one note on In re Tam: TM as right to suppress others’ speech

Judge Reyna’s dissent makes a point that I think courts will find very hard to grapple with, whatever the fate of 2(a) or disparagement specifically:

Judge Dyk concurs in the result today only because he believes the content of Mr. Tam’s mark is so “indisputably expressive” that it cannot be regulated under the lesser standards applied to commercial speech. Dyk, J., concurring at *20-21. But if the expressive content of the mark precludes regulation, on what authority may the government grant Mr. Tam the exclusive right to use this mark in commerce? Whatever standard of scrutiny protects the content of Mr. Tam’s trademark from government regulation, that same standard must necessarily be overcome by the government’s substantial interest in the orderly flow of commerce, or no trademark could issue.

To look at it from the flipside, there’s a mismatch between the rationale for protecting commercial speech–it provides useful information!–and the rationale for giving registrants complete freedom to choose non-inherently informational symbols to which they attach meaning.

from Blogger http://ift.tt/1YuH0dy

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , | Leave a comment

Update: SanMedica v. Amazon favorably settles

Victory is mine! 
Bring me the finest muffins and bagels in all the land!  Public Citizen represented me in a lawsuit to
unseal the key information in SanMedica v. Amazon, a case that applied the 1-800 Contacts rule that ad clickthrough
rates provide an upper bound to the percentage of consumers who could have been
confused online—but sealed the rate it found sufficient to avoid summary
judgment.  After the court granted my
motion to intervene, the parties
agreed to unseal most of the information we sought
, including this fact,
which is crucial to understanding the decision. 
Thanks so much to Scott Michelman and the other lawyers at Public
Citizen who brought this about.  More to
come when the unsealing occurs and I can at last see the significance of the
case for keyword infringement litigation more generally.

from Blogger http://ift.tt/1RDwxZ9

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , | Leave a comment

Transformative work of the day, Star Wars edition

The Washington
Post shows how Ken Burns would recount the Intergalactic Civil War
(so
bonus right of publicity issue too).  Note use of clips from the films–also a DMCA 1201/exemption issue.  (You’re welcome, Washington Post!)

from Blogger http://ift.tt/1YvXDAq

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , , | Leave a comment

A dreaded sunny day for Abbott & Costello heirs: play made fair use of Who’s On First

TCA Television Corp. v. McCollum, No. 15 Civ. 4325 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 17, 2105)
 
The “critically-acclaimed Broadway dark comedy, Hand to God,” used dialogue from the
iconic comedy routine, Who’s On First?
both in the play and in a promotional video for the play (which sadly, I can’t
find online).  Claiming rights in the
routine, plaintiffs, heirs of Abbott and Costello, sued for copyright infringement,
and the court found fair use on the pleadings.
 
According to the complaint: Abbott and Costello first
performed the Routine on March 24, 1938, as a live radio broadcast for The Kate
Smith Hour. In November 1940, they signed a work-for-hire agreement with
Universal Pictures Company that assigned to Universal “all the rights to the
duo’s performances of Who’s On First in One
Night
and The Naughty Nineties.” One Night (1940) was the first
publication for 1909 Act purposes; the Routine was then expanded in The Naughty Nineties in 1945.  These films were properly registered and
renewed.  Universal then quitclaimed its interest
in the Routine to the duo’s heirs (through a chain not relevant here).
 
Accepting all the allegations in the complaint as true, Abbott
and Costello assigned their common law copyright in the Routine to UPC. UPC’s
registration of the initial copyright in One
Night
was “therefore the first time that it obtained [statutory] copyright
under the 1909 Act[,] upon UPC’s registration with the Copyright Office.” The
publication of the Routine within the film then, under circuit precedent, extinguished
the common law copyright in the unpublished version of the Routine.  “Because as much of the 1938 Routine as was
disclosed in the motion picture was published when the motion picture was
published, and because the law treats motion pictures as a unitary works, the
copyrights in One Night and The Naughty Nineties that UPC registered
‘merged’ the Routine with the films.” 
(Citing 16 Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin, 791 F.3d 247, 257-58 (2d Cir. 2015)
(holding that because “[f]ilmmaking is a collaborative process typically
involving artistic contributions from large numbers of people,” statutory
copyright in the film itself could be undermined if “copyright subsisted
separately in each of their contributions to the completed film”).
 
