“stacked” car insurance is plausibly deceptive as useless for single vehicle

Peck v. Progressive Northern Ins.
Co., 2023 WL 2712390, — F.Supp.3d —-, No. 1:22-cv-00490-KWR-JFR (D.N.M.
Mar. 30, 2023)

Peck bought stacked
uninsured/underinsured motorist (“UM/UIM”) coverage on a single vehicle policy.
Stacked UM/UIM coverage permits an insured to aggregate the UM/UIM coverages on
all vehicles insured under a policy. But Peck alleged that stacked UM/UIM coverage
on a policy insurance for a single vehicle is illusory because the insured
receives no benefit for the additional premium.

The court thus declined to dismiss
Peck’s claim under New Mexico’s Unfair Insurance Practice Act (“No person shall
willfully collect any sum as premium or charge for insurance or other coverage,
which insurance or coverage is not then provided or in due course to be
provided (subject to acceptance of the risk by the insurer) by a policy issued
by an insurer as authorized by the Insurance Code.”). Insurance companies “have
a duty to disclose material facts about the policies they sell under the UIPA.”

Defendants argued that there was a
tangible benefit because the coverage available automatically increases if the
policyholder gets an additional vehicle, but there was an additional premium due
if that happened and the policyholder had the burden of notifying Progressive. And
insureds were entitled to stacking by default, unless there was a written
rejection. So it was unclear if there was any benefit to stacking a
single-vehicle policy. Plus, even if it wasn’t illusory, it could still be
deceptive for failing to disclose that there was no benefit to stacking a
single-vehicle policy.

There was no breach of contract
claim, but possibly breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing claim, unjust enrichment, and a New Mexico Unfair Trade Practices Act claim
for the same reasons.

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2023/07/stacked-car-insurance-is-plausibly.html

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , , | Leave a comment

Seen in my travels

 Good cafe name:

Cafe sign reading "The Breakfast Club"

A handbag that probably requires some explanation to today’s students:

A handbag decorated with images of videotape cassettes bearing handwritten labels of well-known movies like Top Gun

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2023/07/seen-in-my-travels.html

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , | Leave a comment

Expert witnesses as Lanham Act defendants

Via an eagle-eyed correspondent: J&J’s bankrupt
subsidiary LTL is suing
the expert witnesses
for the mesothelioma victims in the underlying tort
litigation for injurious falsehood, fraud, and Lanham Act violations for disparaging J&J’s Baby
Powder as causing mesothelioma. They allege that the experts’ published articles were part of a commercial advertising scheme to get hired as expert witnesses, which is … not super consistent with existing caselaw. Suing experts, a very normal thing to
do. Too bad there’s no federal anti-SLAPP law.

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2023/07/expert-witnesses-as-lanham-act.html

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , | Leave a comment

Generic use in the wild

 Are they really super jeep tours?

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2023/07/generic-use-in-wild.html

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged | Leave a comment

Ambiguity could be deceptive where “buy 3 get two free” really meant “get 5 at a lower price per unit”

Sihler v. Fulfillment Lab, Inc, No. 20cv1528-LL-DDL, 2023 WL
4335735 (S.D. Cal. Jun. 23, 2023)

Common sense is a big part of advertising law, as implemented
by the reasonable consumer. It can be hard to distinguish one case from another
in its formal characteristics. Here, the view of a reasonable consumer is
established by empirical evidence of deceptions and complaints, the court says—though
is it really making a normative judgment?

Defendants allegedly use fake celebrity and magazine
endorsements, as well as misrepresentations about price and limited
availability, to induce consumers into buying “keto” weight-loss pills. As
described:

Consumers click on ads that appear
to be news articles with false celebrity endorsements of the Keto Products.
This ad takes them to a landing page for the product with more
misrepresentations. When they click on the purchase button, they are presented
with several purchase offers including “Buy 3 Bottles, Get 2 Free.” Consumers
are warned that supplies are limited or that the special offer will expire soon.
These landing pages are allegedly inaccessible to anyone who does not view the
advertisements or are deleted after a few weeks or months to avoid detection.
After consumers complete their purchase, they are allegedly overcharged for the
full price of all five bottles of product instead of the discounted “Buy 3
Bottles, Get 2 Free.” When consumers dispute the charge with their bank or
credit card company, Defendants allegedly present investigators with a “false
front” website for the Keto Products that includes the actual purchase prices
of the different options, no false advertising, and an easy-to-find “terms and
conditions” hyperlink. Defendants allegedly use the false front websites to
deceive the bank and credit card companies into believing that consumers
purchased Keto Products from those websites rather than the landing pages.

