D’s consumer survey defeats class action about relevance of geographic origin of water for brewing beer

Peacock v. Pabst
Brewing Co., LLC, 2024 WL 1160687, No. 2:18-cv-00568 DJC CKD (E.D. Cal. Mar.
18, 2024)

Interesting
defense-side use of surveys in this consumer protection case. Peacock alleged
that Pabst violated consumer protection law by marketing “The Original Olympia
Beer” as using naturally filtered, artisan water from Tumwater, Washington (a
suburb of Olympia, Washington) “despite the product being brewed elsewhere in
the country using lower quality water and brewing methods.” The court granted
summary judgment for inability to prove deceptiveness.

Peacock identified,
among other things, Pabst’s “It’s the Water” slogan and the depiction of the
“unique waterfalls from the (now) closed brewery from the Olympia area” on the
Olympia Beer packaging, on its website, and on social media.

On deceptiveness, Pabst
argued that Peacock didn’t designate any expert witnesses or other evidence to
show how consumers interpreted the label, while Pabst offered an expert opining
on a consumer survey. Peacock responded that the evidence of deceptiveness
included Pabst’s “own testimony about the point and method of showing the label
to consumers in the store on shelves, the ‘historical’ references described by
Defendant’s own witness, and the labelling and marketing of the beer itself.”

To prevail under California’s
UCL, the plaintiff must produce evidence that shows “a likelihood of
confounding an appreciable number of reasonably prudent purchasers exercising
ordinary care.” This can be done with “surveys and expert testimony regarding
consumer assumptions and expectations” but these are not always necessary as in
some situations “anecdotal evidence may suffice[.]” But evidence of just “a few
isolated examples of actual deception” is not sufficient. A plaintiff can’t win
just by “describing his or her own personal, alleged misunderstanding or
confusion.”

Pabst offered two
surveys: one for prior Olympia Beer purchasers to determine their reasons for
purchasing Olympia Beer, and another where respondents were shown one of two
versions of an Olympia Beer can with one version being as it exists now and the
“control” being a version without the “challenged elements” of the label.

Of the 185
respondents to the first survey, no respondent mentioned the water used to brew
Olympia Beer as their reason for first purchasing Olympia Beer. Only 10
respondents (roughly 5% of total respondents) indicated the “geographic origin
of the beer” as part of their reasoning for their first purchase. The results for
subsequent purchasers were similar.

In the second
survey, only 4, or approximately 2%, of the 202 respondents who were shown the
actual Olympia Beer packaging mentioned “the source or origin of the water used
to brew the beer as a message conveyed by the product’s label.” Two of the 196
respondents in the control group, who were shown the label without the
challenged elements, also “mentioned the source or origin of the water[ ]” thus
indicating that “there [was] no meaningful difference between the test and
control condition ….” (Id.) Similarly, a roughly equal percentage of
respondents from the two groups “mentioned that the Pacific Northwest,
Washington, or Olympia/Olympia Falls was a message conveyed by the label[,]”
and there was only a 3% difference between the control and test groups (62% for
the test group and 59% for the control group) in respondents who thought
“Olympia Beer was brewed with artesian water from Olympia, Washington.”

Given this evidence,
Pabst met its initial burden of establishing the absence of any genuine issues
of material fact, and Peacock’s evidence wasn’t enough. The evidence from Pabst’s
witnesses about “historical” references indicated that the reasons for the slogan
were historical, but they also testified that they didn’t believe that
consumers considered the source of the water.

Likewise, the actual
content of the label and marketing might be relevant background information “but
it does not create a genuine dispute over whether those elements are likelihood
of those elements to confound an appreciable number of prudent purchasers
exercising ordinary care.” Peacock’s own testimony was relevant, but only anecdotal
and, without anything else, insufficient.

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2024/03/ds-consumer-survey-defeats-class-action.html

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Another “buy” button lawsuit over digital licenses continues

In re Amazon Prime
Video Litig., 2024 WL 1138906, No. 2:22-cv-00401-RSM (W.D. Wash. Mar. 15, 2024)

This putative class
action alleged that Amazon overcharged and “[d]eceived consumers by
misrepresenting that it was selling them Digital Content when, in fact, it was
really only licensing it to them[.]” Plaintiffs brought claims under
California, New York, and Washington consumer protection law, and common law
claims for unjust enrichment.

