MLM on MLM action: tortious interference, trade secret, but not false advertising

It
Works Marketing, Inc. v. Melaleuca, Inc., 2021 WL 1650266, No.
8:20-cv-1743-T-KKM-TGW (M.D. Fla. Apr. 27, 2021)

It
Works is a MLM company that sells health and beauty products that requires
distributors to sign a noncompete agreement and provides for arbitration (which
allows “any party” to sue in court for IP claims, practically meaning that It
Works can choose to sue if it wants). Melaleuca is a MLM competitor; individual
defendants were former It Works distributors, but Melaleuca was never a party
to the agreement.

The
claims are mostly the kind of trade secret/tortious interference claims you’d
expect from this setup, and I won’t say much about them, but there is also a
false advertising claim about alleged misrepresentations of distributors’
income with Melaleuca. “For example, Melaleuca endorses fake, high-amount
checks, which the Distributor Defendants then post on social media and message
to It Works distributors to entice them to leave It Works and join Melaleuca.”

In
Florida, a non-signatory can use equitable estoppel to compel a signatory to
arbitrate claims if (1) the non-signatory shows that the signatory is relying
on the agreement to assert its claims against the non-signatory and (2) the
scope of the arbitration provision covers the dispute. Here, It Works’ dispute
with Melaleuca fell outside the scope of the arbitration clause.

Thus,
the court proceeded to address the motion to dismiss, and found tortious
interference and trade secret claims properly pleaded.

False
advertising under the Lanham Act: Failed because It Works didn’t plead that
distributors were “consumers” under the Lanham Act. Solicitations directed to a
potential distributor or employee aren’t covered because they aren’t
“consumers.” (That isn’t actually an element, but this may be complicated by
the fact that MLM businesses have some special reasons to talk carefully about
whether their “distributors” are ordinary “consumers.”) Second, It Works relied
on allegedly false statements that Melaleuca distributors made, allegedly at
Melaleuca’s direction or encouragement, not on Melaleuca advertising. That was
a contributory false advertising claim, but It Works didn’t actually allege
contributory false advertising by Melaleuca.

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CA prohibition of insurance coverage for certain consumer protection cases is constitutional

Adir Int’l,
LLC v. Starr Indemnity & Liability Co., 994 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir.
Apr. 15, 2021)

California’s
AG sued Adir for violating state consumer protection laws based on conduct at
its retail stores that allegedly exploited its mainly low-income,
Spanish-speaking customer base. Adir asked its insurance carrier to pay its
legal defense fees. Though the insurer agreed, the AG warned that the California
Insurance Code forbade it from providing coverage in certain consumer
protection cases brought by the state. The insurer reversed itself and Adir
challenged the law’s constitutionality, arguing that the state unfairly
stripped it of insurance defense coverage based on unproven allegations in the
complaint. This, the court of appeals held, didn’t facially violate Adir’s due
process right to retain counsel. “In civil cases, courts have recognized a
denial of due process only if the government actively thwarts a party from
obtaining a lawyer or prevents it from communicating with counsel. … While it
cannot tap into its insurance coverage, Adir has managed to obtain and
communicate with counsel.”

California’s
law provides:

(a)
No policy of insurance shall provide, or be construed to provide, any coverage
or indemnity for the payment of any fine, penalty, or restitution in any
criminal action or proceeding or in any action or proceeding brought pursuant
to [the UCL or FAL] by the Attorney General … notwithstanding whether the
exclusion or exception regarding this type of coverage or indemnity is
expressly stated in the policy.

(b)
No policy of insurance shall provide, or be construed to provide, any duty to
defend … any claim in any criminal action or proceeding or in any action or
proceeding brought pursuant to [the UCL or FAL] in which the recovery of a
fine, penalty, or restitution is sought by the Attorney General …
notwithstanding whether the exclusion or exception regarding the duty to defend
this type of claim is expressly stated in the policy.

True,
“California has stacked the deck against defendants facing these lawsuits filed
by the state: Although the Attorney General has yet to prove any of the
allegations in his lawsuit, he has invoked the power of the state to deny
insurance coverage that Adir paid for to defend itself.” But that wasn’t enough
of an interference to deny due process, especially given that there was no
allegation that Adir cannot afford competent counsel absent coverage under the
policy.  For comparison, “the right to
retain counsel does not require the release of frozen assets so that a civil
defendant can hire an attorney or otherwise defend his claim.” There was no “indirect
right to fund and retain the counsel through an insurance contract.”

