Innovation, Justice, and Globalization: A Celebration of J.H. Reichman

Harvard Law School
Opening
Keynote
Yochai Benkler, Harvard University
How do we understand what we do in our field against the background
of profoundly increased inequality and stagnation for all but the top 5%, including
an unprecedented increase in death rate among US whites from diseases of
dispair? The economy functions in relation to power. Prior stories that have
failed us: Mainstream economics treated technology as exogenous; it has become
skill-biased. Monotonic story: the more skilled people are, the more they can
adapt to tech, so college degree gets a premium. Fit the 1980s US data
beautifully. Institutions played a relatively limited role in this theory and
we were supposed to educate workers. But that story didn’t work in the
1990s.  Early 2000s: “tasks framework”:
technology still exogenous, deterministic (some things are easier to automate
than others). Middle class jobs—people in the back office of the CPA—were now
being done by Excel. People on assembly line replaced by robots. Nonroutine jobs—the
janitor dealing with irregular floors, the CPA using Excel—still had demand.  But that still didn’t fit the overall
differences b/t different countries, all at the same tech frontier—substantial empirical
threat.
Then the story became: robots will take jobs, cause
sustained levels of structural unemployment; all work will be Uber.  Insitutionalists fought back: politics
led to sustained shift of bargaining power b/t labor and capital, b/t financial
sector and others; free movements of goods/capital but not people across borders
created new methods of offshoring, outsourcing, etc. Tech plays no independent
role in the institutional story.
So, where do we stand, who do law/institutions but also
believe that tech has an important role? 
Innovation economics/IP scholarship has some familiar forms. E.g., Classic/neoclassical
incentives/access model; Schumpeterian: market structure is more important, antitrust
is the key area of law; industrial policy intended to have exogenous effect. Institution
design can seek better innovation w/o attention to distributional effects. Or
you can have distribution sensitive innovation policy—primarily about access;
accepting a market society and looking for redistribution through rules. Market
systems will predictably not deliver access to certain goods, e.g. treatments
for tropical diseases. Central to Reichman’s work. How to structure markets and
more importantly innovation systems to deliver outcomes that are not maldistributive.
Next to this: people looking at tech rather than at IP,
sounding more in STS than in economics or law (Winner, Do Artifacts Have
Politics?, Nissenbaum, Bias in Computer Systems/Values in Design, Lessig, Code),
focusing on the fact that technologies settle politics, whether in the form of
bridges that block access to public beaches or machines that were less
productive than workers but still managed to break unions, tech is used to
resolve social conflict in favor of the party implementing the tech.
Look at ©, patent, TRIPs, WIPO treaty wars: the experience
is of active, knowing, strategic action both by firms and individuals, alone
and collectively, to shape the contest they understand will give them greater
or lesser market power. Rent seeking, particularly on the side of firms seeking
to increase the value of first mover advantages. (For Schumpeterians, rents
aren’t inherently bad—they drive innovation—but it matters how long they will
last before competition comes in.) Individuals come in with: freedom oriented
and other social values. Trying to nullify state capture. Strategic lobbying on
DRM, WIPO, etc. to create technologies that allow incumbents to control
entrants. Today: surveillance capitalism, dark patterns/manipulating consumer
demand.
Markets are arenas where power is negotiated in context—actors
spend some of their rents to create the context that will make it easier to
extract rents next time. Tech is endogenous and plastic.  There’s enough play in the joints that how it’s
designed makes a huge difference including for bargaining and distributions.
Markets are usually not efficient and power therefore matters. Institutions,
tech, and ideology each shape policy. 
Hired scholarship on one side justifying extractive practices; academics
trying to do something else—like Reichman on the relationship b/t academic
science and innovation. Shapes knowledge framework to shape the institutional
framework.
New institutionalism in sociology: models of practice are imitated/normalized
across groups.
Microfoundational component, just looking at the firm: every
firm faces a choice of action in any given context. It can increase
productivity (becoming more competitive) or decrease competitiveness (make products
for which demand is less elastic). Tech and institutions are part of the
investment pathways. Each pathway has an ideology too. They’re constantly
trading off options to shape future rents. Options: increase entry barriers, prevent
entry by innovators, increase competition among workers in the labor market and
decrease competition among employers, increase monitoring of employees, disrupt
collective action among employees/consumers, manipulate demand among consumers.
DRMs, terminator gene, rent maximizing price discrimination are all mechanisms
to control demand and disable competition. Older work on ways in which tech is
used to deskill and homogenize, to monitor labor, to decrease labor’s
bargaining power. “Ghost Work” by Mary Gray—platform organization makes it
harder for workers to organize, and that’s part of the point. It’s not just
about extraction; it’s in part about productivity and it’s also about ability
to strategically grab rents.  In each
relation, the objective is to decrease competition/entry, increase the size and
lifetime of the strategies and the rate of rents; larger rents give you more
bargaining power to capture more.
All this explains dramatic tech innovation/growth in one
sector along with higher rents, more markups, more concentration of firms and
wealth and increasing economic insecurity for everyone else—once the state is
removed as counterbalance through regulation, once unions are weakened through
labor law, then firms can dedicate more resources to rent seeking and rent
extraction over productivity.
Q from Reichman: What is to be done?
A: (1) Knowledge production is part of the process and
having a different story about how tech works opens up different avenues; many
regulators today are highly constrained by fear of upsetting the applecart by
regulating/pressuring tech firms. That’s changing a bit.  Having a better story that understands
structural/distributive things at play in tech policy, not just more is better,
is one part of moving forward. Invite distribution sensitive innovation
theorists to look more at extraction and competition. (2) Invite a multisystem
approach: look in the mirror and worry. He’s spent plenty of time being
skeptical about the state, trying to find self-organizing approaches like free
software. That’s not good enough. That’s not to be nostalgic for the 1950s and
60s—there are excellent reasons that model of regulation lost out in the
developing world. We need to find new ways to make regulation more effective—democratically
accountable but flexible sources of counterpower. Consider: who can actually do
this? What kind of actors can serve as counterpower? What innovations will
undermine the financial power of certain actors?
Maggie Chon: building on rent extraction being not
inherently bad—is it reinvested in R&D and innovation generation that might
lead to more growth/inclusion of labor?
Q: rate of innovation v. direction of innovation—are we even
capable of directional?
A: one of the outcomes of understanding things this way is
to get comfortable nudging tech development into different structures. There’s
no reason to think we should focus on rate; if we focus only on rate based on
letting market actors choose whatever they want we aren’t doing our jobs.
Social/political consequences can be vastly different and disruptive. Power of
labor, 15 years after you go to robot nurses versus PAs with computers in their
pockets, is completely different. Understanding how that relates to the broader
framework may make you demand to see the interactions b/t “rate” and the power
of incumbents.
Reichman: but where does the counterpower come from?
A: Democratic party in the US has changed a bunch in 20
years.  Green New Deal.  EC’s willingness to regulate tech now compared
to its willingness to hand out monopolies in database rights 15 years ago is
different.
Reichman: so institutional tools can evolve into
counterpower.
Do antitrust and competition law trust intellectual property
law too much?
Rebecca Tushnet, Harvard University, session chair
Graham Dutfield, The evolving role of branding in
pharmaceutical management: how should competition law respond?
Are there things other than patents that raise issues with pricing/competition?
Looking at TMs. Norlutin: on the market in UK since 1936.  Pfizer sold marketing authorization to Flynn;
Flynn debranded the product and escaped all price controls. Pfizer became the
sole supplier of the active ingredient to Flynn; Pfizer raised the price and
Flynn did as well (and then some). Then Flynn sought to block importation of Norlutin
from Italy based on its rights.  Competition authority imposed a fine, but they
appealed and won.  Trademarks do matter.
In historical work, patent based rights are often subordinate
to brand based rights. Dyestuff/chemical companies onward. 
What about the science? 
Plain packaging of pills conveys little info.  Text/visuals affect how consumers perceive
and even react to the products. Bayer puts its cross on its aspirin.  When TM litigated, Learned Hand says “aspirin”
has two meanings. Nowadays pharmacos use colors as well. When it’s transferred
to a me-too product that has a completely different price, what happens?  Zantac product expansion.
Looked at old cases on visual aspects of pills, UK case in
1972: court recognizes rights in “getup” or coloring.  Some problems: AstraZeneca, which has gotten
in trouble w/competition authorities over Nexium, has used color to protect
rights.
How does this matter? 
Tentative conclusions: Look further than patent system. Competition law
should reflect this broader focus.  Branding
can actually generate confusion about the product provenance/uniqueness, and
that’s a problem.
Maybe shape/color shouldn’t be protected/shouldn’t be
enforceable against authorized generics for the same conditions. Placebo &
nocebo effects are relevant here; if the color matters, it should be
transferred to the generic drug to avoid artificial creation of nonsubstitutability.
The consumer may reject/experience less effect from the generic.
Sean Flynn, Enforcing Fair Following Rights Through
Competition Law
Confronted an argument in assisting South Africa: you can’t
use competition law to force licensing of patent rights b/c they are completely
separate fields.  Reichman was
foundational in response to that. Also relevant to ©: rights to education and
research w/in the © system can also be seen as competition issues.
How do we craft the interface b/t IP and competition? Louis
Kaplow has done work on finding a realist/realistic proposal. US courts have
looked at the “scope of the patent” but that’s what Felix Cohen would call
transcendental nonsense. If competition law cabins the power of the patent
holder, you can’t use the scope of the patent to determine when competition law
operates: it has to have the ability to operate on the core of the rights,
including the right to exclude. Kaplow said it’s basically a ratio. The more
you have a small patent reward and a large monopoly loss, the more competition law
should bear on the situation and vice versa. 
Can we identify scenarios where one or the other will typically be the
case?
Where monopoly power is on essential goods/services w/
highly inelastic demand curve, and a country has extremely high income inequality,
it will almost always be the case that full exercise of monopoly power will
create small monopoly reward and huge deadweight loss. Edmund Kitsch was wrong:
we didn’t see, after TRIPs, proportional reductions in prices in countries with
less income.  It turns out that charging
high prices in India is still what happens. In the US if you charge a price
that only the top 10% can afford you make less than if you charge a price to
allow 60% to afford it. In South Africa, though, there’s a small # of people
who earn global high incomes and a large # who have very low incomes, and the
profit maximizing price turns out to be to serve only the small #.  You might even make more profit having a
higher price in a poorer country because you’re not serving much of it.
We also have textbook examples: books, like drugs, have
essentially zero marginal cost to distribute. But b/c you’re not trying to
serve the entire market, a higher price earns more profit. Exclusionary pricing:
more profit through massive deadweight loss. 2-3x more than monopoly profit. We
should be restraining that through competition law (or other means).
How to do it? 
Competition, fair use, international law.  In South Africa, they forced the licensing of
AIDS drugs, and after that the advice IP lawyers began giving to drug suppliers
was that any pharmaco has to give at least 4-5 licenses to local producers to enter
the market.  So we shouldn’t look at the
scope of the patent, but at whether there’s massive exclusion in the market. 
For ©, in South Africa there are affordable locally produced
textbooks, but not for niche topics. They can be 10-20x higher priced than normal.
Current SAfrican bill, on the President’s desk now, adds a competition standard
to fair use, allowing use of entire work where authorized copies can’t be
obtained at a price reasonably related to the normal price for textbooks in
South Africa.  Used language from the Berne
convention that was highlighted by Reichman.
Duncan Matthews, A Pro-Competitive Strategy for Developing
Countries: Do we still need this and where do we go from here?
Reichman’s work on flexibilities in TRIPs.  Not just the use of competition law per se,
but invoked Art. 7 & 8 of TRIPs. Art. 8 para. 2 creates potential to
prevent abuse of IP rights. UN panel on access to medicines referred to this as
underutilized.  OECD: competition
committee, where national enforcement agencies are looking closely not only at
excessive pricing and pay for delay and vexatious litigation but also at
patenting strategies, patent thickets, defensive patenting, divisional
applications causing noise & confusion to increase uncertainties for
generics.  TRIPs council: South Africa
has taken the lead, supported by China, India and Brazil, acknowledging that competition
law is one of the least discussed flexibilities and asking for information
gathering.
European perspective: the EC is led at WTO/TRIPs council by
DG Trade, which has pushed back against discussion of this topic, which is somewhat
surprising given what DG Competition has been doing in Brussels.  Pharma inquiry by DG Competition raised patent
strategy issues as recently as Jan. 2019. 
Policy incoherence in the EU prevents the issues from being discussed in
progressive way at TRIPs council; can be harmful to regional/EU discussions as
well. For developing countries, simple information gathering is being blocked.
Reichman’s ideas remain as topical and crucial as they did when TRIPs was new.
Pam Samuelson, The Infusion of Competition Policy in
Copyright Law
When they were starting out, the idea of considering
competition policy in © was relatively new. Reichman’s work on computer
software as applied knowhow was significant. Reichman argued against
overprotection via patent/©. At the time, Whelan v. Jaslow had suggested that
only the general purpose or function of a computer program was unprotected by ©
and everything else was protectable look and feel.  Nimmer’s treatise tried to rewrite the
statute, which is not the way it’s supposed to go. Reichman & Samuelson
started writing amicus briefs and getting more active—Lotus v. Borland, where
the dct protected the command menu hierarchy of a program even though the dct
also said that was the fundamental part of the functionality of the system.  The SCt blew it by splitting 4-4 when it got
to them, and we wouldn’t be in this Oracle mess if it hadn’t, but at least the
1st Circuit got it right. Likewise, worked on Sega v. Accolade to
allow decompilation to get access to un©able subject matter.  This was an uphill battle!  The 9th Circuit tracked their
amicus, yay.  The court said that decompilation
was important to innovation and competition—likewise the Altai case.  The cycle of overprotection seemed to have
come to an end.
But then there’s a threat of underprotection; recent
decisions in CAFC in Oracle v. Google overreacts to give us Whelan v. Jaslow
all over again.  So it’s still amicus
work for Samuelson et al.  Wrote a paper:
if we’re worried about cycles of over and underprotection, we should think
about what kind of protection programs really need—the industrial compilation of
applied knowhow is what’s valuable about them. 
She’s still convinced that’s right. They’re not suitable for ©; they
should be protected, if at all, through a sui generis right. She’s not expecting
that, but we should think it through regardless.
Peter Yu, Revisiting the Historical Lines of Demarcation:
Competition Law, Intellectual Property Rights, and International Trade When
TRIPS Hits 25
EU proposal on data producer’s right for anonymous data.
Japan actually did change its law in 2018 with respect to big data.  “Data is the new oil”: misleading but
persuasive description. Unasked important question: should data be owned in the
first place? Reichman & Samuelson have addressed this in an important
article dealing w/ the modality of protection. There are methods of regulation
between nothing and property rights, including unfair competition law.
Complementary operation of competition law: US filed an IP complaint
against China, its second under TRIPs, 2 years ago, that could have shed light
on these important issues. National treatment (art. 3) and about
license/contract in patent law. Some of the potential defenses come from art.
40, abuse of IP rights. Technology transfer and joint venture issues have been
important for decades, before TRIPs.  In
June, however, they suspended the complaint so we won’t have a ruling.
Traditional knowledge: do people overstate the importance of
protection?  Does competition law have
the same relation to TK as to other IP—do we want to encourage more
competition in this space?
Reichman’s 1983 article on design and the law: foundational.
Justin Hughes: is Altai about as good as sui generis would’ve
been?
Samuelson: yes, given that there would’ve been issues w/sui
generis protection too.  Cases mandating
filtering algorithms out as unprotectable procedures; interoperability as
unprotectable procedures improved the Altai standard. As long as there’s
meaningful effort to filter out the functional, it’s not so bad an outcome. The
software industry is doing well. Microsoft endorsed flexible fair use in its
amicus supporting cert in Oracle, which is not where Microsoft was in the
1990s.  Fed Cir threw out 102(b), merger,
and fair use, and you can get to the Fed Cir by alleging a patent claim; there
are no defenses left in (c) (they would get rid of the scenes a faire doctrine too
if given the chance).
Q: PTO asked for comments on protection of AI. Asked if we
need data protection. Seems quite concerning: comment period extended to Nov.
8.
Samuelson: she’s heard noises that extensive protection for
structure, sequence and organization is necessary because patents are being
invalidated under Alice; she thinks it’s healthy and that the industry doesn’t
need patents as much as all that.  There
should be a layer that is unprotectable except for trade secret; that’s the
most sensible.
Reichman: was puzzled by Alice, which seemed like a move to
the European approach (technical step/solution) but stopped short of it, which
makes it conceptually worse.
Samuelson: Alice involved 10 judges with 7 opinions, which
was part of the problem.  Fed Cir reacts
by saying that SCt threw out patent, so © must step into the void.

