It’s all Greek to me: chlorine claims over yogurt enjoined

Chobani, LLC v. Dannon Co., No. 16-CV-30 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 29,
2016)

Chobani sued for a declaratory judgment that it wasn’t falsely advertising
about Dannon; Dannon immediately filed its answer and counterclaims, and the
court a bit over two weeks later granted a preliminary injunction against
Chobani.
 
Dannon Light & Fit is the leading brand of light yogurt
in the US, and Dannon’s top seller. 
Dannon added Light & Fit Greek as an eighty-calorie Greek nonfat
yogurt.  Dannon alleged that its highest
proportion of light yogurt sales routinely occurs during the first three months
of the year, “as this is the time when most American consumers resolve to make
positive changes relating to weight loss, fitness, and overall health and diet.”  It’s also the time of year when consumers
experiment with new yogurt products, making marketing and sales efforts during
each year’s first quarter crucial.
 
Chobani, meanwhile, actively seeks to differentiate itself
from its competitors in the Greek yogurt market by emphasizing its commitment
to “natural, non-GMO ingredients” and “environmental sustainability practices.”  Its latest offering, Chobani Simply 100 Greek
Yogurt, has “100 calories per serving with no preservatives or artificial
sweeteners.”  Its January 2016 campaign
included a TV ad, a print ad, and digital/social media content, all on the same
theme.
 
The video ad’s opening shot focuses on a cup of Dannon Light
& Fit Greek Yogurt sitting on a table, which is immediately picked up by a
young woman lounging in a pool chair. As she scrutinizes the ingredients label,
a voiceover proclaims:  “Dannon Light
& Fit Greek actually uses artificial sweeteners like sucralose.  Sucralose? Why? That stuff has chlorine added
to it!”  The woman scrunches her face in
disgust and tosses away the cup of Dannon yogurt.  She then chooses Chobani Simply 100 Greek
Yogurt, which is sitting on a table to her right, as a swimming pool becomes
visible in the background.   Voiceover: “Now, there’s Chobani Simply 100.
It’s the only 100 calorie light yogurt sweetened naturally.” “As she tears open
the packaging, the Commercial pans to a wide shot of the swimming pool, where a
child jumps in, making a big splash.  The
camera returns to the woman, now smiling contentedly, before finishing with a
wide shot.”  The final shot includes a
hashtag: #NOBADSTUFF.
 
The print ad’s headline is “Did You Know Not All Yogurts Are
Equally Good For You?”  It continues, “[y]ou
think you are doing something good for yourself and your family [b]y buying
yogurt and instead of bad stuff [a]nd then you find that the bad stuff* [i]s in
your yogurt!” The asterisk refers to a mouseprint footnote explaining that “bad
stuff” means “Artificial Ingredients.” The text above and below the Dannon
product displayed is the same as that in the ad. Further:  “If you want to do healthy things, know what’s
in your cup. Chobani Simply 100 is the only 100-[c]alorie Greek Yogurt without
a trace of any artificial sweeteners or artificial preservatives.”
 

Print ad
The digital content is similar.  The website asks “Do You Know What’s In Your Cup?
. . . . Scroll over to compare our ingredients with those in other light
yogurts to see what’s really inside[.]” 
Ingredients of Dannon’s product are identified as “artificial,” and the
site has a link to the print ad.
 

Digital content
Sucralose, which Dannon uses, has been approved by the FDA
since 1999, and Dannon provided evidence that the FDA reviewed more than 110
safety studies in connection with its use as a general purpose sweetener for
food.  Sucralose is a molecule with
twelve carbon, nineteen hydrogen, eight oxygen, and three chlorine atoms linked
together in a stable form that is safe to consume.  It’s made through a process in which three
atoms of chlorine are substituted for three hydrogen-oxygen groups on a sucrose
molecule.  This trio of chlorine atoms is
known as a chloride, that is, a compound of chlorine that is bound to another
element or group. Chlorides are found in many natural food sources, from table
salt to cow’s milk.
 
