Reading list: a credit card nudge that seemed to work

The power of light-touch financial education: A demonstration with credit card revolvers
JAN 19, 2017

Can simple guidelines, or rules to live by, help consumers reduce their credit card debt? Can they be useful as a financial education tool? The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) commissioned a research study to test two specially developed guidelines reminding consumers to be cognizant of credit card usage. The guidelines were tested in a randomized controlled trial with a large group of consumers who carry a credit card balance month to month. The study found that exposure to one of the two financial guidelines (“Don’t swipe the small stuff”) led to lower credit card balances. Findings suggest that rules-based messages hold promise as a low-cost, scalable method of financial education.

FULL REPORT

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Reading list: new governors of online speech

Harvard Law Review, Forthcoming
Abstract
Private online platforms have an
increasingly essential role in free speech and participation in democratic
culture. But while it might appear that any Internet user can publish freely
and instantly online, many platforms actively curate the content posted by
their users. How and why these platforms operate to moderate speech is largely
opaque.
This Article provides the first
analysis of what these platforms are actually doing to moderate online speech
under a regulatory and First Amendment framework. Drawing from original
interviews, archived materials, and leaked documents, this Article not only
describes how three major online platforms—Facebook, Twitter, and
YouTube—moderate content, it situates their moderation systems into a broader
discussion of online governance and the evolution of free expression values in
the private sphere. It reveals that private content moderation systems curate
user content with an eye to First Amendment norms, corporate responsibility,
and at the core, the economic necessity of creating an environment that
reflects the expectations of its users. In order to accomplish this, platforms
have developed a detailed system with similarities to the American legal system
with regularly revised rules, trained human decision-making, and reliance on a
system of external influence.

This Article argues that to best
understand online speech, we must abandon traditional doctrinal and regulatory
analogies, and understand these private content platforms as systems of
governance operating outside the boundaries of the First Amendment. These
platforms shape and allow participation in our new digital and democratic
culture. They are the New Governors of online speech.

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Iconic movie scene allows copyright but not TM claim against multimedia installation

Harold Lloyd Entertainment, Inc. v. Moment Factory One,
Inc., No. LA CV15-01556, 2015 WL 12765142 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2015)|
Another blast for the past—I would really like to know more
about the Westclip algorithm, but I can’t complain too much about the magic
machine that brings new knowledge straight to my inbox.
HLE sued Moment for copyright infringement and false
designation of origin based on HLE’s copyright in the 1923 silent film Safety Last, starring Harold Lloyd.  “The film’s closing scene features its
principal character, played by Harold Lloyd, dangling from the hands of a large
clock.”  Moment’s multimedia work, the
“Time Tower,” included a video of a man dangling from the hands of a large
clock.  The final chase/climb scene in Safety Last is about seven minutes long;
Lloyd dangles from the clock for about a minute. HLE licensed the Clock Scene
for use the films Back to the Future
and Hugo for scenes in which a
character dangled from the hands of large clock.
 

Lloyd scene

Comparison from complaint

screenshot from video of installation

The Time Tower video is 87 minutes long, with 14 distinct
segments.  One segment is “Silent Movie,”
lasting nearly three minutes; it features a man climbing a building past
various characters, “including a knight in shining armor, a monster reading a
newspaper, a conductor and a socialite.” As part of various shenanigans, the
climbing man grabs the hands of a clock that is on the outside of the building,
and hangs from them for about 10 seconds.  The scene was allegedly called the “Harold
Lloyd tower theme” in pre-production stills. HLE alleged that numerous
consumers were expressly and explicitly deceived and confused into believing
that Moment’s products and/or services were affiliated with Harold Lloyd and
HLE.
Moment argued that there couldn’t be substantial similarity
between Safety Last, a 73-minute film,
and the Time Tower video, because of the small amount of time where similarity
existed.  But the court found obvious
similarities in the two scenes, and that was enough to avoid a motion to
dismiss, because if what has been copied is qualitatively important, a fact
finder can find substantial similarity and HLE alleged that the scene at issue
was “one of the most iconic” images in cinema.  Fair use also couldn’t be resolved on a motion
to dismiss, including questions of transformativeness and market  harm.
However, false designation of origin/false endorsement
claims failed because of Rogers.  (Or Dastar?) The Time Tower video was an expressive work;
the use of Lloyd and the alleged clock scene “trademark” had at least some
artistic relevance, since the scene was “a tribute to the silent era.” Any
reference to “one of the most iconic images in cinema” was artistically
relevant to a tribute to silent movies.
And there was nothing explicitly misleading about the
use.  HLE argued that the Time Tower
video and the website including pre-production stills referring to the scene at
issue as the “Harold Lloyd tower theme” were misleading.  But neither had any explicitly misleading content. There was no direct reference to
Lloyd, and use of a mark alone isn’t explicity misleading; to hold otherwise
would render Rogers a nullity.

This result also doomed the UCL and common law unfair
competition claims.

