Rogers continues to collapse into transformativeness in the Ninth Circuit: dog toy edition

VIP Products LLC v.
Jack Daniel’s Properties, Inc., No. 18-16012 (9th Cir. Mar. 21, 2020)
VIP Products sells the “Bad Spaniels Silly Squeaker” dog toy, which
resembles a bottle of Jack Daniel’s Old No. 7 Black Label Tennessee Whiskey,
but has light-hearted, dog-related alterations. For example, the name “Jack
Daniel’s” is replaced with “Bad Spaniels,” “Old No. 7” with “Old No. 2,” and alcohol
content descriptions with “43% POO BY VOL.” and “100% SMELLY.”
Jack Daniel’s sued
for trademark infringement and dilution, and the district court enjoined the toy.
The court of appeals found that the trade dress was nonfunctional and distinctive,
but the dog toy was an expressive work entitled to First Amendment protection, so
the district court decision was reversed and remanded for Rogers treatment.

VIP’s purported goal
in creating Silly Squeakers was to “reflect” “on the humanization of the dog in
our lives,” and to comment on “corporations [that] take themselves very
seriously.” While the Jack Daniel’s label says, “Old No. 7 Brand Tennessee Sour
Mash Whiskey;” the label on the Bad Spaniels toy instead has the phrase “the
Old No. 2, on your Tennessee Carpet.” A tag states that the “product is not
affiliated with Jack Daniel Distillery.”
The nominative fair
use defense failed because VIP didn’t use the mark itself, but rather a changed
version with “significant differences.” E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star
Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 2008).
However, Rogers
v. Grimaldi
applied. Like greeting cards, “the Bad Spaniels dog toy,
although surely not the equivalent of the Mona Lisa, is an expressive work.” It
used “word play to alter the serious phrase that appears on a Jack Daniel’s
bottle— ‘Old No. 7 Brand’— with a silly message— ‘The Old No. 2.’” In an attempt to distinguish the old Dr. Seuss case, the court says that book made
“no effort to create a transformative work with ‘new expression, meaning, or message,’”
while Bad Spaniels “comments humorously on precisely those elements that Jack
Daniels seeks to enforce here.” [Note how Rogers is slowly collapsing
into transformativeness in the Ninth Circuit—continuing Gordon v. Drape Creative.]
Vacated and remanded
for Rogers analysis; although the district court is supposed to consider
both prongs, it’s hard to see how it could find a lack of artistic relevance,
and even after Gordon, the finding of transformativeness (and the fact
that Jack Daniel’s doesn’t make parody dog toys) seems to dictate the result on
explicit misleadingness.
Dilution: this is “noncommercial”
speech—it does more than propose a commercial transaction—so there can be no
dilution by tarnishment. The court phrases it in a weird way: “Although VIP
used JDPI’s trade dress and bottle design to sell Bad Spaniels, they were also
used to convey a humorous message.” Of course plenty of ads convey a humorous
message; the issue here is that the dog toy is the product being sold, as
opposed to being an ad for a separate product. Thats what makes
it noncommercial speech, not the fact that it was humorous.
I guess it’s a
better opinion than that in the Hummer/Activision case, which also reaches the
right result with grimace-worthy reasoning?

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lawsuit against supplement for implying arthritis claims not preempted

Yamagata v. Reckitt
Benckiser LLC, 2020 WL 1505724, No. 17-cv-03529-VC (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2020)
A very clear opinion. Yamagata challenged
RB’s advertising for joint supplements under California and NY law. As the court
explained: “If the boxes are best understood as making assertions about the
ability of the supplements to alleviate the symptoms of arthritis, those
assertions violate federal law, and the state law claims attacking them are not
preempted. If the boxes are best understood as not making assertions relating
to arthritis, those assertions are authorized by federal law, and the state law
claims are preempted.” The court found that the former was the case.
The court had certified
two classes—one of California buyers and one of New York buyers. RB moved for
summary judgment, arguing (1) preemption, (2) its products work as advertised,
and (3) the plaintiffs’ full refund theory had to fail because the supplements
were not worthless.
Preemption: “The key
constraint, for the purposes of this litigation, is a [federal] ban on
statements implying that the supplement mitigates, treats, prevents, or cures a
specific disease or class of diseases. Some of the assertions on the Move Free
Advanced labels do just that, and so they are not protected by the preemption
provision.” Generally, federal law allows supplements to make structure/function
statements [the court helpfully notes that these are called “claims” by the
regs but that’s confusing in this context], but not statements implying that
the supplement can “diagnose, mitigate, treat, cure, or prevent a specific
disease or class of diseases.”
First, is this a
jury issue? It’s partly a factual question insofar as it depends on what the label
statements mean, but the court determined that preemption is nonetheless a
question of law and so it would be decided by the court, even if that required
resolving factual disputes.  See Merck
Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668 (2019) (“a judge, not the
jury, must decide the preemption question,” and  “courts may have to resolve subsidiary factual
disputes that are part and parcel of the broader [preemption] question”).
The FDA says that the
key factor distinguishing a structure/function statement from an implied
disease statement is “whether the labeling suggests that the product will
produce a change in the characteristic signs or symptoms of a specific disease
or class of diseases.” The regs then list a series of ten criteria (one with
five subparts) relevant to that determination, and then provides examples of
statements that would fall on either side of the line: A statement that a
supplement “reduces joint pain,” for example, is off limits; a statement that
it “helps support cartilage and joint function” is not. The reason is that joint
pain is a characteristic symptom of arthritis, so statements about relieving
joint pain impliedly claim to mitigate the disease of arthritis. As the court
noted, “That may seem like a stretch, and it may even seem that the specific
reference to cartilage and joint function draws a closer link to arthritis than
does the broader ‘joint pain.’ But the idea that the FDA’s dictates may conflict
with intuitions only confirms that this preemption determination, while
fact-based, depends ultimately on application of the law.”