Pool chlorine, by
contrast, is a lay term for calcium hypochlorite, “a powerful bleach and
disinfectant that is harmful if added to food or ingested.” It’s distinct chemically
and practically from the chlorine atoms found in sucralose, and it’s not in, or
used to manufacture, any of Dannon’s products.
 
First, the court ruled that Dannon sought a prohibitory
injunction to return the parties to the status quo ante, rather than a
mandatory injunction requiring affirmative acts by Chobani.  Thus, the standard was no higher than that
applied as a result of Winter/eBay.
 
Likely success on the merits: Chobani argued that it was
literally true that sucralose had chlorine added to it, and that the other
challenged messages about “good” or “bad stuff” were mere puffery.  Nope. 
Although “no bad stuff” might be puffery if it weren’t tethered to a
comparative claim about Dannon, here Chobani used that phrase in connection with
statements and images that portrayed Dannon’s yogurt as a safety risk because
it contains sucralose.  Some of the
digital content didn’t give the full comparison, but it did include a link to
the full print ad.
 
Even if Chobani’s statements about “chlorine” were literally
true, there could still be literal falsity if the clear meaning, in context,
was false.  (The court wasn’t so sure
about literal truth.  The statement that
chlorine was “added to” sucralose was inaccurate, if sucralose is created by
adding chlorine to a precursor compound; sucralose doesn’t exist until the
chlorine is combined with the precursor, and adding additional chlorine to a
stable sucralose compound would likely have no effect.  Chobani’s own expert claimed that it was scientifically
accurate to say “chlorine has been added to form sucralose.”  A factfinder is likely to conclude that the
campaign unambiguously conveys the literally false message that Dannon’s
product contains sucralose and is therefore unsafe to consume. Chobani argued
that sucralose’s safety was the subject of legitimate scientific debate, but
the record didn’t support that claim: “the balance of record evidence reflects
that sucralose is an unusually well-studied compound repeatedly determined to
be safe for ordinary consumption.”  While
some research suggested that high doses could be toxic, that’s also true of
salt and water.  Further, it was “telling”
that Chobani’s own products contained the same type of “chlorine”—the chloride
found in all-natural, non-GMO milk, but Chobani made no mention of that fact.
 
Dannon was entitled to a presumption of irreparable harm given
the literally false direct comparative advertising at issue.  Even if such presumptions are illegitimate
because “categorical” in a way precluded by eBay,
Dannon still showed irreparable harm. 
Given the difficulty of showing how many sales or how much goodwill
would be lost, it was enough to show (1) competition in the relevant market and
(2) a logical causal connection between the alleged false advertising and the
claimaint’s own sales position.  That’s a
no-brainer here.
 
The balance of hardships also favored relief, since Chobani
has no protectable interest in advertising falsely.  And barring false advertising is in the
public interest, especially when it comes to serious issues like food safety.
 
The parties agreed on a $1 million bond, which the court
accepted. The injunction blocked the existing ads, as well as similar claims
related to chlorine content, healthfulness because of the presence or absence
of chlorine, the presence of pool chlorine in Dannon yogurt, the danger of
sucralose, the lack of safety of Dannon products, or “bad stuff” in connection
with Dannon products.

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USPTO white paper on remix, first sale, and statutory damages

Here.  No love for an exception for noncommercial user-generated content (Canada’s YouTube exception), but at least some support for the viability and importance of fair use, including discussion of the OTW’s contributions.  What is a bit aggravating is the apparent belief that, because the noncommercial/commercial barrier is permeable, it is therefore of little significance to policy–after all, some noncommercial users might grow up to be professional artists in the field in which they first made noncommercial remix, meaning … what, exactly?  That art students copying Picassos in the art museum should be licensed and paid-for, because it encourages the development of capabilities that are later employed in for-profit endeavors?  That the person who writes Star Wars fan fiction and later writes NYT-best selling novels about dragons should kick back some money to Disney?  Look, even my alma mater recognizes that it’s only entitled to ask for some of my earnings now, despite its contributions to my capacities (such as they are).  That is, the observation “the noncommercial/commercial barrier is permeable,” mostly with respect to creators but occasionally with respect to specific works, doesn’t entail any inability to identify when a particular activity is commercial or noncommercial, or any reason to disregard that status.  And there’s a lot of reason to treat activities that are noncommercial differently because of the different ways that people behave, reason, and learn in noncommercial spaces, even if some of them later take the skills they developed and make commercial art. 

