Campbell conference: overview on fair use

Panel I. Overview of Fair Use Since Campbell (Moderator, Professor Gomulkiewicz)
 
Barton Beebe, NYU
 
Updated dataset 1978-2014: 460 opinions. Available on his website.  Significant limitations of case-counting: can’t substitute for qualitative analysis or other quantitative approaches looking at what judges actually do versus what they say they do. Also, can’t substitute for studying what authors and publishers do. But still provides some insights.
 
Findings: Nearly 70% are post-Campbell.  35% are from the Circuit.  Fair use articles in law reviews outstrip fair use cases a lot, 3:1. Reversal and appeal rates are completely normal for civil litigation. Fair use win rates overall are almost 50%.  Correlate most strongly with overall outcome: Factor one comes first, factor four slightly less. Two is close to irrelevant and three is a bit of sideshow.  If Kienitz is any guide (almost an appallingly bad opinion), it looks like Chicago economists v. New York humanists or modernists.
 
Transformativeness: tried to show impact of Campbell on word count in fair use opinions as against other factors. Increased attention to the concept of transformativeness. 8 in 10 fair use opinions address transformativeness.  What are the other 2 doing? Notwithstanding Kienitz, has transformativeness taken over? Do judges find fair use first, then transformativeness?
 
Quantitatively: nearly sufficient to trigger fair use finding, but not necessary.  79 find transformative use, 76 found fair use (outliers, Castle Rock; RDR v. Warners; Richards (someone wanted to make a new dictionary from another’s)); 111 fair use findings, 40 did not find transformativeness and 7 explicitly found nontransformativeness.  One thing about reading the cases: a lot of indiscipline—a lot of district courts citing to Sony and Harper & Rowas if Campbell never happened—the subtleties of the presumptions have been lost on many district judges.
 
June Besek, Columbia: Changes to © law seem to fulfill the prophecy that the internet would change everything. Not anti-fair use—thinks a lot of the cases, including iParadigms(plagiarism), are rightly decided. But is disturbed by trajectory: that the first factor has become outcome-determinative—commerciality, creativity, size of taking all become irrelevant, and transformativeness means different market.  Courts straining to find uses transformative because it makes the analysis flow so nicely.  White v. West: briefs in a database isn’t transformative.  We’ve gone from databases that are used as search tools to providing substantive content: White, TVEyes, thumbnail search engines next to framed inline link to the original.  You’re providing content there. Cases disproportionately emphasize public benefit over private benefit to the creator. Why should the burden fall exclusively on authors and publishers to provide this benefit, rather than being funded by the public as a whole? We don’t allow people to reproduce textbooks at will.  There is a public benefit in Google Book search, but keeping down the cost of patent filings?  It’s not a question of whether the PTO will get things—conscientious lawyers will pay for the copies.
 
What does it mean to be transformative? Can it mean merely disseminating to a new market?  Should Napster then have been transformative?  The market would be very different now were that true, because record companies weren’t in that market—Napster claimed not to hurt CDs, but that wasn’t the relevant market.  Digitizing millions of seldom-used books: true that brings them into circulation, but what if someone creates a specialized subset of books that are already word searchable—is it transformative to do that again, maybe to keep Google from over your shoulder. Maybe the algorithm is better/different/improves competition.  Is that not transformative any more?  That will mean lots of copies will be disseminated.
 
Is it transformative for Google to enlarge its database for books that are digitally published and not only available on shelves?  It’s available for search somewhere else—will that weigh in favor of/against Google?  Is it justifiable to prefer to have everything in one database?  Slippery slope.  What about public benefit in putting unpublished works up? Archives would love it because of their scattered userbase.  Factor 2 considerations: are they simply overwhelmed?  Maybe so for orphan works, but for non-orphans? That’s one of the next issues. Finally, courts are construing purpose very narrowly to find D’s purpose different from P’s purpose. Artificial construction of purpose: sometimes authors don’t really focus on purpose, or think about anything beyond immediate goals.  Sometimes their purpose is “exploit whatever I can,” even if it doesn’t exist when they write. 
 
Wish we could go to Congress, but unlikely they’ll act, and courts can’t refuse to decide cases in front of them. But some things considered as transformativeness now are well beyond what fair use doctrine should be addressing.
 
Rebecca Tushnet, Georgetown
 
My skin in the game: helped found the Organization for Transformative Works: a concept that has been taken up by many nonlegal fans to explain what it is they do when they make fanworks based on, but exploring and often critiquing, their favorite media properties. Both transformative content and transformative purpose elements; also transformative with respect to the creators and communities that form around them—we don’t often discuss the good that creating things does for creators as a factor in legal analysis, though I’d like it if we should—our submission in response to the PTO/NTIA Green Paper on remix spends a lot of time on that.
 
Most debates about the proper meaning of transformativeness are really about the larger shift towards more robust fair use.  Critics of big transformativeness have an underlying dispute with fairness, not with transformativeness: they are uncomfortable with fair use findings in favor of exact copies, or sometimes in favor of inexact copies made with different but noncritical purposes. So, we hear less (but not nothing) these days about transformativeness’s potential interference with the derivative works right. If transformation means transformation in content, it can be hard to figure out the line between transformed content that is fair use and transformed content that is an infringing derivative work.  Those criticisms don’t hit as hard with respect to purpose-transformativeness, where the defendant’s copying doesn’t necessarily implicate the derivative works right—the Google Books/Hathitrust litigation, for example. 
 
This shift from the concern with interference with derivative works right to concern with interference with things like the existing library exceptions is an example of ideological drift—where legal arguments that used to be made by people on one side of a political debate shift to being made by those on the other side.  There are clear political dimensions to fair use rhetoric, where many low-protectionists have shifted to performative claims about the robustness of fair use and high-protectionists now claim that fair use is uncertain and therefore not very important/potentially in conflict with the three-step test under Berne.  Samuelson says that fair use is predictable, which has important ramifications for compliance w/the three step test: she is performing what she wants to be true (and I think is!).
 
Jeanne Fromer, NYU: Campbell was skeletal, but helped solve the circularity of the fourth factor. Courts are just now starting to work on the fourth factor. Campell suggests full bodied investigation of market effects; but that some effects don’t matter.
 
Full bodied: implication in Campbell that one ought to look at market benefits v. market harm.  Strong value of transformative works to public + variety of market effects that may follow + recognition in third factor that there’s often a close connection between a work’s use and the need to call attention to the work in the defendant’s own work.  Footnote: there can be market benefits, per Leval.  Implicit: works can draw attention to, enhance, affirm original work’s role in marketplace. Fourth factor says “effect,” not “harm.”  Finding new works on Google Book search = benefit. Court emphasized that in finding fair use.
 
Companies too are recognizing this more & more: Disney, once notorious for going after copiers—Air Pirates—now likes parodies of Frozen.
 
