Notre Dame Scope Roundtable, part 2

Jeanne Fromer & Mark McKenna, Claiming Design
Commentators: Sarah Burstein and Rebecca Tushnet
RT: Great paper exploring the ways that different claiming
regimes contribute to producers’ ability to maximize rights by claiming under
multiple overlapping regimes, copyright, design patent, and trade dress. Discuss
specific regimes, then overarching issues.
One key argument of the paper: Early claiming might force a
designer to think more carefully, and at an earlier stage, about the ways it is
likely to market the design and about extent and nature of competition their
designs will face. Query whether this is only true when there is peripheral
claiming, or where scope is limited very strictly to the claimed
design/counterfeits thereof—early claiming by exemplar may allow for a lot of
manipulation too. One example: Maker’s Mark case v. Jose Cuervo, where the
registered mark is the dripping wax seal but it turns out that red is a
component of the “real” mark, which quite clearly allows Maker’s Mark a better
chance at validity.
The TM registration process is also more demanding in terms
of limits on presentation: the PTO will refuse to register a “mutilated” mark
or a phantom mark; the thing claimed must be recognizable and complete as a
symbol in itself without other matter interposed or to be added later. This
serves notice functions but may also make possible some intervention on scope. Should
the description offered in an unregistered trade dress have to meet the same
standards for clarity as the registration process? Paper says courts don’t have
a uniform level of generality; is there any way to specify the appropriate
level of generality w/reference to PTO practice? Drawing of the mark?
Copyright: Lack of clarity about the claim complicated
Varsity Brands: the ambiguity about whether Varsity claimed only
two-dimensional drawings or the designs of uniforms themselves. Varsity
registered its copyright in two-dimensional drawings of cheerleading uniforms,
but the Sixth Circuit treated its claim against Star Athletica as if Varsity
claimed rights in the design of threedimensional cheerleading uniforms. Did the
SCt understand or destroy the difference? The car example in the opinion
suggests that there is a difference, but the treatment of the “uniform” design
suggests that there is not.
Originality and the concept of the “work” somewhat limit the
extent to which one can manipulate the exemplar in copyright, as is likely to
be taken up on remand in Varsity Brands. But we are increasingly seeing that
design patent lacks similar constraints. Not only does it not have a decent
functionality doctrine, but the ability to claim tiny parts of a design,
accompanied by lots of dotted lines, may minimize the risks of not capturing
what a competitor will do, especially if you can file multiple design patents
on the same object—iPhone. One possible path for the paper: instead of election
of remedies, but think about whether it’s possible to limit design patents per
article of manufacture—even with many points of novelty, still only one design.
Another really useful insight: visual claiming likely
focuses viewers on a design’s gestalt—though perhaps in skewed ways—rather than
individual features, whereas verbal claiming likely does the opposite. And
verbal claiming is often unavoidable once there is a serious challenge to
validity using prior art or we’re at the infringement/scope stage—this seems to
be true in design patent and copyright, and courts don’t even try to avoid
verbal claiming in trade dress, using the ability to articulate the trade dress
in words as a proxy for the examination that the claimant has otherwise avoided
by not registering.
All three regimes entail forms of central claiming because
these legal regimes involve laying claim to some members of the set of designs
protected by the right as contrasted with peripheral claiming, which would lay
claim to all members of that set. If litigation occurs, this central claiming by
exemplar is then supplemented by claiming by characteristic. Central claiming
reduces the cost of claim drafting, because the drafting party need not think
through and articulate at the time of claiming the metes and bounds of the
design. Central claiming by exemplar is also cheaper than claiming by
characteristic, and may involve simply creating the relevant work or design.
Paper says: Visual claims are necessarily by exemplar (even
if labeling directs the viewer to particular characteristics of the exemplar). But
we can do better with notice by specifying the best way to do visual exemplar claiming,
plus supplemental claiming by characteristic. So how do we do that? One
subsidiary point made by the paper: The trick of “broken line” claiming can
undercut the notice provided by the claims and make it hard to manage the scope
of the design rights. Examiners, competitors, or judges might perceive the
level of specificity in these drawings to be much greater than they actually
are. Ok, so what is the possible solution? For design patent: Requiring a claim
to cover an article of manufacture plus the claimant’s ability to identify
point of novelty, even if the point of novelty is the overall combination? That
actually is what we do w/©, where we have a work and then the unprotectable elements
get filtered out, supposedly.  And w/TM,
we use the concept of source identifier to do the heavy lifting—with respect to
product design, the idea of “limping marks” might also be of use, cf. the
European Kit Kat case: association isn’t enough.  New thought: in dilution we’ve specified that
association isn’t enough, it must be association that impairs the
distinctiveness in the mark.  So too for rights
in limping marks in the first place: association with a particular producer is
not enough, it must be association that consumers use to identify the goods and
services they wish to buy or avoid.
Sarah Burstein: Agree re: mutilation/phantom marks: separate
commercial impression required for just a part. That could be an external
limiting constraint—where Ugg claims any boot w/ button infringes the trade
dress, maybe you need separate commercial impression.
Not sure she buys rosy picture of early design claiming—plenty
of shenanigans possible.  Paper says most
designs are claimed before infringement begins. Not sure that’s true,
especially for litigated design patents. Maybe true of what’s on register in
archives, but filed or amended post-marketing—Nike files 100 different
variants. More economical approach: file whole iPhone, then keep chain of
continuations in the oven.  Nordock:
continuation of utility patent filed 4 years after “infringer” came on market.
Earlier disclosure is good, yes.
Trade dress: Taco Cabana’s continuing ability to say that “pink
is a part of our trade dress” even though it wasn’t claimed in the last Taco
Cabana case. That remains a problem even after the first definition occurs
through litigation.