front and back

sides

Applying this
framework, the accused labels implied that the supplement can mitigate, treat,
or prevent arthritis. First, “supports joint comfort” was dangerously close to
a statement that a supplement “reduces joint pain;” it’s hard to articulate a
meaningful difference between the two. And a statement that is a structure/function
statement in isolation “can improperly imply an effect on a disease if other
parts of the label associate the supplement with a disease.” Relevant context
includes the product name, any pictures or symbols, citations to journal
articles, and statements about the formulation of the product, if printed on
the label.  Here, the ads contained “elements
closely associated with arthritis,” most prominently the Arthritis Foundation
logo, accompanied by the following statement: “Move Free™ is a Proud Sponsor of
the Arthritis Foundation®: Move Free™ is proud to support the Arthritis
Foundation’s efforts to help people take control of arthritis.” Even though the
“support” was clearly financial, “the logo and statement nonetheless draw an
explicit link between the supplement and arthritis,” which was relevant to the
meaning of the other statements on the label.
The court also
pointed to the citation to a journal article in the “Journal of Aging and Research,”
along with the choice to highlight glucosamine and chondroitin on the front of
the box. Osteoarthritis is “nearly universal…by age 80,” so a citation to an aging
journal on a joint supplement label was suggestive of arthritis, and industry
marketing research finds that about half of arthritis sufferers view “glucosamine
&/or chondroitin” as “the most effective arthritis treatment.” For the same
reason as “supports joint comfort” was an implied disease statement, the
statement that the product “supports 5 signs of joint health: mobility,
flexibility, strength, lubrication, and comfort” was also an implied disease
statement.
The court highlighted
that it was not determining falsity; it was determining whether the claims were
technically structure/function statements or implied disease statements solely
for purposes of preemption.  RB was not
constrained in its ability to argue about whether the labels implied, under
state law, that the supplement would mitigate arthritis.
Falsity/misleadingness:
RB relied on the purported benefits of calcium fructoborate alone, and not on
the effects of glucosamine or chondroitin, but there was a triable issue of
fact: RB had some evidence based on randomized control trials that calcium
fructoborate can benefit joints, while the plaintiff’s expert called the
methodology and reliability of those studies into question and another cultured
pig cartilage in various concentrations of calcium fructoborate and found no
positive effect. A jury could go either way.
Full refund theory:
RB argued that even if the supplements do not help joints, they are not
worthless because some of the ingredients can provide benefits unrelated to joint
health. “But people purchase joint supplements for the advertised joint health
benefits. … If the plaintiffs received none of the advertised joint health
benefits, they are entitled to a full refund.”

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T-Mobile is plausibly liable for acts of explicitly authorized dealers

City of New York v. T-Mobile
USA, Inc., 2020 WL 1498522, No. 451540/2019 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Mar. 23, 2020)
The City of New York
and the New York City Department of Consumer Affairs (DCA) sued T-Mobile, its subsidiary
MetroPCS New York, and 42 dealers, alleging violations of the Consumer
Protection Law and regulations. The court refused to dismiss the action against
T-Mobile and MetroPCS.
T-Mobile allegedly deceptively
targeted lower income consumers under its “lower-priced prepaid (no contract)
wireless brand” Metro by T-Mobile, formerly known as MetroPCS. The allegedly
deceptive practices included “selling used phones as though they were new”; “deceiving
consumers about financing”; “overcharging consumers”; “providing defective
receipts”; “failing to provide a receipt”; and “making deceptive
representations about the Metro by T-Mobile refund policy.” (NYC rules provide
that receipts must be offered for any consumer purchase over $20, and must be
provided on request for $5-20 purchases.)
T-Mobile argued that
it couldn’t be held liable for the alleged unlawful conduct by independent
dealers because T-Mobile has no contract with those dealers giving them actual
authority to act on behalf of T-Mobile, and the facts didn’t support a theory
of apparent authority. DCA sought to hold T-Mobile liable for two types of
deception: (1) its “30-Day Guarantee” was, in fact, only a limited 7-day return
policy with several conditions; and (2) the “Virtual Chat Assistant” on the
T-Mobile website (which was obviously T-Mobile’s responsibility) failed to
fully and correctly disclose the return policy. First, DCA sufficiently alleged
that T-Mobile was liable for deceptive acts by the Corporate Stores run
directly by T-Mobile’s subsidiary MetroPCS because those stores create the
impression of agency based on the relationship between the parties. And at a
minimum, the pleadings created a factual question whether T-Mobile is liable
under the apparent authority doctrine for the conduct of the dealers who were
labeled “authorized” not only in their signs but on the website and via conduct
in the stores.
DCA also alleged
deception by MetroPCS in its stores: selling used phones as if new; financing
terms that double the cost of the phone; overcharges via improper taxes and
activation payments; failure to provide receipts; and defective receipts. MetroPCS
apparently accepted responsibility for Corporate Stores, and it acknowledged
that it executed Indirect Dealer Agreements giving dealers actual authority to
act on behalf of MetroPCS, but it argued that their limited actual authority didn’t
extend to wrongful conduct. But that couldn’t be resolved at the pleading
stage: MetroPCD didn’t show as a matter of law that the dealers were at all
times “acting antagonistically” to the interests of MetroPCS.

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A blueberry bagel that is mostly imitation blueberry is plausibly misleading

Izquierdo v. Panera
Bread Co., No. 18-CV-12127 (VSB), 2020 WL 1503557 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2020)
Panera sold a “blueberry
bagel” that allegedly wasn’t.  [My father
thinks that bagels with fruit etc. in them already aren’t bagels, but the
allegation here is about the blueberry.] The court dismisses plaintiff’s claim
for injunctive relief because he isn’t likely to be injured again, but otherwise
denies the motion to dismiss his consumer protection claims.
The ingredient list
for the Bagel “is not displayed in-store,” but allegedly “contains only trace
amounts of real blueberries” and a “far greater proportion of imitation
blueberry ingredients.” Even inspecting the product, a reasonable consumer
allegedly couldn’t identify this fact. For context, Panera also sells a
Blueberry Muffin, which contains “fresh blueberries” as the second-to-last
ingredient and no imitation blueberries, and allegedly “[e]ven low-cost,
supermarket-shelf blueberry bagels contain only real blueberry ingredients,” so
that “[a] reasonable consumer would expect a blueberry bagel sold at a
bakery-café that stresses its healthfulness and authenticity to contain more
real blueberries than its low-cost, supermarket-shelf counterparts.”
The Second Circuit
isn’t as easy on future purchases as the Ninth, so plaintiff didn’t
successfully plead likely future injury and lacked standing for injunctive
relief.
However, he
plausibly alleged misleadingness to a reasonable consumer. The bagel is
advertised in stores with a placard reading “Blueberry” and online as a
“Blueberry Bagel,” and it allegedly appears to contain discrete pieces of fruit
scattered throughout the bagel. “It is plausible that a reasonable consumer
would believe that these visible pieces are real blueberries, in light of the
placard on the basket and their normal expectations of blueberry baked goods,”
especially given that it appears under a sign advertising Defendant’s
commitment to “clean food” and “menu transparency,” and is sold alongside a
Blueberry Muffin that contains only real blueberries.
It was not enough
that the bagel did contain some blueberries and that the ingredient list was “readily
available.” It can be “materially misleading to suggest a product contains a
greater proportion of a preferred ingredient than it actually does, even where
there is a visible ingredients list that states the correct composition of the
food.” (Citing Mantikas v. Kellogg Co., 910 F.3d 633, 639 (2d Cir. 2018)
(involving “whole grain” and “made with whole grain” claims where crackers were
primarily enriched white flour), and some earlier cases.)  Although this was a close case, the court
noted that there were no allegations that a customer purchasing the bagel
in-store would have ready access to an ingredients list prior to making a
purchase, and anyway Mantikas made clear that “a reasonable consumer
should not be expected to consult the Nutrition Facts panel on the side of the
box to correct misleading information set forth” elsewhere on the packaging.
Similarly, plaintiff
adequately, though barely, pled injury by alleging that the bagel had
“significantly less value than it warranted.” A price premium theory was
plausible, even though every Panera bagel sells for the same price; the
appropriate comparator could be other blueberry bagels, which plaintiff alleged
are “low-cost” yet contain “only real blueberry ingredients.”
Fraud was also,
though just barely, alleged. The facts alleged with particularity suggested “conscious
misbehavior or recklessness,” including: (1) Panera knew the bagel’s true
composition, as evidenced by its publication of the ingredient list; (2) Panera
produced the bagel in such a way that the imitation blueberries are
indistinguishable from the real blueberries; (3) Panera purposely advertises
“menu transparency” and its “clean” food; (3) Panera is aware of consumer
beliefs about the healthful qualities of blueberries; and (4) Panera sought to
capitalize on those beliefs and its branding to sell more bagels by calling it
a Blueberry Bagel.

