the
same problems.]  Egyptian Goddess says you look at patented design and accused design
in the context of the prior art.  This is
now not being done, so if you get a 102 reference you should tell the PTO to
evaluate the prior art in light of its prior art.
What is the basis for Int’l Seaway?  Peters v. Active, 1889 SCt case.  Maxim: that which infringes, if later, would anticipate,
if earlier.  Graver Tank, 1950, created
doctrine of equivalents for utility patents: substantially the same function in
substantially the same way to produce the same result.  Fed. Cir. said in Lewmar, 1987, said that
Peters v. Active had to be adjusted to take doctrine of equivalents into
account. That which would literally
infringe if later in time would anticipate if earlier.  Lee v. Dayton-Hudson, Fed. Cir. 1988, Gorham test inherently makes doctrine of
equivalents inherent in infringement test. 
The problem: the test for design patent infringement is doctrine of
equivalents, but only in cases of literal infringement is there anticipation.  So infringement isn’t the same as
anticipation.
Elizabeth Ferrill, Finnegan: Examples of obviousness from
recent PTAB decisions. Design patent prosecution isn’t public unless the patent
issues. Affirmance of rejection: we never see that unless there’s an appeal to
the Fed. Cir.  PTAB heard about 15
appeals in design cases last year; ½ never become public.  PTAB cases also create bigger chances for
argument—long briefs, long explanations of decisions.
Obviousness is not as simple as anticipation. Primary
reference, from perspective of ordinary designer: design characteristics have
to be basically the same as the claimed design: (1) does it discern the correct
visual impression created by the patented design as a whole; (2) is the
secondary reference creating “basically the same” visual impression.  Secondary reference can modify the primary
reference to create a design that has the “same overall visual appearance” of
the claimed design.  Appearance of
certain ornamental features in one reference would suggest the application of
another.  Even if one side looks very
similar, other views might not.
Caterpillar v. Miller: Design is a warning triangle applied
to a curved surface of a coupler for an excavator. Invalidated for obviousness.
The appearance of the prior art doesn’t have to be identical to the claimed
design.  Basically the same, but not
exactly.  Secondary reference was another
type of coupler which did show a curved surface.  Coupler manual + curved surface = motivation
to combine. 
Premier Gem v. Wing Yee Gems: picking and choosing secondary
references. Petitioner wasn’t successful in challenging registration of jewelry
design; petitioner shouldn’t choose certain features from secondary references
while ignoring others – hindsight bias.
William LaMarca, USPTO, Office of the Solicitor: We still
apply the same test from the perspective of the ordinary skilled
designer/artisan.  Int’l Seaway impacted
anticipation, not obviousness. 
Ferrill: how could Int’l Seaway override a previous panel
decision? 
LaMarca: previous SCt precedent controls. PTO is correctly following
statute in applying ordinary skilled artisan for 103 obviousness; also
following the Fed. Cir. We think we’re consistent even if there are problems.  Examiner can’t just ignore the legal
standard. 
Ferrill: if the test is the same, you should have to apply
it the way the courts should apply it.
LaMarca: MPEP does discuss and give examples of how they
apply anticipation; they do say it doesn’t have to be identical. There is the
further point that close but slight differences = view it in context of prior
art; if you feel the examiner hasn’t done that you should argue it to the examiner
and in your appeal.
Saidman: expresses doubt that an examiner taking the
perspective of an ordinary observer would behave/react differently than an
examiner taking the perspective of an ordinary designer.

Ferrill: depends on the degree of crowding in the art, but
probably applied very similarly.

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Design Law at GW Law: Design Patent Damages