Configuration designs—seem less concerned w/surface
ornamentation/packaging—would like more clarity on that. Now after Star Athletica maybe we are going to
have more conflicts w/surface ornamentation.
Big picture Q: why should we care what you claim? Still get
broader scope in TM no matter what b/c of infringement standard. We didn’t always
care. In 19th c.: you could claim article of manufacture configuration,
surface ornamentation, both. PTO didn’t really care.  You got the whole thing.  Curious about how that might interact
w/framing effects mentioned in the paper. 
TM: separate commercial impression might be a limit.  Do you want some limit on “you get what you
claim”?
Fromer: What’s the connection b/t claiming and scope? You
could say it’s irrelevant, but it is about framing the case/setting things
up.  This paper is teeing up the fact
that this process is actually going on, b/c right now it’s relatively
unreflective—courts often accept the descriptions they get uncritically.  That has many effects.  There should be internalization w/in business
of claiming too broadly or too narrowly; utility patents has that in spades.
But utility patent is peripheral claiming; hard to do in central claiming b/c
you can make inconsistent claims in central claiming—emphasize different
features at different times, different levels of generality. Make them
internalize costs of claiming broadly sometimes and narrowly other times. 
McKenna: Other thing difficult in TM: rights are dynamic;
trade dress you have today can change tomorrow, whereas utility patent is
supposed to be locked down, at least in theory. 
Lemley: struggle w/peripheral/central divide, b/c advantages
and disadvantages for each. Utility patents: verbal claiming sucks. However
manipulable the image is, lawyers are better at manipulating words but also
creating weird unintended effects in both directions, broader and narrower
scope.  One question is whether we ought
to think differently about it depending on whether copying is an element of the
regime in question.  Disclaimers can also
be used: use of words to supplement images might not be “here’s what’s
important” but “here’s what standing alone I don’t claim”—that allows a prior
art analysis.  Closest prior art idea in
design patent—here’s what needs to be distinguished.
Penalizing overclaiming: in the noncompete context, some
courts have a no-blue-pencil rule: if it’s overbroad, we strike the whole thing—this
deters overclaiming.  Is there a way to
do that in design patent that shares the utility patent’s feature that if it
covers the prior art it’s invalidated in its entirety?
Buccafusco: There’s a validity/creativity stage: do you have
something capable of granting rights at all? 
That has costs of overbreadth. There’s also a functionality screen.  There’s also a liability/scope claim.
Copyright smashes them all together at the same time w/overlapping doctrines.
Over regimes spread them out.  Think
about costs of overclaiming at different stages? Costs w/r/t validity might not
be that high if validity doesn’t create a lot of market power.
McKenna: deep down no one form is adequate.  Verbal claiming doesn’t work.  Show students verbal description of Taco
Cabana, and they think it’s every Mexican restaurant ever; show them the
pictures and they think, oh, it’s nearly the same.  Inescapable conclusion is that the best
requires some combination of visual and verbal. Shouldn’t pretend as design
patent does that you’re only doing visual, not verbal; shouldn’t do what trade
dress law does, which is require verbal but often take whatever plaintiff shows
up with.
Samuelson: Independent invention isn’t as much of a concern
on the design patent side. What is the motivation for design patent? The possibility
of getting total profits!  Perry Saidman:
claims that design patents are just about stopping knockoffs. How does that fit
in?  A bit more about strategic
considerations that affect early/late claiming.
McKenna: very few companies create product configurations to
indicate source; they figure it out later; many registered long after first use
(he believes).  Lawyers dabbling in both—love
design patent b/c they can get secondary meaning from design patent exclusivity—bootstrap
into secondary meaning. Other strategic reason: the ability to get patents on
bits and pieces, which you can’t do effectively w/TM because atomizing “mark”
into bits makes source identification difficult.  Also faster than acquiring secondary meaning.
Zahr Said: there is self-claiming that’s posturing but ends
up being performative via overenforcement—e.g., DMCA notices. You claim
something and then you claim to own every part of it, even though the law is
not that way.  Loves the idea of
disclaiming.
Lemley: award extra remedies for better claiming? 
Fromer: hold people to their intentions.
Said: somewhere between claiming and estoppel.
McKenna: if I say my design is X but then claim infringement
by X-1, it’s not a difference in harm, but in what triggers the harm. 
Lemley: you get a substantial benefit from claiming ex post.
Markman hearing is good b/c makes you decide scope when both validity and
infringement are on line at the same time. 
As long as we’re doing scope before infringement we’re better off than
we are today.
Fromer: might not help w/all notice but would help in
specific inquiry.
Burstein: might also get a design patent b/c there’s no use
requirement: can stop making handbag and still claim rights.  Copying: is design patent really about
deterring knockoffs? If so, that’s a very different system than we actually
have.  We’d have to change the way we
proved copying. Industrial design has been about mass production, which
presumes access; we’re just cutting to the chase by fighting about similarity.
But we do have copying-like doctrines; if there’s really close prior art, you
might not have been copying the plaintiff. She sees in complaints designs that
look independently created, in part b/c they’re super functional.  If it’s truly ornamental, one can expect less
independent creation, but if anything goes there’s a lot of independent
creation.
McKenna: real ornamentality requirement could also solve
this problem.
Lemley: many of the problems are functional but not all,
especially for minimalist design like rounded corners on a phone.  Not b/c it’s functional but b/c it’s simple.
Burstein: designers wouldn’t want to work in a clean room—the
whole point is to find new solutions; looking at what other designers have done
is important.  [There is no clean room,
as there is not w/©.]
Said: courts too often find that “making choices” =
protection.  No, choices for many reasons
should not be protected. 
Grynberg: Fed. Cir. dominance is a problem: they control
design patents but design patents aren’t their focus.
Fromer: same with PTO. 
At least there are unregistered TMs so that TMs aren’t the sole province
of an agency for which they are not primary as a focus.