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Innovation, Justice, and Globalization: A Celebration of J.H. Reichman

Harvard Law School
Opening
Keynote
Yochai Benkler, Harvard University
How do we understand what we do in our field against the background
of profoundly increased inequality and stagnation for all but the top 5%, including
an unprecedented increase in death rate among US whites from diseases of
dispair? The economy functions in relation to power. Prior stories that have
failed us: Mainstream economics treated technology as exogenous; it has become
skill-biased. Monotonic story: the more skilled people are, the more they can
adapt to tech, so college degree gets a premium. Fit the 1980s US data
beautifully. Institutions played a relatively limited role in this theory and
we were supposed to educate workers. But that story didn’t work in the
1990s.  Early 2000s: “tasks framework”:
technology still exogenous, deterministic (some things are easier to automate
than others). Middle class jobs—people in the back office of the CPA—were now
being done by Excel. People on assembly line replaced by robots. Nonroutine jobs—the
janitor dealing with irregular floors, the CPA using Excel—still had demand.  But that still didn’t fit the overall
differences b/t different countries, all at the same tech frontier—substantial empirical
threat.
Then the story became: robots will take jobs, cause
sustained levels of structural unemployment; all work will be Uber.  Insitutionalists fought back: politics
led to sustained shift of bargaining power b/t labor and capital, b/t financial
sector and others; free movements of goods/capital but not people across borders
created new methods of offshoring, outsourcing, etc. Tech plays no independent
role in the institutional story.
So, where do we stand, who do law/institutions but also
believe that tech has an important role? 
Innovation economics/IP scholarship has some familiar forms. E.g., Classic/neoclassical
incentives/access model; Schumpeterian: market structure is more important, antitrust
is the key area of law; industrial policy intended to have exogenous effect. Institution
design can seek better innovation w/o attention to distributional effects. Or
you can have distribution sensitive innovation policy—primarily about access;
accepting a market society and looking for redistribution through rules. Market
systems will predictably not deliver access to certain goods, e.g. treatments
for tropical diseases. Central to Reichman’s work. How to structure markets and
more importantly innovation systems to deliver outcomes that are not maldistributive.
Next to this: people looking at tech rather than at IP,
sounding more in STS than in economics or law (Winner, Do Artifacts Have
Politics?, Nissenbaum, Bias in Computer Systems/Values in Design, Lessig, Code),
focusing on the fact that technologies settle politics, whether in the form of
bridges that block access to public beaches or machines that were less
productive than workers but still managed to break unions, tech is used to
resolve social conflict in favor of the party implementing the tech.
Look at ©, patent, TRIPs, WIPO treaty wars: the experience
is of active, knowing, strategic action both by firms and individuals, alone
and collectively, to shape the contest they understand will give them greater
or lesser market power. Rent seeking, particularly on the side of firms seeking
to increase the value of first mover advantages. (For Schumpeterians, rents
aren’t inherently bad—they drive innovation—but it matters how long they will
last before competition comes in.) Individuals come in with: freedom oriented
and other social values. Trying to nullify state capture. Strategic lobbying on
DRM, WIPO, etc. to create technologies that allow incumbents to control
entrants. Today: surveillance capitalism, dark patterns/manipulating consumer
demand.
Markets are arenas where power is negotiated in context—actors
spend some of their rents to create the context that will make it easier to
extract rents next time. Tech is endogenous and plastic.  There’s enough play in the joints that how it’s
designed makes a huge difference including for bargaining and distributions.
Markets are usually not efficient and power therefore matters. Institutions,
tech, and ideology each shape policy. 
Hired scholarship on one side justifying extractive practices; academics
trying to do something else—like Reichman on the relationship b/t academic
science and innovation. Shapes knowledge framework to shape the institutional
framework.
New institutionalism in sociology: models of practice are imitated/normalized
across groups.
Microfoundational component, just looking at the firm: every
firm faces a choice of action in any given context. It can increase
productivity (becoming more competitive) or decrease competitiveness (make products
for which demand is less elastic). Tech and institutions are part of the
investment pathways. Each pathway has an ideology too. They’re constantly
trading off options to shape future rents. Options: increase entry barriers, prevent
entry by innovators, increase competition among workers in the labor market and
decrease competition among employers, increase monitoring of employees, disrupt
collective action among employees/consumers, manipulate demand among consumers.
DRMs, terminator gene, rent maximizing price discrimination are all mechanisms
to control demand and disable competition. Older work on ways in which tech is
used to deskill and homogenize, to monitor labor, to decrease labor’s
bargaining power. “Ghost Work” by Mary Gray—platform organization makes it
harder for workers to organize, and that’s part of the point. It’s not just
about extraction; it’s in part about productivity and it’s also about ability
to strategically grab rents.  In each
relation, the objective is to decrease competition/entry, increase the size and
lifetime of the strategies and the rate of rents; larger rents give you more
bargaining power to capture more.
All this explains dramatic tech innovation/growth in one
sector along with higher rents, more markups, more concentration of firms and
wealth and increasing economic insecurity for everyone else—once the state is
removed as counterbalance through regulation, once unions are weakened through
labor law, then firms can dedicate more resources to rent seeking and rent
extraction over productivity.
Q from Reichman: What is to be done?
A: (1) Knowledge production is part of the process and
having a different story about how tech works opens up different avenues; many
regulators today are highly constrained by fear of upsetting the applecart by
regulating/pressuring tech firms. That’s changing a bit.  Having a better story that understands
structural/distributive things at play in tech policy, not just more is better,
is one part of moving forward. Invite distribution sensitive innovation
theorists to look more at extraction and competition. (2) Invite a multisystem
approach: look in the mirror and worry. He’s spent plenty of time being
skeptical about the state, trying to find self-organizing approaches like free
software. That’s not good enough. That’s not to be nostalgic for the 1950s and
60s—there are excellent reasons that model of regulation lost out in the
developing world. We need to find new ways to make regulation more effective—democratically
accountable but flexible sources of counterpower. Consider: who can actually do
this? What kind of actors can serve as counterpower? What innovations will
undermine the financial power of certain actors?
Maggie Chon: building on rent extraction being not
inherently bad—is it reinvested in R&D and innovation generation that might
lead to more growth/inclusion of labor?
Q: rate of innovation v. direction of innovation—are we even
capable of directional?
A: one of the outcomes of understanding things this way is
to get comfortable nudging tech development into different structures. There’s
no reason to think we should focus on rate; if we focus only on rate based on
letting market actors choose whatever they want we aren’t doing our jobs.
Social/political consequences can be vastly different and disruptive. Power of
labor, 15 years after you go to robot nurses versus PAs with computers in their
pockets, is completely different. Understanding how that relates to the broader
framework may make you demand to see the interactions b/t “rate” and the power
of incumbents.
Reichman: but where does the counterpower come from?
A: Democratic party in the US has changed a bunch in 20
years.  Green New Deal.  EC’s willingness to regulate tech now compared
to its willingness to hand out monopolies in database rights 15 years ago is
different.
Reichman: so institutional tools can evolve into
counterpower.
Do antitrust and competition law trust intellectual property
law too much?
Rebecca Tushnet, Harvard University, session chair
Graham Dutfield, The evolving role of branding in
pharmaceutical management: how should competition law respond?
Are there things other than patents that raise issues with pricing/competition?
Looking at TMs. Norlutin: on the market in UK since 1936.  Pfizer sold marketing authorization to Flynn;
Flynn debranded the product and escaped all price controls. Pfizer became the
sole supplier of the active ingredient to Flynn; Pfizer raised the price and
Flynn did as well (and then some). Then Flynn sought to block importation of Norlutin
from Italy based on its rights.  Competition authority imposed a fine, but they
appealed and won.  Trademarks do matter.
In historical work, patent based rights are often subordinate
to brand based rights. Dyestuff/chemical companies onward. 
What about the science? 
Plain packaging of pills conveys little info.  Text/visuals affect how consumers perceive
and even react to the products. Bayer puts its cross on its aspirin.  When TM litigated, Learned Hand says “aspirin”
has two meanings. Nowadays pharmacos use colors as well. When it’s transferred
to a me-too product that has a completely different price, what happens?  Zantac product expansion.
Looked at old cases on visual aspects of pills, UK case in
1972: court recognizes rights in “getup” or coloring.  Some problems: AstraZeneca, which has gotten
