False advertising and TM infringement receive very different damages treatment: case in point

CareDx, Inc. v. Natera, Inc., No. 19-662-CFC, 2023 WL
4561059 (D. Del. Jul. 17, 2023)

Another entry in the “courts treat Lanham Act false
advertising very differently than Lanham Act trademark infringement, despite
identical damages provisions” line. Natera made superiority claims for its
Prospera. CareDx
sued Natera for false advertising
. In a trial held last year, the jury
found that CareDx proved by a preponderance of the evidence at trial that: (a)
nine of the ten alleged false advertisements were false; (b) Natera
intentionally and willfully engaged in false advertising; (c) Natera was liable
for false advertising under the Delaware Deceptive Trade Practices Act; (d)
Natera was liable for unfair competition; and (e) Natera intentionally or
recklessly engaged in unfair competition. It also found that CareDx was
entitled to $21.2 million in actual damages “attributable to Natera’s false
advertising and/or unfair competition,” and that CareDx was entitled to $23.7
million in punitive damages “for Natera’s unfair competition.” The court
rejected the damages award.

Actual deception—reliance on the falsity—must be proven to
establish damages for a Lanham Act violation, even if based on an unambiguous
and literally false advertisement. (The missing step is treating state and
federal claims the same here, which presumably everyone already agreed to.)

The jury was instructed that:

to recover damages under the Lanham
Act, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that, one, the
defendant’s false advertising actually deceived a portion of the purchasing
public in that customers relied on the false advertising in making a purchasing
decision. There’s no presumption here for the damages question. The burden
rests on the plaintiff to prove that by a preponderance of the evidence.

All right. And then the second
thing that the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence is that,
as a result of the false advertising, the plaintiff sustained injury. If you
find that CareDx proved these things, then you consider what amount of money to
award to CareDx as damages.

But, the court concluded, there was no evidence at trial that
any person was deceived by or relied on any of the nine advertisements found by
the jury to be false. CareDx’s evidence “does not establish directly or even
circumstantially that a person was in fact deceived by or relied on Natera’s
advertisements.” Specifically, Natera internally characterized a PowerPoint
slide that contained at least one of the false advertisements as “the money
slide.” “But that testimony is not probative of actual customer behavior.”

Nor did significant sales growth linked to the marketing
campaign at issue.  

Natera’s marketing plans and its training of marketing
personnel were also insufficient. “Proof of what Natera intended to accomplish
or thought it could achieve with its marketing plans and training efforts in no
way establishes that those plans and efforts succeeded.”

Compare the treatment of intent/expectation on the trademark
side: It is basically inconceivable that a court would reason this way in a
trademark damages case, despite the same statutory language for both.

The court also found that the following testimony didn’t
show reliance:

Counsel: And did this concern you,
that they were marketing that their specificity was better in the Sigdel study
than in the Bloom study?

Witness: You [counsel] kind of
mentioned how many phone calls I got from the University of Pennsylvania, from
Cleveland Clinic, from all around the country about their claiming superiority
based on what, they have a better assay. So this caused a lot of confusion
internally and externally with our customers.

Another witness:

Counsel: So does it matter whether
the other party is claiming superiority or not?

A. Absolutely.

… You know, these two publications
are ones that are not apples to apples, and they’re going around as if they are
and confusing clinicians, confusing patients.

“No rational juror could conclude from this vague,
conclusory, and hearsay-riddled testimony that customers were deceived by or
relied on false advertisements published by Natera.” In a trademark case, it’s
much less likely that this would be considered hearsay, but instead reporting mental
state.

Still, “in the Third Circuit, evidence of an intent to
mislead does not warrant a presumption of actual deception.” Judgment as a
matter of law on Lanham Act damages for Natera. Thus, CareDx also failed to
establish the causation and injury required to sustain a damages award arising
from its state law claims (and this also doomed the entire state unfair competition
claim).

However, there was sufficient evidence of literal falsity. For
example, the jury found literally false Natera’s claim that Prospera is “[m]ore
sensitive and specific than current assessment tools across all types of
rejection.” But Natera’s designated corporate representative admitted at trial
that two studies showed that Prospera’s specificity was lower than AlloSure’s
specificity and that AlloSure was a “current assessment tool[,]” as that phrase
is used in the advertisement. Natera argued that the claim was ambiguous and
thus not literally false because the phrase “sensitive and specific”
“reasonably refers to ‘AUC’—a measure familiar to physicians that combines both
sensitivity and specificity.” But ambiguity is a fact question for the jury.

