WIPIP: Copyright: Incentives and the Digital Age

Tang, Creative Labor in the Age of Platform Capitalism

Theories of expressive work and creativity: lead to idea
that AI training itself is not a © problem b/c it doesn’t use work
expressively. Past idea: digital creativity enhances autonomy by giving
individuals greater roles in authoring their own lives. When people are
creative, making new things out of old things, become producers, they exercise
and perform freedom and become the sort of people who are free. Semiotic
democracy.

This model is challenged by paradigm shift in digital
creation. From early days of YouTube—hotbed of amateur creativity—to current
situation of rightsholder synergy. “Collaborative model” in which “rights
holders” and “online creators” are partners in sharing viral profits. YouTube’s
ContentID, along with Meta and TikTok, allows users to take bits and pieces
without themselves needing to pay. This changes how we think about digital
creativity on the internet. Those autonomy arguments are actually no different
than autonomy arguments made by Uber, Postmates, and other gig economy companies—greater
flexibility for a bohemian lifestyle. But we know that’s not true. Creators
relied on TikTok for their livelihoods—Uber drivers are subject to algorithmic
black box whims; YouTube doesn’t make its monetization/demonetization policies
public. At best, platforms are oligopolistic for creators.

Platforms have always gathered that meaning-making
expression into data; made it clear when they changed TOS to make it explicit
that they were using data to train generative AI. The analysis of the datafication
of creative works can learn from privacy scholarship, which has asked: how does
privacy law evolve from dignitarian individualistic notions focusing on
noneconomic invasions for the era of mass privacy invasions through gathering
data en masse?

Q: historically, the vast majority of artists have failed.
Maybe the platforms make things better [or don’t make things worse] by allowing
artists to find their audiences.

A: consider TV writers negotiating for uses of AI.

Rosenblatt: This is part of a story of precarity; sounds like
freedom but isn’t—gig economy analogy is convincing. What does this do for ©? TV
writers—that’s WFH. The one thing these creators have is ©, and what good does
it do them? Very little. YouTubers have © but it doesn’t seem to be relevant.
Is there something else we should be doing?

A: all these arguments—the payments would be minimal, it
would be too hard to track all the uses—have been made in privacy, so we could
look there. WFH: challenge to the idea of the inextricable link b/t work and
the author.

Lunney, Incentives and Music Composition

Fundamental premise of ©: more rights means more $ for
righsholders means more creative output. This paper is looking at music
composition: does revenue increase output? Does revenue increase number of
composers? RIAA shipment data in constant dollars—going back to 1962. Steady
climb; 80s recession and recovery; Napster/filesharing decrease until 2015,
back to the early 60s level, and then starts to rise again. ASCAP etc. payouts
also have to be considered for composers, and there we see a steady increase
rather than sharp drops, with a few blips. With both taken into account, you
still see a filesharing effect, but not quite as drastic as for recording
revenues (and not much recession effect).

What happened to composers? Hot 100: a relative measure of
quality rather than absolute, since it’s competing with the current
alternatives. More money means fewer top hits rather than more contenders. For absolute
measures of quality, looked at decay over time. The 90s (high revenue period) songs
did worse than expected. The low-revenue 2006-2015 period is where people are
still listening to the songs today. Can control for various variables including
teenage population and revenue is still uncorrelated or negatively correlated
with revenue.

Superstar composers: only 2 from the 1990s, many more from
other lower-revenue decades. So more money is associated with fewer and lower
quality hit songs, fewer first appearance songwriters, and fewer superstar
songwriters. Next steps: more data, looking for varied output based on quality
of hit, and revisiting assumption of equal shares of songwriting credits.

Rosenblatt: what the trends are in publishing deals—are the
deals better/worse/different/360? Industry practice has changed considerably
over that period.

A: good question, but his core question is does more ©
yield more music? Why it does or doesn’t is an interesting Q but not his
main one.

Fromer: Movies: Blockbusters are often perceived as less
creative; gatekeeping around who is allowed to produce them—is there anything
like that dynamic here?

A: certainly gatekeeping on the artist side. Harder to tell
on the publishing/composing side. We hear about artists being taken advantage
of. [We definitely hear about composers forced to share credit with performers
in order to get the song recorded by them.]

Fromer: Artists wanting to work with a particular hitmaker
may matter.

A: we’re increasing the number of composers on average in a
hit song, for sure.

Q: some songs are on the Billboard 100 forever.

A: sure, it’s not a perfect measure of quality, but that’s
why I also look at whether it’s still being streamed years later.

Q: another possibility: look at # of DMCA takedowns to
measure popularity/quality.

Cathy Gellis: did the Copyright Act of 1976 coming into
effect have any relation to what happened to spike revenue in 1978? But also
note that the “filesharing collapse” was also correlated with the collapse of
record stores, which wasn’t just about filesharing but was also about the
prices record companies were charging to record stores that made them
unsustainable.

A: hard to explain 1978. But you’re right, there’s a lot
going on. And only looking at Hot 100, so there may be other things going on,
although the music industry is highly skewed to the top.

Q: Number of composers being added: people are preemptively
adding composers w/similar style b/c of fear of Blurred Lines type lawsuits.

Pager, Copyright’s Extended Duration as Feature not Bug

Most valuable works may struggle before they are recognized
as valuable—Van Gogh died penniless. Moby Dick, Citizen Kane were commercial
failures. Art from marginalized communities may take time to be recognized.

Publishers will only invest in works that they think will
pay off fast if © term is short. Does that mean © needs to last 100 years? Not arguing
for any particular term. But could play with a variable term. Return to a renewal
term—option. That would allow mainstream iconic works to renew, which would be
bad; could couple it with some sort of revenue cutoff, so the works that have
had returns on their investment can’t renew.

RT: Renewal restrictions: as far as I know most blockbuster movies
have technically lost money; so how would that work?

A: could go by box office/gross.

RT: What about the naïve economic model here? The backlist
is already gone from publishing with life + 70—publishers are already not
investing in works that will pay off over 20 years, even with that very long term.

A: you might take more risks on an unknown if you think
there’s more money around.

RT: what does that have to do with the term? Your time horizon
is still going to be 1 year. [See also “I’ll be gone, you’ll
be gone
.”]

Jake Linford: you’re really telling a desert story not an
incentive story: this person deserves a reward and we need to create some sort
of system to give them a reward.

Tang: there’s tons of data that the industry is becoming
more risk-averse and more winner-take all, not willing to tolerate failure,
despite its concentration (because of its concentration?). [Cory Doctorow and
Rebecca Giblin say that the way to deal with the bully taking your kid’s lunch
money is not to give your kid more lunch money; this is a statement about ©
rights.]

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2025/02/wipip-copyright-incentives-and-digital.html

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WIPIP: Innovation policy

Michael Burstein, The Law of the Direction of Innovation

Foundational texts: NBER Rate and Direction of Inventive
Activity, and revisited. But we need to ask: what innovation should we
prioritize? What innovation, by whom, and for whom? These are contestable
subjects of political choice. Health law scholars have started to ask why so
many me too drugs instead of novel therapeutics; trying to generalize from
these questions.

Positing two axioms representing conventional wisdom in law
& business: (1) entrepreneurial activity, mediated by price signals and
supplemented by exclusive rights, is the best way to establish the direction of
innovation. (2) private ordering of innovation policy takes place largely in
the absence of legal structure; law’s role is only to ensure that IP
facilitates adequate price signaling.

This is wrong in a few ways. Startups direct innovative
efforts towards funders’ interests—structured by VC incentives. Incumbent firms
are influenced by corporate rules. Covenants not to compete matters. That’s all
not just price. Even if was just price, IP doesn’t mediate price in a vacuum;
IP makes choices. Market demand also doesn’t equal social demand/value of
innovation. Gov’t funding remains an important tool of innovation policy.

How do we get an innovation ecosystem w/striking disparities
in investment/development of tech that we see today? VC investment is mostly in
IT and consumer-oriented stuff. Silicon Valley has become optimized to produce
those kinds of innovations. Crypto, but not encryption from same underlying
tech base. Crypto has low capital requirements, low barriers to entry.
Encryption is deep tech, w/long and uncertain regulatory cycle/demand, but
potentially much greater social value.

We’ve had different innovation systems over time—Bell Labs,
corporate R&D.

One goal: challenge notion that innovation is part of market
alone and not part of legal choice.

Gaps in literature to fill: economic literature has some
useful modeling, but doesn’t explain mechanisms by which economic incentives
actually arise. Innovation ecosystems may be described, but each part of
ecosystem is molded by various laws, private law and public law. In law, we tend
not to see the ecosystem as deserving of integrated study—we tend to atomize
each piece.

Law influences direction by structuring relationships among
firms, individuals, and markets (VC contracts are an example: generally
applicable law rather than innovation specific); by delineating entitlements
(creation/enforcement of legal rights or creating space for nonmarket
innovation); creating or limiting markets—shaping demand (export controls that
limit the addressable market for certain tech); subsidizing investments,
generally through gov’t spending or the equivalent (gov’t grants).