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Marketing method and display are functional, nondistinctive trade dress

AMID, Inc. v. Medic Alert Found. U.S. Inc., No. H-16-1137
(S.D. Tex. Mar. 16, 2017)
American Medical ID (AMID) sued MedicAlert Foundation United
States for trade dress and copyright infringement. The parties compete in the
market for medical-identification jewelry. One of their marketing techniques is
sending unsolicited mass-mailed countertop displays with tear-off pads attached
to doctors’ offices. “Both companies include a letter to each doctor’s office
explaining what to do with the enclosed display and the importance of patients
wearing medical-identification jewelry.” 
I’m just going to pretend that the court said that AMID “registered its
copyright” in its letter.  There, that
feels better.  AMID also claimed that
unsolicited mailing of countertop easel displays was a protected marketing
method and that its countertop display was protected as trade dress that
MedicAlert infringed
It all started when a former AMID marketing manager, Justin
Noland, resigned from AMID and went to work at MedicAlert. MedicAlert hadn’t
mailed unsolicited countertop displays to doctors’ offices for the previous six
years, but resumed the mailings after Noland began working there.  
In July 2015, AMID complained to MedicAlert that Noland had
violated his noncompete agreement with and confidentiality obligations to AMID,
and that MedicAlert had made a “virtual carbon copy” of AMID’s display.  In August, MedicAlert responded that it
wouldn’t fire Noland because the noncompete clause had already expired, and noted
that MedicAlert would “remain mindful of all the operating boundaries
concerning marketing materials between our two companies . . . .” MedicAlert didn’t
agree to recall, stop using, or change the MedicAlert marketing displays or
other marketing materials.  AMID
responded in early September, mostly proposing a marketing partnership.  AMID sued in April 2016, making nearly 11
months between when AMID allegedly first saw the MedicAlert displays on the
MedicAlert website and when it sued.  The
court denied a preliminary injunction, despite finding a likelihood of success
on the merits of the copyright claim.
The display method/display itself were not registered.  AMID claimed they were inherently
distinctive.  Abercrombie doesn’t work well for non-word marks.  We know more about what can’t be inherently
distinctive—color, product design—than what can.  Erring on the side of caution, as instructed
by Wal-Mart, the court here found the
claimed trade dress to be on the “product design” side, rather than product
packaging, thereby requiring secondary meaning.
AMID proposed a number of different versions of its claimed
trade dress.  After the PI hearing, AMID
alleged rights in a “Marketing Plan and Scheme” that included:
a.         unsolicited
mass-mailing to doctor and other professional offices of display;
b.         an
easel display with integral order forms;
c.         real
jewelry facsimiles in the upper portion of the display;
d.         an
introductory letter;
e.         a
see-through cardboard cover over the jewelry with one medal visible; and
f.          a
clear mailing wrapper.
It also alleged rights in the “[p]ackaging as received by
the professional office of the mailed [d]isplay,” and the “display as used in
the professional offices,” specifically:
a.         an
easel display having three panels on the front portion of the display;
b.         a
top panel, followed by a larger central panel with real jewelry facsimiles
followed by an order form on the lower portion of the display; and
c.         an
order form pad below the central panel taking up approximately 2/3 of the
display face with photographs of jewelry on the face of the order form.
 

AMID package

AMID display at Publix

display comparison

MedicAlert package

As the court noted, one cannot “coherently define exactly
what the trade dress consists of and determine whether that trade dress is
valid and if what the accused is doing is an infringement” until after the claimant
submits the “discrete elements” making up the its claimed trade dress. AMID’s
final version included for the first time “the proportion of space taken up by
the order form pad, photographs of jewelry, and the number, position, and size
of the panels.”  The court commented that
it wasn’t clear at what point changing the definition of the claimed trade
dress would require an amended complaint. 
Without precise boundaries, determining infringement—and determining
what a competitor could and couldn’t do without entering a courtroom—is very difficult.  The court referred to Wal-Mart’s instructions “to be cautious about applying vague,
litigation-friendly tests for inherent distinctiveness,” and noted that AMID
has changed its marketing materials over the years, helping to create a “moving
target.” 
AMID’s witness claimed that all the variations shared a
“family look,” but her testimony about what meant “was elastic and expansive.” She
claimed that 80 percent of the displays distributed since 2012 had this “family
look.” The court wasn’t clear which the other 20% were.  AMID used “displays with clearly different
shapes, sizes, text size and font, color, artwork, layout, and materials,” and
some didn’t contain any of the elements AMID identified as defining its trade
dress. Thus, AMID failed to define its trade dress with sufficient clarity or
consistency. 
Plus, erring on the side of caution as instructed, the court
classified this ambiguous trade dress as product design, requiring secondary
meaning for protection.  AMID argued that
its trade dress was “akin” to product packaging, but AMID’s products are
bracelets or dog tags and the purported trade dress didn’t “package” the actual
jewelry AMID sells.  It was in the middle
of the packaging and design spectrum.
AMID also failed to show secondary meaning.  Four of the claimed seven trade-dress
elements were packaging designed to be removed by a doctor’s staff before
putting it out for potential buyers (or doctors) to see.  AMID argued that these elements were seen by the
“gatekeepers”—the staff in the medical office who make the decision to place
the display on a counter visible to the “end users,” the patients.  The court commented that “[i]t stretches
current law to analyze [gatekeeper staff] as the relevant consumer in the
secondary-meaning inquiry.” Doctors might also be gatekeepers in deciding
whether to place the display in their waiting room or whether to recommend
medical-identification jewelry.  Ultimately, gatekeeper recognition couldn’t
determine secondary meaning, because gatekeepers weren’t consumers of medical-information jewelry. “The parties have not
cited cases in which a court found protectable trade dress, when, as here, most
of the purported trade-dress elements are never seen by members of the buying
public.”
Plus, the secondary meaning evidence was lacking as to
consumers, especially given the many variations in displays AMID had used over
the years.  MedicAlert put on a consumer
survey finding negative secondary meaning—that is, 35.3% of the test group and
39.8% of the control group associated the two displays they saw with one
company.  In the test group, 3.2%
identified MedicAlert as the source of the display they saw, while 5.4% of the
control group did.  Similar results
obtained for a test of whether “Medical IDs Save Lives!” had attained secondary
meaning.  AMID’s criticisms of the survey
were unavailing, especially given that the survey properly targeted people
who’d bought/were likely to buy medical identification jewelry.
Another survey found that 23.3% of the doctor-respondents
currently displayed advertising or promotional literature from both AMID and
MedicAlert; 58.5% didn’t currently display either; and the remainder were
roughly split.  There was no evidence
from this survey that either party’s marketing materials were replacing the
other’s.
Annoyingly, the court quoted the line that “evidence of
intentional copying shows the strong secondary meaning of [a product] because
‘there is no logical reason for the precise copying save an attempt to realize
upon a secondary meaning that is in existence,’” right before it started in on
functionality (which it found here).  But
still, there was circumstantial evidence of intent to copy given Nolan’s
employment and the resumption of mass mailings. 
(The court did say that intent to copy was more relevant to infringement
than to protectability in the first instance.)
Finally, the trade dress was functional and AMID didn’t meet
its burden to show nonfunctionality. 
Under the first TrafFix test,
a feature is functional when it “is essential to the use or purpose of the
article or if it affects the cost or quality of an article,” and it’s essential
“if it serves any significant function other than to distinguish a firm’s goods
or identify their source.” If the feature is functional under this definition,
there is no need to consider competitive alternatives.
Evidence of functionality included that displays using an
easel design and attached pad with tear-off sheets are covered by utility
patents and are commonly used. Attaching sample products to countertop displays
was also commonplace, and attached samples had to be placed so as not to make
the display fall over. The combination of functional features wasn’t configured
in a nonarbitrary manner.
And finally: there was no showing of irreparable harm, given
AMID’s delay in seeking relief even after calling the display “an extreme
knockoff” and expressing “great concerns about the use of those [displays] in
the marketplace.”  AMID’s 2015
correspondence didn’t demand that MedicAlert stop distributing the displays or
remove the display from its website.
The copyright infringement claim fared better.  The transmittal letter that introduces a
healthcare professional to AMID’s marketing materials is “the first thing a
healthcare professional sees on opening the display package.”  The court found “obvious” similarities,
including virtually identical text at the bottom as well as overall look and
other content.
 

