no injury to alcoholic kombucha producer from competitor’s false no-alcohol/low-sugar label (cute dogs are also involved)

Tortilla Factory, LLC v. GT’s Living Foods, LLC, No. CV
17-7539 FMO (GJSx), 2023 WL 6296900 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2023)

Interesting bench trial result that finds no proximate
causation of plaintiff’s injury from defendant’s false advertising. Despite finding
the plaintiff’s expert’s testimony about sugar and alcohol levels in
defendant’s kombucha “credible and compelling,” lack of harm doomed its case.
(But that suggests that some AG might want to get involved, especially as to
whether GT should be selling its products without the alcohol warning label.)

The basic allegations: defendant’s kombucha had much higher
levels of sugar and alcohol than advertised, allowing defendant to sell it
without an alcohol warning and to get consumers who didn’t want those levels of
sugar and alcohol to choose it. Tortilla Factory’s Kombucha Dog has
approximately 1.25% alcohol by volume and is sold as an alcoholic beverage,
with a government-required warning label. It also uses pictures of rescue dogs
on the label. And Tortilla Factory entered into an exclusive distribution deal
that was a disaster—the distributor let lots of accounts die.

Meanwhile, GT is the leading kombucha seller in the market,
with about 50% market share as of 2018, but there are about 300+ kombucha
brands in the US, with California the most competitive state given lots of
local brands.

Tortilla Factory simply couldn’t show the requisite harm.
Although it argued that it expended significant amounts on corrective
advertising about authentic kombucha and sugar, the court found that it was
just typical advertising “undertaken by any small business entering a
competitive market.”

And more generally, the misrepresentations about the amount
of alcohol in, and lack of a government alcohol warning label on, certain of
GT’s products would not have decreased Tortilla Factory’s sales. A customer who
wanted a product that didn’t have enough alcohol to need a label would have
instead purchased “one of dozens of available nonalcoholic kombucha drinks in
the market.” Tortilla Factory’s own expert testified that the alcohol label was
very important to consumers and was a drag on sales. And his survey was suspect
because he showed consumers the front of a Kombucha Dog bottle with images of
rescue dogs, but only the back and side of GT’s Classic bottle, and conceded
that “the photo of a cute dog could inject bias into the result[.]”

Because the alcohol part was so important, the sugar
misrepresentations became unimportant: again, a consumer who wanted lower sugar
content would have chosen a different nonalcoholic kombucha beverage even if
GT’s had been properly labeled, and there was no evidence about consumer
reactions to sugar labels.  

Evidence about Tortilla Factory’s prior customers who
eventually sold GT’s also didn’t show harm causation from falsity, as opposed
to other factors like the disaster distributor or GT providing special flavors
(also, GT sold kegs to some customers, and the evidence of falsity related to
bottles, not kegs; I don’t know the science here so I don’t know if that would
likely make a difference).

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2023/10/no-injury-to-alcoholic-kombucha.html

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TM and takings claims against Puerto Rico fail: license plates/tags aren’t use in commerce

Clemente Properties, Inc. v. Urrutia, No. 22-1373 (GMM),
2023 WL 6201397, — F. Supp. 3d — (D.P.R. Sept. 22, 2023)

Plaintiffs own Roberto Clemente’s IP rights and a
registration for ROBERTO CLEMENTE for “figurines, statues and statuettes made
of non-precious metal; beer cans made of non-precious metal sold empty.” (The
district court doesn’t appear to care about what the registration is for; I had
to look it up.) They sought at least $45 million from the government of Puerto
Rico for issuing a commemorative license plate for the fiftieth anniversary of
Roberto Clemente’s “Hit 3000,” at $21/plate. There was also a mandatory $5
charge for a commemorative vehicle certificate tag that was yellow, had the
figure of Roberto Clemente with the name “Clemente,” the number “21,” the
number “50,” and phrase “3000 hits.” The revenues were transferred to the
Roberto Clemente Sports District Fund for the use of the Department of Sports
and Recreation.