McKenna: Fed. Cir. doesn’t like to invalidate design patents—it’s
also the outlier in TM functionality; it’s an outlier in how it treats ©
(Oracle v. Google).

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Roundtable on the Scope of IP Rights, Notre Dame Law School

Barton Beebe & Scott Hemphill, The Scope of Strong
Marks: Should Trademark Law Protect the Strong More Than the Weak?
Commentators: Mike Grynberg and Mark Lemley
Grynberg: Doctrine developed for certain situations may not
make sense for other situations, including the relevance of strength. (1) Why
does strength play such an important role in TM litigation? (2) Can we be sure
that super-strong marks resist confusion at low levels of similarity/product
relatedness? (3) normative implications.
(1) Maybe courts just misunderstand relation b/t TM strength
and confusion, or maybe they’re enacting assumptions about free riding into
law. But equating strong marks w/likely confusion could also be a heuristic for
judges/juries. Beebe’s earlier work on multifactor test: one thing judges do is
stampede the factors. Representative heuristic: cases w/strong or well-known
marks correspond to our mental model of what TM infringement is.
(2) Consumers can be loyal to a weak mark & recognize
differences. How do we characterize the consumers w/in the curve described by
strong/weak marks? We need to be able to describe the consumers—some will
simply not know the mark; others will know and be familiar; others will know
and be unfamiliar/not alert. For famous marks, maybe the proportion of “alert”/difference-noticing
consumers is higher, but maybe it’s higher for weak marks too because they
simply don’t know the mark; there’s nothing to be confused about. Maybe famous
marks include fewer consumers who don’t know anything, but maybe the shift is
to a greater share of careless consumers who know a little but aren’t very
alert. Strength and familiarity may not be the same thing.
(3) Sometimes the paper seems to gesture at: Normatively,
reasonable consumers should not have been confused. Even if the strength story
were true, then, we might want to ignore it: inattentive consumers are not
protected; reasonable consumers exercising ordinary care is a standard that
doesn’t necessarily have anything to do with the treatment of strength as such.
Strength is a proxy for a general removal of context?  If this isn’t strictly about strength, then
solutions could be properly directed at cabining the causes of action or
creating safe harbors such as for referential uses.
Mark Lemley: Why care about strength at all? We could just
ignore it, but the point of the paper is not that it’s irrelevant but that it’s
relevant in ways we don’t currently treat it in the law. Can you use this
argument in reverse: I have a weak mark so I should get more protection?  Or is it that strong marks don’t get much
protection and weak marks don’t either? 
One way to deal w/this might be inherent distinctiveness. We lump
together two very different concepts. Acquired distinctiveness might diminish
likely confusion, but inherent distinctiveness might have no impact at all, or
the impact is different.  Apple v.
Pineapple Computer, at outset of Apple’s existence—[to me this is the Lollipops
v. Jellybeans roller rink case]—inherent distinctiveness can support a finding
of confusion in a way acquired can’t b/c a person only vaguely familiar might think
“fruit—computer—oh yeah, I recognize that.”
Strength might change the type of confusion we care about.  Affiliation, post-sale, sponsorship
confusion.  Should we care about that?  If strength is bolstering the weakest
confusion cases, that might further justify the conclusion that strength
shouldn’t be used as a supporting factor. 
Dilution: where strength does the most work is dilution, b/c
it substitutes for every other factor for a strong enough class of marks. There
might actually be dilution proof marks. 
Things that generate enough consumer awareness that you can’t dilute
them—iconic, like Uncle Sam, American flag, Santa Claus—you can’t dilute them
no matter how hard you try, sorry, Bad
Santa
.  Maybe the presence of
parodies, satires, etc. ought to signal
fame, with implications for “policing” theories.
Beebe: Students do relate most easily to famous examples—our
ideal type of TM litigation involves super-strong marks. What is the
implication, then?

Lemley: proxy for bad intent. 
Nikepal?  That was chosen b/c Nike
was a strong mark.  If that’s right, then
we affirmatively might not care about it, b/c free riding is ok, or we might
think that there are already plenty of proxies for bad faith.
McKenna: that strain of thought, there’s no good explanation
for choosing this similar mark, goes back to technical TM ideas—as old as the
distinction b/t different kinds of TMs.
Beebe: would like to emphasize more that our focus is
super-strong marks. The paper should be just about utterly super-strong marks.  Phase shift: widely recognized by general
consuming public, and known very well. Inverted U phenomenon we’re arguing for
is limited to those super-strong marks. If well known, consumers know it well
and can identify differences.
Does it work in reverse is a fantastic question. Didn’t address
it in the interests of simplicity but now we can.  Quick answer: superstrong marks is our focus,
but talking about the inverted U as a whole is useful. Normative commitment is
narrower, so resists the weak marks should get broader protection idea, but
should think about it. 