(The White Paper does formally disavow any value judgment as between amateurs/professionals, but its implicit assumption that the natural arc of the amateur is to aspire to professionalism is understandable only in a context that expects or demands monetization to identify value.  I imagine all the drafters have some hobby or other that they engage in–singing in a choir, knitting for friends, telling stories to children–that they never plan to monetize.  Is their development stunted?  Or are they making choices about pleasure and nonmonetizable value that law should do its best not to squelch?  I know where my money, so to speak, is.)

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Lexmark gives some non-TM owners standing to sue for infringement

Innovation Ventures, LLC v. NVE, Inc., 2016 WL 266396, No.
08-11867 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 21, 2016)
 
This long-lived dispute goes another round of various
motions in limine.  Innovation sued NVE
for trademark infringement; NVE counterclaimed for false advertising.  Here, the court applies Lexmark to resolve disputed questions around trademark ownership, and
decides that the jury will hear all the evidence and render an advisory verdict
about the equitable issues, because the false advertising counterclaim and
unclean hands defense to trademark infringement are so intertwined.
 
NVE sought to present its unclean hands defense to the jury;
Innovation sought to prevent NVE from presenting evidence about unclean hands
to the jury and to bifurcate the trial. 
The unclean hands evidence was: (1) Innovation’s allegedly improper
registration of domain names using NVE’s 6 Hour POWER name, including
http://www.sixhourpower.com and http://www.6hourpower.com; (2) Innovation’s alleged efforts
to keep NVE’s products off the retail shelves; (3) Innovation’s alleged opposition
to NVE’s application to register “6 Hour POWER” with the PTO; and (4) Innovation’s
publication and distribution of a “Legal Notice” which NVE claims mislead
retailers into removing NVE’s products from the shelves because it over-broadly
identified the products against which Innovation had obtained an injunction. (Similarly named products from a different producer.)
 
Innovation wanted to try its trademark infringement claim to
the jury first, without allowing the jury to hear any evidence about false
advertising or unclean hands.  Innovation
argued that the false advertising claim would be moot if Innovation won because
NVE would have had no legal right to sell an infringing 6 Hour POWER product in
the first place. And if Innovation lost, any 
unclean hands evidence would be irrelevant, though a second trial could
be held on false advertising.  NVE
pointed out that this would let Innovation put its best case forward, and not
allow NVE to provide a full defense. 
 
The court decided that all the legal and equitable issues
would be presented to the same jury, and the jury would be instructed to return
advisory verdicts on the factual questions related to the equitable claims,
with the final decision on the equitable issues being reserved to the Court.  While Innovation argued that unclean hands
evidence would be unduly prejudicial, many factual questions were common to the
legal and equitable claims, requiring their presentation to the jury.  The unclean hands evidence largely overlapped
with the false advertising counterclaim. 
Moreover, the jury would be aided by a “full presentation of the real
circumstances that surrounded how these parties acted in competition with one
another.” Evidence of Innovation’s alleged efforts to get retailers to remove NVE’s
products from store shelves “could indicate a concerted effort on behalf of
Plaintiff to drive Defendant out of the market.”
 
Innovation’s concerns about prejudice were not dispositive
because some of the evidence—that relevant to false advertising—“is rightfully
before the jury and prejudice arising therefrom cannot be considered unfair
prejudice.” Any additional risk of prejudice from the less serious unclean
hands evidence could be avoided by carefully instructing the jury, and didn’t
outweigh NVE’s right to a jury trial and the needs of judicial efficiency.
 
Innovation did win confirmation of its standing.  Previously, NVE argued that Innovation didn’t
own the underlying trademark when it sued. 
NVE argued that it learned during discovery that a separate company may
have owned the 5 Hour ENERGY trademark when the case was filed, and the court
agreed that it appeared that, at some point in time, this separate entity was
in fact the owner, and Innovation had only a nonexclusive license.
 