The DTPA doesn’t require actual confusion, so there was
still liability.

If the judgment was later vacated or reversed, a new trial
would be required.

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2023/07/false-advertising-and-tm-infringement.html

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no duty to defend despite allegations of label copying; but insurers can’t recoup defense costs already spent

Continental Casualty Company v. Winder Laboratories, LLC,
— F.4th —-, 2023 WL 4504183, No. 21-11758 (11th Cir. Jul. 13, 2023)

Winder, a generic pharma manufacturer, sought insurance
coverage for a false advertising lawsuit. The court of appeals affirmed the
finding that there was no coverage, but also that Winder didn’t have to pay the
insurers back for the representation they offered during the coverage dispute.

As relevant “personal and advertising injury” was defined to
include an injury “arising out of” either “[o]ral or written publication, in
any manner, of material that slanders or libels a person or organization or
disparages a person’s or organization’s goods, products or services” or “[t]he
use of another’s advertising idea in [the insureds’] ‘advertisement.’ ”1 The
policies also had a “failure to conform” provision that excluded coverage for
injuries “[a]rising out of the failure of goods, products or services to
conform with any statement of quality or performance made in [the insureds’]
‘advertisement.’ ” Neither policy at issue included a reimbursement provision
allowing the insurers to recoup defense costs.

The underlying lawsuit by Concordia asserted various claims
under the Lanham Act and Georgia law, focusing on the allegation that Winder
“falsely or misleadingly advertised their B-Donna product, and subsequently
their Phenohytro product, as generic [equivalents] to [Concordia’s product]
DONNATAL directly to the pharmaceutical industry, including to potential
purchasers.”

The insurers agreed to defend, subject to a reservation of
rights to disclaim coverage, but also included a “not-so-standard reimbursement
provision”: “VFI specifically reserves its right to seek reimbursement of
defense costs incurred on [the insureds’] behalf for all claims which are not
potentially covered by the VFI Policy.” The insurers also sued for a
declaratory judgment that they had no duty to defend or indemnify.  The district court held that Concordia’s
allegations were “squarely” excluded by the “failure to conform” provision
because the “operative complaint [was] based entirely upon allegations that
[Winder] misrepresented the quality” of Winder’s products.

Winder argued that Concordia’s complaint alleged a “personal
and advertising injury” because it included allegations that Winder copied
Concordia’s DONNATAL label inserts. But did the false advertising claim hinge
on the alleged label copying? If so, there would be coverage; if not, and the claim
rested on allegations that Winder actively misrepresented its drugs, then the
alleged injury arose from the “failure of goods … to conform with any
statement of quality or performance made in [the insureds’] ‘advertisement,’ ”
and the insurers were protected by the “failure to conform” exclusion.

The court of appeals agreed with the latter approach. The
copying allegations were clearly in service of the misrepresentation of
equivalence claim—copying was merely one of the means by which the misrepresentation
was allegedly carried out. This was not a “personal and advertising injury”
stemming from “[t]he use of another’s advertising idea”—i.e., Concordia’s
labels. The specific allegation that Winder made “false or misleading”
representations and statements about its products by “marketing the products as
‘generics’ that are comparable to and/or substitutable for [Concordia’s]
DONNATAL,” was a “textbook” of failure-to-conform.

Also, Winder argued that Concordia’s false advertising claim
relied on statements made by non-party drug databases for which Winder wasn’t
responsible; but Concordia clearly alleged that Winder’s initial alleged misrepresentations
were the but for cause of its injuries. Winder further alleged that it only
made true statements which couldn’t “fail … to conform with any statement of
quality or performance ….” However, the underlying complaint, which
determined coverage, alleged misrepresentations.

At least Winder wasn’t required to reimburse the insurers. “[B]ecause
insurers under Georgia law have a broad duty to defend when there is ‘even
arguably’ a covered claim, the insurers had an active duty to defend up until
the point when the district court ruled otherwise. Simply put, under the facts
of this case, the insurers were under a duty to defend until the district court
ruled that they were not.” No new contract was created by the insurers’
reservation of rights letter, and just asserting a right to reimbursement in a
reservation of rights letter isn’t enough if the insurance contract did not
contemplate a right to recoupment.

