Ebay is really great for this sort of thing:
![]() |
| Glade Plug-in in the shape of a pine tree |
See Car-Freshner v. S.C. Johnson & Son, 70 F.3d 267 (2d Cir. 1995).
from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2025/04/new-in-my-tm-collection.html
Ebay is really great for this sort of thing:
![]() |
| Glade Plug-in in the shape of a pine tree |
See Car-Freshner v. S.C. Johnson & Son, 70 F.3d 267 (2d Cir. 1995).
from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2025/04/new-in-my-tm-collection.html
Panel 3 – Media and Communication Systems for Attention
Capture
This panel will address how different fields, from media
studies to economics, think about attention, how it is captured and valued. Do
different types of media (political news, advertisements, sexual content, etc.)
produce different attentional patterns? How is attention captured through
technology? What issues does attention distortion raise?
David Simon, Associate Professor of Law, Northeastern
University (moderator)
Nick Seaver, Associate Professor of Anthropology, Tufts
University
Attention as a method of control—a name for how we can be
disciplined/enrolled into projects of bosses or other people who want to
control us. If we thought of attention that way we’d change how we regulated
and valued attention.
Mouse jiggler: one form of resistance to this type of
discipline. Bosses use bossware to surveil whether you’re “working.”
That also reveals just how lousy our techniques for
detecting attention are. Very hard to know! We use “impressions” or sales as
proxies. Self-driving cars use torque on the steering wheel to check whether
you’re prepared to take over—but that means that you can just use a weight to “pay
attention” for you. Even the most safety-focused forms of “attention” have been
turned back into discipline from above.
Bridget Todd, Fellow at Berkman Klein Center
Podcasting: what makes it different? Identity mediates our experience
of digital technologies. Podcasting is inherently a medium for people who like
to talk. Opposite of short-form content, with some exceptions. Deep dives into
complicated/nuanced issues. [Books?] Requires attention!
Asking “who benefits from this attention?”: conflict
entrepreneurs. They effectively hijacked conversations around identity. Our
current media landscape is tailor-made for conflict entrepreneurs to do this.
It makes us more divided, suspicious, lonelier, and less curious. Focuses
attention on differences among individuals, values, identities. Bite-size
journalism makes people more black-and-white in their thinking, less nuanced. What
can we do? More exposure to complicated narratives: a man who waited for 6
hours to speak in support of an anti-trans bill in Wisconsin, and listened to
the advocates speaking about their lives, and changed his mind.
Rebecca Tushnet, Professor of Law, Harvard University
Maybe by accident the flip side of Professor Seaver’s talk. My
fields are IP and advertising: and what I suggest those fields tell us is that attention
can be owned, but when attention is not an object of ownership, it is not regulated.
We value ownership of attention but not its other possible characteristics. One
thing that means is that we often are unable to measure the thing that we say
is ownable. A well-known quote, attributed to retail mogul John Wanamaker,
says: “Half the money I spend on advertising is wasted; the trouble is I don’t
know which half.”
I also have something of a side note, or a cautionary one:
courts often believe things about human cognition that are simply wrong, and it
is hard to make them change their minds because they often consider their
beliefs about cognition to be common sense. An example from copyright:
In an important copyright case, Judge Learned Hand wrote
that “everything registers somewhere in our memories, and no one can tell what
may evoke it” – Learned Hand was a great judge but a terrible neuroscientist:
as it turns out, we do not process a lot of sensory input that we get, and it
is never encoded in memory, not long-term or short-term. But courts still rely
on this principle to hold that musicians may have engaged in subconscious
copying without knowing about it, and it is very hard to get a court to reject
a factual assertion made by Learned Hand.
Lots of similar assertions about how consumers think in TM.
More relevantly to attention in particular, copyright’s fair
use test distinguishes between unauthorized uses that are justified and
unauthorized uses that use another’s work “merely . . . to get attention or to
avoid the drudgery in working up something fresh” which are less likely to be
fair—so one of the things the copyright owner owns by default is the right to
your attention based on their expression.
Similarly, TM: TM focuses on the ability of a mark to
identify the source of a product—a mark is communicative, and a good mark
captures attention. The ability to be recognized and noticed is at the core of
what a good trademark is! That means that unauthorized attention-getting uses
might be infringing. Initial interest confusion is a concept that explicitly
relies on the idea that a trademark might get a consumer’s attention and then the
seller might sell them something else, and that’s infringing even though no
sale is ever completed as the result of confusion. At the same time, we distinguish
between initial interest confusion and mere distraction/comparison—it can be
legitimate to catch the consumer’s eye by, e.g., comparative advertising.