However, Innovation sued under §43(a), and argued that it
didn’t need to own a mark to pursue its claims as long as it showed it was
likely to be harmed by infringement.  (It
also argued that, by subsequent agreement with the third party, it became the
owner nunc pro tunc of the trademark, but the court didn’t reach that argument.)  The court agreed that Innovation adequately
alleged sufficient commercial interest in the mark to have standing under Lexmark. 
(Sorry, Justice Scalia. Until you give us another simple name for it,
it’s standing.)
 
Under § 43(a), “any person who believes that he or she is or
is likely to be damaged” may bring a claim for infringement resulting from
false association or false advertising, “without regard to any ownership
interest the plaintiff may have in the trademark.”  This means that manufacturers, competitors,
distributors, and others may have standing if they satisfy Lexmark, which the court characterized as setting the standard for
“whether a non-owner plaintiff has standing to raise a claim under § 43(a).” 
 
Innovation fell within the zone of interests protected by
the Lanham Act—its interests were those of a person engaged in commerce, with
commercial interests in reputation or sales at stake, and not those of a mere
deceived consumer.  NVE couldn’t defend
by arguing that a third party had superior rights; such a jus tertii defense is
disfavored in trademark law.  Moreover,
Innovation alleged proximate cause: that the introduction of NVE’s allegedly
infringing product resulted in lost sales and association with a competing
product.

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Court rejects Zippo jurisdiction test but allows suit over alleged copying

Kindig It Design, Inc. v. Creative Controls, Inc., — F. Supp.
3d —-, 2016 WL 247574,  No.
2:14-cv-00867 (D. Utah Jan. 20, 2016)
 
Mostly a personal jurisdiction ruling in this
copyright/patent infringement/false advertising case brought by Kindig, which
customizes hot rods.  Creative Controls,
which customizes vehicles for accessibility purposes, is a Michigan corporation
with no place of business, property, employees, etc. in Utah.  Creative Controls did have a website allowing
Utah residents to order; it donated a custom parking brake for use on a car
Kindig was customizing in Utah; it sold a single door handle to a Utah
customer; and it allegedly copied photographs and contents from Kindig’s Utah-based
website.  (In return for the donated
brake, Kindig sent Creative Controls a disk with photos of the finished car,
and a letter indicating that it could use the photos for promotional purposes;
these are among the allegedly copied photos at issue.)   The door handle was ordered by a Kindig
employee’s relative, and the parties agreed that personal jurisdiction could
not be based on this plaintiff-generated contact.
 
The court found that it didn’t have personal jurisdiction
over Kindig’s patent claims, but did have personal jurisdiction over copyright
and related claims.  The court further
held that the patent claims weren’t so related as to justify the exercise of
pendent personal jurisdiction.  Among
other things, the court rejected the Zippo
website jurisdiction test as incompatible with modern internet practices,
holding that traditional tests were readily applicable to internet-based
conduct.  As the court pointed out, many now-ubiquitous
interactive features didn’t exist in 1997 when Zippo was decided, and also the
presence of intermediaries such as Facebook makes it hard to figure out how to
judge the “interactivity” of something like a Facebook page related to the
defendant’s own activity.  Moreover, the
traditional purposeful availment test doesn’t require that the purposeful
availment be for commercial purposes; without that limit, pretty much everybody
looks like they’re personally availing themselves of pretty much any
jurisdiction under Zippo.
 
The allegedly infringing copying of Kindig’s photos from its
Utah website, however, gave rise to personal jurisdiction over Creative
Controls on all claims related to the alleged copying.  Kindig sufficiently identified the works at
issue by including copyright registration information and date of first
publication.  By alleging that Creative
Controls’ website “contains photographs of customized automobiles which [sic]
are nearly identical to [the copyrighted] photographs of customized automobiles
found on the Kindig website,” the complaint provided sufficient notice of the
allegedly infringing works, even if it didn’t otherwise identified them.
 