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TheRealReal is ok except where it is FakeFake

Chanel, Inc. v. The
RealReal, Inc., 2020 WL 1503422, No. 18-CV-10626 (VSB) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2020)
Very interesting
case: Chanel sued TRR for trademark infringement etc. for allegedly
overclaiming its association with Chanel by prominently advertising how much
Chanel there was on its fashion resale platform. The court rejects Chanel’s claims
except to the extent they’re predicated on the sale of alleged counterfeits, in
what is a real victory for resale platforms under present circumstances.
TRR offers
purportedly genuine secondhand Chanel products as part of its luxury resale
offerings, and in 2018 acknowledged that Chanel was one of the most popular
brands bought and sold through consignment.
As you read these
claims, consider how many of them might be puffery at least in isolation: TRR
advertises itself as “the world’s largest online marketplace for authenticated,
consigned luxury goods” and says “[a]uthenticity is the cornerstone of The
RealReal.” It claims that it has “developed the most rigorous authentication
process in the marketplace,” that it is “the only resale company in the world
that authenticates every single item sold,” that “[t]here is no other resale
company doing more to remove fakes from the market every day and put
counterfeiters out of business,” that its “dedicated Quality Control team
provides an additional layer of control to help prevent fakes from being sold
on [its] site,” and that its “team works diligently and is constantly
innovating to ensure [it] … keep[s] fraudulent products off the market.” Its FAQ
says: “[u]nlike most resale companies, The RealReal takes possession of all
items and physically evaluates every item to authenticate it.” Also: “We employ
over 100 brand authenticators, gemologists, horologists and art curators. … Our
authentication process and all of our internal processes are changing
constantly, driven by new technologies like machine learning and AI.”
TRR claimed to use “a
rigorous, brand-specific authentication process” in which “high risk” items
were “sent to authenticators with significant authentication experience, who
are highly specialized in specific categories. Many of these authenticators
join The RealReal from the luxury brands themselves—like Tiffany, Hermès and
Rolex—or auction houses like Sotheby’s and Christie’s and have a deep knowledge
of the markers, materials and craftsmanship behind genuine products. They
assess each item based on these and other characteristics.” Low risk items, “such
as contemporary brands with clear authenticity markers, are sent to be
authenticated by our copywriters, who have a minimum of 30 hours of authentication
training.” TRR claims that its Quality Control team adds an additional layer of
protection and that it leverages data to use algorithms to ensure that “high
risk” products get the most scrutiny.
The TOS state: “You
acknowledge and agree that The RealReal’s authentication process is in-house
and independent. Brands identified on the Site are not involved in the
authentication of the products being sold, and none of the brands sold assumes
any responsibility for any products purchased from or through the website.
Brands sold on the Site are not partnered or affiliated with The RealReal in any
manner. However, The RealReal fully cooperates with brands seeking to track
down the source of counterfeit items, which includes revealing the contact
information of consignors submitting counterfeit goods.”
TRR takes possession
of all goods sold, and “[u]pon receipt, … evaluate[s] each item … to
determine, in its sole discretion, its authenticity, quality, and value.” TRR
could refuse to accept an item; if it determined that an item was counterfeit,
it would notify the consignor and give them an opportunity to prove authenticity;
any item finally determined to be counterfeit would be destroyed, not returned.
Chanel investigated
TRR’s Chanel offerings in 2018, and found at least seven counterfeit handbags
that allegedly differed in quality from real Chanel, “and some contained cartes
d’authenticité with serial numbers that did not correspond to the genuine
serial numbers designated by Chanel for those particular styles of handbag.” When
Chanel notified TRR, TRR asked for additional substantiating information. After
that, TRR removed the identifying serial numbers from all of its Chanel-branded
leather goods product listings, and may have removed physical serial number
tags from Chanel handbags. The complaint quoted two customer reviews in which
customers state that they were sold counterfeit Chanel handbags. Chanel alleged
that TRR’s authentication experts do not have the necessary qualifications to
authenticate Chanel products, and have failed to identify counterfeit Chanel
bags. It argued that TRR didn’t disclose sufficient information for consumers
to understand that Chanel is not involved in The RealReal’s authentication
process, or affiliated with The RealReal’s business.
Opening principles: At
the motion to dismiss stage, Chanel argued, the court couldn’t consider
nominative fair use, because it was an inherently factual inquiry. But it’s Chanel’s
burden to plead sufficient factual content to plausibly allege why Defendant’s
use of its trademarks is not permissible under the nominative fair use doctrine.
However, “where counterfeit marks are involved, it is not necessary to perform
the step-by-step examination of each Polaroid factor because counterfeit marks
are inherently confusing.”
Application: the
complaint didn’t plausibly allege infringement, false endorsement, or unfair
competition based on TRR’s use of genuine Chanel marks, but did plausibly
allege infringement based on advertisement and sale of counterfeits.
The Lanham Act “does
not prevent one who trades a branded product from accurately describing it by
its brand name, so long as the trader does not create confusion by implying an
affiliation with the owner of the product.” Though Chanel’s marks had great
strength, and though there might be direct competition with new products, “the
complaint also includes evidence suggesting that secondary fashion markets
bolster primary markets,” and Chanel’s lack of its own secondhand market meant
that there was no direct competition. There was no evidence of customer confusion
over affiliation or of TRR’s bad faith. And the luxury market was relatively
sophisticated and high-priced. “Balancing these factors, it is highly unlikely
that a customer buying a secondhand Chanel product from The RealReal—which
unambiguously holds itself out as consignment retailer in a luxury market—would
confuse the nature of The RealReal’s business, the source of its products, or
its affiliation—or lack thereof—with Chanel.” 
Many of the other Polaroid factors weren’t apposite for a secondhand
goods case: “the similarity of the marks, the evidence of bridging the gap, and
the respective quality of the products in question are not as relevant where,
as here, the marks used and goods sold by Defendant are indeed the same as the
Plaintiff’s marks and goods. Such is the nature of resale markets.”
This fact also made
the use of Chanel’s mark necessary to identify TRR’s goods, for nominative fair
use.  Furthermore, Chanel didn’t plausibly
allege facts suggesting that The RealReal “stepped over the line into a
likelihood of confusion by using [Chanel’s] mark[s] too prominently or too
often, in terms of size, emphasis, or repetition.” TRR has a Chanel page briefly
describing Chanel and advertising products with the Chanel marks, it also has
brand-specific pages for nine other luxury fashion brands. There were no facts
suggesting that TRR displays Chanel-branded goods “more prominently than other
luxury-brand goods,” or that it used Chanel marks “in any other capacity than
to identify Chanel products as Chanel.”
There were also no
non-conclusory allegations to suggest that The RealReal inaccurately depicts
its relationship with Chanel or Chanel’s products and services. Statements that