in trouble w/competition authorities over Nexium, has used color to protect
rights.
How does this matter? 
Tentative conclusions: Look further than patent system. Competition law
should reflect this broader focus.  Branding
can actually generate confusion about the product provenance/uniqueness, and
that’s a problem.
Maybe shape/color shouldn’t be protected/shouldn’t be
enforceable against authorized generics for the same conditions. Placebo &
nocebo effects are relevant here; if the color matters, it should be
transferred to the generic drug to avoid artificial creation of nonsubstitutability.
The consumer may reject/experience less effect from the generic.
Sean Flynn, Enforcing Fair Following Rights Through
Competition Law
Confronted an argument in assisting South Africa: you can’t
use competition law to force licensing of patent rights b/c they are completely
separate fields.  Reichman was
foundational in response to that. Also relevant to ©: rights to education and
research w/in the © system can also be seen as competition issues.
How do we craft the interface b/t IP and competition? Louis
Kaplow has done work on finding a realist/realistic proposal. US courts have
looked at the “scope of the patent” but that’s what Felix Cohen would call
transcendental nonsense. If competition law cabins the power of the patent
holder, you can’t use the scope of the patent to determine when competition law
operates: it has to have the ability to operate on the core of the rights,
including the right to exclude. Kaplow said it’s basically a ratio. The more
you have a small patent reward and a large monopoly loss, the more competition law
should bear on the situation and vice versa. 
Can we identify scenarios where one or the other will typically be the
case?
Where monopoly power is on essential goods/services w/
highly inelastic demand curve, and a country has extremely high income inequality,
it will almost always be the case that full exercise of monopoly power will
create small monopoly reward and huge deadweight loss. Edmund Kitsch was wrong:
we didn’t see, after TRIPs, proportional reductions in prices in countries with
less income.  It turns out that charging
high prices in India is still what happens. In the US if you charge a price
that only the top 10% can afford you make less than if you charge a price to
allow 60% to afford it. In South Africa, though, there’s a small # of people
who earn global high incomes and a large # who have very low incomes, and the
profit maximizing price turns out to be to serve only the small #.  You might even make more profit having a
higher price in a poorer country because you’re not serving much of it.
We also have textbook examples: books, like drugs, have
essentially zero marginal cost to distribute. But b/c you’re not trying to
serve the entire market, a higher price earns more profit. Exclusionary pricing:
more profit through massive deadweight loss. 2-3x more than monopoly profit. We
should be restraining that through competition law (or other means).
How to do it? 
Competition, fair use, international law.  In South Africa, they forced the licensing of
AIDS drugs, and after that the advice IP lawyers began giving to drug suppliers
was that any pharmaco has to give at least 4-5 licenses to local producers to enter
the market.  So we shouldn’t look at the
scope of the patent, but at whether there’s massive exclusion in the market. 
For ©, in South Africa there are affordable locally produced
textbooks, but not for niche topics. They can be 10-20x higher priced than normal.
Current SAfrican bill, on the President’s desk now, adds a competition standard
to fair use, allowing use of entire work where authorized copies can’t be
obtained at a price reasonably related to the normal price for textbooks in
South Africa.  Used language from the Berne
convention that was highlighted by Reichman.
Duncan Matthews, A Pro-Competitive Strategy for Developing
Countries: Do we still need this and where do we go from here?
Reichman’s work on flexibilities in TRIPs.  Not just the use of competition law per se,
but invoked Art. 7 & 8 of TRIPs. Art. 8 para. 2 creates potential to
prevent abuse of IP rights. UN panel on access to medicines referred to this as
underutilized.  OECD: competition
committee, where national enforcement agencies are looking closely not only at
excessive pricing and pay for delay and vexatious litigation but also at
patenting strategies, patent thickets, defensive patenting, divisional
applications causing noise & confusion to increase uncertainties for
generics.  TRIPs council: South Africa
has taken the lead, supported by China, India and Brazil, acknowledging that competition
law is one of the least discussed flexibilities and asking for information
gathering.
European perspective: the EC is led at WTO/TRIPs council by
DG Trade, which has pushed back against discussion of this topic, which is somewhat
surprising given what DG Competition has been doing in Brussels.  Pharma inquiry by DG Competition raised patent
strategy issues as recently as Jan. 2019. 
Policy incoherence in the EU prevents the issues from being discussed in
progressive way at TRIPs council; can be harmful to regional/EU discussions as
well. For developing countries, simple information gathering is being blocked.
Reichman’s ideas remain as topical and crucial as they did when TRIPs was new.
Pam Samuelson, The Infusion of Competition Policy in
Copyright Law
When they were starting out, the idea of considering
competition policy in © was relatively new. Reichman’s work on computer
software as applied knowhow was significant. Reichman argued against
overprotection via patent/©. At the time, Whelan v. Jaslow had suggested that
only the general purpose or function of a computer program was unprotected by ©
and everything else was protectable look and feel.  Nimmer’s treatise tried to rewrite the
statute, which is not the way it’s supposed to go. Reichman & Samuelson
started writing amicus briefs and getting more active—Lotus v. Borland, where
the dct protected the command menu hierarchy of a program even though the dct
also said that was the fundamental part of the functionality of the system.  The SCt blew it by splitting 4-4 when it got
to them, and we wouldn’t be in this Oracle mess if it hadn’t, but at least the
1st Circuit got it right. Likewise, worked on Sega v. Accolade to
allow decompilation to get access to un©able subject matter.  This was an uphill battle!  The 9th Circuit tracked their
amicus, yay.  The court said that decompilation
was important to innovation and competition—likewise the Altai case.  The cycle of overprotection seemed to have
come to an end.
But then there’s a threat of underprotection; recent
decisions in CAFC in Oracle v. Google overreacts to give us Whelan v. Jaslow
all over again.  So it’s still amicus
work for Samuelson et al.  Wrote a paper:
if we’re worried about cycles of over and underprotection, we should think
about what kind of protection programs really need—the industrial compilation of
applied knowhow is what’s valuable about them. 
She’s still convinced that’s right. They’re not suitable for ©; they
should be protected, if at all, through a sui generis right. She’s not expecting
that, but we should think it through regardless.
Peter Yu, Revisiting the Historical Lines of Demarcation:
Competition Law, Intellectual Property Rights, and International Trade When
TRIPS Hits 25
EU proposal on data producer’s right for anonymous data.
Japan actually did change its law in 2018 with respect to big data.  “Data is the new oil”: misleading but
persuasive description. Unasked important question: should data be owned in the
first place? Reichman & Samuelson have addressed this in an important
article dealing w/ the modality of protection. There are methods of regulation
between nothing and property rights, including unfair competition law.
Complementary operation of competition law: US filed an IP complaint
against China, its second under TRIPs, 2 years ago, that could have shed light
on these important issues. National treatment (art. 3) and about
license/contract in patent law. Some of the potential defenses come from art.
40, abuse of IP rights. Technology transfer and joint venture issues have been
important for decades, before TRIPs.  In
June, however, they suspended the complaint so we won’t have a ruling.
Traditional knowledge: do people overstate the importance of
protection?  Does competition law have
the same relation to TK as to other IP—do we want to encourage more
competition in this space?
Reichman’s 1983 article on design and the law: foundational.
Justin Hughes: is Altai about as good as sui generis would’ve
been?
Samuelson: yes, given that there would’ve been issues w/sui
generis protection too.  Cases mandating
filtering algorithms out as unprotectable procedures; interoperability as
unprotectable procedures improved the Altai standard. As long as there’s
meaningful effort to filter out the functional, it’s not so bad an outcome. The
software industry is doing well. Microsoft endorsed flexible fair use in its
amicus supporting cert in Oracle, which is not where Microsoft was in the
1990s.  Fed Cir threw out 102(b), merger,
and fair use, and you can get to the Fed Cir by alleging a patent claim; there
are no defenses left in (c) (they would get rid of the scenes a faire doctrine too
if given the chance).
Q: PTO asked for comments on protection of AI. Asked if we
need data protection. Seems quite concerning: comment period extended to Nov.
8.
Samuelson: she’s heard noises that extensive protection for
structure, sequence and organization is necessary because patents are being
invalidated under Alice; she thinks it’s healthy and that the industry doesn’t
need patents as much as all that.  There
should be a layer that is unprotectable except for trade secret; that’s the
most sensible.
Reichman: was puzzled by Alice, which seemed like a move to
the European approach (technical step/solution) but stopped short of it, which
makes it conceptually worse.
Samuelson: Alice involved 10 judges with 7 opinions, which
was part of the problem.  Fed Cir reacts
by saying that SCt threw out patent, so © must step into the void.

