small competitor lacks standing against big one’s nondisparaging advertising

HomeLight, Inc. v.
Shkipin, — F.Supp.3d —-, 2024 WL 940089 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2024)

Sometimes, courts
are very generous to competitors in presuming Lanham Act standing—as with the recent Meta ruling—and sometimes they aren’t. I have yet to detect a real
pattern across facts/circuits, but suggestions welcome.

Previous
ruling
.
Shkipin’s amended
false advertising counterclaim fails again. Although Shkipin alleged commercial
injuries—“network effects and ad revenues, and also … goodwill value associated
with its 100% free services to real estate agents and consumers” but there wasn’t
sufficiently direct causation. None of HomeLight’s statements allegedly
disparaged or even referred to Shkipin’s business.

To establish that HomeLight proximately caused HomeOpenly to suffer a
loss of sales, Mr. Shkipin would need to show how deceptive statements about
HomeLight directed at shoppers on HomeLight’s own website necessarily caused
advertisers not to buy ads from HomeOpenly. Even assuming that there is a
direct relationship between the number of shoppers who use or visit HomeOpenly
and its ability to sell ads, and that HomeLight’s deceptive statements resulted
in some reduction in the number of shoppers visiting HomeOpenly’s website, this
connection is too attenuated to establish proximate cause. This is especially
true given the countercomplaint’s other plausible explanation for why online
home shoppers might find HomeLight’s website but not HomeOpenly’s: HomeLight’s
heavy spending on various forms of online and TV advertising that Mr. Shkipin
characterizes as “highly effective.”

These causation
problems also defeated his state UCL claim. The allegedly unlawful/fraudulent
conduct underlying the UCL claim—that HomeLight received illegal kickbacks in
violation of RESPA—wasn’t sufficiently linked to the injuries Shkipin claimed.

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2024/03/small-competitor-lacks-standing-against.html

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , | Leave a comment

Second Circuit affirms holding that asterisk/fine print sufficiently clarifies ambiguous claim

Montgomery v. Stanley
Black & Decker, Inc., 2024 WL 939151, No. 23-735-cv (2d Cir. Mar. 5, 2024)

Plaintiffs sued
defendant (Craftsman) for deceptive business practice claims under both the New
York General Business Law (NYGBL), and the Virginia Consumer Protection Act
(VCPA), as well as asserting warranty and common law claims. They alleged that the
“Peak HP” labeling on the packaging of Craftsman vacuums is misleading because
the vacuums are unable to achieve the advertised horsepower. The District Court
dismissed the complaint because the dagger or asterisk symbol next to the “Peak
HP” label directs the consumer to fine print explaining that “Peak HP” is the
horsepower achieved in laboratory testing, not ordinary use. The court of
appeals affirmed.

Based on the entire
packaging, a reasonable consumer would not be misled because of the fine print
explanation. Plaintiffs didn’t allege the “Peak HP” label was false, and though
their interpretation was one reasonable one, the fine-print meaning was also
reasonable, and the dagger/asterisk “would alert a reasonable consumer to the
fact that certain caveats may apply to the ‘Peak HP’ designation.” Just because
it was in fine print didn’t mean it couldn’t clarify an ambiguous label. There
were no allegations that a consumer couldn’t see it or that its terms were
confusing.

 

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2024/03/second-circuit-affirms-holding-that.html

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , | Leave a comment

local ad company has Lanham Act standing against Meta for allegedly overstating ad reach

Metroplex Communic.,
Inc. v. Meta Platforms, Inc., 2024 WL 940127, No. 22-cv-1455-SMY (S.D. Ill.
Mar. 5, 2024)

Metroplex, a local
advertising company, brought a putative class action against Meta for unfair
competition. Although Meta argued that Metroplex was an ad purchaser for two of
its local media properties (a news site and an FM radio station), given that it
has advertised on Facebook dozens of times in the last few years, Metroplex
argued that it was a Meta competitor.

Metroplex alleged
that sells and places digital and targeted advertisements on its local news
website, its “Best of Edwardsville” website, radio advertisements for its FM and
AM radio stations, and print advertisements that are placed in local newspapers
and in the “Best of Edwardsville” magazine. Metroplex also allegedly develops
tools and systems for managing and optimizing advertising campaigns for
businesses.

Meta allegedly drew
buyers away from its local news outlets by (1) using the word “people” in
statements related to advertising on Meta and (2) overestimating the number of
people on Meta’s apps and reachable by ad campaigns, and contends that Meta’s
users were “not actually people,” because some accounts were false and some
people have more than one account. It asserted claims under the Lanham Act and
the Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act.

Metroplex satisfied Lexmark
by alleging that the parties compete directly for the same customers and Meta’s
false or misleading statements were material to advertisement buyers. Lost
sales could be plausibly inferred by these allegations.

As for stating a
claim, Meta noted that most of the challenged statements weren’t “advertising.”
They were numerical estimates taken from Meta’s SEC filings or provided to
individual advertisers for particular ad campaigns, and generic references to
“people” on informational webpages. But the plaintiff did enough to satisfy Rules
8 and 9(b).

A reasonable
consumer could be confused despite Meta’s alleged disclaimers or qualifying
statements in SEC filings or in icons that led to popup windows, given the
allegations of falsity, just as the back label of a product can’t correct false
statements on the front. Given allegations that Meta allegedly inflates
audience estimates and reach metrics and such audience size figures can be over
30% of the actual number, it would be plausible for consumers to be deceived.

The IUDTPA claim
also survived because Metroplex, an Illinois company, alleges it was damaged as
a competitor in the Edwardsville and greater Metro East region in Illinois.

The court also
rejected Meta’s motion to compel arbitration; these claims, asserted in its
capacity as Meta competitor, were outside the scope of the agreement Metroplex
signed to run its Facebook pages.
 

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2024/03/local-ad-company-has-lanham-act.html

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , | Leave a comment

Bank has Lanham Act standing to assert disparagement claim against former customer (itself a service provider)

SouthState Bank,
N.A. v. Qoins Technologies, Inc., — F.Supp.3d —-, 2024 WL 911075, No.
1:22-CV-5020-MHC (N.D. Ga. Mar. 1, 2024)

“Qoins is a
financial technology company that collects funds from its customers and
disburses payments to designated creditors in order to help its customers pay
off their debts.” Customers inform Qoins of their outstanding debts that they
wish to pay and transfer money to Qoins “on a regular basis to satisfy such
debts over time.” In 2019, Qoins entered into a Master Disbursement Services
Agreement with Atlantic Capital Bank to establish a banking relationship, which
included creating bank accounts that contained customer funds. SouthState is
ACB’s successor in interest. Under the agreement, Qoins was the bank’s customer
(and Qoins customers weren’t). It set up custodial accounts for holding
customer funds—not to be used for operations; an operating account; and a
reserve account. Qoins customers would make deposits to custodial accounts;
Qoins would make payments to creditors and then reconcile deposits and
payments. Qoins agreed to ensure that custodial accounts had sufficient funds
to carry out the payments and to cover any fees related to the transactions,
and to keep records of its transactions and provide accurate information to the
bank.

In June 2022, “SouthState
documented the mutual agreement” reached by Qoins and SouthState that the
banking relationship between them would terminate, effective July 20, 2022. SouthState
was unable to complete the transition process to a new bank partner (Evolve)
because “ACH requests to SouthState for Qoins’s Customers’ funds [ ] exceeded
the amounts in Qoins’s accounts with SouthState.” Qoins initiated an ACH
request in the amount of $150,000 from the Custodial Accounts to Evolve;
however, because the Custodial Accounts were overdrawn, SouthState denied the
request. SouthState allegedly eventually had to charge off the negative
balances of Qoins’s accounts in an amount in excess of $33,000.”

SouthState alleged
that the custodial accounts were improperly “used in multiple instances by
Qoins to fund Qoins’s other accounts at SouthState”; custodial accounts were
frequently funded by the operating account; Qoins’ earnings weren’t sufficient
to maintain operating capital; and funds from the different accounts were commingled.

In early December
2022, Qoins published an announcement on its website informing customers that
it “recently switched to a new bank partner” in order to “provide additional
services,” but “[u]nfortunately, however, some of our customers have not been
able to migrate their accounts due to ongoing issues with SouthState Bank.”

The announcement
included a question, “Why can’t I access my money?” and provided the following
answer:

If you never attempted to migrate, or if you received an error message
during the migration process (including a message that says your account is “on
hold”), your funds are still at SouthState Bank. SouthState Bank is unable to
release your funds, so we have been unable to migrate your account or refund
your money. We continue to work with SouthState Bank to resolve this matter
expeditiously. While we have seen some customers reach out to SouthState Bank
directly, customers have had no luck. Some customers have also reached out to
our new bank partner, but they are not in a position to help.

Qoins’s announcement
also provided a link to the FDIC’s Customer Assistance Form and informed any
aggrieved customers that a Qoins representative would assist in helping the
customer file a complaint against SouthState with the FDIC. Qoins also referred
to SouthState in its responses to customer reviews, saying it was responsible
for withholding funds. This was all allegedly false and misleading (given that
Qoins customers were not SouthState customers, they weren’t FDIC insured). “Numerous”
Qoins customers allegedly filed complaints against SouthState “with relevant
federal agencies,” even though SouthState was not responsible to Qoins’s
customers and SouthState did not possess any records of the customers’
interactions with Qoins.