Circularity: absence of licensing fee: how do we weigh that? Looking at market benefit as well as market harm: consider effects that pass a certain degree of speculativeness. 
 
Finally, market for criticism doesn’t matter. But why not?  Hinted: Empirically unlikely, though that’s not entirely true. We should look at true potential effects and unlikelihood matters. Should also exclude effects unrelated to expressive value of the work: ideas, public benefit of work.  Courts can focus more attention on that going forward.
 
Glynn Lunney, Tulane: Didn’t think Campbell would be a bigger case than Sony, but has seen change.  Consistency with three-step approach: Look at WTO panel interpretation.  Certain special cases.  Does this mean rare/unusual/not run of the mill. Normal exploitation: same meaning: can’t be a large part of the market.  Can’t unreasonably prejudice rights of author: interpreted as meaning too much. Reduces to a one-step test.  The L&E doesn’t significantly reduce the actual or potential revenue to the rights holder.
 
Argument for fair use violating the three-step test: Difference is that the three-step test only considers the author; the fair use doctrine also considers benefits to public, and allows more loss to the rightsholder if the use is sufficiently transformative. 
 
So will we see a WTO arbitration panel rejecting fair use?  Very unlikely, and also unlikely that we would change the law any more than 110(5) was changed.  ISDS could lead a country to challenge us. But this is really about weaponizing the three step test as an argument for narrowing fair use and beating foreign legislatures with a club when they consider adopting fair use (e.g. Australia).
 
Can we take this weapon away?  One: is fair use a limitation or exception at all? Its characterization as affirmative defense is relatively recent.  Well, is idea/expression a L&E?  Is Feist?  What about independent creation? Do each have to pass the 3-step test to be ok?  I’ve pled all three as affirmative defenses, for strategic reasons.  They may be implicit in the rights–§107 comes after §106, though.  But §106 says subject to the rest of the statute! The only people who participate in WTO panels are the government, so they don’t give the full set of theories.
 
Reversal: if the three-part standard is inconsistent with fair use, it must change.  Modify TRIPS to broaden the standard! We added in originality and idea/expression to TRIPs for software. If it turns out that there were a finding of violation, we should change the test.
 
Kate Spelman, K & L Gates
 
Took 150 years to get here.  Fair use starts with a case about George Washington’s letters, reflecting the common law.  Journal from when Campbell came out: clients were quite worried; this was a song with video of them saying “I don’t remember coming up with this song; it happened after a concert.”  That had a stigma in those years: they were on drugs.  (Cf. Blurred Lines.)  There are still cases that smack of a morality play: that’s lots of what fair use was before Campbell. 
 
Nobody called to ask about how to use fair use proactively before then. Usually fair use came up only after response to a C&D. Using fair use is now a normal part of economic transactions.
 
Q: will fair use be more of an international doctrine in 20 years?
 
RT: I feel bad about making predictions.
 
Besek: wouldn’t be surprised to see more fair dealing than there is now. Australian recommendations; Hargreaves Report in the UK recommended against fair use but more fair dealing exceptions. Unlikely to be consensus internationally: attitude that just b/c the US has it doesn’t mean it’s right.
Beebe: past—rhetorical mode of pessimism, trying to gain attention by claiming doom of fair use coming: Lessig’s “right to hire a lawyer” could become self-fulfilling once academics say there’s no such thing as fair use. It can create the doctrine. When we start becoming optimistic, that can also strongly influence the doctrine.
 
Q: One irony is that Campbell is a music case, and yet lots of music folks say there is no fair use in music.  Are there non-parody music borrowing cases in fair use?  If not, why not?  Why so resistant?
 
RT: the rhetoric that there is no such thing as fair use for music is everywhere in the industry; judges fear they don’t understand music and so feel unqualified to judge what is transformative. Compare: photographers’ rhetoric, which is just as vigorous about lack of fair use, but judges are more confident they can interpret images.
 
Fromer: role of specific provisions for cover songs in deterring implication of other exceptions applying.
 
Lunney: fair use doesn’t necessarily add much to idea/expression because they think they’ve made substantial similarity perform that function.  (Though fair use orients one differently to the role of tradition than idea/expression does.)
 
Q: rise of ancillary copyrights in Europe and potential levies—is there a global consequence for transformative fair use?
 
Spelman: Yes. The question is how even/fair are those consequences. The answer: not very.  Technological consequences in Africa, cf. Arewa.  Clients want global solutions. It’s so pleasing to get Amazon delivery, and we don’t think about how that happened.  Google said that it would never be based in the UK because it doesn’t have fair use, but by tacit acceptance the UK does have fair use by using services provided from the US.
 
RT: I’m not sure it’s a consequence—these places don’t have fair use in the first place; copyright owners are asking for lots of stuff anyway. W/o fair use they’d still be demanding levies.
 
Q: what advice for the future/Restatement of Copyright?
 
Lunney: be cautious in all areas. 76 Act was supposed to be tech neutral language, without ever guessing that consumers would be copying in their own homes. Only address the problems you know are problems.  Unintended consequences.
 
Besek: what is the mandate?  Reflect and describe law, and/or make proposals for the future?  There’s usually some of both in a Restatement.

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Campbell conference: overview on fair use

Panel I. Overview of Fair Use Since Campbell (Moderator, Professor Gomulkiewicz)
 
Barton Beebe, NYU
 
Updated dataset 1978-2014: 460 opinions. Available on his website.  Significant limitations of case-counting: can’t substitute for qualitative analysis or other quantitative approaches looking at what judges actually do versus what they say they do. Also, can’t substitute for studying what authors and publishers do. But still provides some insights.
 
Findings: Nearly 70% are post-Campbell.  35% are from the Circuit.  Fair use articles in law reviews outstrip fair use cases a lot, 3:1. Reversal and appeal rates are completely normal for civil litigation. Fair use win rates overall are almost 50%.  Correlate most strongly with overall outcome: Factor one comes first, factor four slightly less. Two is close to irrelevant and three is a bit of sideshow.  If Kienitz is any guide (almost an appallingly bad opinion), it looks like Chicago economists v. New York humanists or modernists.
 
Transformativeness: tried to show impact of Campbell on word count in fair use opinions as against other factors. Increased attention to the concept of transformativeness. 8 in 10 fair use opinions address transformativeness.  What are the other 2 doing? Notwithstanding Kienitz, has transformativeness taken over? Do judges find fair use first, then transformativeness?
 
Quantitatively: nearly sufficient to trigger fair use finding, but not necessary.  79 find transformative use, 76 found fair use (outliers, Castle Rock; RDR v. Warners; Richards (someone wanted to make a new dictionary from another’s)); 111 fair use findings, 40 did not find transformativeness and 7 explicitly found nontransformativeness.  One thing about reading the cases: a lot of indiscipline—a lot of district courts citing to Sony and Harper & Rowas if Campbell never happened—the subtleties of the presumptions have been lost on many district judges.
 