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Allergan gets small damages award in case against compounder

Allergan USA, Inc. v. Imprimis Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 2019
WL 4546897, No. 17-cv-01551-DOC-JDE (C.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2019)
Previous
discussion of liability issues
in this pharmaco v. compounder false
advertising case. After the court awarded partial summary judgment to Allergan
(falsity and materiality, not damages), the court excluded Allergan’s expert
report that based all its damages estimates on the Imprimis business model, not
on the impact of the particular statements at issue. And the jury was to rule
on Lanham Act damages only (there were also UCL violations, but the relief
there is equitable and Allergan couldn’t get disgorgement). The jury awarded Allergan
$48,500 in damages and zero in disgorgement of profits.
Imprimis renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of law,
which the court denied. Imprimis argued that Allergan presented no credible
evidence linking the false advertisements to lost Allergan sales. Mot. at 3. It
relied on Out of the Box Enterprises, LLC v. El Paseo Jewelry Exchange, Inc.,
732 Fed. App’x 532 (9th Cir. Apr. 30, 2018), where the jury found in favor of
the plaintiff and awarded $1.5 million in lost profits due to false
advertisements. The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff’s expert’s testimony
“established only a correlation—not a causal relationship—between [the]
advertisements and a decline in Out of the Box’s projected profits.” The
testimony also “did not provide the jury with a way to determine by a
preponderance of evidence the amount of any lost profits … In short, the record
provides ‘no way to determine with any degree of certainty what award would be
compensatory,’ as required by our precedent.”
Imprimis likewise argued that Allergan’s references to a
drop in its sales established a correlation, not a causal relationship, making
both (1) the fact of damage and (2) the amount of damage unproven.
As for the fact of damage, the Ninth Circuit has “generally
presumed commercial injury when defendant and plaintiff are direct competitors
and defendant’s misrepresentation has a tendency to mislead consumers.” “The
Court instructed that the parties are in direct competition and consumer
deception existed; the jury could therefore infer that the false statements
caused some injury to Allergan.”
As for the amount, a court “must ensure that the record
adequately supports all items of damages … lest the award become speculative
or violate [the Lanham Act’s] prohibition against punishment.” For jury awards,
courts accept “crude” measures of damages based upon reasonable inferences so
long as those inferences are neither “inexorable … [nor] fanciful.” The Court
instructed the jury: “Allergan does not need to quantify its damages in any
particular way or provide expert testimony; many sources can provide the
requisite information upon which you may calculate damages. Only the fact of
damages must be established with reasonable certainty. You need not calculate
the amount of damages with absolute exactness but there must be a reasonable
basis for computing the amount of damages.” The jury was allowed to consider
both direct and circumstantial evidence.
There was no direct testimony from a relevant consumer that
she purchased from Imprimis rather than Allergan due to the false
advertisements; and there was no survey of relevant consumers indicating actual
confusion or economic harm. But Allergan presented sufficient circumstantial
evidence. For example, a medical practice requested information on Imprimis’s
FDA report from July 2017, and in response, Imprimis’s VP of Quality stated
that “FDA found our products and services to be safe and effective.” A doctor
from the practice placed an order with Imprimis only two weeks later. An
Imprimis sales rep told another practice that Imprimis’s drugs combine
“FDA-approved” component before the practice made a purchase. There was also
evidence that Allergan lost market share during the time in which Imprimis made
the false promotional statements at issue.
Allergan argued to the jury that it should use the following
methodology: (1) begin with Imprimis’s unit sales during the time period the
jury believed that Imprimis’s false advertising had an effect; (2) multiply
that number by the percentage of Imprimis’s sales the jury found was
attributable to false advertising; (3) discount the product of that calculation
by Allergan’s market share for that drug to determine Allergan’s lost sales
units caused by false advertising; and (4) multiply that by Allergan’s per-unit
profitability. Imprimis disagreed, but this was a reasonable way to ask the jury
to think about the case. The jury asked the Court for the “summary document
showing the market share of Allergan Products,” and the jury could reasonably
have reached the $48,500 figure from this information and circumstantial
evidence before it.
It’s true that other factors affected the market, and
Allergan’s sales trends in the pre-wrongdoing period might have supported a
different conclusion.  “But that does not
mean that the jury could not infer any connection between lost sales and false
advertisements.” Imprimis mostly convinced the jury that there wasn’t much in the way of lost sales, but not entirely.

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chilling effect: competitor’s name in text of keyword ad requires extreme care

TSI Prods., Inc. v. Armor All/STP Prods. Co., 2019 WL
4600310, Nos. 17-cv-01131, 18-cv-1682 (MPS) (D. Conn. Sept. 23, 2019)
TSI sued defendants for trademark infringement, unfair
competition, and false advertising under the Lanham Act; for Sherman Act
violations; and for violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act
(CUTPA). Astonishingly, all claims survived a motion to dismiss.
The parties compete in the market for do-it-yourself
refrigerant products and recharge kits, which permit car owners to recharge
their vehicle air conditioning (AC) systems on their own. They’re sold in
specialty automative stores and automotive departments of stores such as
Walmart. “[T]he non-value-added refrigerant category consists mainly of cans of
R-134a refrigerant, without any included additives, tools, gauges, or hoses….
[T]he category of value-added automotive AC recharge kits consist of cans of
R-134a refrigerant that also typically contain some combination of additives,
lubricants, hoses, gauges, or other tools.” The parties compete in both
categories.
TSI sells its refrigerant and recharge kits under the brand
names AVALANCHE, AC AVALANCHE, and BLACK DIAMOND AVALANCHE. TSI has registrations
for AVALANCHE and BLACK DIAMOND AVALANCHE. It claims rights in the mountain
logos used with its word marks.
Armor All bought “AC AVALANCHE” as a Google ad word, putting
an Armor All ad at the top of the search results. Armor All allegedly “made no
effort to distinguish themselves and their products from TSI, either in the
Google ad itself or on the linked AC Pro Website webpage.”
Prior to 2017, Armor All allegedly did not “utilize any
mountain imagery in its packaging of ARCTIC FREEZE products,” but started using
one that allegedly “looks confusingly similar” to the mountain logo on TSI’s
products and “causes customer confusion as to the source of the goods.”
TSI also alleged that Armor All made a number of
misrepresentations about its own products, e.g. “Our kits come with everything
you need to recharge your system with no additional tools or equipment,” “fast,
easy and accurate recharging,” and “just three easy steps.” For its refrigerant,
it claimed “#1 Rated Coldest Air” and “#1 Coldest Air,” “Formula with 2X
cooling boosters vs. the next leading brand of AC recharge kits: independently
tested to deliver the coldest air from your vehicle’s AC,” and “A/C PRO ultra
synthetic refrigerant kit features a specially designed formula that helps a
vehicle’s A/C produce the coldest air.”
In the smaller “market for value-added auto AC recharge kits
in the United States,” Armor All had an estimated market share of 88% in 2017.
TSI is Armor All’s largest competitor in terms of market share, with
approximately 10% share , and prior to TSI’s entry into the value-added AC
recharge kit market in 2015, Armor All did not face substantial competition in
that market. Armor All allegedly paid off retailer Advance Auto “to renege on
its agreement with TSI and refuse to allocate shelf space to TSI’s products,”
and made a similar deal with Pep Boys. 
Armor All also sent TSI a letter alleging infringement of
two patents. TSI hired a lawyer and responded. Neither Armor All nor its predecessor allegedly had a “good
faith belief that TSI infringed” either patent. Armor All allegedly “notified
retailers within the relevant market” about the companion lawsuit consolidated
with this one, which Armor All filed against TSI in 2017.
Keyword ads: although this is worded broadly, Armor All used
TSI’s mark as the beginning of its ad text in a way that wasn’t explicitly
comparative, and that’s clearly vital.  Edible
Arrangements, LLC v. Provide Commerce, Inc., No. 3:14-CV-00250 (VLB), 2016 WL
4074121, at *11 (D. Conn. July 29, 2016), adopted the “perspective of a user of
the internet search engine at issue,” and focused particularly on “(i) the
strength of the plaintiff’s mark as a unique search term related to a distinct
line of products, … (ii) the similarity of the marks and whether the
defendant’s mark draws a clear distinction as a competing brand…. [and] (iii)
what the consumer saw on the screen and reasonably believed, given the
context.” Armor All contended that “the purchase of a competitor’s marks as
keywords alone, without additional behavior that confuses consumers, is not
actionable.” TSI alleged that the displayed ad looked like this:

