Deadline extended to Friday: TM scholarship roundtable

 

TM scholarship roundtable

The Trademark and Unfair Competition Scholarship Roundtable
co-hosted by Harvard, NYU, and the University of Pennsylvania will take
place this year at the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia, PA.
The Roundtable is designed to be a forum for the discussion of current
trademark, false advertising, right of publicity, and related unfair
competition and IP scholarship, covering a range of methodologies,
topics, and perspectives. Five to six papers will be chosen for
discussion over the course of the Roundtable, with each paper allocated
an entire hour for discussion and assigned a commentator.   

The
Roundtable will be held on Friday, October 10, 2025. If there is a
critical mass of papers, we may also extend the Roundtable through
Saturday morning, October 11th. Participation at the Roundtable will be
limited and invitation-only. We expect all participants to have read the
papers in advance. The Roundtable will cover the travel and lodging
expenses for invited authors.  We invite submissions from scholars
working on any aspect of trademark, false advertising, marketing, right
of publicity, unfair competition, or related areas of the law. Priority
will be given to those who can attend the entire event (including
Saturday) and a dinner the night of Friday, October 10th. Submissions
must be of full drafts in Microsoft word or PDF format. The deadline for
submission is May 30th.

To submit a draft paper, please fill out the form here: https://cvent.me/RXxbZ0 and upload an anonymized
version of your draft.  Please note that the maximum file size that may
be uploaded is 10MB. Appendices or other supporting material or larger
files can be emailed separately to ctic@law.upenn.edu; please do not submit a CV or cover letter. 

For further information about the Roundtable, please email: Jennifer Rothman (Penn): rothmj@law.upenn.edu; Barton Beebe (NYU): barton.beebe@nyu.edu; or Rebecca Tushnet (Harvard): rtushnet@law.harvard.edu.

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2025/05/deadline-extended-to-friday-tm.html

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , | Leave a comment

court holds Elon Musk couldn’t be deceived by statements he coauthored

Musk v. OpenAI, Inc., 2025 WL 1482386, No. 4:24-CV-04722-YGR
(N.D. Cal. May 1, 2025)

I’m only discussing the false advertising claims; they are
funny.

Musk’s false advertising claim under California law fails
because “there is no evidence Musk relied on OpenAI’s public-facing statements
to his detriment,” given that, under the facts pled as the complaint and the
attached exhibits, “Musk himself helped author” the statements about OpenAI’s
commitment to humanity that allegedly misled him.

Musk’s Lanham Act claims also failed; the theory was that the
statements injured Musk and xAI as competitors, but “Musk is not xAI himself”
and thus could not have been injured.

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2025/05/court-holds-elon-musk-couldnt-be.html

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged | Leave a comment

omission of FedEx’s role in embryo transport was potentially deceptive

S.W. v. Cryoport, Inc., 2025 WL 1421909, No.
8:24-cv-02212-AH-(DFMx) (C.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2025)

Tragic facts in this consumer protection case. Plaintiffs
underwent IVF treatments in 2019 to preserve their options, resulting in six cryopreserved
healthy embryos. They contracted with Cryoport to have the embryos transferred
from a fertility clinic in San Francisco to Irvine, California. Cryoport provided
a travel tank to the clinic, clearly labeled as containing live specimens. What
plaintiffs allegedly didn’t know was that Cryoport hired FedEx to physically
take the package from San Francisco to Irvine; they learned that by receiving
tracking alerts to FedEx. FedEx misdelivered the package to Cryoport’s
logistics center, where a Cryoport employee opened the container and removed
the contents; the embryos were then put back into a container and delivered to
Irvine, no longer viable.

Plaintiffs sued for (1) bailment; (2) negligence and/or
gross negligence; (3) violation of the California CLRA and (4) violation of the
UCL. The contract’s limitations on liability to $200 applied (though not as to
gross negligence); the court found that the contract limitations weren’t
unconscionable or void as against public interest, though the claims otherwise
survived. (Not clear to me whether CLRA/UCL claims are also governed by the
contract; consumer protection laws were designed in part to avoid ordinary
contractual exculpation clauses and the claims here go to whether they would
have engaged in the transaction in the first place had they known the truth.)

The CLRA and UCL claims were based on omissions. “A failure
to disclose a fact can constitute actionable fraud or deceit in four
circumstances: (1) when the defendant is the plaintiff’s fiduciary; (2) when
the defendant has exclusive knowledge of material facts not known or reasonably
accessible to the plaintiff; (3) when the defendant actively conceals a
material fact from the plaintiff; and (4) when the defendant makes partial
representations that are misleading because some other material fact has not
been disclosed.”

