DMCA Class 21 (vehicle software) FYI

From the Copyright Office: Class 21 Witnesses, Additional written materials were submitted at the hearing for Proposed Class 21: Vehicle software – diagnosis, repair, or modification. The Copyright Office provided the opportunity to respond to these materials until the close of business on June 2, 2015. The Office did not receive any such responses to the additional written materials. However, this appears to be the result of a technical issue. If you sent in responses to the additional written materials submitted for Class 21 available at http://copyright.gov/1201/2015/class21/, please resend those responses to: Steve Ruwe Assistant General Counsel Office of the General Counsel U.S. Copyright Office sruwe@loc.gov Please get the word out–the Office does not have records of who attempted to submit a response.

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failure to show damage from accusation of falsity dooms counterclaims

Cascade Yarns, Inc. v. Knitting Fever, Inc., 2015 WL 3407882,
No. C10–861 (W.D. Wash. May 27, 2015)

This five-year odyssey ends with a whimper. 
Cascade and KFI sell luxury yarns; Cascade initially sued KFI for
mislabeling the fiber content of certain yarns. Ultimately, the case went to a
jury solely on KFI’s counterclaims for unfair competition under the Lanham Act
and Washington common law, defamation, and tortious interference with business
expectancies. Each claim arose out of Cascade’s posting a statement under the headline
“Milk Protein Fiber Hype”:
 
There has been a lot of hype
recently about a fiber advertised as “Milk Protein Fiber.” Given the
substantial price that “milk” yarns command, it made sense to investigate what
this “milk” fiber actually is. We were surprised to learn that three “milk”
yarns sourced from Knitting Fever were nothing more than common acrylic blends.
Acrylic is an inexpensive fiber, which is often added to make yarns soft and
affordable. Beyond the lack of milk, two of these yarns did not contain either
the cashmere or alpaca, listed on their labels.
We presented this information to
KFI, first to their attorneys informally, then later to the Court. KFI raised
questions regarding the testing methodology of our expert, but chose not to
have these yarns actually tested. So far, KFI asserts that the yarns, listed
below, contain milk, alpaca and cashmere, purely because the salesmen who sold
it to KFI says [sic] that they do. We attached the documents from Cascade’s
fiber expert, as well as the response from KFI’s plastics expert.
1) Ella Rae Milky Soft: advertised
as a 50/50 cotton milk protein blend is actually cotton and acrylic.
2) Laines du Nord (KFI) Baby Milk:
advertised as 63% wool, 30% milk fiber, and 7% cashmere is actually 68% wool
and 32% acrylic.
A. Retails for $6.60 for a 25 gram
skein or $26.40 per 100 grams.
B. Cascade Pacific 60% acrylic 40%
wool (merino) retails for $6.50 per 100 grams.
3) Ella Rae Latte: advertised as
30% alpaca, 30% milk, and 40% microfiber actually contains neither milk nor
alpaca and is 69% acrylic and 31% wool.
A. Retails between $9.00 to $10.00
for 50 gram skein or $18–$20 per 100 grams.
B. Again Cascade Pacific retails
for $6.50 and has a third more wool.
 
Cascade removed the posting sometime in 2012.
 
The court granted judgment as a matter of law to Cascade
because of KFI’s failure to show damages. Assuming (!) that the statement was
commercial comparative advertising, a presumption of injury is only available
for deliberately deceptive
comparative advertising.  No witnesses
testified to Cascade’s mental state.  A
Cascade witness testified that he relied on the reports of a fiber analyst,
Kenneth Langley, which he consequently believed to contain only true
statements.
 
Nor was there direct evidence of injury.  KFI did not link a drop in its business to
Cascade’s actions here; Cascade has been posting lots of pleadings from this
case wholly unrelated to the milk fiber yarn issue. “The jury would have no way
to find that KFI’s damages were attributable to the milk fiber posting and not
to the public airing of unrelated grievances throughout the course of this
litigation, or to any number of economic or other causes.” Nor did KFI show any
Cascade profits were attributable to this posting. “[U]nder these circumstances,
any award would constitute an impermissible penalty rather than compensation,”
so the court wasn’t going to send it to the jury.  This ended the state common law unfair
competition claim too.
 