June Besek, Columbia: Changes to © law seem to fulfill the prophecy that the internet would change everything. Not anti-fair use—thinks a lot of the cases, including iParadigms(plagiarism), are rightly decided. But is disturbed by trajectory: that the first factor has become outcome-determinative—commerciality, creativity, size of taking all become irrelevant, and transformativeness means different market.  Courts straining to find uses transformative because it makes the analysis flow so nicely.  White v. West: briefs in a database isn’t transformative.  We’ve gone from databases that are used as search tools to providing substantive content: White, TVEyes, thumbnail search engines next to framed inline link to the original.  You’re providing content there. Cases disproportionately emphasize public benefit over private benefit to the creator. Why should the burden fall exclusively on authors and publishers to provide this benefit, rather than being funded by the public as a whole? We don’t allow people to reproduce textbooks at will.  There is a public benefit in Google Book search, but keeping down the cost of patent filings?  It’s not a question of whether the PTO will get things—conscientious lawyers will pay for the copies.
 
What does it mean to be transformative? Can it mean merely disseminating to a new market?  Should Napster then have been transformative?  The market would be very different now were that true, because record companies weren’t in that market—Napster claimed not to hurt CDs, but that wasn’t the relevant market.  Digitizing millions of seldom-used books: true that brings them into circulation, but what if someone creates a specialized subset of books that are already word searchable—is it transformative to do that again, maybe to keep Google from over your shoulder. Maybe the algorithm is better/different/improves competition.  Is that not transformative any more?  That will mean lots of copies will be disseminated.
 
Is it transformative for Google to enlarge its database for books that are digitally published and not only available on shelves?  It’s available for search somewhere else—will that weigh in favor of/against Google?  Is it justifiable to prefer to have everything in one database?  Slippery slope.  What about public benefit in putting unpublished works up? Archives would love it because of their scattered userbase.  Factor 2 considerations: are they simply overwhelmed?  Maybe so for orphan works, but for non-orphans? That’s one of the next issues. Finally, courts are construing purpose very narrowly to find D’s purpose different from P’s purpose. Artificial construction of purpose: sometimes authors don’t really focus on purpose, or think about anything beyond immediate goals.  Sometimes their purpose is “exploit whatever I can,” even if it doesn’t exist when they write. 
 
Wish we could go to Congress, but unlikely they’ll act, and courts can’t refuse to decide cases in front of them. But some things considered as transformativeness now are well beyond what fair use doctrine should be addressing.
 
Rebecca Tushnet, Georgetown
 
My skin in the game: helped found the Organization for Transformative Works: a concept that has been taken up by many nonlegal fans to explain what it is they do when they make fanworks based on, but exploring and often critiquing, their favorite media properties. Both transformative content and transformative purpose elements; also transformative with respect to the creators and communities that form around them—we don’t often discuss the good that creating things does for creators as a factor in legal analysis, though I’d like it if we should—our submission in response to the PTO/NTIA Green Paper on remix spends a lot of time on that.
 
Most debates about the proper meaning of transformativeness are really about the larger shift towards more robust fair use.  Critics of big transformativeness have an underlying dispute with fairness, not with transformativeness: they are uncomfortable with fair use findings in favor of exact copies, or sometimes in favor of inexact copies made with different but noncritical purposes. So, we hear less (but not nothing) these days about transformativeness’s potential interference with the derivative works right. If transformation means transformation in content, it can be hard to figure out the line between transformed content that is fair use and transformed content that is an infringing derivative work.  Those criticisms don’t hit as hard with respect to purpose-transformativeness, where the defendant’s copying doesn’t necessarily implicate the derivative works right—the Google Books/Hathitrust litigation, for example. 
 
This shift from the concern with interference with derivative works right to concern with interference with things like the existing library exceptions is an example of ideological drift—where legal arguments that used to be made by people on one side of a political debate shift to being made by those on the other side.  There are clear political dimensions to fair use rhetoric, where many low-protectionists have shifted to performative claims about the robustness of fair use and high-protectionists now claim that fair use is uncertain and therefore not very important/potentially in conflict with the three-step test under Berne.  Samuelson says that fair use is predictable, which has important ramifications for compliance w/the three step test: she is performing what she wants to be true (and I think is!).
 
Jeanne Fromer, NYU: Campbell was skeletal, but helped solve the circularity of the fourth factor. Courts are just now starting to work on the fourth factor. Campell suggests full bodied investigation of market effects; but that some effects don’t matter.
 
Full bodied: implication in Campbell that one ought to look at market benefits v. market harm.  Strong value of transformative works to public + variety of market effects that may follow + recognition in third factor that there’s often a close connection between a work’s use and the need to call attention to the work in the defendant’s own work.  Footnote: there can be market benefits, per Leval.  Implicit: works can draw attention to, enhance, affirm original work’s role in marketplace. Fourth factor says “effect,” not “harm.”  Finding new works on Google Book search = benefit. Court emphasized that in finding fair use.
 
Companies too are recognizing this more & more: Disney, once notorious for going after copiers—Air Pirates—now likes parodies of Frozen.
 
Circularity: absence of licensing fee: how do we weigh that? Looking at market benefit as well as market harm: consider effects that pass a certain degree of speculativeness. 
 
Finally, market for criticism doesn’t matter. But why not?  Hinted: Empirically unlikely, though that’s not entirely true. We should look at true potential effects and unlikelihood matters. Should also exclude effects unrelated to expressive value of the work: ideas, public benefit of work.  Courts can focus more attention on that going forward.
 
Glynn Lunney, Tulane: Didn’t think Campbell would be a bigger case than Sony, but has seen change.  Consistency with three-step approach: Look at WTO panel interpretation.  Certain special cases.  Does this mean rare/unusual/not run of the mill. Normal exploitation: same meaning: can’t be a large part of the market.  Can’t unreasonably prejudice rights of author: interpreted as meaning too much. Reduces to a one-step test.  The L&E doesn’t significantly reduce the actual or potential revenue to the rights holder.
 
Argument for fair use violating the three-step test: Difference is that the three-step test only considers the author; the fair use doctrine also considers benefits to public, and allows more loss to the rightsholder if the use is sufficiently transformative. 
 
So will we see a WTO arbitration panel rejecting fair use?  Very unlikely, and also unlikely that we would change the law any more than 110(5) was changed.  ISDS could lead a country to challenge us. But this is really about weaponizing the three step test as an argument for narrowing fair use and beating foreign legislatures with a club when they consider adopting fair use (e.g. Australia).
 
Can we take this weapon away?  One: is fair use a limitation or exception at all? Its characterization as affirmative defense is relatively recent.  Well, is idea/expression a L&E?  Is Feist?  What about independent creation? Do each have to pass the 3-step test to be ok?  I’ve pled all three as affirmative defenses, for strategic reasons.  They may be implicit in the rights–§107 comes after §106, though.  But §106 says subject to the rest of the statute! The only people who participate in WTO panels are the government, so they don’t give the full set of theories.
 