The court mostly denied
Qoins’ motion to dismiss the resulting claims, including breach of contract and
libel.

False advertising/false
association: SouthState lacked standing to bring a false association claim against
Qoins because there were no allegations of passing off, and in fact Qoins
allegedly identified SouthState as a banking partner. Thus, SouthState didn’t
fall within the zone of interests for false association. [I think what the
court meant was that Lexmark’s zone of interests/proximate cause test
applies to §43(a)(1)(A) claims, as I think it would have to, but that the zone
of interests/proximate cause analysis differs as between false association and
false advertising.]

But SouthState did
have standing for a false advertising claim. “Because SouthState is alleging
reputational injuries, no direct competition is required and SouthState has
pleaded with sufficiency that it has standing to sue because the alleged false
representations about SouthState could impact its business reputation.”

Were the Qoins
statements made in commercial advertising or promotion? Qoins argued that they
were answers to customer questions and not intended to influence customers away
from SouthState or targeted at SouthState customers. The Eleventh Circuit has
adopted Gordon & Breach’s test (probably as modified by Lexmark).

Qoins’s argument that the statements were not made to the purchasing
public is unavailing because SouthState has alleged that Qoins made the
representations on its website and in response to customer reviews on online
application stores. Importantly, these representations are alleged to be
public-facing and widely accessible. “[W]hen statements are so broadly
disseminated, they are much more likely to constitute commercial advertising.”

Drawing all
inferences in SouthState’s favor, “Qoins’s statements were made to pacify
customer concerns and to influence customers to start or continue their
relationship with Qoins. A reasonable inference also can be made that Qoins’s
statements were intended to influence customers to purchase its service,
because such issues were not attributable to the new banking partner.” That
sufficed.

Interestingly, the
court also found that SouthState sufficiently alleged materiality in two
independent ways: (1) allegedly false representations that SouthState continued
to hold customers’ funds concerned “the essential characteristic of its
business as a bank” and (2) because consumers
allegedly filed complaints against SouthState based on Qoin’s
representations, it was plausible that those representations affected consumer
decisions about SouthState.

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2024/03/bank-has-lanham-act-standing-to-assert.html

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged | Leave a comment

Two hospitals can both be best, and use purple ads (for now at least)

NYU Langone Health
Sys. v. Northwell Health, Inc., 2024 WL 898941, No. 23-CV-5032 (VEC) (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 1, 2024)

NYU Langone sued
Northwell for trade dress infringement, unfair competition and false
designation of origin, and false advertising under the Lanham Act, as well as
related claims under the New York GBL and New York common law. The core
allegation is that Northwell copied its advertising to trade off the good will
and reputation of NYU Langone. The court dismissed the complaint—the false
advertising claims with prejudice.

The parties are both
nonprofit health systems in New York and advertise to the same market, with NYU
Langone having recently expanded its presence on Long Island, where Northwell
is headquartered.

NYU, including NYU
Langone and other subsidiaries, has used the color purple in its signage and
branding for over 100 years. NYU Langone’s 2017 style guide suggests the
distinct shade of purple be “prominently feature[d]” with white font and accent
colors like teal and orange, like so:

NYU Langone ad with purple background and white sans serif text

another similar ad on a billboard

NYU Langone alleged
the existence of advertising trade dress (e.g., teal and orange) and photos,
… [and the] use of purple, white, and accent color combinations in words and
phrases in the ad headlines.”

Before 2019,
Northwell advertisements allegedly featured a logo with blue letters and
multicolored arrows on a white background:

ad with patient picture on top and orange and blue text on white background

teal and white background, white and black text

In 2021, Northwell’s
advertisements allegedly changed and now use white letters and arrows on a
purple background:

Northwell ad with purple background and blue and white text

similar ad but some of the background is teal

NYU Langone failed
to adequately allege a protectable trade dress. “To state a claim for trade
dress infringement, a plaintiff must first clearly articulate the design or
combination of features that make up the trade dress. The articulation must
provide a ‘precise expression of the character and scope of the claimed trade
dress.’” Clarity and specificity are “imperative because courts cannot ‘shape
narrowly-tailored relief if they do not know what distinctive combination of
ingredients deserves protection.’” Further, “[t]rade dress descriptions with
too many possible combinations are not specific enough to state a claim.”

The allegations here
were

confusing and expansive. The Complaint provides a laundry list of
elements, some introduced by “e.g.” and some connected by “or,” that
encompasses such a wide variety of features that it would be difficult for
competitors to know whether their advertisement falls within the trade dress.
NYU Langone defines its trade dress as follows:

the prominent use of a distinctive purple color, the use of particular
accent colors (e.g., teal and orange) and photos, specific font types, colors
and headline styles (i.e., all cap sans serif white headlines, as well as white
font with certain words and phrases emphasized in the same or similar accent
colors), use of purple, white, and accent color combinations in words and
phrases in the ad headlines, and specific layouts in terms of placement and use
of accent colors, all of which create a distinctive look and feel.

Photos in the complaint
of the alleged trade dress “vividly illustrate how features such as font,
color, and layout vary across ads. Even among ads that are predominantly
purple, the shade of purple varies; some have all cap white writing; some have
all white sentence case writing; and some have a mix of white and other color
writing.”

subway ad as described by court

Facebook ad on purple background with white and orange text

Other ads had “just
a splash of purple”:

Mostly teal background with white text and then some purple at bottom

mostly pink background with white and purple text and purple at bottom

Some ads were split
between photos and text, with the text varying in color and case and with the
split sometimes being vertical and sometimes horizontal:

photo of basketball players on left, purple background and white/blue text on right

purple background with white text on top, photo of runner on bottom

The court couldn’t
identify specific fonts, colors, or headline styles that were part of the trade
dress, other than that they were sans serif fonts. “Categories of features”
were insufficient.

The current
definition was too general, contained too many “or” connectors and “for
example” phrases, and “overall encompasse[d] too many possible permutations and
combinations to constitute a singular distinct trade dress,” though the court
would allow an amended complaint.

False advertising: NYU
Langone alleged that a Northwell ad falsely claimed that one of its hospitals
“is NYC’s only hospital in the Nation’s Top 50” and “offer[s] the best care in
Manhattan.” This claim was based on rankings from Healthgrades and included the
Healthgrades logo directly underneath the claim. NYU Langone alleged that
Healthgrades’ rating methodology lacks transparency and relies on inaccurate
and incomplete reporting, and that the claim was false because U.S. News &
World Report ranked NYU Langone “#1 in New York State and in the New York City
Metro area” in its “Best Hospitals Honor Roll.”

ad as described with Healthgrades logo on bottom

The statement that
Lenox Hill is the only NYC hospital in the Nation’s Top 50 wasn’t literally
false because Northwell cited the Healthgrades rating. Questioning Healthgrades’
underlying rating methodology didn’t falsify the claim that Lenox Hill was the
only NYC hospital rated in the Top 50 in that particular list.

Nor did NYU Langone
sufficiently allege misleadingness. It was not enough to allege only that “Northwell’s
false or misleading statements actually deceived or have the tendency to
deceive a substantial segment of consumers.” “While proof of confusion is not
necessary at the pleading stage, factual allegations that would allow the Court
plausibly to infer that the advertisement caused confusion are. NYU Langone’s
single conclusory sentence is insufficient.” And “best care in Manhattan” was
puffery.

Under NYGBL § 350,
“a disclaimer or similar clarifying language” can defeat a claim of false
advertising as a matter of law, and the Healthgrades rating did so here.

Amendment would be
futile because no reasonable jury could conclude that consumers were misled or
confused by an add bragging about Lenox Hill’s Healthgrades rating and boasting
that it offers the “best” care in the city. “Consumers are familiar with this
common type of advertising, in which businesses tout that they are the best
according to some newspaper, magazine, blog, Yelp or Google review, poll, or
other rating system.” In fact, NYU Langone does the same:

NYU Langone ad also claiming to be #1 in outcomes with logos of rating entities

Both of these claims
can be true.

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2024/03/two-hospitals-can-both-be-best-and-use.html

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , | Leave a comment

“it appears difficult for a defendant, innocent or not, to defend himself in a claim for disgorgement of profits”

Newborn Bros. Co. v. Albion Engineering Co., No. 12-2999, 2024 WL
887785 (D.N.J. Feb. 29, 2024)

Previously, after a bench trial, the
court found Albion liable for falsely advertising its caulk dispensing guns as
“Made in the USA.”
Now it’s disgorgement time.

After more evidence, the court found that Albion
adequately supported its unclean-hands defense—that Newborn had also made false
USA origin claims—until early 2007.

Although this wasn’t a two-player market, the
evidence (including trade organization membership and Albion’s own offers to
distributors) suggested that Newborn and Albion were direct competitors. Many
distributors carry just one vender; many parties who sell private label
products use only one manufacturer.

Albion saw a strategic advantage in
presenting itself as an American manufacturer, e.g., in a meeting with an
end-user/owner of a caulking company, its director of marketing noted that
Newborn guns were made in China, to which the owner responded “[t]hat’s how we
got into this economic mess,” and the marketing director noted in the contract
management system that “Made in U.S.A. could become even more important during
this economy.” A former Newborn customer switched to Albion based on its claim
of US manufacture. After Albion added hard-to-remove country of origin
markings, Newborn’s sales increased fifty percent.