To be clear, A/C Pro is the competing product.  Armor All argued that the result was
prominently labeled as an ad, that it was only one of several ads, and that the
webpage hosted at the link address didn’t “any reference to TSI or its
AVALANCHE products.” Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 102 at 16. Armor All it argued
that the structure of the advertisement itself (“AC Avalanche – A/C Pro Saves
You Time & Money – acprocold.com”) separated the search term (“AC
Avalanche”) from Armor All’s “comparative advertising slogan,” making confusion
unlikely.
The court disagreed, and I do too. Drawing all reasonable
inferences in favor of TSI, the combination of keyword purchases plus ad text
was plausibly confusing. “AC Avalanche” and “A/C Pro” weren’t presented as
competing brands in the context of the advertisement. This was not, as alleged,
a clear “three-part structure: ‘[search keyword] – [advertising slogan] –
[website address].’ ” As the court pointed out, in the example shown, other
sponsored advertisements use hyphens but follow different structures: the other
two sponsored ads didn’t use the “AC Avalanche” search term at all, and neither
appeared to use two competing brands or companies. “Try Pepsi – It is Better
than Coca-Cola” or “Stop Collection Calls—is Allied Interstate Calling You” have
been found nonconfusing, but the ad here made no clear distinction between the
terms. “The overall context makes it plausible that the hyphen implies
association rather than disassociation.”

Avalanche mountain logos

Armor All Arctic Freeze
The mountain logo unfair competition/infringement claim also
survived. This one is a harder sell for me on plausibility—I would think that absent
more similarity in the words, the use of the mountain concept in very different
forms isn’t plausibly confusing—but Armor All focused on ownership (not
suitable for resolution on a motion to dismiss) and argued that its 2014
registered copyright on its “ARCTIC FREEZE Mountain Label” used a mountain logo
and preceded TSI’s alleged first use of the mountain logos in 2015. That failed
because owning a copyright isn’t a defense to infringement (though that’s not
exactly the claim here, which is priority-based, not copyright-ownership-based;
the copyright registration is judicially noticeable evidence of use preceding plaintiff’s
claimed first use).  The court nonetheless
accepted the factual pleading that Armor All did not use any mountain imagery
on its refrigerant products until 2017. 
(I wonder about whether there’s any exposure to fees if in fact the 2014
use really reflects what was on the market and TSI persists in this claim.)
False advertising: The court can kick claims based on clearly
subjective opinions out on a motion to dismiss, but should dismiss false
advertising claims only if the statements “fall comfortably within the category
of non-actionable puffery.”
Recharge kit statements: Armor All’s kits consist of
refrigerant, a hose and trigger dispenser, and a gauge that measures the
“pressure on the low side of the AC system” and indicates a “suggested fill
range.” TSI alleged that measuring the pressure only on the low side of a car’s
AC system can “lead to unusable and inaccurate pressure readings” for the
“[m]any AC systems [that] use a BLOCK or TXV valve [to] regulate the flow of
refrigerant.” This can lead consumers to overcharge their systems, which is are
costly to repair. Based on these allegations, TSI alleged that statements such
as “Our kits come with everything you need to recharge your system with no
additional tools or equipment,” “Extends A/C/ Life,” “fast and accurate
recharging,” and “The trigger dispenser and measuring gauge make filling your
system to the proper level fast and easy” were literally false and misleading.
Some of these statements—such as “Extends A/C Life,”
“Protects [A/C] System,” “just three easy steps,” and “Easy as 1, 2 …
Squeeze”—were non-actionable puffery, as did use of the terms “fast,” easy,”
“convenient,” and “a breeze.” However statements were specific enough to be
actionable. “All-in-One Kit” and “Come with everything you need to recharge
your system with no additional tools or equipment” implied and outright stated,
respectively, that “no additional tools” were needed to recharge an AC system.
Based on TSI’s allegations, these statements were false because “[a]dditional
tools and equipment are required to safely recharge AC systems with BLOCK or
TXV valves” using Armor All’s kit.  Likewise,
claims to provide “accurate” recharging and “make filling your system to the
proper level fast and easy” were statements of measurable fact that were
allegedly false.
Refrigerant formula: Armor All’s products contain lubricants
and additives in addition to refrigerant. TSI alleged that other AC recharging
products sold in the United States contain only refrigerant (R-134a), and that
a can containing only refrigerant will create colder air than a can of equal
volume that contains refrigerant along with lubricant and/or additives. Thus,
it alleged that the following statements were false: “#1 Rated Coldest Air” and
“#1 Coldest Air,” “Formula with 2X cooling boosters vs. the next leading brand
of AC recharge kits: independently tested to deliver the coldest air from your
vehicle’s AC,” and “A/C PRO ultra synthetic refrigerant kit features a specially
designed formula that helps a vehicle’s A/C produce the coldest air.”
Armor All argued that many courts have found “referring to a
product or service as ‘#1’ with regard to an industry or quality” to be
puffery. But not so here. “#1” advertising statements are non-actionable “when
it is unclear how a property should be measured.” But “coldest” is a statement
of superiority in a specific, measurable attribute. Courts have indeed been skeptical
of superlatives, but “coldest” is not the same type of superlative as “best” etc.  It is objectively verifiable. Armor All’s
claims that its products ave been “independently tested to deliver the coldest
air from your vehicle” and contain “a specially designed formula that helps a
vehicle’s A/C produce the coldest air” stated even more specifics; “claims of
testing are typically actionable.”
The antitrust claims survived too—surprise!

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Inability to quantify damages justifies finding irreparable harm