Design Law 2016, GW Law
MORNING SESSION 1: Design Patent Damages
Moderator: Robert Katz, Banner & Witcoff: Recap of the
patents in suit and damage award. Text of 289: whoever applies the patented
design or colorable imitation thereof to any article of manufacture for the
purpose of sale etc. shall be liable to the extent of his total profit.  Can’t twice recover profits.  $250 floor for damages, back to the 1890s,
closer to $9000 today.  Maybe that doesn’t
work today, though Samsung argued that other parts of the statute were
outdated.
Christopher Burrell, Director & Senior Counsel, Samsung
Electronics: Quoting Giles Rich, “the name of the game is the claim.” That’s
the core of our position.  You can
potentially get a design patent on the entire article/product being sold or
smaller articles/components. W/the PTO allowing design patents on increasingly
smaller components/tiny components that go into a larger product, to stay
commensurate w/the scope of the rights and the statute, that needs to be the
focus for the question “what are you getting total profits on?”  A multicomponent device can be comprised of
many articles of manufacture; look at the patent claims to figure what
components the design is applied to. From our perspective, that still provides
a windfall in the sense that you get the total profits on that article, for
example a scratch resistant touchscreen also subject to a design patent where
the design only contributes some of the value—more than a reasonable royalty.  Another thing to keep in mind: the rulings
about which infringed which patents are hard to understand; Apple got total
profits on one phone and nothing for one highly similar phone; we think that
cautions in favor of a more careful approach to design patents.
Jeff Myers, Lead Patent Counsel, Apple: Not going to
relitigate the case.  The Justices talked
about the VW Beetle example.  Instructive
example: when you hear VW Beetle, you think of the iconic image, rather than
about what’s in it.  Design drives a lot
of what’s in the vehicle.  Shell has a
peculiar value. Same thing for the iPhone. We think the statute is super clear.
Infringer’s profits should be awarded as a whole. Congress had good reasons to
do that: difficult to disentangle design from the overall value of the product;
functionality is easier to separate.  If
the patented design gives infringer’s product its peculiar/distinctive
appearance, total profit should be awarded.
Three things that could occur: Justices might just say “law
is law”; might say we need more facts; might say we need a new standard. If
they do, what would that mean?  Design
patents are about deterrent value. Big companies like Samsung and Apple can
survive, but small/moderate companies w/o resources to bring massive survey
evidence could have problem. Don’t want a situation where people don’t even
bother with design patents, given their increasing use in fashion where there
hasn’t been protection in the past. 
Congress is the better place for questions.
Brian Racilla, USPTO, Office of the Solicitor: Historical
context.  Article of manufacture as a
signpost—Justices seemed amenable to using that.  The objective was to figure out what the article
of manufacture is. Always construed broadly—factfinder should identify what
most fairly may be said to embody the D’s appropriation of the P’s design. Factors:
Scope of the claimed design in drawing/written description; relative prominence
of design in product as whole; whether design conceptually distinct from
product as a whole; physical relationship b/t claimed design and product as
whole—separability, separate manufacture, whether there’s a market for
replacement parts.  We’re focusing on the
accused infringer’s product here.
Burdens that US suggested: plaintiff to show overall,
defendant to show article of manufacture.
Mark S. Davies, Orrick: Designers’ brief.  This isn’t a big case for the SCt.  Challenge for amicus: why should anyone read
it? Our strategy: prominent names from the design community, over 100 great
names.  Design sells the product; Samsung
sales went up 20% after copying Apple’s product.  Second point: the design becomes the
product.  The point of Coke example: the
design becomes so famous that the taste doesn’t matter.  [This is an argument for functionality and
indicates part of why design patent functionality is so screwed up.]
Mark Janis, Maurer School of Law: Themes distilled by
reading group of amicus briefs, not including his.  Plain meaning/briefs focused on “total
profits,” which seemed to be what the case was about until Tuesday’s
argument.  Deterrence: purpose of 289 is
not merely compensatory, but deterrent of counterfeiting/induce
settlement.  Troll behavior: responsive
arguments were that troll concerns were unfounded: there isn’t a design patent
market b/c they protect brand identity; hard to use design patents to threaten
entire mkt b/c designing around is easy; to the extent we think troll behavior
is from nuisance suits from end users, they don’t have much profits to give, so
disgorgement isn’t any worse for them. 
Lots of pages on the general argument that design patents are important
in a variety of ways to a variety of industries—brand maintenance; small
businesses getting leverage v. large businesses; particular industries. 
Eclecticism: when you interpret 289, you have to understand
that design patent law isn’t utility patent law + different modifier. It’s a
mishmash of English law, utility patent, copyright, unique concepts. One should
not take it as a given that just b/c apportionment works in utility patent for
multicomponent innovation it is necessarily workable in design patent.  Congress certainly thought it wasn’t workable
for designs.  Text/structure/history: “total
profits” focus; article of manufacture issues—look at the statutory text.
Clearly referring to the infringer’s article of manufacture.  Statute also says that it imposes liability
on applying design to any article of
manufacture. Have to conclude this calls into question the proposition that the
name of the game is the claim for 289—it says “any” article of manufacture—at least
needs to debate that. We think that the proposed test on article of manufacture
is an invitation for courts to engage in the equivalent of apportionment. What
I find strange about that is that under the guise of interpreting the statute,
we’re going to say that Congress slammed the door on apportionment by using “total
profits” but opened the door wide by incorporating “article of manufacture,” allowing
the same thing through a different analytical route, which seems policy-driven
result.
You could say it’s still good policy to rely on article of
manufacture b/c avoids absurd results, such as the cupholder on the car.  We argue that the policy consequences might
be more mixed than that.  History:
Congress was focused on another type of result that it deemed absurd, which is
the carpet manufacturer who proves infringement and gets nothing.  Congress makes a choice between risks of
absurd results.  Choice is a legislative
matter.
Rebecca Tushnet, Georgetown Law: Concerns of those
supporting Samsung: Now that the seal on mentioning trolls has been
broken.  Design patent trolls are a real
threat: one example that surfaced for me quite by accident was someone who has