In fighting disgorgement, Albion pointed to
other factors driving sales. Many Albion caulking guns were priced forty
percent higher or more; Albion argued that this was evidence that the products do
not compete in the marketplace and cited survey data and testimony that
consumers’ American-made preference cannot account for purchases made despite
such cost disparities.

Because the court had already concluded that disgorgement
was appropriate, it was Newborn’s burden to prove Albion’s sales and Albion’s
burden to prove costs and other deductions from that amount.

Newborn’s expert calculated Albion’s total
revenue from relevant products to be nearly $32 million, and profits a bit over
$15.5 million, meeting Newborn’s burden. Although “it would be inequitable and
contrary to [the court’s] responsibility under the Lanham Act to disgorge
profits unrelated to Albion’s offending conduct,” the court rejected “any
interpretation that places the burden of proof of the sales attributable to
specific representations or consumer confusion affirmatively on Newborn.” Indeed,
the court cited with approval another court’s statement that “it appears
difficult for a defendant, innocent or not, to defend himself in a claim for
disgorgement of profits.”

Moreover, this burden shifting

allows for, and in some instances encourages,
parties to argue past one another to the collective detriment of themselves and
the Court. A plaintiff’s minimal obligation to prove sales and a defendant’s
heavier burden to deduct costs, demonstrate a lack of competition or confusion,
and make other showings to subtract from the sales figure do not naturally
result in apples-to-apples comparisons.

So, Albion didn’t focus on its costs
associated with its sales, but rather whether the parties’ products competed
and whether there was actual consumer confusion. The court partly agreed: customers
who repurchased after the country of origin marking was corrected showed “a
disregard for country of origin as a deciding factor.”

However, the court declined to rely on
testimony that consumers would only pay a 15% premium for American-made
products (meaning that sales of products with a greater premium weren’t
attributable to the false country of origin claims).  It was “clear that Albion saw value in
representing itself as an American manufacturer and sought to distinguish
itself from competitors, particularly Newborn, on that basis. Finding for
Albion on this issue would risk, at least in some instances, unjustly giving
Albion the benefit of excluding relevant products based on markups.” Without
definitive evidence quantifying the value of American manufacture, the court
erred on the side of Newborn. The court also included private-label sales,
because it couldn’t find that the private-label sales were unrelated to
American manufacture.

The court set disgorgement at a bit over $1.6
million plus prejudgment interest. Deterrence couldn’t justify increasing the sum—that
would be a penalty.

Injunctive relief was also appropriate. Albion
ceased placing markings on the relevant products representing Albion’s
eighty-year history of American manufacture after the lawsuit was filed. It
added a “Made in Taiwan” label to handles, later replaced by a stamp on the
recoil plate. Still, Albion guns stamped or otherwise marked to indicate
American manufacture are presently displayed across the country. One
distributor continued to advertise a relevant product as American made until
October 2023, and there were other scattered similar references online.

Thus, there was continued irreparable harm. (I
didn’t see discussion of the TMA’s
presumption.)

And legal remedies were inadequate, since
they couldn’t prevent future violations. “The inadequacy of compensation for
past harm is all the more apparent, in the Court’s view, in light of the
continuing misrepresentations and lack of clarity in the market despite
Albion’s assertion that it has engaged in corrective efforts for more than a
decade.” Thus, the balance of equities and the public interest also favored
injunctive relief.

Albion was ordered to mail a letter and a
copy of the court’s order to each distributor it has sold a caulking gun to
within the past five years requesting that any samples, displays, or other
materials referencing “Phila. PA.” or referring to Albion caulking guns being
“Made in USA” be returned. Albion had to remove from the inventory of its
distributors any B-line guns that bear markings describing Albion’s history as
an American manufacturer and offer to replace any returned materials at its own
cost. It was also required to provide notices to be displayed at each location
at which Albion products are displayed:

A judge of the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey has ruled that Albion Engineering Corp. has
previously misrepresented that certain products were “Made in USA,” through
product mismarking and statements in advertising, promotional materials,
websites, and to customers. Newborn Brothers Co. Inc. v. Albion Engineering
Co., No. 12-Civ-2999 (NLH).

The Court has ordered Albion to comply with
all applicable country-of-origin marking and disclosure requirements. The Court
has ordered Albion to provide to its distributors copies of this notice so that
they may be displayed at all distributor sales locations.

Yikes!

Also, “until such time that Albion seeks and
receives confirmation from United States Customs and Border Protection as to
the marking requirements of its specific manufacturing processes, the packaging
of each Albion caulking gun with any foreign component shall list each
component of the caulking gun and its country of origin.”

 

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2024/03/it-appears-difficult-for-defendant.html

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , | Leave a comment

Falsely advertising “ghost guns” as legal in NY is actionable

State of N.Y. v. Arm
or Ally, LLC, 2024 WL 756474, No. 22-CV-6124 (JMF) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2024)

The AG sued sellers
of “unfinished frames and receivers” — also known as “80% lowers” or “receiver
blanks” —designed to evade restrictions on gun sales. The court explains the
allegations:

A “frame” is the core part of a handgun or pistol, and a “receiver” is
the core part of a rifle, shotgun, or other long gun. An “unfinished” frame or
receiver requires an extra step to be rendered usable: usually the drilling of
a few required holes or the filing of excess plastic.

This step is,
according to one of the defendants, “ridiculously easy” and can be done by an
amateur in under an hour with only basic tools. Some of the defendants make it
even easier by shipping their products in a “jig,” a plastic setting that
enables a customer to easily convert an unfinished frame or receiver into a
firearm. As one defendant said to customers when linking to an instructional
video: “There’s no complicated setup because the jig that came with your slide
keeps everything properly aligned as you make simple cuts with the included
drill bits. Wait, it can’t be that simple? Yes, it is.”

The completed
products are allegedly functionally and visually indistinguishable from frames
or receivers one could buy at a gun store, but they are effectively untraceable
because manufacturers, distributers, and purchasers generally do not comply
with the registration and serialization requirements applicable to “firearms,”
making them “ghost guns.” Lawmakers in New York City and New York State banned
the sale of unfinished frames and receivers in 2020 and 2022, respectively.

During the relevant
time period, defendants allegedly marketed and sold unfinished frames and
receivers “directly to consumers without following any of the federal or state
laws and regulations that apply to the sale of guns, and in particular without
conducting a background check, placing a serial number on the gun, or entering
it into a federal database so that it can be traced back to its source if used
in a crime.” Defendants made at least 100,000 shipments to consumers in New
York not registered as federal firearms licensees (FFL), including undercover
agents employed by the State. Defendants who had federal firearms licenses had
access to, but did not use, the National Instant Criminal Background Check
System before selling unfinished frames and receivers to New York consumers,
while some defendants weren’t licensed to sell firearms at all.

The advertising bit:
Defendants allegedly misled New York customers into “believing that unfinished
frames and receivers are legal workarounds to New York’s gun control laws, as
well as federal law.” Defendants’ websites claimed, among other things, that
unfinished frames and receivers could be sold and purchased with “No FFL
Required,” could “be shipped straight to a customer’s home without an FFL,” were
“not subject to the same regulations as any other complete firearm[s],” were
“completely unregistered and legal,” allowed consumers to “build a completely
legal handgun without any ‘government oversight’ ” and to “legally own a
firearm that does not have to be ‘registered,’ ” were “[a]pproved” by the ATF, and
were considered by the government to be mere “pieces of metal and/or plastic
and not guns.”

Among other claims,
the AG brought NYGBL Sections 349 and 350 claims against them. Defendants
contended that marketing unfinished frames and receivers as “legal” was
protected by the First Amendment. It was not.

First, the marketing
was commercial speech: “NO FFL Required!” came in the midst of other
advertising language, such as “Various colors available,” and “no RED TAPE …
NO Registering … No Transfer fees … Ships right to your door.” Labeling
unfinished frames and receivers as “ATF Approved” on sales websites or touting “Ban
Reversed on All of Our Products!” next to pictures of unfinished frames and
receivers constituted proposing a commercial transaction.

I assume because
Sections 349 and 350 don’t themselves make the sales illegal, the court didn’t
point to the part of Central Hudson
that makes clear that ads for
unlawful products can simply be banned. But that part also says that false or
misleading ads can simply be banned.

And that was
sufficiently alleged: Defendants allegedly continued to market unfinished
frames and receivers as “legal” to New York consumers even after the State and
New York City banned the sale or possession of ghost guns. The complaint
plausibly alleged that at least some defendants knowingly evaded federal and
state laws. On Halloween Day in 2022, one defendant posted a facetious photo of
one of its products dressed as a “ghost gun,” showing that it understood that
“its unfinished frame and receiver products have only one use — to make
untraceable ghost guns.” Various other defendants allegedly touted the
“untraceable” and “unregistered” nature of ghost guns as a major selling point.

a ghost gun–get it?