Harbor Breeze Corp. v. Newport Landing Sportfishing, Inc., 2019
WL 4570033, No. SACV 17-01613-CJC(DFMx) (C.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2019)
Harbor Breeze won a jury verdict of false advertising
against Newport, a competitor in the whale watching tour business, but received
$0 in damages (and $0 in an advisory verdict on disgorgement).  The court declined to order disgorgement of
profits or award attorneys’ fees, but did grant a permanent injunction because
damage had been shown but wasn’t sufficiently quantifiable to allow legal
remedies, making injunctive relief appropriate.
Harbor Breeze operates in Long Beach and San Pedro in Los
Angeles County, and Newport operates in Newport Beach in Orange County.  The false advertising at issue: (1) A
consumer who searched online for “Long Beach whale watching” would get
Newport’s website, which made repeated use of the phrase “Long Beach residents
and visitors,” suggesting that its cruises depart from Long Beach, not Newport
Beach. (2) Newport advertised, for example, a “$10 whale watching special,” but
consumers could never get on its whale watching cruise for only ten dollars;
there was also a $2.50 fuel surcharge and a 2% wharfage fee. “There was also
evidence that calling these extra charges a ‘fuel surcharge’ or ‘wharfage fee’ was
misleading because these fees were a way to get extra revenue, not tied to
actual expenses, and Defendants did not disclose these fees until late in the
process.”
In the Ninth Circuit, unless and until the Supreme Court
changes things, disgorgement under the Lanham Act requires willfulness.  The court agreed with the jury.  It was reasonable to find no willfulness; one
of Newport’s owners testified that Newport made changes to websites and ads
following state court litigation in 2012 over false advertising and afterwards,
they thought they were in compliance. And the evidence indicated an intent to
optimize search results, not to deceive. One change was language on every webpage
that Newport’s boats departed from “beautiful Newport Beach.” Also, a jury
could reasonably find that Newport’s profits weren’t attributable to false
advertising. “There was evidence that, even including the extra fees,
Defendants offered cheaper whale watching cruises than Plaintiffs…. Consumers
might care more about getting a good deal than where the cruise departs or
whether a few dollars get added to the ticket cost.”  And there wasn’t evidence of intent to
mislead about ticket prices because they ultimately disclosed all the fees
prior to purchase, even if that turned out to be misleading.  [Note: this is terrible reasoning. The point
of bait and switch is that you draw the consumer in with one price, then
disclose the extra cost when they’re psychologically and perhaps otherwise
committed to the purchase.  This may not
be an appropriate case for disgorgement, but the fact that they successfully
carried out the bait and switch does not mean they had nondeceptive intent.]
Permanent injunction: The jury found that the false
advertising caused or was likely to cause damage to the plaintiffs. Harbor
Breeze’s VP of operations testified that they regularly received calls from
customers who are confused by the false advertising and who believed that Harbor
Breeze offers Newport’s $16 whale watching special. A customer once attempted
to board Harbor Breeze’s whale watching cruise with a Groupon voucher from Newport
and became upset enough at learning the truth that they let him take the cruise
for free. Other employees similarly testified about confused and angry
customers, harming Harbor Breeze’s business reputation and goodwill.
Legal remedies were inadequate because this kind of harm “is
difficult to quantify,” as the jury’s verdict denying damages demonstrated. The
balance of hardships/public interest also favored an injunction to keep
defendants from returning to their old ways.
However, to protect truthful commercial speech, the court
limited the relief granted. Rather than requiring Newport to put a statement of
its location on all ads or webpages, it would only require disclosure of
Newport’s location for “webpages and advertisements that repeatedly use the
name of another city, making it seem as if Defendants’ whale watching cruises
depart from a city other than Newport Beach. It is not misleading, for example,
for Defendants to state on their website that they are about twenty miles away
from Long Beach. But a repeated reference to Long Beach, without a clear
disclosure regarding Defendants’ location of departure, may mislead or confuse
consumers.”
Nor would Newport have to edit its webpages’ source code to
include the text “Newport Beach Cruise Operator” in the title tag or the phrase
“All Cruises Depart from Newport Beach” in the description tag. To do so, the
court thought, would “significantly burden protected speech,” though it didn’t
explain how.  The analogy was to the splash
screen in the Trafficschool.com case, but that case involved a
clickthrough that interfered with reaching any web page at all on the website;
the proposed mandatory language might not have done much good, but it’s a
standard disclosure that wouldn’t prevent search engine indexing or require a
consumer clickthrough and thus doesn’t appear burdensome at all. The court
thought that the required text would “unfairly impair Defendants’ ability to
optimize their search engine results,” but why? 
If they can only maximize their results by not using the name Newport,
that seems like it’s pretty closely connected to the falsehoods at issue here.
Nor would defendants have to give up domain names with other
city names. There were lawful uses for those; they might want to reserve a
particular domain name, for instance, in case they expand to other cities.
And Newport wouldn’t be enjoined from buying the names of
geographic locations other than Newport Beach on pay-per-click advertising
systems like Google AdWords. There was nothing wrong with that, “so long as
consumers understand the cruises depart from Newport Beach.” There was also
nothing wrong with outbidding other operators for ads.
Finally, the court was “concerned about the administrability
and feasibility of an injunction that attempts to enjoin what appears in
organic Google search results or third-party websites like Groupon,” and thus
the injunction wouldn’t hold Newport responsible for content created by third
parties.
Separately, Newport “must advertise a price for a ticket
that is the entire final cost of the ticket, excluding any legally collected
sales tax or any optional, add-on services or goods.”
For attorneys’ fees, this wasn’t an exceptional case;
defendants turned out to be right that plaintiffs couldn’t prove [the amount
of] any damages. “Although the injunction confers some public benefit, stopping
misleading advertising about whale watching does not ameliorate a serious
public harm.”

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“studies prove” as puffery?

Sorry for the photo quality, but I was quite struck by the claim:

“Studies Prove That Live Shows Add Years to Your Life. Who Are We to Argue with Science?”

Query whether reasonable consumers would receive a “tests prove” message.  I do note that there is industry-funded research claiming that live shows improve attendees’ well-being, which they then connect to lifespan–though “years to your life” is misleadingly based on the further claim that people with high well-being live nine years longer than people with low well-being, without any evidence that concert attendance takes people from high to low.  And of course it’s pure correlation, rather than causation–I suspect that people who are able to regularly see live music differ in some significant ways from people who don’t. But the advertising law question of perhaps broader interest: does the fact that there is a real study, however flawed, allegedly behind this bear on whether people are likely to receive a “tests prove” message?  As it turns out, this is a studyable thing.

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Laches bars Peloton Magazine’s claim against Peloton

Move Press, LLC v. Peloton Interactive, Inc., No. LA
CV18-01686 JAK (RAOx), 2019 WL 4570018 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2019)
It’s hard to prove reverse confusion!  Featuring a cameo by IP’s own Orly Lobel.
Move Press uses PELOTON in connection with its print/digital
magazine, Peloton, featuring articles designed to appeal to the cycling
community. The first issue was distributed nationally in 2011. Move Press also allegedly
uses the mark in connection with its website, blog, documentary films, mobile
applications and social media and sells clothing, bags, footwear, hats and
drinking containers on its http://www.pelotonshop.com website. The initial 2010 application
to register PELOTON for “magazines in the field of bicycles” was denied on
grounds of descriptiveness; it was added to the Supplemental Register in July
2011. Move Press filed again on August 14, 2014, and got PELOTON on the Principal
Register for magazines and online magazines “featuring cycling, racing, food,
travel, clothing shoes, sports equipment, sports apparel, health, nutrition,
film, and photography.”
Peloton is the Peloton you’ve heard of, established in
January 2012. “It sells indoor exercise equipment and subscriptions to its
on-demand fitness classes.” A peloton is “a group of riders working
collaboratively while bicycling together,” and the name was chosen to “evoke
the supportive group environment the company sought to foster through its
virtual group fitness classes.”
In November 2012, Peloton filed to register PELOTON for use
in connection with “stationary bicycles equipped with interactive computer
systems, video players, and body bars,” “downloadable software in the nature of
an application for use by individuals participating in exercise classes,
physical training, and exercise instruction,” and “streaming of audio and video
materials on the Internet featuring physical fitness classes, training, and
instruction.” The registration issued on the Principal Register on August 5,
2014.  Peloton has additional registrations
for (i) sports apparel; (ii) as a service mark for retail and online store
services in the field of sports apparel, fitness equipment, and fitness classes;
and (iii) for its stylized “P” logo.
Peloton’s Kickstarter accepting bicycle orders launched on
June 24, 2013, as did http://www.pelotoncycle.com. Peloton began shipping bicycles in
January 2014.
The court granted summary judgment to Peloton on laches. The
most analogous limitation period was the four-year statute of limitations under
California law. When did the period begin to run? The court noted that Peloton’s
2013 launch “received national media coverage in The Wall Street Journal and
Time Magazine,” and the application was published in September 2013. After the
launch, Move Press’s creative director received an email about it from a former
employee, and forwarded it to a principal in late 2013. The principal visited
Peloton’s website and saw that Peloton was using the PELOTON mark and offering
an indoor exercise bicycle with the name Peloton. 2013 was thus the point at
which the limitation period began. Anyway, even if it began only when Peloton
first shipped its products, that was also more than four years before this
action was filed. There was therefore a rebuttable presumption of laches.
Move Press argued that the doctrine of progressive
encroachment justified its delay in bringing this action because Peloton now
sells clothing and has a blog and digital content that was independent of its
stationary bicycles, and because Peloton now targets a broader audience with an
advertising budget that has at least doubled since it started its business
operations. But “[a] junior user’s growth of its existing business and the
concomitant increase in its use of the mark do not constitute progressive
encroachment.”  Peloton had been selling PELOTON-branded
apparel and accessories since it launched its Kickstarter campaign in 2013, and
producing video content in the form of fitness classes since its inception,
always targeting “almost everyone who has any interest in fitness.” That wasn’t
progressive encroachment.
Was the delay unreasonable? The Ninth Circuit has identified
six relevant factors: (i) strength and value of trademark rights asserted; (ii)
plaintiff’s diligence in enforcing mark; (iii) harm to senior user if relief denied;
(iv) good faith ignorance by junior user; (v) competition between senior and
junior users; and (vi) extent of harm suffered by junior user because of senior
user’s delay.
The first two factors weighed in favor of Peloton. The marks
were relatively weak: descriptive or suggestive. But Peloton’s mark was
substantially more valuable due to its “rapid and continuing growth” relative
to that of Move Press. And Move Press was not diligent in protecting its mark;
despite actual and constructive knowledge in 2013, Move Press did not file an
opposition or seek to cancel any of Peloton’s federal registrations. Move Press
also didn’t seek to enforce its rights in the PELOTON mark against other
companies using PELOTON in connection with bicycle-related goods and services
(there were a couple). And there was a three-and-a-half-year delay between July
13, 2014, when it sent Peloton a C&D, and initiation of suit on February
28, 2018.
As for the harm to Move Press if relief is denied, that
turned on likely confusion, on which there were genuine factual issues (see
below).  The same with factor five
(whether the parties compete). Those couldn’t be weighed either way.
Factor four “focuses on whether Peloton had prior knowledge
of Move Press when it decided to adopt the mark PELOTON.” There was an email to
Peloton’s founder and CEO from his mother, on August 18, 2012, stating, “Just
saw at my grocery store the magazine Peloton.” “Although this provides some
evidence as to Peloton’s awareness of the existence of Move Press in 2012 prior
to announcing or selling its products, there are undisputed facts showing that
Peloton selected the name PELOTON [in 2011] before it was aware of Move Press.”
The final factor was the harm to Peloton from Move Press’s
delay.  Peloton’s investment in the brand
was substantial during the period of delay. It had invested millions of
dollars, hired a lot of people, opened PELOTON-branded retail showrooms across
the US, received numerous awards and widespread media coverage, and overall
developed substantial good will and recognition in the fitness market. The
prejudice would be “substantial” if Peloton were to lose rights to the PELOTON
name.
Overally, the weighable factors weighed heavily in favor of
Peloton, entitling it to summary judgment on whether the delay was unreasonable.
For the same reasons, Peloton would be prejudiced by allowing suit.  “[A]t least some reliance on the absence of a
lawsuit” is necessary to show prejudice.
When Peloton filed its trademark
application for PELOTON, the PTO initially rejected it, citing Schwinn’s
PELOTON registration for outdoor bicycles. Thereafter, Peloton contacted
Schwinn, which led to an agreement between the two that allowed Schwinn to
maintain its registration for its mark for its outdoor bicycle while allowing
Peloton to use the mark in connection with home fitness products and services. The
PTO then approved Peloton’s amended application. This evidence supports an
inference that Peloton would have acted differently had Move Press challenged
Peloton’s use of the PELOTON mark when Peloton filed its trademark application.
There was also no triable issue on prejudice.
Move Press argued that willful infringement wasn’t subject
to laches. This requires knowledge on the defendant’s part that its conduct
constitutes infringement. The record was insufficient to allow a jury to conclude
that there was willful infringement. Numerous courts have found that “[p]rior
knowledge of a senior user’s trademark does not necessarily give rise to an inference
of bad faith and may be consistent with good faith.” There was no evidence of
wrongful intent to capitalize on Move Press’s goodwill, and when the founder learned
of Move Press, he believed there was no likelihood of confusion between PELOTON
Magazine and Peloton’s goods and services. “[A] knowing use in the belief that
there is no confusion is not bad faith.”  Nor was it bad faith to continue using PELOTON
after receiving the C&D.  Peloton
responded by rejecting Move Press’s claims and concluded by stating “[w]e trust
that this resolves the matter; however, if you have questions, please contact
the undersigned.” There was no response, until Move Press sued three and a half
years later. “By failing to respond to Peloton’s response letter, Move Press
reinforced Peloton’s belief that it was not infringing on the Move Press mark.”
Turning to Move Press’s motion for summary judgment, Peloton
argued that Move Press couldn’t establish priority, which would have to be
based on common law rights preceding Peloton’s Nov. 9, 2012 filing date. “According
to Move Press, by the end of 2011, 25,000 print copies had been distributed
nationwide and Move Press had 15,000 digital subscribers.” Move Press also
relied on statements by Peloton’s founder’s mother about seeing a copy of the
PELOTON magazine in a grocery store in Texas.
Move Press was not entitled to summary judgment on whether
it had sufficient nationwide market penetration to give it common-law rights.
The evidence of use included only copies of 2014 magazines, not 2011 magazines.
Internal emails about promotional reach weren’t enough to show that the use was
“sufficiently public” as of 2011. Sufficient penetration had to be assessed
considering “volume of sales and growth trends, the number of persons buying
the trademarked product in relation to the number of potential purchasers, and
the amount of advertising.”  There wasn’t
any evidence about the actual location of its subscribers or the actual sales
in each state.
There were also triable issues on likely confusion sufficient
to reject Move Press’s motion for summary judgment on confusion.
Even if the Move Press mark was suggestive, “suggestive
marks are presumptively weak,” and there were several other PELOTON-related
marks in the cycling market.  Although there
was some evidence of Move Press’s commercial strength (in 2018, it distributed
12,000 printed copies of the magazine, and the number of digital subscribers
dropped to 7000; over eight years it had “approximately one billion online
responses to its social media content”), Peloton’s was substantially stronger.
There was a potential for reverse confusion, making the strength of the mark
factor favor Move Press. [Other courts would say that higher-than-suggestive
conceptual strength is required to make the strength factor favor the plaintiff
in a reverse confusion case.]
Relatedness/proximity of goods: triable issues on how close
they were.
Similarity of the marks: though the words were the same, the
visual appearances differed. Move Press began with a serif font in all
lowercase letters, underlined with the caption “fuel the ride” beneath it. It later
changed to a non-serif font and in all capital letters. At all times, it was black
and white and was often preceded by “Move Press” and followed by “Magazine.” Peloton,
meanwhile, uses a san serif font in all capital letters, frequently in
conjunction with its registered “P” logo in bright red. This was enough to create
a triable issue of fact on visual dissimilarity. And a reasonable jury could
find a difference in meaning between PELOTON alone (used as a metaphor for a
body of riders) and PELOTON Magazine (which could be reasonably understood as a
publication about bicycle races).
 