Plaintiffs alleged that
Amazon offers cheaper “rent” options for some of its content, but more
expensive “buy” options as well. When consumers “buy” digital content, it’s
stored in a folder called “Video Purchases & Rentals.”

But, in fact, Amazon
does not cannot pass title of any of this content to consumers. “If the
licensing agreement for any of the Digital Content is terminated, Amazon has to
pull the Digital Content from not only its site but from all consumers’
purchased folders, ‘which it does without prior warning, and without providing
any type of refund or remuneration to consumers.’”

Amazon argued that
Article III standing was absent because plaintiffs haven’t lost access to their
digital content, and that their claims of overpayment also rested on the mere
threat of future unavailability. The court disagreed: there’s a plausible
difference in value between owning outright versus purchasing a revocable
license.

“Buy” was also
plausibly deceptive. Amazon argued that “buy” didn’t mean perpetual ownership,
and that it sufficiently disclosed the risk of losing access. Plaintiffs
pointed out that Amazon also allows real
, non-repossessable purchases
with the “Buy” button for tangible goods.
 Again, the court agreed with plaintiffs:
it was plausible that “buy” could be materially misleading. The court
hypothesized a consumer who paid nearly $40 for Barbie and Oppenheimer,
but whose Barbenheimer (first judicial appearance?) weekend was ruined
because Amazon suddenly lost one license. “Understandably, this consumer ‘might
feel a little miffed [or go nuclear] if she were told that she received exactly
what she paid for.’”

It was also
plausible that the TOS didn’t sufficiently disclose the restrictions. Though
the “buy” button manifests consent to a contract, “certain terms and policies
could fail to meet statutory standards of clearness and effectiveness.”

Washington state
unjust enrichment claims were dismissed, however, because that state only
recognizes the tort where there’s no contract, and there was one here.

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2024/03/another-buy-button-lawsuit-over-digital.html

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CFP: Trademark and Unfair Competition Scholarship Roundtable 2024

The Trademark and
Unfair Competition Scholarship Roundtable co-hosted by Harvard, NYU, and the
University of Pennsylvania will take place this year at Harvard. The Roundtable
is designed to be a forum for the discussion of current trademark, false advertising, and right of
publicity scholarship, covering a range of methodologies, topics, and
perspectives. Five to six papers will be chosen for discussion over the course
of the Roundtable, with each paper allocated an entire hour for discussion and
assigned a commentator.   

The Roundtable will
be held on Friday, October 18, 2024. If there is a critical mass of papers, we
may also extend the Roundtable through Saturday morning, October 19.
Participation at the Roundtable will be limited and invitation-only and we
expect all participants to have read the papers in advance. The Roundtable will
cover the travel and lodging expenses for invited authors. 

We invite
submissions from academics working on any aspect of trademark, false
advertising, marketing, right of publicity, or related areas of the law.
Priority will be given to those who can attend the entire event and a dinner
the night of Friday, October 18. Submissions must be of full drafts in
Microsoft word format. The deadline for submission is May 15, 2024, and
decisions on participation will be made shortly thereafter, ideally, by June
1st.   

To submit a draft
paper, please fill out the form here (https://ift.tt/FigKkf5) and
upload an anonymized version of your draft. 
Please note that the maximum file size that may be uploaded is 10MB.
Appendices or other supporting material can be uploaded separately; please do
not submit a CV or cover letter. 

For further
information about the Roundtable, please email either: Barton Beebe (NYU):
barton.beebe@nyu.edu; Jennifer Rothman (Penn): rothmj@law.upenn.edu, or Rebecca
Tushnet (Harvard): rtushnet@law.harvard.edu.