Plaintiffs brought both California statutory claims and RICO
claims; the court certified a nationwide RICO class and a California subclass.

If you want a sense of how this is going to go, defendants
contested numerosity because there was only shipping data, not data on how many
different consumers bought and used products. With tens of thousands of
shipments, and sales of about $93 million in two and a half years, the court
found numerosity. (They also argued that there was no typicality because a
named plaintiff described viewing a website promoting “Buy 3 bottles, Get 2
free” but the website examples submitted instead promote “Buy 3, Get 2 Free.”
The court disagreed.)

Commonality of deception on a classwide basis:  Under California law, no individualized proof
of deception, reliance, or injury is required if the conduct would deceive a
reasonable, ordinary consumer in the target population. Defendants argued that
there was no evidence of deception of reasonable consumers other than named
plaintiffs’ own declarations, but the court disagreed:

Plaintiffs provided examples of
webpages with the same allegedly false and misleading endorsements and pricing
information similar to what they viewed and relied on. They also submitted instructions for Keto
Products call center employees that describe three standard buying packages,
which match the package options and unit prices on the webpages that Plaintiffs
viewed and in the examples that they provided. The
only other buying packages described in the instructions are for unadvertised
special promotional packages. The call center instructions also describe
typical calls, which include complaints of being overcharged in the same manner
that Plaintiffs describe: that they believed they would be charged the listed
price for two or three bottles and receive one or two bottles free, but were
instead charged the listed price for all bottles received.

Along with a witness who testified to the lack of change in
ads over time, plaintiffs showed that they and absent class members viewed the
same or substantially similar endorsements and pricing information.

Would this be likely to mislead a reasonable consumer?

The three package options are
advertised as follows: (1) text reads “Buy 3 Get 2 Free!” followed by
“$39.74/bottle” with a depiction of a group of three bottles next to a group of
two bottles with a plus sign between them; (2) text reads “Buy 2 Get 1 Free!”
followed by “$49.97/bottle” with a depiction of a group of two bottles next to
one bottle with a plus sign between them, and (3) text reads “Buy 1 Bottle”
followed by “$69.99/bottle.”

Are those additional bottles “free”?

Defendant argued that a reasonable consumer would understand
that they’d be charged $39.74 for each of 5 bottles if they bought five. It’s
obvious to an ordinary English speaker that you wouldn’t offer that deal that
way (you’d say “buy 5 at $39.74 each!” etc.) if you wanted it understood. The
FTC’s guides on the use of “Free” would also count against this, if considered.

The court found the same declarations, webpage examples, and
call center scripts to be sufficient evidence that a reasonable consumer is
likely to be misled. (E.g., a standard script for “I was overcharged” that begins when a caller says words to the effect of “I thought it was $39.74 x 3 bottles which would be $119.22.”) Here, the “ambiguity” in the pricing information supported
misleadingness—compare the treatment of “ambiguity” in cases that reject
consumer claims. Would this work if there were fine print disclosures “resolving”
the ambiguity? My suspicion is that it wouldn’t—and shouldn’t—because a
substantial number of reasonable consumers would have no reason to think that “free”
was ambiguous. But how, otherwise, are we to tell what counts as “correctable
ambiguous” and “misleadingly ambiguous”? As the court points out, “even a
perfectly true statement couched in such a manner that it is likely to mislead
or deceive the consumer, such as by failure to disclose other relevant
information, is actionable under [the FAL].” I tend to think the “correctable
ambiguity, thus plaintiffs lose” cases downplay misleadingness without a good
theory.

And since misleadingness is an objective test, it’s capable
of classwide resolution. The rest (including predominance) follows, including certification
on the RICO claims of all things.

 

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2023/07/ambiguity-could-be-deceptive-where-buy.html

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , | Leave a comment

Oregon SCt rules on “ascertainable loss” in false discount case

Clark v. Eddie Bauer LLC, 371 Or. 177, — P.3d —-, SC
S069438 (Jun. 29, 2023)

Under Oregon’s Unlawful Trade Practices Act (UTPA), a person
who suffers an “ascertainable loss of money or property” as a result of another
person’s violation of the UTPA may maintain a private action against that
person. The Ninth Circuit certified to the state supreme court the question
whether a consumer can suffer an “ascertainable loss” under the UTPA when she
buys items at an outlet store that have been advertised as being sold at a
substantial discount but that have never been sold at that or any other
location at the “list,” or non-sale price, and when she would not have
purchased at that price but for the false advertising of a sale price. The state
supreme court answered yes, that was an ascertainable loss.