Beebe: Practitioners say affiliation confusion still exists, so Beebe/Hemphill
argument is irrelevant.  Strength =
knowledge not just of signifier but of other contextual elements.
Lemley: one implication might be that if strength does the
work in affiliation confusion, that’s less valuable/more dangerous and a reason
to discount strength.  Identical marks in
radically different contexts might be of interest.  If someone outright copies a random coffee
shop logo to sell soap in a different city, it’s not clear whether we should
even care; who is harmed?  Copying Apple
logo to sell soap will attract attention in a different way (not just b/c it’s
aesthetically appealing) and that might be different, at least as a proxy for
bad faith.
RT: Drawing on Lemley’s point.  Strength and affiliation confusion: maybe
strength increases likelihood of confusion for these types of confusion
(including post-sale) if we think these types worth having, but only after a
certain level of similarity is reached. 
May also make a product category difference; what kinds of marks are
likely to engage in sponsorship etc. relationships and with what other
products.  NASCAR sponsorships v. other
types of relationships: anyone might sponsor NASCAR, but not anyone would
affiliate with anyone else, including a competitor (which also has implications
for MTM Watch type cases).  Fortres
Software case—some insights there that might deserve actual theoretical
elaboration and connection to other doctrines; maybe also Land O Lakes!  Those cases don’t tell you what to do in the
next case that arises, but they’re also not wrong: there are differences in
plausibility of confusion claims.
Are there super-strong marks w/in category?  Old Lexis v. Lexus case: is Lexis
super-strong w/in its category? 
Interaction b/t product similarity and mark secondary meaning.  So w/in category, may be easier to
distinguish small differences or you’d expect “a Lexis Nexis company,” whereas
Lexad doesn’t have that implication. 
Jim Gibson: If we got rid of strength, would intent and
actual confusion do the same work?
Pam Samuelson: A mark that stays in one category for a long
time, even if it’s super-strong, may be unlikely to affiliate with other
products.  Honda makes cars; Apple by
contrast keeps expanding the kinds of products it makes.
McKenna: is strength even an empirical matter, or a reward
for having chosen a good mark/having built goodwill. Samuelson’s strength is
not goodwill/familiarity but more like marketing theory—if you’ve seen a bunch
of market extensions, the likelihood that you’ll see another as a market
extension is higher.  Law assumes
strength equals greater familiarity equals greater likelihood of
confusion.  Can’t have it both ways—can’t
be a theory of confusion but not helpful in dispelling confusion.  In terms of “no good reason for you to pick
that mark” that came from a technical TM background that required direct
competition—if you’re directly competing and using the same technical TM, there
probably is no good reason. But once we blow that up, the work that strength
does changes—lets you enforce it against broader range of goods and services—and
old assumptions don’t make sense.  Paper
can illuminate the difference b/t strength w/in category, which might give you more
scope w/in category but not outside it, and strength across categories.
Lemley: what do we do about Nikepal then?  The absence of plausible explanation other
than drawing from strength of mark is true even w/o identity.
McKenna: true, but that’s dilution or nothing.  If the law’s assumption is right, you should
only be able to win if you show a survey, showing high levels of confusion—not just
15%.  If you can’t that’s pretty telling.
Chris Buccafusco: higher level brands may feel more
confident to spin off products—popularized whiskey may be more likely to try
out beer.  Budweiser will put its name on
all sorts of drinks.  Whiskey has whiskey
aged in beer casks, beer aged in whiskey casks—those markets are now
interrelated.  Jameison’s will be more
likely to try that than a non-well-known brand. 
McKenna: actually exceedingly rare to be in beer and spirits
industries.  There’s expansion in cider
but it’s interesting if consumers think that.
Buccafusco: Consider also that 90% of the value of a LV bag
is the signalling function; maybe confusion over that is more important than
confusion over a mark that is source identifying but not socially signalling in
the same way.
Grynberg: Consider pieces of a mark—the Maker’s Mark red wax
seal—you could have appropriation but not of the whole; the paper seems to
assume the whole mark is there.
Lemley: maybe a difference b/t word, image, and product
configuration marks—but that may be about skepticism about product
configuration trade dress.

McKenna: plausibility of alternative explanations for using
configuration may be much higher by default.

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Reading list: Placebo effects of marketing

Yann Cornil et al., Does Red Bull Give Wings to Vodka? Placebo Effects of Marketing Labels on Perceived Intoxication and Risky Attitudes and Behaviors
Forthcoming, Journal of Consumer Psychology

Abstract:


Why sexual assaults and car accidents are associated with the consumption of alcohol mixed with energy drinks (AMED) is still unclear. In a single study, we show that the label used to describe AMED cocktails can have causal non-pharmacological effects on consumers’ perceived intoxication, attitudes, and behaviors. Young men who consumed a cocktail of fruit juice, vodka, and Red Bull felt more intoxicated, took more risks, were more sexually self-confident, but intended to wait longer before driving when the cocktail’s label emphasized the presence of the energy drink (a “Vodka-Red Bull cocktail”) compared to when it did not (a “Vodka” or “Exotic fruits” cocktail). Speaking to the process underlying these placebo effects, we found no moderation of experience but a strong interaction with expectations: These effects were stronger for people who believe that energy drinks boost alcohol intoxication and who believe that intoxication increases impulsiveness, reduces sexual inhibition, and weakens reflexes. These findings have implications for understanding marketing placebo effects and for the pressing debate on the regulation of the marketing of energy drinks.

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Reading list: Pam Samuelson on bottom-up and top-down theories of fair use

A Response to Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky, The
Dual-Grant Theory of Fair Use,
83 U Chi L Rev 1051 (2016).

Abstract: This Essay explains why I think that Dual-Grant
takes an unduly narrow view of the work that fair use does and should do in US
copyright law, is blatantly inconsistent with existing case law in more ways
than it acknowledges, fails to recognize important values found in many fair
use cases, and would, if followed, have the unintended consequence of making
fair use more unpredictable and incoherent than it is now.

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internal studies on consumer preference support class action treatment for weed killer claims