Cryoport argued that no reasonable consumer who purchased
Defendant’s standard transport services would be deceived into believing that it
would physically transport the materials at issue. But plaintiffs alleged that
Cryoport repeatedly identified itself as offering “transportation,” “shipping,”
and “courier” services, and conveyed to consumers that it itself transports the
material entrusted to it. They sufficiently alleged that the identity and
participation of FedEx was material information that Cryoport was obligated to
disclose, and that the omission was likely to confuse reasonable consumers; the
complaint pointed to public reviews highlighting that FedEx is involved. “This
indicates that a reasonable consumer would likely not understand from
Defendant’s representations that it utilized FedEx for its services.”

 

 

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2025/05/omission-of-fedexs-role-in-embryo.html

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , | Leave a comment

omissions-based deceptiveness claims are easier to bring in Cal. than NY

Gamino v. Spin Master, Inc., No. ED CV 23-2242-DMG (SPx), 2025
WL 1421907 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2025)

California and New York residents sued the manufacturers of
certain children’s toys they purchased, “Orbeez water beads,” alleging the
water beads pose certain severe, undisclosed health hazards to children. “Water
beads” are “tiny, spherical, and gelatinous toys that look strikingly similar
to candy” and have gained immense popularity over the last decade. They’re made
from superabsorbent polymers that expand up to 1,500 times their original size
when exposed to water. “They are often marketed as sensory toys for children
who are young or who suffer from developmental conditions to squish and move
around to aid in their fine motor development.”

However, because they swell when exposed to fluid, “water
beads pose severe health risks to children who ingest or insert the beads into
their bodies, unless the beads are identified and surgically removed. This can
cause injuries such as intestinal blockage or obstruction of the nasal cavity,
ear canal, or respiratory system.” Worse, they’re “practically invisible” on
x-rays. Plaintiffs alleged “several thousand reported water beads-related
hospitalizations of children across the country, per year, since at least 2017,
including several reported deaths.”

Each product has a warning for a choking hazard and
instructions to keep the product away from children under 3 and pets. Also,
each product except one also includes a “CAUTION: DO NOT EAT” warning or an
illustration indicating not to eat the product. A few Orbeez products also
include “do not insert Orbeez into nose or ear” warnings. See, e.g., id. at 6.2

Spin Master argued that no reasonable consumer could have
been misled because the front packaging features prominent warnings about the
dangers of eating Orbeez. “But such warnings do not capture the essence of the
hazards alleged.” Plaintiffs alleged that “there is a severe risk of harm if
children insert a water bead into their body other than by eating it—for
instance inserting a water bead into their ear or nose,” citing an allegation
about a child who suffered profound hearing loss after inserting a water bead
into her ear, where it grew in size and was undetected for 10 weeks.

“A choking hazard warning could reasonably be interpreted by
a consumer to suggest that if a child swallows a water bead without immediately
choking, the child is no longer in danger.” But the complaint alleged that
choking wasn’t the only danger, citing incidents in which children suffered
severe harm or even death after ingesting or aspirating water beads, including
incidents in which there was a delayed onset of symptoms coupled with the
inability of x-rays to detect the ingested bead lodged in the child’s body. Even
“do not eat” warnings coupled with “choking hazard” warnings could plausibly
mean, to a reasonable consumer, that the choking hazard was the reason
not to eat the beats.

However, the NY consumer protection claims were dismissed
because plaintiffs could reasonably have obtained the information from other
sources. Under NY law, an omissions-based claim requires that “the business
alone possesses material information that is relevant to the consumer and fails
to provide this information.” The complaint itself showed that Spin Master wasn’t
alone in possessing information about the hidden dangers of the products,
including the Consumer Products Safety Commission’s publicly available
databases [ed. note: for now!]. “Consumers and parents have also allegedly
denounced water beads for over a decade, including a parent who runs a
non-profit organization to educate the public about the dangers of children
playing with water beads.”

By contrast, in DeCoursey v. Murad, LLC, 673 F. Supp. 3d
194, 218 (N.D.N.Y. 2023), plaintiffs alleged an eye product contained color
additives unsafe for the eye area, citing FDA regulations prohibiting color
additives. “A consumer could not reasonably have learned of the danger, as the
consumer would have had ‘to research the regulation for each specific additive
and cross-reference the general FDA regulation that color additives may not be
used unless the specific regulation for the color additive permits use in the
eye area.’” And Kyszenia v. Ricoh USA, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 3d 350 (E.D.N.Y.
2022), involved only complaints on a “handful” of websites.