On defamation, KFI was a private figure, but the milk fiber
yarn post involved a matter of “public concern,” “in light of the public’s
interest in the accuracy of product labeling as well as in consumer warnings of
fraudulent or deceptive business practices.” Under state law, KFI would need to
show negligence to recover actual damages, and actual malice to recover
presumed damages.  It couldn’t show
actual damages, as noted above, and it also couldn’t show actual malice either
through knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for truth. Though KFI had
evidence of falsity, neither falsity nor proof of failure to investigate before
publishing are sufficient to show malice.
 
Similar difficulties attended the tortious interference
claim; KFI failed to show the existence of specific expectancies, Cascade’s
knowledge thereof, and resulting damages.  KFI didn’t to identify any of its customers
who were deterred by the milk fiber yarn posting.
 
KFI pointed to an email that I can imagine another court
finding sufficient, given the difficulty of finding actual evidence of deception—in
this email, a customer thanked Cascade “for helping her to avoid $200 of
contemplated purchases of milk fiber yarns.” The court found that this one
email contained hearsay and was insufficient. “It was admitted to contradict
Mr. Dunbabin’s testimony about the extent to which the milk fiber yarn posting
was viewed but not for the truth of the matter asserted therein.”  (Couldn’t it also go to the customer’s state
of mind, which would show deception?)
 
Cascade’s claims for injunctive relief based on KFI’s past
mislabeling also failed.  In order for cessation
of unlawful conduct to moot a claim for injunctive relief, the defendant bears
the burden to show that its reform is irrefutable and total.  The court found “ample assurances” that KFI
had stopped selling the mislabeled yarns at issue in 2012 and wouldn’t sell
them in the future.  Cascade’s remaining
claims were dismissed.

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failure to show damage from accusation of falsity dooms counterclaims

Cascade Yarns, Inc. v. Knitting Fever, Inc., 2015 WL 3407882, No. C10–861 (W.D. Wash. May 27, 2015)
This five-year odyssey ends with a whimper.  Cascade and KFI sell luxury yarns; Cascade initially sued KFI for mislabeling the fiber content of certain yarns. Ultimately, the case went to a jury solely on KFI’s counterclaims for unfair competition under the Lanham Act and Washington common law, defamation, and tortious interference with business expectancies. Each claim arose out of Cascade’s posting a statement under the headline “Milk Protein Fiber Hype”:
 
There has been a lot of hype recently about a fiber advertised as “Milk Protein Fiber.” Given the substantial price that “milk” yarns command, it made sense to investigate what this “milk” fiber actually is. We were surprised to learn that three “milk” yarns sourced from Knitting Fever were nothing more than common acrylic blends. Acrylic is an inexpensive fiber, which is often added to make yarns soft and affordable. Beyond the lack of milk, two of these yarns did not contain either the cashmere or alpaca, listed on their labels.
We presented this information to KFI, first to their attorneys informally, then later to the Court. KFI raised questions regarding the testing methodology of our expert, but chose not to have these yarns actually tested. So far, KFI asserts that the yarns, listed below, contain milk, alpaca and cashmere, purely because the salesmen who sold it to KFI says [sic] that they do. We attached the documents from Cascade’s fiber expert, as well as the response from KFI’s plastics expert.
1) Ella Rae Milky Soft: advertised as a 50/50 cotton milk protein blend is actually cotton and acrylic.
2) Laines du Nord (KFI) Baby Milk: advertised as 63% wool, 30% milk fiber, and 7% cashmere is actually 68% wool and 32% acrylic.
A. Retails for $6.60 for a 25 gram skein or $26.40 per 100 grams.
B. Cascade Pacific 60% acrylic 40% wool (merino) retails for $6.50 per 100 grams.
3) Ella Rae Latte: advertised as 30% alpaca, 30% milk, and 40% microfiber actually contains neither milk nor alpaca and is 69% acrylic and 31% wool.
A. Retails between $9.00 to $10.00 for 50 gram skein or $18–$20 per 100 grams.
B. Again Cascade Pacific retails for $6.50 and has a third more wool.
 