Reversal: if the three-part standard is inconsistent with fair use, it must change.  Modify TRIPS to broaden the standard! We added in originality and idea/expression to TRIPs for software. If it turns out that there were a finding of violation, we should change the test.
 
Kate Spelman, K & L Gates
 
Took 150 years to get here.  Fair use starts with a case about George Washington’s letters, reflecting the common law.  Journal from when Campbell came out: clients were quite worried; this was a song with video of them saying “I don’t remember coming up with this song; it happened after a concert.”  That had a stigma in those years: they were on drugs.  (Cf. Blurred Lines.)  There are still cases that smack of a morality play: that’s lots of what fair use was before Campbell. 
 
Nobody called to ask about how to use fair use proactively before then. Usually fair use came up only after response to a C&D. Using fair use is now a normal part of economic transactions.
 
Q: will fair use be more of an international doctrine in 20 years?
 
RT: I feel bad about making predictions.
 
Besek: wouldn’t be surprised to see more fair dealing than there is now. Australian recommendations; Hargreaves Report in the UK recommended against fair use but more fair dealing exceptions. Unlikely to be consensus internationally: attitude that just b/c the US has it doesn’t mean it’s right.
Beebe: past—rhetorical mode of pessimism, trying to gain attention by claiming doom of fair use coming: Lessig’s “right to hire a lawyer” could become self-fulfilling once academics say there’s no such thing as fair use. It can create the doctrine. When we start becoming optimistic, that can also strongly influence the doctrine.
 
Q: One irony is that Campbell is a music case, and yet lots of music folks say there is no fair use in music.  Are there non-parody music borrowing cases in fair use?  If not, why not?  Why so resistant?
 
RT: the rhetoric that there is no such thing as fair use for music is everywhere in the industry; judges fear they don’t understand music and so feel unqualified to judge what is transformative. Compare: photographers’ rhetoric, which is just as vigorous about lack of fair use, but judges are more confident they can interpret images.
 
Fromer: role of specific provisions for cover songs in deterring implication of other exceptions applying.
 
Lunney: fair use doesn’t necessarily add much to idea/expression because they think they’ve made substantial similarity perform that function.  (Though fair use orients one differently to the role of tradition than idea/expression does.)
 
Q: rise of ancillary copyrights in Europe and potential levies—is there a global consequence for transformative fair use?
 
Spelman: Yes. The question is how even/fair are those consequences. The answer: not very.  Technological consequences in Africa, cf. Arewa.  Clients want global solutions. It’s so pleasing to get Amazon delivery, and we don’t think about how that happened.  Google said that it would never be based in the UK because it doesn’t have fair use, but by tacit acceptance the UK does have fair use by using services provided from the US.
 
RT: I’m not sure it’s a consequence—these places don’t have fair use in the first place; copyright owners are asking for lots of stuff anyway. W/o fair use they’d still be demanding levies.
 
Q: what advice for the future/Restatement of Copyright?
 
Lunney: be cautious in all areas. 76 Act was supposed to be tech neutral language, without ever guessing that consumers would be copying in their own homes. Only address the problems you know are problems.  Unintended consequences.
 
Besek: what is the mandate?  Reflect and describe law, and/or make proposals for the future?  There’s usually some of both in a Restatement.
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Pam Samuelson on futures of fair use

University of Washington School of Law: Fair Use In The Digital Age: The Ongoing Influence of Campbell v. Acuff-Rose’s “Transformative Use Test” (aka Campbell at 21)
 
Opening Keynote Address: Professor Pam Samuelson: Possible Futures of Fair Use
 
Campbell had a “transformative” impact on fair use law. Thanks to Judge Leval for contribution to literature and positive evaluation of fair use law.  Thanks to Zahr Said for organizing.
 
Campbell is doctrinally most significant copyright decision of 20th century; only close contenders are Feist and Sony, which are cited more often but for narrower points.  Court took case to disclaim Sony & Harper & Row presumptions of unfairness for commercial uses, and of harm if commercial—that is a lot of presumptions for a commercial use, and lots of fair uses have commercial dimensions. 
 
More nuanced interplay among fair use factors: think about the way they relate to one another, and how much each of them should weigh, instead of just counting.  Public interest can be considered; bad faith in sense of rejecting need for license is irrelevant: not unfair because D initially sought a license b/c that might just be attempt to avoid litigation. Recognition that market for licensing certain uses, e.g. parody, may not work well. And yes, transformative uses are more likely fair.
 
Three types of cases: altering expression for new work: Campbell, Suntrust, Cariou v. Prince
Productive use of first work in second work: Generally iterative copying to illustrate a point, set context: Bill Graham Archives, New Era.  Iterative but for different purpose: Kelly v. ArribaSoft. Stands in contrast to “nontransformative”—Tushnet worried that Campbell’s emphasis on transformation would put nontransformative, but expressive, works at risk.
 
Bill Graham Archiveswas equally transformative as a case: although the use was productive in Samuelson’s sense, the decision talked a lot about the reasonableness of the use in light of its purpose.  Gave a lot of comfort to those kinds of uses. Campbell asked whether the amount taken was reasonable in light of purpose, not necessary, and Bill Graham solidifies that. Case also involved failed licensing negotiations but still fair.
 
Cairou v. Prince: 25 of 30 uses held fair; remand for 5 others (cases settled); would reasonable observer consider works to be transformative (not what artist said he intended)—definitely a different message than Cariou was conveying.
 
HathiTrust: fulltext searchable database was transformative creation: different purpose though iterative copies. Enabling access to full text for print-disabled persons: nontransformative but still qualified as fair use.  Fair use can serve as a gap filler, not trumped by specifics of 108 & 121.  Speculation re harms—hypothetical licensing markets, security breach—were insufficient.
 
Range of possible futures: Status quo seems pretty good to me.  Another possibility: pendulum swings back some or a lot in the courts as to transformed expression or different purposes cases. Legislation to cut back on fair use or require equitable renumeration for distributional uses; WTO/ISDS challenge to fair use as treaty violation.  Fair use v. the three step test?  Most copyright limitations and exceptions are statutory and specific. Fair use is open ended and flexible, but fair use cases fall into policy relevant clusters.  Interference w/ normal exploitation?  If too much harm to the market, use won’t be fair, so fair use satisfies that requirement too. Unreasonably prejudice legitimate interests of rights holders? Fair uses don’t.  Should WTO panel consider one step at a time or weigh holistically?
 
Does Cariou or Kienitz undermine derivative works right? No. Both defendants conveyed a very different message through transformativeness of expression. Both are critical commentary cases; both were uses plaintiff wouldn’t have been willing to license; claims also have the flavor of moral rights objection.  Rulings would have been even stronger if they pointed this out.
 
Unfairness in Morriscases/no SJ for defendant in NJ Media v. Pirro for non-critical transformed-expression fair use cases.
 