The defendants
mostly argued that their statements were merely “expressions of legal opinion.”
The question is whether the customer “understood [the statement] merely as an
expression of opinion.” Nat’l Conversion Corp. v. Cedar Bldg. Corp., 23 N.Y.2d
621, 628 (1969) (finding it important that the “tenant’s lawyer was persuaded
not to verify” the truth of the landlords’ statements about the law on account
of the landlords’ authority and the certainty with which they spoke); see also
Lukowsky v. Shalit, 110 A.D.2d 563, 567-68 (1st Dep’t 1985) (“[A]
misrepresentation of law is actionable if the representation is made by an
individual possessing superior knowledge.”). Defendants marketed their
unfinished frames and receivers as “completely” legal “from a position of
superior knowledge as established merchants in the gun industry.”

 

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2024/02/falsely-advertising-ghost-guns-as-legal.html

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , | Leave a comment

US News rating was mere opinion except as to school that intentionally submitted bad information to it

Favell v. Univ. of
Southern Cal., 2024 WL 751006, No. CV 23-3389-GW-MARx (C.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2024)

Plaintiffs alleged
that defendants conspired to inflate the US News ranking of USC Rossier School
of Education by submitting inaccurate or incomplete data to US News and market
the resulting ranking to the public. USC had a business relationship with 2U,
an education technology startup, to develop an online Master of Arts in
Teaching program. This was the first of USC Rossier’s online degree programs
and went live in June 2009; 2U received an undisclosed percentage of the
tuition revenue.

US News calculates
its education school rankings using eleven criteria, including “student
selectivity,” which accounts for 18% of the school’s total score and is
comprised of three objective sources of admittance data: (1) the school’s
doctoral acceptance rate (6%); (2) mean GRE quantitative scores (6%); and (3)
mean GRE verbal scores (6%).

During the relevant
period—through 2021—US News didn’t distinguish between in-person and online programs.
However, USC submitted student selectivity data only for USC Rossier’s highly
selective, in-person Ph.D. program, but not from its less-competitive EdD
program (which was offered online after 2015). From the 2009 rankings to the
2010 rankings, USC Rossier’s reported acceptance rate dropped 40 percentage
points (from 50.7% to 10.5%), and its ranking rose 16 places (from #38 to #22).
US News began publishing a specialty ranking of online master’s degrees in
education in 2013, when USC Rosier’s online Master of Arts in Teaching program
ranked #44. USC didn’t appear on the list after that.

Defendants allegedly
heavily marketed USC Rossier’s rapidly rising ranking to the public to boost
enrollment in the online programs. USC allegedly orchestrated this scheme
through its submission of false/incomplete data, and then advertised the
resulting rankings knowing that they were misleading. 2U allegedly helped “push
the rankings out on a much broader scale,” and knew or should have known that
the rankings were fraudulently procured. For example, 2U engaged in online
advertising to promote USC Rossier’s ranking; it spent more than half of its
revenue on program sales and marketing. USC likewise regularly touted USC
Rossier’s ranking (and that USC Rossier was “top-ranked”) in press releases, on
social media, on the Rossier Website, and in other promotional materials.

Fortunately for 2U,
the court thought it was accused only of puffing. The court considered two kinds
of statements: (1) statements that USC Rossier was “top-ranked,” and (2)
statements which included the specific numerical ranking assigned by US News.

The first category
was “textbook puffery.” A claim that a school is “top-ranked” is both “vague
[and] highly subjective” and lacks “the kind of detailed or specific factual
assertions that are necessary to” test the truth of the claim.

Some ads included a
specific numerical US News ranking. For example, USC published a “News Alert”
on the Rossier Website celebrating the fact that it “ha[d] just been ranked
22nd in U.S. News and World Report’s 2010 edition of America’s Best Graduate
Schools.” On an earlier motion to dismiss, the court had found that this was
potentially actionable because the allegations

do not target US News’ selection or weighing of the objective criteria
which determine the rankings…. Instead, Plaintiffs claim that Defendants
knowingly reported false data to US News. Those underlying data are entirely
falsifiable, and the weight that they were to be assigned by US News was
predetermined. The fact that such data were considered alongside other
subjective considerations to produce a final ranking does not render USC’s
promotion of the allegedly fraudulently obtained ranking non-actionable. As
Plaintiffs note, if the law were otherwise, “any business that submits false
information to get a certification … could not be held liable because each of
those certifications would have at their core a methodology based on an opinion
as to which data points should be considered.”

2U argued that, since
it didn’t knowingly provide false data, this reasoning didn’t apply to
it. Plaintiffs responded that they still weren’t targeting US News’ choices
about how to rank, only the underlying false data, and that false advertising
is strict liability. The court, I think wrongly, agreed with 2U: to proceed,
plaintiffs needed to allege that 2U knew of that falsity or lacked a good faith
belief in the accuracy of the rankings. And since rankings and ratings are “almost
universally” treated as statements of opinion, “even if [one] could draw any
fact-based inferences from [the] rating, such inferences could not be proven
false because of the inherently subjective nature of [the] ratings calculation”
as long as the party expressing the opinion honestly entertained it and didn’t
have superior knowledge or special information.

Although US News is
the one with the opinion here, a reasonable consumer could construe defendants’
affirmation of that opinion as implying that the defendants “held some good
faith belief in its accuracy (i.e., that it was not fraudulently obtained).”
Plaintiffs plausibly pled lack of good faith as to USC, but not as to 2U;
alleged negligence was insufficient.

Although there’s no
mens rea requirement in California’s consumer protection statutes, that goes to
a separate issue:

Although Plaintiffs are correct that the negligent dissemination of a
false statement of fact would suffice, Plaintiffs do not allege that 2U’s
advertisements were literally false, nor could they. The question here,
therefore, is whether 2U’s advertisements are even actionable in the first
instance – i.e., are they misleading because they imply any false assertions
upon which a reasonable consumer could rely? In most instances involving
statements of opinion, the answer to that question will be “no.” In some cases,
however, a statement of opinion may “reasonably ‘be interpreted … as an
implied statement’ that the speaker ‘knows facts sufficient to justify him in
forming’ the opinion, or that he at least knows no facts ‘incompatible with
[the] opinion.’ ” If and only if that implied statement is false – and the
speaker does know of undisclosed fact incompatible with the opinion – is the
opinion is misleading. In other words, requiring that Plaintiffs allege
knowledge of the falsity underlying US News’ opinions in not contradicted by
the absence of a mens rea requirement under the statutes ….

Nor did plaintiffs
successfully plead joint/secondary liability. Liability under the UCL and CLRA
“cannot be predicated on vicarious liability.” It “must be based on [defendant’s]
personal ‘participation in the unlawful practices’ and ‘unbridled control’ over
the practices that are found to violate [the UCL] or [FAL].” In making this
determination, courts have focused on various factors such as whether the
defendant: (1) “issued [its] own advertisements” or merely repeated the
deceptive statements of another, (2) “controlled the language” or “reviewed or
monitored the representations” made by another, or (3) had notice of the
violating conduct.

The service
agreement between the parties wasn’t enough to make 2U liable. Under the
agreement, “USC was required to (1) market the online programs ‘in a manner
comparable to’ the in-person programs; (2) ‘consult with [2U] in the
development of additional Promotional Strategies’; and (3) provide 2U ‘with
access to information pertaining to both classroom-based and online students’
admissions, performance, and post-graduation outcomes.’ ” Although plaintiffs
alleged that 2U bought ads, they didn’t allege that 2U actually issued or
authored any of the advertisements upon which they relied. The mere fact that
under the agreement, USC was required to market the online programs “in a
manner comparable to” the in-person programs and “consult with [2U] in the
development of additional Promotional Strategies” didn’t show that 2U
controlled the statements at issue here. “USC maintained the main Rossier
website” where the allegedly misleading statements were posted, and any
marketing materials 2U made were “subject to USC’s written approval prior to
any use.”

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2024/02/us-news-rating-was-mere-opinion-except.html

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , , | Leave a comment

TMSR Session 3: Private Actors…and their Machines

Introduction: Jeanne
Fromer

Private actors
pursue their own interests. Focused on Amazon: free riding on gov’t mechanisms,
particularly TM law, to communicate to gov’t not to regulate it—product liability,
intermediary liability. It’s also cheaper, and Amazon is notoriously cheap.
Affecting TM law (as set forth in new paper with Mark McKenna, which is
excellent). Can enshrine things like notice & takedown in © law, but that
has effects on the ability to assert fair use. When things are happening en
masse at a business, just as in the TM system, w/o individualized attention and
with a different agenda than the law’s, you can see the law’s protective
features be minimized. So big theme: dealing with masses of marks—eBay, domain
names are another example—requires new thinking. You have to be wary of private
actors’ incentives.

TMs are a proxy for
all sorts of info and goodwill, but there are other things that are proxies for
that and have always been—selling in a certain marketplace or mall gives
information; being the first listing in the Yellow Pages (might be the first
nonsense marks!). But we’re seeing more and different proxies for information
and goodwill; started w/search engines but seems more prominent now. Amazon is
used for more product search than Google. Product reviews: different info is
available. AI modeling is also imagining what consumers want to see. We
consider that TMs have costs as well as benefits; we should think about the
costs as well as benefits of these proxies. TMs may not matter as much with these
other proxies, but they’re also noisy proxies. (This reminds me of a classic
Posner assertion where he claimed
that Trisha Waldron’s photograph, or the location of her stores, would give
people information about whether she was Native American.)  People will game them in all sorts of ways
that dilute their information, whether that’s product review manipulation or
otherwise.