Harder cases: corporate governance—that shapes both
individual firms/people as well as markets as a whole. R&D tax credits; gov’t
procurement—both a subsidy and market-making. Regulation—can prohibit and can
structure what people can do, and direction of innovation responds in kind. IP
may operate across modes. Delineating entitlements and subsidizing investments
by overcoming public goods problems, but also shapes market, e.g. by
identifying what’s protectable and unprotectable and by shaping licensing law.

Sapna Kumar: how does the model handle goods that more
closely resemble public goods than private goods, like new antibiotics and
vaccines for infectious diseases less common in the US now (but might be in the
future). Infrastructural goods might be different.

A: the market paradigm tells us the underproduction problem
is bigger with such goods, so it wouldn’t surprise him if things like
regulation/gov’t procurement play a bigger role there.

Rosenblatt: people are uncomfortable with value judgments:
which technologies are value-promoting and which aren’t.

Kumar, Scientific and Technical Expertise after Loper Bright

Her impression: majority fundamentally misunderstood
intertwining of sci/tech expertise w/statutory interpretation. Lessons we can learn
from patent litigation about how judges acquire needed knowledge about technical
issues. Proposal: funding neutral experts for appellate courts for complex
administrative law cases.

Loper Bright: Judges must independently interpret statutes. Judges
must exercise independent judgment when they interpret ambiguous statutes;
adopted very narrow version of Skidmore deference—can’t defer to agencies but
can look for persuasiveness, doesn’t seem different from being persuaded by a
party or amicus. Claimed holding based on APA, but framed decision w/in Art.
III arguments—invoked Marbury twice.

Many prominent scholars claim lots of deference is left, but
her own view is that lots has changed. Courts are forbidden from deferring. LB
might exacerbate politicization for judges. Some judges may try to improperly
defer. But what about judges who try to faithfully follow LB—what is a
deference-free system of interpretation?

Patent has some lessons! District judges struggle to
understand complex sci/tech, which contributes to patent cases being
time-consuming. They cope by relying heavily on expert tech tutorials,
technically trained clerks, tech-trained magistrate judges, and neutral experts
for complex cases, sometimes special master or technical adviser. How does the
CAFC cope? Expertise of the judges themselves, and technically trained law
clerks.

We don’t have any of that for APA situations. No means for
parties providing tech tutorials; appellate courts have few technically trained
clerks; page limits on briefs and non-tech trained lawyers make it hard for
judges to learn what they need; no means for hiring neutral experts at
appellate level.

Neutral expert proposal has been floating around for a bit:
Breyer & Leventhal, JJ, both proposed. Common in other countries, EU and
England. Best of both worlds—independent judgment of judges & access to
reputable info on sci/tech.

Implementation: Congress could fund it up front (unlikely);
appellate courts could do this on their own and bill parties for cost (is this
allowed?). Experts would explain background sci/tech, not opine in law. Give
teachings in written form, subject to party response. Goal to prevent overreliance
and opacity, while preserving adversarial system. Patent system suggests that
this can work. This isn’t a substitute for Chevron, but it’s something.

RT: Could an appellate ct send to dct for this purpose?

A: would take amending the APA.

Burstein: can appellate courts appoint special masters?

A: seen conflicting things—need more research into their
inherent authority.

Jacob Sherkow: there are original APA actions in the dct—those
could have experts.

Q: generalist judges are always coming into situations they
don’t know anything about—music, reinsurance markets, complex family
situations, how do ski resorts work. That doesn’t mean anything you said is
wrong. But why is science special?

A: dct often plays a filtering role.

Q: problem where you can’t find an expert who isn’t in one
camp or another—an interest in advancing (or not) large hadron collider
projects. Maybe you need to hire 2-3 with different ways of looking at the same
thing.

A: that’s true.

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2025/02/wipip-innovation-policy.html

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WIPIP: Copyright: Infringement & Enforcement

McFarlin, Restoring Joint Authorship

We apply a separate accrual approach to © infringement:
Petrella. But a one-time plain & express repudiation of joint authorship to
a claim for accounting, Zuill, 9th Circuit. Should we continue to do
so? Chuck Berry & Johnnie Johnson disputed authorship but Berry’s name was
the only one on the record—counts as an express repudiation, so he loses his
chance to claim authorship. But if Petrella could assert claims 40 years later,
why not Johnson?

Zuill’s rationales: (1) inequitable to let claimant wait in
the weeds and then pounce—seems inconsistent with Petrella. (2) adverse
possession by ouster, since © is like real property in that it lasts for a
really long time. Flawed analogy? Ouster generally means sole possession of a tangible
thing in exclusion of co-owner. Requires actual dispossession, not just declaration
or failure to share profits. Stability of title has economic importance, sure,
but so did Scorcese’s title to Raging Bull. How can you become an author of
another’s work by prescription?

Should new claimants be able to reopen this, like Johnnie
Johnson’s estate?
Glynn Lunney: what counts as an accrual of a cause of action? W/infringement, a
new infringement. How does a claim of authorship accrue multiple times?

A: the claim accrues as an acclaim for an accounting upon
the failure to pay profits. A new revenue source comes in; the failure to pay
creates the new claim.

Lemley: test case where there’s a repudiation but no profits
for five years. What should happen then? (He thinks the inconsistency is that
Petrella is wrong.)

A: standing for declaratory judgment, but no bar to future
suit. That’s an inconsistency—using declaration standing for claim and then
putting a bar on the accounting.

RT: Evidentiary difficulties (which aren’t as pressing for
Petrella type cases)? What about applying this to WFH?

A: courts are already dealing with that, in e.g. the Jack
Kirby case, and yes, to be consistent you’d probably have to extend that to WFH
claims.

Q: how does this affect termination rights?

A: also a big problem. Also exists w/infringement and
separate accrual. Courts may subconsciously be anti-joint authorship and
pro-sole authorship, even if it’s not coherent.

Smith, Looser Forms of Parody

Campbell initially defined parody for © purposes as
commenting on the original work; if it has no critical bearing on the substance
or style of the original composition, its claim to fair use diminishes. Some
decisions didn’t let you target the author or the subject: Salinger v. Colting;
Dr. Seuss v. Penguin Books; Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation. Split though b/c cases
like Burnett v. Twentieth Century Fox allowed targeting of author or someone associated
with the work. Targeting the subject of the work—generally involving a photo.
WWE v. Big Dogs—courts generally found that to be satire but not parody; some
cases push the line.

Then, Goldsmith twice said that parody targets an “author or
work.” So, the questions: parody of what: what can a secondary work target? And
what are “looser forms of parody”? (In discussion she suggests “String of Puppies” as
a possibility.) Is it on a scale or spectrum? Is there something between parody
and satire? Is it something that’s more effective with the borrowing albeit not
strictly necessary?

Linford: parody v. satire as proxies for necessary v. not
necessary? But how do you figure that out?

Newman: Barbie fair use cases are not really commentary on
the expression of Barbie but commentary on the social meaning of
Barbie that she had accrued over time. [I think that’s revealing of the
vapidity of the demand that a parodist comment on the “work”—not all parts of
the work are protected by copyright law. Just like dissecting a joke kills it,
the plaintiff in a fair use case tries to break the parody/commentary down and
say it’s not required for whatever the defendant is trying to say.]

Lemley: Ralph Nader Mastercard ad: the judge was motivated
not to rule for Mastercard & accepted that this was a parody of sanctimonious
merchants of high interest consumer debt, but that was clearly not the primary
message Nader was trying to send. One question is what the standard of proof
is; another related one is who the audience is—“may reasonably be perceived”
suggests the (reasonable) audience should be consulted.

Comments note that Europe (wisely) doesn’t distinguish
parody from satire.

Lunney: courts like to look reasonable and split the baby,
which may explain the language distinguishing satire in Campbell.

Rub, Circumventing SCOTUS

Copyright law needs updating, but Congress is not doing it.
Examining 21st century opinions Eldred, Grokster, Golan, Kirtsaeng,
Star Athletica, Aereo– attracted many amicus filings, use in copyright
casebooks, citations in law reviews, so we understand them as important. But
lower courts don’t always do much with them.

Part I: Narrow interpretation cases: Aereo, Star Athletica.
Aereo: volition doctrine could be on the chopping block, but the Court didn’t
name it, and the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have subsequently ignored it
while the dissent blessed volition (and worried about its future) and the SCT
majority didn’t disagree—no impact on the volition doctrine’s development.

Star Athletica: can I draw it? Seems a very test to meet.
Separability still has some teeth, in some courts, sometimes; some courts apply
a low standard and some courts don’t. Courts use other filtering doctrines
extensively to replace separability. This is the messiest.

Grokster: worried that SCT created an independent duty to
filter. But the tech moved on and distribution models moved on. Turns out that
Grokster didn’t do much. Inducement cases tend not to turn on failing to filter
and looking for profit. Got filtering through business models [and suing Cox
and other connection providers!]