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2024/03/cfp-trademark-and-unfair-competition.html

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Earth, Wind & Infringement: TM owner succeeds against overclaiming “reunion” band

Earth, Wind &
Fire IP, LLC v. Substantial Music Group LLC, — F.Supp.3d —-, 2024 WL
1025265, No. 23-20884-CIV-MORENO (S.D. Fla. Mar. 1, 2024)

With the ordinary
multifactor confusion test, courts position themselves as looking for empirics
(even though the thrust of several of the factors is normative). But with nominative
fair use, courts engage in more unfair competition/normative reasoning. When a
court finds that a use went beyond identifying to suggesting a connection, it often
doesn’t use any of the factors that empirically
we might use to figure
out if that was true. Instead, it generally determines that the defendants did “too
much” based on its own sense of what’s accurate. Here, though, a bit of empirics
creeps in.

The facts: Earth,
Wind & Fire is owned by the sons of Maurice White, founder of the well-known
musical group “Earth, Wind & Fire,” and owns trademark rights in the name.

“Defendants decided
to form and promote a band, in which Richard Smith would be the guitarist that
would perform the music of Earth Wind & Fire. It is undisputed that Smith
played with the Earth, Wind & Fire for a few years, but the size of his role
during those years is in dispute.” They called the new band, “Earth Wind &
Fire Legacy Reunion” and “The Legacy Reunion of Earth, Wind & Fire.” They
also used plaintiff’s word mark and its “Phoenix” logo mark. After plaintiffs
objected, defendants changed their name to “Legacy Reunion of Earth Wind &
Fire Alumni,” made logo and color changes, and ceased using the “Phoenix” logo.

The court granted
summary judgment on liability to plaintiff.

Nominative fair use:
Earth, Wind & Fire wasn’t readily identifiable without use of its name. What’s
“reasonably necessary” to identify it can differ from case to case. Although
the initial uses seemed clearly more than reasonably necessary, defendants stopped
using Earth, Wind & Fire’s distinctive font, took out the distinctive
“Phoenix” logo, switched the title of its musical shows from “Earth Wind &
Fire Legacy Reunion” to “Legacy Reunion of Earth Wind & Fire Alumni,” and
changed the color scheme. Thus, they satisfied the second element of NFU.

However, the court put
the burden on defendants to show that they did “nothing that would, in
conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark
holder.” This was a closer call, but the court rejected the defense.

In the Princess
Diana case, Cairns, the court “found persuasive that the advertisements
for the Princess Diana related products did not claim that they were sponsored
or endorsed by the trademark holder, where other of the defendant’s
celebrity-related products do state that they are ‘authorized’ by a trademark
holder.” By contrast, the silence here was not as meaningful because there
weren’t other “authorized” products. And “Legacy Reunion of Earth Wind &
Fire” lacked “a clear disclaimer or limiting language about who is performing.”
Plus, defendants “combined the advertising with text that discusses the Earth
Wind & Fire’s legacy”: their website said that the band “dominated the 70’s
with their monster grooves and high energy, danceable hits, garnering 20 Grammy
Award nominations and a Hall of Fame Induction along the way.” It further
states that “[t]he style and sounds of the greatest hit recordings by Earth,
Wind & Fire were built by founder Maurice White and the contributions of a
stellar collective of some of the best musicians in the world throughout the
decades.” These ads “draw a close, unmistakable association with Earth, Wind
& Fire to a degree unwarranted by the historical record.” “Regardless of if
Defendants’ musicians were technically sidemen or members, the advertisement
and marketing were still deceptive and misleading as to whether the main (or
most prominently known) members of the band would be performing. The use of the
word ‘alumni’ is not enough to dispel the notion that Defendants’ band is not
sponsored.” This was close, because “some original musicians and members … are
performing, [but] the advertisements are overstating the originality of the
group. Plaintiff shows this through multiple consumer online posts, commenting
with frustration on their expectations based on advertisements verses what they
received.” This isn’t evidence of association in general, like the survey in New
Kids
, but rather of a material quality gap—maybe that kind of evidence is
especially relevant.

The court also
rejected acquiescence, estoppel, and laches defenses.