Plaintiffs brought trademark and related claims, including
takings claims, all of which the court dismissed.

The First Circuit has repeatedly held that Puerto Rico is
entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, which Congress has not
successfully overridden with respect to Lanham Act claims. Nor had the
Commonwealth waived its immunity. “While Plaintiffs seek prospective relief,
they have provided the Court with no basis from which it can infer any
possibility of an ongoing violation of federal law.” For trademark, any request
was moot since the law requiring the sale of license plates and license labels
expired by its own terms on December 31, 2022.

Anyway, there was no viable claim. (Sometimes less is more.
It can’t have helped that plaintiffs claimed that the use infringed tarnished
not only the RC trademark, but also the “trademarks, names and likeness of his
sons as individual businessmen and representatives of the mark.”)

The court began with the proposition that Lanham Act claims
require both “use in commerce” and “commercial use.” Even accepting the
validity of the registration, plaintiffs failed to allege a use of the mark in
commerce “in connection with” “goods or services.” Although they alleged that
they were going to sponsor their own license plates, they didn’t actually
allege that they had done so. The confusion inquiry is “not applied to assess
confusion in the abstract; it is focused on the likelihood that commercially
relevant persons or entities will be confused.”

License plates and vehicle certificate tags are issued by
the Department of Transportation. They are “governmental property intended
primarily to serve a governmental purpose, and inevitably they will be
associated with the state that issues them.” Thus, “not only are these not the
classes of products or services that trademark law protects, but issuing motor
vehicle license plates and tags cannot be considered commercial use, as it is a
clear government activity.”

Plus, the plates and tags depicted Clemente in the context
of “an event of historical significance for both Puerto Rico and Major League
Baseball.” The court doesn’t explain its reasoning but it seems to think this
bolsters the conclusion that this was not a trademark use.

False advertising: No Lexmark standing for want of
proximate cause. Plus, there was no commercial advertisement or promotion.  The plates and tags couldn’t be considered ads.
Further, depicting Clemente in historical context was descriptive, not
misleading. Although plaintiffs alleged that defendants implied, by using
Clemente’s name, that funds raised would go to them, as owners of the mark,
those were “conclusory statements of unspecified injury and of the type that
was not intended to be protected by the Lanham Act.”

Takings: Even if trademarks are protected by the Takings
Clause, sovereign immunity still applied. Also there was no expropriation of
the trademark here.  There was no
permanent physical invasion nor a complete deprivation of all economically
beneficial use. “Plaintiffs remain free to use their trademarks as they wish.”

Claims against
individual defendants failed for all those reasons, plus qualified immunity.

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2023/10/tm-and-takings-claims-against-puerto.html

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proximate causation isn’t as easy when there’s no disparagement

HomeLight, Inc. v. Shkipin, No. 22-cv-03119-PCP, 2023 WL
6284738, — F.Supp.3d —- (N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2023)

HomeLight runs an online platform that matches real estate
agents with homebuyers and sellers and requires any agent who accepts a
referral resulting in a sale to pay 25% of their commission to HomeLight.
Shkipin operates an alternative agent-matching platform, HomeOpenly, that does
not charge referral fees and instead obtains revenue from advertising and
auxiliary services. HomeLight sued him for false advertising and trademark violations,
and Shkipin counterclaimed under federal antitrust law, federal false
advertising law, and California’s UCL. I will only discuss the (unsuccessful)
advertising-related claims.