Martin v. Monsanto Co., No. 16–2168, 2017 WL 1115167 (C.D.
Cal. Mar. 24, 2017)
This case grants class certification, illustrating the use
of internal consumer research in class action practice.  The probabilistic nature of consumer reaction
is not necessarily a great fit with class actions, but the use of presumptions
can deal with that, as here.
Monsanto makes Roundup Weed & Grass Killer Concentrate
Plus and Roundup Weed & Grass Killer Super Concentrate. Unlike “Ready-to-Use”
Roundup, these concentrates must be diluted with water before use. A prominent
sticker on the front neck of the bottle states that the product “Makes Up to __
Gallons”:  
 

bottle with “makes up to 42 gallons” prominent on neck
On the back label of the bottle, the instructions advise
users to “Add 6 fl oz Per Gallon of Water” for Concentrate Plus, or “2 1/2 fl
oz Per Gallon of Water” for Super Concentrate. Martin alleged that, when users
follow the instructions on the back label, the concentrates only produce about
half of the amount that Monsanto claims on the front neck sticker.  Additional instructions are in a pamphlet sealed
under the back label, which can be opened before purchase, but it’s not clear
how many consumers do that. The instructions state that, for best results,
consumers should use the amounts provided on the back label, but that, for
“easy to kill weeds such as seedlings,” the purchaser may add less concentrate
per gallon of water. Only in that case will the concentrates make the amount
claimed on the neck sticker.
Martin brought the usual California advertising/warranty
claims.
Analysis of note: Monsanto argued that Martin wasn’t typical
because she “did not read the instructions prior to purchase,” but failed to
present any evidence that any significant portion of the class read the
pamphlet or fold-out prior to purchase, or, specifically, the alternative
mixing instructions for “easy to kill weeds such as seedlings.” Martin had
evidence that she acted like thousands of other purchasers. And “a plaintiff’s
individual experience with the product is irrelevant where, as here, the injury
under the UCL, FAL, and CLRA is established by an objective test…. [I]njury is
shown where the consumer has purchased a product that is marketed with a
material misrepresentation, that is, in a manner such that members of the
public are likely to be deceived.”
Monsanto argued that Martin was an inadequate class
representative because she “seeks less in damages than the purported class
members could receive outside of a class litigation through a full refund.” Monsanto’s
consumer guarantee states: “If for any reason you are not satisfied after using
this product, simply send us original proof of purchase and we will replace the
product or refund the purchase price.” But people who sought refunds weren’t
adequate class representatives, because they aren’t class representatives at
all, and members who want a refund were free to opt out.
Predominance: Monsanto argued that class members had varying
reasons for purchasing the concentrates, making materiality and reliance predominating
individual issues. But for breach of express warranty, and for violations of
the UCL and FAL, Martin didn’t need to prove individualized reliance. And,
while reliance is an element of the CLRA, “an inference of common reliance
arises if representations are material, and materiality is judged by an
objective standard rather than any understandings specific to the individual
consumer.”
At this stage of the litigation, Martin provided sufficient
evidence of materiality to the reasonable consumer to make class certification
appropriate. Monsanto’s own documents and consumer studies did the work. Monsanto
itself considered its Gallons statement to be a “key claim[ ].”  A 3,000 person consumer research study found
that “[w]hen asked what helps them make a purchase decision about what
concentrate product to buy at [the] shelf,” 42% of respondents selected “How
many gallons of product you can make,” which was the third-highest of 13
factors. Two-thirds of those who purchased concentrated herbicide did so
because of “Value (price per oz. is cheaper than ready-to-use).” When
researchers presented focus group subjects with a mock shelf of herbicide
products, they observed that “Price to gallon ‘best value’” claims caught
consumers’ eyes with “some frequency,” with “some consumers actually d[oing]
the math on their notepads for various brands.”
A presumption of reliance is inappropriate when class
members “were exposed to quite disparate information,” but here, there was no
evidence that class members could buy the products without being exposed to the
representations at issue. In “cases involving product labels,” courts
“reasonabl[y] … infer that the class members were exposed to the allegedly
misleading statement at the point of sale.”
Similarly, Martin’s damages models were tied to her theory
of liability and could be measured on a classwide basis. The “underfill”
percentage could be calculated by comparing the number of gallons made when
following the instructions on the back label with the number of gallons
promised on the neck label. This number could then be multiplied by the retail
price to obtain a standard damage amount for each bottle. This
benefit-of-the-bargain model was adequately tied to Martin’s theory of
liability on her express warranty claim and appeared to be capable of measuring
damages on a classwide basis, since the methodology was identical for every
purchaser and for any given bottle size. 
Likewise, her restitution damages model was adequately tied to her
theory of liability on the UCL, FAL, and CLRA claims and appeared to be able to
measure damages on a classwide basis.  Class
members bargained for a certain price-per-gallon: the average retail price
divided by the number of gallons promised. This number could serve as a proxy
for the actual value-per-gallon of spray solution and multiplied by the number
of gallons the products actually supplied to determine the actual value of the
products. Monsanto could challenge these models through cross-examination at
trial.

Finally, Monsanto’s refund policy didn’t make class
treatment inferior.  Under the plain
language of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3), “[t]he analysis is whether the class
action format is superior to other methods of adjudication, not whether a class
action is superior to an out-of-court, private settlement program.” 

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Plaintiff doesn’t have to rebut 230 immunity in complaint against multiple parties

Moretti v. Hertz Corp., No. 14-469, 2017 WL 1032783 (D. Del.
Mar. 17, 2017)
Moretti sued for violation of California’s false
advertising, consumer protection, and unfair and deceptive trade practices
laws, and common law fraud.  Moretti
alleged that prices for car rentals in Mexico were advertised in U.S. dollars
but later converted into Mexican Pesos at an artificially inflated rate,
leading him and other consumers to pay more than the advertised price for their
rentals as a result. Defendants also allegedly failed to inform consumers that
the purchase of liability insurance was mandatory, disclosing terms and
conditions stating the contrary. Hertz and Dollar Thrifty allegedly supplied the
misleading information about car rental prices and terms to Hotwire, and
Hotwire incorporated the content into listings on its website. Hotwire allegedly
continued to do so despite consumer complaints and Hotwire’s knowledge of the
information’s fraudulent content.
Hotwire moved for judgment on the pleadings under §230.   The court found that a complaint need not
affirmatively negate any of the elements of Section 230 immunity. Immunity
under §230 requires Hotwire not have “contribute[d] materially” to the
offending nature of the content, and the complaint was silent on that. “Taking
the well-pleaded factual allegations as true, there is no basis in the
Complaint from which the Court could conclude that Hotwire did not function as
an ICP and did not contribute materially to the alleged misrepresentations.”  Some §230 cases can be decided on the
pleadings, but not this one; “the Court cannot treat the Complaint’s silence as
to whether Hotwire materially contributed to the false statement as an
affirmative allegation that Hotwire did not do so.”  The court was influenced by counsel’s
representations at oral argument that, “if needed, [Morelli] could plead
sufficient facts to show that Hotwire is not entitled to the protection of
Section 230 immunity.”  Given that
additional facts would help the parties and the court to understand the case,
the court ordered Morelli to amend the complaint “to include any specifics
which are in his possession that help to show why Plaintiff believes Hotwire is
not immune under Section 230.”