Cascade removed the posting sometime in 2012.
 
The court granted judgment as a matter of law to Cascade because of KFI’s failure to show damages. Assuming (!) that the statement was commercial comparative advertising, a presumption of injury is only available for deliberately deceptive comparative advertising.  No witnesses testified to Cascade’s mental state.  A Cascade witness testified that he relied on the reports of a fiber analyst, Kenneth Langley, which he consequently believed to contain only true statements.
 
Nor was there direct evidence of injury.  KFI did not link a drop in its business to Cascade’s actions here; Cascade has been posting lots of pleadings from this case wholly unrelated to the milk fiber yarn issue. “The jury would have no way to find that KFI’s damages were attributable to the milk fiber posting and not to the public airing of unrelated grievances throughout the course of this litigation, or to any number of economic or other causes.” Nor did KFI show any Cascade profits were attributable to this posting. “[U]nder these circumstances, any award would constitute an impermissible penalty rather than compensation,” so the court wasn’t going to send it to the jury.  This ended the state common law unfair competition claim too.
 
On defamation, KFI was a private figure, but the milk fiber yarn post involved a matter of “public concern,” “in light of the public’s interest in the accuracy of product labeling as well as in consumer warnings of fraudulent or deceptive business practices.” Under state law, KFI would need to show negligence to recover actual damages, and actual malice to recover presumed damages.  It couldn’t show actual damages, as noted above, and it also couldn’t show actual malice either through knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for truth. Though KFI had evidence of falsity, neither falsity nor proof of failure to investigate before publishing are sufficient to show malice.
 
Similar difficulties attended the tortious interference claim; KFI failed to show the existence of specific expectancies, Cascade’s knowledge thereof, and resulting damages.  KFI didn’t to identify any of its customers who were deterred by the milk fiber yarn posting.
 
KFI pointed to an email that I can imagine another court finding sufficient, given the difficulty of finding actual evidence of deception—in this email, a customer thanked Cascade “for helping her to avoid $200 of contemplated purchases of milk fiber yarns.” The court found that this one email contained hearsay and was insufficient. “It was admitted to contradict Mr. Dunbabin’s testimony about the extent to which the milk fiber yarn posting was viewed but not for the truth of the matter asserted therein.”  (Couldn’t it also go to the customer’s state of mind, which would show deception?)
 
Cascade’s claims for injunctive relief based on KFI’s past mislabeling also failed.  In order for cessation of unlawful conduct to moot a claim for injunctive relief, the defendant bears the burden to show that its reform is irrefutable and total.  The court found “ample assurances” that KFI had stopped selling the mislabeled yarns at issue in 2012 and wouldn’t sell them in the future.  Cascade’s remaining claims were dismissed.
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“designed to meet standard” doesn’t mean “meets standard,” court says

Caltex Plastics, Inc. v. Shannon Packaging Co., 2015 WL
3407889, No. 2:13–cv–06611 (C.D. Cal. May 27, 2015)

Caltex makes polyethylene bags and laminated products for military and
electronics. Shannon competes with Caltex. 
The Department of Defense has a Qualified Products List (QPL), which
lists products that the DOD has approved to be used in Defense Department
contracts that require a “qualified” product.  Caltex has a product on the QPL for a
particular specification (Type III, static shielding), and this is presently
the only qualified product for that specification.  There was no evidence that Shannon ever said
that its products were on the QPL or that they were DOD-qualified. Its data
sheets previously said that its competing product was “[d]esigned to meet the
performance of [the Type III standard].” Shannon stopped saying this, and, when
it accepts an order, now advises the customer that its bags are not on the QPL.
Shannon’s previous representation was based upon the results of testing Shannon
conducted of its material, or which a third party conducted on behalf of
Shannon of its material; Caltex did not test them for this litigation.