A couple of points
from the confusion analysis: Third-party use didn’t weaken the mark because
each third-party use identified by defendants included “tribute” somewhere in
the name and most of the websites made clear exactly who was performing. E.g.,
“The Ultimate Earth, Wind & Fire Tribute Band” website includes information
of the performers, which explicitly states that the Saxophonist Curtis Johnson
“[t]oured with the original EARTH, WIND & FIRE BAND.” The “Kalimba – Earth
Wind & Fire tribute” site explicitly stated that the band seeks to
“accurately reproduce the infectious grooves.” Defendants’ name, by contrast,
was “Legacy Reunion of Earth Wind & Fire Alumni,” “which implies not that
they are ‘covering’ or ‘reproducing’ the music but were the original
performers.” Even “The Earth Wind, & Fire Experience featuring The Ray
Howard Band” identified itself as an “experience” and a performance by an
entirely different band.

Similarity of
advertising media: The fact that the parties used separate websites and social
media favored defendants, by showing a distinction between the groups. It just
wasn’t enough.

Bad faith: Not shown,
because just knowing of the prior mark isn’t enough without an intent to misappropriate.

Actual confusion:
emails said things like “I attended the [Earth, Wind & Fire] legacy reunion
in Pensacola, Florida in hopes of seeing Philip Bailey, Verdine White and
others from the original band. Their pictures are on the advertisement,
posters, or whatever. The impression of Reunion would be original band members
from various years. Why is it misleading? The pictures should be removed from
advertisement. The details read friends and family or something like that.”

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2024/03/earth-wind-infringement-tm-owner.html

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calling an accepted Rule 68 offer a judgment of infringement could be defamatory

Double Diamond
Distribution Ltd. v. Crocs, Inc., 2024 WL 1051951No. 23-cv-01790-PAB-KAS (D. Colo.
Mar. 11, 2024)

I have a
long-running interest in Rule 68 offers of judgment, and this case involves an
interaction with false advertising law! The parties compete in the shoe market.

In 2006, Crocs sued now-plaintiff
Double Diamond and Dawgs, its affiliate. Trial was scheduled for 2022 (!), but then-defendants
sent offers of judgment to Crocs. Double Diamond’s offer stated: “This offer is
made for the purposes specified in Rule 68 and is not to be construed either as
an admission that Double Diamond is liable in this action or that Crocs has
suffered any damage.” Dawgs’ offer was similar (though it offered $6 million, where
Double Diamond offered $55,000, and contemplated bankruptcy).  Crocs accepted.

Crocs then issued a
press release, “Crocs secures long sought-after judgment of infringement
against USA Dawgs and Double Diamond Distribution.” The press release announced

a judgment of infringement against USA Dawgs and Double Diamond
Distribution as a result of both companies’ sales of imitation Crocs shoes. In
conjunction therewith, Crocs also obtained $6 million and $55,000 in damages,
respectively, against the companies.

This case is the culmination of years long battles between the parties
after USA Dawgs and Double Diamond Distribution began selling shoes that
infringed Crocs’ patents in 2006. Both USA Dawgs and Double Diamond
Distribution have since conceded the validity of Crocs’ patent rights.

“We are fiercely protective of the Crocs brand and our iconic DNA. We
have zero tolerance for infringement of our intellectual property rights or for
anyone who tries to benefit off the investments that we have made in our
brand,” said Daniel Hart, Executive Vice President and Chief Legal & Risk
Officer at Crocs. “This judgment not only reinforces the validity of our patent
rights, it also reinforces our unrelenting determination to take forceful steps
to protect our brand equity.”

This judgment of infringement comes nearly one year to the day after
Crocs filed lawsuits against 21 companies alleging infringement of its
registered trademark rights in its clog designs. …

The court declined
to dismiss Double Diamond’s resulting defamation claim. This was not a case
where the “gist” was true on the facts alleged. A Rule 68 offer of judgment
does not require an admission of liability, which may be disclaimed. If that
happens, the court’s judgment does not constitute a finding of or an admission
of liability against the defendant.