Likewise, trademark’s protections for truthful uses can be
limited if the user uses “too much” of the mark—relies too heavily on its
attention-getting power, as courts have ruled in cases like a former Playboy
playmate’s website that repeated that she was Playmate of the Year too many
times, or a luxury resale website emphasizing Chanel products too heavily in
its advertising.
Dilution: making it harder for a mark to stand out/capture
your attention—Delta is diluted versus Xerox which is not: no real empirical
evidence this does harm to TM owners but the sense of unfairness suffices to
get courts to condemn what they see as free riding
Outside of ownership, my fields don’t have ways to think about
attentional harms
Advertising law: getting attention is unregulable because
only falsifiable claims can be evaluated—even advertising systems that purportedly
require factuality don’t generally regulate attention-grabbing in general,
especially in the visual or oral realm.
Regulation of sponsorships and endorsements are an example:
FTC is focused on metadata disclosure—disclosure that content is sponsored—as well
as on whether endorsers make claims that need substantiation. The thought is
that audiences can calibrate their attention or the credibility they give to
the claims once there’s disclosure—but it’s important to understand the
underlying dynamic which is that sponsored content is something that audiences
have a harder time tuning out—it’s not like a banner ad that you can just have
attentional blindness towards.
Indeed, advertising is often seen as a tax on audiences or the
price they pay for other content, even though availability of information is
necessary for an efficient market. James Kellner, the chairman and CEO of
Turner Broadcasting, stated that people who skip TV commercials are violating
their contract with TV companies who provide ad-supported programming. He grudgingly
accepted that “there’s a certain amount of tolerance for going to the
bathroom.”
Attention is owed—but the givers of attention are not the
ones who are in control. That assumption or expectation that advertising is
hostile to its audiences’ interests, perhaps perversely, itself gives some
credibility to the idea that most attempts to capture audience attention are legitimate—we
expect the audiences to be running away, so we also expect the advertisers to
be lunging forward to catch the audiences in any way they can.
Emily West, Professor of Communication, UMass
Attention, inattention and convenience: from book Buy
Now: How Amazon Branded Convenience and Normalized Monopoly. Inattention
allows us to draw attention to things that we find more rewarding; can distract
us from consolidation of corporate power. Production of user inattention is
strategic and purposeful. If content was the bait for ad-supported media, convenience
is the bait in the digital economy for greater platform enclosure of time,
spending, attention. Ease at the center of any interaction/exchange;
facilitates inattention to multiple steps, research, complexity—a structure of
feeling and a logistical form. Decreases discernment and price sensitivity—decisional
muscles get flabby. Get out of the habit of going to the store, the news, etc.—these
things come to us. Google’s AI answers remove even the need to consider the
search results. Offering itself as authoritative source, but it’s a digital ad
company and not a library.
Simon: Different visions: Attention & control; attention
as an asset or point of conflict; attention as ownership/ownership of
attention; attention as convenience. TM law allocates control over
attention-getting to make it easier to find stuff. Attention can also be an
asset to employers. And to sellers who offer convenience (or maybe your desire
not to pay much attention is the asset there).
Seaver: there are boundary objects or trading zones where
disciplines meet—but people are often talking about different things (a “suitcase
term”). Are these definitions of attention all the same? Attention is a big
bag, but that can be appropriate!
West: the temptation is to go to individualized responses—“I
just need to be more careful/buy less/pay more attention”—but it’s the mental
infrastructure we live with. The firms have 150 psychologists on staff and it’s
not a fair fight.
Q: Seaver/Tushnet: Does attention exist or is it just about
metrics that we use for owning, controlling people/their behaviors? A proxy for
something deeper. Todd/West: podcasting and convenience—podcasts are regularly being
used to fill free time, raising the question whether they are really deeper
dives. Attentional experience different from that of reading books (we can do
other stuff while we listen). Current attention ecosystem: media strategy that
has to do with trying to reach the individual or the population that is the
most remote from the issue; anyone who actually knows what’s going on is alienated
by the way the news promotes the issues, but the goal is not to reach people
who understand—instead, it’s to reach the people who know the least.
West: longform content is just another method of platform
enclosure. Amazon/Tiktok equivalents of QVC where you can just watch and click
to buy.