“[m]any of [its] authenticators join The RealReal from the luxury brands
themselves—like Tiffany, Hermès and Rolex,” were insufficient to allege a
probability of customer confusion. This was especially true given The
RealReal’s disclosure that “[b]rands identified on [its website] are not
involved in the authentication of the products being sold, and none of the
brands sold assumes any responsibility for any products purchased from or
through the website,” and that “[b]rands sold on the [website] are not
partnered or affiliated with The RealReal in any manner.”
Although another court
has held that “guarantees of authentication [ ] themselves may be taken as
suggesting sponsorship or endorsement by Chanel,” this court found that “such
guarantees, without more, are sufficient to demonstrate a likelihood of
customer confusion, especially since the law requires ‘a probability of
confusion, not a mere possibility.’” In the contrasting case, WGACA, the
defendant allegedly overemphasized Chanel; sold “more Chanel-branded products
… than those of any other brand”; and had “social media pages include[d]
quotations of Coco Chanel” and photographs of Chanel products accompanied by
the hashtags “#WGACACHANEL” and “our #WGACACHANEL.” And its letters of
authenticity stated, for example, “[t]his letter confirms that item
Q6HCHK00KB000 Chanel Black Long Tissue Box is an authentic Chanel decoration.” “Such
an authenticity guarantee is materially different from the authenticity
statements on The RealReal’s website.”
However, allegations
about counterfeits were different. TRR wasn’t like eBay because it was plausibly
directly liable as the actual seller, not the mere facilitator of sales. TRR
had “sole discretion” to “approve for sale, price, display, market, and make
available for sale the goods sold through its website and retail locations.”
[What do you want to bet that eBay’s TOS also let it control these things,
albeit that it does not generally use its power to set price terms? Cf. recent
discussions about price gouging for PPE on eBay.  Increasing
the price of items to a level that is much higher than is considered fair or
reasonable is not allowed on eBay
,” the platform itself says. [PS eBay:
does what’s going on with Liberty wooden jigsaw puzzles count? Because that’s a
wild ride.]]  Still, TRR, unlike eBay,
was “more than a platform for the sale of goods by vendors.” Even though it
didn’t formally take title to the merchandise, it “maintain[s] [the] inventory
of merchandise,” and upon receipt of products from consignors “b[ears] the risk
of loss” for the products. Thus it was the seller.
The court pointed
out that TRR benefited by “curating the products offered through [its] market
and defining the terms on which customers can purchase those products,” and
thus “must bear the corresponding burden of the potential liability stemming
from its ‘sale, offering for sale, distribution, [and] advertising of’ the goods
in the market it has created.”
False advertising: For
the counterfeits but only for the counterfeits, under the facts alleged, TRR’s
authenticity claims were literally false, and even if not, they were
misleading.  However, to the extent that
Chanel was pleading that the use of its marks for authentic goods misled consumers
into thinking there was an affiliation, the court rejected that as a false
advertising theory for the same reasons given above, and it rejected Chanel’s
claim of false advertising based on The RealReal’s use of the term “vintage.”
TRR made a lot of
authenticity claims. Its statement “we ensure that every item on The RealReal
is 100% the real thing” was “an unambiguous representation of fact that all of
the products advertised and sold by The RealReal are 100% authentic.” This
interpretation was bolstered by TRR’s statements distinguishing itself from
other luxury consignment retailers, including its representations that “[t]here
is no other resale company doing more to remove fakes from the market every day
and put counterfeiters out of business,” that it is “the only resale company in
the world that authenticates every single item sold,” and that “[u]nlike most
resale companies, The RealReal takes possession of all items and physically evaluates
every item to authenticate it.” It identifies its authenticators as “experts,”
and among the experts listed on its website are four authenticators with
particular expertise in authenticating Chanel handbags. The court noted that “[t]o
authenticate does not mean, as The RealReal suggests, to merely ‘guarantee that
each item offered for sale’ has gone through The RealReal’s ‘authentication
process.’” [This seems like it could be fixed, but at time of writing it seems
the same. Disclosure: I have bought from TRR and have been satisfied with my
purchases; I have no reason to question the authenticity of the items I bought.]
As Tiffany v.
eBay
made clear, “the law prohibits an advertisement that implies that all
of the goods offered on a defendant’s website are genuine when in fact … a
sizeable proportion of them are not.” A sufficient disclaimer might suffice to
avoid falsity, but TRR didn’t show “where on its website or advertising it
acknowledges the existence, or even the possibility, of counterfeit products in
its marketplace.” Its FAQ, for example, doesn’t answer the question:
Q: Are there many fake products on The RealReal?
A: We have developed the most rigorous authentication process in the
resale marketplace.
The court pointed
out that Tiffany didn’t define “sizeable proportion,” and seven might
not be that, but the complaint survived a motion to dismiss.
The court also found
“noteworthy,” though unnecessary, the contrast between TRR’s customer-facing
ads and its shareholder disclosures. In its IPO, TRR explained:
From time to time we receive counterfeit goods for consignment. While
we have invested heavily in our authentication processes and we reject any goods
we believe to be counterfeit, we cannot be certain that we will identify every
counterfeit item that is consigned to us. As the sophistication of
counterfeiters increases, it may be increasingly difficult to identify
counterfeit products. We refund the cost of a product to a buyer if the buyer
questions its authenticity and returns the item. The sale of any counterfeit
goods may damage our reputation as a trusted online marketplace for
authenticated, pre-owned luxury goods which may impact our ability to attract
and maintain repeat consignors and buyers. Additionally, we may be subject to
allegations that a pre-owned luxury item we sold is not authentic despite our
confirmed authentication of such item. Such controversy could negatively impact
our reputation and brand and harm our business and operating results.
“The attempt at
transparency evident in the above disclosure paints a much different picture
from that conveyed to consumers shopping at The RealReal’s stores or on its
website. This lack of customer-facing transparency undermines the Lanham Act’s
goal of ‘protecting persons engaged in commerce [ ] against unfair competition.’”
State law claims:
same results. Where state law requires bad faith, Chanel adequately alleged
that as to counterfeits: TRR’s initial response was to remove identifying
serial numbers from its Chanel product listings, and possibly to remove
physical serial number tags from Chanel handbags sold to customers. “A reasonable
inference based on The RealReal’s conduct is that it removed product serial
numbers from its site and physical products to deprive Chanel and consumers of
a legitimate tool for identifying counterfeit goods. Recognizing that discovery
might demonstrate that The RealReal had honest motives for removing these
serial numbers from its product listings and products, Chanel’s allegations are
sufficient to allege bad faith at this stage, and its New York state common law
claim can proceed” as to the counterfeits.
However, as to §§349-350
claims, Chanel didn’t show injury to the public interest over and above
ordinary trademark infringement, especially since these were luxury goods not
generally accessible to the public at large and not implicating public health
or safety.