a relatively recent design patent for novelty sunglasses with plastic slats
across the opening for the lenses, which I seem to recall being a thing for
Devo in the 1980s—and yet the patentee was extracting licensing fees from and even
suing retailers around the country. 
Compare to the concern for small designers: the US fashion industry as
an industry has been pretty innovative for a while without historical reliance
on design patents—Chris Sprigman and Kal Raustiala have a book about this.
History has already mentioned: historically, no protection
for small parts of an overall design; now that’s patentable, and there is a
strong equitable and logical argument that patentees shouldn’t be able to have their
cake and eat it too: that is, claim rights in just the corners of a design,
which is only a small part of the overall appearance, but profits from the
whole product sold to the consumer.  Design
patent for a logo: carpet mfgr gets a design patent on the logo it puts on the
label, on the underside. Then what?
Another possibility, of course, would be to go back to the
historical practice of not granting design patents except on an entire
design.  That would also require
difficult decisions about what the protected design is, but the damages
discussion clearly demonstrates that difficult decisions are inescapable.
IP professors: use causation to create awards only for
profits attributable to the infringement—the reference in the statute to not
allowing double recovery for profits attributable to the infringement indicates
a causation requirement.  Constitutional
basis for this idea in ideas of due process as well as the Patent &
Copyright Clauses.  Not much interest in
that at oral argument, but an understandable definition of article of
manufacture could accomplish much of the same goal in many cases where design
patents are for small elements of an overall product.
A few other points about article of manufacture: figuring
out the defendant’s article of
manufacture as the measure of total profits might theoretically differ from the
plaintiff’s article of manufacture;
in most cases, though, they should be the same, although this is also tied into
the question of whether the design must relate to a particular article of
manufacture. For example, look at Janis’ “any article of manufacture” argument:
could I get a design patent for a USB drive in the shape of a rubber duck
because no one had ever applied the rubber duck to a USB drive?  If that’s the case because prior art
inquiries should be limited to the general area of the article claimed,
presumably only another USB drive could infringe my design patent and not a bar
of soap in the shape of a rubber duck. 
This is another way for me to say that while damages issues may seem
separable from scope and validity, they aren’t really.
Question for discussion: what might the article of manufacture
be where the infringing design is the icon for an app that doesn’t ship with
the device but is downloaded from the app store?  Does the defendant even have an article of
manufacture in that case?  Does the
plaintiff?
Q: anything surprising at oral argument?
Davies: that the Justices weren’t particularly interested in
the details of this particular case. 
Apple argued that article of manufacture had not been raised below, but
the Justices didn’t seem to care.  4-5
Justices embraced design as in itself valuable.
Burrell: encouraging that Justices grappled w/practice of
granting partial design patents in tension w/historical practice.  There’s no dispute here that both parties
think design is valuable.  Samsung’s #1
US holder of design patents; 1700 designers around the world. The question is
the appropriate measure of damages, and Justices were rightly focused on that.
Janis: had hoped for some question about whether this was an
exercise in statutory interpretation or trying to amend the statute.  I didn’t know that Samsung would go just to
article of manufacture, though not terribly surprised given the gov’t’s
advocacy of that as middle ground was very effective advocacy. 
Q for Davies: facts of the case—last design patent case?
Davies: 1880s.
Q: that’s what they do, ignore the facts of the case.
Davies: as a process matter, if you’re going to make
complaints about suitability for review, it’s too late after cert is
granted.  DIG is a possibility and a
nonzero chance that they could decide they’re mistaken, but it’s not what he
would predict.
RT: Push back against Janis’ statutory amendment argument.
It’s perfectly normal for certain elements to overlap as between different
possible tests.  Lexmark/Lanham Act: a lot of what was rejected in the prudential
standing test comes back as causation, which Scalia heartily approves.  So the fact that you’d get some overlapping
deductions from apportionment and from article of manufacture—but not identical—doesn’t
make this anything other than an exercise in standard statutory interpretation.
Janis: there was partial claiming/design patents on logos at
the time. Was Congress thinking about that? I doubt it.  We’ve asked that question; a lot of the
design patents are on carpets, wallpapers, silverware, so when they say design
drives demand, that’s what they’re thinking about. But again, if we say today
their baseline assumption was incorrect, we should go back to Congress.
RT: But you don’t need to say Congress’ baseline assumption
was incorrect if you focus on article of manufacture!  If it was just the logo on the label of the
carpet that was infringed, you can look at the label to award total profits.
And that is perfectly consistent w/what we think Congress was thinking—about a
design patent covering the whole carpet—when it made the total profits rule.
Burrell: Gov’t’s brief did a nice job on the historical
context.  Waiver etc. of issues raised
below is also addressed in Samsung’s briefing.
Katz: we don’t like the idea of apportioning design—take burden
from patentee to prove how much the design contributed.  Patentee has burden to prove total sales, but
infringer has burden to prove deductions. 
Gov’t suggests a similar rule w/r/t article of manufacture: is it
unreasonable to shift the burdens to show what the infringer’s article of
manufacture is?
Racilla: burden of proving infringement and damages falls to
patentee.  Preponderance of evidence:
total profits of defendant; most patentees will go for the full product sold to
the market.  Maybe different if it’s just
a cupholder.  Burden of production shifts
to infringer w/superior knowledge of why they chose certain components.
Davies: experts’ reports all assumed that the article of
manufacture was the phone; Samsung’s position was that it hadn’t been allowed
to present evidence of anything else.
Burrell: There is some disagreement among the parties about
how burdens would play out. Our view: correct rule is that article of
manufacture would be first determined. Consistent w/patent cases, burdens
largely on P both for establishing infringement and predicates for determining
damages—proving up quantum of profits and article of manufacture.  Our view, esp. in our reply brief, is that
burdens rest on P. Not fundamentally different than for utility patents.
Katz: but this was a special provision for design patent
damages to remedy the inadequacy of utility patent damages.