In Hand to God, “Jason,
the play’s shy and repressed main character, finds a creative escape from his
religious small-town life through his hand sock-puppet, named Tyrone.”  Tyrone begins in Jason’s mother’s Christian
Puppet Ministry, but “begins to develop a life of its own, possibly due to
demonic possession.”  The use of the
Routine is as follows:
 
About fifteen minutes into the
play, Jason attempts to impress his crush, Jessica, by performing about one
minute and seven seconds of the Routine, with Tyrone as Costello and Jason as
Abbott. Impressed, Jessica asks Jason if he made up the dialogue himself, and
he says “yes.” The audience is intended to recognize the famous Abbott and
Costello sketch and find humor when Tyrone, the puppet, calls Jason a liar and
tells Jessica that the sketch “is a ‘famous routine from the Fifties.”‘ The
puppet proceeds to insult Jessica, saying, “You’d know that if you weren’t so
stupid,” and then exposes Jason’s feelings for Jessica. (“It doesn’t matter
because he thinks you’re hot.”). Providing a contrast with the soft-spoken
Jason, the puppet Tyrone’s outrageous and subversive behavior escalates over
the course of the play, and its post-Routine outburst provides a starting point
for the gradual exposure of the darker side of Jason’s personality.
 
The nature of the work: creative and iconic, weighing in
plaintiffs’ favor.  Amount taken: about
one minute and seven seconds, while the Routine in One Night runs about three minutes and The Naughty Nineties goes almost nine minutes; the play uses a
hybrid of the first thirty-seven seconds of One
Night
and the first minute and six seconds of The Naughty Nineties.  Because even one line, “Who’s on first?” is
instantly recognizable, and the play uses more than that, the amount factor
slightly favors the plaintiffs, though this factor is comparatively less
important than transformativeness.  [Hey,
if it’s a unitary work, how come we aren’t measuring amount by the percentages
of the total films represented by the routine? Here, the qualitative part of
the assessment probably remains similar, but chopping up works into parts has
risks for fair use, which is one supporting justification for the ultimate
holding in Garcia v. Google, cited by
the court here.]
 
Effect on the market: alleged harm to the licensing market
wasn’t enough; a reasonable observer wasn’t likely to find that Jason and his
puppet’s reenactment of the Routine could usurp the market for the original
Abbott and Costello performance. “Furthermore, Defendants’ transformative use
of the Routine could arguably broaden the market for the original work, as it
exposes a new audience of viewers to the work of the classic American comedy
duo.”  This is even a stronger statement
of this market-enhancing conclusion than that in Google, I think.  Favors
defendants.
 
The determinative factor, however, was
transformativeness.  The use of the scene
using the Routine in the promotional video (which might only have images from
the scene, not dialogue, if it’s like others I looked at) showed a commercial
purpose.  Defendants used that clip
because it was representative of the plot, and also was specifically mentioned
in many articles and reviews of the play. 
But commerciality can be discounted in transformativeness cases.
 
Commentary isn’t necessary. The relevant distinction is whether
the new work “merely ‘supersede[s] the objects’ of the original . . . or
instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different character,
altering the first with new expression, meaning or message.” Creating “a
distinct visual aesthetic and overall mood” for the audience is transformative.  Here, the tone of the new performance was “markedly
different,” using the Routine to create a background for the increasingly
sinister development of Tyrone’s character. 
This creates a new understanding/aesthetic about the relationship
between horror and comedy absent from Abbott & Costello’s performances.  Jason and his hand, rather than two actors,
perform the Routine to contrast his seemingly soft-spoken personality and his
inner nature, which isn’t the same purpose as the original. Though both
performances evoke laughter, that doesn’t matter: the Routine provides comic
relief in the play for reasons that differ from the humor of the original
sketch.  Tyrone breaks the fourth wall
when he tells Jessica that she should recognize the routine—he’s sharing an
inside joke with the audience.  “The
audience laughs at Jason’s lie, not, as Plaintiffs claim, simply the words of
the Routine itself.”  And for the lie to
be apparent, the original needs to be recognizable.