Different purpose cases: 16 of 50 cases in past three years. 7 were easily fair use, even by Jane Ginsburg’s lights—e.g., guy who sued lawyer who distributed his CV to court and opposing parties as part of considering him as expert witness; use of blog for disciplinary proceedings; eBay resales of magazines featuring photo on front cover.  4 were plaintiff wins (e.g., photo of gay couple used in political ad in Colorado—personal privacy interest, which she thinks isn’t a © interest); White v. West(briefs in West database); AIP v. Schwegman & Winstead (lawyer copying of STEM articles for assessment of patentability); 2 Google book search cases.
Future: fair use as affirmative defense or not? Campbell was wrong about this case.  Fromer: market benefits can be considered. Different purpose cases = nontransformativeness but without the negative presumptions? First Amendment: why not talk about it? Hughes: maybe fair use can become broader as the work gets older.  Example: Colting’s sequel to Catcher in the Rye; maybe it makes it fair or makes it so no injunctive relief would be appropriated. Community-endorsed best practices guides given some weight, even if not negotiated with righs groups.  Recognition of “user rights” as in Canada.
 
Contracts overriding fair use rights: case law is pretty negative.  Anti-reverse engineering clauses in mass market licenses are troubling: unenforceable as conflicting w/copyright policy?  Judicial recognition of fair use circumvention, with 1201(c)(1) as the statutory hook; an implied right to make a tool to accomplish fair uses?
 
Remedial responses: damages instead of injunction: Campbell endorses, but courts haven’t followed the lead. Appropriate in appropriation art cases?  If a fair use case is close, it shouldn’t be willful even if ultimately infringing; statutory damages in plausible fair use cases range from minimum to maximum: chilling effects problem.
 
Fair use has evolved substantially, as Congress expected. Important reason: © got much more complicated and bigger, as Litman wrote. Fair use started out as a way to help second comers to create new works, but provided useful fraimwork for many types of uses. Now: tool through which to balance interests in times of rapid change. Best future: status quo and new horizons.
 
Hughes: agree with you on conclusion, just don’t like transformativeness. Expert witness cv: there’s no market; nature of work is factual.  Didn’t need to call it transformativeness. 
 
Samuelson: working with existing framework, where different purpose matters a lot. Different purpose doesn’t have to be called transformativeness to be fair.  Court basically says: this isn’t the kind of thing we’re talking about.  (Bond case where the work was not factual, or at least allegedly not.)
 
Q: question about remix cultures: DJ who does remix has great work but won’t make it to broad audience through traditional distribution methods (work on iTunes is largely stripped of interesting stuff).
 
Samuelson: if the year after Campbell remix culture had been everywhere, everyone would have freaked out.  Industry has become more supple about UGC, including music, than they would have been in previous decades. But commercially viable remix is still something that fair use can do a bit on, but can solve some problems. Compulsory licensing?

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Pam Samuelson on futures of fair use

University of Washington School of Law: Fair Use In The Digital Age: The Ongoing Influence of Campbell v. Acuff-Rose’s “Transformative Use Test” (aka Campbell at 21)
 
Opening Keynote Address: Professor Pam Samuelson: Possible Futures of Fair Use
 
Campbell had a “transformative” impact on fair use law. Thanks to Judge Leval for contribution to literature and positive evaluation of fair use law.  Thanks to Zahr Said for organizing.
 
Campbell is doctrinally most significant copyright decision of 20th century; only close contenders are Feist and Sony, which are cited more often but for narrower points.  Court took case to disclaim Sony & Harper & Row presumptions of unfairness for commercial uses, and of harm if commercial—that is a lot of presumptions for a commercial use, and lots of fair uses have commercial dimensions. 
 
More nuanced interplay among fair use factors: think about the way they relate to one another, and how much each of them should weigh, instead of just counting.  Public interest can be considered; bad faith in sense of rejecting need for license is irrelevant: not unfair because D initially sought a license b/c that might just be attempt to avoid litigation. Recognition that market for licensing certain uses, e.g. parody, may not work well. And yes, transformative uses are more likely fair.
 
Three types of cases: altering expression for new work: Campbell, Suntrust, Cariou v. Prince
Productive use of first work in second work: Generally iterative copying to illustrate a point, set context: Bill Graham Archives, New Era.  Iterative but for different purpose: Kelly v. ArribaSoft. Stands in contrast to “nontransformative”—Tushnet worried that Campbell’s emphasis on transformation would put nontransformative, but expressive, works at risk.
 
Bill Graham Archiveswas equally transformative as a case: although the use was productive in Samuelson’s sense, the decision talked a lot about the reasonableness of the use in light of its purpose.  Gave a lot of comfort to those kinds of uses. Campbell asked whether the amount taken was reasonable in light of purpose, not necessary, and Bill Graham solidifies that. Case also involved failed licensing negotiations but still fair.
 
Cairou v. Prince: 25 of 30 uses held fair; remand for 5 others (cases settled); would reasonable observer consider works to be transformative (not what artist said he intended)—definitely a different message than Cariou was conveying.
 
HathiTrust: fulltext searchable database was transformative creation: different purpose though iterative copies. Enabling access to full text for print-disabled persons: nontransformative but still qualified as fair use.  Fair use can serve as a gap filler, not trumped by specifics of 108 & 121.  Speculation re harms—hypothetical licensing markets, security breach—were insufficient.
 
Range of possible futures: Status quo seems pretty good to me.  Another possibility: pendulum swings back some or a lot in the courts as to transformed expression or different purposes cases. Legislation to cut back on fair use or require equitable renumeration for distributional uses; WTO/ISDS challenge to fair use as treaty violation.  Fair use v. the three step test?  Most copyright limitations and exceptions are statutory and specific. Fair use is open ended and flexible, but fair use cases fall into policy relevant clusters.  Interference w/ normal exploitation?  If too much harm to the market, use won’t be fair, so fair use satisfies that requirement too. Unreasonably prejudice legitimate interests of rights holders? Fair uses don’t.  Should WTO panel consider one step at a time or weigh holistically?
 
Does Cariou or Kienitz undermine derivative works right? No. Both defendants conveyed a very different message through transformativeness of expression. Both are critical commentary cases; both were uses plaintiff wouldn’t have been willing to license; claims also have the flavor of moral rights objection.  Rulings would have been even stronger if they pointed this out.
 
Unfairness in Morriscases/no SJ for defendant in NJ Media v. Pirro for non-critical transformed-expression fair use cases.
 