There was no consideration for the reimbursement provision. Importantly,
“a promise to perform a preexisting contractual obligation does not constitute
consideration for a new agreement.” The parties’ contracts already required a
defense against certain third-party lawsuits, so the letters were no more than a
promise to perform an existing obligation. Further, the underlying contract
didn’t provide which party would select legal counsel, so offering Winder the option
to choose counsel didn’t give up anything on the insurers’ side.

Nor was Winder unjustly enriched by retaining “the benefit
of an expensive defense to which they knew they were not entitled.” Even
assuming this argument didn’t immediately fail due to the existence of a
written contract, there was nothing “unjust” about requiring the insurers to
fulfill their contractual obligations. “[W]e cannot say that an insured is
unjustly enriched when its insurer tenders a defense in order to protect its
own interests, even if it is later determined that the insurer did not owe a
defense.”

Georgia law wouldn’t require this, the court predicted. “The
duty to defend is extremely broad under Georgia law.” There was no majority
rule favoring recoupment nationwide; the current case law “appears to be
more-or-less in equipoise with the recent trend favoring the ‘no recoupment’
rule.” More importantly, in Georgia, the broad duty to defend is “foundational.”
But a rule allowing for broadscale reimbursement without any contractual
provision securing that right would collapse the duty to defend into the duty
to indemnify. “That is, if the duty to defend required insurers to mount a
defense but the defense was widely reimbursable upon a court’s determination
that no ongoing duty to defend exists, the duty to defend would simply become
the duty to indemnify.” [This seems technically untrue—you could have a rule
separating the duty to defend from the duty to indemnify as long as a court
agreed that the allegations of the complaint created the duty to defend but an ultimate
finding/narrowing of the case could avoid the duty to indemnify—but that kind
of distinction does at least push against the breadth of the duty to defend.]

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2023/07/no-duty-to-defend-despite-allegations.html

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“stacked” car insurance is plausibly deceptive as useless for single vehicle

Peck v. Progressive Northern Ins.
Co., 2023 WL 2712390, — F.Supp.3d —-, No. 1:22-cv-00490-KWR-JFR (D.N.M.
Mar. 30, 2023)

Peck bought stacked
uninsured/underinsured motorist (“UM/UIM”) coverage on a single vehicle policy.
Stacked UM/UIM coverage permits an insured to aggregate the UM/UIM coverages on
all vehicles insured under a policy. But Peck alleged that stacked UM/UIM coverage
on a policy insurance for a single vehicle is illusory because the insured
receives no benefit for the additional premium.

The court thus declined to dismiss
Peck’s claim under New Mexico’s Unfair Insurance Practice Act (“No person shall
willfully collect any sum as premium or charge for insurance or other coverage,
which insurance or coverage is not then provided or in due course to be
provided (subject to acceptance of the risk by the insurer) by a policy issued
by an insurer as authorized by the Insurance Code.”). Insurance companies “have
a duty to disclose material facts about the policies they sell under the UIPA.”

Defendants argued that there was a
tangible benefit because the coverage available automatically increases if the
policyholder gets an additional vehicle, but there was an additional premium due
if that happened and the policyholder had the burden of notifying Progressive. And
insureds were entitled to stacking by default, unless there was a written
rejection. So it was unclear if there was any benefit to stacking a
single-vehicle policy. Plus, even if it wasn’t illusory, it could still be
deceptive for failing to disclose that there was no benefit to stacking a
single-vehicle policy.

There was no breach of contract
claim, but possibly breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing claim, unjust enrichment, and a New Mexico Unfair Trade Practices Act claim
for the same reasons.

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2023/07/stacked-car-insurance-is-plausibly.html

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Seen in my travels

 Good cafe name:

Cafe sign reading "The Breakfast Club"

A handbag that probably requires some explanation to today’s students:

A handbag decorated with images of videotape cassettes bearing handwritten labels of well-known movies like Top Gun

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2023/07/seen-in-my-travels.html

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Expert witnesses as Lanham Act defendants

Via an eagle-eyed correspondent: J&J’s bankrupt
subsidiary LTL is suing
the expert witnesses
for the mesothelioma victims in the underlying tort
litigation for injurious falsehood, fraud, and Lanham Act violations for disparaging J&J’s Baby
Powder as causing mesothelioma. They allege that the experts’ published articles were part of a commercial advertising scheme to get hired as expert witnesses, which is … not super consistent with existing caselaw. Suing experts, a very normal thing to
do. Too bad there’s no federal anti-SLAPP law.