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falsely advertising “proprietary” and “exclusive” material isn’t actionable under Dastar

Crocs, Inc. v. Effervescent, Inc., 2021 WL 4170997, No.
06-cv-00605-PAB-KMT, No. 16-cv-02004-PAB-KMT (D. Colo. Sept. 14, 2021)

Dawgs alleged that Crocs falsely marketed its shoes in
violation of the Lanham Act by advertising Croslite, the foam material that
Crocs shoes are made from, as “patented,” “proprietary,” and “exclusive.” Dawgs
stated that it “received numerous inquiries from its customers and potential
customers regarding Dawgs’[s] foam material in comparison with Croslite” and
that these inquiries “have consistently revealed a concern that Croslite is
superior because it is held out as patented, exclusive[,] or proprietary such
that[,] in the mind of the customer, Crocs is perceived to have invented a
superior [ethyl vinyl acetate (“EVA”)] material that no other manufacturer can
match.” Crocs admits that its advertisements have “linked” such terms as
“patented,” “proprietary,” and “exclusive” to features, characteristics, and
qualities of the product material, and that Crocs’s goal in its Croslite
messaging was to imply that its products have “superior characteristics,
qualities, and features.” This allegedly misled “the public and consumers by
claiming that Crocs footwear is made of an exclusive and proprietary
closed-cell resin that they call ‘Croslite,’ when, in fact, ‘Croslite’ is
merely the common ethyl vinyl acetate used by many footwear companies around
the world.”

Nonetheless, the court found that Dastar barred the
§43(a)(1)(B) claims as well as the §43(a)(1)(A) claims. I think this is
wrong—the patented/proprietary/exclusive language here is not the same as
claiming authorship; it’s claiming uniqueness as a reason for consumers to
believe that Crocs possess superior product characteristics to those of
competitors’ products. To the extent that the claims lead consumers to believe
that Crocs are “made of a material ‘different than any other footwear,’” a
difference made credible to consumers by references to patents and/or
proprietary knowledge, that is a claim about the physical nature of specific
product components, not about authorship. When the Supreme Court left
§43(a)(1)(B) claims open in Dastar, this is the kind of thing that fits
well.

But the court here disagreed, relying on the Federal
Circuit’s Baden Sports decision.  “Baden,
a basketball manufacturer, argued that Molten had engaged in false advertising
when Molten claimed that its basketballs were ‘innovative,’ ‘exclusive,’ and ‘proprietary’
when its ‘innovative’ layer of padding beneath the cover was invented by Baden,
not Molten.” The Federal Circuit held that §43(a)(1)(B) did not bar the
statements because “[n]o physical or functional attributes of the basketballs
[were] implied by Molten’s advertisements.” The terms “innovative,”
“exclusive,” and “proprietary” involved a “false designation of authorship,”
but “authorship, like licensing status, is not a nature, characteristic, or
quality” under the Lanham Act.

Comment: Baden’s claim was different than Dawgs’ claim here:
Baden claimed it was falsely losing credit, which really does sound like Dastar.
Dawgs’ claim is that Crocs falsely claimed to have a unique material, which it
does not in fact use. It’s not about credit or source of the idea at all.
“Proprietary” may or may not imply inventorship, but even if that implication
is non-actionable, if “proprietary” implies “made of different materials than
other competitors,” none of the concerns behind Dastar are implicated
and many of the concerns of false advertising law are.

I would have accepted Dawgs’ argument that Dastar
doesn’t apply because “Crocs has falsely advertised Croslite as patented,
proprietary, and exclusive in order to create a false impression regarding
specific qualities and characteristics of its shoe material, including that its
shoes are superior to competitors’, that they are soft, comfortable, lightweight,
odor-resistant, and non-marking, which goes to the nature, characteristics, or
qualities of the products.” However, the court didn’t find that argument made
in the claim or counterclaim, which merely alleged “that Croslite is merely a variation
of ethyl vinyl acetate used by many footwear companies around the world and
that, by Crocs claiming to have invented Croslite, Crocs has implied that
Dawgs’s footwear is inferior.” Dawgs only mentioned lightweightness, etc.
later. In a footnote, the court also found that “unauthenticated screenshots
from online reviews of Crocs shoes” provided to show actual confusion weren’t
admissible for summary judgment purposes.