AMID letter

MedicAlert letter

“While MedicAlert had a long history of using displays in
its marketing campaigns up to 2009, MedicAlert has presented no evidence that
it used a letter until the mailings sent after Noland arrived.”  However, there was still no irreparable harm,
given AMID’s delay and MedicAlert’s cessation of its use of the similar letter.

The court declined to dismiss a common-law
unfair-competition claim based on misappropriation of “valuable business
methods, marketing plans, confidential know-how and proprietary information,” not
rising to the level of trade secrets.

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Who’s responsible for allegedly false, concealed endorsement deals?

Woodard v. Labrada, 2017 WL 1018307, — F. Supp. 3d —, No.
16-00189 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2017)
I
discussed this case before
.  Woodard
alleged misrepresentations about the effectiveness of weight loss supplements,
specifically the Labrada Garcinia Cambogia Dual Action Fat Buster and Labrada
Green Coffee Bean Extract Fat Loss Optimizer. 
Naturex makes Svetol, the active ingredient in the Fat Loss
Optimizer.  Naturex allegedly dvertised
Svetol as the “most studied and proven green bean extract,” and attributed its
effectiveness to “100% premium Robusta beans” processed to yield a “high
concentration of key chlorogenic acids.” InterHealth makes SuperCitrimax, the
active ingredient in the Dual Action Fat Buster, and allegedly claimed “maximum
stability, solubility, bioavailability, and efficacy” as well as “60% all
natural HCA derived from the Garcinia Cambogia fruit.”
Labrada allegedly advertised the products as “clinically
proven” “FAT BUSTERS” with “ZERO BINDERS, ZERO FILLERS, AND ZERO ARTIFICIAL
INGREDIENTS.” Plaintiffs alleged that these claims were deceptive because the
supplements contained artificial ingredients. For example, SuperCitrimax was allegedly
a synthetic form of hydroxycitric acid. 
Plaintiffs further alleged that defendants misrepresented the quantity
of active ingredients in the products, the origin of the ingredients (“Made in
the USA”), and the overall quality of the products. Labrada allegedly cited
“peer reviewed, published” scientific studies on the labels to claim that the products
“support significant weight loss.” But one such study was later “retracted by
the authors after data was found to be falsified.” [So, essentially, the food
is lousy and the portions are too small.]
Dr. Oz allegedly fraudulently promoted the Labrada products
on his show by misrepresenting his affiliations with the brands he allegedly
endorses. (E.g., he said: “I’ve warned everybody that I’m not going to mention
specific brands, but I do want to go through exactly what I would look for.
You’re going to look on that list of ingredients. There should be ZERO FILLERS.
There should be ZERO BINDER, ZERO ARTIFICIAL INGREDIENTS…”)  He allegedly had undisclosed paid
spokespersons for InterHealth and Naturex on his show to promote the products;
he told his viewers that his guests were doctors or scientists, but they lacked
such credentials. Dr. Oz allegedly referred to the retracted study when touting
the magic of the Green Coffee Extract as a weight-loss aid to his viewers. He
also described it as a “good quality” study during the Senate Hearing on
“Protecting Consumers from False and Deceptive Advertising of Weight-Loss
Supplement Products.”  Various media
defendants allegedly aided Dr. Oz by concealing his endorsement arrangements,
in violation of anti-payola rules, helping him to exploit the trust consumers
place in “America’s Doctor.”
The court found various claims adequately alleged against
some of the defendants, but not Sony. 
EMV, a company responsible for “facilitating strategic partnerships
between Dr. Oz, like endorsements, collaborations, speaking engagements, and
equity deals, etc.” was sufficiently targeted by the pleadings.  Its website stated: “Our goal is for Dr. Oz
to forge a direct and authentic connection between you and your demographic,”
to create an “alliance” that “will ensure brand integrity, large scale
awareness, and continued financial growth.” This allowed a plausible inference that
EMV played a direct role in causing Dr. Oz’s affirmative misrepresentations to
be disseminated to the consuming public, and that EMV aided and abetted Dr. Oz
in concealing the endorsement deals. “It is plausible that any prudent business
partner or representative of Dr. Oz that solicits endorsement deals on his
behalf would be charged with the knowledge that Dr. Oz’s repeated disavowals of
such endorsement deals constitute a breach of duty to those harmed by such
representations.” Thus, the complaint plausibly alleged that EMV participated
in fraud, either intentionally and directly or negligently and contributorily.  Indeed, the existence of a special duty to
consumers, as required for a negligent misrepresentation claim, could plausibly
be inferred from EMV’s profiting from Dr. Oz’s endorsement deals.  “[W]ithout individuals justifiably relying on
Dr. Oz’s recommendations or representations, EMV would have nothing of value to
offer to potential clients.”
Allegations of Sony’s direct participation were lacking, but
not allegations as to media defendants ZoCo and Harpo, which “either provided
substantial assistance to, aided and abetted, employed, entered a joint venture
and/or were involved in a civil conspiracy with Dr. Oz, and either one of the
Labrada Defendants or the Supplier Defendants.”  ZoCo produces the Dr. Oz Show and manages its
website.  An archived page of the website
allegedly displayed the Svetol trademark along with statements made by a
spokesperson for Naturex; this was sufficient to allege that ZoCo “promotes and
markets the Labrada products (and/or their proprietary active ingredients)
across the United States.” An agency relationship could also plausibly be
inferred from Dr. Oz’s @ ZoCo business email address at the pleading stage. There
was a plausible inference that ZoCo “directly participated in the tortious
conduct, had actual knowledge that Dr. Oz was breaching a duty to consumers,
and provided substantial assistance to Dr. Oz and his co-defendants in this
endeavor.”
The complaint did not, however, sufficiently allege Harpo’s
direct liability. Harpo is ZoCo’s parent company; the allegations did make it
plausible that Harpo could be vicariously liable for ZoCo and Dr. Oz’s tortious
conduct as a principal. Harpo was plausibly in a position to directly control
the acts of its agent, Dr. Oz, since Harpo holds and produces copyright,
“creates and develops original TV programming,” and “control[s] any broader
joint venture/web project with Dr. Oz.”  “As the alleged holder of the intellectual
property rights to The Dr. Oz Show, one can reasonably infer that Harpo stands
to gain the most from using the show as a subliminal advertising platform for
deceptively marketed weight-loss supplements.”