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False advertising of sperm donor leads to wrongful birth claim

Doe 1 v. Xytex Corp., No. C 16-02935, 2017 WL 1112996 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 24, 2017)|
A false advertising case arising out of a wrongful birth
claim: Does One and Two used xytex.com, which sold human semen for use in
artificial insemination. Xytex’s website stated that it is “an industry leader
in reproductive services with a commitment to unsurpassed quality controls,”
that the donors’ personal health and family history were carefully screened
through a comprehensive medical process developed by the CDC, that Xytex’s
“FDA-mandated screening and testing also ensures our donors’ continued good
health,” and that the screening process was so thorough that a mere “1 percent
of the men that inquire about being a donor candidate are evaluated,” and,
ultimately, “[f]ewer than 5 percent of the candidates become donors”  The Does alleged that they believed, based on
the website, that Xytex was the sperm bank with the most rigorous qualification
standards. They allegedly asked a Xytex representative if she knew of any Xytex
sperm donors that had “a particularly impressive health and education history.”
The representative identified Donor #9623, and stated that “his sperm had
already been used to successfully inseminate women and it would be sold out as
soon as his profile was published.” She also stated that Donor #9623 was “ultra
intelligent” and that he looked “like a model.” The Does bought sperm from
Donor #9623, and Doe One ultimately gave birth to P.S.
Nine years passed, and then the Does saw an article about a
lawsuit specifically relating to Xytex Donor #9623, who was a mentally ill
schizophrenic felon who had pled guilty to residential burglary. He had dropped
out of college and held no degrees whatsoever; Xytex also altered his photos, removing
a large facial mole.  Doe One expressed
her concern to an agent of Xytex, who said that she was not aware “of any
reported medical issues” related to Donor #9623; Doe One also received an email
from the Chief Medical and Laboratory Director for Xytex, who said that he had “received
no information to confirm that Donor #9623 has schizophrenia” and that it
“would be irresponsible of Xytex to notify clients of unsubstantiated claims.”
Plaintiffs further alleged: When Donor #9623 first came to Xytex, he worked as a
janitor/waiter and had dropped out of school. He’d already been hospitalized,
as an adult, for mental health reasons, at least twice. During these
hospitalizations, “the medical staff of two different hospitals diagnosed Donor
#9623 with psychotic schizophrenia, narcisstic personality disorder, and significant
grandiose delusions.”  He also had an
extensive criminal history.  Xytex’s
“rigorous qualification procedure” “included filling out a questionnaire on his
first visit and undergoing a ten-minute physical examination, in which the
examining physician did not discuss Donor #9623’s physical or mental health
history.” Donor #9623 told Xytex that he thought his IQ was about 130, but Xytex’s
representative “suggested to him that he was a genius with an IQ of about 160.”
She further told him that the more educated donors did well selling their
sperm, and that Xytex usually dealt with donors with higher education.  “Xytex alleged that it had no knowledge of
either Donor #9623’s medical or criminal record.”
The Does alleged that their child needed counseling and that
they’d suffered other expenses and mental stress, as well as needing funds “to
evaluate and care for their child to ensure that should she become
schizophrenic, she will have the best care possible.” They sued for intentional
misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, strict products liability,
products liability based on negligence, breach of express warranty, breach of
implied warranty of merchantability, battery, negligence, false advertising,
wrongful birth, specific performance, punitive damages, and violations of the
California Unfair Competition law.
For the misrepresentation claims, Xytex argued that “Buyer
Beware” should apply, “but plaintiffs had no way to conduct due diligence on
Donor #9623 whose true identity was hidden from plaintiffs by Xytex. Only Xytex
knew his true identity and was able to conduct any diligence.”  The Does also sufficiently alleged damages
caused by the misrepresentation in the form of expenses for monitoring the
child over and above ordinary preventative medical care.
On scienter, Xytex argued that plaintiffs failed to allege
that Xytex knew about Donor #9623’s misrepresentations about himself. But they
did allege that the information regarding Donor #9623’s medical health history,
as well as his criminal record could have easily been discovered “through
publicly accessible, indisputable, medical and professional documents,”
especially in light of Xytex’s proclamation of its “intense and arduous”
qualification process that “generat[es] a lot of medical, psychological,
genetic, and social information.” The court concluded that, on the allegations
of the complaint, “Xytex surely knew that it failed to screen up to the
standard it advertised. This alone would show reckless disregard and therefore
is adequate to show that Xytex acted with scienter.”
Negligence/wrongful birth claims also survived, but not
breach of warranty because California law made the relevant statutory provision
inapplicable to tissue-related activities such as sperm sales. A medical
battery claim was also dismissed, because the insemination was carried out by
separate third parties and Xytex never committed an intentional or offensive
touching of Jane Doe One.

Now, false advertising: Xytex allegedly violated the UCL/FAL
by promoting misleading information about the nature, characteristics, and
qualities of Donor #9623.  The alleged
facts supported the reasonable inference that Xytex acted recklessly as to its
misrepresentations.  A claim for punitive
damages also survived.