Burrell: We don’t disagree that the statute was enacted in
the wake of Dobson.  But unlike in ©, where there is explicit
burden shifting, there is no such thing in the patent statute, which speaks to
congressional intent given ordinary rules of litigation.
Davies: risk is that we parse SCt’s 100-year statements for
every little nuance. The SCt will say something very high level and the Fed.
Cir/dist. cts will have to work out the practicalities.
Katz: both sides can afford big teams of lawyers. Enforcing
against small infringers, the Qs are different. Proving article of manufacture
w/survey evidence or expert testimony as mentioned at oral argument=over
$100,000. Would Ps ever get relief under this type of test?  If you’ve disclaimed part of the design, you
could have difficulty defining the article and would have to take that into
account before sending a C&D.
RT: Same as other issues you think about—asserting rights in
an unregistered trade dress even though proving it up at trial might be
expensive.
Myers: it depends on the product/its importance to the
company.  Other companies would struggle
with that b/c they are smaller.
Burrell: types of considerations: we would largely view it
the same way. Refrigerator latch case, the piano case cases—the damages statute
was applied in ways consistent w/ the rule we’re arguing for. Will this change
the incentives? No, b/c we think this is where we’re already at fundamentally
as the statute reads.
Katz: Refrigerator latch involved de minimis
infringement.  [?]  In rare circumstances, there could be some de
minimis approach where we keep enforcement as it is but a de minimis exception—is
that workable, compared to the gov’t’s proposed 2-part test each of which has 4
subparts and may require accountants as well as survey evidence to define the
article of manufacture?
Racilla: Kennedy floated de minimis idea and it didn’t seem
to work.
Myers: it could be that in some situations a small part does
make the product distinctive, so that would cause questions of its own.
Katz: we’re seeing more copies of car designs.  Recent Range Rover Evoque/compare Chinese Landwind
E32.  Is the article of manufacture the
shell of the auto body?  How would the
gov’t’s test work with that?
Davies: have to show that someone was induced to purchase
the product b/c of the design—have to prove deception.  [I think this is a misdescription as
reflected by the jury verdict, and I think he might agree if I understand him
correctly; can’t really be asking the jury that if we also have lots of design
patents on parts—we’re asking “deceptive in isolation,” or whatever that means.]  Don’t know how the gov’t’s test applies with
that standard.
Racilla: we’d look at what’s actually claimed—the wheels?  Whether it’s a prominent factor—the shell of
the body of a car lends a lot to the visual appearance overall.
Katz: why does that matter as to whether it’s the article of
manufacture?  If I make an ugly car
w/great innards, and someone copies the appearance, why should the relationship
matter to what the article of manufacture is?
Racilla: test is prominence in overall appearance, not
driving sale. We look back to Gorham:
the design is what gives distinctive appearance overall. [Which forces us to
ask why if at all the PTO should be granting patents on small
portions/logos/etc.  If that’s the design, then anything that
doesn’t give the article its distinctive appearance overall should not be
patentable!]
Burrell: By definition, if directed to entire exterior of
car, then the article of manufacture is the entire exterior of the car. Not
very hard to prove.  Profit calculation—we
don’t necessarily think the statute proscribes any particular methodology. 
Katz: isn’t that just a forced royalty?
Burrell: No.  Key
distinction is that under article of manufacture test, it’s the total profits
on that article, including those that relate to contributions to its value
coming from utility/function.  Front
glass of phone as example: shape, scratch resistance, etc. Quite different from
reasonable royalty which is focused on incremental value of patent.
Katz: Gorham patent covers handle, but not the entire
flatware—spoons, forks not claimed. How would that work out in the gov’t’s
test?  Is the article of manufacture the
spoon or the spoon back?  [I can’t figure
out what the argument for making it less than the spoon would be under the gov’t’s
test.]
What about a Fendi bag? 
The whole bag even if it’s got a nice interior?  [The panel isn’t willing to commit; this is
my point about the lack of fit b/t granting patents on partial designs and then
trying to figure out damages using a standard that assumes, with Gorham, that the design is that which
gives the article its distinctive
appearance.] [And this is why abandoning point of novelty, while understandable
on its own, is messing with the overall design patent scheme—we need point of
novelty in order to make design patents on a whole article possible in many
cases.]
Perry Saidman: Small/medium clients: Wrote amicus on their
behalf.  If the SCt adopts something like
the four-factor analysis, it will break the system for these small/medium
clients in the real world. Some say that their only ability to bring Wal-Mart to
the table in $40,000 infringement case is the total profit rule.  They say: if you start slicing and dicing and
giving retailers ammunition to slice and dice; we won’t even be able to get
them to the table, and we’ll stop getting design patents and copying will become
rampant.  Gov’t wrote: no
apportionment.  That’s right. Second
part: but, we can slice and dice the article of manufacture can be less than
that to which the patented design is applied/the accused infringer is selling.
That sounds like apportionment.  Justice
Kennedy also asked that. How does the gov’t reconcile that?
Racilla: the definition of article of manufacture is how we
reconcile that.  It may be a component of
a larger product that’s sold. Or it may not be. There’s a fundamental
difference b/t looking at the amount of design that drives sale v. looking at
total profits of an article of manufacture, which is a component of a product,
to which a design has been applied.
Q: interesting point from oral argument: residual
effect/windfall; then we get to claim on entire article—there seems to be
agreement that you’d get more than exoskeleton of the car itself, the
functional aspects. No one would ever claim the car w/ the undercarriage.  Dishwasher: you never claim the back
housing.  That’s the reality—it’s the
appearance for the consuming public. There will always be dotted lines.  [For certain classes of goods; not so much
carpets and wallpaper.] In reality, how will this work?
Burrell: point of clarification: our view: functional
aspects whose contributions is ignored in our scheme would be the functional
aspects of the article, which is VW’s body—the fact that the door opens &
closes, not the functional aspects of the engine. Our view is that it depends
on the claim—all the exterior portions to which the design is applied. If it
turned out that the Beetle was basically just things for selling the shell, you
could probably show that the profits from the exterior are very high. Our rule
is commensurate w/article of manufacture that PTO is allowing the person to
claim.