The statements that
Crocs obtained “a judgment of infringement against USA Dawgs and Double Diamond
Distribution as a result of both companies’ sales of imitation Crocs shoes” and
“[t]his judgment…reinforces the validity of [Crocs’] patent rights” were
plausibly false because the statements would have a “different effect on the
mind of the reader” from that which the Rule 68 offer of judgment would have
produced. And they were plausibly material because the statements would likely
cause reasonable people to think “significantly less favorably” about Double
Diamond than they would if they knew the truth. Unlike the difference between “stalking”
and “harassment,” this was not “a minor, technical error in legal terminology.”

Trade libel claims
survived for the same reason.

Lanham Act false
advertising: Crocs argued that the press release was not “commercial
advertising,” because (a) the press release was directed at investors, not the
relevant purchasing public; and (b) Double Diamond never alleged that the press
release promoted Crocs’ shoes to consumers. However, Crocs published the press
release on its website and had the press release published to 440,000 websites,
newsrooms, and direct feeds using PRNewswire. And it stated that Crocs “is a
world leader in innovative casual footwear for women, men, and children,
combining comfort and style with a value that consumers know and love.” This
was enough to plausibly allege commercial advertising, along with the allegation
that Crocs made the statement in order to obtain increased sales and brand
differentiation; the press release repeatedly referred to Crocs’ brand and
products and included the invitation “To learn more about our brands, please
visit http://www.crocs.com or http://www.heydudeshoesusa.com or follow @Crocs or
@heydudeshoes on Facebook, Instagram and Twitter.” Because the websites that
posted the press release have a combined viewership of 6 billion people per
month, the allegations were sufficient to show that the statements were “disseminated
sufficiently to the relevant purchasing public.” This also allowed a claim
under the Colorado Consumer Protection Act.

Intentional
interference with contractual relations failed, however, because there was no
identified specific relationship with a third party.

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2024/03/calling-accepted-rule-68-offer-judgment.html

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reasonable consumers aren’t required to know collagen can’t be vegan

Kandel v. Dr. Dennis
Gross Skincare, LLC, 2024 WL 965621, No. 23-cv-01967 (ER) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5,
2024)

Similar
California litigation at a later stage
. Kandel alleged that Gross Skincare deceptively
labeled and advertised its skincare products as containing collagen when, in
fact, they do not.

“Collagen is a
protein found exclusively in humans and animals that has been linked to
youthful skin, hair, and nails. It is composed of thousands of amino acids
intertwined in a specific, unique sequence. Without being sequenced this way,
amino acids do not confer the same benefits as collagen.” The products at issue
are uniformly branded with the phrase “C + Collagen.” The list of ingredients
includes “Collagen Amino Acids”; some products also feature the term “collagen
amino acids” in a separate section on the package titled “What It Is”/“What’s
In It For You.”

one of the packages at issue: C + Collagen Deep Cream

One side of each package
also contains a small symbol indicating that the product is vegan—making “collagen”
content impossible. Gross Skincare allegedly knows that consumers will pay more
for skincare products that contain collagen and intends for consumers to infer
from the “Collagen” branding that the products do so.

C + Collagen package sides with small blue arrow pointing to small vegan symbol at bottom and blue underline of "collagen amino acids" in ingredient list
blue lines/arrows added by court to highlight relevant terms

NY GBL claims were
sufficiently alleged. Gross Skincare argued that the “C + Collagen” phrase didn’t
imply that the products contain collagen, but instead that the Vitamin C in the
products increases natural production of collagen in the user’s skin. It
claimed that the rest of the package clarified that the products contain
“collagen amino acids” and are vegan. Because of the label “vegan,” it argued, a
reasonable consumer would understand that they do not contain collagen.

This interpretation of
“C + Collagen” was “certainly less intuitive than Kandel’s.” Even considered as
a whole, the complaint alleged misleadingness. The use of “collagen amino acids”
“likely only reaffirms that collagen is an ingredient” and was itself arguably
confusing; the label did nothing to explain it.