Likewise, Kindig sufficiently pled false
advertising/deceptive trade practices. 
Creative Controls argued that the claims should be dismissed because the
photos weren’t materially misleading: it was implausible that any differences
in door handles displayed in photos of cars and actual Creative Controls door
handles would be material to consumers, given the small size of the
photos.  But the court found that it was
plausible that consumers would be influenced by the photos.  “Indeed, the reasonable inference is that
Creative Controls included the photographs of the unique customized cars with
the very intent of influencing potential customers.”
 
Nor would the court dismiss unjust enrichment or conversion
claims as preempted at this stage.  And
here the court just errs: it said that, because some of the photo copyrights
might be invalid, unjust enrichment and conversion claims might not be
preempted if based on invalid copyrights. 
But that’s backwards under §301, which was specifically designed to
prevent claims replicating the subject matter of copyright, whether or not the
work (or idea/fact) at issue was copyrightable. 
It should be immediately evident that §301 applies to an unjust
enrichment/conversion claim based on copying a work in the public domain due to
expiration of federal copyright protection; so too here.  (And that’s setting aside the issue that,
even if a registration is invalid for some reason, the copyright still exists if the work is copyrightable.  Only the details of federal
jurisdiction/availability of certain remedies turn on the validity of the
registration.)
 
The court did hold that Kindig failed to state a claim for
fraud.  There were no facts indicating
Creative Controls defrauded Kindig; a
fraud on the public at large didn’t allow Kindig to sue, and Kindig didn’t
allege it acted in reliance on Creative Controls’ misrepresentations.

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Showing irreparable harm isn’t easy

Pruvit Ventures, Inc. v. ForeverGreen International LLC, —
F.Supp.3d —-, 2015 WL 9876952 No. 15-CV-571 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 23, 2015)
(magistrate judge)
 
Defendants moved for a preliminary injunction on their
counterclaims involving dietary suppplements. 
Defendant Axcess is the exclusive licensee of patented technology
relating to
appetite suppression and weight loss.  Defendants alleged that a prospective
sub-license to Pruvit never became effective, while Pruvit argued that it was
approved.  Pruvit went to market with a
supplement called KETO//OS1, allegedly using defendants’ patent and trade
secrets, while defendant ForeverGreen then launched a competing supplement,
KetonX.  Pruvit sued defendants for
breach of contract, disparagement, and related claims.  Defendants counterclaimed for, among other
things, trade secret misappropriation, patent infringement, and false
advertising.  Defendants sought a
preliminary injunction, and the court analyzed irreparable harm in detail,
assuming arguendo that they’d shown likely success on the merits.
 
Speculation isn’t enough to show irreparable harm.  The movant must show that monetary damages
are an insufficient remedy and that their alleged harms are not just possible,
but likely. The judge reviewed six theories of harm, none of which worked.
 
Price erosion: Pruvit’s product allegedly caused price
erosion in the relevant supplement market, and defendants might be forced to
drop the price of KetonX to compete. 
Further, customers would resist future price increases, so ForeverGreen
wouldn’t then be able to raise the price without destroying goodwill.  Price erosion isn’t irreparable harm; money
damages can compensate for it.  Plus, the
testimony was merely speculative, with no economics expert or other expert
testifying to it.
 
Reputational harm: although this can be irreparable harm, “the
showing of reputational harm must be concrete and corroborated, not merely
speculative.” Defendants argued that Pruvit’s supplement had negative side
effects, such as headaches, diarrhea, and nervous system issues, and that such
problems were likely to be attributed to KetonX or ketosis supplements
generally because the products are seen as alternatives.  But they failed to show that the established
negative side effects of Pruvit’s KETO//OS were causing customers to turn away
from KetonX and/or the ketosis supplement market, or that KetonX didn’t also
cause the side effects alleged.  The
court agreed that “[i]t is difficult to imagine under what extraordinary set of
circumstances the introduction of a product with a ‘lower reputation for
quality’ would, instead of highlighting the higher quality of its competitors,
reflect adversely upon the field as a whole.” Moreover, the Fifth Circuit previously
held that “[t]he lost goodwill of a business operated over a short period of
time is usually compensable in money damages,” and both products had only been
on the market for about six months.
 