from Blogger http://ift.tt/1k6OEIk

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged | Leave a comment

Reading list: Lanham Act standing after Lexmark

Virginia E. Scholtes, The Lexmark Test for False Advertising Standing: When Two Prongs Don’t Make a Right, 30 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1023 (2015):

Part I of this Note tracks the development of standing under § 43(a) of
the Lanham Act and analyzes the three-way circuit split on false
advertising standing that existed before the Lexmark decision. Part II
describes the Supreme Court’s decision in Lexmark, focusing on the
Court’s reasoning for formulating the new two-pronged test and the
Court’s interpretation of the Lanham Act’s purpose. Part III assess the
extent to which both the zone-of-interests prong and the proximate cause
prong serve the purposes of the Lanham Act. First, Part III shows how
the zone-of-interests prong gives a right of action to plaintiffs with an
injury the Lanham Act was intended to protect, focusing on the issue of
consumer standing under § 43(a). Next, Part III explains two situations
where the proximate cause prong may fail to serve the purpose of the
Lanham Act: when the defendant has a low market share, and when the
plaintiff’s injury was inflicted through network effects. Finally, Part III
analyzes courts’ application of the proximate cause prong in false
advertising cases and concludes that the relaxed application of the
proximate cause requirement will likely prevent this prong from barring
plaintiffs who otherwise fall within the class of plaintiffs the Lanham Act
was intended to protect. Overall, the Lexmark test for federal false
advertising standing serves the purpose of the Lanham Act because it
grants a cause of action to plaintiffs with a commercial injury, thus
deterring unfair competition.

from Blogger http://ift.tt/1YodOzA

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , , | Leave a comment

Defendant can’t take advantage of TM abandonment it created

Axiom Worldwide, Inc. v. HTRD Group Hong Kong Ltd., 2015 WL
8113965, No. 8:11–cv–1468–T–33 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 30, 2015)
 
Axiom sued seeking to confirm its ownership of certain IP,
including trademarks, related to medical devices, and for infringement resulting from its unauthorized use.  It won summary judgment against numerous
defendants, and prevailed again after a non-jury trial, receiving damages and a
permanent injunction, which was affirmed.
 
Defendants sought modification of the permanent injunction,
which enjoined them from using Axiom’s trademarks, including “DRX 9000” and
“Axiom Worldwide” for any commercial purpose. 
Defendants alleged that Axiom had abandoned the marks for medical
devices; that the federal registrations for Axiom Worldwide and DRX 9000 had
been cancelled; that Axiom has had no substantive operations in the United
States since 2010; and that at least since 2011, no new devices in the “DRX”
line could be offered for sale in the U.S. because the FDA 510(k) pre-market
clearances for those devices were de-listed. Thus, the legal basis for the
injunction allegedly no longer existed.
 
Axiom responded that it hadn’t abandoned the marks but
rather licensed them to other companies, who were using them on the internet at
http://ift.tt/1TS7ejI, in fax blasts to doctors, and at trade shows both
domestically and internationally. Also, Axiom argued that defendants had
flagrantly violated the injunction, and that any nonuse was their fault.  The court heard testimony from James Gibson,
president of Axiom.
 
An injunction may be modified when its original purposes are
not being fulfilled in any material respects, or perhaps when the party seeking
modification shows that a significant change in circumstances warrants revision.
 Either way, defendants failed to show
entitlement to a change.  Defendants
argued that the abandonment of the marks, and their consequent availability to
the public, constituted a change in circumstances.
 
Gibson conceded that Axiom had no substantive business
operations in the United States, apart from litigation, since 2010, although he
testified to Axiom’s efforts post-judgment and post-appeal to regain a footing
in the DRX medical device service and sales market.  Nonuse for three years is prima facie
evidence of abandonment, creating a rebuttable presumption of intent not to
resume use.  Moreover, intent to resume
use “cannot be far-flung or indefinite; rather there must be an intent to
resume use within the reasonably foreseeable future.”  However, here, much of the period of nonuse
was caused by defendants and others like them, and was excusable; further, Axiom
took efforts to resume meaningful use of the marks in a timely manner.
 