Under the facts as stated in the certification order, more
than 90 percent of the products offered at Eddie Bauer outlet stores are
manufactured solely for sale at the outlet stores and are not sold elsewhere:

Defendants advertise clothing at
the Eddie Bauer Outlet stores as being sold at a substantial discount, typically
between 40 percent and 70 percent off. However, with limited exceptions, the
clothing is never sold—at the outlet stores or anywhere else—at the “list”
price, i.e., the price shown on each product’s original tag; the clothing sold
at the outlet stores is only ever sold at “discounted” prices.

State law bars, among other things, false or misleading
representations of fact concerning the reasons for, existence of, or amounts of
price reductions and advertising price comparisons without conspicuously
identifying the origin of the price the seller is comparing to the current
price. The plaintiff alleged that she wouldn’t have made her purchases if she’d
known that the goods weren’t in fact being sold at a discount.

Defendants argued that plaintiff
had received exactly the products that she believed she was buying, and that
their value at the time of sale was at least what plaintiff had paid. They
noted that plaintiff had not alleged, for example, that the Fleece Zip [she
bought] was worth less than the $19.99 sale price or that it did not possess
the features or quality that plaintiff had expected it to have.

Thus, they argued, there was no ascertainable loss. The
district court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss on the ground that the
complaint didn’t allege that defendants had made false representations about
the character or quality of the garments that plaintiff bought, which the
district court understood to be essential under the state supreme court’s
decision in Pearson v. Philip Morris, Inc., 361 P.3d 3 (2015). On appeal,
plaintiff noted that many of the provisions of the consumer protection law prohibit
deception in ways that do not relate to the quality or characteristics of a
product, and argued that she’d suffered an ascertainable loss in various ways,
including price inflation from the putative bargain.

“Ascertainable loss” means, generally, “any determinable
loss,” even a loss that cannot be measured exactly. Only economic losses may be
recovered, although even if “[t]he private loss … may be so small that the
common law likely would reject it as grounds for relief, yet it will support an
action under the statute.” And, given the legislature’s consumer-protection
concerns, it was appropriate to take a broad view of “ascertainable loss.”

The court here addressed only the theory that the plaintiff
wouldn’t have purchased at the price that she actually paid had she known the
truth, not other theories of injury (such as that the overall market price was
inflated by the even higher reference prices).

“[P]laintiff only was required to allege that, as a result
of any practice prohibited under the UTPA, she suffered an ascertainable
loss—that is, a loss capable of being observed or determined, however small.”
Where the product was not what was bargained for, it doesn’t matter that there’s
no outside, objective measure of market value.

In plaintiff’s case, what she
wanted was items of clothing whose selling price had, at some earlier time,
been what defendants’ false price list-ings indicated. What she received, on
the other hand, was merchandise that had never been offered for sale at those
prices. Thus, whether or not those items ever sold at those higher price
points, and whether or not defendants’ alleged pricing scheme can be viewed as
representing that the items previously had retail or market values equivalent
to the prices shown on their product tags, plaintiff paid money to defendants
for articles of clothing that she would not have bought had she known their
true price history. The money that plaintiff is out as a result is her “loss.”…

As the Connecticut Supreme Court
observed in discussing that state’s statute, it should not matter that a person
unlawfully led to believe that she was buying one thing ultimately received
another thing of equal or even greater value. Hinchliffe, 184 Conn at 614, 440
A2d at 814 (“To the consumer who wishes to purchase an energy saving
subcompact, for example, it is no answer to say that he should be satisfied
with a more valuable gas guzzler.”).

The alternative holding would leave citizens without a
remedy where the legislature declared a practice unlawful and provided for a
private remedy, and we don’t live in a world of perfect efficiency where the
plaintiff could resell the product without transaction costs for exactly the
price she paid.  Thus, the court rejected
the idea that “a person does not suffer an ascertainable loss so long as she
receives something of equal or greater value than the money she was deceived
into giving up for it.”

Although other courts interpreting other laws have reached
the opposite conclusion, reasoning that deception alone can’t be injury, that’s
not what’s going on. The injury is loss of money the consumer would have
retained if the defendant had not unlawfully deceived her (as opposed to a situation
where she saw the allegedly fake sale price, believed it and thus was deceived,
but still didn’t buy, where there would be no loss).  