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Dastar/preemption bars claims based on allegedly false claims of credit for innovation

OptoLum, Inc. v. Cree, Inc., No. CV-16-03828, 2017 WL
1057924 (D. Ariz. Mar. 21, 2017)
The parties compete in the market for LED lights. OptoLum
claims to be the inventor of technology used inside LED bulbs allowing them to
have the look and feel of traditional incandescent bulbs.  It alleged false advertising under the Lanham
Act, an unjust enrichment claim, and two patent infringement claims (which I
will not discuss).
The court found that these claims were puffery:
• The “Cree Filament Tower™
Technology” is “the genius idea inside” the Cree LED bulb;
• Cree “found a way to put the LEDs
in the center of the bulb like a traditional light bulb” and “we’re making an
LED but we are actually inventing all the technology in between”;
• “[O]ne of the technical
breakthroughs that enabled Cree to break the $10 threshold is our new Cree
Filament Tower™ Technology. The Filament Tower™ is the Cree innovation that
lets our LED bulb replicate the look and feel of filament based traditional
lights”;
• “[Cree] engineers came up with a
very elegant solution to the design issues inherent in LED bulbs. In a compact
form, the Filament Tower produced the light dispersion we wanted without
problematic heat building”;
• “[I]nventing the LED technology
that delivers like an incandescent was hard work, but designing a bulb in a
form-factor that consumers trust at a price they can afford was even harder.
Designed with Cree LED Filament Tower Technology, the Cree LED bulb represents
a breakthrough in LED bulb design and performance”; and
• “[Cree] invented the
lighting-class LED.”
The court found these all nonactionable puffery as a matter
of law.   The claim that Cree’s Filament Tower
Technology was a “genius idea” was “the epitome of puffing.” Likewise, the
other statements about “breakthroughs” were “not specific, not concrete, not
measurable, and therefore puffery.” A “very elegant solution” was “sufficiently
imprecise to constitute puffery,” as were the “look and feel,” “long useful
life,” and “energy efficiency and low cost” claims.
OptoLum argued that Cree falsely claimed that it was the
source of ingenuity, innovation, and technological breakthroughs attributable
to OptoLum.  The court replied: Dastar
A contrary holding would create a conflict with the Patent Act.

Similar reasoning doomed the unjust enrichment claim.  OptoLum alleged that there was significant
value in being perceived by consumers as an innovator, inventor, and creator of
groundbreaking technology. But patent law preempts an unjust enrichment claim
based on such grounds.  Given that the
plaintiff’s right to relief would depend on resolving inventorship, a
substantial question of patent law, patent law preemped “any state law that
purports to define rights based on inventorship.”  While a contract implied in fact could support
an equitable unjust enrichment claim if no formal contract existed between the
parties, those weren’t the allegations here.

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Nursing homes’ claims are puffery

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Golden Gate National Senior
Care LLC, No. 336 M.D. 2015, — A.3d —-, 2017 WL 1075535 (Comm. Ct. Pa. Mar.
22, 2017)
Golden Gate manages and operates 36 skilled nursing
facilities in Pennsylvania.  The
Commonwealth sued for: (1) Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law
(UTPCPL) violations; (2) breach of contract; and (3) unjust enrichment. I’ll
consider only the advertising-related claims.
The UTPCPL does not apply to providers of medical services,
but nursing homes are “hybrid organizations, offering both medical and
non-medical services.” They are liable under the UTPCPL only as to the non-medical
services they provide. 
The Commonwealth challenged chain-wide marketing statements
that the court found were puffery:
·      
“We have licensed nurses and nursing assistants
available to provide nursing care and help with activities of daily living
(ADLs). Whatever your needs are, we have the clinical staff to meet those
needs.” This claim was “expressed in broad, vague, and commendatory language.”
·      
“Snacks and beverages of various types and
consistencies are available at any time from your nurse or nursing assistant.” Likewise,
as applied to the Commonwealth’s allegation that there was insufficient
staffing to timely respond to residents’ requests.
·      
“A container of fresh ice water is put right
next to your bed every day, and your nursing assistant will be glad to refill
or refresh it for you.” This was mere “subjective analysis or extrapolations,
such as opinions, motives and intentions, or general statements of optimism.”
·      
“Clean linens are provided for you on a regular
basis, so you do not need to bring your own.” This claim was “vague” and
undefined.
·      
“Providing exceptional dining is important to
us. Not only do we want to meet your nutritional needs, but we want to exceed
your expectations by offering a high level of service, delicious food and an
overall pleasurable dining experience. … We have a seat reserved for you in our
dining room!”  This was puffery
expressing Golden Gate’s “priorities and intentions for residents, rather than
makes specific objective representations about the quality of the dining
experience.”  Though the Commonwealth
alleged that residents couldn’t use the dining facilities due to staffing
shortages, the “reserved seat” claim wasn’t a promise that residents would
always be brought to the dining facilities.
·      
“[W]e believe that respecting your individuality
and dignity is of utmost importance.” 
The “we believe” was enough to signal “subjective analysis or
extrapolations, such as opinions, motives and intentions.”
·      
“A restorative plan of care is developed to
reflect the resident’s goals and is designed to improve wellness and function.
The goal is to maintain optimal physical, mental and psychosocial functioning.”  The Commonwealth didn’t allege that the plans
weren’t developed, but that they were incomplete or not properly
followed/updated. The description of the plan was aspirational puffery.
·      
“We work with an interdisciplinary team to
assess issues and nursing care that can enhance the resident’s psychological
adaptation to a decrease in function, increase levels of performance in daily
living activities, and prevent complications associated with inactivity.”
Again, there was no allegation that there was no such interdisciplinary team;
the rest was puffery.
·      
“Our goal is to help you restore strength and
confidence so you feel like yourself again and can get back to enjoying life
the way you should. That’s The Golden Difference.”  Too subjective.
The Commonwealth also alleged facility-level
misrepresentations, but statements in assessments of individual residents, care
plans, and bills for services not provided weren’t advertising or promotion (borrowing
the Lanham Act definition).  Statements
by individual employees/agents weren’t enough, and “representations made in
resident care plan development are not likely to make a difference in the
purchasing decision, since such representations are made after an individual is
admitted and becomes a resident.”