Different purpose cases: 16 of 50 cases in past three years. 7 were easily fair use, even by Jane Ginsburg’s lights—e.g., guy who sued lawyer who distributed his CV to court and opposing parties as part of considering him as expert witness; use of blog for disciplinary proceedings; eBay resales of magazines featuring photo on front cover.  4 were plaintiff wins (e.g., photo of gay couple used in political ad in Colorado—personal privacy interest, which she thinks isn’t a © interest); White v. West(briefs in West database); AIP v. Schwegman & Winstead (lawyer copying of STEM articles for assessment of patentability); 2 Google book search cases.
Future: fair use as affirmative defense or not? Campbell was wrong about this case.  Fromer: market benefits can be considered. Different purpose cases = nontransformativeness but without the negative presumptions? First Amendment: why not talk about it? Hughes: maybe fair use can become broader as the work gets older.  Example: Colting’s sequel to Catcher in the Rye; maybe it makes it fair or makes it so no injunctive relief would be appropriated. Community-endorsed best practices guides given some weight, even if not negotiated with righs groups.  Recognition of “user rights” as in Canada.
 
Contracts overriding fair use rights: case law is pretty negative.  Anti-reverse engineering clauses in mass market licenses are troubling: unenforceable as conflicting w/copyright policy?  Judicial recognition of fair use circumvention, with 1201(c)(1) as the statutory hook; an implied right to make a tool to accomplish fair uses?
 
Remedial responses: damages instead of injunction: Campbell endorses, but courts haven’t followed the lead. Appropriate in appropriation art cases?  If a fair use case is close, it shouldn’t be willful even if ultimately infringing; statutory damages in plausible fair use cases range from minimum to maximum: chilling effects problem.
 
Fair use has evolved substantially, as Congress expected. Important reason: © got much more complicated and bigger, as Litman wrote. Fair use started out as a way to help second comers to create new works, but provided useful fraimwork for many types of uses. Now: tool through which to balance interests in times of rapid change. Best future: status quo and new horizons.
 
Hughes: agree with you on conclusion, just don’t like transformativeness. Expert witness cv: there’s no market; nature of work is factual.  Didn’t need to call it transformativeness. 
 
Samuelson: working with existing framework, where different purpose matters a lot. Different purpose doesn’t have to be called transformativeness to be fair.  Court basically says: this isn’t the kind of thing we’re talking about.  (Bond case where the work was not factual, or at least allegedly not.)
 
Q: question about remix cultures: DJ who does remix has great work but won’t make it to broad audience through traditional distribution methods (work on iTunes is largely stripped of interesting stuff).
 
Samuelson: if the year after Campbell remix culture had been everywhere, everyone would have freaked out.  Industry has become more supple about UGC, including music, than they would have been in previous decades. But commercially viable remix is still something that fair use can do a bit on, but can solve some problems. Compulsory licensing?
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Thermolife sues critic’s blog for cybersquatting

A reader pointed me to this lawsuit, alleging cybersquatting against http://ift.tt/1CLQWzE based on Thermolife’s Muscle Beach marks.  You may notice that this isn’t really a domain name, but a blog hosted on WordPress.  In an in rem proceeding, will the court be able to recognize both the problem with the ACPA claims in terms of “domain name” and the problem with alleging cybersquatting?  The site appears to be highly critical and classic fair use.

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Thermolife sues critic’s blog for cybersquatting

A reader pointed me to this lawsuit, alleging cybersquatting against https://ronkramermusclebeach.wordpress.com/ based on Thermolife’s Muscle Beach marks.  You may notice that this isn’t really a domain name, but a blog hosted on WordPress.  In an in rem proceeding, will the court be able to recognize both the problem with the ACPA claims in terms of “domain name” and the problem with alleging cybersquatting?  The site appears to be highly critical and classic fair use.

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resources spent correcting false advertising provide business standing in California

Underground Solutions, Inc. v. Palermo, No. 13 C 8407, 2015 WL 1594189 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 7, 2015)
 
Previous ruling on this dispute between Underground Solutions and a person who basically served as an expert supporting its competitor. Related case about a website impersonating Palermo.  In its amended complaint, Underground Solutions alleged trade libel, violation of the Lanham Act, intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, and violation of California’s UCL. Palermo moved to dismiss the last two, and the court denied the motion.
 
For intentional interference, a plaintiff has to show “that it is reasonably probable that the lost economic advantage would have been realized but for the defendant’s interference.” This usually means alleging “a lost contract, failed negotiation, or ongoing business relationship.”  This time around, Underground Solutions alleged that an engineer had approved its pipe for a bid on a project in Santa Clara, but the local water district expressed concern about the pipe after reviewing materials authored by Palermo, and the engineer subsequently withdrew his approval, precluding Underground Solutions from bidding on the project. In addition, Underground Solutions alleged that it was the sole supplier of the relevant pipe in the US. The court found that the business discussions about a specific construction project, resulting in an approved use, formed a relationship sufficient to give rise to a tortious interference claim. 
 
Palermo argued that he didn’t now about any particular prospective deal, but it sufficed to allege that “Palermo knew that UGSI’s Fusible PVC® pipe was being considered by several municipalities for upcoming projects, and knew or should have known that his false and misleading statements would reflect negatively on UGSI’s Fusible PVC® pipe, causing the contractors considering UGSI’s Fusible PVC® pipe to reject said pipe.”  Palermo further argued that other competitors were still being considered for the project. But including Underground Solutions’ pipe in a narrowed set of approved pipes was sufficient—all that’s required is reasonably probable benefit, not certain benefit.
 
As for the state law false advertising claim, Underground Solutions had standing because it allegedly lost money or property by virtue of being “forced to expend time, effort, and funds to correspond and meet with potential clients to debunk the misstatements….” Nor did Underground Solutions need to allege that itrelied on the false advertising; this is a competitor suit and not a consumer suit.  “Requiring a competitor to allege reliance … would effectively read unfair competition claims out of the statute. That would be contrary to the legislature’s express intent.” Proposition 64’s express intent was to protect “California businessesand consumers from unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business practices” (emphasis added).

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resources spent correcting false advertising provide business standing in California

Underground Solutions, Inc. v. Palermo, No. 13 C 8407, 2015 WL 1594189 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 7, 2015)
 
Previous ruling on this dispute between Underground Solutions and a person who basically served as an expert supporting its competitor. Related case about a website impersonating Palermo.  In its amended complaint, Underground Solutions alleged trade libel, violation of the Lanham Act, intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, and violation of California’s UCL. Palermo moved to dismiss the last two, and the court denied the motion.
 
For intentional interference, a plaintiff has to show “that it is reasonably probable that the lost economic advantage would have been realized but for the defendant’s interference.” This usually means alleging “a lost contract, failed negotiation, or ongoing business relationship.”  This time around, Underground Solutions alleged that an engineer had approved its pipe for a bid on a project in Santa Clara, but the local water district expressed concern about the pipe after reviewing materials authored by Palermo, and the engineer subsequently withdrew his approval, precluding Underground Solutions from bidding on the project. In addition, Underground Solutions alleged that it was the sole supplier of the relevant pipe in the US. The court found that the business discussions about a specific construction project, resulting in an approved use, formed a relationship sufficient to give rise to a tortious interference claim. 
 