 

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2023/07/oregon-sct-rules-on-ascertainable-loss.html

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , | Leave a comment

no predominance of common issues where many consumers would still have taken the drug at issue

Painters & Allied Trades District Council 82 Health Care
Fund v. Takeda Pharm. Co., 2023 WL 4191651, — F. Supp. 3d –, No.
2:17-cv-07223-JWH-AS (C.D. Cal. May 24, 2023)

I tell my students that probabilistic claims are easier for
competitors to bring than directly harmed consumers themselves, because competitors
can aggregate harm, whereas if a court thinks that only 45% of consumers were deceived
it may well reject a direct consumer protection claim. This case illustrates
that principle well, though in a slightly different configuration. Here, a national
third-party payer class was certified, but not a California consumer class.

The claims relate to the drug Actos and allege RICO violations
and violations of state consumer protection laws because defendants conspired
to market Actos fraudulently by concealing the association between its use and
its users’ subsequent development of bladder cancer. Defendants allegedly misled
the FDA regarding the risk of bladder cancer by generating false studies,
manipulating study results, and controlling the messaging about Actos to
conceal aspects of the drug’s mechanism that could have raised concerns, and
also misled prescribing physicians, consumers, and third-party payors into
believing that Actos did not create an increased risk of bladder cancer. A
group of patients who developed bladder cancer sued and a jury returned a
verdict in favor of bellwether plaintiffs.

Painters alleged that it “reimbursed a significant number of
claims at potentially elevated prices for Actos” that would not have been
reimbursed “but for the fraud. Emails, testimony, and internal marketing
studies suggested that defendants were aware that language linking Actos to
bladder cancer would reduce sales of Actos, and sales of Actos indeed began to
decline when the FDA announced that it would investigate Actos for bladder
cancer risk. Sales dropped even more precipitously after a bladder cancer
warning was added to the Actos label. Plaintiffs’ expert found that, had a
bladder cancer warning been issued from the beginning, third-party payors would
have paid for 56% fewer Actos prescriptions during the class period.

The expert estimated that around 40% of the Actos
prescriptions would have still been written (and, thus, would have been
reimbursed), even if there was full awareness of the bladder cancer risks,
while 56.77% were fraudulently induced. Only third-party payors who paid for at
least five Actos prescriptions would be part of the class; the odds were thus
that any TPP that paid for at least five Actos prescriptions had,
statistically, a 98.5% chance of suffering an injury; that 1.5% chance didn’t
defeat predominance. And other data indicated that only about 4% of patients
switched from Actos to an equally or more expensive drug, which again wasn’t
enough to defeat predominance for the TPPs.

But there was no predominance for the consumer class,
because the individual plaintiffs would vary so much in whether they still
would have taken the drug if they’d known the true risks. There was “some
compelling common evidence of materiality,” such as a “wave” of physician
contacts in the wake of the actual risk disclosures, and one defendant’s
concession that bladder cancer risks would be a “serious thing” for a
healthcare professional.

Nonetheless,

the materiality of that bladder
cancer risk to patients’ diabetes prognoses is highly individualized. Moreover,
some medicines and treatment regimens would be ineffective; some patients would
have no other option other than Actos, notwithstanding the bladder cancer risks.
Those determinations necessarily reside with the patients and their physicians.
Even Comanor recognized that reality. Therefore, the question of whether Takeda
or Lilly’s omissions were material to the choices of any physician-patient
tandem is an individualized one.

California’s ordinary presumption of reliance from material
deceptiveness was insufficient, because doctors consider so many patient-specific
factors in prescribing. Although the bladder cancer risks here were “ones that
most reasonable physicians and patients would evaluate before choosing an
appropriate healthcare regimen,” materiality exists only where the omission of
those risks “would have been important to the decision-making process.” And
that was individualized.

The Court is loath to insert itself
into the doctor’s office and impose its judgment onto physicians and their
patients, blanketly concluding on behalf of all “reasonable persons” that some
risks matter (i.e., bladder cancer risk) and that some do not (i.e., untreated
or mismanaged diabetes). … And indeed, [plaintiffs’ expert’s] own model
suggests that 40% of Actos purchases would have been made even if full
information of the risks was known. Forty percent is not a trivial amount ….

This also meant that there were individualized questions of
actual injury (for the CLRA claim) that predominated over common issues. The
court also thought the damages model wasn’t sufficiently explained, compared to
the damages model for the TPPs.

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2023/07/no-predominance-of-common-issues-where.html

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , | Leave a comment

odd 2d Circuit case about misleadingness versus confusion

Gibson v. SCE Gp. Inc., 2023 WL 4229913, No. 22-916 (2d Cir.
Jun. 28, 2023)

Another models (and one model’s sister) v. nightclubs case. Gibson
et al. appealed partial summary judgment against them on on their claims for
false endorsement under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, and violations of New
York Civil Rights Law sections 50 and 51. Appellant Burciaga also appealed a
judgment awarding her $5,000. The court of appeals affirmed.