Harm to shareholder value: There were other explanations for
a decline in share value, like ForeverGreen’s losses in 9 out of 12 fiscal
years, and mere speculation wasn’t enough, nor was alleged temporal proximity
between Pruvit’s launch and the decrease in value.
 
Lost market share/first-to-market advantages: Defendants
argued that, in the multilevel marketing model both parties used, being first
to market was extremely important, because a new product launch creates
significant interest in the industry and attracts distributors excited to take
the new product to market, maintaining a larger market share than would
otherwise exist. Moreover, Pruvit’s presence in the market also limited the
supply of raw materials necessary to manufacture KetonX, prevented defendants
from making important industry contacts/acquiring important distributors, and
deceived consumers through false labeling.
 
Lost market share/lost sales aren’t irreparable harm in
themselves.  Moreover, lost market share
must be substantiated, and here all defendants did was claim that they must
have lost market share, without quantifying it or establishing that it had
happened. “[N]either the difficulty of calculating losses in market share, nor
speculation that such losses might occur, amount to proof of special
circumstances justifying the extraordinary relief of an injunction prior to
trial.”
 
Lost opportunities to obtain raw materials: there was no
evidence that Pruvit’s supplier was the only supplier.  Nor did the evidence show that Pruvit was to
blame for lost distributors, or that Pruvit’s labeling had turned customers away
from the ketosis supplement market as a whole.
 
Lost profits: these are readily quantifiable and thus not
irreparable.
 
Lost right to exclude: Also not irreparable, especially
given that defendant Axcess, at least initially, voluntarily began a sublicense
agreement.
 
Defendants’ five-month delay in seeking relief also weighed
against a finding of irreparable harm; they even delayed two months after
Pruvit sued them to counterclaim, weighing heavily against a finding of
irreparable harm.

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NYT throws hissy-fit, sues over use of thumbnails in critical book

David Shields recently published War Is Beautiful: The New York Times Pictorial Guide to the Glamour of Armed Conflict.  The argument of the book is that the images chosen by the Times to decorate its front pages glamorize and glorify war.  Agree or not, it is at least an argument, and Shields even licensed the full-size pictures in the book from the Times.  However, the endpapers of the book as published show thumbnail images of the front pages of the editions from which the full-size photos come, and the publisher didn’t license the front pages.  The Times has, quite unwisely, sued over this textbook (coffee-table book?) fair use.

Endpapers to War is Beautiful

Let’s review: Factor one, purpose of the use: images contextualizing the main argument of the book, which involves the overall aim of the Times, not just the photos in isolation but their presentation by the paper.  That’s classic historicization and commentary: transformative use under Dorling Kindersley.  Nature of the work: already published, favoring fair use; news photos and news stories, even if creative, are highly factual, though that doesn’t matter much in transformativeness cases.  Amount taken: The Times apparently claims a copyright in the layout of the front page, but really the work would have to be that day’s print edition, meaning that the book reproduces a fraction of the work, although qualitatively perhaps more important than an average page.  But the real kicker, of course, is size.  Much more than in Dorling Kindersley, where you could at least read most of the text in the images, there’s no way anyone could read the chunks of news stories at issue here.  Size cuts decisively in favor of fair use.  Market effect: the Times isn’t entitled to any market for transformative uses, even if there were some market for unreadable thumbnails.

It’s hard not to look at this lawsuit as the reaction of a paper embarrassed at having licensed photos for what turned out to be a work of harsh criticism.  Whether that criticism is justified or not (and whether licenses were even required, or sought only to avoid a legal battle), the once-Grey Lady looks unappealingly thin-skinned.  I would point out that fees are available to prevailing copyright defendants, and no matter what happens in Kirtsaeng the law is clear enough here that this is a good case for such an award.

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My Other Bag seeks fees from TM bully LV

Public
Citizen supports My Other Bag in its motion for attorneys’ fees against
fashionable trademark bully Louis Vuitton.
 
As usual, cogent and vigorous argument. 