Palermo argued that he didn’t now about any particular prospective deal, but it sufficed to allege that “Palermo knew that UGSI’s Fusible PVC® pipe was being considered by several municipalities for upcoming projects, and knew or should have known that his false and misleading statements would reflect negatively on UGSI’s Fusible PVC® pipe, causing the contractors considering UGSI’s Fusible PVC® pipe to reject said pipe.”  Palermo further argued that other competitors were still being considered for the project. But including Underground Solutions’ pipe in a narrowed set of approved pipes was sufficient—all that’s required is reasonably probable benefit, not certain benefit.
 
As for the state law false advertising claim, Underground Solutions had standing because it allegedly lost money or property by virtue of being “forced to expend time, effort, and funds to correspond and meet with potential clients to debunk the misstatements….” Nor did Underground Solutions need to allege that itrelied on the false advertising; this is a competitor suit and not a consumer suit.  “Requiring a competitor to allege reliance … would effectively read unfair competition claims out of the statute. That would be contrary to the legislature’s express intent.” Proposition 64’s express intent was to protect “California businessesand consumers from unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business practices” (emphasis added).
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Preemption and dormant commerce clause challenges to Cal. Made in US law fail

Clark v. Citizens of Humanity, LLC, No. 14–CV–1404, 2015 WL 1600679 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2015)
 
Plaintiffs bought Citizens of Humanity jeans marked with “Made in the USA,” but alleged that the products contained component parts made outside the US, including the fabric, thread, buttons, subcomponents of the zipper assembly, and/or rivets.  Plaintiffs alleged that the jeans therefore were “of inferior quality” and “less reliable” than jeans actually made entirely in the United States and that they overpaid in reliance on the claims. They brought the usual California claims.
 
Defendants argued that California’s Made in the USA law was conflict preempted by virtue of the FTC’s Made in the USA regulations and that it violated the dormant commerce clause; the court disagreed.
 
Preemption: California law provides:
 
It is unlawful for any person, firm, corporation, or association to sell or offer for sale in this State any merchandise on which merchandise or on its container there appears the words ‘Made in the U.S.A.,’ ‘Made in America,’ ‘U.S.A.,’ or similar words when the merchandise or any article, unit or part thereof, has been entirely or substantially made, manufactured, or produced outside of the United States.
 
Cal. Bus. & Prof.Code § 17533.7. California courts have interpreted this section strictly: “if the merchandise consists of separate, identifiable components, section 17533.7 requires ‘any article, unit, or part’ of the merchandise to be ‘entirely or substantially made, manufactured, or produced domestically to qualify for use of a ‘Made in U.S.A.’ or similar label.” So, “a product, like [the aircraft carrier] the U.S.S. Ronald Reagan, can be overwhelmingly and substantially ‘made in the United States’ but could not be claimed to have been ‘made in the United States’ unless is contained absolutely 100 percent American parts, down to the last screw.”
 
The FTCA says:
 
To the extent any person introduces, delivers for introduction, sells, advertises, or offers for sale in commerce a product with a ‘Made in the U.S.A.’ or ‘Made in America’ label, or the equivalent thereof, in order to represent that such product was in whole or substantial part of domestic origin, such label shall be consistent with decisions and orders of the Federal Trade Commission issued pursuant to section 45 of this title.
 
15 U.S.C. § 45a. The FTC’s standard, as adopted, is that “manufacturers shall be permitted to use the ‘Made in the U.S.A.’ label on products that are ‘all or virtually all’ made in the United States.” There is no bright line, but if foreign-made component parts comprise a “negligible portion of the product’s total manufacturing costs and are insignificant parts of the final product,” then the item will be considered to have been made in the United States.
 
Defendants argued that this regulation had two purposes: preventing consumer deception and encouraging manufacture in the US by allowing manufacturers to use the powerful “Made in the USA” label.  California’s law conflicted with the latter.  The FTCA, however, says that “[n]othing in this section shall preclude the application of other provisions of law relating to labeling.” §45(a).  Nor is compliance with both laws impossible.  Also, plaintiffs argued that the second alleged purpose wasn’t actually a purpose, and that the goal of consumer protection was served by California’s more vigorous law.
 
The court found that it wasn’t impossible to comply with both laws; they could use the “Made in the USA” label only to items entirely made in this country, or by using a distinct label for clothing sold in California. In addition, the court agreed that both laws were aimed at preventing consumer deception. And even if promoting US manufacture was a secondary objective, “it cannot be said that § 17533.7 stands as an obstacle to promoting it because surely § 17533.7 encourages some manufacturers to complete all of their manufacturing in the United States.”  (I’ve written about this problem before with respect to “organic.”  The trouble is figuring out the balance between manufacturers who find it worthwhile to meet the purity standard because of the greater payoff, and those who would be willing to invest extra in a lesser standard but just give up and go fully conventional/foreign if they can’t use the label.)
 
In addition, the regulation doesn’t bar use of “Made in the USA,” only the use of an unqualified label in California unless the product is 100 percent made in the United States. Manufacturers can still use the unqualified label in other states.
 
Separately, the Federal Textile Fiber Products Identification Act (TFPIA) requires that any garment that is “processed or manufactured” in the United States include a “Made in the U.S.A.” label, regardless of whether component parts are manufactured outside of the United States. Such labels may be accompanied by additional language such as “of imported fabric.” Defendants argued that the TFPIA required what California law barred, and that California law didn’t allow qualified labels.  Plaintiffs argued that California law would allow qualified claims such as “Made in USA of globally sourced component parts.” The court agreed: “using detailed labels that indicate which component parts are foreign and which are domestic allow a manufacturer or retailer to comply with both state and federal law.”  The law’s goal, after all, was accurate labeling to protect and inform consumers, and qualified labels promoted that objective.  Manufacturers who chose to employ a qualified label nationwide “would not be able to avail themselves of the lower standard required by the FTC regulation as the labels would have to comply with the stricter California standard,” but they could use different labels in California. Compliance with both standards might be inconvenient, but wasn’t impossible.
 
As for the dormant commerce clause, evenhanded regulation with indirect effects on interstate commerce is okay if the state’s interest is legitimate and the burden on interstate commerce does not clearly exceeds the local benefits. For a court to find that a facially neutral statute violates the dormant commerce clause, “the burdens of the statute must so outweigh the putative benefits as to make the statute unreasonable or irrational.”
 
Defendants argued that the California law had no public benefit, given that, according to the FTC’s findings, a significant portion of consumers around the country are willing to accept that products labeled “Made in the USA” may contain component parts made in foreign countries. Plus, the California law might encourage manufacturers to give up and move everything overseas, harming the public. The burden on interstate commerce was significant because manufacturers had to choose among (1) not selling in California, (2) labeling all their products for sale to California, thus losing the benefits of the “Made in the USA” label, or (3) labeling separately for California.
 
Plaintiffs responded that there was a fourth alternative: qualified “Made in the USA” labels. That alternative put a minimal burden on interstate commerce.
 