The “falsity of the implied association” between plaintiffs
and defendant didn’t relieve plaintiffs of the burden of showing likely
confusion. (As I’ve said before, it’s worth noting that the FTC generally thinks
that appearing in what is obviously an ad does not itself constitute an
endorsement, consistent with this outcome.)

Somewhat oddly, the court then says:

To the extent that this approach to
the false endorsement claim diverges from our caselaw involving false
advertising, that result is consistent with the fact that the two types of
claims are distinct. See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components,
Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 122 (2014) (explaining that false association and false
advertising claims under the Lanham Act are distinct). Whereas the text of the
Lanham Act’s false association provision requires that the false or misleading
representation of fact be “likely to cause confusion,” its false advertising
provision requires only that a person “misrepresent[ ].” Compare 15 U.S.C. §
1125(a)(1)(A), with id. § 1125(a)(1)(B).

This is one reason people don’t like unpublished opinions; false
advertising cases have also required resulting deception, but presumed it in
cases of literal falsity—not implied falsity.

This seems like unthinking textualism which future courts
will rightly not take seriously. How do you know if something is a
misrepresentation (as opposed to literally false) without looking at likely
deception?

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2023/07/odd-2d-circuit-case-about.html

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , | Leave a comment

conclusory allegations of confusion don’t allege statutory standing for TM claim

Blacks in Technology Int’l v. Greenlee, 2023 WL 4186376, No.
3:20-CV-3008-X (N.D. Tex. Jun. 26, 2023)

On one side: Blacks in Technology International (BIT
International), Blacks United in Leading Technology International (BUILT), and
Blacks in Technology, Texas (BIT Texas). On the other: Blacks in Technology,
LLC (BIT LLC) and two individual defendants, Greenlee and Schultz. After much
back and forth, BIT LLC had trademark/unfair competition claims against the BIT
International, BUILT, and BIT Texas; I’ll ignore the other claims.

Perhaps because the litigation seems to have been otherwise
painful, the court actually gave some attention to the harm story and found that
BIT LLC failed to allege that it had standing to bring its trademark claims.

BIT LLC wasn’t the registrant for one of the marks at issue,
BLACKS IN TECHNOLOGY, but it could establish that it owned the mark by showing
it used the mark as a source identifier, but it made only conclusory assertions
that it did so. Under §43(a), it didn’t have to own the mark (or the other
asserted registered mark, a “Blacks in Technology” logo) as long as it
satisfied the zone of interests and proximate cause tests.

Even if BIT LLC fell within the Lanham Act’s zone of
interests, it failed to allege proximate causation of injury. The “paradigmatic
direct injury” is “diversion of sales to a direct competitor”; other recognized
injuries may include “harm[ing] a plaintiff’s reputation by casting aspersions
on its business,” “denigrat[ing] a plaintiff’s product by name,” “damag[ing]
the product’s reputation by, for example, equating it with an inferior
product,” or “seek[ing] to promote [the defendant’s] own interests by telling a
known falsehood to or about the plaintiff or his product.” BIT LLC made only
conclusory assertions of likely confusion and resulting damage. “BIT LLC then
includes what appears to be a screenshot from a nondescript social media chat
forum in which five participants discuss the similarity between BUILT’s logo
and BIT LLC’s logo.” And it alleged that the putative “infringement will also
lessen the ability of [the Mark and the Logo] to identify and distinguish BIT[
] LLC’s goods and services, thereby causing harm to BIT[ ] LLC.”

That wasn’t enough.

BIT LLC has failed to allege any
economic or reputational injury “flowing directly from the deception wrought
by” the advertising of BIT International or BIT Texas. Its complaint makes no
mention of any specific advertising by these two parties whatsoever. And BIT
LLC’s screenshot demonstrating the apparent confusion of five anonymous users
of an unidentified social media chat forum—all of whom were able to distinguish
the two logos, and none of whom referred to anything indicating reputational or
economic harm—is insufficient to plausibly allege that BUILT proximately caused
any injury to BIT LLC via infringement.

Claim dismissed without prejudice.

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2023/07/conclusory-allegations-of-confusion.html

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , | Leave a comment

Inter American Convention allows claims that Lanham Act makes dubious after Abitron; but what about Article III?