Even if one accepts
Gross Skincare’s definition of “collagen amino acids” as “the building blocks
of collagen,” the court did not assume that a reasonable consumer understands
that collagen is a protein composed of amino acids. So too with “vegan.” Even
if the consumer noticed this small symbol, they’d have to know that collagen
comes exclusively from animals.  This
certainly couldn’t be assumed on a motion to dismiss.

Breach of warranty
and unjust enrichment claims under New York law, however, failed, as well as
claims on behalf of a nationwide class.

Kandel did have
standing as to four products she didn’t buy but that contained the same alleged
misrepresentations.

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2024/03/reasonable-consumers-arent-required-to.html

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small competitor lacks standing against big one’s nondisparaging advertising

HomeLight, Inc. v.
Shkipin, — F.Supp.3d —-, 2024 WL 940089 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2024)

Sometimes, courts
are very generous to competitors in presuming Lanham Act standing—as with the recent Meta ruling—and sometimes they aren’t. I have yet to detect a real
pattern across facts/circuits, but suggestions welcome.

Previous
ruling
.
Shkipin’s amended
false advertising counterclaim fails again. Although Shkipin alleged commercial
injuries—“network effects and ad revenues, and also … goodwill value associated
with its 100% free services to real estate agents and consumers” but there wasn’t
sufficiently direct causation. None of HomeLight’s statements allegedly
disparaged or even referred to Shkipin’s business.

To establish that HomeLight proximately caused HomeOpenly to suffer a
loss of sales, Mr. Shkipin would need to show how deceptive statements about
HomeLight directed at shoppers on HomeLight’s own website necessarily caused
advertisers not to buy ads from HomeOpenly. Even assuming that there is a
direct relationship between the number of shoppers who use or visit HomeOpenly
and its ability to sell ads, and that HomeLight’s deceptive statements resulted
in some reduction in the number of shoppers visiting HomeOpenly’s website, this
connection is too attenuated to establish proximate cause. This is especially
true given the countercomplaint’s other plausible explanation for why online
home shoppers might find HomeLight’s website but not HomeOpenly’s: HomeLight’s
heavy spending on various forms of online and TV advertising that Mr. Shkipin
characterizes as “highly effective.”

These causation
problems also defeated his state UCL claim. The allegedly unlawful/fraudulent
conduct underlying the UCL claim—that HomeLight received illegal kickbacks in
violation of RESPA—wasn’t sufficiently linked to the injuries Shkipin claimed.

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2024/03/small-competitor-lacks-standing-against.html

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Second Circuit affirms holding that asterisk/fine print sufficiently clarifies ambiguous claim

Montgomery v. Stanley
Black & Decker, Inc., 2024 WL 939151, No. 23-735-cv (2d Cir. Mar. 5, 2024)

Plaintiffs sued
defendant (Craftsman) for deceptive business practice claims under both the New
York General Business Law (NYGBL), and the Virginia Consumer Protection Act
(VCPA), as well as asserting warranty and common law claims. They alleged that the
“Peak HP” labeling on the packaging of Craftsman vacuums is misleading because
the vacuums are unable to achieve the advertised horsepower. The District Court
dismissed the complaint because the dagger or asterisk symbol next to the “Peak
HP” label directs the consumer to fine print explaining that “Peak HP” is the
horsepower achieved in laboratory testing, not ordinary use. The court of
appeals affirmed.

Based on the entire
packaging, a reasonable consumer would not be misled because of the fine print
explanation. Plaintiffs didn’t allege the “Peak HP” label was false, and though
their interpretation was one reasonable one, the fine-print meaning was also
reasonable, and the dagger/asterisk “would alert a reasonable consumer to the
fact that certain caveats may apply to the ‘Peak HP’ designation.” Just because
it was in fine print didn’t mean it couldn’t clarify an ambiguous label. There
were no allegations that a consumer couldn’t see it or that its terms were
confusing.