Proximate cause: None of the challenged statements allegedly
disparaged HomeOpenly, so Shkipin needed to allege how deceptive statements
about HomeLight directed at shoppers on HomeLight’s own website “necessarily
caused advertisers not to buy ads from HomeOpenly.” Even assuming a there is a
direct relationship between the number of HomeOpenly visitors and its ability
to sell ads, and that HomeLight’s deceptive statements resulted in some
reduction in the number of shoppers visiting HomeOpenly’s website, this was “too
attenuated to establish proximate cause.” This was especially true given the
countercomplaint’s other plausible explanation for why online home shoppers
might find HomeLight’s website but not HomeOpenly’s: HomeLight’s heavy spending
on various forms of online and TV advertising that Shkipin characterized as
“highly effective.”

Separately, he didn’t properly allege
falsity/misleadingness. Challenged statement: “Our service is 100% free, with
no catch. Agents don’t pay us to be listed, so you get the best match.” The
countercomplaint alleged that the failure to mention that partner agents do pay
referral fees is a “deceptive omission.” But this didn’t plausibly plead that
the omission deceived a substantial segment of HomeLight’s audience, especially
since the counterclaim included a HomeLight webpage specifying that “HomeLight
receives a portion of the agent’s commission as a referral fee.”

Challenged statement: “HomeLight is operated in compliance
with all state and federal housing laws.” Not actionable because it includes a
legal conclusion rather than a statement of fact.

Challenged statement: “The agents we recommend on HomeLight
typically can save you thousands on your home purchase.” Not a promise of
specific results.

Challenged statements such as: “We’ve designed a solution
that allows you to sort through over 2 million agents from all of the top real
estate brokerages in order to find the perfect one for you.” No allegations of
facts contradicting transaction/agent numbers and the rest was subjective
non-actionable puffery.

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2023/10/proximate-causation-isnt-as-easy-when.html

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EDNY judge doesn’t have a beef with Wendy’s and McDonald’s ads

Chimienti v. Wendy’s Int’l, LLC, No. 22-CV-02880 (HG), 2023
WL 6385346 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2023)

Plaintiff alleged New York statutory and common law claims
based on allegations that Wendy’s and McDonald’s misleadingly advertised the
quantity of food contained in various menu items sold at their restaurants by making
the food look bigger in pictures with more toppings and thicker patties. The
court dismissed the claims, mainly because the advertisements were not
misleading as a matter of law.

Plaintiff alleged, for example, that in McDonald’s
advertisements, “the beef patty extend[s] all the way to the edge of the bun,”
but the patty “comes nowhere near the edge of the bun” when a hamburger is
actually served. Defendants allegedly use uncooked, or partially seared, burger
patties for their ads because “fully cooked burgers tend to shrink and look
less appetizing.”

First, the plaintiff failed to allege the necessary injury
because he didn’t allege that he saw the specific ads he identified as misleading.
Even if he had seen them, they were mostly puffery:

Defendants’ act of advertising
their products in a manner that makes them visually appealing … makes no
objective claims about Defendants’ products. Defendants’ efforts to present
appetizing images of their products are no different than other companies’ use
of visually appealing images to foster positive associations with their
products, which courts within the Second Circuit have held to be immaterial
puffery as a matter of law.

Depiction of the size of products, however, relates to an
objective fact and is therefore not puffery. Still, a reasonable customer would
not have been misled, given that the allegation was that the ads used the
identical amount of uncooked meat that a customer would receive cooked: “This
concession that both the advertisements and the products served in stores contain
the same amount of meat is fatal to Plaintiff’s claims.” (I’m not sure this
makes sense. If I thought I was seeing the cooked version, then by hypothesis I
expected even more meat, since the uncooked version would have been even
bigger.) Also, “the entirety of the advertisement on each website page
describes in objective terms how much total food customers would receive.” They
had calorie information, and Wendy’s said theirs was made with a “quarter-pound*”
of beef with the asterisk referring to “[a]pproximate weight before cooking.” Quoting
“various social media personalities who complained about the size and quality
of Defendants’ products” didn’t change this result. “[W]hile plaintiffs are not
required to meet the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) for GBL
claims, plaintiffs must do more than plausibly allege that a label might
conceivably be misunderstood by some few consumers. Instead, [p]laintiffs must
plausibly allege that a significant portion of the general consuming public or
of targeted consumers, acting reasonably in the circumstances, could be
misled.”