For some background: Axiom created an LLC and transferred
certain assets to the LLC; the LLC ran into financial trouble and its assets
were bought by HTRD, which filed paperwork with the PTO to assign Axiom’s
trademarks to itself.  HTRD used Excite
Medical to make and sell DRX devices using Axiom’s trademarks, designs, and
other intellectual property.  It was this
that led to the lawsuit which established that Axiom owned the relevant IP. The
court ordered the cancellation of HTRD’s registrations of the trademarks and
directed the PTO to amend its records to show Axiom as the owner.
 
The first notice of cancellation for failure to file a
section 8 declaration for “Axiom Worldwide” came while HTRD claimed to own the
marks and before the district court’s ruling that Axiom owned the marks. A
later notice of cancellation, for the “DRX 9000” word mark, came after the
entry of judgment, when the marks had been reassigned to Axiom.  HTRD filed the first required Section 8
Declarations for both marks between the fifth and sixth anniversaries of the
registration, but the PTO rejected the declaration for “Axiom Worldwide”
because HTRD didn’t have proper chain of title. For the “DRX 9000” mark, the
PTO accepted the declaration from HTRD, but cancelled the registration for
failure to file the declaration at the ten-year mark.  In any event, the owner didn’t properly file
section 8 declarations, and that couldn’t be blamed on the PTO or someone else.
 
In April 2011, purportedly to protect the marketplace from
counterfeit goods, Axiom de-listed its DRX 9000 series of products with the
FDA, which prevented it from making DRX devices in the U.S. After the
litigation, Axiom conveyed the trademarks to other entities, as a result of
substantial judgments against it.  One of
those other entities is currently authorized by the FDA to manufacture DRX 9000
devices, because it re-listed the 510(k) clearance with the FDA this year.  Although these entities haven’t made new
devices, Gibson testified that they could do so if they received a customer
order, and that they’d been advertising new machines for sale since attending a
trade show in January 2015 in Dubai. They also attended trade shows in Nevada
and the West Coast and intended to go to others ithis fall. The DRX 9000 mark
and the Axiom Worldwide trademark and logo have been used at these trade shows.
Axiom also showed “fax blasts” from between February and June 2014, promoting
the sale of service parts and used devices for the DRX machines (the latter for
international customers, which would seem to create a use in the US issue). Gibson
further testified that he attempted to regenerate Axiom’s business activity but
was unable to obtain investors who were fearful of the injunction and of defendants’
continued violations.
 
Axiom showed that defense counsel, on behalf of defendant
Excite Medical, filed an application with the PTO to register “DRX 9000” for
medical devices in May 2015.  Its declaration
that “the applicant is the owner of the trademark or service mark” or
alternatively, that “the applicant is entitled to use the mark in commerce” and
that “the signatory believes …. no other person has the right to use the mark
in commerce ….” was, according to Axiom, clearly false, and a blatant
violation of the injunction. Defendants responded that it was merely an ITU
application, and that  Excite Medical
intended to use the mark for “back braces,” not for the spinal decompression
device at issue in this litigation.
 
The court concluded that, “despite some missteps and
apparent difficulty getting business restarted, the whole of this litigation
demonstrates Axiom’s efforts to reclaim the marks for use of the marks in
commerce.”  Its actions of suing after
learning that HTRD claimed ownership of the intellectual property and had
reassigned the Axiom trademarks to itself and begun manufacturing and selling
DRX 9000 devices weighed against any finding of inexcusable nonuse. “While
Axiom ceased further operations pending a determination that it owned the
marks, its conduct in seeking to regain control of its marks and intellectual
property simply does not lend support to Defendants’ claims of abandonment nor
their request for modification.”  The court
wasn’t willing to allow defendants to benefit from a problem they’d helped
cause.  Their attempts to do so included
the ITU, since the injunction explicitly prevented defendants from “[m]aking
representations that they own or are authorized to use any of the trademarks or
intellectual property rights and proprietary information this Court has found
belong to Axiom.” Defendants’ and their counsel’s belief in the marks’
abandonment didn’t displace the injunction, and their insistence on testing its
boundaries weighed against a finding that the injunction had served its
intended purpose.
 