 

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2024/03/second-circuit-affirms-holding-that.html

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local ad company has Lanham Act standing against Meta for allegedly overstating ad reach

Metroplex Communic.,
Inc. v. Meta Platforms, Inc., 2024 WL 940127, No. 22-cv-1455-SMY (S.D. Ill.
Mar. 5, 2024)

Metroplex, a local
advertising company, brought a putative class action against Meta for unfair
competition. Although Meta argued that Metroplex was an ad purchaser for two of
its local media properties (a news site and an FM radio station), given that it
has advertised on Facebook dozens of times in the last few years, Metroplex
argued that it was a Meta competitor.

Metroplex alleged
that sells and places digital and targeted advertisements on its local news
website, its “Best of Edwardsville” website, radio advertisements for its FM and
AM radio stations, and print advertisements that are placed in local newspapers
and in the “Best of Edwardsville” magazine. Metroplex also allegedly develops
tools and systems for managing and optimizing advertising campaigns for
businesses.

Meta allegedly drew
buyers away from its local news outlets by (1) using the word “people” in
statements related to advertising on Meta and (2) overestimating the number of
people on Meta’s apps and reachable by ad campaigns, and contends that Meta’s
users were “not actually people,” because some accounts were false and some
people have more than one account. It asserted claims under the Lanham Act and
the Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act.

Metroplex satisfied Lexmark
by alleging that the parties compete directly for the same customers and Meta’s
false or misleading statements were material to advertisement buyers. Lost
sales could be plausibly inferred by these allegations.

As for stating a
claim, Meta noted that most of the challenged statements weren’t “advertising.”
They were numerical estimates taken from Meta’s SEC filings or provided to
individual advertisers for particular ad campaigns, and generic references to
“people” on informational webpages. But the plaintiff did enough to satisfy Rules
8 and 9(b).

A reasonable
consumer could be confused despite Meta’s alleged disclaimers or qualifying
statements in SEC filings or in icons that led to popup windows, given the
allegations of falsity, just as the back label of a product can’t correct false
statements on the front. Given allegations that Meta allegedly inflates
audience estimates and reach metrics and such audience size figures can be over
30% of the actual number, it would be plausible for consumers to be deceived.

The IUDTPA claim
also survived because Metroplex, an Illinois company, alleges it was damaged as
a competitor in the Edwardsville and greater Metro East region in Illinois.

The court also
rejected Meta’s motion to compel arbitration; these claims, asserted in its
capacity as Meta competitor, were outside the scope of the agreement Metroplex
signed to run its Facebook pages.
 

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2024/03/local-ad-company-has-lanham-act.html

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Bank has Lanham Act standing to assert disparagement claim against former customer (itself a service provider)

SouthState Bank,
N.A. v. Qoins Technologies, Inc., — F.Supp.3d —-, 2024 WL 911075, No.
1:22-CV-5020-MHC (N.D. Ga. Mar. 1, 2024)

“Qoins is a
financial technology company that collects funds from its customers and
disburses payments to designated creditors in order to help its customers pay
off their debts.” Customers inform Qoins of their outstanding debts that they
wish to pay and transfer money to Qoins “on a regular basis to satisfy such
debts over time.” In 2019, Qoins entered into a Master Disbursement Services
Agreement with Atlantic Capital Bank to establish a banking relationship, which
included creating bank accounts that contained customer funds. SouthState is
ACB’s successor in interest. Under the agreement, Qoins was the bank’s customer
(and Qoins customers weren’t). It set up custodial accounts for holding
customer funds—not to be used for operations; an operating account; and a
reserve account. Qoins customers would make deposits to custodial accounts;
Qoins would make payments to creditors and then reconcile deposits and
payments. Qoins agreed to ensure that custodial accounts had sufficient funds
to carry out the payments and to cover any fees related to the transactions,
and to keep records of its transactions and provide accurate information to the
bank.

In June 2022, “SouthState
documented the mutual agreement” reached by Qoins and SouthState that the
banking relationship between them would terminate, effective July 20, 2022. SouthState
was unable to complete the transition process to a new bank partner (Evolve)
because “ACH requests to SouthState for Qoins’s Customers’ funds [ ] exceeded
the amounts in Qoins’s accounts with SouthState.” Qoins initiated an ACH
request in the amount of $150,000 from the Custodial Accounts to Evolve;
however, because the Custodial Accounts were overdrawn, SouthState denied the
request. SouthState allegedly eventually had to charge off the negative
balances of Qoins’s accounts in an amount in excess of $33,000.”