Kirtsaeng: Court prioritized free movement of copies. But
market segmentation is still here. Most © materials are distributed digitally.
Second Circuit shut down secondary market in digital copies (ReDigi) and
libraries too (Internet Archive). Price discrimination by right is still here
nonetheless.

Eldred & Golan: No limit on Congressional power to
expand copyright—but user groups got organized to press against expanding
copyright in SOPA/PIPA. Legal power can exist without political power. Didn’t
open floodgates to new legislation. [Though that’s perhaps b/c of point one:
Congress can’t often get it together to act.]

Even most significant SCT decisions w/Ginsburg & Breyer
exert only modest influence on broader trajectory of © law. Repeat players in
ecosystem can bypass any disturbance to Force. © is incremental. 0.7
opinions/year can’t do much. Are we spending too much time focusing on SCT? Is
this minimalism justified?

RT: Do you mean © law or © practice? You make claims about
the broader trajectory of © law but a lot of your points are about © industrial
relations. Likewise, effects of Star Athletica on registrations/C&Ds may be
very different.

Lunney: If Grokster had come out the other way, would the
market look the same today as it does or would it be radically different? I
think it would be different. Eldred, likewise—if Lessig hadn’t brought the
case, would there have been enough political focus to develop the political
pressure against term extension?

A: sure. Maybe not overruling Sony was a message.

Lemley: maybe we’ve ignored cases we should have paid
attention to—Petrella has completely reshaped copyright litigation by trolls,
with big effects on substantial similarity doctrine in music cases as a
consequence (as well as other things like the law developed around actors like
Higbee). Fourth Estate, the registration case, has also had a big impact.

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2025/01/wipip-copyright-infringement-enforcement.html

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WIPIP: IP for the Larger World

Koo, De-Colonising Copyright Law

Is fair use even possible outside the US? If we want to
export fair use, what is it we actually want to export? Many US academics many
not think it’s the greatest idea—if we had a blank slate to redesign, what
would we do?

Issues: © not fit for purpose in developing English-speaking
Commonwealth countries—Caribbean, Southeast Asian. Issues with access—sometimes
access is only possible through piracy. Single author doesn’t fit well with
collaborative creative cultures—reggae music. Indian and African influences on Caribbean
music; restricts innovation to current forms. What is considered original
creation? Who is considered an author? Like US, law was traditionally imposed,
but we continue to impose them on ourselves. Doesn’t reflect needs/lived
realities. Cut and paste from UK or from international treaties. Lack of
inclusion and lack of influence of these countries—may not even has existed as
independent/as republics when these agreements were being negotiated.

TWIL (third world international law) or postcolonial approach?
TWIL approach: attempt to destroy international law will seem impossible b/c of
link to trade. But this framework is undemocratic and oppressive. How can the
reformation take place?

Undemocratic: int’l treaties demonstrate a battle between
have and have-not countries

Harms: ignores collective creative cultures, limits access
to works, hamstrings innovation and cultural creative processes. Maybe not allowing
students to photocopy at will, but maybe allowing museums and libraries to
digitize.

Borrowing copyright concepts may simply amount to trading
colonizers for imperialists.

Rosenblatt: mix of cultures in Trinidad & Tobago

A: Yes, so what does creation look like? Influence is
everywhere; can be accused of infringement from other places?

RT: suggestion to leverage TRIPS?—ability to retaliate for
non-IP related trade violations of the US, which are clearly going to feature
strongly in the next 4 years—prior TRIPS rulings on online gambling/the US
homestyle exception for small businesses allow other countries to retaliate
including by suspending their IP laws w/r/t US IP. Why not allow students or
libraries to photocopy US works at will?

Digital versus analog: access that is limited to countries
that need it will either require strong digital walls or analog copies.

Do you think that designations of origin are better forms of
IP? Madhavi Sunder/IP3

Is there a universalist end state? If so, then might want
something that could be imperial/ you wouldn’t worry about being accused of
infringement from outside.

A: wouldn’t necessarily be worried about a universal system
if it worked well. Trinidad & Tobago is tourism-based; any system that
allows more sources of investment/development would be good?

Designations of origin—not useful immediately, only if you’re
known. Have a GI for a T&T steel band, but have to convince people outside
that it’s worthwhile.

Irene Calboli: be provocative, go bold—don’t have to have
all the details yet while you’re making the case for reform, rather than trying
to mitigate.

Gebru, Cultural Appropriation as Passing Off

No authoritative definition, but common features: power
imbalance, lack of understanding, harm of some sort, context matters. First
mention of “cultural appropriation” in OMG Dolls case—though court didn’t like
it.

Proposed taxonomy has two axes: is the symbol diffused or
distinct; is the use noncommercial or commercial? Diffused: place-bound; legally
recognized group; shared across different communities. Would only allow legal
intervention with a commercial appropriation of a distinct symbol. Diffused and
noncommercial: Justin Timberlake’s cornrows. Specific and noncommercial: Kente
cloth used by congresspeople after George Floyd’s death. Diffused and
commercial: Aunt Jemima. Specific and commercial: Navajo symbols used by Urban
Outfitters, litigated by Navajo as TM case.

Passing off theory—extended to GI theories with “Greek
Yogurt,” “Champagne,” etc.

Case studies: Jeep Cherokee. Is there collective goodwill? Yes,
some signaling happening—trying to communicate meaning. Official name of the
source group; distinct group w/place, centralized institutions, legal status. Easy
case for framework.

Gucci’s use of turban: sacred product; market value?; other
cultures have turbans, so is it unique—harder question.

Q: privileges centralized cultures—which bakes in a certain
perspective. Why should we privilege that? The reason a culture is diffuse
might be because of previous cultural violence, now immunized. Maybe that’s how
it has to be. [The recent book by Carrie Lowry Schuettpelz, The Indian
Card: Who Gets to Be Native in America
is really good on this point.]

A: yes, it is a present day snapshot of what consumers think
right now.

Q: then just be very transparent about that.

Buccafusco: Gucci seems like a pretty expressive company, so
what’s the difference between Justin Timberlake’s dreadlocks and Gucci’s
turbans? Is it just that Gucci is monetizing directly and Timberlake
indirectly? Plus, there seems like there’d be a lot of food in your regulatable
quadrant. Are you just reinventing GIs?

A: food might be too diffuse.

Rosenblatt: are you concerned at all with transformation?
Also, what is a culture that can be appropriated? Subaltern subcultures like
punks, some organized and some less so, can get appropriated.

Buccafusco, Masur, & Whalen, Measuring the Value of
Distinctive Brands: Evidence from the Bordeaux Wine Market

Distinctive here means different from other marks, not well-known.
Everyone agrees that branding is important. Chasse-Spleen: easier to find. Suggestive
or arbitrary or fanciful but not in the “jumble of letters” sense. Question: to
what extent do distinctive brand names help generate price premiums?

In many markets, we don’t see much congestion around the
semantic core, and TM law keeps firms from clustering. But! The market for
Bordeaux wines comes from the 18th century, when TM law wasn’t doing
much work. More than 5000 unique wineries, 150 million gallons of wine, largely
homogenous products: red blends of Cabernet and Merlot. Most branding choices
more than a century ago. Median price is $15/bottle, but some bottles sell for
$1000s/bottle. 28% of producers share a virtually identical name w/at least one
other producer. 150 with LaCroix in their name, including 6 Chateau LaCroix
alone.

H1: distinctively named wines will command higher prices.
H2: even after controlling for wine quality. H3: price differential for distinctive
names will be higher for high-quality wineries than for low-quality wineries.
Scrubbed la, de, des, chateau and computed pairwise similarity scores b/t each
wine name and every other wine name. Measured similarity by nearest ten
neighbors.

H1 supported: highly similar wines: $13.44 expected price.
Highly dissimilar: over $27.

H2: assume a rating of 90, a median good score. 21.68 versus
25.02, so the price premium persists, about 15%

H3: low rating wines, difference is $2.21; high rating,
difference is $9.59 both about 200% price difference

We don’t detect meaningful distance costs, that is, being
too unique—but there aren’t any Chateau XZMOXO or the like in our datasets, so
we might not see that.

We detect no price benefit for low priced wines that might
have gotten a boost from similarity to high-priced neighbors. “Chateau LaTour
Margot” not so good.

Why don’t they switch? Tradition? A lot are owned by multinationals,
so why not?

Congestion is a problem, and TM should continue to push
brands away from linguistic core

We also don’t have enough variation in quality data to
identify effects of investments in quality on differently named types.

Fromer: Is it possible that having a similar name decreases
incentives?

A: Even among the high end there are lots of very similar
names. Very hard to tell; not making causal claims.

Calboli: are there registrations?

A: probably not. Certainly not in 18th century.

Calboli: Would like to know whether logos help distinguish—crests
of specific noblemen.

A: trying to pull, but there aren’t pictures in many
circumstances.

Calboli: how often are there overlaps on a given menu? Distribution
might differ.

A: Yes and no.