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grey goods: materiality is key

Dentsply Sirona, Inc.
v. Dental Brands For Less LLC, No. 15 Civ. 8775 (LGS), 2020 WL 1643891 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 2, 2020)
Trademark confusion
is sometimes a normative conclusion, not an empirical one, even though the
language surrounding it is empirical. Here, the court states a rule: “In a
gray-market-goods case, if the goods are not ‘genuine’ then a likelihood of
confusion exists.” One could frame this as a presumption that it’s not
cost-effective to allow defendants to rebut: it is so likely that non-“genuine”
goods confuse consumers about their qualities that we don’t allow a defense.
But the way that courts define “genuine” often stretches to a bunch of things
that consumers are unlikely to care about, and include contexts where the
divergences between the foreign and domestic products are fully disclosed, so I
can’t ultimately buy this as an empirical claim.  

Grey goods cases are much more plausible not
as trademark cases but as unfair competition cases—though we really should focus
on materiality.  Here, I suspect the court pays more careful attention to materiality because it has been cued by the false advertising claims; possibly the plaintiff could’ve gotten a better result if it had only argued trademark infringement.
The court
explains that goods aren’t genuine if “they do not conform to the trademark
holder’s quality control standards or if they differ materially from the
product authorized by the trademark holder for sale.” And materiality has “a
low threshold …, requiring no more than a slight difference which consumers
would likely deem relevant when considering a purchase of the product.” The
court found a factual question on materiality here; Dentsply identified various
differences between the foreign and domestic products, “including that Dental
Brands’ warranty provides less protection and is harder to access; that Dental
Brands customer service is inferior to Dentsply’s; and that Dental Brands’
packaging contains irrelevant information that can confuse or mislead
customers.”  Dental Brands argued that
the product inside the packaging was identical, and that its dentist customers “care
only that they can get the same product from Defendant at a more economical
price than what Plaintiff offers.” 
Evidence from Dentsply’s sales database reflected “conversations between
Plaintiff’s distributors and dentists suggesting that the dentists do not care
about the differences and care only about the price.” 
It’s reasonable to
let circumstantial evidence (differences in warranty/customer service) count as
evidence of materiality, but it’s disturbing to me how many other courts are willing
to treat warranty differences as dispositive evidence, especially when the
differences are disclosed to consumers; not every defendant has a database of customer
conversations to point to.  Here, the
court is explicit that survey evidence is not required for materiality. Also,
the database statements probably weren’t inadmissible double hearsay. The
distributor statements were likely admissible as business records and the
dentist statements were likely a statement of the declarant’s then-existing
state of mind.
Unsurprisingly, the
same facts could also support a false advertising claim (under the Lanham Act
and NY GBL §349) for a reasonable jury.
Dilution: No,
Dentsply is no Beyonc
é. “The
record provides that members of the dental industry are aware of the Dentsply
trademarks, but offers no evidence that the mark is recognized by the general
public.” This also prevented a finding of sufficient distinctiveness under
state law.
Tortious
interference claims also failed.

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2d Circuit: no irreparable injury where website tracks clicks to buy

Carson Optical, Inc.
v. Alista Corp., No. 19-2509, — Fed.Appx. —-, 2020 WL 1683460 (Mem) (2d
Cir. Apr. 7, 2020)
Interesting—the Second
Circuit approves the district
court’s reasoning
that online sales can be tracked perfectly, and thus financial
harm from false advertising is not irreparable. Carson sued to enjoin defendants
from advertising magnifying mirrors on Carson Optical’s product pages on
Amazon.com. The district court relied on a declaration that “Amazon’s tracking
of clicks on Defendants-Appellees’ advertisements on Carson Optical’s Amazon
webpage would provide a basis to estimate Carson Optical’s losses from the
purportedly false advertisements.”  This
was enough to show that the general proposition that “[i]t is virtually
impossible to prove that so much of one’s sales will be lost or that one’s
goodwill will be damaged as a direct result of a competitor’s advertisement.”
Coca-Cola Co. v. Tropicana Prods., Inc., 690 F.2d 312, 316 (2d Cir. 1982), was
in applicable. Carson “failed to show why the data referred to by the
declaration would not provide a reasonable starting point for a suitable
damages analysis.”  [Query whether under
the proposed reversal of eBay to restore a presumption of irreparable
injury in trademark cases, this declaration could have rebutted such a
presumption.]
The court of appeals
further noted that the challenged ads didn’t explicitly refer to Carson’s
mirrors, or compare defendants’ mirrors to Carson’s; they were just allegedly
false. The district court thus didn’t clearly err in finding no irreparable
injury.