Sony and Harpo agreed “to collaborate on a website and
digital extensions” where Sony was to “provide marketing, legal/business
affairs, finance, and other back office services.” That wasn’t sufficient to
allege Sony’s direct involvement in the web marketing. There was also a
distribution agreement stating: “Harpo will control any broader joint
venture/web project with Dr. Oz but Harpo acknowledges Sony’s strong interest
in partnering on a Dr. Oz branded new media venture and will discuss with Sony
in good faith meaningful opportunities to participate.” The complaint didn’t
sufficiently allege that Dr. Oz’s fraudulent promotion of the Products fell
within the partnership’s business activities, or that Sony and Harpo “had equal
rights to direct and govern the conduct of each other” with respect to the
promotion or content of The Dr. Oz Show. Likewise, aiding and
abetting/conspiracy allegations as to Sony were insufficient, even assuming
Sony provided financial or marketing assistance to The Dr. Oz Show.  “[S]ubstantial assistance is insufficient for
fraud without actual knowledge.” 

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allegedly false generic claims not actionable, but contributory liability possible

Concordia Pharm. Inc., S.À.R.L. v. Winder Laboratories, LLC,
16-CV-00004 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 15, 2017)
Concordia makes Donnatal to treat irritable bowel syndrome
and acute enterocolitis.  (There’s
related litigation
that ended
badly for the defendant there
.) 
Concordia’s predecessor had conditional approval for ANDAs for Donnatal
tablets and elixir, which had become necessary when the FDA was required to
retrospectively evaluate previously approved drugs.  Concordia alleged that it was the only
company legally permitted to market PBA (phenobarbital and belladonna alkaloid)
products. 
Winder makes generic drugs; Steven Pressman owns
Winder.  In 2013, Winder began plans to
manufacture a generic version of Donnatal to be marketed by a third party,
Method, under the name Me-PB-Hyos. After Me-PB-Hyos was listed on several drug
databases, Concordia sued in the Western District of Virginia.  Defendants here were dismissed from that litigation
for lack of jurisdiction, and they subsequently took steps to begin production
and marketing of a generic version on their own.  In 2016, Winder listed B-Donna and Phenohytro
pharmaceutical products with the FDA and subscription pharmaceutical drug
databases, including Medi-Span and First DataBank.  B-Donna was removed from the FDA website but
remains listed with the drug databases.  Health
care professionals, insurers, payers, and pharmaceutical manufacturers use the
drug databases to determine whether generic substitutes are available for brand
named products. Pharmaceutically equivalent products are “linked” in the drug databases.
The B-Donna and Phenohytro products were submitted with labels and package
inserts indicating that they contained the same active ingredients, in the same
amounts, and in the same dosage forms as Donnatal products, and were thus
linked. The labels and package inserts also indicated that the B-Donna and
Phenohytro products had been reviewed and classified by the FDA.
The court declined to be bound by the false advertising
reasoning in Concordia Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Method Pharmaceuticals, LLC,
2016 WL 1271082, No. 3:14CV00016 (W.D. Va. Mar. 29, 2016).  As to the claim of literal falsity in claims
about FDA review and classification, those were precluded by the FDCA.  Concordia’s theory of liability was that
statements that B-Donna and Phenohytro were reviewed and classified by the FDA
and that Phenohytro was indicated for certain uses were false.  Their falsity depended on the meaning of the
word “drug” in an FDA regulation. That is, once a “Drug Efficacy Study
Implementation notice on a prescription drug” has been published in the Federal
Register, the FDA requires all labeling to include “an appropriate
qualification of all claims evaluated as other than ‘effective.’”  Donnatal includes such language in its
packaging and inserts because of a 1975 DESI notice classifying Barbidonna (the
former name) tablets and elixir as “possibly effective.”  If “drug” means “specific producer’s product,”
then a similar claim for B-Donna and Phenohytro would be false.  But if “drug” means “specific combination of
active ingredients in particular strengths and dosage amounts,” as defendants
contended (which seems more plausible at first glance), it would be true.  The FDA hasn’t set forth its interpretation
of “drug” in this context, and the court declined to interpret the FDCA/the
DESI notice without letting the FDA weigh in first. 
Pom Wonderful
didn’t prevent this result.  There,
falsity could be determined independent of FDA regulations. Here, finding
defendants’ statements to be false would require an interpretation in the first
instance of FDA regulations under the FDCA.
Second: Concordia alleged that defendants falsely claimed