Industria De Alimentos Zenu S.A.S. v. Latinfood U.S. Corp., No.
16-6576 (KM) (MAH), 2023 WL 4200169, — F. Supp. 3d — (D.N.J. Jun. 27, 2023)

 

Industria sued Latinfood for trademark and copyright
infringement; Latinfood counterclaimed for tortious interference against
Industria and another counterdefendant Cordialsa. The court granted summary
judgment against Latinfood on the counterclaims, and gave partial victories to
both sides on the main claims. Notable for use of the Inter American Convention
to protect foreign marks in the US—Christine Haight Farley has explored
this once-forgotten treaty that seems to be undergoing a revival.

Industria, based on Colombia, produces and distributes food
products under two relevant brand names: Zenú and Ranchera. They’re successful
brands: approximately $300,000,000 annually in sales of Zenú products and
$100,000,000 in sales of Ranchera products. But Industria does not advertise or
sell its Zenú or Ranchera products in the United States and there are no market
surveys specific to the United States for Zenú or Ranchera.

Industria has never had a registration for Ranchera; its
application was opposed by an unrelated third party and has been suspended; a
prior registration for Zenú was cancelled and Industria never sold any Zenú or
Ranchera products in the United States when it owned that registered trademark.

Latinfood’s predecessor in interest was founded by Zuluaga, who
lived in Colombia until he was approximately 17 years old. Zuluaga claimed
first use of Zenú in 2011; the predecessor company applied to register the mark
in 2013, with specimens using actual images of Industria’s products (though
Zuluaga claimed lack of knowledge either of Industria or the specimens filed on
its behalf by a filing service). The mark was registered in 2013; nearly two
years later, Zuluaga told the filing service that “we need to replace / change
the pic of the specimen loaded in the application…. [T]he one showed in the
application is not mine.”

Zuluaga told a designer to look at Industria’s website when
creating Latinfood’s packaging designs for Zenú and Ranchera and brought one of
Industria’s Ranchera labels to the designer’s office. I have tried to sort
plaintiff and defendant’s labels based on what the court says, but I might be
wrong (which is clearly the point).

 I believe these four images are Industria’s Ranchera:

I believe this is Latinfood’s Ranchera:

Industria’s Zenú (again, I think):

Latinfood Zenú (I think):

Latinfood did ultimately change the Zenú logo.

Also:

Some of Latinfood’s Zenú and
Ranchera product labels state that the product is manufactured or distributed
by “Zenú Products US, Inc.”; display the web address http://www.zenu.us.com; and
contain the phrase “Linea de Exportacion,” which translates to “exportation
line.” Latinfood does not export its Zenú or Ranchera products outside the
United States. In 2016, the Latinfood website contained the phrase “We have
products from” followed by marks of imported brands, among which was an image
of Industria’s Zenú mark. Advertisements made for Latinfood Zenú products used
the phrase “una deliciosa tradición,” which translates to “a delicious
tradition.”

One supermarket sold Latinfood’s products in an aisle
designated for “Hispanic and Latin imported goods,” despite having another
aisle designated for similar goods made in the U.S. After a sales manager for Cordialsa
visited the supermarket and told the manager that he was “surprised to find”
Zenú-marked products at the store, it ceased carrying Latinfood’s products,
though the reason was unclear.

The extent of Industria’s plans for US sales and the reason
for Industria’s decision not to import its products was “heavily disputed” by
the parties. Prior import plans in 2010-11 were paused. Industria became aware
of Latinfood’s Zenú and Ranchera products sometime between October 2013 and
September 2014. Its cancellation petition for Zenú has been suspended during
this litigation.

Inter American Convention for Trademark and Commercial
Protection: Industria sought cancellation of the registration and priority in
the US under the IAC, as well as an injunction against “unfair competition.” [I’m
not sure how we should think about Article III standing for purposes of
injunctive relief—it seems clear there’s standing to contest the registration,
but is there sufficient injury/redressability for an injunction if there’s no
pending use in the US?]

Latinfood argued that the IAC claims were barred by territoriality.
“Here, the U.S. has purposely breached the territoriality principle by entering
into mutual treaty obligations with certain foreign nations. The IAC is a
self-executing treaty, having the force of law by virtue of its enactment. The
IAC has thus been recognized as an exception to the territoriality principle.”
And it creates a private cause of action. Industria didn’t need to comply with §44(d)
in order to claim rights under the IAC.

Latinfood won summary judgment on the claim under Article 7,
whose sole remedy is to grant priority. Industria clearly conceded that its IAC
claims weren’t based on a claim of priority rights in the US.  Also, because Latinfood registered the Zenú
mark in the U.S., Industria was barred from using Article 7 to gain priority
over the Zenú mark for itself.