Although Axiom’s financial circumstances made it doubtful
that Axiom itself could reenter the DRX sales or service business, it had
post-litigation licensing agreements that allowed it and its transferee to do
so, and those entities were actively marketing the DRX products and using the
marks for their sales and service efforts. (The court again didn’t address the
international v. use in the US aspects of this marketing.)  “[T]hese intentional and concrete efforts to
reestablish business in the DRX line of machines are not far flung or
indefinite.”

from Blogger http://ift.tt/1lT5EUd

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , | Leave a comment

Puerto Rico registration can’t constitutionally extend elsewhere

Puerto Rico Coffee Roasters LLC v. Pan American Grain
Manufacturing Co., Inc., 2015 WL 8551102, No. 3:15–CV–02099 (D.P.R. Dec. 11,
2015)
 
P.R. Coffee Roasters, which sells “Café Rico” coffee in
P.R., sued Pan American for trademark infringement, false advertising, and
related claims under federal and Puerto Rico law based on Pan American’s
conduct in the coffee industry, specifically its Florida sales of “Rico Coffee”
 using the same name, packaging format,
and color scheme as P.R. Coffee Roasters’ Café Rico,” along with alleged
disparagement of P.R. Coffee Roasters. P.R. Coffee Roasters further alleged
that the statement on packages of Rico Coffee, that “it is no accident
Puertorrican coffee is the preferred coffee of Popes and Kings” infringed P.R.
Coffee Roasters’ trademark in the slogan “The Coffee of Popes & Kings,” on
packages of “Alto Grande” coffee, another P.R. Coffee Roasters brand.  (I imagine the nominative use argument might
be an uphill battle here, but it’s an interesting thought.)
 

Plaintiff’s Café Rico
Plaintiff’s Alto Grande, The Coffee of Popes & Kings
 



Defendant’s Rico Coffee
Defendant’s coffee: It is no accident that Puertorrican Coffee is the preferred coffee of popes & kings

Also, P.R. Coffee Roasters alleged that Pan American was waging
a “defamation campaign” that accusds P.R. Coffee Roasters of “using child
labor,” “selling imported coffee as local coffee,” and “participating in
efforts to undermine the Puerto Rico coffee industry,” etc.  The court pointed out that, to some extent,
the allegations were that Pan American’s wrongs were at cross-purposes: seeking
to benefit from, but ultimately destroy, the reputation of P.R. Coffee
Roasters’ coffee brands.
 
P.R. Coffee Roasters alleged that Pan American knew of its
Café Rico trademark due to a series of deals and litigation by Pan American
involving the mark. Pan American’s Rico Coffee was allegedly marketed to the
same type of consumers as P.R. Coffee Roasters’ brands, such as “the Puerto
Rican community in Florida, who know and have been consuming Café Rico for more
than 70 years.”  
 
Pan American argued that it had senior rights, but that
certainly couldn’t be resolved on the pleadings. Plus, Pan American seemed to
base its claim on its incontestable right to use the trade dress for “Arroz
Rico,” a brand of packaged rice.  But
P.R. Coffee Roasters alleged the use of its Café Rico mark for coffee since
“approximately 1936” and that it was the senior user of the mark for coffee.
 
P.R. Coffee Roasters thus sufficiently pled infringement of
its registered and unregistered marks/designs, though it didn’t allege a
separate trade dress claim and would be held to that concession.  “Café Rico” was unregistered under federal
law, so P.R. Coffee Roasters would ultimately have to prove secondary meaning
under a rigorous standard, but it adequately pled secondary meaning by alleging
that the word mark had been in continuous use since the 1930s, such that “the
Puerto Rican community in Florida … know[s] and ha[s] been consuming Café
Rico for more than 70 years,” and by appending to the complaint historic
examples of the advertising and promotion of the mark.  Thus, P.R. Coffee Roasters sufficiently
alleged that its mark could identify the source of coffee in Florida.
 