Katz: maybe we could craft a system where innocent
infringement/infringement that didn’t drive sale would get lesser damages; we
could think about alternatives in the statute.

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Copyright Office Ringer Fellow Opportunities

From the Copyright Office: The Copyright Office’s Barbara A. Ringer Copyright Honors Program is an eighteen to twenty-four month paid fellowship designed for attorneys in the early stages of their career with a dedicated interest in copyright law.  During this program, Ringer Fellows work closely with senior attorneys in the Copyright Office on cutting-edge issues of copyright law and policy before Congress, the courts, and with other government agencies.  A current Ringer Fellow is listed on the cover of the government’s Supreme Court brief in the Star Athletica v. Varsity Brands case, “a well-deserved recognition of her contributions.”
The application period for fall 2017 spots in the program is closing on October 17th. 
Interested applicants can visit http://ift.tt/sCvtqQabout/special-programs/ringer.html for more information.  If any of your students have any questions, they can send an email to RingerHonorsProgram@loc.gov.

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biased survey dooms “ask your doctor” ad campaign for 5-Hour Energy

Washington v. Living Essentials, LLC, NO. 14-2-19684-9 (King
County Super. Ct. Oct. 10, 2016)
The state sued Living Essentials seeking injunctive and
declaratory relief under Washington’s Consumer Protection Act.  While the court found that some of the
challenged 5-Hour Energy claims had not been shown to be unsubstantiated
(specifically, claims that the vitamins in the product offered benefits and
that the product wouldn’t cause a sugar crash), the court found violations of
the CPA relating to claims that (1) 5-Hour Energy lasts longer than a cup of
coffee because of the synergistic or interactive effects of caffeine, B vitamins
and nutrients in the product; (2) Decaf 5-Hour Energy would provide energy,
alertness and focus that lasts for hours; and (3) doctors recommended 5-Hour
Energy.
Vitamin claims included the tag lines “B Vitamins for
Energy; Amino Acids Focus & Better Mood.” The ads expressly claimed that the
vitamins and nutrients in 5-Hour Energy played a role in providing energy,
alertness and focus and worked synergistically with caffeine to make the
biochemical or physiological effects last longer than caffeine alone.  The court found that Living
Essentials didn’t downplay or minimize the effects of caffeine. Rather, Living
Essentials claimed that the duration of the recognized physiological benefits
of caffeine would be extended because of the non-caffeine ingredients in 5-Hour
Energy.
Vitamins/amino acids taglines
vitamin claims

 

more vitamin claims
In addition, Living Essentials introduced a decaf version, marketing it with a press release claiming that the decaf
product provides “a sustained energy boost” for people sensitive to caffeine. The
Living Essentials website claimed that Decaf 5-Hour Energy “gently” works to
provide alertness, which it attributes to the presence of choline. These were
objective claims about physiological benefits.
Decaf claims
And Living Essentials also claimed to avoid the “crash”
effect of combining sugar and caffeine, leading consumers to experience a
glucose drop when they consumed competing, sugary caffeinated beverages.  After NAD investigation, Living Essentials
modified its advertisements to qualify the “no crash” language by including an
asterisk directing consumers to a small print disclaimer saying “No crash means
no sugar crash.”
Does your energy drink make you crash?

 

sugar and caffeine are to blame!

 