Q: does any law govern name changes? Champagne region has
weird rules I know.

A: probably; also a ton of social pressure.

Calboli & Izyumenko, Role Models Matter: Surveying
Gender Gap in Intellectual Property Teaching in Institutions of Higher
Education

Inquiry will span US, Europe, Asia (where numbers of women
are lower, especially in higher positions). Data collection and surveys.

Questions about data collection?

Mazzurco: extending the tenure clock as an issue: Women have
to extend their tenure clock b/c if they take leave, they can’t write while
they’re on parental leave b/c they’re taking care of a newborn; men often don’t
take leave or if they do, they are able to write while they are on leave so it’s
an extra benefit for them.

A: that may also affect pay.

Q: you should also ask the same questions of men to learn
about whether there are differences in treatment/responses/perceptions.

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2025/01/wipip-ip-for-larger-world.html

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WIPIP Panel 2B Copyright: Authorship, Ownership

Newman, Adoption as Authorship

Concept of being an author: personally generating all the
sensory signals other humans will process as part of the work—comes into being
because my mind decides to put it there and my body guides it. Certainly in
authorship disputes between the person who generates the idea and the one who
creates the detailed expression, the latter is favored. But then it gets more
complicated. Setting up a shot versus clicking the button to take the shot: Sarony.
What matters is whether you had a clear intellectual conception and you used
tools to embody the expression. To be an author is to have a fully formed work
in your head and transcribe it in some medium? But even that is a bad model of
authorship usually. What happens is more: I generally know what I want to say,
and engage in trial and error to see what I can get on paper that makes sense.
It probably bears some relation to what I started with, but not identical. The
fundamental act of authorship is getting to some point where you recognize some
set of signals that you recognize should have communicative meaning that you
adopt as a communicative act. Until adopted, it was just a set of signals;
adoption makes it a communicative act. Alfred Bell’s famous dicta: defective musculature
or clap of thunder can be adopted. Don’t want to limit it to only the final
product you choose to publish—if you’re engaged in working, it’s inherently
adoptive, whether or not that’s your final product. Jackson Pollock: if one of
those, he didn’t like the result and chose to discard it, that canvas is not a
work of authorship.

RT: Read Karen Gover, Art and Authority. You aren’t saying
the core is adoption rather that it’s the union of conception and adoption –
have to already be engaged in a process of creation, not just wandering down
the beach looking for driftwood—Duchamp’s urinal, or adopting the Constitution
or the Rifleman’s Creed as your own expression.

A: he does think picking up the driftwood is expressive but
not eligible for copyright because it’s a preexisting fact, just like using AI and
picking a result might produce expressive work that’s not created by you. [RT:
then what makes your theory a theory of copyright and not a theory of art?]

Betsy Rosenblatt: introducing intent? What about private
works?

A: publication isn’t important, but communicative intent is.
You can adopt something as your unpublished work.

Buccafusco: you’re defining authorship, not originality. [I
will note that Feist seems to conflate those two.] There are some cases of
authorship that might not have originality.

Q: if you reject a bunch of photos as bad, are you an author
of them?

A: you took the photos with the intent of making a work, so
probably. There’s some sense in which the subsequent act of reviewing the works
I’ve generated/caused to be generated and identifying which are satisfying
should be regarded as important.

Q: fixation as a proxy for adoption, at least as of 1976?
Compare to Hemingway common law copyright case.

Op den Kamp, First: Shifting Benchmarks in Film History,
Copyright, and Archival Practices

Palmedo, Lutes, & Safner, The Demographics of Authorship
in the United States

Video essay about Leland Stanford’s commissioning of Edward
Muybridge to try to determine whether horses’ feet left the ground all at once
during a gallop. Copyright claimed 1878 by Muybridge, but Stanford published
The Horse in Motion in 1882 with Muybridge’s name left off title page,
mentioned only as technical assistant. Royal Society in UK shut him out as a
result. Stanford used photos as raw material, informational only.

Rosenblatt: Muybridge did achieve IP protection, just couldn’t
capitalize on it as he wanted to b/c Stanford was so powerful. Is this a story about
IP or about power? The power of narratives to swamp law?

Q: but was Muybridge really a lone author or was there real
collaboration?

A: Stanford is able to produce witnesses who say he paid for
everything even though there are no written documents—it’s about the greater
tensions in his wealth (letting M live on his land for free, etc.). Though he
knew for years that M was registering © and taking out patents on inventions.

Brent Lutes, Demographics of Copyright Registrations in the
US

2011-2022 applications; 9 most registered types of works;
registrations by individuals; using registrations per person per year by zip
codes; geographic matching. When you control for education, effects of income
on registration go away—so income was a proxy for education. Education also
drives a lot of the racial/ethnic data. Urbanness is also important:
population/housing density. 10% increase in urbanness increases copyright registrations
5.5%, not coming from numbers or income—probably an agglomeration effect. Age
also matters too—older adults register more than younger adults, even
controlling for education and income.

Raw correlations with racial/ethnic groups were significant;
if there were educational and income equalities, the range would shift a lot,
but Native Americans would still not be registering very much and multiracial groups
would be registering a lot. More diverse areas are associated with more
registrations, but we don’t know which way the causation flows. We also know
that urbanness and diversity are correlated. Controlling for urbanness, still
there’s a positive statistically significant relationship with diversity.

Karol, American Art’s Little Copyright Secret: Why So Many
20th Century Artworks Are in the Public Domain and Why That Matters

Basic claim: most works were published and placed in public
domain when first exhibited for sale in commercial art galleries with no notice
and no restrictions on copying. We should presume, absent contrary evidence,
that midcentury visual art shown in a gallery for sale is in the public domain
unless the estate/foundation demonstrates otherwise. Limitations: American art
before Jan. 1, 1978. So roughly 1930-1977. Example: image from an art show from
a photographer who was in there—making copies—without restrictions.

Publication without notice terminated ©. Exceptions for
limited publication. American Tobacco v Werckmeister 207 US 284 (1907), pre
1909: no general publication because bylaws of Academy, where work was
exhibited, expressly prohibited copying.

Letter Edged in Black, ND Ill 1970: No restrictions on
copying, thus work of sculpture is in public domain. Others, including state
court cases, reason similarly.

But publication under the 1909 Act is notoriously outcome-driven—MLK
“I Have a Dream” case example b/c courts often think that preserving © in
canonical works is important.

Museums as interest groups in support which would help them
digitized collections?

Courts should not worry about issues going forwards since
this is only for pre-1978 works. But will publishers accept the truth?

Deborah Gerhardt: Why not go all the way to 1989, when
notice was eliminated fully as a requirement? Also, it’s not just visual art!
Film, other modalities.

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2025/01/wipip-panel-2b-copyright-authorship.html

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WIPIP, UNLV: TM Protectability

Jeanne Fromer (with Beebe and Stein), An Empirical Picture of
Trademark Law

We are running out of competitively effective word marks.
What about images? Word marks dominate consistently over time, but numbers have
increased in every category. Our definitions: images include image only,
text+image, and stylized word marks. Live image marks over time keeps
increasing, with a lot of text+image and a growing number of others.

Inadequacy of TM law: visual depletion and congestion;
difficulty handling visual similarity in confusion analysis; difficulty
handling visual distinctiveness in the sense of source identification.

Empirical questions: are we running out of visual marks?
What are changes over time in classes? Applicant behavior?

2003-2023: image only, 200K office actions, image+text, 500K
office actions. 79.1% of case files contain images.

Design search codes: 3 level taxonomy of 29 top level
categories such as human beings, foodstuff, supernatural and other beings, and
furniture; 157 second level categories, such as trees/bushes, cutlery, and
bells; 1400 third-level categories, such as Dutch women. Shades of “those
belonging to the Emperor
.” All sorts of weird racial categories. (I wonder
if this will be purged by the new administration.) Design search codes can be
added by the PTO or suggested to be added/changed by applicants. Need to find
more about the process, which seems quite informal.

In class 25, apparel, for all 2023 live marks, only 50 of the
1400 noncolor design search code categories are not claimed (e.g., Scotch
women). Geometric figures & solids is pretty crowded, same with animals. 32
marks with images of a dove in class 25. When a word is taken, it’s taken; are
these all different doves capable of coexistence? Also, image+text with image
of dove is 74, and 16 word only marks.

Visual complexity: is number of design search codes per mark
increasing over time? Is resort to geometric marks increasing or decreasing?
Can we measure complexity with an AI model?

Likely confusion: McCarthy says there’s little in the way of
guidelines to determine degree of visual similarity that causes LOC; no point
in launching into long analysis, only thing to say is I know it when I see it;
court case agrees.

Increasing 2(d) refusals over time—but that seems possibly
to be based on text, not on the images, b/c examiners have difficulty finding
similar images based on tools they have (her hypothesis)

Distinctiveness: Abercrombie for word marks, Seabrook for
non-word marks. 2d Circuit continues to try to shove non-word marks into
Abercrombie, but most other circuits use Seabrook. Abercrombie focuses on
distinctiveness of source. Seabrook looks at distinctiveness from other
marks or ornamentation—differential distinctiveness. Suggestion: we should look
for both! Consider things that are generic/descriptive for the classes for
which they have design codes (e.g., a carpet design code for carpets).