Plaintiff didn’t make any toppings-specific arguments, and
anyway, the ads don’t specify the quantity of the toppings, “so their depiction
of toppings does not become misleading simply because Defendants’ actual
products may contain less than Plaintiff’s ‘personally preferred amount’ of
toppings.”

Also, ads can’t support a breach of contract claim.

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2023/10/edny-judge-doesnt-have-beef-with-wendys.html

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YouTube videos aren’t commercial advertising/promotion even if some commercial info is in channel bio

Wealthy, Inc. v. Cornelia, 2023 WL 6379449, No. 2:21-CV-1173
JCM (EJY) (D. Nev. Sept. 29, 2023)

“This action arises out of a series of interviews published
on YouTube and conducted by Cornelia that plaintiffs perceive as defamatory.”
Defendant Buczkowski is the owner and operator of Wealthy, allegedly a “leading
entrepreneurship, finance, business, real-estate and self-improvement company.”
Buczkowski has 23,700 subscribers on YouTube, and his videos have garnered over
1.2 million views.

Cornelia also has a YouTube channel with approximately
150,000 subscribers, publishing videos on investing, business, and fitness that
have received over 13.8 million views. Cornelia published a series of videos
entitled “Authentic or Charlatan” in which he claims to expose “fake gurus on
social media.” Defendants produced multiple interviews with another internet
personality, John Mulvehill, a dating and self-improvement coach who made most
of the challenged statements: that Buczkowski (1) lied about his educational
achievement; (2) laundered money; (3) manufactured and/or sold illegal drugs;
(4) framed Mulvehill for his 2013 arrest in Las Vegas, leading to four felony
and four misdemeanor charges; and (5) was involved in the death of a
28-year-old woman who was the alleged victim in the arrest of Mulvehill.

Cornelia sued for (1) unfair competition and false
advertising under the Lanham Act, (2) defamation, (3) intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and (4) business disparagement.

Although the court didn’t apply Nevada’s anti-SLAPP protections
because they failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the
statements were made in good faith because their gist or sting was substantively
true, defendants still prevailed.

There was evidence that Cornelia researched Mulvehill’s
claims and sources, which was sufficient to show there was no actual malice on
his part. For example, in his deposition, Cornelia testified that he received
information from Mulvehill, including a video from a former employee of
plaintiffs who corroborated claims about plaintiffs’ unethical business
practices and their using young, unqualified people to write the instructional
and promotional material for plaintiffs’ courses. Cornelia never had any
information contradicting negative claims about plaintiffs when the videos were
published. “Even if Cornelia were mistaken, his conduct is not remotely close
to constituting reckless disregard.”

False advertising: This wasn’t commercial speech because the
accused videos weren’t ads. Although plaintiffs argued that defendants promoted
Cornelia’s “house hack expert book” and a “first 1,000 subscribers mentoring
program,” those were present in Cornelia’s biographical YouTube information,
not any of the videos themselves. “The subject of this action is the YouTube
videos themselves, not the YouTube channel as a whole.” The closest they got
was that, in the first video, Mulvehill said without prompting: “you do have
some real estate stuff on the side.” Cornelia said “right” and didn’t elaborate.

 

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2023/10/youtube-videos-arent-commercial.html

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literal falsity of claim that website doesn’t allow checkout in under a minute supports preliminary injunction

Novation Solutions, Inc. (o/a DealMaker) v. Issuance Inc., 2023
WL 6373871, No. 2:23-cv-00696-WLH-KSx (C.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2023)

DealMaker is a financial technology company that provides
its users with the ability to raise capital by conducting investment offerings
via its online platform. Issuance is a competitor: a financial technology
company with a retail capital raising and investment processing platform. Defendant
Marble is Issuance’s co-founder and chief executive officer.