The false advertising claim was also sufficiently pled.  P.R. Coffee Roasters alleged that the
falsities were “disseminated under the Facebook accounts for Pan American’s
brand Café Mami and the campaign ‘Salvemos el café 100% puertorriqueño,’
controlled by Pan American’s public relations team.”  “Whether a P.R. Coffee Roasters coffee is
cheap or good, imported or local, adulterated or pure, destructive of Puerto
Rico or supportive of it, and complicit in child labor or standing against it
are all material representations about the coffee because they all ‘relate[ ]
to a characteristic that defines the product at issue, as well as the market in
which it is sold.’” The alleged accusations struck at the heart of P.R. Coffee
Roasters’ brand.  And the allegations
were of explicit falsity, requiring no extrinsic evidence of consumer
deception.  Likewise, P.R. Coffee
Roasters properly alleged that Pan American made false statements about itself:
that it was protecting locally produced coffee, using the “slogan ‘Salvemos el
Café 100% puertorriqueño’ (Save the 100% Puertorrican Coffee),” while at least two
of the three brands affiliated with Pan American, Del Patio and De Mi Tierra, used
imported coffee. P.R. Coffee further alleged that Pan American was abusing its
control of 90% of the fertilizer market to harm P.R. coffee growers, contrary
to its representations.
 
Pan American argued that the court lacked jurisdiction
because all the allegedly disparaging statements occurred in Puerto Rico and
were directed at the consuming public there. 
But Congress legislated to the full extent of its Commerce Clause power
in the Lanham Act.  Pan American
allegedly waged part of its defamation campaign through online “ads and
sponsored social media sites.” And anything that has “traveled via the
Internet” has “traveled in interstate commerce.” Separately, “an adverse effect
on the sales or goodwill of one whose trademark is used in interstate commerce
is a sufficiently substantial effect on interstate commerce to entitle [P.R.
Coffee Roasters] to invoke the protection of the Lanham Act, even if the [acts]
of [Pan American’s] are wholly intrastate.”
 
The court also rejected Pan American’s First Amendment
defense at this stage, since the First Amendment didn’t give Pan American a
right to engage in misleading commercial speech.
 
However, P.R. Coffee Roasters couldn’t bring a Puerto Rico
trademark claim, because Puerto Rico trademark law didn’t apply
extraterritorially, both on statutory interpretation and Dormant Commerce
Clause/First Amendment grounds. (Note interesting invocation of the First
Amendment here—as we’ll see, the court suggests that there is a First Amendment
right of others to use descriptive terms without secondary meaning.  That would suggest some trouble for
incontestability.)  Extraterritorial
application of trademark rights in “Café Rico” would conflict with the PTO’s
holding that P.R. Coffee Roasters was required to disclaim rights in the word
mark, other than as shown in the design mark, because “Café Rico” is a
descriptive phrase in Spanish, meaning “delicious, rich coffee.” “The
extraterritorial application of Puerto Rico law in this case would not only
unravel the delicate balance between free speech and property rights struck in
the Lanham Act, but it would also unconstitutionally impede interstate trade
and speech.”

The court dismissed P.R. Coffee Roasters’ trademark misuse claim, because there
was no cause of action for that. 
However, P.R. Coffee Roasters could bring Puerto Rico tort claims to the
extent that they adopted the Lanham Act—so P.R. Coffee Roasters could sue
another Puerto Rico citizen, as Pan American was, for conduct in the state of
Florida that violated the Lanham Act. 
The court reserved the question of whether, if Puerto Rico law provided
extra remedies (as it might), such remedies would be preempted.
 
By contrast, P.R. Coffee Roasters’ defamation claim under
Puerto Rico law failed.  Although Pan
American didn’t show it was a public figure, P.R. Coffee Roasters still needed
to plausibly allege negligence. 
Negligence is assessed based on the “nature of the published
information,” the “[o]rigin of the information and reliability of its source,”
and the “[r]easonableness of the process for checking the truthfulness of the
information.”Although discovery would be required to prove negligence, P.R. Coffee Roasters still had the burden at this
stage to plead negligence in a non-conclusory manner supported by pertinent
facts. This it did not do.

from Blogger http://ift.tt/1RTPV3c

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , , , , | Leave a comment

California false advertising requires “advertising,” but unfair competition doesn’t