Article 8 grants the owner of a mark the “right to apply for
and obtain the cancellation or annulment of the interfering mark.” This
relevantly requires that the owner had legal protection for its mark in another
state and the other party knew of the owner’s use for the specific goods to
which it applied the mark before it adopted the mark. (There’s another route,
not available here, when the mark owner was already trading in marked goods in
the country in which cancellation was sought.)

Summary judgment for Industria was appropriate: It showed
legal protection in Colombia prior to Latinfood’s application, and the evidence
of knowledge of use on the same goods was “overwhelming and one-sided.” “Latinfood
cannot shirk responsibility by simply stating that Mr. Zuluaga was unaware of
the contents of the application he signed.” (There was other evidence of
knowledge too.) The same goods requirement was satisfied even though the
parties’ lists of food items didn’t correspond “precisely” or “item-for-item.” “Latinfood’s
registration covers various meat and fish products, which would fall within the
plain meaning of ‘meat, fish, poultry and game’ covered by Industria’s
registration.”

The order was temporarily stayed pending full authentication
of the Colombian registrations.

Under Article 17 of the IAC, Industria needed to show,
relevantly, that Latinfood’s interfering mark “may lead to error or confusion
in the mind of the consumer” with respect to Industria’s commercial name. The
court found an issue of fact and denied summary judgment on likely confusion
(see below).

Article 18 grants the right to “apply for and obtain an
injunction against the use of any commercial name or the cancellation of the
registration or deposit of any trade mark.” (The injunction-against-use
provision is where there may be an Article III problem, it seems to me.)   This relevantly
requires a showing that Latinfood’s interfering name or trademark is “identical
with or deceptively similar to” Industria’s commercial name “already legally
adopted and previously used in [Colombia] in the manufacture, sale or
production of articles of the same class”; and prior to Latinfood’s use or
adoption of the name or mark, Industria used and continues to use the
“commercial name adopted and previously used” for the “same products” in
Colombia. But it does not seem to require harm. Still, the court granted
summary judgment for Industria (conditional on authenticating the registration).

Lanham Act (and parallel NJ Fair Trade Act): Here too there
may be standing problems. The TM part of this might need revisiting in light of
Abitron; the court earlier held that use of a mark in the US wasn’t
required to bring Lanham Act claims, but subsequently Meenaxi Enterprise, Inc.
v. Coca-Cola Company, 38 F.4th 1067 (Fed. Cir. 2022), demanded injury to sales
or reputation in the US and held that “nebulous future plans for U.S. sales
cannot be the basis for a Lanham Act claim.” [Dawn Donut, but for
extraterritorial use.]

So, did Industria satisfy Lexmark? There were genuine
issues of fact on (1) whether Industria had concrete plans to enter the United
States market; and (2) whether Industria’s commercial injury was proximately
caused by Latinfood’s actions. There was insufficient evidence of reputational
injury as an alternative theory; Industria didn’t provide any evidence even
showing that it had any particular US reputation to be harmed.

Industria argued that Latinfood blocked its entry into the
US market, and a jury could credit its evidence, but there was also evidence
that it couldn’t enter the US market because of various regulations.

False advertising: Industria argued that deception could be
presumed from literally false statements that Zuluaga “convinced a major
product manufacturer in Colombia to sign an exclusive distribution and
importing rights agreement for the tri-state area”;  his statement to a supermarket sales associate
that he had Colombian products; and Latinfood’s website stating in substance
that it offered Industria’s Zenú products. For the first two, Industria failed
to show literal falsity. Among other things, the sales associate testified that
Zuluaga did not mention the names of the Colombian products (is that even
commercial advertising or promotion?). But the third statement was literally
false.

As evidence of deception, Industria submitted evidence that one
of Latinfood’s distributors believed that Latinfood’s products were associated
with Industria’s products. Also, a Twitter user sent a message to Industria’s
Twitter account with a picture of Latinfood’s Zenú and Ranchera products and
asked whether Industria had “a sales franchise for beer sausage and ranchera
sausage that they are selling in New York and New Jersey and Florida, as
so-called Colombian sausages.” Industria’s advertising agency manager,
responded that the products are not Industria’s, to which the alleged customer
replied “So why are they using your brand? This makes Colombians abroad get
tricked.” A supermarket sales associate testified at deposition that
Latinfood’s products were sold in a store aisle with other Hispanic or
Latin-sourced products, rather than in an aisle with products made in the U.S. A
supermarket store manager testified that Zuluaga had a reputation for selling
Colombian products and that Zuluaga told him that Zenú was a brand known in
Colombia. And of course, Latinfood’s packaging resembles and implies an
affiliation with Industria. The packaging also includes the line “Linea De
Exportacion,” which translates to “exportation line.”