DealMaker alleged that defendants stole its trade secrets
and also alleged violation of state and federal false advertising law. Shortly
after DealMaker first sued, Marble allegedly “embarked on a marketing campaign
that included disparaging remarks about DealMaker” and its products, claiming
falsely that:

These statements were allegedly made at an event in Miami
whose recording was uploaded to YouTube, as well as in a slide deck that was
uploaded to Deal Night’s website in accordance with Issuance’s marketing
agreement with Deal Night. The slide deck had disclaimer language that the
information on the slides was not complete, and that the slides contained
forward-looking statements.

challenged representations in slide form

For purposes of a preliminary injunction motion, the court
first considered literal falsity.

Challenged claim: DealMaker’s customers do not retain
ownership over their own data.  DealMaker
argued that the lack of any mention of the transfer of ownership of
confidential data in its TOS indicates that clients own their own data, while
defendants argued that the absence of any affirmative discussion was itself
evidence of lack of client ownership, whereas Issuance’s own terms promised
that the customer “owns and shall remain the sole owner” of its information. Defendants
pointed to DealMaker’s TOS provision that it could “use” client’s data for
DealMaker’s marketing purposes, and anecdotal evidence from a prior DealMaker
customer indicating that DealMaker “exploited and misused the customer’s
investor list for the purpose of contacting its investors to market other
companies’ securities offerings listed through DealMaker. DealMaker noted that
Issuance’s own terms include a provision that allows Issuance to license its
data.

This wasn’t literal falsity, given the silence of the
DealMaker TOS.

Challenged claim: DealMaker offers the same products and
services as [Issuance] at higher prices (8-10% as compared to 4-5%) and DealMaker’s
fees are charged as a percentage of capital raised. DealMaker argued that its
offers weren’t the same as Issuance’s so one-to-one comparisons were false, and
that its fees don’t depend on a percentage of capital raised. Defendants
offered examples of contracts that, they argued, had a fee structure of 8-10%.  DealMaker said those were contracts with DealMaker
Securities LLC, a registered broker dealer, which is a separate legal entity
and not a party to this lawsuit, and that its fees may be higher because it
offers additional services to its clients that Issuance does not. This was not
enough for literal falsity, since the slides didn’t claim that the parties
offered the same products. Also, a potentially reasonable reading of the
statement was that in the aggregate, DealMaker’s fees equate to 8-10% of the
capital it raises, rather than being explicitly a statement that its fees were
based on a percentage of what was raised. Ultimately, DealMaker didn’t show
that was false at this stage.

Challenged claim: DealMaker’s platform does not offer “checkout
in under one minute” to its customers, while Issuance’s platform does: This was
likely explicitly false. The slide clearly compared the parties’ platforms.
DealMaker’s evidence showed that checkout on its platform in less than a minute
was possible. This was a specific and measurable advertisement claim of product
superiority based on product testing and not puffery.

Challenged claim: DealMaker’s publicly disclosed “street”
valuation is $200 million.

Marble explained that he arrived at the $200 million
valuation by multiplying DealMaker’s $20 million estimated revenue for 2022 by
a multiplier of ten. DealMaker argued that as a private company, it does not
have a public valuation and thus this number is fabricated and false. Defendants
responded that the slide proposed a “street estimate,” which is an industry
term for an unofficial estimate and not a “publicly disclosed valuation” as
suggested by DealMaker.

“Street estimate” was sufficiently ambiguous that it was
susceptible to defendants’ interpretation.

Deception would be presumed for literally false statements. Also,
the statement was “published and promoted on an investor industry website,
presented at a forum focused on connecting potential investors and company
founders, and was directed at an audience of potential investors attending
industry events where potential clients in this industry are the most
susceptible to being deceived by the false statements.” This also took care of
materiality.