Finally, Living Essentials created an “Ask Your Doctor” ad
campaign.  Living Essentials retained
Thomas Maronick, Ph.D., a professor of marketing at Towson University in
Maryland and the former Director of Impact Evaluation in the Bureau of Consumer
Protection at the FTC to create an online survey of 503 physicians. Instead of
asking doctors their general opinions about energy drinks/supplements, the
survey asked whether they’d recommend a low calorie/low sodium energy drink for
patients who already consumed such products. “Not surprisingly, the majority of
doctors said ‘Yes’”—73.6%, to be exact.
The survey also showed respondents a 5-Hour Energy label and a brief
description of the product, and asked them if they would recommend 5-Hour Energy
to their healthy patients who use energy drinks; 47.7% of the doctors said yes,
while about 25% said no.
Living Essentials also conducted a follow-up paper survey done
in connection with sales staff’s in-person promotional visits to doctors’
offices, in which they’d leave samples of the product and brochures describing
5-Hour Energy’s ingredients. Dr. Maronick wasn’t involved in the paper survey
process and had concerns about whether such a method would suffer from biased
responses.  Living Essentials received 2,659
paper surveys in which about 90% of the respondents indicated that they would
recommend a low-calorie energy supplement to patients who use energy
supplements, and 74% would specifically recommend 5-Hour Energy. Living
Essentials created ads with scripts such as:
We asked over 3,000 doctors to
review 5-Hour Energy. And what they said was amazing. Over 73 percent who
reviewed 5-Hour Energy said they would recommend a low calorie energy
supplement to their healthy patients who use energy supplements. Seventy-three
percent. 5-Hour Energy has four calories and it’s used over nine million times
a week. Is 5-Hour Energy right for you? Ask your doctor. We already asked
3,000.
Placed next to the ad spokeswoman was a large stack of
papers, which she flipped through or gestured to while speaking.  ABC and NBC refused to run the ads without
some changes, and consumers also complained.
Ask your doctor ad
The court considered evidence about the effects of the
various ingredients, including evidence developed after the ads aired, which
could “shed light on pre-claim studies” used to substantiate claims. The state
argued that caffeine was the sole active ingredient in 5-Hour Energy, in the
sense of having a physiological effect on the human body. The court disagreed,
because B vitamins, taurine, tyrosine and choline are bioactive.  However, that didn’t mean that these bioactive
ingredients, in the amounts found in 5-Hour Energy, would provide the
advertised benefits of “energy, alertness, and focus.” There was disagreement
among the experts about whether healthy, well-nourished adults could benefit
from the vitamins and amino acids or whether they’d simply be excreted.  The court found that the state hadn’t shown
there was no benefit whatsoever from these ingredients.  However, the state did show that claims that
the other ingredients had a synergistic effect with caffeine for the promised
benefits of “energy, alertness and focus” were unsubstantiated; the evidence
Living Essentials offered was incapable of distinguishing the effects of
caffeine from the overall effects of the product.  Likewise, the study of the decaf product was
insufficiently reliable to substantiate Living Essentials’ claims.
Living Essentials presented evidence that it complied with
industry standards in substantiating its ad claims, first, by having its
advertising director conduct internet research on the formula’s ingredients,
then by instituting a process for legal and regulatory review by an outside law
firm, followed by retaining others to perform literature reviews, and finally
by commissioning clinical studies.  The
advertising director’s internet research was not adequate substantiation
because he “had no ability or training to assess the scientific reliability of
anything he read online.”  Nor was
regulatory or legal review reasonable substantiation.  “There is simply no evidence in the record
that anyone with any science training ever assessed the ad claims and the
science backing up those claims against the FTC substantiation guidelines.”  Nor was there any evidence that anyone in the
company ever looked at the literature reviews.
Living Essentials did act reasonably in undertaking clinical studies,
but the key question was whether the studies were adequate to support the ads’
claims.
Living Essentials also submitted the expert testimony of J.
Howard Beales, III, the former Director of the Consumer Protection Division of
the Federal Trade Commission.  He testified
that the claims in Living Essentials’ ads were all subjective, rather
than objective, and thus could not be deceptive.  The court disagreed:
The company intentionally promoted
the product’s ingredients as changing the way the body functioned. It promoted
the product as a healthy way to achieve these physiological results. The
company spent a significant amount of money on clinical studies to establish
that 5-Hour Energy was having a biochemical or physiological effect on the
bodies of its consumers. As Dr. Beale admitted, if an advertiser claims that a
product will change or affect the physiological functioning of the body, that
is an objective claim for which scientific substantiation [can] exist.
The Washington CPA follows FTC interpretations, including
the substantiation requirement.  “Where
implied claims are conspicuous and reasonably clear from the face of the
advertisement, extrinsic evidence is not required to prove the existence of
implied claims.”  Also, the FTC can show
misleadingness either through showing (1) actual falsity of express or implied
claims; or (2) that the advertiser lacked a reasonable basis for asserting that
the message was true. And here we get a little weird, because the court cited a
case relying on the execrable In re GNC (not
an FTC case) for the proposition that the FTC could show literal falsity “if
all reasonable scientists would agree that the claims do not provide the
benefits as asserted. The FTC may do this by showing the advertiser’s expert
opinions are unreasonable or that no expert believes in the assertion.”
But the state was relying on the lack of reasonable basis theory, so the In re GNC dicta gets just a little worse
without affecting this case, because the court declined to apply the “all
reasonable scientists” standard to Living Essentials’ substantiation
evidence.  “The advertiser has the burden
of establishing what substantiation it relied on for a claim, and the State has
burden of establishing that that substantiation is inadequate.”
Under FTC guidance to advertisers of dietary supplements,
claims about the efficacy of dietary supplements must be supported by
“competent and reliable scientific evidence,” defined as “tests, analyses,
research, studies or other evidence, based on the expertise of professionals in
the relevant area, that have been conducted and evaluated in an objective
manner by persons qualified to do so, using procedures generally accepted in
the profession to yield accurate and reliable results.” The FTC weighs multiple
factors to establish the appropriate substantiation, including type of product,
type of claim, benefits of truthful claims, costs of false claims, expert opinion
about what substantiation is reasonable, and the cost or feasibility of
developing substantiation. The court noted that “[t]his does not mean, however,
that an advertiser can make any claim it wishes without substantiation, simply
because the cost of research is too high.”
The FTC also tells advertisers not to cherry-pick studies
and to ensure that studies are relevant to the claims made in ads, including
consideration of the dosage and formulation of the advertised product compared
to what was studied.
Under this standard, Living Essentials’ claims that that B
vitamins promote energy and amino acids promote alertness and focus were not
deceptive. However, it was deceptive to claim that these ingredients worked
synergistically with caffeine to enhance caffeine-derived energy, alertness,
and focus.  None of the studies Living
Essentials submitted reliably tested that question. Likewise, the decaf ads
were deceptive in claiming that the decaf product would generate energy and
alertness that “lasts for hours.”  Living
Essentials’ substantiation relied on studies involving daily dietary
supplementation of taurine in 3000 mg or more; Decaf 5-Hour Energy contains
only 483 mg of taurine.  And studies of
the actual product didn’t show significant benefits at the 3-hour mark.
The “no crash” claims were ok, though, because Living
Essentials switched to specifying “sugar crash,” and there was no empirical
evidence of caffeine-related crashes in habituated users.
The “ask your doctor” ads were deceptive, because they were
misleading.  An expert in the science of
consumer behavior and persuasion tactics testified credibly that the clear
takeaway from these ads was that “doctors would recommend” 5-Hour Energy. But
the surveys didn’t ask doctors if they thought 5-Hour Energy was healthy or
safe. Instead, they told doctors that 5-Hour Energy was a low fat, low calorie,
low sodium, sugar-free drink and asked if the doctors would recommend 5-Hour Energy
for healthy patients who already use energy supplements. These questions were  “biased, leading, and designed to elicit a
limited response. Due to the phrasing of the questions that preceded this
question, a ‘no’ response to this question suggested that the responding doctor
would instead recommend a high fat, high calorie, or high sodium energy
supplement, rather than allowing doctors the option of saying they do not
recommend energy supplements at all.”
question to doctors

 

Another problem was that the 73% claim in the ad was based
on the online survey of 503 doctors, but the reference to “3,000 doctors” was a
combination of both surveys. The survey methods used for the online survey and
the paper survey “differed so dramatically that the surveys could not
reasonably be combined and represented as the same survey.” The doctors who
participated in the paper survey weren’t randomly selected.

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court says product reformulation might be deceptive if survey supports claim

Nutrition Distribution LLC v. Driven Sports, 2015 WL
12645002, No. LA CV13-06195  (C.D. Cal.
Jan. 15, 2015)
Nutrition sued defendants over their sales of a nutrition
supplement product called “Craze.” In July 2013, defendants discontinued the
sale of the initial version of Craze after it was reported that the ingredients
included amphetamine, amphetamine analogues and/or methamphetamine analogues,
none of which was identified on the product label. The FDA sent a warning
letter and defendants discontinued sales. 
Defendant DS intends to sell Craze again with about 75% similarity to
the prior formula.
Although the prior label was materially false, plaintiff
couldn’t show irreparable injury with respect to that version, since there was
no evidence the prior formula would be used again. Injunctive relief wasn’t
justified; it would serve only a hypothetical public interest.
Plaintiff also sought to prevent defendants from using the
Craze trademark in any new product.  Again,
plaintiff couldn’t show irreparable harm; among other things, it couldn’t show
that money damages would be inadequate if the revised Craze improperly diverted
sales from plaintiff’s products.
The court also didn’t accept theory of misleadingness, which
was that: (1) some members of the public are aware that the old version of
Craze contained the prohibited substances, and will assume that the new version
will as well, and for that reason will purchase it; or (2) some members of the
public were unaware that the old version contained the prohibited substances,
liked its effect and will, therefore, assume that the new version will be the
same, and for that reason will purchase it. “Although these theories may have
some equitable appeal, neither is supported by any evidence.” One could also
hypothezie that “another group of those who used the earlier version of Craze
learned that it was taken off the market because it contained the Substances,
as a result, does not trust DS products, and will not purchase the new version
of Craze even if DS represents that it does not contain any improper component.”
A consumer survey could help validate plaintiff’s theories, but plaintiff
offered none at this point in the case.