However, the plaintiffs did plead a duty to disclose under
California law, which requires “(1) the existence of a design defect; (2) the
existence of an unreasonable safety hazard; (3) a causal connection between the
alleged defect and the alleged safety hazard; and that the manufacturer knew of
the defect at the time a sale was made.”

The court dismissed equitable relief claims, though not
claims for injunctive relief, and also kicked out claims for unjust enrichment,
negligent misrepresentation, NY fraudulent inducement but not California
fraudulent inducement, and express/implied warranty claims (because a failure
to disclose can’t be an affirmation of fact or promise by a seller that becomes
part of a bargain).

 

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2025/05/omissions-based-deceptiveness-claims.html

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , | Leave a comment

Reminder: TM scholarship roundtable

The Trademark and Unfair Competition Scholarship Roundtable
co-hosted by Harvard, NYU, and the University of Pennsylvania will take
place this year at the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia, PA.
The Roundtable is designed to be a forum for the discussion of current
trademark, false advertising, right of publicity, and related unfair
competition and IP scholarship, covering a range of methodologies,
topics, and perspectives. Five to six papers will be chosen for
discussion over the course of the Roundtable, with each paper allocated
an entire hour for discussion and assigned a commentator.   

The
Roundtable will be held on Friday, October 10, 2025. If there is a
critical mass of papers, we may also extend the Roundtable through
Saturday morning, October 11th. Participation at the Roundtable will be
limited and invitation-only. We expect all participants to have read the
papers in advance. The Roundtable will cover the travel and lodging
expenses for invited authors.  We invite submissions from scholars
working on any aspect of trademark, false advertising, marketing, right
of publicity, unfair competition, or related areas of the law. Priority
will be given to those who can attend the entire event (including
Saturday) and a dinner the night of Friday, October 10th. Submissions
must be of full drafts in Microsoft word or PDF format. The deadline for
submission is May 27th.

To submit a draft paper, please fill out the form here: https://cvent.me/RXxbZ0 and upload an anonymized
version of your draft.  Please note that the maximum file size that may
be uploaded is 10MB. Appendices or other supporting material or larger
files can be emailed separately to ctic@law.upenn.edu; please do not submit a CV or cover letter. 

For further information about the Roundtable, please email: Jennifer Rothman (Penn): rothmj@law.upenn.edu; Barton Beebe (NYU): barton.beebe@nyu.edu; or Rebecca Tushnet (Harvard): rtushnet@law.harvard.edu.

We look forward to reading your submissions!

Jennifer (Barton & Rebecca)

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2025/05/reminder-tm-scholarship-roundtable.html

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , | Leave a comment

Court finds literal falsity where two supposedly distinct, rated reverse mortgage sellers are actually one

Longbridge Financial, LLC v. Mutual of Omaha Mortgage, Inc.,
No. 24-cv-1730-DMS-VET, 2025 WL 1382866 (S.D. Cal. May 13, 2025)

Mutual owns defendant Review Counsel and is the first and
only advertising partner of defendant Advisory; those two have similar
websites. Review Counsel’s disclosure banner at the top of its webpages, which
previously stated that Review Counsel was “affiliated with” Mutual of Omaha,
now states that it is “owned and operated by Mutual.” Likewise, Advisory
updated its “Disclaimers” page with a “[l]ist of [a]dvertising [p]artners” that
“have paid to advertise with [Defendant Advisory]”; a list that includes only
Mutual of Omaha. Advisory also added a disclosure to its landing page and
“changed some references on its site [previously] describing it as
‘independent,’ to ‘objective.’ ” Both websites now omit any reference to
Retirement Funding Solutions (RFS), which was previously listed as Defendants’
number two recommended reverse mortgage provider, but which is also Mutual of
Omaha in a different hat.

Longbridge argued that both websites still: (1) falsely
represent those defendants as independent organizations using objective ratings
despite their financial relationship with Mutual of Omaha; (2) use “arbitrary
and statistically unsound criteria” that artificially boost Mutual of Omaha’s rating
as a reverse mortgage provider while deflating other providers’ scores; and (3)
use false and misleading Google ads and landing pages that promise consumers
information about “Top 3” reverse mortgage providers while actually only
promoting Mutual of Omaha.