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reverse passing off still actionable as false advertising, court reminds us

OTR Wheel Engineering, Inc. v. West Worldwide Services, Inc., 2016 WL 236231, No. CV-14-085 (E.D. Wash. Jan. 20, 2016)

Interesting little case that doesn’t mention Dastar, but is a rare application of the Dastar principle that reverse passing off can be actionable as false advertising under appropriate circumstances, which these might be.

Plaintiff alleged both trademark infringement and false advertising based on its contention that its Outrigger word mark was “buffed off” of test tires used by defendant in China. The court correctly granted reconsideration of its initial holding that this allegation raised a genuine issue of material fact as to infringement. The word mark was allegedly removed before the goods were shipped in commerce (which wouldn’t matter anyway, under Dastar). Moreover, a reference to “Outrigger” in email wasn’t infringement. However, there was a genuine issue of material fact whether defendants falsely represented to a customer that the test tires were their own tires when in fact, they were Outrigger tires, in order to get the customer to choose defendant over plaintiff. As a result, there was a viable false advertising claim even without an infringement claim. (“Commercial advertising or promotion” might be the big remaining barrier.)

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NY has jurisdiction over out-of-state processor for alleged magazine scammer

People v. Orbital Pub’g Gp., Inc., 21 N.Y.S.3d 573 (Supreme
Ct. 2015)
 
The AG alleged violations of NY state consumer protection
law, including a law specific to magazine subscription sales, involved here.  Respondents send official-looking
solicitations that allegedly misled consumers into thinking they came from the
publications themselves.  On the left
side, they contain four boxes, containing numbers, labeled: “Control Number,”
“Please Return By,” “Installment” and “Total Amount.” Near the four boxes are
(1) a publication’s name and (2) a phrase suggestive of billing, such as
“Magazine Payment Services,” “Publishers Billing Exchange,” “Publishers Billing
Center,” “United Publishers Service,” “Magazine Billing Network,” “Publishers
Billing Association,” “Subscription Billing Service,” “Publishers Billing
Center,” or “Subscription Billing Service.” The right side of the solicitations
typically contain the same four boxes under a heading of “Notice of Renewal,”
and again with the publication’s name printed underneath the boxes.  Here is an example of at least a similar
invoice I found at the URL http://ift.tt/1JZZ74E:
 

“Respondents, which typically do not have authorization to
act as agent for the various publications, charge significantly more for the
subscription than the publications themselves charge and retain the difference.”
In addition, the State alleged that that respondents, when soliciting for
renewal subscriptions, failed to disclose the date that existing subscriptions
end, as required by New York law.
 
Respondents argued that any confusion about whether the
solicitation was made by the publication itself was not their fault.  The back of the solicitations said: “We offer
over 600 magazines as an independent subscription agent between magazine
publishers and clearinghouses in order to facilitate sales and service. As an
agent we do not necessarily have a direct relationship with publishers or
publications that we offer. . . ..”
 
Respondents also argued that the court lacked
jurisdiction over the individual respondents and respondent Adept.  The state argued that Adept’s exclusive
business was providing support to the other corporate respondents: bookkeeping,
data management, consumer mail processing, and consumer refund processing. Adept
denied any involvement in consumer complaint handling or control over the
content of the solicitations, though Adept made some suggestions after an
investigation by the Oregon AG.  (Adept
is located in Oregon.)
 
The court found jurisdiction over Adept and its principal:
 
From a technical view, Adept has
been careful not to project itself into New York or to transact business here.
From a practical view, it is hard to deny that Adept, albeit indirectly, has
availed itself of the benefit of New York consumers, as the record shows that
Adept’s reason for being is to support and facilitate the solicitations that
are the subject of this proceeding. The record also shows that all of Adept’s
profits flow from these same solicitations.
 
Although Adept’s contacts with New York were through the
mail and sent by sister entities, together the respondents formed a single
business model.  The sister entities were
owned by a New York LLC, and thus Adept availed itself of New York law.  Further, the record showed that Adept processed
the mailing addresses, payments, and refunds of New York consumers, and also
has some role in the content of the solicitations sent to New York consumers.
 