Golden v. Sound Inpatient Physicians Medical Group, Inc., No.
14-cv-00497, 2015 WL 8539034 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2015)
 
Golden, a medical doctor, was a VP of medical affairs/chief
quality officer at Dameron Hospital from 2008-2012.  Golden was also the majority shareholder of
the California Hospitalist Physicians, Inc. (CHP), a medical corporation
providing primary care medical services, which contracted with Dameron to
provide services from 2009-2012, at which point Dameron chose Sound Inpatient
as the new hospitalist group for Dameron. 
Golden had entered into agreements with several doctors to provide
hospitalist services for their patients, competing with Sound Inpatient.
 
Golden posted a list in the emergency room of doctors who
designated her as the hospitalist for their patients.  But Sound Inpatient sent letters to providers
saying Golden did not practice at Dameron anymore; sent a nurse to visit
offices of providers stating Golden was not practicing at Dameron anymore; and told
employees to inform Dameron emergency room staff not to check anymore whether Golden
was designated as hospitalist for patients, because all those patients were now
assigned to Sound Inpatient.
 
Golden sued for violation of the California consumer protection
laws.  She had standing to sue because she
alleged that she lost money as a result of patients not seeking her services
anymore.
 
Under Cal. Bus & Prof. Code § 17500, it’s “unlawful for
any person [or] corporation … with intent directly or indirectly to dispose of
real or personal property or to perform services … or to induce the public to
enter into any obligation relating thereto, to make or disseminate … any
statement, concerning that real or personal property or those services … which
is untrue or misleading, and which is known, or which by the exercise of
reasonable care should be known, to be untrue or misleading.”  However, a close reading of the statute
convinced the court that the statements had to be made in “advertising,” which
these statements were not.  The relevant
language from Section 17500 refers to false statements disseminated: “in any
newspaper or other publication, or any advertising device, or by public outcry
or proclamation, or in any other manner or means whatever, including over the
Internet.” The all-inclusive language of “any other manner or means whatever”
could include letters, a nurse’s statements to providers, and instructions to
employees not to check whether Golden had been designated as the hospitalist. But
section 17500 as a whole clearly referred to advertising, and there was a “common
sense” difference between the communications at issue here and advertising. If
Golden could sue here, “nearly any false statement connected with the sale of a
product/service constitutes false advertising.” 
(Which would be a problem because …)
 
The language of the statute clearly referred to harm to the
public, and Golden didn’t show that the public was induced or that a false
advertisement was disseminated to the public. Instead, Sound Inpatient
allegedly targeted individual providers and employees.   “[T]hese sporadic, infrequent means were not
directed at the public for purposes of section 17500.”  Moreover, the complaint didn’t allege how
consumers such as patients were deceived or harmed, just that medical providers
and staff were the recipients of false statements.  (If they didn’t get the hospitalist they’d
chosen, why isn’t that harm?)
 
Section 17200 prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent
business act.”  “Unlawful” borrows
violations of other laws, and without a 17500 predicate claim, there was
nothing there.  As for “fraudulent,” that
requires actual and justifiable reliance, and Golden didn’t allege that she
relied on Sound Inpatient’s false statements. 
Nor did most of the facts alleged amount to “unfair” conduct, which
requires “an incipient violation of an antitrust law, or that violates the
policy or spirit of [such] laws because its effects are comparable to a
violation of the law, or that otherwise significantly threatens or harms
competition.”

However, alleged false statements that Golden wasn’t practicing at Dameron
anymore nudged the complaint based on 17200 past the threshold of plausibility.
 Repeatedly making such false statements
with the aim of drawing patients away from Golden stated a claim for unfair
competition.

from Blogger http://ift.tt/1O6YOqy

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , , , | Leave a comment

Transformative work of the day, Omelas edition

I know I do a lot of these from The Toast, but that’s kind of their thing.

from Blogger http://ift.tt/1RO20Xv

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , | Leave a comment

Soliciting lawsuits against TM owner isn’t confusing use of TM owner’s mark

AMCOL Sys., Inc. v. Lemberg Law, LLC, No. 3:15-3422, 2015 WL
8493955 (D.S.C. Dec. 10, 2015)
 
AMCOL provides debt collection services and is subject to the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA)’s ban on “harassment” in debt
collection. AMCOL alleged that it had substantial goodwill associated “recognized
by the relevant consumers, including AMCOL’s clients and debtors.”  (Seems unlikely that the debtors have much
goodwill towards AMCOL, though.)  Lemberg
allegedly used the internet to advertise its services using AMCOL’s marks,
interfering with internet users’ ability to reach AMCOL’s own website, and
misleading potential clients into believing that AMCOL’s services violated
applicable laws such as the FDCPA. 
 