Longbridge sought an injunction requiring removal of various
webpages and reviews/review metrics, including a review of Longbridge that
falsely listed it as not being licensed in Hawaii. After Longbridge moved for
injunctive relief, Review Counsel stopped using the phrase “Top 3 Reverse
Mortgages” in its sponsored Google ads and instead used “2025’s Best Reverse
Mortgages” and “Top U.S. Reverse Mortgage Companies Reviewed & Ranked.” It
also removed the false statement that Longbridge was not licensed in Hawaii.

The court found that the Hawaii statement was literally
false. And ads promising information about “Top 3” reverse mortgage providers were
literally false “because those ads redirected consumers to landing pages that
highlighted Mutual of Omaha and RFS—which the parties agree are the same
company—as two of the three ‘top’ providers.”

Likewise, “spotlighting and recommending of Mutual of Omaha
and RFS as two separate reverse mortgage providers was literally false by
necessary implication.” Listing them side by side, describing them as “some of
our notable reverse mortgage loan partners” and “industry leaders,” describing
both as having “[e]xcellent customer service” and “[g]reat borrower reviews
from independent sites,” and listing a different phone number for each
necessarily implied that the two were separate and independent entities.

In addition, Longbridge showed that other past statements,
while not literally false, would likely mislead or confuse consumers. Review
Counsel’s previous banner disclosure, stating that Review Counsel was
“affiliated with” Mutual of Omaha and RFS, was “literally true but obfuscated
Mutual of Omaha’s actual control and ownership of Review Counsel.” (The court
didn’t identify extrinsic evidence of deception, though I don’t think it should
have to.)

What about the current websites, highlighting Mutual of
Omaha as their “Featured” or “Top” reverse mortgage company? Longbridge argued
that their disclosures were insufficient and too far removed to reveal the true
nature of Mutual of Omaha’s ownership and control of Review Counsel and
Advisory, and that the sites’ ratings and criteria were “unsound, arbitrary,
deceptive and misleading.”

But the court found the current disclosures sufficient,
again without any consumer reception evidence.  At the top of every Review Counsel webpage is
an evergreen banner stating that “Review Counsel is owned and operated by
Mutual of Omaha Mortgage,” and a bolded “Disclosure” link at the top of the
landing page that repeats the same disclosure.

Review Counsel page with disclosure at top

Advisory with much less impressive disclosure that “the companies” on the page compensate it

Advisory’s current disclosures include a paragraph on the
landing page stating that “[t]he companies listed on this page compensate us as
advertising partners.” And, at the very bottom of Advisory’s full-form
disclaimer page, Advisory added a “[l]ist of [a]dvertising [p]artners” denoting
Mutual of Omaha as the only company to “have paid to advertise with
[Advisory].” Longbridge didn’t meet its burden to show misleadingness: “While a
consumer would have to read Advisory’s long-form disclosure to understand the
true nature of Mutual of Omaha’s advertising relationship with Advisory, the
other two disclosures on the landing page—albeit less informative—should spur a
reasonable consumer to further inquire about Advisory’s advertising
partnerships. Advisory’s long-form disclosure page ultimately provides that
information.” However, without that specific information, the previous
disclosures were misleading, since they only referred to paid partnerships. “That
Mutual of Omaha is Advisory’s only advertising partner is a vital piece of
information consumers should know to avoid being misled or confused. The
information is particularly salient because Mutual of Omaha is featured on
Advisory’s landing page and Advisory makes vague references to ‘[c]ompanies’
who pay Advisory to be promoted or featured on its website without identifying
those companies.

The court rejected Longbridge’s argument that defendants’
“.org” domain names were misleading and confusing because they are primarily
used for “nonprofit websites such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
open-source projects, charitable organizations, and educational platforms.” “To
the extent Defendants’ ‘.org’ usage engenders a false sense of trust and
objectivity, Defendants’ current disclosures likely counteract it.”

What about the ratings criteria and ratings? Longbridge
argued that defendants’ criteria were neither relevant nor meaningful to
reverse mortgage consumers and instead were pretextually selected to make
Mutual of Omaha Defendants’ top rated reverse mortgage provider. But the court
found that ratings with this much judgment involved were likely not factual
claims. “[C]hallenges to the selection of purportedly objective criteria which
are summarized by a five-star rating are not actionable under the Lanham Act.”

Likewise, the individual review pages for Longbridge were
not actionable. Review Counsel’s own “3.7” rating for Longbridge showed alongside
another four-star rating and a button to “Read Reviews.” Clicking that button
brings a consumer to Review Counsel’s consumer review section for Longbridge, a
consumer would see that Longbridge’s four-star rating is based entirely on a
single consumer review stating “Yes. I understand.”