There was no constitutional problem with asserting
jurisdiction because these acts constituted minimum contacts with New York, and
Adept received its revenue from a company organized under New York law. Adept could
reasonably expect to be brought before a New York court if those solicitations
violate New York law.
 
General Business Law § 335–a[4] provides, in relevant part,
that:
 
Any person, firm, association or
corporation engaged in business, the principal purpose of which is to regularly
solicit magazine subscription orders for delivery in this state through the
mail for profit shall, in any direct written communication to a magazine
subscriber inviting the subscriber to renew a subscription, clearly,
conspicuously, understandably and readably: a. disclose the month and year in
which the subscription expires …
 
There’s an exception for good faith errors made despite the
existence of procedures designed to avoid such error. Respondents challenged
the law as a violation of substantive due process.  (Not the First Amendment?)  But the law had a rational basis, even as
applied to independent subscription agents with no relationship with the
publishers (if not more so!).  Excluding
non-profits from the regulation was rational. 
Nor did the state instead have to rely on publishers printing an
expiration date clearly on all publications sent to subscribers, allowing
consumers to cross-reference those publications when they received
solicitations.  The state’s consumer
protection purpose was legitimate and rationally related to the
regulation.  That it might preclude
respondents from sending solicitations to New York was not of constitutional
moment.  “The Legislature has made an
implicit judgment that if a subscription agent does not know when a consumer’s
current subscription ends, it cannot solicit that consumer for a renewal.
Making that judgment is within the Legislature’s authority.”
 
General Business Law §§ 349 and 350: Deceptive acts or
practices/false advertising.  The
solicitations were clearly consumer-oriented, as required, and at least raised
a fact question about misleadingness.  On
their faces, the solicitations looked like they were sent directly from
publishers, which could cause consumers to believe that they were being offered
a standard price from the publishers, rather than a substantial premium
(sometimes nearly twice the publisher’s rate). Nonetheless, the disclaimer on
the back raised a fact question about whether a reasonable consumer “would have
taken the time to read it and learn that the solicitations were not being sent
by publishers and that the cancellation policy may be more draconian than the
ones offered by publishers.”
 

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SanMedica v. Amazon: how many clickthroughs make likely confusion plausible?

In SanMedica v. Amazon, the court initially
found enough evidence of confusion
from Amazon’s continued use of a
trademark in keyword ads (after it had kicked the seller off its platform, but
continued to offer competing brands) to deny summary judgment.  However, the court’s initial opinion redacted
the percentage of consumers who saw the Amazon ads and clicked through, and the
percentage who bought something after clicking through, which meant that it was
impossible to understand how the court had applied the governing 1-800 standard, which holds that
clickthroughs provide an upper bound on possible confusion.  With
the able assistance of Public Citizen, I intervened
, and we ultimately
agreed to remove a significant amount of the redactions in the opinion and the
underlying documents.  I’m pleased to be
able to bring you the crucial paragraph in the opinion:
 
In the present case, there is
similar evidence setting an upper limit on how often consumers were lured to
Amazon’s website by clicking on the sponsored ads. It is undisputed that during
the Advertising Period, approximately 319,000 sponsored ads were generated. Out
of those, there were approximately 35,000 clicks on the sponsored ads. The
click to impression rate of the sponsored ads is approximately 11 percent. This
rate sets the “upper limit on how often consumers really were lured in such a
fashion.” Amazon contends that of the “35,253 users that clicked on the ads for
SeroVital, only 984 made any purchase at Amazon.com, a measly 3 percent.”
Although consumer purchases constitute three percent, the focus is not on the purchase
rate but instead on the 11 percent rate that consumers were lured to Amazon’s
website. Eleven percent, although a relative small number, is not so
insufficient to suggest that there was no likelihood of confusion.
 
Trademark law takeaway: not great from a traditional
perspective—11% as an upper bound is really low, when 15% is a more normal breakpoint.  However, given what’s known about
clickthrough rates, most non-Amazon keyword advertisers can probably breathe a little
easier.

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