RT: TM doctrines prioritize form over substance: TM is a
shortcut to compress information about the product/service: you see Coca-Cola
and remember the taste and the advertising and the lifestyle. But the TM owner
is allowed to change quality/characteristics without notice even though continuity
is supposedly the justification for the right. The obligation created by
reputation is not reciprocal.
Seaver: Attention is used as a proxy for productivity (the
mouse jiggler) or safety (the steering wheel)—the real value is the thing that
the attention is attached to, like truth (for media). Historically specific in
the modern era, perhaps.
Q: Do you think that attention can justly be owed?
RT: I’m attempting to describe how IP thinks about these issues; it depends on
the doctrine. Bundle of content and attention—attention might be owed if it
were really an efficient market if you were really free to choose it instead of
something else. It’s not fair if there’s monopoly control or market distortion.
Seaver: we tend to assume that neuroscience has to be
consulted, but if attention is just a word for “people should be able to do
things on their own schedules and at their own behest” you don’t need
neuroscientists for that. When Trump was elected in 2016, there was a lot of
attentional discourse: (1) how could this have happened, we (the polity) weren’t
paying attention; (2) everything he does is a distraction (to/for the polity) from
something else; (3) he has no attention span. These are three levels of
attentional discourse. The polity pays attention by writing things in the papers
even though we traditionally assume that writing things in papers leads to the
polity paying attention.
West: Advertisers like digital advertising because it can
show you the breadcrumbs of how you spent your ad dollars and whether someone
clicked—more behavioral.
RT: disagree—that’s only for some types of ads. Coca-Cola
doesn’t use behavioral advertising, and there’s lots of ad fraud. And only some
types of transparency. Amazon may tell you cost per click, but it doesn’t tell
you how you get put on the first page of search results, and it could change
how it organizes its site and destroy you at a moment’s notice.
Seaver: note that the jiggler is not super effective
resistance; interesting to see the pushback. Doesn’t find it morally
objectionable, but defeating the safety device on a car is—but they’re framed
the exact same way by their users.
from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2025/04/the-battle-for-our-attention-empirical.html
Medical Depot, Inc. v. Med Way US,
Inc., — F.Supp.3d —-, 2025 WL 948334, No. 22-CV-01272 (OEM) (SIL)
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 20
This case focuses on trademark “use.” The parties are
medical supply companies who use similar marks—“Med-Aire” and “MEDAIR®”—to
brand the medical air mattresses they sell.
Plaintiff, dba Drive, has sold air mattresses using the
“Med-Aire” mark since 2007. From 2007 to 2023, Drive’s “Med-Aire” mattresses
amassed gross sales of $160 million. “Med-Aire” was used on at least some of
Drive’s external packaging for its medical air mattress products intermittently
since 2007. Drive used the ™ symbol in connection with its “DRIVE” trademark for
its “Med-Aire” mattress products between 2007 and 2020. But it didn’t use the ™
symbol in connection with its “Med-Aire” mark until 2020, two years after Med
Way started using its “MEDAIR®” mark. “Med-Aire” appeared on at least certain
shipping labels for Drive’s air mattress products, alongside product
descriptions in the same font, color, size, location, typeset, and style as the
rest of the product descriptions, at least intermittently, since 2007. “Med-Aire”
appeared inside and on the cover of a user manual included with at least some
“Med-Aire” air mattress systems, and on the face plate of the air pump that
accompanied the mattress system, which is sold separately. “Med-Aire” also
appeared in at least some of Drive’s catalogs and brochures since “as early as
2007.” Drive also distributed monthly promotional “Med-Aire” product catalogs. And
“Med-Aire” was displayed in flyers at retailers of “Med-Aire” products since
2011, at trade shows since 2007, and on websites since at least as early as
2009.
Med Way, meanwhile, displayed MEDAIR on its goods in
interstate commerce since at least as early as April 1, 2019. Med Way stamps “MEDAIR®”
on its medical air mattresses and pumps. In late 2019, Med Way hired counsel to
conduct a trademark clearance search for the term “MEDAIR,” and variations
thereof, which did not reveal Drive’s “Med-Aire” mark. It filed a use-based
application for “MEDAIR” in connection with “air mattresses with pump, for
medical purposes” with a first use date of April 1, 2019; it was registered in
2020.
Drive and its affiliates have 67 federally registered
trademarks. Drive waited until July 8, 2020, to do a clearance search for the
term; having done so, it found MEDAIR and then tried to register Med-Aire for
“[m]edical products, namely, therapeutic mattresses” and the like. The PTO
ultimately suspended Drive’s application pending disposition of Med Way’s
prior-filed application; Drive’s cancellation petition is suspended pending the
outcome of this litigation.