Jake Linford: Thinks of both Abercrombie and Seabrook as
asking the same question of sending the consumer a signal of branding.

A: that may be a proxy, but they aren’t necessarily the same
thing. Flowers have nothing semantically to do with apparel, but are used in
fashion.

Deborah Gerhardt: it can do both, like red for strawberry
flavor.

A: yes, absolutely. Just reads Seabrook differently.

Felix Wu: psychology literature on images and how much
distance between images we should require—can that tell us anything?

RT: holistic v. sequential perception of images v. words.

Rachael Dixon: People do try to game the system all the time—claiming
a cannabis leaf was a maple leaf, for example. There are no design codes for
poop emojis.

Sari Mazzuco: There might be a lot of space for congestion
if there’s a lot of thin protection, like a thinly protected stylized “O.”

A: yes, that might be a difference from words, like a bunch
of text+image marks with a name + image of a rug for rugs. (I wonder if the rug
image should then be disclaimed.)

Grynberg, The Paranoid Brand in American Politics

Misinformation and trust. Can marketing tell us anything
useful? Not interested in specific sources like NYT, but in mindsets. Institutional
trust v. cynicism. Faith in liberal institutional structures with self-correction
mechanisms v. cynicism about information as power.

Marketing framework: How Brands Grow, influential book
w/contested theses—brands grow by improving their mental and physical
availability—does the brand come to mind when purchase is possible?
Distinctivess in their model matters more than differentiation. True
differentiation is hard absent IP which can create faux differentiation;
consumers don’t care nearly as much about brands as marketers do. Thus
distinctive brand assets, like brand names, logos, jingles etc. around which
memory structures may form, are more important than actual product features. Important:
category entry points—moment that product category is relevant, opportunity for
brand to come to mind—marketer can target these entry points. E.g., people
might eat candy when taking a break from work. Kit Kat marketing is built
around “take a break.”

Any worthwhile application to information problems? Ideas as
brands: “Government can’t do anything right.” What views are mentally available
if there’s a line at the DMV?

Branding trust v. cynicism: “trust the science” v. “do your
own research”

If differentiation isn’t so important: Both can fill the need
of explaining the moment, framing read of a news source, providing a course of
action, entertaining, etc. We “shop” from both mindsets. Institutions often act
in a non-trustworthy way, meaning the paranoid view is sometimes correct.

Structural advantages for cynical brand: building reach is
cheap: flooding the zone with shit; ease of tailoring to audience, emotion/outrage;
ease of tailoring to whatever is happening; institutional supports. Decline of
reported journalism and expense of real journalism. Suitability for short,
high-volume consumption like social networks. Decline of gatekeepers.

What can the trust brand do? Targeting entertainment, education/civics,
smoothing contacts with government like pre-filling tax forms as an
anti-disinformation measure; understanding the need for volume/reach. Problem:
Nuance complicates mental availability.

Does this perspective yield anything that is interesting or
distinct from what’s in the ether?

Branding and the anti-democratic moment? Democratic systems
are open to multiple sources of information and strong self-correction
mechanisms. Populist view is that everything is about power. Closed systems are
dictatorial. Populist branding activities are also organizing/control
activities in an attention economy.

Q: maybe trust/cynicism isn’t the right dichotomy. Positive
v. negative claims—reliability v. they’re bad is also in the marketing
literature. Where is the position of rational ignorance for a consumer? Maybe
now we start in a position of distrust and people look for reasons for trust,
which is why Trump has fewer problems than Dukakis.

Dickson, X Doesn’t Mark the Spot: When Name Changes Fail

89% of marketing emails in July 2024 still called it
Twitter. Some of the most visited English language news sites in the world
still use Twitter in their reporting. Other rejected name changes: The Willis
Tower is still the Sears Tower; the Mario Cuomo Bridge is still the Tappan Zee;
the Ronald Reagan National Airport is still National. Stadium name change
rejections are also common. People are still mad about Macy’s buying Marshall
Field’s and changing the name to Macy’s in 2006—protests continued to 2012 and
beyond.

Why do companies change names? (1) bankruptcy/going out of
business; (2) mark super racist; (3) merged/bought out; (4) poisoned/killed
people; (5) terrorist group is using name of our company like mobile payment system
ISIS.

Why resist? Neuroscience: stickiness, anchoring bias;
nostalgia; local pride, fears of encroaching outside forces; sense of
community; disapproval of person or entity related to name change.

Could companies actually retain rights to marks they haven’t
been using in years based on consumers’ continuing use of these names? Public
use doctrine for nicknames like Coke might help them, as in Coca-Cola v. Koke,
even though Coca-Cola discouraged used of the name at the time due to cocaine connotations.
Bud for Budweiser, VW Beetle got rights in Bug. Yankees got to stop “Baseball’s
Evil Empire.” Even public use of VDS to refer to VCDS.

Can the public use doctrine overcome abandonment? Even when
companies have actively discouraged use?

Many companies that have rebranded have managed to keep
their registrations alive for years after abandonment with really sketchy/bad
specimens: Twitter’s renewed in 2024; Washington football team renewed its old
name with a specimen article about its past use. Marshall Field’s renewed with a
picture of a sign on a building that didn’t even match the claimed mark; so too
with National Airport.

Q: another reason/explanation: resentment of participating
in someone else’s marketing campaign—especially if the stadium name changes
every 3 years. (Also defends renewal of Washington team mark to prevent other
people selling merchandise.)

RT: This set of examples is a really good illustration of Jessica
Litman’s insight that we participated in creating value of TMs too. Indianapolis
Colts case would say that when there’s no continuity b/t old and new marks,
there’s no interest for the new owner to assert—today, I think we would
consider that also in the register of Article III standing.

Linford: thinks that courts would find standing based on the
idea that consumers would punish the old owner b/c the connection remains.

Irene Calboli: it’s different with X because reporters say
(formerly Twitter) and that’s different from having people still carrying around
Chanel bags in Russia even though Chanel no longer sells in Russia—those are
different kinds of contexts that have to be recognized.

Q: contrast: what are the characteristics of name changes
that do stick? How long do the changes take to stick?

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2025/01/wipip-unlv-tm-protectability.html

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NYC loses greenwashing case against Exxon and pals

City of New York v. Exxon Mobil Corp., — N.Y.S.3d —-, 2025
WL 209843, No. 451071/2021 (N.Y.S. Ct. Jan. 14, 2025)

Probably not the last we’ll hear about this, but the court
dismissed the City’s two consumer protection claims against defendants for: (1)
misrepresenting the purported environmental benefit of their fossil fuel
products, and failing to disclose the attendant climate change risks of these
products, and (2) engaging in false and misleading greenwashing campaigns. Previously,
the courts dismissed public nuisance, private nuisance, and trespass claims as
preempted. See City of New York v. BP P.L.C. et al., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466 (S.D.
NY 2018), aff’d City of New York v. Chevron Corp., 993 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2021). The
court summarized its key holdings:

First, the City’s allegations that
NYC consumers are climate conscious, yet are being misled by Defendants’
failure to disclose that fossil fuels cause climate change is not sustainable
because the City propounds that the connection between fossil fuels and climate
change is publicly known information. Second, the City has not sufficiently
pled that Defendants’ alleged greenwashing campaigns, involving statements
about clean energy and alternative energy sources, are “made in connection with
the sale” of a consumer good (i.e., fossil fuel products) in NYC, as required
under the CPL. The Court further determines that claims for statements that
predate April 22, 2018 are time-barred.

The greenwashing allegations related to: (1) “product
greenwashing” statements intended to mislead consumers as to the climate
benefits of specific gasoline products without disclosing the adverse impacts
of those products on the climate, and (2) “corporate greenwashing” statements
intended to present Defendants as climate-friendly thereby inducing consumers
to purchase their fossil fuel products. As an example of product greenwashing, BP
advertises Invigorate, “an additive that BP describes on its website as better
than ‘ordinary fuels’ that have problems like ‘increased emissions’.” Shell
advertises the Shell Nitrogen Enriched Cleaning System and a line for its
premium grade of fuel called V-Power Nitro+ Premium as “produc[ing] fewer
emissions.” Exxon advertises that Synergy Diesel Efficient fuel is the “latest
breakthrough technology” that helps consumers “[r]educe emissions and burn
cleaner,” and “was created to let you drive cleaner, smarter and longer.” And lots
more. The City argued that these statements were misleading “by emphasizing the
climate-friendly benefits of the product without disclosing the material fact
that the product still causes climate change despite the claims of reduced
emissions.”

“New York courts have determined that where the plaintiff
does not plead facts that the defendant alone possessed the purported material
information, a reasonable consumer cannot have been misled.” The fossil
fuel/climate change link is public, so consumers can’t have been duped by
defendants’ failure to disclose.