People trust Amazon,
not the individual “marks” on the site, including their ability to return
products easily; TM’s work is done in the service of Amazon. A variant of
separating the mark from the brand; not seeing it in all categories, and we may
have a world in which some marks—maybe the 1%–are not divided from brands but the
others are. Not that surprising that the luxury marks are not selling on these
platforms and are often fighting them; luxury may require keeping the mark with
the brand.

Human desire for
TMs? We like how they sort us/how we get to identify with them? Even if we live
in a world with other sources of info, maybe we still like TMs. How much of
that is cultural?

Eric Goldman

SAD scheme
and what it tells us: Efficacy/brittleness of our institutions—the real action
is below the waterline, with implications for everything else we’re doing. Sealed
complaint; ex parte TRO; used to freeze entire accounts and money. TRO is
better than a notice & takedown—you get the seller’s entire account down
and you get all their money; marketplaces are treating them as risk of being
held liable for infringement by that merchant. Gives rights claimants things
they couldn’t get from notice & takedown; will only increase until we fix
it.

Standard notice
doesn’t produce $, but if you can freeze $, they’ll pay you to get it back.
Entire law firms tell rightsowners: let me have the right to enforce and I’ll cut
you a check every month. Luke Combs outsourced his enforcement; he didn’t say
that he was going to stop using the scheme, even though he tried to make the
one person who got attention whole.

TRO freeze is
usually left in place even after the TRO expires. We can start w/good faith
presumption that the court thinks it’s doing something temporary, but it’s not
given the nature of the TRO and the marketplace. Mistakes are common in the
process and appeals are almost nonexistent. Thus there is little scrutiny and
little pushback.

Main players have
dubious rights—emojis, smileys—already at the border of what TM should protect.
They shouldn’t have the power that marketplaces give them.

Increasingly seeing
competitors using SAD scheme to knock them out during peak sales periods. TROs
harm consumers.

Lessons for
institutional thinking: The law of TM on the streets is very different from
what it looks like in appellate cases. Ex parte: the law is whatever the judge
will sign. Civil procedure critiques—basic joinder, jurisdiction questions
where the rules are clear but are simply not matching what is taking place.

Third-party enumerated
rules are also law on the street. Actual adjudication by services is what the
law “really” is. Google’s TM policy for keyword ads is law for 99% of all TM
disputes out there.

SAD scheme is
swallowing up the rest of TM law. About 1000 SAD scheme cases are filed in the
past year with 200 defendants each, that’s 200,000 defendants versus about 3000
traditional cases in the past year. It’s 99% of TM law and that will only grow
as long as the scheme continues to work.

TM is a terrible
subject matter for ex parte proceedings. When the defense doesn’t show up, it’s
too error-prone. It’s like with CPB. Riddled with errors. Adjudicators need to
hear about risks of overenforcement, overclaiming; defenses—he gets emails from
sellers of used or grey market goods snared in a robotic search. The judge isn’t
hearing that they’re not counterfeiters.

Other examples:
design patent, as Sarah Burstein
has writte
n. Putting pictures side by side often isn’t enough. Trade
secret: its scope is the whole ball game.

Because of the lower
stakes, secretiveness, lack of access to court that Ds have, these cases just
don’t get corrected.

Research project: Go
and look at ex parte proceedings and whether there were subsequent proceedings
and whether the court changed its mind—we could literally identify the error rate.

This needs to be
fixed, but next steps are not clear. We haven’t found a good way to intervene
in the cases. Even when judges blast specific plaintiffs, they still aren’t
taking the corrective action—they aren’t applying their reasoning to other
cases or other Ds, they aren’t imposing sufficient penalties to deter.

Mary LaFrance

Focusing on
counterfeits doesn’t address other forms of infringement. Birkenstock &
Nike left Amazon b/c of counterfeit concerns; that was Amazon’s focus. But
private systems have limited ability to process context. High risk of false
positives as well as false negatives. Focusing on counterfeiting doesn’t
protect consumers from other types of non-genuine goods, which exist on Amazon
& eBay—gray goods, expired products, repackaged, mishandled in supply
chain. SHOP SAFE wouldn’t change that b/c it is only about counterfeits. We
know that automated systems designed to flag infringements get lots of false
positives b/c they can’t recognize fair use; may also be false negatives,
though that’s not the focus. There probably aren’t other major complications
than fair use for © screening, though they can also miss licensed uses; but it’s
much harder for TM to determine infringement.

Nongovernmental
mechanisms that work well: Dave
Fagundes on derby girl names
, using norms. But the context is really simple:
1 name, 1 skater.

UDRP: context gets
considered.

But you need a full
LOC analysis if you really want to ID infringement; instead, automated systems
aim for counterfeits. False positives: probably miss descriptive fair use. Platforms
may not have incentives to help sellers who are wrongly identified get back
online; not willing to face potential contributory liability. Platforms don’t
disclose how many invalid notices they get.

Brands can choose to
“gate” on Amazon with authorization letters, but how does the consumer know the
seller will stick to selling genuine goods? Brick & mortar sellers have more
protections in their supply chains as a rule—relations w/distributors over
time, though there are exceptions with discount retailers. [I don’t think this
is describing the situation of small brick & mortar sellers.] Their
potential liability for counterfeits gives them more incentives to be careful,
whereas ecommerce platforms don’t face that potential now with third party
sellers.

SHOP SAFE would
impose contributory liability with [RT: impossible to comply with] safe
harbors. Would lead to more false positives. Seller could appeal, but there’s
no requirement that be expeditious. And proof that goods aren’t counterfeit
could be challenging, b/c there’s no way to have Amazon actually inspect the
products; there’s also no requirement that the TM owner cooperate with the
process, so even if the seller provides product codes, the TM owner doesn’t
have to verify them even if they’re accurate.  SHOP SAFE would also presage a move to require
filtering for © to replace the DMCA.

Stacey Dogan: role
of human agency in private actions in an increasingly AI-driven world. We think
of TMs as informational vessels that allow consumers to make decisions for
themselves based on what they’ve learned either personally or through other
means about the goods bearing the mark. But as we move increasingly to
algorithmically chosen or differentiated tools to be used by third parties to
shape our preferences, that notion of TMs as having info value to humans who
then exercise their agency and make choices go away. Private actors will act in
profit-maximizing ways; TM owners have always done this, and intermediaries
have existed, but when they’re doing all this informational intermediation for
their own economic incentives, that’s very troubling.

Jeremy Sheff: we
have one to one disputes; one to many where a TM owner tries to enforce against
a lot of counterfeiters; then many to many disputes like low quality marks
flooding the system in ways that raise costs for everyone. Crystals and mud
story about this: in many to many, an attractive case for more crystalline,
bright line, formalist rules for cancelling registrations. One to one is more
attractive for standards. One to many: hard to figure out whether to worry more
about over or underenforcement. If we were to try to adapt different rules, we
have to ID what category we’re in, and how someone might be allowed to contest
their categorization. DMCA has a formalist process: if you flip the switch
three times, you end up in federal court. [You’re supposed to do that, but
platform policies don’t work that way—they often don’t restore struck material—and
neither do infringers, who may just reupload without filing a counternotice.]

Goldman: that
assumes that someone can access court enough to push back.

Sheff: yes. If
everything’s done by platform w/no recourse, there’s no way to reverse that.

Goldman: the rule of
law is in place but is inaccessible.

Sheff: DMCA says
counternotify and you’ll end up in federal court at the end of the day; that
might be too expensive, but that’s the cost of muddy standards. Nothing like
that for TM.

Lemley: Prior rounds
of trolling, something that helped: targeting the lawyers for sanctions or even
state bar work. Are these the sorts of representations a lawyer can ethically make
to a court? State bars don’t have standing requirements and you don’t have to litigate
in the case itself. The appetite for doing it might dry up if there are disciplinary
consequences for lawyers about joinder, jurisdiction, etc.

RT: On LaFrance’s points
about gray, expired goods, etc: I’m pretty sure TM owners are actually happy to
argue that all those things qualify as counterfeits. I also don’t think used,
grey market, expired/near expired, repackaged goods, mishandled goods are
infringing or counterfeit; the problem if any is that they’re falsely
advertised.

Fagundes wrote follow-up
article suggesting that system was breaking down.
Revisiting Roller Derby’s Master Roster, in
CREATIVITY WITHOUT LAW (Kate Darling & Adam Perzanowski eds., NYU Press,
2016).

Marketa Trimble: A
little worried about following up TRO success rates—in the trade show context, should
not compare to online case results. In the trade show context, there’s a lot of
information that preexists, so there is some relationship between the two
parties. Judges are pretty strict on issuing bonds in those cases. And also
there is a robust world of social norms surrounding Ps in these cases—they do
have offline reputation to protect; they’re repeat players. Online plaintiffs
are less constrained to care about their reputation among sellers.

Even in trade show
cases, we were shocked how little the judges knew about the problem of bad TROs.
What helped was meeting judges from other countries, so they weren’t just
hearing from local lawyers about how the world worked. Protective letters in
other countries: ability to alert court in advance about a potential problem
with a case. Might seem burdensome but courts love it (they collect fees for
it).