The court, not interested in implicature, found that Shannon’s claim of
“designed to meet the performance” of the QPL standard wasn’t literally false
just because Shannon’s product wasn’t on the QPL.  Even assuming that Shannon’s statement was an
establishment claim, Caltex didn’t prove that the bags weren’t “designed” to meet the standard, or that Shannon didn’t
test them through the DOD-approved test method. 
Lack of substantiation is itself not actionable under the Lanham
Act.   Nor was there evidence of consumer
deception, so that was it.

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"designed to meet standard" doesn’t mean "meets standard," court says

Caltex Plastics, Inc. v. Shannon Packaging Co., 2015 WL 3407889, No. 2:13–cv–06611 (C.D. Cal. May 27, 2015)
Caltex makes polyethylene bags and laminated products for military and electronics. Shannon competes with Caltex.  The Department of Defense has a Qualified Products List (QPL), which lists products that the DOD has approved to be used in Defense Department contracts that require a “qualified” product.  Caltex has a product on the QPL for a particular specification (Type III, static shielding), and this is presently the only qualified product for that specification.  There was no evidence that Shannon ever said that its products were on the QPL or that they were DOD-qualified. Its data sheets previously said that its competing product was “[d]esigned to meet the performance of [the Type III standard].” Shannon stopped saying this, and, when it accepts an order, now advises the customer that its bags are not on the QPL. Shannon’s previous representation was based upon the results of testing Shannon conducted of its material, or which a third party conducted on behalf of Shannon of its material; Caltex did not test them for this litigation.
The court, not interested in implicature, found that Shannon’s claim of “designed to meet the performance” of the QPL standard wasn’t literally false just because Shannon’s product wasn’t on the QPL.  Even assuming that Shannon’s statement was an establishment claim, Caltex didn’t prove that the bags weren’t “designed” to meet the standard, or that Shannon didn’t test them through the DOD-approved test method.  Lack of substantiation is itself not actionable under the Lanham Act.   Nor was there evidence of consumer deception, so that was it.
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Can you patent the Barbra Streisand effect?

Lawyer sues EFF over its stupid patent of the month award.

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Can you patent the Barbra Streisand effect?

Lawyer sues EFF over its stupid patent of the month award.

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Don’t start a competing business using your boss’s equipment

Nedschroef Detroit Corp. v. Bemas Enterprises LLC, 2015 WL
2453511, No. 14–10095 (E.D. Mich. May 22, 2015)
 
Defendants Rigole and LePage were Nedschroef employees in
Detroit who formed a competing company, Bemas, while still working for Nedschroef.
Nedschroef makes industrial machines that produce metal fasteners, such as
nuts, bolts, and screws, and the Detroit operation provided service and replacement
parts for US customers.  Rigole was the
highest ranking Nedschroef employee in North America, while LePage was a
project and service engineer.  Both
possessed significant authority and access to proprietary information.
 
In late 2010/early 2011, the Nedschroef Detroit employees
were told that the Detroit operation would be closed unless business improved,
and employees received a pay cut.  Rigole
and LePage, using the names of their significant others, formed Bemas a few
months later.  While the individual
defendants were still employed by Nedschroef, Bemas sold replacement parts for
Nedschroef machines and serviced Nedschroef machines.  Nedschroef presented evidence that they copied
proprietary drawings of replacement parts (rather than reverse engineering from
the parts), though defendants denied this, and also denied obtaining a customer
list from Nedschroef’s private server, claiming instead that Rigole learned
their names from his years working at Nedschroef.  They said that, when people contacted them in
their capacity as Nedschroef employees and said that Nedschroef’s price was too
high or delivery time too long, they’d tell customers about Bemas and provide a
quote.  Though they maintained that they
had little control over Nedschroef pricing, which was set at the corporate
level in Belgium, they had access to Nedschroef’s price list. Amost all of
Bemas’ customers were first customers of Nedschroef, and almost all of the
goods and services offered by Bemas were offered by Nedschroef.
 