Also, some of the alleged product greenwashing statements (I
didn’t list them all) were puffery or not misleading in context, referring to keeping
an engine cleaner, not the environment.  

As for the corporate greenwashing statements, they weren’t
sufficiently alleged to be “made in connection with the sale … or …
offering for sale … of consumer goods or services.” The court thought that
accepting the City’s interpretation—where brand advertising that makes consumers
feel good about a seller counts—would render the “made in connection”
requirement meaningless. Thus, “statements as to investments in clean energy
resources, such as wind and solar, and alternative energy sources, such as LNG,
hydrogen fuel cells, and biofuels,” weren’t actionable.  

The court thus didn’t reach defendants’ arguments that their
statements were protected by the First Amendment. It did hold that government
enforcement actions weren’t covered by the anti-SLAPP law.

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2025/01/nyc-loses-greenwashing-case-against.html

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GIGO? literal falsity and a remedy mismatch

InSinkErator LLC v. Joneca Co., No. 8:24-cv-02600-JVS-ADS, 2025
WL 250032 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2025)

InSinkErator, allegedly the world’s largest manufacturer of
garbage disposals for home and commercial use (and to its shame, an
entity that sued a TV show for dilution for showing a garbage disposal being
used unsafely
), sued its competitor Joneca for falsely advertising the
horsepower of its garbage disposals and secured a preliminary injunction.

Joneca prominently claims that its garbage disposals are
rated at 1/2, 3/4, 1, and 1 1/4 horsepower on its product packaging, as well as
its promotional materials online and in brick-and-mortar retail stores
nationwide. These garbage disposals tend to match the same horsepower
advertised by InSinkErator on its disposals, but at a cheaper price. InSinkErator’s
testing revealed results approximately 39% below the claimed 1 1/4 horsepower
disposal, and 24% below the claimed 1 horsepower disposal; none of Joneca’s
products allegedly produced the claimed horsepower.

Joneca didn’t deny the test findings, but argued that the
recognized standard for garbage disposals looks only at input horsepower and
not the output horsepower measured by InSinkErator. Thus, it argued that there
was no falsity, because all of the tested samples met or exceeded the
input-based horsepower rating.

The key question, then, was whether “horsepower” was unambiguous.
If the court construed the question to be “what do consumers think ‘horsepower’
means?” maybe it would have required a consumer survey. But the court didn’t;
it accepted testimony about industry standards, and thus finds literal falsity.
Joneca’s expert relied on the Underwriter Laboratories compliance standard UL
430 Waste Disposers, which establishes a method for rating horsepower of
garbage disposals on an input basis. But that was a safety standard, not meant
to be used to measure horsepower, as confirmed by engineers at UL. The court
was more persuaded by InSinkErator’s expert and sources such as the National
Electrical Manufacturers Association (and others), which requires claims of
horsepower on motors to be derived from the torque output by the motor. Ultimately,
a court may determine literal falsity “based on its own common sense and logic
interpreting the message.” See Edminston v. Jordan, 98 Civ. 3298 (DLC), 1999 WL
1072492, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 1999). “The general consensus among
engineers, even if not specific to the garbage disposal industry, appears to be
that horsepower is determined by mechanical output.”

InSinkErator also provided market research to show that
consumers ranked horsepower as one of the top purchasing considerations for
garbage disposals, as well as “retailer perspective” indicating that horsepower
was “a key differentiating factor”—Lowe’s and Home Depot organize and advertise
them by horsepower. “This signals that horsepower is an important—if not
primary—distinction used by retailers to market to consumers.” That bolstered “the
common sense impression that more horsepower means more efficiency.” Home Depot
characterized higher horsepower disposals as “Heavy Duty,” and lower as “Light
Duty” and said that “[t]he higher the HP, the better the disposal will run.
Food waste will be ground into finer particles and you’ll have fewer jams,” while
Lowe’s said that “models with higher HP motors have better sound insulation and
run more quietly than basic models.”

And then, in the remedy, the court imposes only a disclaimer
remedy that seems quite unlikely to work, and won’t actually correct for the
misimpressions given how—as it has already explained—garbage disposals are
marketed.

In setting out the injunction, the court states that “Joneca
would be free to explain during retailer bids and sales presentations that its
products have a certain horsepower input, or alternatively, to explain that
InSinkErator’s AC induction motor design requires more output horsepower to
provide the same level of performance as Joneca’s PMDC motor. Such is not a
hardship, but rather the truth, as Joneca has described it.” But will it need
to do so given the actual injunction?

The injunction bars “false and deceptive horsepower claims,”
then says that “Any horsepower-related communications to retailers,
wholesalers, or other third parties for the purposes of obtaining contracts for
the sale of Joneca-made garbage disposal products will include a clear and
conspicuous disclaimer stating: ‘Horsepower claimed on package does not
indicate motor output or motor power applied for processing.’” But they’ll
still be shelved in stores as 1 HP motors next to InSinkErator’s 1 HP motors,
if I understand this correctly. (The order says Joneca can’t assist, etc. the
continued display of false and deceptive claims in stores—are the general statements
about HP on Lowe’s and Home Depot’s sites, or the stocking of the parties’
products side by side, encompassed in that?)  Even if the sticker is conspicuous, it seems at
best contradictory with the store placement; will consumers then think that’s
also true of InSinkErators? Making matters worse, if the motors on the parties’
products work differently, then they aren’t actually fully comparable just on
horsepower, are they? What exactly is a consumer supposed to make of all this?

I’m left wondering: why not at least explain why the court didn’t
require Joneca to label its product with what the court had just held was the
only truthful measure of HP with respect to motors in this context—output?

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2025/01/gigo-literal-falsity-and-remedy-mismatch.html

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annoyingly redacted opinion finds Block falsely advertised versus TurboTax

Intuit Inc. v. HRB Tax Gp., Inc., 2024 WL 5320392, No.
5:24-cv-00253-BLF (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2024)

Intuit, which makes TurboTax and
has had some advertising
troubles of its own
(hey, check out the IRS Free
File program
, for taxpayers with AGI of $84,000 or less and with many fillable
forms for those with more), sued HRB (Block) for its advertising of a competing
tax product, and succeeded in part.

TurboTax has three tiers: TT Do-it-yourself (DIY), Live
Assisted, and Live Full Service. Live Assisted, the focus of this case, allows
customers to prepare their tax returns largely independently, but it also
provides “unlimited access to tax experts to help them with any questions that
they may have,” among other features. (Live Full Service, by contrast, involves
actually turning over all the taxpayer’s documents to a tax professional to
prepare the return.)

Within TT Live Assisted, there are multiple individual
products that a customer may select based “upon the level of tax complexity” of
their situation. TT Live Assisted Basic might apply to a consumer with just a
W-2 and no additional schedules. TT Live Assisted Deluxe is for a “slightly
more complex” tax situation, e.g. “additional deductions and credits” or
“mortgage interest.” Live Assisted Premium, “essentially includes all tax forms
[and] schedules.” But all have tax expert assistance including “expert final
review,” following a prompt asking whether the consumer wants to connect with
an expert about their tax return.

Block has two tiers: Do-It-Yourself (DIY) and “File with a
Tax Pro.” Within DIY, there are a further four tiers, including Free Online,
Deluxe, Premium, and Self-Employed. DIY Free Online is geared toward simple tax
returns and is free. DIY Deluxe is for consumers with more complex tax
situations, such as those seeking to “maximiz[e] deduction and credits,” so it
includes more tax forms. DIY Premium allows reporting of investment or rental
income. DIY Self-Employed is for self-employed taxpayers who need to file a
Schedule C.

DIY Deluxe had live expert help, artificial intelligence
assistance, an automated accuracy review or error check, year-round support,
and various guarantees, among other features. Separately, Block offers “Tax Pro
Review” as an add-on, which allows “a DIY consumer, after they have filled out
their taxes, the ability to send their tax return to a tax expert” along with
their source documents, so that the tax expert can review, sign, and file the
return.

Intuit challenged five of Block’s ad claims: (1) claims that
Block’s products with expert and AI assistance features start at a lower price
than Intuit’s products with similar features; (2) claims that Block’s paid DIY
products are comparable to TurboTax Live Assisted; (3) claims that Block’s products
with AI and expert assistance cost “[a]t least $54 less than TurboTax Live”; (4)
claims that Intuit’s Live Full Service product “starts at” $169; and (5) claims
suggesting that “5 million ‘TurboTired’ TurboTax consumers ‘switched’ to Block
in 2023.”

For example, Block advertised: “Fed up with hidden fees?
Make the switch to H&R Block with upfront transparent pricing.” TT
challenged the middle tile’s claim that Block offered “expert help” “[s]tarting
at $35” when Intuit’s “starting at” price for the same “expert help” was $0.

comparative ad

Also, relevant to claim (2), the ad compared a TurboTax Live
Assisted product—Live Assisted Deluxe—with Block’s paid DIY products that don’t
include a final expert review, which Intuit alleged was a material difference. TT
Live and Live Assisted included guarantees that Block didn’t for its paid DIY
products. Finally, Intuit, argued that Block’s products used chatbots to make
it “incredibly difficult, if not impossible, to actually engage with an
expert,” whereas TT didn’t.