Mark McKenna:

Important to
recognize that the quality of online shopping has gotten really bad.
Enshittification is real. Labeling has gotten much more confusing. Amazon is
also decentering brands because you can’t necessarily trust that you’ll get the
right thing just by ordering it by name. The motivation to respond to
counterfeiting is increasingly understandable even if we have skepticism about
methods. What’s the best way to do that? Schedule A was an invisible problem,
but why is that happening at the same time as platforms are creating dispute
resolution policies? Maybe this is all really about lawyers and not brands. But
it’s worth thinking about which levers are being pulled on brand value/what is
depressing the informational value of TMs.

Linford:
externalization of costs—Amazon just tells you to throw the product away if it’s
not what you ordered. Free shipping makes it easy to start & stay with
Amazon.

One response is to
get off the platform. We’ve externalized to consumers the cost of protecting
themselves—reading reviews.

Another cost of AI
specifically: energy. Generating one image cost as much as one charge of your
phone. Should that weigh into the fair use analysis? [No, for so many reasons,
including that the alternative to fair use is licensing.]

Doesn’t handing over
right to sue to lawyers create a problem like for Righthaven in ©? Some sort of
naked licensing/transfer in gross?

Lisa Ramsey: this
might drive us not to grant TMs in inherently descriptive terms like LIFEGUARD
for clothing.

Could algorithmic
practices affect what counts as TM use? Brand name, product source
(manufacturer, third party, etc.), description all show up on Amazon. If Amazon
adopted a policy of taking down content only when it appeared in brand name or
product source and not in description, that could affect how courts think about
it too. User names on social media may or may not include trademarks; user bios
give more information.

Bill McGeveran:
Enshittification is about size, size is about antitrust: you can enshittify
when you have market power. Scale has various manifestations.

Burrell: Monopsony is
a better description b/c the economic evidence is that lower market
concentration is necessary to have a monopsony.

McGeveran: that’s
definitely Wal-Mart. Links to larger conversation about antitrust. You can’t
tell a full story about causes or potential responses without looping in
antitrust concerns.

There are so many
different harms, including monopsony, that are getting blurred together. Useful
to pull them apart. Having a listing taken down is not the same thing as being
kicked off a platform entirely and losing your reputation accrued on the platform
[and having your account seized including the money]. Some enshittification is
nuisance to consumers, but it’s not the same thing as getting expired medicine
that Amazon wouldn’t replace quickly.

Grinvald: Amazon’s
disregard of supply chain is part of what’s eroding connection between product
and source—signaling to purchaser that it doesn’t matter who the seller is.

Note that shifting
to Target by mail won’t help b/c Target/Wal-Mart has also allowed third-party
sellers to ship from their site. That’s the Amazon effect!

Discussion of various
attempts to game liability for selling defective products—if Amazon is
advertising, storing the product in its warehouses and shipping it, why should
it matter whether it’s a “third party seller” fulfilled by Amazon?

Mid-Point
Discussants: Lisa Ramsey

The problem of
anticompetitive takedowns: DMCA, UDRP. Parody accounts: use noncommercial
speech s a bright line, whether as defense or otherwise? If we had bright lines
in the statute, maybe platforms would be more willing to keep speech up when
challenged.

Marketa Trimble

UDRP as potential
model for alternative dispute resolution/shaping rules that can be skewed by
private ordering. UDRP is fast, cheap, doesn’t require legal representation.
But also has flaws that we can learn from. Flattened the TM world. Designed for
alphanumerical strings; treats TMs as word marks and ignores other types of
TMs. Ignores classes of goods and services, which is incredible. It also
ignores national law. Drafted w/the assumption that there is something beyond
the written words that can be drawn from to interpret many of its concepts:
what is a TM? Is registration required? What is substantial similarity? What is
fair use? Many things were left unexplained, and there was no choice of law
provision. The idea that you create a new body of law that will on its own
create all this case law and interpretation to fill in the blanks is rather naïve.
Common law takes centuries. So naturally they started w/national law, and given
the dominance of US, Australian, UK panelists, we saw a lot of that influence.
Might work well for the US, but might have problems scaling internationally. The
panels may give victory to one who had a mark anywhere in the world first.

Need appellate process.
The alternative is court—so how do you treat the UDRP in courts? It’s possible
that courts turn to their own national laws, as we saw in the Barcelona.com
case and others. Filling in the blanks is a big challenge.

Despite all the
changes in the world, there is still a lot of reliance on TMs. [Tide is not a “brand”
in the pumped-up way that some now are; its primary function is to guarantee
and make you feel good about your detergent, not anything else.]

Note that UK IPO won’t
register a mark in all non Latin characters on the theory that no British
person would be able to understand/remember it—compare to “nonsense marks.”

Just as we needed
AirBNB to understand why a hotel is a good idea, Uber to see what taxis are
good for, we may need algorithmic recommendations to see what TMs are good for.

Linford: There’s
been a presumption that Amazon isn’t working right now for buying a brand I
want to buy b/c search results are not reliable. If I put Tide in I don’t necessarily
get Tide out. If I’m uncertain about whether I’ll get Tide and how long the
search will continue to do that, that’s a problem. MTM v. Amazon bothers him: would
like Amazon to do the one thing of telling him “we don’t have MTM.” Danger is
that intervention has problematic downstream effects.

We are talking about
these brands as if they once had a guarantee—Philip Morris has bought brands
that I may have strong affection for, but I don’t have strong affection for
Philip Morris. We no longer have strong rules against selling marks. But does
that mean we presume too much consistency from brand sellers? If that was
already false, the Amazon problem is less acute/might get us to correct our
priors in the proper direction.

Lemley: MTM is a
Rorschach test to see if people’s attitudes have shifted to see how we’ve been affected
by the techlash. Would it be great if you could automate communicating only and
all correct information at scale? Sure. But if you just give liability for not
doing so, we are likely to do damage, and end up with sites that warn “we don’t
have what you want” followed by a list of things you want. That doesn’t solve
the problem of whether Amazon is reliable. But MTM is a case of Amazon being
perfectly reliable: here are the watches we have available to you, the closest
to what you were looking for. A standard higher than that is trouble.

Enshittification is
not “there’s stuff on Amazon whose provenance I don’t know.” It is that Amazon
got dominant by giving you the products you wanted; once it achieves that
position, it has a strong incentive to sell the space between you and the stuff
you want. Accurately identifying third party alternatives is not a problem, but
making it hard for me to find what I want through the clutter of advertising is
a problem. Amazon makes more profit selling ads than it does selling products,
which is not great.

Dinwoodie: Lush won
against Amazon in the UK, had to label “we don’t have it.”

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2024/02/tmsr-session-3-private-actorsand-their.html

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , | Leave a comment

TMSR Session 2: Administrative Agencies and Specialized Courts

Introduction: Robert
Burrell

IP Australia exerts
extraordinary control over legislative agenda; if you can persuade IP Au. that something
needs to change, then it can change quite quickly. But the flipside is that it’s
seen in light of what the Office needs to worry about. There have been problems
with defenses; the Office doesn’t have to worry about infringement, so nothing
changes. But to deal with different holidays in different states, emergency
legislation was passed within weeks so the Office would know how to count
deadlines.

Volume of decisions
by hearing officers: registrability decisions have first mover advantage. They
ought to be able to exert significant control over case law: courts should be slow
to depart from existing practice.

Limited oversight:
fed court worried about undermining confidence in specialized tribunals.

Office can also
react if not happy w/court decisions. What matters is what the TMEP says the
court said, which isn’t always the same as what the court said; sometimes says “the
court can’t have meant that.”

IP Australia also
regulates patent & TM attorneys through professional standards board
domination.

Academic research:
you have to demonstrate you’re bringing in grants; a great way to increase the
chance of that is an industry partner; the best funded, most active one of
those in TM is IP Australia, so that controls the focus of research. Recently
appointed first in-house economist; has now metastasized. IP Austl. doesn’t
know what to do with all of its money (it’s self-funding), so we have the
Wallace & Grommit World IP Exhibition, with Grommit chasing off copycats.

Most important
countervailing factor: competence. Leading case on distinctiveness, where
Australian High Court lowered the distinctiveness bar—until it reached the high
court, it was being litigated by a construction partner. In fairness to the
high court, none of the evidence you’d have expected to have in about the
importance of “Italian” when you are selling coffee was before the court, so it’s
not as surprising they did something done. So in litigation, no one says “the
Office has done this 20 times before.”

Mark Lemley

Agencies in TM law: PTO
is sort of a black box b/c ignored TM so long on the policy side. It would never
occur to anyone to put a TM person at the head of the PTO; it’s a tiny
percentage of their policy work. The good news is that there is an opportunity
to do policy work not tainted by existing capture. If and when that changes,
INTA will show up. A broader/systemic problem is the problem of scope: we see
this in patent side when Office tries to intervene. The business of the PTO is
granting patents/TM. They have a lot of experience w/distinctiveness and
functionality, as well as failure to function. But they have virtually no
experience, except in TTAB, with other side of the equation, remedies, 1A
limitations, etc. When they bump up against those in cases like Tam they do a
lot of running in place w/o useful guidance. Even if you could navigate around
capture, the scope one is harder b/c it’s systemic; you can’t give them deep
knowledge on the infringement side. One of the risks of looking at only one
side is that you can’t actually grant a “narrow” registration.