A reasonable consumer should notice
that the 3.7 score [that is, nonactionable opinion] and the four-star score are
distinct since they are side-by-side and numerically different. Additionally,
if a reasonable consumer were to click on “Read Reviews” to read the four-star
consumer review, they would likely conclude it was not relevant to evaluating
Longbridge’s services since the consumer review is nonsensical—stating, “Yes, I
understand.”

As for Longbridge’s complaints about Mutual of Omaha’s
individual consumer ratings, there was no suggestion that Review Counsel authored
or influenced them.

However, Advisory’s prior statements that its reviews and
scores “are based upon Advisory’s own independent propriety scoring system” and
that advertisement compensation does not influence Advisory’s reviews, scores,
or ratings of providers, were falsifiable. A claim of independence “is a
statement of fact that can be proven true or false.” Given that Advisory was
founded and owned by Mutual of Omaha’s former General Counsel, the Advisory
website was designed using a “templated design footprint” provided by Review
Counsel, and Advisory’s sole advertising partner is Mutual of Omaha, that was
dubious, but the record didn’t support a preliminary injunction.

Materiality: disclosure of the Mutual of Omaha connection
was material “because it misrepresents an inherent quality or characteristic of
Review Counsel’s services—whether a consumer can trust Review Counsel’s reviews
and recommendations.” Even if reverse mortgage consumers were “savvy” and
needed mandatory counseling from a government-approved agency before they could
take out a reverse mortgage, that evidence was too generalized. “Further, the
mandatory counseling occurs well after consumers are exposed to and potentially
influenced by Defendants’ false and misleading statements. It is also contested
whether these counselors are allowed to redirect consumers from their chosen
reverse mortgage provider.” The same was true for Advisory’s disclosures. “Consumers
are more likely to use Advisory’s website if they can trust and rely on the
information Advisory chooses to present. Failing to disclose the sole source of
income for Advisory, when that source is a reverse mortgage provider
highlighted on Advisory’s website, could certainly influence consumers’
decisions to use Advisory’s website and choose a reverse mortgage provider.”

The court presumed irreparable harm, which defendants didn’t
rebut. It didn’t matter that Longbridge had no evidence of harm or that
defendants voluntarily changed their websites. Even if Longbridge’s business
was growing, that could happen anyway, and its greater growth might have been
stymied by the false advertising. Review Counsel argued that Longbridge itself
paid for favorable placement and ratings on competing comparison/review
websites, but it didn’t Longbridge own and operate any advertising website or
serve as the sole advertiser of a review website that was founded by a former
Longbridge employee. Anyway, “[e]vidence of threatened loss of prospective
customers or goodwill certainly supports a finding of the possibility of
irreparable harm.”

The court also rejected arguments based on Longbridge’s
delay of more than sixteen months in seeking preliminary injunction rebuts the
presumption of irreparable harm.  “ ‘[D]elay
is but a single factor to consider in evaluating irreparable injury’; indeed,
‘courts are loath to withhold relief solely on that ground.’ ” Longbridge
discovered Review Counsel’s false advertising in April 2023, then raised formal
complaints to relevant trade associations and state banking regulators between
July 2023 and January 2024 before eventually suing in September 2024. The
magnitude of Longbridge’s “potential harm [became] apparent gradually,
undermining any inference that [Longbridge] was ‘sleeping on its rights.’ ” Longbridge
attempted to resolve its claims extrajudicially during the delay period, and
then the potential for harm increased with Advisory’s founding in January 2024.
An additional eight months delay wasn’t dispositive under these circumstances.

The good news for defendants: the injunction didn’t require
discontinuing current practices, only that they couldn’t (1) advertise that
Longbridge is not licensed to issue loans in any state or territory where
Longbridge is licensed; (2) advertise to consumers on sponsored Google-search
links that they provide information relating to “Top 3” reverse mortgage
providers when their landing pages advertise fewer than three independent
reverse mortgage providers; (3) advertise RFS on their websites as if RFS were
an independent reverse mortgage provider originating its own loans, including
by representing that RFS has customer support phone lines, reviews, and ratings
that are distinct from Mutual of Omaha; or (4) “diminish” their existing
disclosures.