But the court here found Baden persuasive. “Falsely
claiming to have ‘patented’ something is akin to claiming to have ‘invented’
it, and to plagiarizing or reverse passing off, which Dastar held not to
be covered by the Lanham Act’s false advertising prohibition.” [I think this
highlights the logic flaw: this isn’t reverse passing off! There’s nothing
entailed here about Crocs falsely claiming credit for something someone else
did, as there was in Baden where the allegations did at least resemble
reverse passing off.]

The Sixth Circuit has likewise held that “a
misrepresentation about the source of the ideas embodied in a tangible object
… is not a misrepresentation about the nature, characteristics, or qualities
of the object.” The court here thus reasoned that, “even assuming that Crocs
misrepresented the source of the ethyl vinyl acetate as a proprietary and
exclusive foam, Croslite, … that is not enough for a Lanham Act false
advertising claim under § 1125(a)(1)(B).”

Neither “exclusive” nor “proprietary” is a statement about
the nature, characteristics, or qualities of the product. Moreover, the
allegations that these statements claimed superiority didn’t help because “a
claim of superiority is puffery, which is not actionable under the Lanham Act.”
[Sleight of hand here: the nature of the claim is generalized to a superiority
claim, and “superior” is puffery. But the claim itself was of uniqueness, which
is a reason that the shoes might be superior, and is not vague or unmeasurable
in the same way.]

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both being on an app store and not being on an app store make confusion likely

Reflex Media, Inc. v. Luxy Ltd., 2021 WL 4134839, No.
2:20-cv-00423-RGK-KS (C.D. Cal. Jul. 13, 2021)

Eric
Goldman has highlighted the toxic assumptions about sex workers and their
clients that the court tosses off in its likely confusion analysis
. Potential
purchasers of sex are deemed “more sophisticated and less likely to be confused
since they are successful individuals looking for relationships” (citation
needed). But potential sellers of sex/people interested in the receiving payment side of an “arrangement” are
deemed unsophisticated because, apparently, they are just looking to “hook up,”
and the risks of sex work to their bodies, minds, freedom, and legal records
would apparently not induce careful scrutiny of the forum. Paging Ann
Bartow
!

Plaintiffs run online dating websites, Seeking
Arrangement.com and Seeking.com, along with a mobile application, Seeking,
which is not on the Apple App Store. Luxy operates a competing online dating
website, OnLuxy.com, and a mobile application, LuxyApp. Luxy allegedly used “Online
Arrangement” and plaintiffs’ trademark “Seeking Millionaire” as metatags on its
website, and other Seeking trademarks as search terms in the Apple Appstore and Google
Play Store to yield LuxyApp as a search result. Luxy also allegedly infringed
plaintiffs’ copyrights by copying their terms of use and privacy policy and by
using plaintiffs’ trademark “SA” in the description of its privacy policies.
[sigh]

In typical TM analysis fashion, the court concludes that
heads, plaintiffs win, and tails, defendants lose: because Seeking isn’t
on Apple’s app store, confusion is more likely when only Luxy’s app comes up in
response to a search since consumers will expect Apple to have everything.
[This seems like the rejected theory of liability in Amazon v. MTM, but clearly
I am not in tune with current keyword jurisprudence.] On the other hand,
because Seeking is on Google Play, confusion is also more likely
there because of the similarity of marketing channels.

“This situation is different from the websites in Network
Automation
and Playboy, which were clearly distinguished with ad designations.
The search results here do not have those same disclaimers.” [Again, no mention
of MTM.] [The court also suggests that, because Seeking isn’t on Apple’s app
store, consumers couldn’t compare the parties’ apps and thus it might not be
possible for defendants to engage in truthful comparative advertising on the
Apple app store, which seems like a pretty bad rule.]

The court doesn’t even dismiss the counterfeiting claim,
despite finding the legal argument that keywords aren’t applied to the defendant’s
goods persuasive; it wanted more briefing at the summary judgment stage.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the court doesn’t even discuss the
differences between false advertising and trademark, grouping it all into
§1125(a).

 

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TM claimant may add false advertising claims as direct competitor

Entrepreneur Media, Inc. v. Roach, 2021 WL 4134836, No.
8:20-cv-01690-JVS-AD (C.D. Cal. Jul. 1, 2021)

Entrepreneur, a frequent trademark claimant, sought to amend
its complaint and add new parties to the TM claims here. Entrepreneur has 15
federal registrations that include the word “entrepreneur.” Roach, meanwhile, makes
frequent use of the phrase “The Unstoppable Entrepreneur” and applied to
register the phrase for “Business consultancy; Business marketing consulting
services.” Entrepreneur’s opposition remains pending.