For claim (4), Intuit dropped the price of Live Full Service
to many customers at a starting price of $89, although in prior years the
starting price had been $169; until it was contacted by Intuit regarding the
inaccuracy, Block ran ads stating that the starting price for Intuit’s Live
Full Service product was $169.

For (5), Intuit pointed to an email: “It’s Better with Block”
that also included “TurboTired? Switch and save with Block” and concluded:
“Join the 5 million+ who switched to Block last year.”

TurboTired/join the 5+million who switched ad

Intuit offered Professor Joel Steckel of the New York
University Stern School of Business as an expert who conducted several surveys.
He testified that respondents looking at Block’s home page—which displayed an
advertisement similar to the challenged ads—believed that “there were at least
as many features in the Block website and that the Block product costs less.” Based
on another study, in combination with a review of academic literature, Dr.
Steckel concluded that “Block’s conduct, which resulted in the perception of an
equal or superior product at a lower price, could cause negative feelings
regarding the pricing of TurboTax products and harm the TurboTax brand.” And a
third study looking at the TurboTired ad led him to conclude that claims that
“5 million+” people switched to using Block products “likely did influence …
consumers to switch to Block” because those consumers “would have understood
that … the 5 million-plus who switched to Block had all switched there from
TurboTax.”

Block’s own expert, Hal Poret, critiqued these surveys and
the related testimony, including use of controls.

Claims about expert/AI help: Intuit argued that Block
“falsely claim[s] that its paid DIY products offering ‘expert’ and ‘AI’
assistance ‘starting at’ $35 were cheaper than Intuit’s product with expert and
AI help.” These challenged ads were “literally false,” according to Intuit,
because TurboTax Live Assisted Basic—which is free for certain
customers—includes expert and AI assistance. Block responded that the point of
the ad was not to compare the starting price for expert/AI assistance in any
circumstance, but rather to compare Block’s DIY Deluxe product with Intuit’s
TurboTax Live Assisted Deluxe product, and that the prices listed were
literally true insofar as those were the products being compared.

The court found that Intuit’s reading of the ad was correct
and that the ad was literally false by necessary implication. Block’s own witness
testified that the bullet points listed on the relevant advertising tile
pertained to various Block products, not just Block’s DIY Deluxe product: the
tile mentions “[o]ptions for deductions, investors, and self-employed,” a
statement that alludes to Block’s DIY Premium and DIY Self-Employed products.

Thus, it wasn’t credible that the ad was supposed to compare
TurboTax Live Assisted Deluxe with Block DIY Deluxe based on “the tax
situations that th[ose] product[s] cover” and “the tax forms that are
available” in those products. The advertising tile clearly emphasized the
availability of expert assistance—other than the $35 price, the most prominent
text on the tile states “File your taxes with expert help.” And it said nothing
about the specific tax forms available through Block’s DIY Deluxe product;
instead, it alluded to multiple different Block products. “Block could easily
have emphasized certain specific tax forms if indeed that was the basis for the
price comparison, but it did not do so. Instead, it told customers about the
starting price for Block’s products that include expert help. A viewer of this
ad would readily recognize the ‘necessary implication’ that the TurboTax
product it listed as a comparison was the lowest-priced TurboTax product with
expert assistance.” The court therefore presumed actual deception as well.

The court also found likely success on materiality. (Here’s
where harm causation gets tricky—since Intuit doesn’t directly benefit from
anyone who uses the free product with expert assistance, and people who pay for
TT because they mistakenly thought they’d get to use the free product are more
accurately characterized as victims of false advertising rather than as beneficiaries,
the “value” that Intuit gets here is actually at most “brand value” rather than
the value of a truthful claim. We’re in a world where that’s enough, I guess.)

Steckel’s study of the ad at issue concluded that
“respondents thought that there were at least as many features in the Block
website and that the Block product costs less.” He also found that “price [was]
extremely important,” and he also found that approximately one-third of survey
respondents identified availability of tax expert assistance as important. He
also summarized academic literature showing that “price comparisons …
increase[ ] the purchase likelihood of the brand making the comparison and
reduce[ ] consumers’ intent to search for more information.” “In combination,
Dr. Steckel’s findings support his conclusion that claims that tax expert
assistance is available starting at a lower price through Block’s products are
likely to affect consumer purchasing decisions, since a significant number of
consumers are interested in expert assistance and a significant number of
consumers also care strongly about the price of the product they select.”

Block’s critiques were insufficient; Poret primarily
challenged the lack of a proper control group, which went primarily went to
misleadingness/deception. And even without a proper control, the court wasn’t “persuaded
that it should ignore Dr. Steckel’s finding that 25 percent of respondents who
viewed the original advertisement thought it showed that Block’s products
included comparable or more features than the comparator product.”

The court also found likely injury to Intuit, applying a
presumption of injury when there’s direct competition and a tendency to mislead,
as well as testimony of Intuit’s Director of Marketing Strategy of her
belief  that the ads “absolutely were
harmful” to Intuit, in the form of both reputational harm and economic harm and
Steckel’s testimony that “Block’s conduct, which resulted in the perception of
an equal or superior product at a lower price, could cause negative feelings
regarding the pricing of TurboTax products and harm the TurboTax brand” and
conclusions from the academic literature that “price comparisons … increase[
] the purchase likelihood of the brand making the comparison and reduce[ ]
consumers’ intent to search for more information.”

To the extent Block was enjoined from claiming that expert
and AI assistance “starts at” a lower price with Block than with Intuit, Block would
likewise be barred from claiming that expert and AI assistance costs at least
$54 less with Block than with Intuit, given that Intuit provides expert and AI
assistance for free through TurboTax Live Assisted Basic, so such assistance is
actually available for less with Intuit than with Block.

What about the claims comparing Block’s paid DIY products
with TT Live Assisted? Intuit identified several putative material differences:
(1) although both companies’ products offer “as-you-go” expert assistance, only
TurboTax Live Assisted has the additional “expert final review” feature without
additional cost; (2) this also allows a free upgrade for an expert to prepare,
sign, and file the review; (3) TurboTax Live Assisted includes a guarantee that
consumers will be reimbursed for any penalties assessed due to errors made by
the tax expert who assisted the Live Assisted consumer; (4) TT’s access to live
experts is easier.

Block argued that comparing the two was not misleading and
that these putative differences were marketing gimmicks that weren’t significantly
different; the vast majority of TT Live Assisted consumers, it said, didn’t get
an expert final review, since they must take proactive steps to prompt the
review process.

Lanham Act case law accepts an apples-to-oranges theory of
falsity for comparative advertising when an ad “omits differences which would
have been material to recipients.” The court found that Intuit’s feature was
genuinely different from Block’s on expert final review, citing some redacted
evidence. Its tools “enable Intuit’s experts to proactively identify any
overarching concerns about consumers’ prepared returns.” Although both
companies’ products permit unlimited question-and-answer with live experts, at
the end of the process, an Intuit customer can request a final review in which
the expert conducting the review proactively looks for issues and uses unique
tools to help target any such issues. Block doesn’t have that “proactive”
feature for its paid DIY products.

In addition, TT Live Assisted permits a tax expert to
“complete, sign, and file” a consumer’s return on their behalf, while a Block
consumer looking for a similar sign-and-file service must “pay the add-on fee
for Tax Pro Review.” Although this free upgrade occurs in only a “tiny fraction”
of cases (again, redacted), the court found that this was also a genuine
difference.  However, the argued ease of
access to expert assistance was not shown to be a genuine difference. Both
products included “as-you-go” assistance from experts that can be reached using
a “help button” from virtually any page of the tax preparation software
experience. Both had live help via web chat, phone call, or screen share. Although
Block’s web chat uses an “AI Assistant” to ask an initial set of questions
before connecting a consumer to a live expert, the court was persuaded Block’s
evidence and arguments showing that the exchange with the AI assistant was
quite brief. And although some Block experts are located in India, they receive
the same training and interact with consumers the same way regardless of their
location.

Finally, Intuit’s argument that the parties’ guarantees were
meaningfully different was mistaken.  

So, were expert final review and/or free sign-and-file used
in a “tiny fraction” of cases material? The court indicated that materiality
could be assessed in two ways: whether the omitted information was “ ‘likely to
influence the purchasing decision’ of consumers,” generally demonstrated
through use of consumer surveys, or whether “the defendants misrepresented an
inherent quality or characteristic of the product.” While the “inherent
qualit[ies] or characteristic[s]” of a product may sometimes be
self-explanatory, any doubts as to what counts as “the very nature” of the
product “must be addressed by evidence of why a consumer sought out a given
product—i.e., the primary purpose(s) that drove their consumption activity.”