Nedschroef further alleged that defendants used Nedschroef’s
employees, equipment, warehouse and other resources to run Bemas and compete
against Nedschroef. For the first two and a half years of Bemas’ existence,
Rigole and LePage conducted the company’s business while employed by Nedschroef
and using their Nedschroef-owned computers. Suppliers shipped parts to Bemas at
Nedschroef’s warehouse, where Bemas would use Nedschroef’s forklift to unload
the goods and then ship them to Bemas’ customers. Nedschroef alleged that this caused
consumer confusion, such as an email in which Rigole discussed an order with a supplier
and said “please do not send emails concerning Bemas to my Nedschroef email
address,” getting the response “[the order] is a Nedschroef order, is it not?
Greg quoted this to Nedschroef and I assumed this is who we sold it too [sic],
so [the order] is for Bemas?” Another person sent a “Nedschroef Order” to
Bemas, and other suppliers appeared confused.
 
The court easily found misappropriation of corporate
opportunities and breach of fiduciary duty and the duty of loyalty, as well as
misappropriation of trade secrets (even if defendants’ version of events was
true, they got proprietary drawings from Nedschroef customers who received them
from Rigole and LePage; the defendants knew that the drawings shouldn’t have
been given to customers except in “exceptional circumstances” after
consultation with Belgium).  The evidence
also established conversion of the drawings and other property used to compete
directly against Nedschroef.  Nedschroef
also won on unjust enrichment and civil conspiracy.
 
Interestingly, the court found no false designation of
origin/false advertising under the Lanham Act because defendants didn’t use any
“false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false
or misleading representation of fact.” Any confusion was due to the individual
defendants’ dual roles as representatives of Nedschroef and Bemas.  The Michigan Consumer Protection Act claims failed
because it requires a consumer transaction, and these were business
transactions.
 
However, the district court found common-law unfair
competition because of the likelihood of confusion. The parties sold the exact
same goods/services and the same marketing channels (that is, Rigole and
LePage), and defendants’ conduct caused actual confusion among suppliers, which
allowed an inference of likely confusion among buyers.  (Hmm, price and sophistication would seem to
cut against that for the consumers, but ok.)
 
Finally, the court found tortious interference with
prospective economic advantage despite defendants’ arguments that Bemas only
provided parts for and/or serviced Nedschroef machines if customers previously
requested a quote for the same part or service from Nedschroef and rejected the
quote. But before Rigole and LePage formed Bemas, there was only one source in
North America for the majority of the parts needed for Nedschroef machines:
Nedschroef. Without an alternative, the customer would have had to purchase the
parts from Nedschroef Detroit at the price quoted or go without the part. “Presumably
the latter option was not a realistic one where the customer relies on the
parts to operate their Nedschroef machine.”

The defendants were permanently enjoined from further unfair competition to
sell Nedschroef  parts or services because
their conduct, the court found, “caused a loss of goodwill and competitive
market position … which courts have recognized cannot be fully compensable by
monetary damages.” Nedschroef doesn’t have a huge market share, so an
injunction precluding defendants from providing replacement parts for
Nedschroef machines left substantial legitimate business for them to seek.
 
Nedschroef also was entitled to the return of compensation
paid to the individual defendants, to Bemas’ profits from their breach of
fiduciary duties, and treble damages plus costs and attorney’s fees from the
conversion. [How are the damages from the conversion, as opposed to the other
conduct, going to be measured?]