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2023/07/expert-witnesses-as-lanham-act.html

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Generic use in the wild

 Are they really super jeep tours?

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2023/07/generic-use-in-wild.html

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Ambiguity could be deceptive where “buy 3 get two free” really meant “get 5 at a lower price per unit”

Sihler v. Fulfillment Lab, Inc, No. 20cv1528-LL-DDL, 2023 WL
4335735 (S.D. Cal. Jun. 23, 2023)

Common sense is a big part of advertising law, as implemented
by the reasonable consumer. It can be hard to distinguish one case from another
in its formal characteristics. Here, the view of a reasonable consumer is
established by empirical evidence of deceptions and complaints, the court says—though
is it really making a normative judgment?

Defendants allegedly use fake celebrity and magazine
endorsements, as well as misrepresentations about price and limited
availability, to induce consumers into buying “keto” weight-loss pills. As
described:

Consumers click on ads that appear
to be news articles with false celebrity endorsements of the Keto Products.
This ad takes them to a landing page for the product with more
misrepresentations. When they click on the purchase button, they are presented
with several purchase offers including “Buy 3 Bottles, Get 2 Free.” Consumers
are warned that supplies are limited or that the special offer will expire soon.
These landing pages are allegedly inaccessible to anyone who does not view the
advertisements or are deleted after a few weeks or months to avoid detection.
After consumers complete their purchase, they are allegedly overcharged for the
full price of all five bottles of product instead of the discounted “Buy 3
Bottles, Get 2 Free.” When consumers dispute the charge with their bank or
credit card company, Defendants allegedly present investigators with a “false
front” website for the Keto Products that includes the actual purchase prices
of the different options, no false advertising, and an easy-to-find “terms and
conditions” hyperlink. Defendants allegedly use the false front websites to
deceive the bank and credit card companies into believing that consumers
purchased Keto Products from those websites rather than the landing pages.

Plaintiffs brought both California statutory claims and RICO
claims; the court certified a nationwide RICO class and a California subclass.

If you want a sense of how this is going to go, defendants
contested numerosity because there was only shipping data, not data on how many
different consumers bought and used products. With tens of thousands of
shipments, and sales of about $93 million in two and a half years, the court
found numerosity. (They also argued that there was no typicality because a
named plaintiff described viewing a website promoting “Buy 3 bottles, Get 2
free” but the website examples submitted instead promote “Buy 3, Get 2 Free.”
The court disagreed.)

Commonality of deception on a classwide basis:  Under California law, no individualized proof
of deception, reliance, or injury is required if the conduct would deceive a
reasonable, ordinary consumer in the target population. Defendants argued that
there was no evidence of deception of reasonable consumers other than named
plaintiffs’ own declarations, but the court disagreed:

Plaintiffs provided examples of
webpages with the same allegedly false and misleading endorsements and pricing
information similar to what they viewed and relied on. They also submitted instructions for Keto
Products call center employees that describe three standard buying packages,
which match the package options and unit prices on the webpages that Plaintiffs
viewed and in the examples that they provided. The
only other buying packages described in the instructions are for unadvertised
special promotional packages. The call center instructions also describe
typical calls, which include complaints of being overcharged in the same manner
that Plaintiffs describe: that they believed they would be charged the listed
price for two or three bottles and receive one or two bottles free, but were
instead charged the listed price for all bottles received.

Along with a witness who testified to the lack of change in
ads over time, plaintiffs showed that they and absent class members viewed the
same or substantially similar endorsements and pricing information.

Would this be likely to mislead a reasonable consumer?

The three package options are
advertised as follows: (1) text reads “Buy 3 Get 2 Free!” followed by
“$39.74/bottle” with a depiction of a group of three bottles next to a group of
two bottles with a plus sign between them; (2) text reads “Buy 2 Get 1 Free!”
followed by “$49.97/bottle” with a depiction of a group of two bottles next to
one bottle with a plus sign between them, and (3) text reads “Buy 1 Bottle”
followed by “$69.99/bottle.”