Of note: In the discussion of adding another defendant, the
court noted defendants’ argument that this was being done to harass: Defendants
alleged that “Entrepreneur’s counsel stated that Entrepreneur’s allegations
were likely to be highly publicized, and that he intended to refer Defendants’
dissatisfied customers to plaintiffs’ lawyers,” which they interpreted as a
threat. This “inference of intention to harass” was reasonable, but not
inevitable. “Entrepreneur’s desire to bring forth a claim for false advertising
against a competitor in a similar market is not unusual behavior.”

Along with adding a defendant, Entrepreneur might eventually
be allowed to add a false advertising claim, based on facts that were allegedly
discovered only during Roach’s deposition. Roach’s webinar slide deck allegedly
contained false statements to potential customers that Roach’s program is the
“only” program guaranteed to double someone’s revenue in twelve months. The
deck allegedly also referred to “9 Free Bonuses,” that a reasonable consumer
would allegedly conclude are sold separately. And, in deposition, Entrepreneur
allegedly learned for the first time that some of the customers in defendants’
advertised “Unstoppable Entrepreneur Success Stories” never enrolled in the
Unstoppable Entrepreneur Program. (Defendants rejoined that they came from
defendants’ pre-rebranding coaching program, but that factual dispute doesn’t
matter at this stage.)

However, there was not good cause to challenge the words
“flexible” and “risk free” on defendants’ website when a consumer attempts to
purchase the Unstoppable Entrepreneur Program. Entrepreneur allegeed that it
learned only after deposition that “this information is potentially misleading
to consumers because the purchase of the plan is locked in, and a consumer must
pay full price for the program.” But the website displaying two payment plans
along with specific information regarding the payment methods was publicly
available prior to the deposition, and the contract contained the specific
payment terms, which Entrepreneur acknowledged. “What Entrepreneur learned in
the Roach deposition was the same information that could be uncovered by
reading Defendants’ standard contract: that Defendants expected signing
consumers to continue contractual payment regardless of whether the consumer
wanted to leave the program midway through.”

Nor would amendment for the other statements necessarily be
futile, though further allegations would be required. Entrepreneur fell within
the statute’s zone of interests—alleged lost sales and reputational injury. And
Entrepreneur alleged that “but for” defendants’ false advertising, consumers
would not have been misled and diverted away from Entrepreneur. Although some
courts might well agree that this was merely conclusory, this court found that
sufficient. The parties could be considered “fellow commercial actor[s]” “because
both offer the same goods and services including coaching services consulting,
books, and podcasts,” and thus diversion from falsity was plausible.

In addition, Entrepreneur successfully alleged falsity under
Rule 9(b) by identifying the alleged falsehoods in the webinar slide deck.
Entrepreneur alleged that the Unstoppable Entrepreneur Program was not
guaranteed to double someone’s revenue in twelve months because many consumers
enrolled in the Unstoppable Entrepreneur Program did not achieve that result,
and that other programs could do so. And it was plausible that a consumer
viewing the “free bonuses” might reasonably conclude that they are able to be
purchased separately.

However, there were missing details that were required: Entrepreneur
didn’t state with particularity “when” the slide deck was presented (even a
date range), how often it was presented, how it was presented, or by which
defendant.

As to the allegedly false testimonials, likewise
Entrepreneur alleged the “what” (false testimonials) and the “how” (testimonies
provided by people who were not allegedly enrolled in the Unstoppable
Entrepreneur Program), but not the where and when. “Although Entrepreneur’s
Reply contends that the success stories are currently available on Defendants’
website, the proposed FAC fails to mention where the testimonials appear or
have appeared.” So the motion to add a false advertising claim was denied
without prejudice.

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TM complainant fails to sink its teeth into unrelated false advertising claims

Vampire Family Brands, LLC v. MPL Brands, Inc., No. CV
20-9482-DMG (ASx), 2021 WL 4134841 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2021)

VFB sued MPL for Lanham Act, UCL, and FAL violations based
on MPL’s “vampiro” cocktail. Unsurprisingly, the trademark claims survive a
motion to dismiss, but associated false advertising claims don’t.