Peloton with logo

Peloton Magazine with slogan

Actual confusion: Move Press cited nine examples of customer
confusion, five of them Peloton Magazine being tagged in posts about
Peloton.  E.g., Orly Lobel tweeted “Hugh
giving all the rest of us in the #Peloton family goals to aspire to @onepeloton
@pelotonmagazine though I bet he doesn’t have near 500 @classpass classes yet!”;
in response to the tweet “Follow us for cycling news, photos, features and RT’s
of intrigue,” a user wrote “I think I will pass.. You pulled your ads from
@Hannity #diseasedLiberals don’t get my $$$$”; “Stay away from Peloton spin
bikes … worst customer service ever @pelotonmagazine #peloton #spinning
@PelotonBikes Paid for now two weeks with no show appointments…. shop
elsewhere.”  One person wrote to Move
Press seeking to feature a Peloton spin bicycle on a show; one entity sent a
vehicle for review to the magazine along with a personal note stating, “My
coworker just took delivery of a new Peloton bike today.” The owner of a
cycling industry insurance agency asked about PELOTON Magazine’s affiliation
with the PELOTON bicycle and whether Peloton paid Move Press a licensing fee to
use PELOTON, and one talent/media agency approached Move Press to discuss
providing PELOTON-branded cycling packages and global live racing; when Move
Press said there was no affiliation, the executives ended the meeting.
This wasn’t enough to avoid a triable issue on actual confusion.
“Given that the two marks have been in the market for more than four years and
that both parties use Twitter, ‘a handful of examples of anecdotal confusion
are insufficient to support a finding confusion.’” The four non-Twitter
examples were insufficient show “persuasive evidence that a significant number
of consumers have formed a similar mental association” to demonstrate actual
confusion.
Marketing channels: it wasn’t enough to both advertise on
the internet (everyone does) or at the Tour de France (only one marketing
channel among many for both parties). Weighed against likely confusion.
Degree of care: Although Move Press argued that its
consumers were unsophisticated, it also contended that its magazine “is trying
to reach a high-end cycling male-dominated base of consumers” with an “average
household income of 175 [thousand]” who are “highly-educated.” And Peloton’s
customers “exercise a higher standard of care when deciding whether to spend
$2000 on an exercise bicycle or $4,000 on a treadmill.” Triable issue of fact.
Peloton’s intent: in a reverse confusion case, bad intent
could be shown with “evidence that a defendant deliberately intended to push
the plaintiff out of the market by flooding the market with advertising to
create reverse confusion,” or that “the defendant knew of the mark, should have
known of the mark, intended to copy the plaintiff, failed to conduct a
reasonably adequate trademark search, or otherwise culpably disregarded the
risk of reverse confusion ….”  But
there was no particularized evidence of purposeful disregard for the risk of
reverse confusion. Peloton’s declaration said that it discovered several
companies that were using “Peloton” as their brand name or in connection with
their products and services, but none used “Peloton” for interactive home
fitness products. There was a triable issue on bad faith.
Product expansion: The triable issue of fact as to the
relatedness of the goods made this factor neutral.
Overall, Move couldn’t prevail on summary judgment of likely
confusion.

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pharmaco gets summary judgment against compounder on falsity/unlawfulness

Allergan USA, Inc. v. Imprimis Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 2019
WL 4545960, No. 17-cv-01551-DOC-JDE (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2019)
The parties compete in the market for ophthalmic drugs. Imprimis
sells its ophthalmic drugs pursuant to Sections 503A and 503B of the FDCA
(compounding and outsourcing). None of its ophthalmic drugs are approved
by the FDA. Imprimis has exceeded FDA limits on compounding/outsourcing
in various ways, including by using the unapproved component artesunate to
prepare drugs until it received a letter from FDA and by using bulk drugs that
weren’t on the FDA-issued lists of bulk drugs for 503B.
Imprimis advertised that its pharmacies “only use
FDA-approved ingredients,” and that its Cyclosporine-based formulations are
“made from FDA-approved drug components,” and told a potential customer in
Kansas that “In simpler terms, FDA found our products and services to be safe
and effective.” A video on its Go Dropless website included the statement, “The
patient is protected from infection and inflammation even more effectively than
can be achieved with expensive, inconvenient and irritating topical
medications.” Also, a press release claimed “Imprimis Pharmaceuticals Go
Dropless™ Video Interview Survey Reveals 95% of Leading Cataract Surgeons
Surveyed Would Prefer Dropless Therapy.” Though Imprimis didn’t have the
details of the survey, it “understands” that survey participants were asked
“Would you prefer your patients not to have to take topical eye drops following
an ocular surgery,” rather than identifying a specific formulation such as its
Dropless Therapy injectables. When the survey was conducted, Imprimis “probably
had less than ten customers” for its injectable Dropless formulations, and, of
the 21 surgeons surveyed, only “a handful” had used them. Up to 20 months
later, Imprimis was advertising these “recent” survey results and indicated
that they referred to Imprimis’s product specifically.
Allergan sued for false advertising under the Lanham Act and
violations of the UCL’s unlawful and unfair prongs. A related
case
shows how this is going to go.   Previously, even in the presence of unlawful
statements regarding “FDA approval” that generated Lanham Act liability, the
Court declined to hold the defendants liable under the Sherman Law and UCL “so
long as the compounder complied with FDA’s interim guidance, especially in
light of the agency’s ongoing implementation efforts.” Where it didn’t comply
with the interim guidance, there could also be Sherman Act/UCL liability.  There was noncompliance here—among other
things, Imprimis wasn’t requiring individual prescriptions before compounding
when it should’ve been.
However, Allergan couldn’t get restitution under the UCL
based on disgorgement of Imprimis’s profits. “The profits obtained by Imprimis
come from third parties rather than from Allergan. They were never in
Allergan’s possession.” Only injunctive relief was available for this claim.
Lanham Act claims: Imprimis claimed that its pharmacies
“only use FDA-approved ingredients” and were “made from FDA-approved drug
components.” That was literally false because FDA does not approve individual
“ingredients” or “components” of drugs. “In simpler terms, FDA found our
products and services to be safe and effective” was also literally false
because Imprimis “does not subject its drugs to the FDA approval process that
would support such a finding.”  Likewise,
Imprimis’s claim that it “Meets requirements under Section 503B of the FD&C
Act” was literally false based on the findings above.
Superiority claims: The survey/surgeon preference claim was
a “tests prove” claim that could be falsified by showing that “such tests ‘are
not sufficiently reliable to permit one to conclude with reasonable certainty
that they established’ the claim made.” Even without expert testimony, the
court found literal falsity.  “No
reasonable jury could determine the survey was sufficiently reliable to
conclude with reasonable certainty that 95% of cataract surgeons surveyed
prefer Dropless Therapy.” The survey didn’t even ask about Imprimis’s specific
product. So too with the video claiming “the patient is protected from
infection and inflammation even more effectively than can be achieved with
expensive, inconvenient, and irritating topical medications.”  This wasn’t “merely a professional opinion; it
is a promotional statement published by the company, and Dr. Lewis appears to
have been a consultant paid by Imprimis to speak with ophthalmologists and
investors.” Imprimis’s witnesses knew of no basis for the video’s claim.
Literal falsity created a rebuttable presumption of actual,
material deception. “Regardless, the uncontroverted facts also establish that
the statements were material. Some of the false commercial promotions were even
made in direct follow-up to consumer questions about quality and FDA
compliance.”
Whether there was harm to Allergan, and the extent of that
harm, was for the jury.