The court found that Med-Aire was suggestive because “it
requires some imagination and some thought” to understand the kind of goods it
refers to; it was obviously medical, but it wasn’t obviously a mattress. This
is the wrong standard because it’s only half the question: the appropriate
inquiry is, knowing the goods, does it require imagination to connect
the goods with the mark? The classic Abercrombie spectrum gets its name
from a case in which the court found SAFARI distinctive for some apparel items
but not others. Noodles would be descriptive for a restaurant, but arbitrary
for a furniture store. Courts often get this wrong, but they shouldn’t. Here,
the court was apparently encouraged in its error by both sides.
The court then turned to trademark use. Citing Alexandra J.
Roberts, Trademark Failure to Function, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1977 (2019), the court
stated: “To merit protection, a trademark must be ‘used in a trademark way,’
meaning that it ‘must appear where consumers expect a trademark to appear, and
it must be sufficiently set off from the surrounding text and images to attract
notice.’” The court also looked to Jack Daniel’s and the TTAB. A mark
“must be used in such a manner that its nature and function [as a trademark]
are readily apparent and recognizable without extended analysis or research and
certainly without legal opinion.” Scholastic Inc. v. Speirs, 28 F. Supp. 2d 862
(S.D.N.Y. 1998), aff’d, 199 F.3d 1323 (2d Cir. 1999) (cleaned up).
“Common indicators suggesting that a word or phrase might be
viewed by the public as a trademark include large font relative to surrounding
text, all capital letters or initial capitals, distinctive print style, use of
color, and prominent position on a label or in an advertisement. In short, a
mark must stand out from the surrounding text.” Advertising expenditures can
also be circumstantial evidence, as can sales. (Though you still need to know
which part of the sales experience counts as a trademark!)
Conceptual strength also matters. “For example, where a mark is fanciful, ‘even
though [the mark] may be embedded in other text, there is no danger that [the
mark] will be interpreted as merely descriptive or informational matter … As
such, its only purpose is to provide a unique identifier to a product that is
otherwise identified only by a generic name and technical explanatory,
information’” (citing In Re Eli Lilly & Co., 2015 WL 4241138 (T.T.A.B.
2015)).
Using these principles, plaintiff used “Med-Aire” as a
trademark. “Med-Aire” “consistently appears as the first word or phrase in
product descriptions, uses initial capital letters, appears at the product
point of sale listings, appears in advertising and promotional materials, is
referred to by consumers as ‘Med-Aire’ in voluminous consumer communications,
is suggestive, and products bearing the mark have amassed millions of dollars
in sales, all of which supports finding that the mark has been used as a source
identifier.”
The court distinguished Jaymo’s Sauces LLC v. Wendy’s Co.,
19-CV-01026, 2021 WL 4712685, at *4 (C.D. Ill. Oct. 8, 2021), which held that “S’Awesome”
was not an adequate source identifier for sauce in part because of the term’s
nonprivileged placement, the sauce label’s emphasis on other (descriptive)
terms, and the comparatively small, plain font of “S’Awesome,” as well as
marketing materials that featured only “occasional” use of the “S’Awesome” term.
Here, Drive used “Med-Aire” as an individual product mark and also used a house
mark on its products; that’s fine. “Drive does not emphasize other
non-trademarked phrases, images, or terms relative to ‘Med-Aire’ on labels and
in promotional materials,” and frequently used “Med-Aire” in promotional
materials.
The lack of brand awareness surveys or marketing experts was
not dispositive, nor was it dispositive that consumers often refer to “Drive”
mattresses or product numbers. Drive also submitted evidence of consumer
communications about “Med-Aire” products, demonstrating that consumers did
perceive “Med-Aire” as a source identifier.
“Size, location, and other characteristics may be
determinative for trademark use for descriptive terms that have acquired
secondary meaning,” but were less important for suggestive terms.
With nothing else in serious dispute, Drive had priority and
showed likely confusion as well as its entitlement to cancellation of Med Way’s
registration.
But its state law unfair competition claim, which required
bad faith, failed because Med Way presented evidence that it relied on a
trademark clearance search and advice from counsel. There was also no fraud on
the PTO.
Med Way’s dilution counterclaim also failed because Drive
was the senior user and because Med Way’s mark was not famous.