Are those additional bottles “free”?

Defendant argued that a reasonable consumer would understand
that they’d be charged $39.74 for each of 5 bottles if they bought five. It’s
obvious to an ordinary English speaker that you wouldn’t offer that deal that
way (you’d say “buy 5 at $39.74 each!” etc.) if you wanted it understood. The
FTC’s guides on the use of “Free” would also count against this, if considered.

The court found the same declarations, webpage examples, and
call center scripts to be sufficient evidence that a reasonable consumer is
likely to be misled. (E.g., a standard script for “I was overcharged” that begins when a caller says words to the effect of “I thought it was $39.74 x 3 bottles which would be $119.22.”) Here, the “ambiguity” in the pricing information supported
misleadingness—compare the treatment of “ambiguity” in cases that reject
consumer claims. Would this work if there were fine print disclosures “resolving”
the ambiguity? My suspicion is that it wouldn’t—and shouldn’t—because a
substantial number of reasonable consumers would have no reason to think that “free”
was ambiguous. But how, otherwise, are we to tell what counts as “correctable
ambiguous” and “misleadingly ambiguous”? As the court points out, “even a
perfectly true statement couched in such a manner that it is likely to mislead
or deceive the consumer, such as by failure to disclose other relevant
information, is actionable under [the FAL].” I tend to think the “correctable
ambiguity, thus plaintiffs lose” cases downplay misleadingness without a good
theory.

And since misleadingness is an objective test, it’s capable
of classwide resolution. The rest (including predominance) follows, including certification
on the RICO claims of all things.

 

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2023/07/ambiguity-could-be-deceptive-where-buy.html

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Oregon SCt rules on “ascertainable loss” in false discount case

Clark v. Eddie Bauer LLC, 371 Or. 177, — P.3d —-, SC
S069438 (Jun. 29, 2023)

Under Oregon’s Unlawful Trade Practices Act (UTPA), a person
who suffers an “ascertainable loss of money or property” as a result of another
person’s violation of the UTPA may maintain a private action against that
person. The Ninth Circuit certified to the state supreme court the question
whether a consumer can suffer an “ascertainable loss” under the UTPA when she
buys items at an outlet store that have been advertised as being sold at a
substantial discount but that have never been sold at that or any other
location at the “list,” or non-sale price, and when she would not have
purchased at that price but for the false advertising of a sale price. The state
supreme court answered yes, that was an ascertainable loss.

Under the facts as stated in the certification order, more
than 90 percent of the products offered at Eddie Bauer outlet stores are
manufactured solely for sale at the outlet stores and are not sold elsewhere:

Defendants advertise clothing at
the Eddie Bauer Outlet stores as being sold at a substantial discount, typically
between 40 percent and 70 percent off. However, with limited exceptions, the
clothing is never sold—at the outlet stores or anywhere else—at the “list”
price, i.e., the price shown on each product’s original tag; the clothing sold
at the outlet stores is only ever sold at “discounted” prices.

State law bars, among other things, false or misleading
representations of fact concerning the reasons for, existence of, or amounts of
price reductions and advertising price comparisons without conspicuously
identifying the origin of the price the seller is comparing to the current
price. The plaintiff alleged that she wouldn’t have made her purchases if she’d
known that the goods weren’t in fact being sold at a discount.

Defendants argued that plaintiff
had received exactly the products that she believed she was buying, and that
their value at the time of sale was at least what plaintiff had paid. They
noted that plaintiff had not alleged, for example, that the Fleece Zip [she
bought] was worth less than the $19.99 sale price or that it did not possess
the features or quality that plaintiff had expected it to have.

Thus, they argued, there was no ascertainable loss. The
district court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss on the ground that the
complaint didn’t allege that defendants had made false representations about
the character or quality of the garments that plaintiff bought, which the
district court understood to be essential under the state supreme court’s
decision in Pearson v. Philip Morris, Inc., 361 P.3d 3 (2015). On appeal,
plaintiff noted that many of the provisions of the consumer protection law prohibit
deception in ways that do not relate to the quality or characteristics of a
product, and argued that she’d suffered an ascertainable loss in various ways,
including price inflation from the putative bargain.