In a footnote, the court analogized to a cancellation
request, which requires a plaintiff to “show a real and rational basis for his
belief that he would be damaged by the registration sought to be cancelled,
stemming from an actual commercial or pecuniary interest in his own
[trade]mark.” As noted above, that evidence was missing.  Also, plaintiff didn’t show that such a
request would be deemed timely under § 1064(1), which requires that a
cancellation request be made within five years of a registration.  [NB: Cancellation on the basis of
deceptiveness is not subject to the five-year limitation.]

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Dual use of same mark on customized Jeeps not confusing, court rules

Moab Indus. v. FCA US, LLC, No. 3:12-cv-8247, 2016 WL
5859700 (D. Ariz. Oct. 6, 2016)
Moab sued FCA, aka Chrysler, for trademark infringement (via
reverse confusion) and state-law dilution based on Chrysler’s use of MOAB on a
limited edition version of its Jeep brand. 
Chrysler counterclaimed for infringement and dilution because Moab customizes
and “upfits” Jeeps and applies its Moab mark without removing Chrysler’s marks;
the expansiveness of this claim caught my eye, though unfortunately the court
doesn’t give a clear statement about just how implausible and dangerous that
claim is.  The court conducted a bench
trial and rejected everyone’s claims.
 

Chrysler’s Moab Special edition

Moab Industries’ customized Jeep

Moab has a registration for the service mark MOAB INDUSTRIES
to plaintiff for “automotive conversion services, namely, installing specialty
automotive equipment.” In 2012, Chrysler filed an ITU application for the
trademark MOAB for use in connection with “[m]otor vehicles, namely, passenger
automobiles, their structural parts, trim and badges.”  A 2012 trademark search revealed plaintiff’s
MOAB INDUSTRIES mark, as well as MOAB TAXI for “taxi transport”; in Class 39
and MOAB STAR for “lights for vehicles,” as well as, inter alia, MOAB standing
alone for “bicycles”; “retail store and online retail store services in the
fields of clothing, camping gear, sporting goods”; “juices and fruit drinks”;
and “eyewear; namely, eyeshields for use in sports activities.” The search
results also included common law uses like MOAB 4X4 OUTPOST and MOAB
OFFROAD,  both auto conversion businesses—the
former actually located in Moab.  The PTO
refused Chrysler’s application because of likely confusion with two registered
marks, one of which was Moab’s.  The
application has been suspended in light of the current lawsuit, filed in late
2012.  (Given B&B, it turns out that Moab might have been better off waiting—query
whether there’s any reason to apply preclusion in the other direction!)
For model year 2013, Chrysler introduced a JEEP WRANGLER
MOAB Special Edition vehicle and sold about 3,375 of them.  (Chrysler also sells a MOAB branded,
after-market wheel, and has done so since before Moab began selling upfitted
vehicles. The wheels themselves do not bear the MOAB mark and there was no
evidence of likely confusion between the wheels and Moab’s services.)
Relevant factors: the MOAB mark was “relatively weak,”
somewhere between suggestive and arbitrary; for these purposes, suggestive
marks are conceptually weak, and Moab produced no evidence of commercial
strength of either mark. Chrysler didn’t use MOAB on its vehicles any
more.  This conceptual and commercial
weakness decreased the likelihood of reverse confusion.
The goods were closely related, sold to the same class of
purchasers for similar uses and functions, though Moab’s version had “a more
robust stance,” whatever that means.  The
marks were highly similar; both versions placed the MOAB mark in large letters
on both sides of the hood of their vehicles, suggesting potential confusion.
Actual confusion: Moab produced witnesses testifying that web
searches for “Moab” regularly turned up first a link to Chrysler.  But such searches did not suggest any
connection between the parties, and Moab’s website expressly disclaimed any
connection.  Two witnesses bought Moab
upfitted Jeeps and later encountered Chrysler’s Moab special edition, but they
weren’t potential customers; they both knew they owned Moab-upfitted vehicles.
Another witness was clear that she knew that both parties were selling
different Moab branded Jeeps, and she was in a client-banker relationship, not
a buyer-seller relationship with Moab. 
Leading questions caused some other witnesses to express “confusion,”
but they simply had questions about the source of the Moab Special Edition, and
there was no evidence linking their questions to any potential or actual effect
on customers’ purchasing decisions.  [NB:
Materiality is not usually required!] For example, one witness was a buyer for
a dealership that bought and sold Moab-upfitted Jeeps. When he saw a Moab
Special Edition, he recognized that it wasn’t a Moab Industries vehicle, so he
went online and found information about the Special Edition.  “The lack of substantial evidence of actual
confusion suggests little likelihood of confusion.”
The parties use very different marketing channels: Chrysler
sells new vehicles through authorized dealers, while Moab buys those vehicles,
upfits them, and then resells them through auction and resale dealers, “in some
instances the used car lots of defendant’s authorized dealers. This factor
suggests little likelihood of confusion.” Though Moab has aspirations to make
vehicles, these are mere aspirations, and the parties are unlikely to expand
into each other’s goods.
The parties’ goods are expensive and intended for off-highway
use under difficult to extreme circumstances. “These are not purchases likely
to be made without careful consideration and investigation of the product.”
Intent: Chrysler chose the Moab mark “largely in
consideration of defendant’s long-standing participation in off-road jamborees
at Moab, Utah.” There was no evidence of prior knowledge of Moab Industries by
top management.  Chrysler’s Arizona VP
knew about Moab Industries, as did Chrysler’s audit group; Chrysler designated
Moab Industries as a fleet purchaser, but there was no evidence that this
knowledge was ever conveyed to the legal department or top management before
Chrysler’s CEO approved the Moab Special Edition.  The PTO’s finding of likely confusion was “entitled
to very little weight inasmuch as the USPTO would not have had access to most
of the evidence which is before the court.”
Overall, lack of actual confusion, marketing channels used, and
degree of care weighed strongly in favor of finding confusion unlikely.
Chrysler counterclaimed to cancel the MOAB INDUSTRIES based
on its use on vehicles manufactured by Chrysler, which Chrysler argued misrepresented
the source of Chrysler’s vehicles. There was no evidence that Moab was claiming
to have manufactured the Jeeps it resold. Moab’s advertising clearly advised potential
customers that Moab’s MOAB vehicles weren’t endorsed by Chrysler, or that the
sales had caused any economic harm to Chrysler or damaged its goodwill in any
way.
Dilution: Again, there was no evidence of tarnishment,
despite Chrysler’s “bold” assertions of inferior quality and speculation about
the stability of upfitted vehicles. Owners of Moab-upfitted vehicles who
testified were “well satisfied with their vehicles and plaintiff’s follow-up
services.”