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2025/05/court-finds-literal-falsity-where-two.html

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , | Leave a comment

Lanham Act false advertising disgorgement is equitable; no jury trial required

Diamond Resorts U.S. Collection Development, LLC v. Wesley
Financial Group, LLC, No. 3:20-CV-00251-DCLC-DCP, 2025 WL 1334625 (E.D. Tenn.
May 7, 2025)

Another timeshare case! Diamond alleged that defendants
engaged in “a deceptive timeshare cancellation business” that induces Diamond’s
timeshare owners to breach their contractual agreements with Diamond Resorts. It
sued for false advertising in violation of the Lanham Act, the Tennessee
Consumer Protection Act, and for the unauthorized practice of law. As trial
approached, Diamond told the court that it wouldn’t pursue legal relief, only an
injunction, disgorgement, attorneys’ fees, and costs, so that defendants
couldn’t get a jury (which, one infers, might be more sympathetic to defendants
because timeshares can be such nightmares). The court ruled that there was no
statutory or Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in these circumstances.

“The right to a jury trial is guaranteed by the Seventh
Amendment,” which states that “[i]n Suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved.” Common law means “suits in which legal rights were to be
ascertained and determined,” and not suits in which “equitable rights alone
were recognized, and equitable remedies were administered.” Making this
distinction requires a court to compare the action at bar to “18th-century
actions brought in the courts of England prior to the merger of the courts of
law and equity,” because that is an excellent way to run a system. “[A]ctions
that are analogous to 18th-century cases tried in courts of equity or admiralty
do not require a jury trial.” If history doesn’t provide an answer, courts “look
to precedent and functional considerations.” The inquiry also requires the
court to “examine the remedy sought and determine whether it is equitable in
nature.” “Th[is] second inquiry is the more important” of the two. Because of
the value of a jury trial, a court “indulge[s] every reasonable presumption” in
favor of finding a right to a jury trial.

Nonetheless, there was no statutory right to a jury trial in
a Lanham Act case. “Congress has shown that it knows how to provide litigants
with a right to a jury trial when it wants to.”

In Osborn v. Griffin, 865 F.3d 417 (6th Cir. 2017), the
Sixth Circuit observed that “in 18th century chancery courts, what [modern-day
courts] now call disgorgement was embodied in the remedies of ‘accounting,
constructive trust, and restitution,’ ” which “were almost universally
recognized as being within the ambit of courts of equity.” Disgorgement, that
is, was equitable.

More specifically, how did England’s 18th-century courts treat
actions for trademark-related disputes when parties sought disgorgement as a
remedy in those actions? The Sixth Circuit has recognized that, “prior to
statutory protection for trademarks,” English and American courts “treated the
damages portion of such suits as an equitable action in the nature of an
accounting.” Consistent with this history, the Lanham Act allows for
disgorgement “subject to the principles of equity” for claims of false advertising
under § 1125(a).

True, the Sixth Circuit spoke about trademark cases, not
false advertising. But Lexmark says that “the Lanham Act treats false
advertising as a form of unfair competition,” and, the court here reasoned, “unfair
competition is analogous to trademark infringement.” Analogy was good enough
here.

Likewise, the disgorgement remedy was equitable in nature,
even when the disgorgement was sought to redress false advertising rather than
trademark infringement. What about an earlier Sixth Circuit statement that,
“[d]espite this pervasive equity background [in trademark actions], the damages
or accounting aspect of trademark infringement actions are considered legal
actions for purposes of the jury trial clause of the Seventh Amendment.” The
Sixth Circuit relied on Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962), which held
that “a plaintiff, by asking in his complaint for an equitable accounting for
trademark infringement, could not deprive the defendant of a jury trial on
contract claims subsumed within the accounting.” “In short, Dairy Queen
was an action for compensatory damages.”

But plaintiffs here disavowed seeking compensatory damages.
“In Dairy Queen, the Supreme Court was itself skeptical of Dairy Queen’s
claim because it had shades of a breach-of-contract claim and a
trademark-infringement claim all in one, but the Supreme Court declined to
resolve the ‘ambiguity’ in this claim because it was certain that Dairy Queen’s
request for a ‘money judgment’ was “wholly legal in its nature however the
complaint [was] construed.’” Here, disgorgement would only require proof of
defendant’s sales, meaning that “evidence of compensatory damages arising from
any breach of contract will be off the table at trial.” But, given that the
theory here was that defendants induced Diamond Resorts’s timeshare owners to
breach their contracts with Diamond Resorts, the court would watch carefully to
prevent plaintiffs from using theories of breach of contract to arrive at lost
profits; if they did so, defendants would be entitled to a jury trial.

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2025/05/lanham-act-false-advertising.html

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , | Leave a comment

Georgetown Law Institute for Technology Law & Policy student writing competition

 The annual Georgetown Law Institute for Technology Law & Policy student writing competition is now open.  We hope you will encourage your students to submit their papers for consideration.