SouthState alleged
that the custodial accounts were improperly “used in multiple instances by
Qoins to fund Qoins’s other accounts at SouthState”; custodial accounts were
frequently funded by the operating account; Qoins’ earnings weren’t sufficient
to maintain operating capital; and funds from the different accounts were commingled.

In early December
2022, Qoins published an announcement on its website informing customers that
it “recently switched to a new bank partner” in order to “provide additional
services,” but “[u]nfortunately, however, some of our customers have not been
able to migrate their accounts due to ongoing issues with SouthState Bank.”

The announcement
included a question, “Why can’t I access my money?” and provided the following
answer:

If you never attempted to migrate, or if you received an error message
during the migration process (including a message that says your account is “on
hold”), your funds are still at SouthState Bank. SouthState Bank is unable to
release your funds, so we have been unable to migrate your account or refund
your money. We continue to work with SouthState Bank to resolve this matter
expeditiously. While we have seen some customers reach out to SouthState Bank
directly, customers have had no luck. Some customers have also reached out to
our new bank partner, but they are not in a position to help.

Qoins’s announcement
also provided a link to the FDIC’s Customer Assistance Form and informed any
aggrieved customers that a Qoins representative would assist in helping the
customer file a complaint against SouthState with the FDIC. Qoins also referred
to SouthState in its responses to customer reviews, saying it was responsible
for withholding funds. This was all allegedly false and misleading (given that
Qoins customers were not SouthState customers, they weren’t FDIC insured). “Numerous”
Qoins customers allegedly filed complaints against SouthState “with relevant
federal agencies,” even though SouthState was not responsible to Qoins’s
customers and SouthState did not possess any records of the customers’
interactions with Qoins.

The court mostly denied
Qoins’ motion to dismiss the resulting claims, including breach of contract and
libel.

False advertising/false
association: SouthState lacked standing to bring a false association claim against
Qoins because there were no allegations of passing off, and in fact Qoins
allegedly identified SouthState as a banking partner. Thus, SouthState didn’t
fall within the zone of interests for false association. [I think what the
court meant was that Lexmark’s zone of interests/proximate cause test
applies to §43(a)(1)(A) claims, as I think it would have to, but that the zone
of interests/proximate cause analysis differs as between false association and
false advertising.]

But SouthState did
have standing for a false advertising claim. “Because SouthState is alleging
reputational injuries, no direct competition is required and SouthState has
pleaded with sufficiency that it has standing to sue because the alleged false
representations about SouthState could impact its business reputation.”

Were the Qoins
statements made in commercial advertising or promotion? Qoins argued that they
were answers to customer questions and not intended to influence customers away
from SouthState or targeted at SouthState customers. The Eleventh Circuit has
adopted Gordon & Breach’s test (probably as modified by Lexmark).

Qoins’s argument that the statements were not made to the purchasing
public is unavailing because SouthState has alleged that Qoins made the
representations on its website and in response to customer reviews on online
application stores. Importantly, these representations are alleged to be
public-facing and widely accessible. “[W]hen statements are so broadly
disseminated, they are much more likely to constitute commercial advertising.”

Drawing all
inferences in SouthState’s favor, “Qoins’s statements were made to pacify
customer concerns and to influence customers to start or continue their
relationship with Qoins. A reasonable inference also can be made that Qoins’s
statements were intended to influence customers to purchase its service,
because such issues were not attributable to the new banking partner.” That
sufficed.

Interestingly, the
court also found that SouthState sufficiently alleged materiality in two
independent ways: (1) allegedly false representations that SouthState continued
to hold customers’ funds concerned “the essential characteristic of its
business as a bank” and (2) because consumers
allegedly filed complaints against SouthState based on Qoin’s
representations, it was plausible that those representations affected consumer
decisions about SouthState.

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2024/03/bank-has-lanham-act-standing-to-assert.html

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