VFB owns several trademark registrations including
“Vampire,” specifically for wine and pre-mixed alcoholic beverages other than
beer, and “Vampyre,” specifically for spirits. “VFB’s marks are visible to the
public in many places, including on VFB’s website, in the public records of the
USPTO, and in various national media due to VFB’s continuous marketing of its
products.” [Seriously? It seems more like a concession of lack of market
penetration if you have to rely on your own website and the PTO’s records to
show public recognition!] In 2017, VFB began selling a pre-mixed canned Bloody
Mary cocktail as “Vampire Gourmet Bloody Mary Cocktail,” allegedly made with
actual tomatoes and vodka. But it isn’t actually being made/distributed right
now, though VFB argued that it was coming back.

MPL sells a pre-mixed alcoholic cocktail labeled “Vampiro.” The
label asserts that it is “a fizzy grapefruit cocktail” made with “100% Blue
Agave,” although the ingredients list does not contain grapefruit. It is made
of agave wine, not from distilled spirits. Likewise, MPL also sells a
ready-to-drink “margarita wine cocktail” that doesn’t contain tequila or any
distilled spirit and is also made with agave wine.

VFB alleged trademark infringement, and that the Vampiro
Cocktail label’s claims that it is made from 100% agave and with grapefruit were
false advertising that would tarnish and dilute VFB’s marks. Similarly, VFB
alleged that a real “margarita” is made with tequila and, therefore, the
absence of tequila from MPL’s Margarita Cocktail constituted false advertising.
“Because the alcohol tax is approximately ten times that of the tax on wine,
VFB argues that Defendants gain an unfair competitive advantage against it and
other makers of alcoholic cocktails that use distilled spirits, rather than wine,
in their cocktail recipes.”

As I noted above, claims that “vampiro” was the generic name
of a Mexican cocktail or constituted descriptive fair use didn’t suffice to
grant a motion to dismiss. As to use as a mark, the court reasoned that the use
of “Vampiro” on MPL’s product as pictured in the images submitted by both
parties “shows that the word is in stylized, large font across the center of
the beverage can, in white font against a red background.” The description
“FIZZY GRAPEFRUIT COCKTAILWITH CITRUS & SPICE” was in smaller font beneath
“Vampiro,” “giving the impression that the smaller text is a descriptor and
Vampiro is a mark for the product.”

False advertising: Article III standing existed, but not
Lanham Act standing. VFB could establish injury in fact through “a chain of
inferences showing how defendant’s false advertising could harm plaintiff’s
business.” MPL argued that there was no concrete injury because VFB does not
currently sell any pre-mixed cocktail products. However, VFB’s CEO and counsel
[um] attested that “VFB has arrangements with another manufacturer to produce
more of the Vampire Bloody Mary and with experienced industry salespeople to sell
the product, and that VFB will resume sales after the current pandemic
subsides. VFB also submitted a new Certificate of Label Approval to the TTB for
the Vampire Bloody Mary in January 2020. “This evidence that VFB is prepared to
sell the Vampire Bloody Mary indicates that VFB could suffer non-speculative,
imminent harm from Defendants’ actions.” The relative cheapness of defendants’
“cocktails” could give them a competitive advantage. This was enough for
Article III standing.

Statutory standing, however, was more demanding:

Because VFB does not currently sell
the Vampire Bloody Mary and its previous sales were limited distributions at
beer festivals or a handful of liquor stores, VFB does not identify any
economic injury flowing from Defendants’ current advertising of the Margarita
Cocktail and Vampiro Cocktail. VFB does not allege prior economic injury, and
any future economic injury VFB may suffer when it restarts distribution of the
Vampire Bloody Mary is too attenuated to be considered proximately caused by
Defendants’ advertising.

And it was even more attenuated to argue that defendants’
allegedly false advertising of the Margarita Cocktail and Vampiro Cocktail harmed
VFB’s sales of other types of alcohol, specifically Vampire wine and Vampyre
vodka. The alleged falsity of the grapefruit/cocktail/margarita claims couldn’t
plausibly “directly cause consumers to purchase less of VFB’s red wine or
vodka, considering the differences between the types of beverages.” Even if
consumers were misled into thinking that the products contained distilled
spirits or natural ingredients, “it is not clear why those consumers seeking to
purchase a pre-mixed cocktail would instead reach for wine or vodka.
Characterizing VFB and Defendants as direct competitors because both make
alcoholic beverages would dramatically expand the ‘zone of interest’ in which a
plaintiff may sue for false advertising under the Lanham Act.”