The court first found that there was a legitimate state interest in combating deceptive advertising. Defendants’ disagreement with the California legislature over whether consumers were protected by limiting the use of unqualified “Made in the USA” labels was insufficient.
“[T]he California legislature decided that there is an important difference between items completely or substantially made in this country.”
 
Once qualified labels were allowed, there was no undue burden on interstate commerce. Manufacturers could use a qualified label nationwide, or a different label for products sold in California.

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Preemption and dormant commerce clause challenges to Cal. Made in US law fail

Clark v. Citizens of Humanity, LLC, No. 14–CV–1404, 2015 WL 1600679 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2015)
 
Plaintiffs bought Citizens of Humanity jeans marked with “Made in the USA,” but alleged that the products contained component parts made outside the US, including the fabric, thread, buttons, subcomponents of the zipper assembly, and/or rivets.  Plaintiffs alleged that the jeans therefore were “of inferior quality” and “less reliable” than jeans actually made entirely in the United States and that they overpaid in reliance on the claims. They brought the usual California claims.
 
Defendants argued that California’s Made in the USA law was conflict preempted by virtue of the FTC’s Made in the USA regulations and that it violated the dormant commerce clause; the court disagreed.
 
Preemption: California law provides:
 
It is unlawful for any person, firm, corporation, or association to sell or offer for sale in this State any merchandise on which merchandise or on its container there appears the words ‘Made in the U.S.A.,’ ‘Made in America,’ ‘U.S.A.,’ or similar words when the merchandise or any article, unit or part thereof, has been entirely or substantially made, manufactured, or produced outside of the United States.
 
Cal. Bus. & Prof.Code § 17533.7. California courts have interpreted this section strictly: “if the merchandise consists of separate, identifiable components, section 17533.7 requires ‘any article, unit, or part’ of the merchandise to be ‘entirely or substantially made, manufactured, or produced domestically to qualify for use of a ‘Made in U.S.A.’ or similar label.” So, “a product, like [the aircraft carrier] the U.S.S. Ronald Reagan, can be overwhelmingly and substantially ‘made in the United States’ but could not be claimed to have been ‘made in the United States’ unless is contained absolutely 100 percent American parts, down to the last screw.”
 
The FTCA says:
 
To the extent any person introduces, delivers for introduction, sells, advertises, or offers for sale in commerce a product with a ‘Made in the U.S.A.’ or ‘Made in America’ label, or the equivalent thereof, in order to represent that such product was in whole or substantial part of domestic origin, such label shall be consistent with decisions and orders of the Federal Trade Commission issued pursuant to section 45 of this title.
 
15 U.S.C. § 45a. The FTC’s standard, as adopted, is that “manufacturers shall be permitted to use the ‘Made in the U.S.A.’ label on products that are ‘all or virtually all’ made in the United States.” There is no bright line, but if foreign-made component parts comprise a “negligible portion of the product’s total manufacturing costs and are insignificant parts of the final product,” then the item will be considered to have been made in the United States.
 
Defendants argued that this regulation had two purposes: preventing consumer deception and encouraging manufacture in the US by allowing manufacturers to use the powerful “Made in the USA” label.  California’s law conflicted with the latter.  The FTCA, however, says that “[n]othing in this section shall preclude the application of other provisions of law relating to labeling.” §45(a).  Nor is compliance with both laws impossible.  Also, plaintiffs argued that the second alleged purpose wasn’t actually a purpose, and that the goal of consumer protection was served by California’s more vigorous law.
 
The court found that it wasn’t impossible to comply with both laws; they could use the “Made in the USA” label only to items entirely made in this country, or by using a distinct label for clothing sold in California. In addition, the court agreed that both laws were aimed at preventing consumer deception. And even if promoting US manufacture was a secondary objective, “it cannot be said that § 17533.7 stands as an obstacle to promoting it because surely § 17533.7 encourages some manufacturers to complete all of their manufacturing in the United States.”  (I’ve written about this problem before with respect to “organic.”  The trouble is figuring out the balance between manufacturers who find it worthwhile to meet the purity standard because of the greater payoff, and those who would be willing to invest extra in a lesser standard but just give up and go fully conventional/foreign if they can’t use the label.)
 
In addition, the regulation doesn’t bar use of “Made in the USA,” only the use of an unqualified label in California unless the product is 100 percent made in the United States. Manufacturers can still use the unqualified label in other states.
 
Separately, the Federal Textile Fiber Products Identification Act (TFPIA) requires that any garment that is “processed or manufactured” in the United States include a “Made in the U.S.A.” label, regardless of whether component parts are manufactured outside of the United States. Such labels may be accompanied by additional language such as “of imported fabric.” Defendants argued that the TFPIA required what California law barred, and that California law didn’t allow qualified labels.  Plaintiffs argued that California law would allow qualified claims such as “Made in USA of globally sourced component parts.” The court agreed: “using detailed labels that indicate which component parts are foreign and which are domestic allow a manufacturer or retailer to comply with both state and federal law.”  The law’s goal, after all, was accurate labeling to protect and inform consumers, and qualified labels promoted that objective.  Manufacturers who chose to employ a qualified label nationwide “would not be able to avail themselves of the lower standard required by the FTC regulation as the labels would have to comply with the stricter California standard,” but they could use different labels in California. Compliance with both standards might be inconvenient, but wasn’t impossible.
 
As for the dormant commerce clause, evenhanded regulation with indirect effects on interstate commerce is okay if the state’s interest is legitimate and the burden on interstate commerce does not clearly exceeds the local benefits. For a court to find that a facially neutral statute violates the dormant commerce clause, “the burdens of the statute must so outweigh the putative benefits as to make the statute unreasonable or irrational.”
 
Defendants argued that the California law had no public benefit, given that, according to the FTC’s findings, a significant portion of consumers around the country are willing to accept that products labeled “Made in the USA” may contain component parts made in foreign countries. Plus, the California law might encourage manufacturers to give up and move everything overseas, harming the public. The burden on interstate commerce was significant because manufacturers had to choose among (1) not selling in California, (2) labeling all their products for sale to California, thus losing the benefits of the “Made in the USA” label, or (3) labeling separately for California.
 
Plaintiffs responded that there was a fourth alternative: qualified “Made in the USA” labels. That alternative put a minimal burden on interstate commerce.
 
The court first found that there was a legitimate state interest in combating deceptive advertising. Defendants’ disagreement with the California legislature over whether consumers were protected by limiting the use of unqualified “Made in the USA” labels was insufficient.
“[T]he California legislature decided that there is an important difference between items completely or substantially made in this country.”
 
Once qualified labels were allowed, there was no undue burden on interstate commerce. Manufacturers could use a qualified label nationwide, or a different label for products sold in California.
Posted in consumer protection, ftc, http://schemas.google.com/blogger/2008/kind#post, preemption | Leave a comment