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scientific debates can ordinarily be resolved in false advertising cases

Pax Water Technologies, Inc. v. Medora Corp., 2019 WL
4390567, No. LA CV18-09143 JAK (AGRx) (C.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2019)
The parties compete in the market for water treatment
technologies for municipalities, public water agencies and districts, and
private parties.  Using chlorine to
disinfect water causes a reaction with organic matter in the water, resulting the
formation of THMs [trihalomethanes], which is itself a public safety and health
risk. The parties compete to sell systems
to remove THMs from drinking water.
Pax challenged two Medora documents: a “THM Removal Systems
Comparison Table” and a White Paper, “Misrepresentations by PWT of the 2012
Camarillo, CA Potable Tank Mixing Study.” Camarillo conducted a head to head
text comparing Pax’s tripod vortex mixer with Medora’s mixer; a mixer is one
component of a THM removal system. After the
test was completed, Camarillo continued to use Pax’s tripod mixer, but
discontinued the use of Medora’s mixer, and Pax talked up the results.  Medora then wrote to Pax stating that Pax falsely
represented the results of the comparison and provided a competing
interpretation of the results. Pax disagreed.
The White Paper stated that “[a] truthful analysis would
conclude that” (i) Medora’s mixer outperformed Pax’s mixer; and (ii) Pax’s
mixer performed “so poorly that its mixing data would have been the same even
if the mixer had not been turned on during the study.” The White Paper also
includes “a summary of the study, a comparison of the data generated based on
use of the competing products, and an analysis of the results in support of
these conclusions.” Pax alleged that the analysis was based on false scientific
premises about what the chlorine concentration in the test tank should’ve been.  The White Paper listed the size and cost of the competing
products, as well as the method for installing them and claimed that “most
customers have figured out that the GS-12 is a much better value than the [Pax]
mixer” based on features including its price, design, installation,
performance, reliability, modeling, and customer data.  Pax alleged that Medora’s mixer cost $15,000,
not $7800 as stated in the White Paper, and that the White Paper falsely
claimed that the Pax mixer is “[n]ormally deployed with divers” and is “tied
down,” whereas the mechanical attachment of the device “is not recommended by
Plaintiffs, is not required to keep the tripod mixers from moving within the
tank, and is not common.”
As for the comparison table, it didn’t include Pax’s name
but Pax alleged that, “based on the products’ characteristics,” “[a]ny person
familiar with THM removal systems would recognize that” the products described
in the latter two columns of the table are both “manufactured and sold by
Plaintiffs, which are the sole source of” products of these types that met the
identified product standards.  It made
several allegedly false representations and comparisons.
Both the documents were on Medora’s website and were
allegedly provided to actual or potential customers, and their claims were allegedly
verbally repeated.
Medora argued that its claims were protected under ONY, Inc.
v. Cornerstone Therapeutics, Inc., 720 F.3d 490 (2d Cir. 2013), as
“non-actionable scientific conclusions.” The court here pointed out that ONY
limited its holding to scientific conclusions that had been “presented in
publications directed to the relevant scientific community” through
“peer-reviewed academic journals.” Following Eastman Chemical Co. v.
Plastipure, Inc., 775 F.3d 230 (5th Cir. 2014), the court declined to
extend ONY to the use of “snippets” of a study that were included in
“statements made in commercial advertisements and directed at customers.” As Eastman
noted, “Advertisements do not become immune from Lanham Act scrutiny simply
because their claims are open to scientific or public debate. Otherwise, the
Lanham Act would hardly ever be enforceable — ‘many, if not most, products may
be tied to public concerns with the environment, energy, economic policy, or
individual health and safety.’ ”
In a nice formulation, the court here explained, “The scientific
nature of a conclusion does not mean that it is not actionable per se. Instead,
the question is whether a scientific conclusion was stated within a commercial
advertisement.” At that point, the fact/opinion distinction became dispositive,
and that is typically an issue not suited for resolution on a motion to
dismiss.  “To be sure, to prevail on
their claim, Plaintiffs may need to prove that the conclusions stated in the
White Paper are contrary to the ‘well accepted science of water chemistry.’ However,
such a determination can be made through the normal processes of civil
litigation.” Separately, factual statements about the parties’ products, e.g.,
cost and whether they needed to be tied down, aren’t like those in ONY. 
Commercial advertising or promotion: Obligatory note that Gordon
& Breach
probably doesn’t survive Lexmark untouched, but the key
prongs here are whether the claims were (1) commercial speech and (4) disseminated
sufficiently to the relevant purchasing public to constitute advertising or
promotion within that industry.
The complaint adequately alleged that White Paper was
commercial speech. Its language could reasonably support an inference that it
proposed a commercial transaction. Its introduction claimed that Medora’s product
“outperformed” Pax’s competing product during the head-to-head comparison; it
included information on the comparative price and features of the competing
products; it summarized its contents as showing that Pax’s communications improperly
discredited Medora’s product; and it stated that it was a response to Pax’s
“marketing documents.” It then encourages readers to conclude — as “most
customers” have — that Medora’s product “is a much better value” than Pax’s,
citing specific features and providing Medora’s logos, phone number and website
address. The complaint further alleged that the White Paper was in fact used to
persuade actual or potential customers to purchase Medora’s product, by posting
the White Paper on its website and by stating its contents and/or providing
copies of it when Medora’s agents and employees met “with actual or potential
customers of the parties’ products.”
This was plausibly advertising because it was “speech about
a product or service by a person who is offering that product or service at a
price, directed to persons who may want, and be willing to pay for, that
product or service.” Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 27 Cal. 4th 939 (2002). It was
plausibly directed toward potential customers. Its title, “Misrepresentations
by [Plaintiffs] of the 2012 Camarillo, CA Potable Tank Mixing Study,” made it part
of the parties’ commercial dispute. It referred to two specific products, and Medora
had an economic motivation to persuade readers to buy its product instead of
Pax’s.
The parties disputed whether allegations of sufficient
dissemination to the relevant consumers had to meet the heightened pleading
standards of FRCP 9(b). Assuming without deciding that they did, it was enough
to plead that the White Paper had been accessible on Medora’s public website
since at least May 2018; that, through this posting, it “reached a significant
number of actual or potential customers of the parties’ products”; and that Medora
provided copies of the White Paper to actual or potential customers of the
parties’ products and/or has made the false and misleading statements and
claims to them that are contained in the White Paper. Given that the market was
allegedly specialized and limited, this was enough. “[I]nformation about the
particular employees of Defendant who disseminated the White Paper, and the names
of the potential customers to which it was provided, are ‘peculiarly within the
opposing party’s knowledge’ and therefore can be alleged based upon information
and belief.”
Medora then argued that there weren’t enough allegations of
harm from the comparison table, because it didn’t contain any “direct
reference” to Pax’s product. Even assuming that Pax needed to allege actual
injury, it was enough to allege that “Medora’s actions have caused harm and damage
to Plaintiffs and have resulted in a corresponding improper financial benefit
and gain to Medora,” given the allegations of a limited market for the products
and the importance of every single customer.

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“Hawaiian” plus imagery isn’t deceptive indication of origin (or is it?)

Maeda v. Kennedy Endeavors, Inc., No. 18-00459 JAO-WRP, 2019
WL 4544272 (D. Hawai’i Sept. 19, 2019)
Kennedy sells “Hawaiian” brand snacks; plaintiffs alleged
that the name and packaging misled them into thinking that the snacks were made
in Hawai’i from local ingredients, in violation of Hawai’i and California law.  (They’re made in Washington state, which it
says on the back of the package.) Kennedy argued that its uses of “Hawaiian”
and Hawai’i imagery were puffery.  The
court found that, for purposes of a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs pled deceptiveness
to a reasonable person for the Hawai’i claims, except with respect to
injunctive relief based on future harm. However, and somewhat puzzlingly, it
reached a different result with respect to California claims (reasoning that there was no Hawai’i precedent about finding lack of deceptiveness on a motion to dismiss).
 

some of the accused packages with Hawaiian name and imagery
Williams doesn’t require consumers to look at the
back of the package to the nutrition label, but the court distinguished it because
that case involved fruit juice snacks and alleged misrepresentation about
ingredients. This is a case involving alleged misrepresentation about
origin.  The court apparently believes
that “an origination label readily identifies location to correct potential
misconceptions about geographic origin, while an ingredient list requires an
examination to ascertain whether representations about a product are true.” (The
court also said it wasn’t relying on the Washington origin disclosed on the
back, though.)
While the front of the package isn’t necessarily puffery, no
reasonable Californian consumer could be deceived. “Other than the word ‘HAWAIIAN’
there are no assertions, phrases, or claims to assess on the packaging at
issue.” [Kind of depends on what the images imply, doesn’t it?]  The court thought that “Hawaiian” isn’t
general, “[b]ut neither is it a specific assertion or concrete statement about
a product.”  That seems like a misguided
conclusion—there may be some room for dispute about definitions, but origin
statements are treated as factual all the time. Still, the package bore no more
specific identification of a place in Hawai’i as the origin of the products: “merely
referencing Hawaii and its culture on the packaging is not enough on its own to
confuse a reasonable consumer regarding the origin” of these products, without
additional representations. Also, “unlike products such as macadamia nuts or
coffee, chips are not inherently associated with Hawai‘i.”

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