“Ascertainable loss” means, generally, “any determinable
loss,” even a loss that cannot be measured exactly. Only economic losses may be
recovered, although even if “[t]he private loss … may be so small that the
common law likely would reject it as grounds for relief, yet it will support an
action under the statute.” And, given the legislature’s consumer-protection
concerns, it was appropriate to take a broad view of “ascertainable loss.”

The court here addressed only the theory that the plaintiff
wouldn’t have purchased at the price that she actually paid had she known the
truth, not other theories of injury (such as that the overall market price was
inflated by the even higher reference prices).

“[P]laintiff only was required to allege that, as a result
of any practice prohibited under the UTPA, she suffered an ascertainable
loss—that is, a loss capable of being observed or determined, however small.”
Where the product was not what was bargained for, it doesn’t matter that there’s
no outside, objective measure of market value.

In plaintiff’s case, what she
wanted was items of clothing whose selling price had, at some earlier time,
been what defendants’ false price list-ings indicated. What she received, on
the other hand, was merchandise that had never been offered for sale at those
prices. Thus, whether or not those items ever sold at those higher price
points, and whether or not defendants’ alleged pricing scheme can be viewed as
representing that the items previously had retail or market values equivalent
to the prices shown on their product tags, plaintiff paid money to defendants
for articles of clothing that she would not have bought had she known their
true price history. The money that plaintiff is out as a result is her “loss.”…

As the Connecticut Supreme Court
observed in discussing that state’s statute, it should not matter that a person
unlawfully led to believe that she was buying one thing ultimately received
another thing of equal or even greater value. Hinchliffe, 184 Conn at 614, 440
A2d at 814 (“To the consumer who wishes to purchase an energy saving
subcompact, for example, it is no answer to say that he should be satisfied
with a more valuable gas guzzler.”).

The alternative holding would leave citizens without a
remedy where the legislature declared a practice unlawful and provided for a
private remedy, and we don’t live in a world of perfect efficiency where the
plaintiff could resell the product without transaction costs for exactly the
price she paid.  Thus, the court rejected
the idea that “a person does not suffer an ascertainable loss so long as she
receives something of equal or greater value than the money she was deceived
into giving up for it.”

Although other courts interpreting other laws have reached
the opposite conclusion, reasoning that deception alone can’t be injury, that’s
not what’s going on. The injury is loss of money the consumer would have
retained if the defendant had not unlawfully deceived her (as opposed to a situation
where she saw the allegedly fake sale price, believed it and thus was deceived,
but still didn’t buy, where there would be no loss).  

 

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2023/07/oregon-sct-rules-on-ascertainable-loss.html

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no predominance of common issues where many consumers would still have taken the drug at issue

Painters & Allied Trades District Council 82 Health Care
Fund v. Takeda Pharm. Co., 2023 WL 4191651, — F. Supp. 3d –, No.
2:17-cv-07223-JWH-AS (C.D. Cal. May 24, 2023)

I tell my students that probabilistic claims are easier for
competitors to bring than directly harmed consumers themselves, because competitors
can aggregate harm, whereas if a court thinks that only 45% of consumers were deceived
it may well reject a direct consumer protection claim. This case illustrates
that principle well, though in a slightly different configuration. Here, a national
third-party payer class was certified, but not a California consumer class.

The claims relate to the drug Actos and allege RICO violations
and violations of state consumer protection laws because defendants conspired
to market Actos fraudulently by concealing the association between its use and
its users’ subsequent development of bladder cancer. Defendants allegedly misled
the FDA regarding the risk of bladder cancer by generating false studies,
manipulating study results, and controlling the messaging about Actos to
conceal aspects of the drug’s mechanism that could have raised concerns, and
also misled prescribing physicians, consumers, and third-party payors into
believing that Actos did not create an increased risk of bladder cancer. A
group of patients who developed bladder cancer sued and a jury returned a
verdict in favor of bellwether plaintiffs.

Painters alleged that it “reimbursed a significant number of
claims at potentially elevated prices for Actos” that would not have been
reimbursed “but for the fraud. Emails, testimony, and internal marketing
studies suggested that defendants were aware that language linking Actos to
bladder cancer would reduce sales of Actos, and sales of Actos indeed began to
decline when the FDA announced that it would investigate Actos for bladder
cancer risk. Sales dropped even more precipitously after a bladder cancer
warning was added to the Actos label. Plaintiffs’ expert found that, had a
bladder cancer warning been issued from the beginning, third-party payors would
have paid for 56% fewer Actos prescriptions during the class period.