that B-Donna and Phenohytro were FDA-approved and substitutable for Donnatal,
including by listing them in the drug databases in such a way as to produce
linkage with Donnatal. The “FDA-approved” claims were precluded, as above. For
the rest, the court did not accept that including the active ingredients, their
strengths, and their dosages in the promotion materials provided to the drug databases
constituted false or misleading advertisements. 
The argument was that the databases took accurate information and improperly
linked the parties’ products; this wasn’t enough.
Contributory false advertising: This theory is recognized in
the Eleventh Circuit.  (Important note:
the court didn’t discuss “commercial advertising or promotion.”  If the databases aren’t engaging in
“commercial advertising or promotion” of their own products when they
distribute the information, how can they be violating the Lanham Act to create
a primary violation allowing for secondary liability?  If the answer is that the database providers
are engaged in commercial advertising because of the promotional interests of
the data-submitters, that seems a bit
worrisome for any reporter who reports out positive promotional information
from a commercial source.  If drug
databases aren’t engaged in
commercial advertising or promotion when they distribute the linkage
information, though, then plaintiffs will have to find some tort that isn’t
limited to commercial advertising or promotion to challenge any resulting
falsehood.  If I were defendants, I’d
seek some clarity on this—and maybe an amicus from the drug databases, which
stand here accused of primary liability for violating the Lanham Act even if
un-sued at present.)
Anyway, once direct liability is established, the plaintiff
has to allege that the defendant contributed to the conduct by acting with “the
necessary state of mind—in other words that it intended to participate in or
actually knew about the false advertising.” In addition, the plaintiff has
allege that the defendants “actively and materially furthered the unlawful
conduct—either by inducing it, causing it, or in some other way working to
bring it about.”  The court found that
this had been properly alleged, since the result of the database’s linkage was
the misleading implication that defendants’ products were “FDA-approved
‘generic’ products that are therapeutically equivalent or A-rated to and/or
substitutable” for Donnatal.  Literal
truth can still be misleading. 
The court rejected defendants’ preclusion argument, which
was that the FDA requires them to include the active ingredients, their strengths,
and their amounts in the advertising material sent to the drug databases.  FDA requirements/authorizations aren’t a
ceiling on the regulation of drug labeling, since “Congress intended the Lanham
Act and the FDCA to complement each other . . . .”
Trademark infringement: Defendants argued that there was no
use in commerce, and that any likelihood of confusion was prevented by the
indication on the Medi-Span listing that B-Donna is labeled by Winder.  But use in commerce is broad enough to cover
listing on the databases without any sale. 
And Concordia properly alleged likely confusion at the motion to dismiss
stage.  Donnatal was at least suggestive,
and not used by other parties, making it strong.  (But the part of the marks that overlaps,
donna, has to be at most descriptive of belladonna derivatives.)  Concordia also alleged sufficient similarity
between the marks (the court didn’t break that down further) and the
products/sales channels, as well as an intent “to exploit the reputation and
success of DONNATAL.”
As to labeling Winder as the supplier, that wasn’t enough at
the motion to dismiss stage.
The common-law unfair competition claim was preempted
because it was equivalent to the precluded direct false advertising claim
above. The Georgia Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act was analogous to §
43(a), so the trademark-related claims survived and not the false advertising
claims.
Unjust enrichment: The “essential elements of the claim are
that (1) a benefit has been conferred, (2) compensation has not been given for
receipt of the benefit, and (3) the failure to so compensate would be
unjust.”  Concordia alleged sufficient
facts to state a claim: “Defendant gained a benefit by copying Plaintiff’s
DONNATAL labels for use with B-Donna and Phenohytro, thus saving Defendant the
time and resources needed to create its own.” 
[There is simply no way this is not preempted by §301 of the Copyright
Act.  Courts have held time and again
that unjust enrichment claims are preempted when they’re based on copying of
this sort.]
Additionally, Concordia alleged that being linked in the
databases consituted unjust enrichment. 
[If they’d been FDA-approved generics for a non-grandfathered drug,
would it constitute unjust enrichment? 
If not, why not?  This gets to the
difficulty we often have in defining “unjust” enrichment or “unfair”
competition as distinct from fair free riding.]