The court found that Industria’s argument for false
advertising “falls on the wrong side of the line between a false association
claim and a false advertising claim. On these facts, any mistaken belief that
Latinfood’s products were Industria’s products depends on evidence of a false
association between the brands, which is distinct from a false advertising
claim.”

The use of “exportation line” was arguably the exception,
but “[o]ne country’s exportation … is another’s importation, and the meaning is
unclear.” There was no evidence of a tendency to deceive.

What about injury? To get injunctive relief, a plaintiff has
to prove likely injury. But there was no evidence that the only actionable
statement—Latinfood’s use of Imdustria’s logo on its website in 2016—was likely
to cause injury. “[N]o reasonable jury in 2023 could conclude that Latinfood’s
use of Industria’s logo in 2016 is likely to cause damage to Industria in the
future.” Summary judgment for Latinfood.

Trade dress infringement: Summary judgment denied; I’m going
to skip most of the discussion because, sadly for the hardworking district
court, I think Abitron does require revisiting it, even if the trade
dress is inherently distinctive and was copied. Without a reputation in the US,
I don’t see how there can be confusion in the US.

On strength, Industria conceded that it didn’t actively
advertise in the US, but submitted evidence that its trade dress had been “seen”
by US residents and that its websites have been visited by US users “thousands”
of times 2012-2017, which “may indicate at least some commercial strength of
its trade dress.” (Later, the court noted, “there are no products for sale on
those websites and there is no indication that Industria sells products to
United States consumers either through its websites or in stores.”) In light of
the size of the food market, that’s a bit hard to credit. Citing domestic precedent,
however, the court reasoned that “the mark’s strength in other markets is
relevant.”

Other evidence of actual confusion, besides that noted
above, was that, sometime in or after 2014, a Facebook user posted in a group
titled “WikiWomen in Medellin” that she purchased “ranchera sausages” at an
unidentified location in the United States and that “they say” that “Zenú set
up a plant in New York for the Colombia market in the U.S.A.” And the copying
here could also lead to an inference of deception.  “The fact finder might also find it
significant, however, that for a relevant period of eight years, Industria was
able to provide only three somewhat equivocal instances of customer confusion.”

Did intentional copying show intent to confuse? A jury could
go either way.

Trademark infringement/false association: There wasn’t
sufficient evidence that Industria owned the Zenú or Ranchera marks for
purposes of the trademark infringement claim. (I don’t quite get how it could
show ownership of the trade dress in the US but not ownership of the word
marks.) Summary judgment for Latinfood.

Cancellation for fraud: Industria wasn’t required to
establish United States trademark rights to petition for cancellation of
Latinfood’s Zenú mark. A trademark application is a “legitimate commercial
interest,” which satisfies the “real interest” requirement, and “blocking” an
application can satisfy the belief of damage requirement. It was entitled to
summary judgment because Zuluaga knew that Industria had a prior right. (This is
inconsistent with the holding above that Industria didn’t have US rights:
Zuluaga signed a declaration stating “to the best of his/her knowledge and
belief, no other person, firm, corporation, or association has the right to use
the mark in commerce
, either in the identical form thereof or in such near
resemblance thereto as to be likely when used on or in connection with the
goods/services of such other person, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake,
or to deceive.” We know this means US commerce, so his knowledge of the Colombian
rights wouldn’t matter.)

But there was also fraud in using Industria’s products in
photos purporting to show Latinfood’s use. Industria showed that Latinfood
never used the Zenú mark in commerce prior to filing its application.

Copyright: The Third Circuit applies the discovery rule to
the limitations period of three years. Industria filed its copyright
infringement claims on April 21, 2017. Its witness testified that Industria
found out about Latinfood’s use of the Zenú mark in or around October of 2013. It
was put on notice of the need to investigate and the limitations period began
to run then for those claims, but copyright infringement is a continuing
violation so it could reach back three years prior to filing, and also Latinfood
didn’t show it was entitled to summary judgment on the limitations period as to
the Ranchera mark. (Not clear from this discussion if the copyright claims are
really for copyright in the logos or cover the labels.)

The tortious interference counterclaim failed; it related to
one supermarket that removed Latinfood’s Zenú products. Assuming that Industria’s
assertion of its trademark rights led to this removal, Industria had a
substantial basis for its claims, such that “even if its position is not
ultimately borne out, it does not meet the high bar of malice.”

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2023/07/inter-american-convention-allows-claims.html

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , , | Leave a comment