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Don’t start a competing business using your boss’s equipment

Nedschroef Detroit Corp. v. Bemas Enterprises LLC, 2015 WL 2453511, No. 14–10095 (E.D. Mich. May 22, 2015)
 
Defendants Rigole and LePage were Nedschroef employees in Detroit who formed a competing company, Bemas, while still working for Nedschroef. Nedschroef makes industrial machines that produce metal fasteners, such as nuts, bolts, and screws, and the Detroit operation provided service and replacement parts for US customers.  Rigole was the highest ranking Nedschroef employee in North America, while LePage was a project and service engineer.  Both possessed significant authority and access to proprietary information.
 
In late 2010/early 2011, the Nedschroef Detroit employees were told that the Detroit operation would be closed unless business improved, and employees received a pay cut.  Rigole and LePage, using the names of their significant others, formed Bemas a few months later.  While the individual defendants were still employed by Nedschroef, Bemas sold replacement parts for Nedschroef machines and serviced Nedschroef machines.  Nedschroef presented evidence that they copied proprietary drawings of replacement parts (rather than reverse engineering from the parts), though defendants denied this, and also denied obtaining a customer list from Nedschroef’s private server, claiming instead that Rigole learned their names from his years working at Nedschroef.  They said that, when people contacted them in their capacity as Nedschroef employees and said that Nedschroef’s price was too high or delivery time too long, they’d tell customers about Bemas and provide a quote.  Though they maintained that they had little control over Nedschroef pricing, which was set at the corporate level in Belgium, they had access to Nedschroef’s price list. Amost all of Bemas’ customers were first customers of Nedschroef, and almost all of the goods and services offered by Bemas were offered by Nedschroef.
 
Nedschroef further alleged that defendants used Nedschroef’s employees, equipment, warehouse and other resources to run Bemas and compete against Nedschroef. For the first two and a half years of Bemas’ existence, Rigole and LePage conducted the company’s business while employed by Nedschroef and using their Nedschroef-owned computers. Suppliers shipped parts to Bemas at Nedschroef’s warehouse, where Bemas would use Nedschroef’s forklift to unload the goods and then ship them to Bemas’ customers. Nedschroef alleged that this caused consumer confusion, such as an email in which Rigole discussed an order with a supplier and said “please do not send emails concerning Bemas to my Nedschroef email address,” getting the response “[the order] is a Nedschroef order, is it not? Greg quoted this to Nedschroef and I assumed this is who we sold it too [sic], so [the order] is for Bemas?” Another person sent a “Nedschroef Order” to Bemas, and other suppliers appeared confused.
 
The court easily found misappropriation of corporate opportunities and breach of fiduciary duty and the duty of loyalty, as well as misappropriation of trade secrets (even if defendants’ version of events was true, they got proprietary drawings from Nedschroef customers who received them from Rigole and LePage; the defendants knew that the drawings shouldn’t have been given to customers except in “exceptional circumstances” after consultation with Belgium).  The evidence also established conversion of the drawings and other property used to compete directly against Nedschroef.  Nedschroef also won on unjust enrichment and civil conspiracy.
 
Interestingly, the court found no false designation of origin/false advertising under the Lanham Act because defendants didn’t use any “false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact.” Any confusion was due to the individual defendants’ dual roles as representatives of Nedschroef and Bemas.  The Michigan Consumer Protection Act claims failed because it requires a consumer transaction, and these were business transactions.
 
However, the district court found common-law unfair competition because of the likelihood of confusion. The parties sold the exact same goods/services and the same marketing channels (that is, Rigole and LePage), and defendants’ conduct caused actual confusion among suppliers, which allowed an inference of likely confusion among buyers.  (Hmm, price and sophistication would seem to cut against that for the consumers, but ok.)
 