State law false advertising counterclaims also failed for
want of public injury. “Med Way’s evidence consists of a reference to ‘mediocre
reviews,’ but many products receive ‘mediocre reviews,’” and anyway there was
no showing of how Med Way’s mattress reviews compared.
The court declined to award disgorgement. There was no finding
of extreme difference in quality or bad faith, or even that Med Way benefited
from its infringement. Even though Med Way’s principal physically examined
Drive mattresses to see what a competitor’s mattresses looked like, “a person
could reasonably examine the physical mattress alone—without the point of sale
listing, or the user manual, or an advertising flyer—and not encounter the ‘Med-Aire’
mark” based on Drive’s own exhibits. And, though Med Way continued its use
after Drive’s objection, Med Way’s CEO and Med Way’s attorneys expressed a
genuine belief that although Drive used “Med-Aire,” it was not the senior user
of the mark.
Although Drive didn’t delay in protecting its rights or have
unclean hands, the balance of the equitable factors weighed against profit
disgorgement. Instead, it was entitled to a permanent injunction.
from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2025/04/trademark-use-is-easier-with-suggestive.html
At a hotel recently, I was presented with this gem: “Staybill,” a guide to hotel/local attractions.
Does it matter that PLAYBILL is registered for, inter alia, “making hotel reservations for others”?
from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2025/04/trademark-question-of-day_7.html
Memjet Technology Limited v. Vanguard Graphics International,
LLC, 2025 WL 976915, No.
3:23-cv-1810-JES-AHG (S.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2025)
The parties sell digital inkjet products for use in
commercial industries. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants disseminated a
communication to approximately twenty businesses in the digital inkjet printing
industry stating that “Duraflex print head will no longer be produced by Memjet
effective immediately” and that they were “disappointed in Memjet’s decision
…” and will “provide even better options …” moving forward. This allegedly
libeled Memjet by telling its customers that Memjet was discontinuing Duraflex
printheads immediately without warning to its customers and suggested that the
Duraflex printheads were “substandard, obsolete, and becoming irrelevant within
the print industry.” Plaintiffs also alleged that the communication “violated”
Memjet’s trademarks by displaying the Duraflex name and logo. Plaintiffs sued
for Lanham Act false advertising, trade libel, intentional/negligent
interference with prospective economic relations, and California UCL violations.
Defendants successfully sought dismissal of the dismiss the
trade libel claim, the UCL claim, and the Lanham Act false advertising claim.California
trade libel requires: (1) a false or misleading statement; (2) which
specifically refers to the plaintiff’s product or business; and (3) clearly
derogates that product or business. Statements about Duraflex being
discontinued weren’t clearly derogatory, despite allegations that they prompted
“countless” phone calls, emails and in-person inquiries and that one of plaintiffs’
larger OEM providers “indicated that it would significantly reduce its DuraFlex
printhead forecast as a result of the Communication.” But ‘[t]he defamatory
character of the language must be apparent from the words themselves.’ ” “[A] statement that the Duraflex printheads
are being discontinued effective immediately, even if true, would not
necessarily or clearly carry an implication that something was wrong with the
product or business. For example, unexpected discontinuation of a product could
result from a supply chain issue with a part or from a personal issue with the
business owner that has nothing to do with how the business is run or the
product’s quality.”
UCL: Only allows injunctive relief/restitution. Plaintiffs’
claim for money spent on corrective advertising wasn’t restitution but damages,
and they didn’t seek injunctive relief, so the claim had to go.
Lanham Act: This one I’m dubious about, but the court held
that a statement that a product was being discontinued didn’t relate to its
“nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin.”
Sybersound Records, Inc. v. UAV Corp., 517 F.3d 1137 (9th
Cir. 2008), says that phrase relates to “characteristics of the good itself” and
not to false statements regarding their copyright license status. Characteristics
of a karaoke recording, for example, include “the original song and artist of
the karaoke recording, and the quality of its audio and visual effects.”
Whether a product was discontinued was not a characteristic of the good itself.