Students
are invited to submit papers that provide analysis or insights on
issues at the intersection of technology law and policy. Example topics
could include artificial intelligence, antitrust and consumer
protection, biotechnology, computer crime, cybersecurity, digital
platform regulation, intellectual privacy, international trade, and
social justice applications of technology. 


Papers
will be judged by a blind panel of judges. The author(s) of the first
place paper will be awarded $1,000. The author(s) of the top paper on an
artificial intelligence-related topic will be awarded $1,000.


Please submit papers via email to techinstitute@law.georgetown.eduSubmissions are due by June 6, 2025.

Papers
will be accepted from students enrolled at any ABA-accredited law
school in the United States during the 2024-2025 academic year. The
paper must be the author’s own work, although students may incorporate
feedback received as part of an academic course or supervised 
writing project. 

Please visit the Tech Institute’s website for more details and submission guidelines. Questions can be sent to techinstitute@law.georgetown.edu.

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2025/05/georgetown-law-institute-for-technology.html

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged | Leave a comment

court applies issue preclusion to a jury verdict under a different state consumer protection law

Dent v. Premier Nutrition Corp., 2025 WL 1282627, No.
16-cv-06721-RS (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2025)

Here, the court applies issue preclusion against Premier,
makers of Joint Juice, which lost a bellwether-type trial under NY law (a
ruling affirmed
in relevant part by the Ninth Circuit
), on claims against it based on Illinois
consumer protection laws. The court noted that six other state-wide classes
were stayed before it, and a California class was seeking judgment against
Premier in state court.

Specifically, Premier was precluded from relitigating
materiality, sale in commerce, and the measure of damages.

Premier didn’t dispute that Dent and the Illinois purchasers
saw the same labels as Montera and the New York purchasers during the same
relevant time period. Under California law, which supplied the rule of
decision, “[i]ssue preclusion prohibits the relitigation of issues argued and
decided in a previous case, even if the second suit raises different causes of
action.” However, courts have discretion to deny issue preclusion if its
application does not “comport[ ] with fairness and sound public policy.”

“While Premier may not have expected the Montera
trial to have roll-on effects, it does not follow that any effects would be
fundamentally unfair.” Montera and Dent both alleged that Premier’s
advertisement and marketing of Joint Juice was misleading, harming entire
classes of consumers in each state. The advertisement and labeling of Joint
Juice was identical in New York and Illinois, and the time period covered in
both suits was the same. Whether the advertising is deceptive was evaluated
using the same reasonable consumer standard, not individual consumer
understandings.

Premier argued that new scientific advances in the study of
glucosamine’s potential benefits necessitated a full trial on whether Joint
Juice’s label was in fact deceptive. But “new witnesses or cumulative evidence
do not negate issue preclusion.”

Once issue preclusion was available, the question was what
overlapping issues were decided by Montera. The jury decided that Joint
Juice’s label was misleading, and both NY and Illinois use the same materiality
standard, so there was issue preclusion.

However, the Montera jury didn’t need to reach a
conclusion as to whether Premier intended for the class to rely on the alleged
deceptive act or practice, which is required by Illinois law, so that remained
for trial. (Imagine going to the jury and arguing, sure, it was materially
misleading, but we didn’t intend for consumers to rely on it!)

Dent also conceded that she needed to prove individual
causation, but argued that materiality justified an inference of classwide causation.
Illinois’s ICFA requires that the defendant’s deceptive practice proximately
caused the damages suffered by plaintiff, but not actual reliance. It allows
courts to infer proximate causation on a classwide basis when all class members
are subject to a material, standardized misrepresentation. While the court
found Dent’s argument for preclusion on causation “strong,” it determined that
the issue was not “identical.” “While Dent could certainly demonstrate
causation by proving the class was exposed to uniform, materially misleading
misrepresentations, Montera did not actually do so in her case. Moreover, based
on the caselaw presented, such a showing is necessary, but not sufficient for a
finding of ICFA causation.” The court cited Illinois cases articulating a
standard demanding that “the only logical reason” to buy was as a result of the
deception or that “no rational class member would have acted as they did absent
the misrepresentation.”

What about the measure of harm? The ICFA defines damage as
“the value of what [plaintiff] received less than the value of what was
promised”: a benefit-of-the-bargain theory. This means that a full refund is
justified if a product “had no value to consumers.” “The jury in Montera,
in finding liability and awarding the entire purchase price to consumers,
necessarily concluded Joint Juice was valueless for its advertised purpose.”
Premier presented extensive evidence arguing purchasers received benefits apart
from the potentially deceptive joint health ones advertised on Joint Juice’s
label, but the jury declined to reduce its award based on Premier’s suggested
alternative benefits, such as Vitamin C, Vitamin D, antioxidants, and
hydration. Thus, the damages issues in Dent were narrowed to the
calculation of damages due to the Illinois class based on the number of units
sold and the purchase price, and punitive damages.