One judge concurred in part, agreeing with the puffery conclusion
but would have held that one portion of the UTPCPL, Section 2(4)(xxi),
establishes a cause of action to remedy “any … fraudulent or deceptive
conduct which creates a likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding,” and
doesn’t require an ad; she would have allowed the claim “insofar as it alleges
deceptive conduct involving bills and care plans which could directly impact
purchasing decisions.”

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First Amendment bars labeling restriction for “skim milk” without added Vitamin A

Ocheesee Creamery LLC v. Putnam, 2017 WL 1046104, — F.3d
—-, No. 16-12049 (11th Cir. Mar. 20, 2017)
The Creamery here succeeded in its First Amendment claim to
use the words “skim milk” to describe its product.
The Creamery produces cream by skimming it off the top of
the milk; what’s left over is skim milk: “milk that has had the fat removed
through skimming.”  The skimming process
also removes almost all the vitamin A naturally present in whole milk because
vitamin A is fat-soluble. “The Creamery prides itself on selling only
all-natural, additive-free products, and therefore refuses to replace the lost
vitamin A in its skim milk,” unlike most sellers.
Florida law prohibits the sale of milk and milk products
that are not Grade “A,” which requires, among other things, that vitamin A lost
in the skimming process must be replaced. The State told the Creamery it could
sell its product without adding vitamin A so long as it bore the label
“imitation milk product.” The Creamery offered alternative labels: (1) “Pasteurized
Skim Milk, No Vitamin A Added;” [making Vitamin A sound bad] (2) “Pasteurized
Skim Milk, No Lost Vitamin A Replaced;” [not particularly helpful] (3)
“Pasteurized Skim Milk, Most Vitamin A Removed By Skimming Cream From Milk;”
[possibly not bad] (4) “Non-Grade ‘A’ Skim Milk, Some Milk Vitamins Reduced By
Skimming Cream From All-Natural Pasteurized Milk;” [less helpful] and (5) “The
State Requires Us To Call This: ‘Non-Grade “A” Milk Product, Natural Milk
Vitamins Removed.’ It Is All-Natural Skim Milk With Some Vitamin A Removed By
Skimming Cream From Milk.” [why “some” now instead of “most”?]
The State proposed: “The State requires us to call this:
‘Non Grade “A” Milk Product, Natural Milk Vitamins Removed.’ All natural milk
product with vitamins removed by separating cream from milk.” The Creamery alleged
that it would “happily use” a disclaimer stating that its skim milk does not
have the same vitamins as whole milk.
The court began, ominously, that burden of showing that the Creamery’s
speech was misleading or unlawful and the burden of satisfying the other Central Hudson factors was on the
government. The state said that the Creamery’s skim milk couldn’t lawfully be
sold, but that wasn’t true: it was legal to sell skim milk without restored
Vitamin A; it just had to be sold as “milk product” using an imitation milk permit.
The Creamery’s use of “skim milk” wasn’t inherently
misleading just because it conflicted with the state’s definition. The court
continued:
It is undoubtedly true that a state
can propose a definition for a given term. However, it does not follow that
once a state has done so, any use of the term inconsistent with the state’s
preferred definition is inherently misleading. Such a per se rule would
eviscerate Central Hudson, rendering
all but the threshold question superfluous. All a state would need to do in
order to regulate speech would be to redefine the pertinent language in
accordance with its regulatory goals. Then, all usage in conflict with the
regulatory agenda would be inherently misleading and fail Central Hudson’s
threshold test. Such reasoning is self-evidently circular ….
[The court here indicates its lack of consideration of the
wide range of speech regulations evaluated under Central Hudson, many of which could not be evaded by establishing a
state standardized meaning for a term.]  “[S]tatements
of objective fact, such as the Creamery’s label, are not inherently misleading
absent exceptional circumstances,” and the Creamery’s choice of “skim milk” to
identify its product was a statement of objective fact (citing dictionary
definition).
The court continued:
This is not to say that a state’s
definition of a term might not become, over time and through popular adoption,
the standard meaning of a word, such that usage inconsistent with the statutory
definition could indeed be inherently misleading. But the state must present
evidence to that effect, and that has not been done here.
With a “but see” cite to Zauderer,
where the Supreme Court upheld a regulation without further evidence where “the
possibility of deception is as self-evident as it is in this case.”
Here, the State produced a study in which consumers
indicated they would “expect skim milk to include the same vitamin content as
whole milk.” But that wasn’t enough, because “[t]he State’s study provides no
evidence that consumers expected anything other than skim milk when they read
those words on the Creamery’s bottles, the State’s alternative definition
notwithstanding.” [Yes, because consumers have never before had occasion to
pull apart the aspects of skim milk with which they are familiar, given the regulation.  They don’t know that there’s any difference
between “skim milk” and “skim milk with the same vitamins as whole milk.”] 

Because the label “skim milk” wasn’t inherently misleading
applied to the Creamery’s product, the court proceeded to the Central Hudson three-part test, but even
assuming the state’s interest was substantial, its method was more restrictive
than necessary. “[N]umerous less burdensome alternatives existed and were
discussed by the State and the Creamery during negotiations that would have
involved additional disclosure without banning the term ‘skim milk,’” such as
the Creamery’s willingness to accept: “It [the milk] is all-natural skim milk
with some vitamin A removed by skimming cream from milk.” [Some or most?]  Although Central
Hudson
isn’t a least restrictive means test, the State didn’t show that
barring the use of the term was “reasonable, and not more extensive than
necessary to serve its interest” in avoiding deception and promoting nutrition.

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