TTAB is better
suited, b/c at least get microcosm of LOC cases b/c of competing TM claimants.
Though they aren’t in the same position to do agency rulemaking and also suffer
from Fed Circuit gatekeeping, which has its own rule for LOC—twenty other
factors that no other circuit pays attention to; the Fed Cir refuses to follow
SCOTUS on functionality while other circuits comply. It’s a tough process to
get SCOTUS to fix.

And of course,
agency deference is going away this year. Benefit of being able to point to
those rules seems much less.

Two other
decisionmakers in practice making lots more decisions: The UDRP panels in
cybersquatting. There were a lot of benefits: quick, cheap, but also out of
control. Could learn to facilitate simple cases more cheaply; most people who
have legit defenses can’t afford to assert them in court. A system that gave an
opportunity to do that outside the normal court system might have some
benefits, but UDRP offers cautionary tale about structuring that. Who gets to
decide where cases go is important.

Fromer/McKenna paper
on Amazon’s TM system: that’s not a positive story; they identify a number of
problems. But consider potential positives: Fromer/McKenna show that, b/c you
need a registered mark to participate in the system, there are a lot more
people registering marks than they used to be, especially small businesses. This
has risks/problems of clutter and depletion, but it doesn’t have to be a
problem b/c you’ve got to have the same mark—except that we don’t look at
images, which is a huge problem—but Amazon only cares about identical marks. Thus,
registering
nonsense words
. They function for the Amazon system but not in the minds of
consumers. That can have problems, but a whole bunch of marks that are
extraordinarily narrow/cast no shadow and are only going to be applied against
identical copying doesn’t necessarily create a terrible system, especially
under conditions of congestion. Replacing human mnemonics with a system that
uniquely identifies a good & where it’s from & can connect it to rankings
might be good! But caveat that it’s not clear that Amazon has that system. We
might see a separation of TM function of TMs and the brand loyalty function of
handbags. We’ve been struggling w/the growth of the brand in TM context,
distorting source identification function; Amazon could help us break that
linkage.

Jeremy Sheff

2 years of expungement:
what’s been happening? Director’s initiated 33 expungements; 8 proceeded to
final disposition of expungement (1 partial, 7 full). 771 petitions for
expungements; only 122 have gotten to institution stage which involves an
Office Action. 74 have had an outcome: 32 partial cancellation, 42 full
cancellation. In 80 cases Office decides not to go forward for insufficient
evidence of expungement, though they then proceed with their own action
including evidence dug up by Examiner. So PTO may be cleaning up after
petitioners.

Filing bases for
director-initiated: 15 44(e), 14 1(a), 4 66(a). Non-director: 381 1(a), 233
66(a), 149 44(e).

16b reexamination of
use: 1134 director-initiated, 954 third-party initiated. 304 director-initiated
proceeded to full cancellation, 4 partial. (Question to explore: is the large
number of these connected to post-registration audit?) Non-director initiated,
92 were not instituted, 140 instituted; 19 partial cancellation and 57 full
cancellation.

With three million
active registrations, we might be trying to empty the ocean with a teaspoon.

Post-registration
audit percentages have very different numbers; they choose about 5000
registrations/year and about half end up deleting goods/services. So a random
pull has a 50% chance of finding lack of use on something. For 44(e) and 66(a),
about 2/3 of those audited delete goods/services, whereas it’s 45% for 1(a). That’s
of registrations w/a response. Total cancellations (3883 of 29022 audited) may
be for nonresponse.

What to make of
this? Shoveling sand against the tide, b/c we have ¾ million-1 million new
applications/year. It’s not just the ocean, but the iceberg melting into the
ocean, which means that bad actors flooding the system w/new applications to
gain advantage in private systems, we’re dealing with that process with a
bespoke, artisanal examination process.

If we’re running out
of TMs, that’s a fixed stock that could go away. The examiner cohort is a flow
resource, not a stock; they can get congested. We could increase the price!
Raise registration and renewal fees; make it more difficult to get a
registration for Amazon, which might lower the burden on the system.

In response to
question: we don’t charge by number of goods listed in a class, only by class,
but listing more goods does increase the chance of auditing.

Nobody who’s been
audited would have selected goods/services on basis of concern over auditing
(in response to Burrell’s question about whether that increases the incentives
to use broader generic terms to describe goods/services).

Fighting a forest
fire with a water pistol won’t work.

Dinwoodie: could be
useful if actually internalized—if it happens to repeat filers. Could also add
penalties. [There are costs for deleting goods, but they’re small fees.] Could make
a penalty fee.

Burrell: the problem
is that it runs against the story “you’ll hurt SMEs!” Self-filer makes
mistakes, poor self-filer.

Dinwoodie: could you
do it more granularly?

Burrell: not sure
that’s possible to avoid the innocent SME.

RT: Carol Rose was
right all along
. Property registries are themselves a common that can be
overused. And her insights in that article might suggest something about what
comes next, after the TMA’s tiny tweak that clearly won’t be enough.

Expertise issue—FTC
just issued a rule on impersonation; only heard from INTA and the like, and
apparently doesn’t know anything about TM doctrines or how far INTA thinks “impersonation”
extends. Calling scholars to submit comments as FTC considers supplemental
notice of proposed rulemaking:
whether to impose “means and
instrumentalities” liability on third parties like OpenAI and whether to extend
its new rules to pretending to be an individual, whether a real person or a
completely made up one
—that is, the FTC might make it an unfair trade
practice to use an alias.

URS as extension of
UDRP: faster, a little cheaper, more out of control.

Fromer: definitely
true that TM is swamped by patent at PTO—hard to get attention on TM issues,
and internally it’s created a very sleepy culture in the TM office. You might
get a dynamo like the people who self-started the audit program, and more of
that would be great, but it doesn’t emerge very often. Circular: the reason
patent swamps TM is patent brings in more money, so there’s a very rational
explanation. But it doesn’t have to be that way. It would be great for the PTO
to charge Coca-Cola more than a few hundred dollars to renew. Money brings
attention.

FTC is a place that
could do more TM and might be interested [they already have opinions on ©] and
need education on non-patent IP. TM examiners used to be specialized b/c it
didn’t seem fair that some units were clearing applications faster b/c of the
different demands of the different areas; that would be hard to undo, but
technical devices really are different from beverages. Think about
reinstituting specialization.

Amazon [like the
Trademark Clearinghouse for new gTLDs] does not distinguish in the kinds of
goods for which a mark is registered, so you can use your registration far more
expansively than the PTO designed it.

Ramsey: one
suggestion is to require a specimen of use for each listed good, not just one
good in each class. Also, PTO should bring audit results to Congress’s
attention for further action.

Treat classes commonly
used for expressive uses differently—clothing, mugs versus technical equipment.

Lemley: suggests
maybe the existence of the opposition process changes things. Someone is
immediately looking at your work with a critical eye—that never happens with a
patent. But doesn’t know what examiners’ involvement with that is.

Dinwoodie: intensive
review for productivity on the TM side.

Farley: past
practice was collaborative, knowledge sharing. Remote work has changed that.

Silbey: the
incentives are bad: they’re supposed to issue TMs.

Lemley: system is
set up to push you in a particular direction.

Silbey: what if the
expectation was that some number of applicants should not get TMs?

Sheff: there’s other
stuff we haven’t talked about that are interventions: Domestic residence
requirement has done a lot of work. 150 cases in which Office identified people
who filed 100 applications/week and issued order to show cause and ultimately
sanctioned by forbidding them from filing more; resulted in 19,000 applications
from those applicants. TMA seems to have led to a decrease of 100,000/year.

Burrell: If we were
serious about this, we would have to think about automation/scale. Austl. doesn’t
even revoke TMs when a company is deregistered—why not do more information
sharing? So that if the mark were to be transferred as an asset, some work would
have to be done.

Sheff: linking
systems costs a lot!

Burrell: That’s what
increased fees are for.

Silbey: expertise
can be about narrowing a claim rather than not issuing a TM at all.

Dinwoodie: that’s already
a distinctive feature of the US system, which does it more than anyone else.

Burrell: US
examiners are better than anyone else in the world at narrowing nonsense, even
if that’s a low bar.

Silbey: you need
expertise to do it really well, though. And it’s harder if you have less time
per application.

Study showed that if
there’s a 6 month decision rule, decisions issued in the last 5 days of that
period are more likely to be overturned on appeal.

McGeveran: narrowing
someone, or rejecting them, isn’t as fatal here as it is in other
jurisdictions.

Mid-Point
Discussants: Jake Linford

If registration doesn’t
matter to TM pathologies, then fixing examination won’t matter. There’s some
evidence of heterogeneity among examiners. Hydraulic pressure: Tam & Brunetti
put pressure on TM office; they don’t want to grant disparaging/scandalous—failure
to function steps in. Not clear whether that was top down or bottom up
response, but examiners can find ways to deal w/at least some pressure, and
TTAB is willing to support this exercise of discretion. Brunetti doesn’t get
FUCK registered on f2f grounds. Student note criticizing f2f as
standardless/needs concretization—make it more like aesthetic functionality and
double down on competition. But do examiners think through what we would call
speech-related concerns? You could say f2f has or includes speech concerns.
Though you do see PTO explicitly invoking speech concerns in defense of its
rule in Elster.