Tortious interference: Concordia failed to plead more than
the conclusory allegation that, “[u]pon information and belief, Defendants’
wrongful and intentional conduct has caused third parties to discontinue or
fail to enter into anticipated relationships with Plaintiff.” This wasn’t
enough

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allegedly false generic claims not actionable, but contributory liability possible

Concordia Pharm. Inc., S.À.R.L. v. Winder Laboratories, LLC,
16-CV-00004 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 15, 2017)
Concordia makes Donnatal to treat irritable bowel syndrome
and acute enterocolitis.  (There’s
related litigation
that ended
badly for the defendant there
.) 
Concordia’s predecessor had conditional approval for ANDAs for Donnatal
tablets and elixir, which had become necessary when the FDA was required to
retrospectively evaluate previously approved drugs.  Concordia alleged that it was the only
company legally permitted to market PBA (phenobarbital and belladonna alkaloid)
products. 
Winder makes generic drugs; Steven Pressman owns
Winder.  In 2013, Winder began plans to
manufacture a generic version of Donnatal to be marketed by a third party,
Method, under the name Me-PB-Hyos. After Me-PB-Hyos was listed on several drug
databases, Concordia sued in the Western District of Virginia.  Defendants here were dismissed from that litigation
for lack of jurisdiction, and they subsequently took steps to begin production
and marketing of a generic version on their own.  In 2016, Winder listed B-Donna and Phenohytro
pharmaceutical products with the FDA and subscription pharmaceutical drug
databases, including Medi-Span and First DataBank.  B-Donna was removed from the FDA website but
remains listed with the drug databases.  Health
care professionals, insurers, payers, and pharmaceutical manufacturers use the
drug databases to determine whether generic substitutes are available for brand
named products. Pharmaceutically equivalent products are “linked” in the drug databases.
The B-Donna and Phenohytro products were submitted with labels and package
inserts indicating that they contained the same active ingredients, in the same
amounts, and in the same dosage forms as Donnatal products, and were thus
linked. The labels and package inserts also indicated that the B-Donna and
Phenohytro products had been reviewed and classified by the FDA.
The court declined to be bound by the false advertising
reasoning in Concordia Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Method Pharmaceuticals, LLC,
2016 WL 1271082, No. 3:14CV00016 (W.D. Va. Mar. 29, 2016).  As to the claim of literal falsity in claims
about FDA review and classification, those were precluded by the FDCA.  Concordia’s theory of liability was that
statements that B-Donna and Phenohytro were reviewed and classified by the FDA
and that Phenohytro was indicated for certain uses were false.  Their falsity depended on the meaning of the
word “drug” in an FDA regulation. That is, once a “Drug Efficacy Study
Implementation notice on a prescription drug” has been published in the Federal
Register, the FDA requires all labeling to include “an appropriate
qualification of all claims evaluated as other than ‘effective.’”  Donnatal includes such language in its
packaging and inserts because of a 1975 DESI notice classifying Barbidonna (the
former name) tablets and elixir as “possibly effective.”  If “drug” means “specific producer’s product,”
then a similar claim for B-Donna and Phenohytro would be false.  But if “drug” means “specific combination of
active ingredients in particular strengths and dosage amounts,” as defendants
contended (which seems more plausible at first glance), it would be true.  The FDA hasn’t set forth its interpretation
of “drug” in this context, and the court declined to interpret the FDCA/the
DESI notice without letting the FDA weigh in first. 
Pom Wonderful
didn’t prevent this result.  There,
falsity could be determined independent of FDA regulations. Here, finding
defendants’ statements to be false would require an interpretation in the first
instance of FDA regulations under the FDCA.
Second: Concordia alleged that defendants falsely claimed
that B-Donna and Phenohytro were FDA-approved and substitutable for Donnatal,
including by listing them in the drug databases in such a way as to produce
linkage with Donnatal. The “FDA-approved” claims were precluded, as above. For
the rest, the court did not accept that including the active ingredients, their
strengths, and their dosages in the promotion materials provided to the drug databases
constituted false or misleading advertisements. 
The argument was that the databases took accurate information and improperly
linked the parties’ products; this wasn’t enough.
Contributory false advertising: This theory is recognized in
the Eleventh Circuit.  (Important note:
the court didn’t discuss “commercial advertising or promotion.”  If the databases aren’t engaging in
“commercial advertising or promotion” of their own products when they
distribute the information, how can they be violating the Lanham Act to create
a primary violation allowing for secondary liability?  If the answer is that the database providers
are engaged in commercial advertising because of the promotional interests of
the data-submitters, that seems a bit
worrisome for any reporter who reports out positive promotional information
from a commercial source.  If drug
databases aren’t engaged in
commercial advertising or promotion when they distribute the linkage
information, though, then plaintiffs will have to find some tort that isn’t
limited to commercial advertising or promotion to challenge any resulting
falsehood.  If I were defendants, I’d
seek some clarity on this—and maybe an amicus from the drug databases, which
stand here accused of primary liability for violating the Lanham Act even if
un-sued at present.)
Anyway, once direct liability is established, the plaintiff
has to allege that the defendant contributed to the conduct by acting with “the
necessary state of mind—in other words that it intended to participate in or
actually knew about the false advertising.” In addition, the plaintiff has
allege that the defendants “actively and materially furthered the unlawful
conduct—either by inducing it, causing it, or in some other way working to
bring it about.”  The court found that
this had been properly alleged, since the result of the database’s linkage was
the misleading implication that defendants’ products were “FDA-approved
‘generic’ products that are therapeutically equivalent or A-rated to and/or
substitutable” for Donnatal.  Literal
truth can still be misleading. 
The court rejected defendants’ preclusion argument, which
was that the FDA requires them to include the active ingredients, their strengths,
and their amounts in the advertising material sent to the drug databases.  FDA requirements/authorizations aren’t a
ceiling on the regulation of drug labeling, since “Congress intended the Lanham
Act and the FDCA to complement each other . . . .”
Trademark infringement: Defendants argued that there was no
use in commerce, and that any likelihood of confusion was prevented by the
indication on the Medi-Span listing that B-Donna is labeled by Winder.  But use in commerce is broad enough to cover
listing on the databases without any sale. 
And Concordia properly alleged likely confusion at the motion to dismiss
stage.  Donnatal was at least suggestive,
and not used by other parties, making it strong.  (But the part of the marks that overlaps,
donna, has to be at most descriptive of belladonna derivatives.)  Concordia also alleged sufficient similarity
between the marks (the court didn’t break that down further) and the
products/sales channels, as well as an intent “to exploit the reputation and
success of DONNATAL.”
As to labeling Winder as the supplier, that wasn’t enough at
the motion to dismiss stage.
The common-law unfair competition claim was preempted
because it was equivalent to the precluded direct false advertising claim
above. The Georgia Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act was analogous to §
43(a), so the trademark-related claims survived and not the false advertising
claims.
Unjust enrichment: The “essential elements of the claim are
that (1) a benefit has been conferred, (2) compensation has not been given for
receipt of the benefit, and (3) the failure to so compensate would be
unjust.”  Concordia alleged sufficient
facts to state a claim: “Defendant gained a benefit by copying Plaintiff’s
DONNATAL labels for use with B-Donna and Phenohytro, thus saving Defendant the
time and resources needed to create its own.” 
[There is simply no way this is not preempted by §301 of the Copyright
Act.  Courts have held time and again
that unjust enrichment claims are preempted when they’re based on copying of
this sort.]
Additionally, Concordia alleged that being linked in the
databases consituted unjust enrichment. 
[If they’d been FDA-approved generics for a non-grandfathered drug,
would it constitute unjust enrichment? 
If not, why not?  This gets to the
difficulty we often have in defining “unjust” enrichment or “unfair”
competition as distinct from fair free riding.]