(What about plaintiffs’ services or “commercial activities”? The court
dismissed the complaint without leave to amend, because this was their second
try.)
from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2025/04/whether-product-was-discontinued-doesnt.html
Unveiling the Bond Between Artists and Their Work: A Vignette Study
38 Pages
Posted: 12 Feb 2025
Last revised: 19 Feb 2025
Date Written: January 31, 2025
This paper empirically measures the bond between artists and their
work. In a pre-registered vignette study, the impact of generative AI
(Artificial Intelligence) in the creation process on the relationship
between artists and their creations is investigated. The study provides
evidence for the personality-rights theory of copyright law, predominant
in continental Europe, which emphasizes a close personal bond between
creators and their creations. While other theories of copyright law,
such as the incentive and the labor theory, have already received much
attention from the empirical research community, the personality-based
approach to copyright law has been primarily discussed as a mere
theoretical concept. To address this knowledge gap, over 200 art
students from the five top art schools in Switzerland participated in an
online vignette study where they were randomly assigned to go through
the creation process of visual artwork using either (i) traditional
drawing tools on a canvas, (ii) digital drawing software on a tablet, or
(iii) an AI image generator. The results record the degree of the
participants’ emotional attachment to their artwork and indicate a
nuanced relationship between technological tools and the artist’s bond
to their work. While there is no significant di!erence in emotional
attachment between traditional and digital drawing tools, using an AI
image generator leads to a statistically significant decrease in the
artist’s bond to their work and their perception of the work as their
own intellectual creation. These findings suggest that the use of
generative AI tools to create artwork impacts the extent to which
artists can personally express themselves in their artistic endeavors,
which has significant implications for policymakers in the fields of
copyright law and technology as they navigate the landscape of copyright
protection and authorship of AI-generated works.
from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2025/04/reading-list-margaritha-windisch.html
James v. Chocmod USA Inc., 2025 WL 950509, No. 1:22-cv-01435
JLT SKO (E.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2025)
Plaintiffs sued over defendant’s “Truffettes de France”
(trans. “Truffles from France”), which are, despite the name, made in Canada. They
brought the usual
California claims.
Even if the truffles were not physically different, and if—as
defendant argued—it uses the same recipe in France as it does in Canada and
doesn’t charge more based on place of manufacture, California law holds that
there is a cognizable injury. As the California Supreme Court held in Kwikset:
To some consumers, processes and
places of origin matter. … Whether a wine is from a particular locale may
matter to the oenophile who values subtle regional differences.
…
For each consumer who relies on the
truth and accuracy of a label and is deceived by misrepresentations into making
a purchase, the economic harm is the same: the consumer has purchased a product
that he or she paid more for than he or she otherwise might have been willing
to pay if the product had been labeled accurately. This economic harm—the loss
of real dollars from a consumer’s pocket—is the same whether or not a court
might objectively view the products as functionally equivalent. … Two wines
might to almost any palate taste indistinguishable—but to serious oenophiles,
the difference between one year and the next, between grapes from one valley
and another nearby, might be sufficient to carry with it real economic
differences in how much they would pay.
Chocmod tried to defend by arguing that it had trademark
rights in its brand name and thus no reasonable consumer would be deceived, particularly
because the back label “explicitly states” that they were made in Canada. Initially,
Moore v. Mars Petcare US, Inc., 966 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2020), held:
[B]rand names by themselves can be
misleading in the context of the product being marketed. Descriptive brand
names require of the consumer “little thought,” which can make consumers
susceptible to purchasing because “they won’t have the time or interest to read
about [the product] on [the] website or the back of the box.” Thus, a product
called “One a Day” gummy vitamins, which required two gummies a day for a full
dosage, is explicitly misleading.
The court rejected Chocmod’s argument that “any reasonable
consumer should … be expected to review the packaging to determine the
country of origin, if that is something the consumer feels is important.” The front-label
representations were plausibly misleading to reasonable consumers, who aren’t
required to look beyond the front of the box. Only if reasonable consumers
couldn’t think they’d answered their questions with the front of the package—only
if they’d “necessarily require more information before reasonably
concluding that the label is making a particular representation”—do courts
consider the back as potentially resolving an inherent ambiguity. (Emphasis mine.)
The brand name “Truffettes de France,” or “Truffles from
France,” was not ambiguous and would plausibly mislead a reasonable consumer.
This was much clearer than ambiguous images or phrases addressed in other
cases. Cf. Culver v. Unilever United States, Inc., 2021 WL 2943937 (C.D.
Cal. June 14, 2021) (front labels “Paris,” Depuis 1747,” and “Que Maille”;
court explicitly distinguished “de Paris”); Eshelby v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 664
F. Supp. 3d 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (“L’Oreal Paris” on front label could lead
reasonable consumers to think that the company originated in Paris, but not that
any particular product was); La Barbera v. Ole Mexican Foods Inc., 2023 WL
4162348 (C.D. Cal. May 18, 2023) (“Phrases like ‘The Taste of Mexico!’ are at
once true in every meaningful sense and meaningless; the point is that they are
different in kind from stating the Products are from Mexico.”).