Lemberg runs “several websites soliciting potential clients
to file lawsuits against debt collectors, including http://ift.tt/1RO20qI
and http://www.debtbulldog.com.” One of its headings was “Stop AMCOL Systems
Harassment,” which allegedly defamed AMCOL by suggesting a violation of the
FDCPA.  The “heading” for Lemberg’s
YouTube Channel stated “Amcol Systems Calling You? Sue Amcol Systems for
Harass[ment].” Debtors would allegedly choose to retain Lemberg rather than
working with AMCOL. [Debtors are involuntarily involved with AMCOL.  Query whether debt sellers, AMCOL’s actual
customers, would care what happens after sale, as long as AMCOL pays them for
the debt.]
 
The court kicked out the Lanham Act claims and declined to
exercise jurisdiction over pendent state law claims.  First, likely confusion: Lemberg was using
AMCOL’s marks in connection with advertising their own services, but AMCOL
still failed to allege actionable consumer confusion.  Both Radiance Foundation, Inc. v. N.A.A.C.P.,
786 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2015), and Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309 (4th Cir.
2005), hold that criticism of a plaintiff “via use of its marks” does not
equate to consumer confusion.  Although
those cases involved “First Amendment issues” [and this doesn’t?], the broader
holding is that trademark law doesn’t affect the rights of critics and
commentators, because it requires use that is likely to cause confusion as to
source or sponsorship.
 
Allied Interstate LLC v. Kimmel & Silverman P.C., No. 12
Civ. 4204(LTS)(SN), 2013 WL 4245987 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2013), and NCC Business
Services, Inc. v. Lemberg & Associates, LLC, No. 3:13-cv-795-J-39MCR, 2014
WL 5510892 (M.D. Fl. June 6, 2014), adopted by 2014 WL 5514247 (M.D. Fl. July
23, 2014), similarly found no plausible allegations of likely confusion based
on lawyers’ websites targeting particular debt collectors.  The websites made clear that they belonged to
law firms that sued debt collectors like AMCOL, and references to its name were
“merely for the purpose of advertising Defendant’s services and generating
leads for potential lawsuits.”  [This could
be taken care of as nominative fair use, possibly even under the Third Circuit’s
restrictive test which requires that the defendant need to use the plaintiff’s
mark to explain the defendant’s own goods and services.  Interesting that the court doesn’t even need
to do that, and can rely on basic plausibility.  Seriously, why isn’t this fee-worthy?  Rule 11-worthy?]
 
It was implausible that the relevant consumers—businesses seeking
to hire AMCOL to collect debts—would be confused as to the source or
sponsorship of Lemberg’s services based on its use of AMCOL’s marks. Nor could debtors
be said to be part of the relevant consuming public even if they “choose” to
work with Plaintiff to pay off debts. They were subjects, not customers.
 
How about false advertising, such as allegations that AMCOL
harassed debtors in violation of the FDCPA? 
AMCOL didn’t specifically identify false or misleading representations
of fact. The two identified headings – “Stop AMCOL Systems Harassment” and “Sue
AMCOL Systems for Harassment” – wouldn’t be enough to mislead the relevant
consumers, given the context.  Although
AMCOL claimed damages from debtors refusing to work with it, the relevant
damage would have to come from the merchandising context—from AMCOL’s
consumers.  [Here the court repeats its
no-confusion-as-to-source conclusion, though that’s wrong for false
advertising.  The basic Lexmark reasoning, that AMCOL needs to
plausibly allege a competitive injury, still seems obviously correct.]

from Blogger http://ift.tt/1jYMZ7F

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , | Leave a comment