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“Maximum Strength” is plausibly misleading when cheaper Regular Strength has more active ingredient by volume

Al Haj v. Pfizer
Inc., 2019 WL 3202807, No. 17 C 6730 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 16, 2019)
Al Haj alleged that
Pfizer deceived consumers by charging more for “Maximum Strength” Robitussin
cough syrup than for “Regular Strength” Robitussin even though the former had a
lower concentration of active ingredients than the latter. The court denied
Pfizer’s summary judgment motion and Al Haj’s motion for class certification,
without prejudice.
Al Haj switched from
Regular Strength to Maximum Strength; when she bought, Maximum Strength
Robitussin cost some two dollars more than Regular Strength Robitussin. Both
products contained  two active
ingredients: dextromethorphan hydrobromide (“DXM Hbr”), a cough suppressant,
and guaifenesin, an expectorant. 
Before June 2016,
the recommended dosage of Maximum Strength Robitussin was 10 ml, and each 10 ml
dose of Maximum Strength Robitussin contained the same amount of DXM Hbr (20
mg) but twice as much guaifenesin (400 mg) as the recommended 10 ml dose of Regular
Strength Robitussin. Pfizer then reformulated Maximum Strength Robitussin to
change the recommended dose from 10 ml to 20 ml while keeping Regular Strength
Robitussin’s recommended dose at 10 ml. Pfizer placed a “See New Dosing” alert
at the upper right corner of the product’s box.

The reformulation halved
the product’s concentration of active ingredients. Until Pfizer in mid-2018
similarly doubled Regular Strength Robitussin’s recommended dosage size from 10
ml to 20 ml and thereby halved its concentration of active ingredients, Maximum
Strength Robitussin had the same concentration of guaifenesin but only half the
concentration of DXM Hbr as Regular Strength Robitussin. Because both products
were sold in bottles of the same size, a bottle of Regular Strength Robitussin
had twice as many doses as a bottle of Maximum Strength Robitussin, which cost
more. Pfizer internally touted the reduced number of doses per bottle of
Maximum Strength Robitussin as a positive result of the reformulation.
Al Haj switched
after reading the “Maximum Strength” label and assuming that Maximum Strength
Robitussin would be more effective than Regular Strength Robitussin. Pfizer’s
own market research concluded that “quite a few” consumers would be willing to
spend more on maximum strength medication because they perceive it to “work
better and provide more value” than regular strength medication. Al Haj did not
compare in detail the Regular Strength and Maximum Strength packaging when she
decided to purchase Maximum Strength Robitussin. Even after learning that the
recommended dose was 20 ml, she purchased Maximum Strength Robitussin at least
two more times despite knowing that its 20 ml dose was twice the recommended
dose of Regular Strength Robitussin.
The Illinois Consumer
Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act bans “deceptive business practices”
as well as “business practices that, while not deceptive, are unfair.”  Pfizer argued that the packaging Al Haj saw
included a “See New Dosing” alert on the front of the box and an explanation of
“Maximum Strength” on the back. Pfizer argued that this cured any possible
ambiguity about the meaning of the ‘maximum strength’ claim” as a possible
comparison to regular strength. But, even if the alert would have led a
reasonable consumer to read the dosage information, the consumer wouldn’t have
known that Maximum Strength had a lower concentration of active ingredients
than Regular Strength unless she calculated and compared the products’
concentrations. “[I]t is not reasonable to expect a consumer to cross-check a
product’s ingredient list against another product’s list and then perform
arithmetic to make sure she is comparing equivalent dosage volumes, all to
ensure that the product she intends to purchase has the qualities it purports
to have.” Even though the label stated on the back “Maximum strength claim
based on maximum levels of active ingredients per dose,” “using fine-print text
to obliquely walk back a prominent claim on the front of the box—particularly
absent other product features that contextualize that claim—generally does not
preclude a jury finding that the frontside claim was deceptive.”
The court pointed
out that “by placing a prominent ‘Maximum Strength’ designation on what
otherwise was materially the same frontside packaging as Regular Strength
Robitussin, Pfizer invited consumers viewing both products to assume that a
more expensive bottle of Maximum Strength Robitussin had a greater
concentration of active ingredients than the bottle of Regular Strength
Robitussin.” Moreover, “a reasonable consumer would conclude that she was being
charged more for a bottle of Maximum Strength Robitussin than she would have
paid for a bottle of Regular Strength Robitussin because the former had more
potency per volume than the latter.” Pfizer couldn’t take that implication back
with disclaimers that were oblique at best.
Pfizer invoked the
(bad) decision
holding that 100% Grated Parmesan Cheese
doesn’t mean 100% grated parmesan cheese
where the label expressly disclosed the presence of cellulose. But “unlike
the cheese product in Parmesan, which remained ‘shelf-stable at room
temperature,’ there is no commonsense, ‘observable’ impediment to a consumer
concluding that a bottle of Maximum Strength Robitussin has a higher
concentration of active ingredients than Regular Strength Robitussin.” A jury
could conclude that the relative concentrations of active ingredients in
Regular Strength and Maximum Strength Robitussin were “non-obvious product
qualities that consumers may reasonably rely on packages to clearly disclose.”
Moreover, while “a quick skim of the ingredient label” on the backside of the
packaging of the cheese product showed that the product contained “something
other than cheese” and thereby cured any ambiguity, nothing on the backside of
the Maximum Strength package cured the “Maximum Strength” claim’s ambiguity;
cross-checking with another package and doing math would have been required.
Did Al Haj suffer
actual pecuniary damage? Al Haj ultimately switched to a more expensive Delsym
product, not the less expensive Regular Strength Robitussin. But a reasonable
jury still could find that she suffered “actual pecuniary loss” when she
switched from Regular Strength to Maximum Strength Robitussin and thereby paid
more for a product that had a lower concentration of active ingredients than
its packaging implied. Her injury was established at the time of purchase,
regardless of whether [s]he later was dissatisfied with” Robitussin “and
regardless of whether [s]he would have purchased a substitute product.”  Cases finding no actual damage involve prices
lower than the alternatives, but Al Haj had a cheaper alternative: Regular
Strength. Pfizer argued that the products weren’t comparable because they had
different amounts per dose of the same active ingredients, but a less expensive
alternative need only be “similar,” not identical, to serve as a comparator for
purposes of establishing actual damage under the ICFA. 
Proximate case:
Pfizer argued that Al Haj admitted that she did not purchase Maximum Strength
Robitussin under the “belief that the medication had a higher concentration of
active ingredients per volume” than Regular Strength Robitussin. But “the ICFA
does not require a plaintiff to show actual reliance or diligence in
ascertaining the accuracy of misstatements.” 
Deception was enough, and Al Haj testified that she thought Maximum
Strength would be more effective and thus a better value than Regular
Strength.  Even if she knew the
recommended doses (20 ml vs. 10ml) after her first Maximum Strength purchase, that
wasn’t enough to cure the alleged deception, as she still would need to
“perform arithmetic” and a “cross-check” based on each “product’s ingredient
list” to learn the concentration of active ingredients in each bottle.