Tortious interference: Concordia failed to plead more than
the conclusory allegation that, “[u]pon information and belief, Defendants’
wrongful and intentional conduct has caused third parties to discontinue or
fail to enter into anticipated relationships with Plaintiff.” This wasn’t
enough

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Bud Light Lime-a-Rita not deceptive despite not being so light after all

Cruz v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., LLC, No. 15-56021, —
Fed.Appx. —-, 2017 WL 1019084 (9th Cir. Mar. 16, 2017)
Cruz sued Anheuser-Busch for the usual California claims,
alleging that the labels on cartons containing cans of “Rita” malt beverages,
including Lime-a-Rita, are misleading by using the word “Light,” because the
products contain considerably more calories and carbohydrates per ounce than
other Budweiser products.  The majority
found that no reasonable consumer would be deceived into thinking that “Bud
Light Lime Lime-a-Rita,” which the label calls a “Margarita With a Twist,” is a
low-calorie, low-carbohydrate beverage or that it contains fewer calories or
carbohydrates than a regular beer. It is was clear from the label that the
beverage wasn’t a normal beer: the label calls it a “Margarita With a Twist,” and
pictures a bright green drink, served over ice, in a margarita glass.
The majority concluded that a reasonable consumer might
compare “Bud Light Lime Lime-a-Rita” either to (a) a hypothetical product
“Budweiser Lime-a-Rita,” made with Budweiser instead of with Bud Light, or (b)
a tequila margarita. The hypothetical Bud product would contain more calories
and carbohydrates than the Bud Light Lime-a-Rita, while a tequila margarita
typically contains at least as many calories and carbohydrates as a “Bud Light
Lime Lime-a-Rita.”  

Judge Christen dissented, reasoning that a reasonable
consumer would naturally compare Bud Light Lime Lime-a-Rita with Bud Light
Lime. But Bud Light Lime has far fewer calories and carbohydrates. Judge
Christen didn’t think a reasonable consumer would hypothesize a nonexistent
beverage or compare a malt beverage to tequila. 
Thus, she would have found that reasonable consumers could be misled by
the “light” label.

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Keyword ad case based on failure to disclose connections fails