Here, there was an actual representation about the truffles’
county of origin, which was “so misleading” that a reasonable consumer “need
not search elsewhere for the truth.” Chocmod argued that the product name was
no different from French onion soup, French fries, Belgian chocolates, Mexican
burritos, or Chinese chicken salad. The court was open to the idea that “French
truffles” would be insufficient to satisfy the reasonable consumer test. But “from
France” was different. The label didn’t make representations about style or
recipe, which would be different. Moreover, “the reasonableness of a consumer’s
belief that a salad or other perishable item was shipped from another country
is incomparable to his relative belief as to a shelf-stable product like
chocolate, which was, in fact, shipped from another country—Canada.”
from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2025/04/canadian-origin-truffettes-de-france.html
Tentantable.com, LLC v. Aljibouri, 2025 WL 959656, No. 22-CV-78-LJV
(W.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2025)
Not sure I’ve seen this before! Is selling stolen goods
trademark infringement? No, this court says, and that has to be right.
Plaintiffs sell “various inflatable products such as bounce
houses[,] water slides, and…air blowers used to inflate such products,” as
well as “party tents, pole tents, [and] banquet tents with associated tables
and chairs.” They claim trademark rights in “Zoom Blowers,” “ ‘Pogo’
inflatables,” and “PartyTentsDirect.com.” They also alleged rights in “a black
and yellow housing for an air blower.” Their application “for the yellow and
black color scheme” is pending at the PTO.
Defendant Mohammed Aljibouri began working at Tentandtable
as a “warehouse supervisor” in October 2019. After he quit, they allegedly discovered
that had been “entering orders” and “making deliveries” of the plaintiffs’
goods for which they had no record and had not been paid. He also had
“stole[n]…property” from the plaintiffs’ warehouse. And even after he left,
he made unauthorized orders by signing in as a Tentandtable user.
Defendants sold the plaintiffs’ products, which “bear[ ] the
[p]laintiffs’ names and trademarks[,] including Tentandtable.com, Zoom Blowers,
Pogo Bounce House[,] and Partytentsdirect.com.” They also allegedly sold yellow
and black air blowers that look “similar[ ]” to the plaintiffs’ air blowers.
The RICO claims failed because they were RICO claims.
Trademark infringement as to the allegedly stolen goods: Selling
goods that have been altered so that they “do not meet the trademark owner’s
quality control standards”—or failing “to observe a restrictive condition on
the sale of a product”—and thereby causing “consumer confusion” may be
infringing. But “repackaging of goods is not trademark infringement if it does
not deceive the public or damage the mark owner’s goodwill.” But the complaint
didn’t allege these things. “[T]he mere fact that the defendants sold the
plaintiffs’ goods with the plaintiffs’ trademarks without their permission is
not enough to state a Lanham Act claim.”
Burton v. Label, LLC, 344 F. Supp. 3d 680 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), rejected
similar claims against a former employee, where the allegations were that the
former employee had “use[d] his position as a Label salesman to sell items
represented to be Label goods by placing orders with Label suppliers” and then
keeping the profits for himself. Unlawfully pocketing proceeds that belonged to
an employer does not constitute false designation of origin. ML Fashion, LLC v.
Nobelle GW, LLC, 2022 WL 313965 (D. Conn. Feb. 2, 2022), likewise rejected
Lanham Act claims based on sales of unaltered but allegedly stolen goods. There
was no actionable misrepresentation-by-omission that they had the right to sell
the goods.
As for the more conventional trade dress claims, they failed
too. First, a trade dress plaintiff must “offer ‘a precise expression of the
character and scope of the claimed trade dress.’ ” This is vital to assessing
protectability, infringement, and the scope of any relief. The court was
unconvinced that plaintiffs had provided the requisite articulation here. The
complaint focused on the air blowers’ yellow and black “design[ ],”
“configuration,” “scheme,” and “appearance.” But they said little more than
“yellow and black.” And a “focus on the overall look of a product does not
permit a plaintiff to dispense with an articulation of the specific elements
which comprise its [trade] dress.” Images attached to the complaint couldn’t
relieve plaintiffs of this burden. Still, the Second Circuit has cautioned that
“a plaintiff that articulates the components of its trade dress with the
requisite precision should not have its claims prematurely dismissed”
regardless of whether the trade dress claimed is sufficiently distinctive.