Expert final review was neither an “inherent quality or
characteristic” of Live Assisted nor a “key product feature” going to “the very
nature” of an online tax preparation product, unlike the way that “the amount
of beef in a burger is an inherent quality or characteristic of a burger.” Evidence
that a redacted percentage of Live Assisted consumers take advantage of the
expert final review feature didn’t help. [Hmph.] “The Court is skeptical that a
feature that must be affirmatively invoked—and if not invoked, is not
experienced by the consumer—counts as part of ‘the very nature’ of a product.”
There was no other evidence that the prospect of such review drove consumption.
Evidence that consumers who used expert final review really liked it did not
mean it was material to a purchase decision. Nor did Steckel study expert final
review specifically. “[I]t is possible that consumers do not see a difference
in value between the type of expert final review offered by Intuit and the
as-you-go expert assistance offered by a live expert through either party’s
products.” For the extraordinary remedy of a preliminary injunction, this was
insufficient.

Similar problems hampered Intuit’s showing on the materiality
of the free sign and file service, especially since Intuit doesn’t widely
advertise this service, which requires “dig[ging] deep enough” online to even
know that such an upgrade is available and “the fraction of individuals who are
upgraded in this way is vanishingly slim.”

Claims that over five million consumers switched to Block,
when only redacted [ugh!] did: Intuit argued that 5 million was the total
number of new Block customers. Block added a disclaimer to that effect on its
website after Intuit filed suit, but Intuit argued that it was insufficient.
Block also argued that it discontinued any combination of this claim with the “TurboTax
switcher” message so the claim was moot. The court disagreed, because voluntary
cessation doesn’t moot a claim unless there’s no reasonable expectation that
the wrong will be repeated. Here, Block only added a disclosure after the TRO
hearing and that was just an asterisk linked to small text at the bottom of the
page, not directly below the claim.

The court found likely success on falsity. The ad at issue
necessarily implied that over 5 million people switched from Intuit to Block. The
phrases “TurboTired? Switch and save with Block,” “Switch from TurboTax® now,”
and “Join the 5 million+ who switched to Block last year” all appeared in the
same content box within the email. Plus, even if it weren’t false by necessary implication,
Steckel’s survey showed likely deception in more than 50% of respondents; even
with the disclaimer language in the body of the email, Steckel found that 47
percent of respondents still came to the same conclusion.

Poret critiqued the survey by arguing that TurboTax and
H&R Block are the “dominant names” in the field of online tax preparation,
so people would just guess they’d switched from TT. But “Block has offered no
case law supporting Mr. Poret’s conclusion that a net deception measurement of ‘10
to 20 percent or higher’ is necessary to show ‘enough evidence that an ad is
misleading.’” Then there are redactions that make the discussion hard to
comprehend, but seem to have something to do with Block’s intent. “In other
words, Block itself has created relevant ‘noise’ that may lead respondents to
believe the ‘5 million+’ switched language refers to people switching from
TurboTax specifically, regardless of whether the specific iteration of the
advertisement the respondents review says anything about TurboTax.”

Anyway, the court found that the ad was false, without need
of a “net deception baseline (or a specific quantitative value thereof),” as
informed by the court’s own “experience and understanding of human nature.” While
the materiality burden was high, for a preliminary injunction, “Intuit has a
slightly more forgiving burden for proving actual or likely deception.” Steckel’s
testimony met this burden. “That a large portion of respondents were also
confused by Dr. Steckel’s control version of the email does not change the fact
that many viewers of Block’s advertising claim came away from it with the wrong
conclusion.” [It just means the control also was deceptive!]

Materiality/injury: Block’s own redacted internal materials
supported materiality. [What were they????] “Block clearly believes that
advertising about switching to Block has in past years successfully encouraged
consumers to make such a switch.”

Claims that TT Live Full Service started at $169: Intuit
argued that Full Service was available at $89 to a redacted [!!] percentage of
customers as “test pricing.” Block argued that its pricing team checked TT’s
website and saw the $169 price and had no reason to believe that Intuit would
change its prices in January. Block contended that it couldn’t be held liable “if
Intuit is posting two different prices online” without disclosing that prices
may differ in certain test markets.

Although false advertising is nominally strict liability,
and although the strength of this argument as a matter of consumer protection
is very hard to evaluate given the redaction (if the test pricing was available
to 2% I’d feel very differently than if it was available to 75% of customers),
the court was attracted to the mootness argument here to avoid the issue. Block’s
witness testified that a Block manager checked Intuit’s website every day to
validate the $169 comparison price. When Block was contacted by Intuit’s team
about the $89 price, Block “put a process in place to update that content and
correct the mistake on [Block’s] site,” and Block represented that it does not
plan to run ads using an inaccurate starting price for TurboTax Live Full
Service in the future. There were no circumstances “raising the specter of
gamesmanship” here; this was just a mistake that had been addressed, and the
court denied the request for an injunction as moot.  

For the claims that survived the other factors, there was a
presumption of irreparable harm, which Block didn’t rebut, and “[e]vidence of
threatened loss of prospective customers or goodwill certainly supports a
finding of the possibility of irreparable harm.” Plus there was Steckel’s
testimony that “Block’s conduct, which resulted in the perception of an equal
or superior product at a lower price, could cause negative feelings regarding
the pricing of TurboTax products and harm the TurboTax brand” and could
“influence … consumers to switch to Block.” Thus, Intuit was entitled to an
injunction against Block ads (1) suggesting that the “starting” price for
expert and artificial intelligence assistance is lower with Block’s products
than with Intuit’s products, and (2) placing language about “5 million+” people
having switched to Block in proximity to language about switching from TurboTax
or other language inviting the inference that all 5 million+ people switched to
Block’s products from Intuit’s products.

 

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2025/01/annoyingly-redacted-opinion-finds-block.html

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materiality survey is in–even with 20 industry employees as respondents

Multiple Energy Technologies, LLC v. Under Armour, INC., 2025
WL 82336, No. 2:20-CV-664-NR (W.D. Pa. Jan. 13, 2025)

MET sued Under Armour for multiple things, including false
advertising, and here MET sought to exclude the testimony of Under Armour’s
consumer survey expert Hal Poret, but the court allowed it to rebut MET’s
survey expert Thomas J. Maronick and “to design and conduct a survey to test
whether the relevant FDA claims influence consumer decisions to purchase Under
Armour’s products that contain Celliant.” Poret would testify that his “survey
utilized a classic experimental design consisting of a Test Group and a Control
Group, each consisting of 300 unique respondents.” Participants assigned to
both groups viewed three Under Armour web pages. The first two pages were
identical between the groups. On the third page, however, the test group saw
“Products powered by Celliant have been determined by the FDA to increase
localized circulation, leading to faster recovery[,]” while the control saw
“Products powered by Celliant can lead to faster recovery.”

test image: determined by the FDA to increase localized circulation, leading to faster recovery

control image: can lead to faster recovery

Respondents were then asked: “Based on the webpage you just reviewed, how likely or unlikely would you be to purchase apparel from the advertised product line?” They were offered eight options from “extremely likely” to “extremely unlikely[,]” and ending with “don’t know[,]” (order flipped for half). Then they were asked an open-ended question: “Please tell us all the reasons why you would be __________ to purchase the product we showed you?” Poret concluded that the FDA claim had no statistically significant influence on consumer purchase decisions.

The court found that the report and testimony were relevant and “fit” the case. It didn’t matter that he didn’t test for deception, since his opinion went to materiality, which was also at issue. He used Under Armour ads, changing only the allegedly false FDA claim, making it connected to the question at issue, and so his testimony would help the jury. “Any lingering issues with Mr. Poret’s survey design—like the fact that what influenced survey participants could have been a reference to ‘recovery[,]’—are not grounds for exclusion but fodder for cross-examination.” Alleged flaws in the survey design went to weight rather than admissibility.

MET argued that the control language, “Products powered by Celliant can lead to faster recovery[,]” was improper because it “removed the majority of the language contained in the FDA Claim”—including any reference to the FDA—“and substituted in a word not included in the original FDA Claim.” But it was the statement “that the FDA found the Celliant product benefitted the wearer” that was at issue here, so it wasn’t improper to remove the reference to the FDA. And the deletion of “to increase localized circulation” was defensible, as that language—stating what the FDA determined—was tied to the FDA claim in the test stimulus. Using “can lead to faster recovery” rather than “leading to faster recovery” wasn’t a material wording change; it went to weight rather than admissibility, as did Poret’s decision not to use funneling questions to confirm that participants reviewed the FDA claim language. “In fact, the open-ended question revealed that at least three respondents viewed the FDA claim and found that it impacted their likelihood of purchase.”

The court was also untroubled by his failure to exclude 20 survey respondents who were employees of companies making athletic apparel (including 5 of Under Armour), which does seem a bit dodgy, but that went only to weight. “MET and its expert can certainly explain MET’s issues with Mr. Poret’s analysis and why its survey expert’s opinion is better.”

from Blogger http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2025/01/materiality-survey-is-in-even-with-20.html

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