Finally, the court found tortious interference with prospective economic advantage despite defendants’ arguments that Bemas only provided parts for and/or serviced Nedschroef machines if customers previously requested a quote for the same part or service from Nedschroef and rejected the quote. But before Rigole and LePage formed Bemas, there was only one source in North America for the majority of the parts needed for Nedschroef machines: Nedschroef. Without an alternative, the customer would have had to purchase the parts from Nedschroef Detroit at the price quoted or go without the part. “Presumably the latter option was not a realistic one where the customer relies on the parts to operate their Nedschroef machine.”
The defendants were permanently enjoined from further unfair competition to sell Nedschroef  parts or services because their conduct, the court found, “caused a loss of goodwill and competitive market position … which courts have recognized cannot be fully compensable by monetary damages.” Nedschroef doesn’t have a huge market share, so an injunction precluding defendants from providing replacement parts for Nedschroef machines left substantial legitimate business for them to seek.
 
Nedschroef also was entitled to the return of compensation paid to the individual defendants, to Bemas’ profits from their breach of fiduciary duties, and treble damages plus costs and attorney’s fees from the conversion. [How are the damages from the conversion, as opposed to the other conduct, going to be measured?]
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DMCA hearings: visually impaired/ereaders

Copyright Office: Jacqueline Charlesworth
Michelle Choe
Regan Smith
Cy Donnelly
Steve Ruhe
John Riley
Stacy Cheney (NTIA)
 
In and out: this took 15 minutes.  This exemption will, I predict, be granted.
 
Proposed Class 9: Literary works
distributed electronically – assistive technologies
This proposed class would allow circumvention of access
controls on lawfully made and acquired literary works distributed
electronically for purposes of accessibility for persons who are print
disabled. This exemption has been requested for literary works distributed
electronically, including e-books, digital textbooks, and PDF articles.
 
Proponents: Blake Reid, Samuelson-Glushko Technology Law
& Policy Clinic at Colorado Law
 
You’ve seen contentious exemptions and complicated issues;
this one is very basic: the right of people who are visually impaired to read
books. Basic human right, key to democratic society, uncontroversial renewal.
We’re not asking for modifications, largely unapposed including AAP
(notwithstanding reservations); circumstances have changed only marginally and
circumvention is still necessary on individual and institutional level. Use is
noninfringing, even more after HathiTrust;
still very limited availability of noncircumventing alternatives. Only material
changed circumstance is the Marrakesh Treaty, which makes this exemption
necessary for compliance.
 
C: Thank you and students for helping to make a record in
this class. It’s been very helpful to establish a need for an exemption.
 
Jonathan Band, Library Copyright Alliance: No one’s
opposing.  Marrakesh Treaty point
deserves to be reiterated: if treaty is ratified w/in the next 3 years, we need
to have the exemption in place for compliance.
 
C: Can you elaborate on intersection of exemption and
treaty?
 
Band: the treaty has a provision that countries need to have
a way for visually impaired/authorized entities to circumvent to take advantage
of any access authorized by treaty. Better to be statutory and not in need of
renewal, but this would at least enable people to take actions authorized by
Treaty.
 
Q: AAP mentioned epub and HTML5 format—could you provide
more info?
 
Reid: we’re actually very hopeful about those formats
someday being adopted on a widespread basis and provide a noncircumventing
alternative in our lifetimes. Someday I may be able to avoid seeking renewal
b/c all books come out in epub3 accessible, interoperable formats that work
with text-to-speech and ereaders and braille readers. Unfortunate reality: not
there yet, and not in next 3 years.  At
this point, adoption is inconsistent; availability of titles in those formats
and interoperability of titles purchased on particular platforms still isn’t
there. I hope to have a different answer next time.
 
Band: even if we get to a point where all new books coming
out meet that standard, you still have a legacy problem.
 
Reid: worth noting that addressing access to the archive
will be a really hard problem. Every year that goes by w/o accessible format
creates more archive that isn’t accessible. There are other challenges like
user interfaces on tablets and phones; the tech has a long way to go. Encourage
you to discuss w/relative, family member, friend who’s visually impaired—ask them
how they use a tablet to access even a noncircumvented book.  You will think it’s broken: the computerized
voice is bad; the tech has a long way to go. This exemption won’t fix
everything, but it’s a helpful band-aid for folks looking to engage in
self-help or to make books available to students or clients at an authorized
entity.

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