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100% Pure Aloe can contain preservatives, stabilizers in the absence of evidence from consumers that they care

Beardsall v. CVS
Pharmacy, Inc., — F.3d —-, 2020 WL 1429214, No. 19-1850 (2d Cir. Mar. 24,
2020)

The court explains:
Plaintiffs brought state consumer deception claims [under 12 different
states’ laws] against defendant Fruit of the Earth and its retailer clients.
They alleged that defendants’ aloe vera products did not contain any aloe vera
and lacked acemannan, a compound that plaintiffs say is responsible for the
plant’s therapeutic qualities. But uncontested facts drawn from discovery
showed these allegations to be false: the products were made from aloe vera and
contained at least some acemannan.
To stave off summary judgment, plaintiffs changed their theory,
claiming that the products were degraded and did not contain enough acemannan.
Plaintiffs said that it was therefore misleading to call the products aloe vera
gel, to represent them as “100% Pure Aloe Vera Gel,” and to market them as
providing the therapeutic effects associated with aloe vera. Plaintiffs have
not, however, presented evidence that some concentration of acemannan is
necessary to call a product aloe or to produce a therapeutic effect. Nor have
they offered evidence that consumers care at all about acemannan concentration.
Whatever theoretical merit these claims might have had on a different record,
this record simply does not contain evidence that would allow a reasonable jury
to find in favor of plaintiffs. With this dearth of evidence, the district
court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. We affirm.
The aloe vera gels
at issue are made by processing aloe vera plants, including the addition of stabilizers,
thickeners, and preservatives to make the final gel product shelf-stable. “The
parties agree that the products are 98% aloe gel (the reconstituted aloe vera
solids) and 2% other ingredients (stabilizers and preservatives).” The Fruit of
the Earth label calls the product “Aloe Vera 100% Gel” and “100% Pure Aloe Vera
Gel.” An asterisk after “100% Gel” refers to information on the back of the
label: “Plus stabilizers and preservatives to insure [sic] potency and
efficacy.” Each label’s ingredient list shows that the product contains aloe
juice and various other substances.
(1) Acemannan concentration.
“No reasonable consumer, plaintiffs argue, would purchase an aloe vera product
that contains low concentrations of what plaintiffs maintain is an important
therapeutic component.” This is a theoretically viable claim, but there was no
evidence of material misleadingness. Citing cases, including Lanham Act cases,
that asked for survey evidence, the court noted no evidence that consumers made
purchasing decisions based on ingredient content. Nor was there evidence that
some concentration of acemannan was necessary to render the product effective.
The plaintiff’s
expert testified that fresh aloe should contain at least 5% acemannan by dry weight,
pointing to a trade organization’s standards, while that used by defendants contained
1.01% acemannan by dry weight, and testing on the final product indicated
correspondingly lower concentrations of acemannan in the final product compared
to what the expert expected in an aloe product containing undiluted aloe juice.
In a footnote, the court noted that 45 mg/L and 65 mg/L, compared to the
expected 200–500 mg/L, did not count as “trace,” “infinitesimally small,”
“barely detectable,” and “nonexisten[t].” Anyway, there was no testimony that
lower acemannan concentration meant that the product couldn’t fairly be
described as aloe, and no expert opinion on the relationship between aloe
concentration and efficacy.  The named
plaintiffs’ testimony that they found the labeling misleading did not fill the
gap; “they all felt misled because they were incorrectly informed by their
lawyers that the products contain little or no aloe vera.”  Cases allowing claims to proceed have
involved extrinsic evidence to show how consumers were likely to be materially
misled, such as survey evidence that consumers did not expect “soluble and
microground” coffee in Keurig-compatible pods to be instant coffee, or survey
evidence going to materiality, or internal marketing documents about the value
of consumer perceptions of strength. “Plaintiffs here, in contrast, have
offered no evidence that the products fell short of consumers’ expectations in
any material way.”
The court qualified
its holding: “This is not to say that extrinsic evidence in the form of
consumer surveys or market research is always needed for a plaintiff to survive
summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law on a deceptive advertising
claim. But such evidence is necessary where the advertising is not clearly
misleading on its face and materiality is in doubt.” Without such evidence
here, there was not enough to go to a jury.
(2) Therapeutic
efficacy: again, failed for lack of evidence that the products were ineffective
or that they didn’t contain enough acemannan to achieve a therapeutic effect.
(3) “100% Pure.” First,
there wasn’t enough evidence that this was a misrepresentation that the product
was “high quality” or “especially effective” aloe; there was no evidence
indicating that consumers interpret these as statements of quality. Second, the
preservatives and stabilizers didn’t make the claim misleading. The district
court found the label ambiguous and clarified by the ingredients list.
Plaintiffs conceded in briefing and depositions that “the presence of
preservatives—in reasonably small amounts—was acceptable and something they
expected,” and that “[n]o [p]laintiff took the label to mean that there was
absolutely nothing other than aloe vera in the bottle.” So this theory didn’t
work on these facts, though the court pointedly announced its skepticism of
defendants’ position “that an asterisk pointing to an ingredient list in fine
print could save virtually any deceptive slogan claiming purity.”

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antitrust claim based in part on false advertising in concentrated market survives