Injury can be “generally presumed” when the parties “are
direct competitors and defendant’s misrepresentations has a tendency to mislead
consumers.” This presumption was not rebutted.

In addition, irreparable harm was presumed from likely
success under the TMA. The other factors also favored a preliminary injunction
for the “under a minute” statement.

 

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2023/10/literal-falsity-of-claim-that-website.html

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Panels on Exploring the New Constitutional Limits on Trademark Law

FRIDAY, NOV 3 2023

8:45AM – 3:30PM More info

ADVANCED REGISTRATION REQUIRED

ATTEND AT THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE FRANKLIN PIERCE SCHOOL OF LAW OR BY ZOOM. Full program.

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2023/10/panels-on-exploring-new-constitutional.html

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Amazon escapes liability for its Brand Registry advertising

Deetsch v. Lei, 2023 WL 6373073, No. 22-cv-1166-RSH-BLM (S.D.
Cal. Jul. 21, 2023)

Deetsch alleged that he owned design patents for CPAP pillow
products, which the Lei defendants infringed. They also allegedly used Deetch’s
image in ads and on packaging, and allegedly falsely claimed on Amazon that
their pillow products “were designed in the United States but are manufactured
in China.”

In December 2020, Deetsch notified Amazon of his patents through
the Brand Registry portal and asked Amazon to remove the Lei defendants’
products. He sent two letters by mail in March 2022, but was told he needed to
use the Brand Registry … which he had already done.

Amazon’s Brand Registry advertises “Automated Protections”
that are “[p]owered by Amazon’s Machine Learning.” Amazon claims its service
will “save valuable time,” allows users to report “patent[ ] and design right
violations,” uses “advanced machine learning that prevents bad listings,” and
can “[r]emove counterfeits instantly” “without the need to contact [Amazon].” Deetch
signed up for and paid for a Brand Registry service subscription, and submitted
multiple complaints through that system, allegedly to no avail.

Since the designs were not plainly dissimilar, infringement
was plausible.

False advertising, Lei defendants: The complaint didn’t
explain how “designed in the United States but … manufactured in China” was
materially deceptive and thus didn’t meet FRCP 9(b) pleading standards. A “true
statement that a product was designed in the United States” is not “a
representation that the product does not infringe any third party’s intellectual
property rights.” Motion to dismiss granted.

False advertising, Amazon defendants: The complaint didn’t
explain how any of the statements about the Brand Registry were false or
misleading. It wasn’t enough to suggest that “taking all of the statements
together, a consumer would reasonably expect the Brand Registry service to work
better or faster than it did for Plaintiff.” Even a reasonable consumer’s “disappointment
that a service did not work as well or as quickly as hoped” doesn’t show false
advertising. Also, plaintiff was a customer, not a competitor, and not within
the relevant zone of interests. (State law claims would have been better.)

False association, Lei defendants: Although he alleged that
they used his image, he didn’t allege that this would cause confusion, mistake,
or deception as to his association with the Lei defendants’ products, nor any
facts that would establish that his likeness is recognizable by would-be
consumers. Again, right of publicity would’ve been better.

A copyright claim was dismissed because the plaintiff had
yet to receive his registration; this couldn’t be corrected by amendment in
order to implement the command of Fourth Estate; the dismissal was without
prejudice to refiling a new action.

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2023/10/amazon-escapes-liability-for-its-brand.html

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accusing someone of patent infringement can be actionable disparagement if you know the patent’s invalid

Cap Export, LLC v. Zinus, Inc., 2023 WL 6381821, No.
2:21-cv-07148-JWH-MRWx (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2023)