Premier also argued that it was entitled to raise a First
Amendment defense, which wasn’t raised in Montera until its renewed
judgment as a matter of law after trial. But “issue preclusion requires only
the opportunity to litigate … not whether the litigant availed himself or
herself of the opportunity.” Also, “misleading commercial speech is not
protected,” meaning that Premier couldn’t raise a First Amendment defense
anyway because of the jury findings.

The court also advised the parties that they should settle “this
now antique litigation.”

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2025/05/court-applies-issue-preclusion-to-jury.html

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , | Leave a comment

Burger King’s ads may have told a whopper about burger size

Coleman v. Burger King Corp., 2025 WL 1294605, No.
22-cv-20925-ALTMAN/Reid (S.D. Fla. May 5, 2025)

Nineteen plaintiffs brought claims under 13 states’ laws
alleging that BK falsely advertised the size/amounts of ingredients in various burgers;
the court denied BKC’s motion to dismiss.

BKC allegedly “advertises its burgers as large burgers
compared to competitors and containing oversized meat patties and ingredients
that overflow over the bun to make it appear that the burgers are approximately
35% larger in size, and contain more than double the meat, than the actual
burger.” The complaint also quotes multiple negative reviews posted by
dissatisfied consumers.

images of ads v actual burgers

Previously, the court found that plaintiffs could assert “consumer-protection counts only for those states in which the named plaintiffs purchased their Burger King products.” And they couldn’t advance a breach-of-contract claim based on BKC’s “out-of-stores ads” since “courts generally consider it unreasonable for a person to believe that an advertisement constitutes a binding offer.” But BKC’s “in-store ‘menu ordering boards’ ” were “very different from the advertisements one might see on the Internet or on TV” and could constitute an “offer” under contract law.

BKC argued that reasonable consumers couldn’t have been deceived because “[s]tyling ingredients for photographic purposes, such as by pulling them forward so a head-on image clearly shows what the burger contains, is not misleading to a reasonable consumer visiting a quick-service restaurant, and no precedent suggests otherwise.”

All but one of the relevant states apply the reasonable-consumer test in (substantially) the same way as Florida does, while Arizona uniquely doesn’t consider reasonableness at all and instead asks us to analyze the allegedly deceptive conduct “from the perspective of the ‘least sophisticated reader,’ ” though “bizarre or idiosyncratic interpretations” will not preserve a patently frivolous claim. Nonetheless, Arizona law requires courts to assume “that consumers of below-average sophistication or intelligence are especially vulnerable to fraudulent schemes” and prohibits us from assessing deceptiveness based on “assumptions about the ‘average’ or ‘normal’ consumer.” Arizona law focuses on whether there was a “capacity to mislead” rather than on whether a reasonable consumer would be misled.

Arizona aside, a reasonable consumer could have been deceived.  “[A]t this very preliminary phase of the case, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the Plaintiffs’ favor, BKC’s advertisements—when compared to other, similar advertisements—have a greater capacity to deceive or mislead reasonable consumers.” Although “exaggeration of an item’s quantity (and, for that matter, quality) with idealized imagery is an extremely common technique in the world of food advertising,” plaintiffs plausibly alleged that the ads here “go beyond mere exaggeration or puffery” and “make it appear that the burgers are approximately 35% larger in size, and contain more than double the meat, than the actual burger.” Even more problematically, BKC’s advertisements allegedly changed in 2017 to “materially overstate the size of its burgers” in comparison to previous years: 

old and new ads

This wasn’t mere exaggeration through common food-styling
practices; plaintiff plausibly alleged that BKC misled customers into falsely
believing that the size of BKC’s burgers has, in fact, increased since 2017.  “[R]easonable consumers could be misled if
the disparity between the size of a burger in an ad and size of the burger in
the real world becomes too great. …Who are we to decide whether such a
seemingly substantial difference between what was promised and what was sold
was (or was not) enough to alter the purchasing preferences of reasonable
American consumers?” The 2017 change was very important here. “A change like
this (the Plaintiffs have plausibly suggested) could lead reasonable consumers
to believe (incorrectly, as it turns out) that BKC increased the size of its
burgers in 2017.”

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2025/05/burger-kings-ads-may-have-told-whopper.html

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , | Leave a comment