Novation Ventures, LLC v. J.G. Wentworth Co., LLC, 2016 WL
6821110,  No. CV 15-00954 BRO (C.D. Cal.
Feb. 1, 2016)
Novation factors structured settlements: it buys the right
to receive scheduled future payments from settlement recipients who do not wish
to or cannot wait years for their annuitized payments; it has a market share of
no more than 7%. Its competitor J.G. Wentworth is, along with its subsidiaries,
“by far the largest participant in the factoring of structured settlements,” with
a market share of about 75%.  In 2011,
J.G. Wentworth bought its largest competitor, Peach Holdings, and they own and
control the “Olive Branch Funding” brand.  Given regulatory barriers to entry, there are
only a handful of companies competing in the business.
Novation alleged antitrust and Lanham Act claims based on
the idea that J.G. Wentworth “advertises and presents itself to the public
using (at least) three distinct brand names (JG Wentworth, Olive Branch
Funding, and Peachtree)” without advising consumers that those brands are “all
controlled and coordinated by the brands’ common owner and manager: The JG
Wentworth Company.” This, Novation alleged, served to “systematically corrupt
and frustrate [the] competitive bidding process.” Novation alleged that
comparison shopping was a key determinant of the price sellers received, and
that sellers typically used search engines to do this.
Novation alleged that the top three paid search listings
have “strategic importance,” because “most people ‘click through’ on slots one
through three of search results only.” 
Further, Novation alleged that most sellers get no more than two bids;
relatively few seek three or four. 
(Given the sums of money at stake, it’s interesting that the search is
so limited—each negotiation with a potential provider takes time and effort,
and that short-term cost seems to outweigh the possible long-term benefits,
which are probably unclear at the outset to the consumers.)
In addition, Novation alleged that defendants violated
Google’s internal policies against “double-serving” ads, that is, buying more
than one search result to be shown in response to any given query.  Consumers allegedly believed that they were
getting distinct results, “especially if each APPEARS to be different by virtue
of common visual cues and labels such as trademarked name, brand, phone number,
and logo.”  By coordinating their brands’
bidding, defendants allegedly “consistently grab two and often three of the top
three search listing results on many of the keywords used by consumers
searching for structured settlement buyers.” This behavior “crowds out
competitors and/or drives up the cost of being in second or third position in
any given search ranking, making it more difficult and expensive for Novation
to be found by potential customers looking for genuinely competing offers.”
The court held that Novation failed to allege antitrust
injury because they didn’t allege how the deceptive conduct prevented consumers from clicking on the
third link, e.g., the “http://ift.tt/2nszbIu” to Annuity that showed in
several exhibits; Novation brought no claims against Annuity.  Since consumers were free to choose whether
to click on an ad, and could also use whatever search terms they wanted, there
was no harm to consumer choice, especially since Novation could use TV ads or
radio to compete.  And other competitors
could and did bid for the top ad positions.
Novation also failed to state a false advertising claim.
There were no literal falsehoods; the only falsity came if a consumer searched
“who competes with Peachtree Financial” or “who competes with JG Wentworth.” The
real argument was that when three ads were displayed for ‘JG Wentworth’ and
‘Peachtree Financial’ and ‘Olive Branch Funding,’ reasonable consumers would
believe that these were separate companies competing to provide the service
advertised.  Though likely confusion is
often a question of fact, it isn’t always so. 
In the keyword advertising context, it turns on what the consumer saw on
the screen and reasonably believed.  The
court found that the ads were clearly labeled as ads and didn’t explicitly
describe the others as competitors.  Even
if reasonable consumers would be aware of Google’s internal advertising policy
(the court’s recitation suggests a hint of skepticism about that), there was no
plausible likelihood of deception “where the relevant reasonable consumer would
exercise a heightened degree of care and precision, where the purchase price of
the transactions range from $5,000 to $1,000,000 (or more),” and the consumer
might even have an advisor.  No
reasonable factfinder could find likely confusion.
Novation Ventures, LLC v. J.G. Wentworth Co., LLC, 2015 WL
12765467,  No. CV 15-00954 (C.D. Cal. Sept.
21, 2015)
Earlier version of the complaint, also dismissed.  Defendants’ failure to disclose common
ownership wasn’t a false statement; simple failure to disclose doesn’t violate
the Lanham Act because not saying anything “is neither ‘false’ nor a
‘representation.’ ”  Nor was it plausible
that the ads were misleading.  Toyota v. Tabari held that internet
consumers “fully expect to find some sites that aren’t what they imagine based
on a glance at the domain name or search engine summary…. [C]onsumers don’t
form any firm expectations … until they’ve seen the landing page—if then.
This is sensible agnosticism, not consumer confusion.” The “ad” label made
deception even less plausible.

Nor did the allegations support a trademark infringement
claim.  Novation argued that defendants’
use of their own marks “ ‘caused confusion,’ ‘mistake,’ and has ‘deceived’
thousands of persons … ‘as to the affiliation, connection, or association’ of
JG Wentworth with ‘Olive Branch Funding’ and ‘Peachtree Financial.’ ”  But that wasn’t a trademark infringement
claim.  Novation suggested that
defendants infringed Novation’s marks by using keyword meta tags.  However, there was no allegation that
defendants’ ads or links “incorporate plaintiff’s marks in any way discernable
to internet users and potential customers.” Thus, no reasonable factfinder
could find a likelihood of confusion here. 

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Blast from the past: another keyword ad case where TM won’t work

Int’l Payment Servs., LLC v. Cardpaymentoptions.com, Inc.,
NO. 2:14-cv-02604, 2015 WL 12656280 (C.D. Cal. Jun. 5, 2015)
Old decision, popped up in Westclip.  Plaintiff has a registration for ELITEPAY
GLOBAL for its merchant payment solutions equipment, services and training
business in the credit card processing industry.  CardPaymentOptions.com doesn’t provide credit
card processing services, but does get paid for running ads from processors.  CPO has a review page using IPS’s logo under
the heading “ElitePay Global Review.” The review is written by the website
owner; it rated IPS with a “C-” grade or 1.875 out of 5 stars, and there were
also more than 40 negative comments or reviews about IPS’s services (hello section 230), as well as
links other credit card service processors. 
In addition, CPO bought keyword ads for “ElitePay Global.”
Although summary judgment is usually disfavored in trademark
cases, nominative fair use can allow it. 
IPS’s services weren’t readily identifiable without use of the mark, and
there was no substitute for it in defendants’ AdWords campaign. Nor was the use
more than necessary, even though the mark was used over 50 times on CPO’s
webpage.  CPO was talking about IPS; such
referential uses are exactly what the nominative fair use doctrine is designed
to allow.  As for the AdWords campaign,
there was no evidence that defendants’ link regularly appeared above IPS’s
website in search results, meaning there was no genuine issue about whether the
use was more than necessary.
Finally, there was no suggestion of sponsorship or
endorsement, given the bad grade and associated negative comments and reviews.
The court rejected IPS’s argument that “there is no such thing as bad
publicity.” Likewise, the use of the mark in AdWords and CPO’s webpage path
(http://ift.tt/2mR48DI), didn’t
actively claim affiliation with or sponsorship by IPS. The Ninth Circuit has held
that “[o]utside the special case of trademark.com, or domains that actively
claim affiliation with the trademark holder, consumers don’t form any firm
expectations about the sponsorship of a website until they’ve seen the landing
page,” and that “[s]o long as the site as a whole does not suggest sponsorship
or endorsement by the trademark holder, … momentary uncertainty does not
preclude a finding of nominative fair use.”

Some false advertising-related state law claims survived,
but the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them.

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