Trademark infringement: True, “the use of MOAB by both
parties – and in particular, the fact that both plaintiff’s and defendant’s
MOAB vehicles display defendant’s registered JEEP, JEEP GRILLE, and WRANGLER
registered marks – gives rise to questions (some say confusion).” But there was
no evidence of confusion, and Chrysler’s trademark attorney testified that she
was not “aware of anybody in the world who expressed a belief that [plaintiff]
was actually manufacturing Jeeps.”

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Court deems Uber’s safety claims to be puffery

XYZ Two Way Radio Service v. Uber Technologies, Inc., No. 15-cv-3015
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2016)
Two black-car companies sued Uber for false advertising,
false association, and tortious interference with contractual relations between
them and their drivers. The court rejected all the claims.
The court found that the challenged statements were
generally puffery, such as:
Wherever you are around the world,
Uber is committed to connecting you to the safest ride on the road. This means
setting the strictest safety standards possible, then working hard to improve
them every day. The specifics vary depending on what local governments allow,
but with each city we operate, we aim to go above and beyond local requirements
to ensure your comfort and security—and what we’re doing in the US is an
example of our standards around the world.
… Unlike the taxi industry, our
background checking process and standards are consistent across the United
States and often more rigorous than what is required to become a taxi driver. .
. . We’ll continue innovating, refining, and working diligently to ensure we’re
doing everything we can to make Uber the safest experience on the road.
Although “these statements are intended to convey the
impression that Uber takes the safety of its passengers seriously,” they did so
in ways that were clearly puffery:
The overall tone is boastful and
self-congratulatory. Many of the statements are couched in aspirational
terms—“committed to,” “aim to,” “believe deeply”—that cannot be proven true or false.
Others are vague and hyperbolic; if Uber literally set the “strictest safety
standards possible” at the outset, it could not “improve them every day.” In
sum, the Court concludes that the challenged statements cannot reasonably be
understood as specific representations of objective facts.
Query whether taxi companies, like Domino’s Pizza, can exploit this ruling to their own advantage.
Plaintiffs focused on the background check, which they
alleged was not “more rigorous than what is required to become a taxi driver,”
because it does not require fingerprints, a medical clearance or a drug test,
all of which NYC requires.  But the court
found Uber’s background check claims to be not false.  First, they were qualified with “often,” and
Uber’s website acknowledged that “[t]he specifics vary depending on what local
governments allow,”  and that, “[i]n New
York City, DMV and criminal background checks are conducted by the Taxi and
Limousine Commission (TLC) according to their licensing standards.” Though
drivers for UberX don’t need a commercial driver’s license in Connecticut or
New Jersey, the website is clear that “[i]n order to drive with Uber in New
York City, you need a TLC (Taxi and Limousine Commission) License,” and that
Connecticut and New Jersey Drivers “CANNOT pick up anywhere in New York State.”
Plaintiffs also challenged Uber’s statements about its
drivers as “partners,” some of which were clearly directed at potential
drivers, not customers.  Plaintiffs
alleged that “partners” was false because Uber considers its drivers
independent contractors and expressly disclaims liability for their actions.
But there was no reason to think that customers took “partners” as a legal term
of art.  The term, “as used on Uber’s
website, reads like euphemistic adspeak devoid of any inherent meaning.”  Thus it wasn’t actionable.
False association: some of plaintiffs’ drivers signed up as
Uber “partners,” and used plaintiffs’ cars bearing plaintiffs’ service marks for
Uber pickups. However, the court ruled, “[w]hen a driver employed by one of the
plaintiffs decides to make an Uber pickup in a car bearing one of the
plaintiffs’ services marks, it is the driver—not Uber—who is ‘using’ the mark.”  Interesting ruling—wonder how contributory
infringement might go.

Tortious interference: nope. 
Although drivers’ contracts were at-will, that didn’t make tortious
interference with prospective contract impossible.  But tortious interference with business
relations “requires a showing of malice or wrongful conduct,” which means
something rising to the level of fraud, threats, or breach of fiduciary duty:
“as a general rule, the defendant’s conduct must amount to a crime or an
independent tort.” Plaintiffs didn’t allege those things.

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