UCL/FAL claims: Only survived to the extent they were
congruent with the trademark claims.

 

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“first urgent care” practice claim isn’t material or literally false

American Family Care, Inc. v. Medhelp, P.C., 2021 WL 4149782,
No. 2:19-CV-01325-LSC (N.D. Ala. Sept. 13, 2021)

Not having a materiality or harm requirement really makes a
difference in trademark cases compared to false advertising cases—look at the
reasons this false advertising claim fails.

AFC sued MedHelp for Lanham Act false advertising. AFC supplies
urgent care, family/primary care, and occupational health services nationwide;
its first clinic opened in Hoover, Alabama (Birmingham’s largest suburb), in
1982; no other urgent care clinics were operating in Birmingham.  But, for several years, MedHelp advertised on
its website that “MedHelp was founded in 1982 as the first Urgent Care/Family
Practice in Birmingham.” (In the 1980s, “urgent care” wasn’t in use, and such
clinics were typically called “freestanding emergency rooms,” “minor emergency
rooms,” “immediate care clinics,” or “walk-in clinics.”)

First, the court found that “founded in 1982 as the first
Urgent Care/Family Practice in Birmingham” was ambiguous because there is no
consistent definition of the term “urgent care.” And it was also ambiguous
whether “Birmingham” meant with or without its suburbs. [Comment: There is a
missing step here not revealed in the court’s decision: is MedHelp’s claim
truthful under any plausible definition? Maybe, but the court should
have clarified; if there are multiple possible meanings but the defendant’s
claim isn’t truthful using any of them, then other courts have found literal
falsity, which makes sense given the justifications for the literal/implicit
division.]

Since the ad was “merely misleading,” AFC needed evidence of
consumer deception, which it did not have.

In addition, AFC failed to show materiality, despite its
argument that the claim conveys “broader qualities including, but not limited to,
‘experience,’ ‘trust,’ and ‘competence’ that are important in choosing a health
care provider.” AFC’s expert cited two studies: a conjoint analysis of patient
decisions in two German hospitals and research involving health-seeking
preferences of elderly Filipinos. But the expert failed to link German and
Filipino preferences to US urgent care preferences.

Finally, AFC also failed to show injury. Its expert relied
on evidence that first movers should have a 24-30% market share advantage, but
there wasn’t any evidence that AFC was the first mover in the US urgent care
market and indeed a witness testified that there were “less than a hundred”
urgent care clinics when AFC opened its clinic in Hoover. Nor did the expert
discuss other potential causes like customer service, negative publicity (AFC
was sued for insurance fraud), or technology. Further, there wasn’t evidence
that the misleading first-mover claim “caused AFC to lose any profits, goodwill,
or business opportunities”; there wasn’t even any evidence on how many people
saw the claim.

With all this, the TMA’s presumption of irreparable harm was
no help.

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Second Circuit requires confusion for counterfeiting

Hamilton International Ltd. v. Vortic LLC, No. 20-3369-cv
(2d Cir. Sept. 14, 2021)

A small note about this case affirming a finding that
vintage Hamilton pocketwatch movements converted to wristwatches were not
likely to cause confusion under Champion and Polaroid: While it’s
not really a great leap forward for refurbished goods—at most, the Second
Circuit refused to take further bites out of the doctrine, and its emphasis on
consumer sophistication may even make things harder for Etsy jewelry makers—it
may be less noticeable that the court appears to have joined the
Ninth Circuit
in requiring likely confusion before counterfeiting can be
found.

The court of appeals found that the district court’s “analysis
of Hamilton’s trademark infringement claim under the Lanham Act necessarily
compelled judgment in favor of Vortic and Custer on Hamilton’s remaining
claims. This is because each of those claims required some showing of a
likelihood of consumer confusion. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (federal
counterfeiting claim requiring the plaintiff to show that the use of the
counterfeit mark is “likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive”) ….” [Side note: A little weird to say that state law blurring claims
fail for want of confusion, but I’ll take it—the court says that state dilution
factors “resembl[e] the Polaroid factors and similarly focus[] on confusion.”
Dilution: what is it good for? Absolutely nothing!]