Chase Manufacturing, Inc. v. Johns Manville Corp., 2020 WL
1433504, No. 19-cv-00872-MEH (D. Colo. Mar. 23, 2020) (magistrate)
Chase sued JM for violations of the Lanham Act and the
Sherman Act for tying and monopolization. JM sells construction products,
including mechanical insulation products. Chase is a mechanical insulation
supplier; both parties sell calcium silicate thermal insulation, aka “calsil,”
which is designed to encapsulate pipes, tanks, and other equipment in
industrial facilities. JM has at least a 98% share of the domestic calsil
market, which is approximately $50 million in sales per year, though this is
only approximately 2% of JM’s $3 billion annual sales for all products.
Customers who buy calsil allegedly demand that the product
meet or exceed the requirements set forth in ASTM C533 Type I. Only three
factories in the world produce such calsil that fits North American sizing
norms: two in the United States owned and operated by JM, and one in Shanghai, which
previously produced calsil for JM but now sells its calsil in North America
exclusively through Chase.
Chase’s head-to-head testing indicated that its calsil met
or exceeded the requirements of ASTM C533 Type I, never contained asbestos, and
outperformed JM’s calsil in several categories.
There are five major mechanical insulation distributors that
dominate the country, accounting for approximately 85% of calsil sales; “approximately
ten or fewer” smaller, independent distributors account for the remaining 15%
of the calsil market. Customers require the distributors to carry other
construction products made by JM, including, as relevant to this case, Defendant’s
fiberglass pipe insulation and expanded perlite products. JM is one of only
three fiberglass pipe insulation manufacturers in the United States, with
allegedly at least a 60% share of that market. JM is also one of only two North
American suppliers of expanded perlite pipe and block insulation, and with
allegedly not less than a 50% share of that market.
JM allegedly threatened to cut off sales, extend lead times,
or alter rebate programs for fiberglass pipe insulation and/or expanded perlite
as punitive measures to both large and small distributors who buy calsil from Chase.
It has also threatened to refuse to supply its own calsil to both large and
small distributors who purchase calsil from Chase. JM’s sales managers
allegedly told customers that Plaintiff’s calsil was “poor quality” and “cannot
be trusted to meet ‘specifications,’ ” “ ‘may have asbestos,’ ” and was
“Chinese,” referring to where it was produced. The “Frequently Asked Questions”
page on Defendant’s website states, in part: “[Defendant] is the only
insulation manufacturer in North America to produce water resistant calcium
silicate. While we are aware of one other manufacturer in Asia that produces
[calsil], it is an expensive, custom-order product that is not readily
available.” This course of conduct allegedly choked off Chase’s growth. 
Chase’s per se tying Sherman Act claim was plausibly
alleged.  So was the monopolization
claim, based on tying, refusal to supply, exclusive dealing, and product
disparagement.
As to product disparagement, antitrust treats it weirdly
(watch this space for an article Mike Carrier and I have written on that). In
the Tenth Circuit, as in a number of other circuits, there’s an unwarranted
presumption that false advertising’s effect on competition is de minimis.  To rebut the de minimis presumption, a plaintiff
must plausibly allege the disparagement was “(1) clearly false, (2) clearly
material, (3) clearly likely to induce reasonable reliance, (4) made to buyers
without knowledge of the subject matter, (5) continued for prolonged periods,
and (6) not readily susceptible to neutralization or other offset by rivals.”  [For one thing, assume that the plaintiff
shows at trial that the false advertising kept it and other potential rivals
out of the market. Why should it have to show any of these subfactors? If it
shouldn’t have to show those subfactors then, why should it have to plead them?
Anyway.]
The disparagement claim was based on four statements
attributed to JM sales reps. (1) Chase’s calsil “may have asbestos and may put
your customers and employees at risk.” (2) Chase’s calsil was “poor quality and
cannot be trusted to meet ‘specifications.’ ” (3) Chase’s calsil was “Chinese.”
(4) The sales rep asked why a purchaser “would want to ‘risk buying an unproven
product that may not meet the specifications.’ ” Two of the five large
distributors, allegedly heard JM’s comments and “word gets around” a market
with such concentrated buyers.
The allegations plausibly overcame the de minimis presumption.
Likely to induce reasonable reliance: Chase alleged that JM “has a high degree
of credibility in the industry,” and has particular experience with asbestos
liability. It was reasonable that JM’s history with asbestos (it had to declare
bankruptcy) would give it credibility when discussing asbestos, products that
could put buyers “at risk,” or products fail to meet safety specifications. “Additionally,
and importantly, given the scope of potential liability related to asbestos,
buyers are very likely to rely on statements regarding its presence or related
safety concerns rather than make a potentially business-ending purchase.”
Knowledge of subject matter: JM allegedly targeted its
disparagement to distributors that are its existing customers, all of whom but
one have never purchased calsil from Chase. “Because the vast majority of the
audience were and are not present customers of Plaintiff, they do not have
firsthand knowledge of Plaintiff’s calsil. As alleged misrepresentations bear
on the quality and safety of Plaintiff’s goods, firsthand knowledge is
critical, particularly in a market where much of the sales and product
information are conveyed through individualized relationships with
distributors.” JM argued that Chase included test results as part of its
initial marketing materials, showing that buyers had knowledge of the subject
matter. But it wasn’t clear that the testing addressed asbestos or what
specific information from the test results were included in the marketing
materials, or how widely disseminated Plaintiff’s marketing launch was. It was
reasonable that the distributors that heard the disparaging remarks had no
knowledge of Chase’s safety or quality. [To a certain extent the court is
stretching what the relevant “subject matter” is, but it’s doing so because
this factor is not helpful. One can have knowledge of the subject matter and
still decide to trust someone else’s specific factual claims. If the deception
worked, the listeners’ expertise wasn’t enough to prevent it from working.
Duration: throughout 2018 was enough. Although there were
only a few specific examples, it was reasonable to infer, as plaintiff
specifically argued, that JM was making these disparaging remarks throughout
the launch.
Susceptible to neutralization by rivals: Chase alleged that
“[p]otential liability from possible asbestos exposure is so great that no
reasonable customer would buy a product where there was any question about the
presence of asbestos, no matter how much the seller assures them that the
product does not contain asbestos.” JM’s own bankruptcy trust for asbestos
victims and their families is currently valued at $2.5 billion. Chase alleged a
specific example of a “failed attempt” to assuage a potential buyer’s asbestos
concerns, that “[s]uch rumors, once started, are not easy to dispel,” and that
“it could take many years to do so.” The court found it “more than plausible”
that such statements are not readily susceptible to neutralization.
Antitrust injury/harm to competition: JM argued that the
alleged injury was merely Chase’s failure to gain market share quickly. But JM
alleged that Chase’s exclusionary and anticompetitive conduct caused limitation
of customer choice of suppliers, increased prices, and reduction in calsil
output. There was a plausible claim for monopolization.
Lanham Act false advertising: Originally, Chase didn’t
provide enough allegations that the disparagement amounted to commercial
advertising and promotion by being sufficiently disseminated in the relevant
market. In its amended complaint, it alleged that five major distributors
account for 85 percent of calsil sales, and estimates that “approximately ten
or fewer” smaller, independent distributors account for the remaining 15
percent. It identified two of the smaller distributors as the recipients of the
alleged misrepresentations, as well as two of the five larger distributors.  The allegations were those above, as well as
(1) an allegedly false statement to a smaller distributor that JM had never
sold calsil made in China, and (2) a website statement that “[w]hile we are
aware of one other manufacturer in Asia that produces water resistant calcium
silicate, it is an expensive, custom-order product that is not readily
available.”
Chase sufficiently alleged advertising/promotion because it
alleged that “informal” means of communication—like in-person meetings, social
gatherings, social media, and email—as opposed to traditional media are the
primary means of commercial promotion in the calsil market. Chase also alleged
that “other Gulf Coast contractors” have corroborated the suspicion “that these
statements were widely disseminated by Johns Manville salespeople.” This made
it plausible that the statements were part of an organized campaign by JM,
despite the statements’ informal or behind the scenes methods of communication.
As for the webpage, JM argued that it didn’t refer to Chase
by name; that it wasn’t adequately pled to be false/material; and that it
didn’t injure Chase. Although the no-identification point is silly—there’s only
the one and it’s Chase—Chase didn’t adequately allege injury from the page; it
didn’t even allege that customers or potential customers saw it or that it lost
sales because of it.

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