Cap Export alleged that Zinus fraudulently obtained a patent
after Zinus used the public domain bed-in-a-box sets of a non-party as the
basis for its patent application. Before it prevailed in the underlying patent
litigation, Cap Export alleged that defendants disparaged Cap Export and its
products as an infringer/infringing. Among other things, Defendants’ counsel sent
a letter to Cap Export’s customer 4Moda Corp. and to Amazon. Amazon responded
by shutting down 4Moda’s Amazon webpage, which allegedly caused Cap Export to
lose sales of its bed-in-a-box products. The underlying patent litigation
allegedly fraudulently induced Cap Export to enter into a $1.1 million consent
judgment, which defendants touted in a press release and advertised on Zinus’s
website even after the court vacated the stipulated judgment. Defendants
allegedly distributed the false advertisement to Cap Export’s online sales
partners—including Amazon, Walmart, and Wayfair—which caused a decrease in Cap
Export’s product ranking and sales, through Google Ads, and through a press
release published in July 2019 on the Business Insider website.

When the information about the prior art came in, the court
granted summary judgment in favor of Cap Export in the patent case and
invalidated the patent. There was a partly successful appeal to the Federal
Circuit, after which Zinus gave Cap Export a covenant not to sue.

Courts have generally harmonized the Lanham Act with the Patent
Act by requiring bad faith before claims about patent infringement can
constitute false advertising. Although the Ninth Circuit has held that statements
about copyright licensing status are not actionable under the Lanham Act, it
has referred with approval to the bad faith standard for patent-related claims,
and the court here noted that Lexmark, a Supreme Court case, concerned
false advertising claims based on accusations of infringement and expressed no
concerns about that.

Cap Export sufficiently pled disparagement in bad faith,
knowing the patent was invalid.

The litigation/fair report privileges did not, at this stage,
bar the related state law claims. The ads were not necessary for the
litigation, and the fair report privilege didn’t apply because Cap Export pled
that the statements didn’t match the court proceedings: Defendants claimed that
Cap Export infringed multiple “patents” and falsely asserted that Cap Export
“deliberate[ly] cop[ied] Zinus’ innovation, which could mislead those who
depend on Zinus’ exceptional product quality.”

Tortious interference: “Defendants targeted Cap Export’s
economic relationship with Amazon, Walmart, and Wayfair by sending
communications to those companies concerning the allegedly bad faith underlying
litigation, and Cap Export pleads that those communications damaged Cap
Export’s sales.” Given the alleged bad faith, this sufficed.

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2023/10/accusing-someone-of-patent-infringement.html

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knowingly false statement of regulatory compliance may be actionable

Dental Recycling North America, Inc. v. Stoma Ventures, LLC,
2023 WL 6389071, No. 4:23 CV 670 CDP (E.D. Mo. Oct. 2, 2023)

The parties compete in the market for amalgam capture
devices, which remove fillings (or pieces thereof) from dental office
wastewater. This is required by the EPA because fillings can contain toxic
mercury. EPA regs say that dental offices may comply by using amalgam capture
devices, “separators” and removal devices “other than separators.” Both options
require at least 95% removal efficiency; the former must use ANSI testing,
while the latter must use sampling averages. There’s no premarket approval.

Plaintiff alleged that Stoma falsely advertised that its
Capt-all device, which fits onto the end of a high volume evacuator valve, is
an amalgam separator and EPA compliant. However, it allegedly only treats
amalgam process wastewater that passes through its device, rather than all
potential sources of amalgam process wastewater in a dental office, which is
insufficient.

Stoma argued that representations about legality/legal
compliance were inactionable opinion. Prior cases have so found, unless there
was a clear statement to the contrary from a relevant authority (including a very
clear statute), or unless there was no good-faith belief in the statement about
legality.

Here, the plaintiff alleged that Stoma made/caused others to
make false statements that the Capt-all was tested and found to be an amalgam
separator when it knew that Capt-all did not meet the regulatory definition of
an amalgam separator. Stoma conceded that the Capt-all is not an amalgam
separator; the knowing falsity exception could apply, even if statements about
Capt-all being “compliant” with EPA regulations may not be actionable.

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2023/10/knowingly-false-statement-of-regulatory.html

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