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scientific studies don’t have to be of D’s product exactly for plausibility

Rosenfeld v. AC2T, Inc., 2021 WL 4197176, No.
1:20-cv-04662-FB-PK (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2021)

Rosenfeld alleged that defendants fraudulently marketed a
mosquito control product called “Spartan Mosquito Eradicator.” Spartan’s
advertising allegedly touted that the product will “significantly decrease[ ]
[mosquito] population within 15 days,” and “[p]rovid[e] up to 95% mosquito
control for up to 90 days.” It purported to work through three crucial
ingredients: sugar, salt, and yeast. Spartan advertised that when the product
is mixed with water and ingested by a mosquito, the “crystalline structure” of
salt cuts the mosquito’s stomach, “causing it to rupture.” Meanwhile, the
fermentation process of the yeast produces carbon dioxide inside the mosquito,
also causing its stomach to rupture.

Rosenfeld alleged that none of this was true, as a matter of
biology. He cited a number of studies to bolster his allegations.  

Although the allegation that “[S]partan is ineffective for
mosquito control because it does not kill mosquitoes or decrease mosquito
populations” was not in itself sufficient for plausibility, he cited scientific
studies to support it. AC2T argued that, because those studies did not test
Spartan’s particular chemical formulation, but rather tested only its
constituent ingredients, they cannot support conclusions regarding Spartan’s
effectiveness or establish the plausibility of the complaint.

Not so. Plausibility is the standard; a “claim that a
product physically cannot work is a valid legal theory.” The theory was factually
substantiated with “studies indicating that Spartan’s individual active
ingredients cannot work in the manner that Spartan’s detailed advertising
represents.” Their weight or interpretation was a question of fact that couldn’t
be resolved on a motion to dismiss.

 

 

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Video game skates away from liability to pro skateboarder

Miller v. Easy Day Studios Pty Ltd, 2021 WL 4209205, No.
20cv02187-LAB-DEB (S.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2021)

Gordon v. Drape did mess things up in the Ninth
Circuit, but core Rogers cases are still simple. Defendants paid Zachary
Miller, a professional skateboarder, to assist in developing a video game,
called Skater XL. “Miller believed that the extent of his agreement with
Defendants was to model various clothing outfits, which would then be captured
by a technique called photogrammetry and applied to a generic character in the
video game. Miller alleges that he didn’t consent to the use of his image or
likeness in the game, yet one of the characters in it appears to be his exact
replica.” He sued for violations of the Lanham Act and state-law claims.

Miller alleged that defendants told him that the motion
capture was for a “generic” character in the video game that wouldn’t resemble
Miller or have any identifiable characteristics, and assured him that the video
game “won’t have your name anywhere or anything if you’re worried about that.” He
was paid $250.

Skater XL allows users to “simulate skateboarding tricks and
techniques in a realistic skateboarding environment.” Users can select from
five different skater characters, including four professional skateboarders and
a nameless “generic” skater avatar. “The first four characters are explicitly
identified by name and image in the game, while the latter generic character
has no name or identifying characteristics. This generic character can be
customized according to user preference, including customizing its gender,
race, hair color, clothing, and accessories.” However, Miller alleged that the
generic avatar was an “exact copy” of him, and easily identifiable as him.

False endorsement: Rogers applies; realism is
artistically relevant. “[T]here can be no doubt that including the likeness of
a real-life skateboarder in a video game seeking to simulate real-world
skateboarders and skateboarding environments obviously has at least some
artistic relevance to the work.”

The depiction was not explicitly misleading as to
endorsement
, which is what is required by the second prong of the test. The
court here states it nicely:

Miller argues that Defendants’
actions were explicitly misleading because at least two individuals contacted
him after recognizing his character in the video game. But this misses the
point. The issue here isn’t whether other consumers could simply recognize
Miller’s likeness in the game, but rather whether they would be misled into
believing his association with the game means he is somehow endorsing it.
Although the issue of customer confusion is factual in nature, it’s simply not
plausible that the inclusion of the only anonymous skateboarder in the game,
among four other explicitly identified skateboarders, would convince consumers
that Miller endorsed their video game.

As in the previous Brown video game case, “[t]he
anonymous character’s mere presence in Skater XL doesn’t equate to “an explicit
attempt to convince consumers that [Plaintiff] endorsed the game[ ].”

False advertising: Miller failed to plead statutory
standing. He didn’t compete with defendants. He didn’t allege that he lost
endorsement agreements or suffered any reputational injury, other than in
conclusory fashion. Thus, he failed to plead proximate causation. [Compare
trademark claims!]

The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over the state claims.

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