The expert estimated that around 40% of the Actos
prescriptions would have still been written (and, thus, would have been
reimbursed), even if there was full awareness of the bladder cancer risks,
while 56.77% were fraudulently induced. Only third-party payors who paid for at
least five Actos prescriptions would be part of the class; the odds were thus
that any TPP that paid for at least five Actos prescriptions had,
statistically, a 98.5% chance of suffering an injury; that 1.5% chance didn’t
defeat predominance. And other data indicated that only about 4% of patients
switched from Actos to an equally or more expensive drug, which again wasn’t
enough to defeat predominance for the TPPs.

But there was no predominance for the consumer class,
because the individual plaintiffs would vary so much in whether they still
would have taken the drug if they’d known the true risks. There was “some
compelling common evidence of materiality,” such as a “wave” of physician
contacts in the wake of the actual risk disclosures, and one defendant’s
concession that bladder cancer risks would be a “serious thing” for a
healthcare professional.

Nonetheless,

the materiality of that bladder
cancer risk to patients’ diabetes prognoses is highly individualized. Moreover,
some medicines and treatment regimens would be ineffective; some patients would
have no other option other than Actos, notwithstanding the bladder cancer risks.
Those determinations necessarily reside with the patients and their physicians.
Even Comanor recognized that reality. Therefore, the question of whether Takeda
or Lilly’s omissions were material to the choices of any physician-patient
tandem is an individualized one.

California’s ordinary presumption of reliance from material
deceptiveness was insufficient, because doctors consider so many patient-specific
factors in prescribing. Although the bladder cancer risks here were “ones that
most reasonable physicians and patients would evaluate before choosing an
appropriate healthcare regimen,” materiality exists only where the omission of
those risks “would have been important to the decision-making process.” And
that was individualized.

The Court is loath to insert itself
into the doctor’s office and impose its judgment onto physicians and their
patients, blanketly concluding on behalf of all “reasonable persons” that some
risks matter (i.e., bladder cancer risk) and that some do not (i.e., untreated
or mismanaged diabetes). … And indeed, [plaintiffs’ expert’s] own model
suggests that 40% of Actos purchases would have been made even if full
information of the risks was known. Forty percent is not a trivial amount ….

This also meant that there were individualized questions of
actual injury (for the CLRA claim) that predominated over common issues. The
court also thought the damages model wasn’t sufficiently explained, compared to
the damages model for the TPPs.

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2023/07/no-predominance-of-common-issues-where.html

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odd 2d Circuit case about misleadingness versus confusion

Gibson v. SCE Gp. Inc., 2023 WL 4229913, No. 22-916 (2d Cir.
Jun. 28, 2023)

Another models (and one model’s sister) v. nightclubs case. Gibson
et al. appealed partial summary judgment against them on on their claims for
false endorsement under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, and violations of New
York Civil Rights Law sections 50 and 51. Appellant Burciaga also appealed a
judgment awarding her $5,000. The court of appeals affirmed.

The “falsity of the implied association” between plaintiffs
and defendant didn’t relieve plaintiffs of the burden of showing likely
confusion. (As I’ve said before, it’s worth noting that the FTC generally thinks
that appearing in what is obviously an ad does not itself constitute an
endorsement, consistent with this outcome.)

Somewhat oddly, the court then says:

To the extent that this approach to
the false endorsement claim diverges from our caselaw involving false
advertising, that result is consistent with the fact that the two types of
claims are distinct. See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components,
Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 122 (2014) (explaining that false association and false
advertising claims under the Lanham Act are distinct). Whereas the text of the
Lanham Act’s false association provision requires that the false or misleading
representation of fact be “likely to cause confusion,” its false advertising
provision requires only that a person “misrepresent[ ].” Compare 15 U.S.C. §
1125(a)(1)(A), with id. § 1125(a)(1)(B).

This is one reason people don’t like unpublished opinions; false
advertising cases have also required resulting deception, but presumed it in
cases of literal falsity—not implied falsity.

This seems like unthinking textualism which future courts
will rightly not take seriously. How do you know if something is a
misrepresentation (as opposed to literally false) without looking at likely
deception?

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2023/07/odd-2d-circuit-case-about.html

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