You could increase
the cost of renewal over time, as Posner suggested for ©, but we might not want
that for policy reasons. You could increase fees, but that might exacerbate the
problem of seeing applicants as the customers.

Fraud on the PTO as
an option? The Fed Cir cracked down on that; we could go back to that.

INTA was concerned
that TTAB wasn’t publishing enough of its opinions; would that give better
guidance? Only 6% of TTAB opinions are published; 40% of signed opinions of
courts of appeals.  [It would only
increase the scatter plot.]

We complain about
costs of TM litigation but don’t like the Copyright Small Claims board; INTA
represents Ps and Ds but only very sophisticated ones, united in their
sophistication; could we think about a small dispute procedure? [Isn’t that one
view of registration?]

Stacey Dogan

Where to go?
Structural competence versus personnel-based competence. Appellate courts are
supposed to have a broader eye to the interests at stake than just the parties;
we want them to be equipped to define legal rules that achieve balance in the
law. This aspiration for them requires competence, expertise, capacity to
engage in a flexible normative project that can respond to new questions and
situations. When that competence is absent, either b/c of structural
constraints or institutional failure, that’s disorienting, b/c where do you
look for correction?

SCOTUS failures don’t
seem structural; not unrelated to the larger legal ecosystem. The PTO is inherently
limited. The courts will have to play a significant role in defining the shape
of TM rights. The nuggets of constraint the Court gives us seem plucked from the
ether, without context or explanation.

We’re not going to
solve the personnel issues in the near term. Strategies in the short term: we’re
left with what we have, and find ways to work w/in doctrine like RT suggested.
In months since Jack Daniel’s, the caselaw is not giving lots of hope. The precise
uses that the majority takes for granted—titles of expressive works—are being
treated as source-indicating by the lower courts. There’s an opportunity to
work on lower courts, both trial and appeals, on giving more texture and
principle and normative content to the LOC factors. We’ve seen courts do this
in some contexts. Use in the internet, we saw courts willing to limit factors in
particular cases; could do that with expressive works as well in a way that’s
less “doctrinal” or test-based. Allows for some level of instruction and
consistency in cases of certain types, like use in expressive ways.

Movement lawyering?
In communication with affected constituencies, working at defining more clearly
the problems we’re trying to solve. Identify the greatest threats and capture a
theme. We have to accept the lack of traction we get describing TM harms and
make it more saleable. Look to antimonopoly movement in antitrust space. It’s a
long term project. Using rhetoric + empirical evidence about the costs of
concentration. Speak to the public. Partner with law & political economy
folks; make it into a larger project about the economy. Project: what is public
interest TM law?

Leah Grinvald

CBP: engaged in
development of and enforcement of TM law w/o any judicial oversight. Others
have noted a shift of the costs of private enforcement to public/government. TM
holders can record with CBP, and is used when scanning shipments that come in
through ports. Invites TM owners to provide training materials for their
officers; even have a powerpoint format for them. Invites TM holders to come to
offices, bring samples to train the officers (swag).

They ask TM owners
to ID counterfeits. Their main focus is on detaining and seizing counterfeit
goods; they say they’re protecting the public from counterfeits, whether
handbags or otherwise, as a safety issue. They’ll send the TM owner photos
unless they pay a bond for samples. Regardless of how TM owner verifies it’s
counterfeit, they take the TM owner’s word for it.

Importer has 7 days
to respond if they have a valid reason for importing; if not, the products are
seized and mostly destroyed, but there are provisions for donations (despite
safety concerns) if they need the product—by auction, to nonprofits, or if gov’t
needs them. TM has to be removable from product and product must not pose harm,
though how they know that is a good question if the reason for seizure is to
avoid harm. Anecdata: mostly the products are destroyed. [Some may go home
w/the agents.]

They can also seize goods
with copying or simulating marks, not just counterfeits. The regs don’t give
guidance on what that is; the importer has 30 days under this provision to show
either that they have good reason or that they can remove the TM. There’s
nothing in the regulation that restricts officers to detain only products
within the registered class, despite the fact that marks are supposed to be
registered per class. Backdoor dilution claim w/o need to prove fame or any kind
of association.

All of these
decisions are done at the level of the officer working hand in hand w/the TM
owner; officers aren’t trained in law; there isn’t anything like an internal
appeals process—importers rarely go to court b/c they are mostly small
businesses. No consequences for mistakes to the TM owner or the officer; just
release the goods!

Dinwoodie: US
complained to WTO about China not destroying goods; shouldn’t we be doing better?

Grinvald: not the
first time we’ve been hypocrites; the regulation allowing it is still on the
books.

Burrell: this system
is being exported through the world because of the USTO, and it’s now in Australia.
Timeframes are so tight; even if SME wants to challenge, must find a law firm
that is willing to work around the clock, which is massively expensive.

McKenna: they won’t
even tell you what they’ve seized. They have an internal appeal process that’s
a joke. The TM owner gives them an image; they call the TM owner and ask (w/o a
picture) if they should seize the products and the TM owner says yes. You have to
sue the gov’t to get them back and there is no remedy against the gov’t. With
LKQ, a whole bunch of the seized parts were covered by a design patent license,
but they said “too bad, it’s TM.”

Dogan: you can get
substantive law right and still get wrong outcomes if you get the incentives
wrong, and these stories might be helpful in getting the harms out to the
public. Are there stories about seizures of useful spare parts/works that the
public would be outraged about? Is there a way to make that come more alive?

Should we have
conflicts rules that limit what TM owners can give agents?

Lemley: confront the
rhetorical power of the anti free riding impulse.

Why does this system
work at all? How do they know what’s mapped to relevant goods/services? Has
anyone figured out whether it’s a random walk, mostly circumstances where they
were alerted to a problem, what percentage of goods subject to seizure end up
being seized, etc.?

Another form of
seizure popped up ten years ago: internet domain name seizures. CBP is using
the analogy to seizure of goods to seize domain names. They’re quite clearly at
the behest of particular TM/© owners.

Grinvald: definitely
an audit basis: they randomly open packages and check them against a list.
Latest stats are from 2021; Hong Kong and China are top countries inspected.
They also absolutely encourage anyone to submit tips.

Silbey: seems like a
story similar to Mass. Anticounterfeiting law where industry was policing in
front of stadium on behalf of NFL and just arresting T-shirt sellers. It’s an
MO, not only at the CPB—officers and industry leaders work together. What are
the narratives one might mobilize? Abuse of enforcement systems, collusion. Patent
troll narrative was effective.

Lemley: but TM
bullying stories don’t seem to move the needle in the same way.

Silbey: Eldred
turned out to be a mistake; could not convince the Court there was a problem.
Worry about SCOTUS and TM in the same way: the story we have to tell is not one
they are willing to hear. Empirics, costs, and efficiency don’t matter.

Lemley: yes, the Justices
clearly think people wouldn’t be confused, but VIP must nonetheless lose.

Silbey: might as
well have said “traditional contours of TM” in VIP; so what can we learn from
the patent trolling story?

RT: Better story:
Emojis? Schedule A defendants?
[Thinking
about Lawrence Block’s Batman’s Helpers. Police corruption]

Just a reminder
of my FOIA
lawsuit
against
CBP.
Happy to share the underlying responses with anyone doing research in the area.

Linford: bonding
mechanisms? Schedule A story that got traction was the country music fan
selling Luke Combs stuff. This person’s side hustle was sympathetic. But is an
anti-merchandising right view popular in the US? That’s an empirical question. How
many errors are enough before people stop saying “errors happen”? The procedural
problem is less persuasive the lower you think the error rate is.

Goldman: we don’t
know the error rate b/c it’s not researchable, and it’s not researchable b/c
they’re not following the procedures.

Burrell: where’s the
evidence that we need reliable data to persuade people? We need anecdata that
is powerful: the government took my stuff!

Dinwoodie: When the
RIAA sued a grandmother and a teenager, they looked really bad.

Linford: but the two
cases that made the court of appeals, the RIAA won.

RT: but what does it
mean to win? They aren’t doing it any more and they didn’t collect the money.

McGeveran: people
see themselves as branders now. They identify with the “brand” idea.

Lemley: here’s what
TM owners think you can’t do on Tik Tok: making fun of a brand; wearing branded
clothes w/o permission—that might be a way to flip the narrative. As the world
separates TM from brand, we should think about what it means to separate those
doctrinally—would help us have narrower scope for TM law but also free us to
rethink what a “branding right” would look like independent of confusion over
sales of products. Not sure it would be based on confusion! A lot of bogus confusion
survey stuff would not be important.

Originally dilution
was an alternative cause of action in the states; you couldn’t bring both
claims.

Burrell: IKEA case
in Europe: “IKEA plan” used to describe anti-immigrant plan; court is
considering whether there is “due cause.” Most likely will cut & paste from
their copyright decision saying that satire & parody are ok and send it back
to the Belgian court. In working out whether a parody implicated free speech
rights, Belgium is entitled to take into account its equality guarantee, so being
political speech wasn’t super protective.

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2024/02/tmsr-session-2-administrative-agencies.html

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , | Leave a comment