So the court turned to distinctiveness and found it insufficiently
pled. (It was also skeptical about conclusory allegations of nonfunctionality.)
Product design trade dress always requires secondary meaning,
including the primarily color-based claim here. Plaintiffs did not succeed in
the “formidable task” of pleading secondary meaning for product design. The
complaint was silent on the first four factors courts consider: (1) advertising
expenditures, (2) consumer studies linking the mark to a source, (3)
unsolicited media coverage of the product, and (4) sales success. As to (5),
attempts to “plagiarize” the mark, plaintiffs alleged copying by defendants,
but not by anyone else. “[C]urts have found that when a complaint alleges that
only the defendants have violated the plaintiff’s trade dress, this factor
weighs against an inference of secondary meaning.” As the court noted, “if
allegations of the defendant’s plagiarism were itself enough, this factor
always would weigh in favor of finding acquired secondary meaning.” Finally, the
length of the mark’s use was pled as being since January 2015, and the complaint
didn’t specify that they have used this design “exclusively,” although plaintiffs
referred to the design as “unique.” “But even assuming the plaintiffs have
sufficiently alleged more than seven years of exclusive use, that would not be
enough to state a plausible claim in the absence of any facts relevant to the
other factors.”
The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over remaining claims.
from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2025/04/is-selling-stolen-goods-trademark.html
Nguyen v. Lovesac Co., 2025 WL 950511, No.
2:24-cv-01293-TLN-JDP (E.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2025)
Weird decision finding that a price isn’t an actionable
representation, which—even if true—ignores the difference between a
price and a putative former price represented by a strikethrough, which
implicates specific provisions of consumer protection law enacted precisely to
protect consumers from false and misleading price comparisons. Nguyen alleged
that Lovesac inflates its product prices for the sole purpose of marking them
at a discounted “sale” price. Price
quotes allegedly include a purported “discount” the customer is receiving on
their purchase, which correlates with a “limited time sale” and a fictitious
strikethrough reference price accompanied by a purported percentage off. Lovesac
allegedly warrants to consumers that their purchase received a certain “% off”
of their purchase, resulting in “-$XX” to the initial subtotal.
The court initially found that Nguyen didn’t sufficiently
allege which sofa he purchased, though he did allege the price. He didn’t allege
any “particular size, fill, material, or any of the other customizable features
he purchased.” The complaint also failed to allege, about the investigation
purporting to show that the “sales” were not really sales, “what products were
tracked, what the prices were on specific dates, whether any individual item
prices were identified or tracked, whether the investigation included the
specific ‘Sactional’ items Plaintiff purchased, or any other meaningful details
about the investigation.”
More concerningly, the court rejected Nguyen’s allegations of
misleadingness where the product he bought “displayed an original,
strike-through price of $7,175.00, representing [a] purported $1,793.75
‘discount.’ ” The court instead relied on cases holding that “the price of a
product can[not] constitute a representation or statement about the product.” Parent
v. Millercoors LLC, No. 3:15-cv-1204-GPC-WVG, 2016 WL 3348818 (S.D. Cal. June
16, 2016); Boris v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 3d 1163 (C.D. Cal. 2014).
But a “price” is not a juxtaposition with a putative former/regular price—as
evidenced by the fact that legislatures around the country bar specifically false
advertising relating to “sales.” It’s not the actual selling price that makes
the misrepresentation—it’s the struck-through price presented as some sort of
ordinary price. But the court missed that distinction: “pricing about the
product alone cannot constitute a representation or statement about the
product.”
The California Supreme Court, however, has specifically held that a consumer who buys a product in reliance on a false/misleading reference price has suffered an injury. Hinojos v. Kohl’s Corp., 718 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Dhruv Grewal & Larry D. Compeau, Comparative Price Advertising: Informative or Deceptive?, 11 J. PUB. POL’Y & MKTG. 52 (1992) (“By creating an impression of savings, the presence of a higher reference price enhances subjects’ perceived value and willingness to buy the product. . . . [E]mpirical studies indicate that as discount size increases, consumers’ perceptions of value and their willingness to buy the product increase, while their intention to search for a lower price decreases.”)). As the Hinojos court pointed out, the “what a great bargain!” effect is exactly why the California legislature barred the practice.
from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2025/04/district-court-misunderstands-fake-sale.html
“One Wing to Rule Them All” ad from Moby Dick. “Marinated in Moby’s secret spices and flame-kissed to perfectoin, these delicious wings have the power to put fellowships at risk!”
from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2025/04/trademark-question-of-day.html